Operation Grandslam: Difference between revisions
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=== Second phase === |
=== Second phase === |
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Pleased with the success of operations in Élisabethville, Prem Chand decided to immediately carry forward with the UN's plans. On 31 December the 4th [[Madras Regiment|Madras]] battalion and members of the [[Rajputana Rifles]] moved out of the city for the [[Lufira River]].<ref name= Mockaitis37/> The next day they encountered several foreign mercenaries |
Pleased with the success of operations in Élisabethville, Prem Chand decided to immediately carry forward with the UN's plans. On 31 December the 4th [[Madras Regiment|Madras]] battalion and members of the [[Rajputana Rifles]] moved out of the city for the [[Lufira River]].<ref name= Mockaitis37/> The next day they encountered several foreign mercenaries; in the ensuing gun battle four peacekeepers were killed. Two captured mercenaries revealed that confusion and desertion were occurring among the Katangese forces.<ref name= othen>{{harvnb|Othen|2015|loc=Chapter 26: Katanga '63}}</ref> Altogether the Indian forces faced unexpectedly light resistance and reached the east bank of the Lufira on 3 January.<ref name= Mockaitis37/> |
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By 4 January 1963, the ONUC Air Division had conducted 76 air sorties, while active patrolling by the J-29 jets had cutoff Katanga from support in Angola and Southern Africa.<ref name= dorn30/> |
By 4 January 1963, the ONUC Air Division had conducted 76 air sorties, while active patrolling by the J-29 jets had cutoff Katanga from support in Angola and Southern Africa.<ref name= dorn30/> |
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On 8 January, Tshombe appeared in Élisabethville. The same day Prime Minister Adoula received a letter from the chiefs of the most prominent Kantangese tribes pledging allegiance to the Congolese government and calling for Tshombe's arrest. The following day Tshombe was briefly detained by UN soldiers, but he was released so he could meet with his political associate, [[Godefroid Munongo]], and several of his ministers in Mokambo. It is alleged that along the way Tshombe urged his supporters to resist UN forces, but regardless Mokambo and Bakania were soon occupied.<ref name= OBallance63/> He expressed his willingness to negotiate with the central government, but warned that any advance on Kolwezi would result in the enactment of a [[scorched earth]] policy.<ref name= upi3>{{harvnb|United Press International|1963|p=3}}</ref> On 10 January, UN troops seized an abandoned |
On 8 January, Tshombe appeared in Élisabethville. The same day Prime Minister Adoula received a letter from the chiefs of the most prominent Kantangese tribes pledging allegiance to the Congolese government and calling for Tshombe's arrest. The following day Tshombe was briefly detained by UN soldiers, but he was released so he could meet with his political associate, [[Godefroid Munongo]], and several of his ministers in Mokambo. It is alleged that along the way Tshombe urged his supporters to resist UN forces, but, regardless, Mokambo and Bakania were soon occupied.<ref name= OBallance63/> He expressed his willingness to negotiate with the central government, but warned that any advance on Kolwezi would result in the enactment of a [[scorched earth]] policy.<ref name= upi3>{{harvnb|United Press International|1963|p=3}}</ref> On 10 January, UN troops seized an abandoned gendarmerie base and secured the [[Shinkolobwe]] mine.<ref name= OBallance63/> Tshombe fled to [[Northern Rhodesia]] on a [[Rhodesian Air Force]] plane and made his way to Kolwezi,<ref name= meisler133>{{harvnb|Meisler|2011|p=133}}</ref> the only significant location that remained under Katangese control.<ref name= boulden40>{{harvnb|Boulden|2001|p=40}}</ref> |
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Meanwhile, mercenaries in the city had taken Tshombe's threats about a scorched earth policy seriously and had planted explosives on all nearby bridges, the [[Nzilo Dam]] (which provided most of Katanga's electricity), and most of the [[UMHK]] mining facilities. When Tshombe arrived on 12 January, he was informed by UMHK officials that they had negotiated a tax deal with the central government and were withdrawing their support for secession. They asked him to not spread the news, fearing the mercenaries would feel betrayed and destroy their facilities as revenge.<ref name= othen/> Realizing in a final meeting in Kolwezi that the situation was grim, Colonel [[Bob Denard]] suggested that before fleeing the mercenaries should destroy the Nzilo Dam to make a political statement. Tshombe, knowing that UMHK would disapprove, told him that such an action would be "criminally irresponsible."<ref name= othen/> Company representatives met with Brigadier General Noronha to discuss the best way for UN troops to enter Kolwezi without causing collateral damage. General Moke vainly attempted to organize the 140 mercenaries and 2,000 gendarmes under his command to prepare a final defence of the city. His efforts, undermined by the force's low morale and a lack of discipline, were further hampered by an influx of refugees. Tshombe ordered the Katangese garrison of [[Baudouinville]] to surrender to besieging UN and ''[[Armée Nationale Congolaise]]'' (ANC) forces. Instead, they and most of the population deserted the city while a handful of gendarmes near [[Kongolo, Katanga|Kongolo]] laid down their arms to Nigerian and Malaysian soldiers. On 14 January, Indian troops found the last intact bridge into Kolwezi. After a brief fight with gendarmes and mercenaries they secured it and crossed over, stopping at the city outskirts to await further instruction.<ref name= othen/> |
Meanwhile, mercenaries in the city had taken Tshombe's threats about a scorched earth policy seriously and had planted explosives on all nearby bridges, the [[Nzilo Dam]] (which provided most of Katanga's electricity), and most of the [[UMHK]] mining facilities. When Tshombe arrived on 12 January, he was informed by UMHK officials that they had negotiated a tax deal with the central government and were withdrawing their support for secession. They asked him to not spread the news, fearing the mercenaries would feel betrayed and destroy their facilities as revenge.<ref name= othen/> Realizing in a final meeting in Kolwezi that the situation was grim, Colonel [[Bob Denard]] suggested that, before fleeing, the mercenaries should destroy the Nzilo Dam to make a political statement. Tshombe, knowing that UMHK would disapprove, told him that such an action would be "criminally irresponsible."<ref name= othen/> Company representatives met with Brigadier General Noronha to discuss the best way for UN troops to enter Kolwezi without causing collateral damage. General Moke vainly attempted to organize the 140 mercenaries and 2,000 gendarmes under his command to prepare a final defence of the city. His efforts, undermined by the force's low morale and a lack of discipline, were further hampered by an influx of refugees. Tshombe ordered the Katangese garrison of [[Baudouinville]] to surrender to besieging UN and ''[[Armée Nationale Congolaise]]'' (ANC) forces. Instead, they and most of the population deserted the city while a handful of gendarmes near [[Kongolo, Katanga|Kongolo]] laid down their arms to Nigerian and Malaysian soldiers. On 14 January, Indian troops found the last intact bridge into Kolwezi. After a brief fight with gendarmes and mercenaries they secured it and crossed over, stopping at the city outskirts to await further instruction.<ref name= othen/> |
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On 15 January, Tshombe sent a formal message to Thant, "I am ready to proclaim immediately before the world that the Katanga's secession is ended."<ref name= meisler133/> Munongo fled Kolwezi and angrily declared that he would continue the campaign from Rhodesia, though he soon returned.<ref name= othen/> Tshombe offered to return to Élisabethville to oversee the implementation of Thant's proposal for reunification if Prime Minister Adoula granted amnesty to himself and his government. At a press conference, Adoula accepted Tshombe's proposition and announced that what remained of the Katangese Gendarmerie would be integrated into the ANC.<ref name= OBallance63/> |
On 15 January, Tshombe sent a formal message to Thant, "I am ready to proclaim immediately before the world that the Katanga's secession is ended."<ref name= meisler133/> Munongo fled Kolwezi and angrily declared that he would continue the campaign from Rhodesia, though he soon returned.<ref name= othen/> Tshombe offered to return to Élisabethville to oversee the implementation of Thant's proposal for reunification if Prime Minister Adoula granted amnesty to himself and his government. At a press conference, Adoula accepted Tshombe's proposition and announced that what remained of the Katangese Gendarmerie would be integrated into the ANC.<ref name= OBallance63/> |
Revision as of 20:45, 2 March 2017
Operation Grandslam | |||||||||
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Part of the Congo Crisis | |||||||||
![]() Swedish UN peacekeepers plan their attack on Kaminaville during the operation | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
![]() Supported by: ![]() |
![]() ![]() Supported by: ![]() ![]() ![]() | ||||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
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![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
Unknown human strength Unknown combat aircraft strength 2 reconnaissance aircraft |
14,000–17,000 gendarmes 300–500 mercenaries ~12 aircraft | ||||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||||
11 killed 49+ wounded 7 fighter aircraft damaged 1 reconnaissance aircraft damaged |
50+ killed[b] ~10 aircraft destroyed | ||||||||
There were no confirmed reports of civilian casualties during the operation, but statistics are ultimately unknown.[4] |
Operation Grandslam or Operation Grand Slam was an offensive action undertaken by United Nations peacekeeping forces from 28 December 1962 – 15 January 1963 against the gendarmerie of the State of Katanga, a secessionist state from the Republic of the Congo. The Katangese forces were decisively defeated and Katanga was forcibly reintegrated into the Congo.
The United Nations had tried on multiple occasions to reconcile the government of the Congo with the State of Katanga, which had declared independence under Moïse Tshombe with Belgian support in 1960. Though initially limiting its actions, the United Nations Operation in the Congo became increasingly impatient towards Katanga and Tshombe and was drawing up plans to resolve the situation through force. Tshombe continuously violated agreements he had made with the United Nations and the Congolese government by building up his forces and bringing foreign mercenaries into the conflict. The situation came to a breaking point in December 1962 when Katangese gendarmes brazenly attacked peacekeeping forces in Katanga, causing United Nations Secretary General U Thant to authorize a retaliatory offensive to decisively eliminate secessionist opposition.
Reinforced by aircraft from Sweden, United Nations peacekeepers successfully completed the first phase of the operation, securing the Katangese capital, Élisabethville, and destroying much of the Katangese Air Force by the end of the year. In early January the United Nations forces turned their attention towards remaining strongholds in southern Katanga. Indian peacekeepers surpassed their orders and crossed the Lufira River ahead of schedule, generating panic behind the Katangese lines and causing an incident among United Nations leadership. Tshombe, realizing that his position was untenable, sued for peace. On 17 January 1963, he signed an instrument of surrender and declared the Katangese secession to be over. The central government subsequently reorganized the provincial administration of Katanga to weaken its political structure. Tshombe initially participated but feared his arrest and fled to Europe.
Many Katangese gendarmes and their mercenary leaders, acting under orders from Tshombe, evacuated to Angola to reorganize. In 1964, Tshombe was welcomed back to the Congo and made prime minister. He immediately called upon his forces to suppress communist revolts in the east and centre of the country. This they successfully accomplished, but Tshombe was dismissed from his post in 1965, ultimately losing complete contact with them following his imprisonment in Algeria in 1967. Relations between the new central government and the gendarmes soured, and following an unsuccessful mutiny they returned to Angola. Insurgent activities aimed at Katangese secession continued until late 2016.
Background
Following the Republic of the Congo's independence from Belgium in 1960, the country fell into disorder as the army mutinied. Shortly thereafter South Kasai and the State of Katanga declared independence from the central government. The latter contained the vast majority of the Congo's valuable mineral resources, attracting a significant amount of mining activity under Belgian rule.[5] Many Katangese thought that they were entitled to the revenue generated through the lucrative industry, and feared that under the new central government it would be distributed among the Congo's poorer provinces.[6] Resulting nativist politics with support from the Belgian government and private interests such as the Union Minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) precipitated the Katangese secession.[7]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/b1/Kongo_1961_map_en.png/350px-Kongo_1961_map_en.png)
The deposition (and eventual murder) of the first Congolese prime minister caused further issues in the country, leading to the declaration of a rival government in Stanleyville by the end of the year.[8] In order to prevent a complete collapse of order within the country, the United Nations (UN) established a major peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Operation in the Congo (known under its French acronym as ONUC). In addition to a large body of troops (20,000 at its peak strength), a civilian mission was brought in to provide technical assistance to the Congolese government.[9] Initially, ONUC limited its actions to ensuring the safety of Congolese citizens and foreign nationals and withheld from acting against the secessionist states. However, almost immediately the UN ran into trouble in Katanga. The state's leader and head of the locally entrenched Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT), Moïse Tshombe, at first banned the UN from entering his territory and then greatly limited their peacekeeping efforts.[10] Further issues derived from peacekeepers' efforts to deport foreign mercenaries, many of whom were employed by Katanga.[11][12]
In order to secure their own positions in Katanga and eliminate the mercenaries, UN forces launched Operation Rumpunch and Operation Morthor. The former, though limited in scope, was largely successful, but the latter was fought to a stalemate. Though UN Official Conor Cruise O'Brien had announced as Morthor was underway that, "The secession of Katanga has ended," this statement was quickly realized to be premature.[13]
In December 1961 the UN initiated Operation Unokat to ensure ONUC personnel's freedom of movement and reassert their authority in Katanga.[14] Under military pressure Tshombe was forced to enter serious negotiations with Congolese Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula. On 21 December 1961 Tshombe signed the Kitona Declaration, an agreement whereby he would recognize the authority of the central government and work to reintegrate Katanga into the Republic.[15] However, Tshombe subsequently deferred to the Katangese Parliament and put off any action of reconciliation. In January 1962 the Stanleyville government was finally subdued and the UN was able to refocus its efforts on ending the Katangese secession. By then contact between the central government and Katanga had broken down, and ONUC intelligence reports indicated that the latter was rebuilding its forces.[16]
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/9/94/U_Thant_%281963%29.jpg/175px-U_Thant_%281963%29.jpg)
In August United Nations Secretary General U Thant drew up a "Plan for National Reconciliation" by which Katanga would rejoin a federalized Congo. Adoula and Tshombe both accepted the proposal. Thant was wary of Tshombe's delaying tactics and applied increasing political pressure on the Katangese government to abide by the plan's timetable.[16] The outbreak of the Sino-Indian War in October raised the possibility of all Indian troops potentially being withdrawn from ONUC, putting pressure on UN officials to quickly resolve the secession.[17] Still doubting the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of the situation, Thant sent Special Representative Ralph Bunche to Léopoldville. There, Bunch worked with local UN Mission Chief Robert Gardiner and UN Force Commander Sean MacEoin to create a plan to achieve freedom of movement for ONUC personnel and eliminate the foreign mercenaries. By then it was obvious that Tshombe did not intend on rejoining the Congo; there were 300–500 mercenaries in Katanga (as many as there had been before previous UN operations) and new airfields and defensive positions were being constructed. ONUC personnel and even diplomatic staff faced increasing harassment at the hands of Katangese forces.[18]
On 11 December Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak declared that the Belgian government would support the UN or the Congolese government should they end the Katangese secession through force.[19]
Prelude
On 24 December 1962 Katangese forces openly attacked Ethiopian peacekeepers from several roadblocks.[18][20] The same day a UN observation helicopter was fired upon and forced to land. An Indian member of the crew was mortally wounded while the rest were captured and beaten. Several other peacekeepers were shot and killed.[2] UN troops strictly limited their responses to self-defence, but the attacks continued. On 27 December, in response to the increasing Katangese hostility, the ONUC Air Division issued Fighter Operations Order 16, directing UN aircraft to retaliate against Katangese aircraft mounting any attack (including against non-UN targets) and to shoot down any others deemed to be carrying "visible offensive weapons, such as bombs or rockets".[21]
In an effort to reach a ceasefire, peacekeepers escorted Tshombe to the front lines where he was forced to agree that his own forces were attacking UN positions without provocation.[22] He ordered his troops to cease firing but was ignored.[17] Radio intercepts revealed to the UN that General Norbert Moke, the commander of the Katangese Gendarmerie, had ordered the Katangese Air Force to bomb the Élisabethville airport on the night of 29 December. With the failure to enact a ceasefire, Lieutenant General Dewan Prem Chand of India convinced Thant to authorize a strong, decisive offensive to pre-emptively eliminate Katangese forces.[22] Determined to avoid civilian casualties and widespread destruction, the secretary general sent a wire to the UN Force Commander in the Congo to explain that napalm was to be prohibited from use in combat.[4]
Opposing forces
Katanga
In addition to the 300–500 mercenaries,[18] Katanga had approximately 14,000–17,000 gendarmes in its service.[23] Through reconnaissance, the UN had learned that these forces were concentrated on defending the southern tier of the province (much of the north was already under central government control), with about 5,150 troops in and around the towns of Jadotville, Kolwezi, and Bunkeya. Another 2,000 garrisoned Élisabethville.[16] The UN also estimated that the Katangese Air Force possessed a number of Harvards, Magisters, and de Havilland Vampires, amounting to a dozen combat aircraft.[4] However, they did believe that many Katangese aircraft were unserviceable. ONUC intelligence observed limited stockpiles of ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants at a few airfields.[2]
ONUC
Peacekeeping contingents from Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Sweden, and Tunisia were officially earmarked to carry out the operation.[1] In order to simultaneously deploy these troops for the operation, the UN required a large airlift capability. ONUC had amassed an air transport fleet of 65 planes, the largest being Douglas DC-4s, but it was still insufficient for Operation Grandslam. Thant's military attaché, Indar Jit Rikhye, had requested assistance from the United States Department of Defense. Several days later, the United States committed its air force to provide logistical support. In November President John F. Kennedy offered to send the UN American fighter jets for an "overwhelming show of strength from the air". Thant, though desiring forceful UN ground and air action, was eager to keep ONUC impartial and wanted to refrain from calling on too much support from any major world powers. On 16 December he declared that he would consider the American offer if the situation remained deadlocked by the Spring of 1963. This proved unnecessary.[2]
The need for combat aircraft had been a problem for ONUC. The UN had been delaying the commencement of the operation until sufficient air strength had been amassed to conduct a single attack that could destroy the Katangese Air Force. They feared that a limited attack would fail to eliminate all Katangese aircraft and stretch their own forces thin, thereby allowing Katanga to disperse its air forces among hidden airfields and launch retaliatory attacks on Kamina Air Base.[24] India had withdrawn its Canberra bombers in October, and Ethiopia repatriated its force of Sabres after one was lost in an accident. However, new air surveillance radar equipment was deployed in Kamina and Élisabethville.[25] The ONUC Air Division was bolstered in November by the delivery of two Saab 29 Tunnan (J-29) reconnaissance-variant jets from Sweden, greatly enhancing the force's intelligence capabilities. This was shortly thereafter followed up by the arrival of several J-29 combat aircraft and a 380-strong anti-aircraft unit from Norway.[2]
Operation
Operation Grandslam would be implemented in two phases. The first phase was designed to "restore the security of ONUC troops in the Élisabethville area and their freedom of movement by clearing the gendarmerie road-blocks from which fire had been directed at United Nations troops."[20] The second phase would involve advances on Jadotville and Kolwezi.[18]
First phase
Operation Grandslam commenced on 28 December 1962.[20] The initial attacks triggered the flight of 50,000 refugees, many towards the Rhodesian border, though most would quickly return.[26] In the first day, UN forces killed 50 Katangese gendarmes before securing downtown Élisabethville, the local Gendarmerie headquarters,[27] the radio station,[18] and Tshombe's presidential palace. The UN began issuing issuing rations cards to the civilian populace and demanded that Katanga stop resisting, to which Tshombe refused.[28]
Early on 29 December, the ONUC Air Division launched a surprise assault on the Kolwezi airfield. The J-29 fighter jets strafed with their 20mm cannons, as their 13.5mm rockets were inoperable in the overcast skies. Five fuel dumps and the local administrative building were destroyed.[22] Katangese Air Force Commander Jeremiah Puren had, however, managed to evacuate six Harvard trainers before the attack occurred. Mercenary Jan Zumbach remained with the other portion of the air force in Portuguese Angola and did not intervene, infuriating Puren, who was ordered by General Moke to fall back to Jadotville. For the rest of the campaign most of the Katangese Air Force remained grounded, as Puren feared his Harvards would perform poorly against the UN's faster J-29 jets.[28] Anti-aircraft fire damaged three UN planes at Kolwezi, but their attacks nonetheless continued throughout the day and were extended to other Katangese airfields,[22] such as those at Kamatanda and Ngule.[4] Three further UN reconnaissance missions resulted in the destruction of six Katangese aircraft on the ground and one possible kill in the air.[22]
Ethiopian units seized several gendarmerie roadblocks, while in the north Ghanaian and Swedish forces captured Kamina. Kipushi fell to Irish soldiers.[27] By 30 December, all the objectives for the first phase of Operation Grandslam had been accomplished.[18] General Prem Chand received a congratulatory telegram from Thant for the progress of UN forces.[29]
Second phase
Pleased with the success of operations in Élisabethville, Prem Chand decided to immediately carry forward with the UN's plans. On 31 December the 4th Madras battalion and members of the Rajputana Rifles moved out of the city for the Lufira River.[29] The next day they encountered several foreign mercenaries; in the ensuing gun battle four peacekeepers were killed. Two captured mercenaries revealed that confusion and desertion were occurring among the Katangese forces.[3] Altogether the Indian forces faced unexpectedly light resistance and reached the east bank of the Lufira on 3 January.[29]
The main bridge over the Lufira to Jadotville had been destroyed after the local mercenary commander blew up a truck parked halfway across it. Most of the mercenaries then promptly deserted.[3] The UN troops stopped to await the arrival of American bridging equipment. However, 7 miles (11 km) upstream they discovered a sabotaged rail bridge that was still passable on foot. Brigadier General Reginald Noronha, the local commander, seized the opportunity and ordered the bridge to be secured. The Rajputana infantry crossed the bridge and swiftly neutralized Katangese opposition on the far side of the river. Meanwhile, the Madras battalion located a raft and, with the assistance of a Sikorsky helicopter, managed to bring over most of their vehicles and heavy equipment. Not wanting to remain at an exposed bridgehead, Noronha had his troops occupy Jadotville.[29] General Moke had attempted to organize a defence of the town, but Katangese forces were in disarray,[3] being completely caught off-guard by the UN troops' advance. The Indian soldiers faced no resistance and were welcomed by the local inhabitants. Only when Noronha was in the town did he contact the UN headquarters in Léopoldville.[29]
By 4 January 1963, the ONUC Air Division had conducted 76 air sorties, while active patrolling by the J-29 jets had cutoff Katanga from support in Angola and Southern Africa.[22]
On 8 January, Tshombe appeared in Élisabethville. The same day Prime Minister Adoula received a letter from the chiefs of the most prominent Kantangese tribes pledging allegiance to the Congolese government and calling for Tshombe's arrest. The following day Tshombe was briefly detained by UN soldiers, but he was released so he could meet with his political associate, Godefroid Munongo, and several of his ministers in Mokambo. It is alleged that along the way Tshombe urged his supporters to resist UN forces, but, regardless, Mokambo and Bakania were soon occupied.[26] He expressed his willingness to negotiate with the central government, but warned that any advance on Kolwezi would result in the enactment of a scorched earth policy.[30] On 10 January, UN troops seized an abandoned gendarmerie base and secured the Shinkolobwe mine.[26] Tshombe fled to Northern Rhodesia on a Rhodesian Air Force plane and made his way to Kolwezi,[31] the only significant location that remained under Katangese control.[32]
Meanwhile, mercenaries in the city had taken Tshombe's threats about a scorched earth policy seriously and had planted explosives on all nearby bridges, the Nzilo Dam (which provided most of Katanga's electricity), and most of the UMHK mining facilities. When Tshombe arrived on 12 January, he was informed by UMHK officials that they had negotiated a tax deal with the central government and were withdrawing their support for secession. They asked him to not spread the news, fearing the mercenaries would feel betrayed and destroy their facilities as revenge.[3] Realizing in a final meeting in Kolwezi that the situation was grim, Colonel Bob Denard suggested that, before fleeing, the mercenaries should destroy the Nzilo Dam to make a political statement. Tshombe, knowing that UMHK would disapprove, told him that such an action would be "criminally irresponsible."[3] Company representatives met with Brigadier General Noronha to discuss the best way for UN troops to enter Kolwezi without causing collateral damage. General Moke vainly attempted to organize the 140 mercenaries and 2,000 gendarmes under his command to prepare a final defence of the city. His efforts, undermined by the force's low morale and a lack of discipline, were further hampered by an influx of refugees. Tshombe ordered the Katangese garrison of Baudouinville to surrender to besieging UN and Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) forces. Instead, they and most of the population deserted the city while a handful of gendarmes near Kongolo laid down their arms to Nigerian and Malaysian soldiers. On 14 January, Indian troops found the last intact bridge into Kolwezi. After a brief fight with gendarmes and mercenaries they secured it and crossed over, stopping at the city outskirts to await further instruction.[3]
On 15 January, Tshombe sent a formal message to Thant, "I am ready to proclaim immediately before the world that the Katanga's secession is ended."[31] Munongo fled Kolwezi and angrily declared that he would continue the campaign from Rhodesia, though he soon returned.[3] Tshombe offered to return to Élisabethville to oversee the implementation of Thant's proposal for reunification if Prime Minister Adoula granted amnesty to himself and his government. At a press conference, Adoula accepted Tshombe's proposition and announced that what remained of the Katangese Gendarmerie would be integrated into the ANC.[26]
Aftermath and analyses
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/4c/United_Nations_peacekeeping_air_forces_in_Congo_-_January_1963.jpg/350px-United_Nations_peacekeeping_air_forces_in_Congo_-_January_1963.jpg)
Late in the afternoon of 17 January, Tshombe and Munongo met with UN officials in Élisabethville to finalize negotiations.[3] They concluded with Tshombe signing a formal instrument of surrender with General Prem Chand and acting UN Civilian Chief George Sherry, officially ending the Katangese secession.[33] Four days later he peacefully received UN troops in Kolwezi.[17] Thant sent a congratulatory message to the peacekeeping forces, declaring that the conflict had been "forced upon [them]", adding that "it was only after all other efforts failed that the order was given to undertake defensive action of removing the hostile gendarmerie roadblocks which has now been completed so successfully and fortunately with a minimum of casualties."[34]
Casualties and damages
A total of 11 UN peacekeepers were killed during the operation.[31] Of those, 7 were from the Indian Independent Brigade, which also suffered 49 wounded.[35] This relatively low casualty rate greatly relieved Thant and his advisers.[34] A total of seven UN fighter aircraft and a single reconnaissance aircraft were damaged by fire from the ground.[36] In return, the Katangese Air Force had lost almost a dozen of its Harvards, Magisters, and de Havilland Vampires, most while on the ground. All Katangese combat aircraft, except for one or two Harvards, were recorded as destroyed by UN forces at the conclusion of Grandslam.[22] A subsequent investigation by an ONUC intelligence team found that 15 aircraft had been hidden at Angolan airfields for use, in the words of captured Belgian mercenaries, "in the next fight for Katanga's secession".[36] The operation also cut short a delivery of Cavalier Mustangs which Tshombe had purchased and had been expected to arrive sometime in January. The UN was also able to confirm that Katanga had been able to acquire their aircraft with the knowledge and assistance of the governments of Portuguese Angola, South Africa, and Northern Rhodesia.[4]
ONUC communications breakdown
The unexpected advance of the Indian forces under Brigadier General Noronha into Jadotville on 3 January had created considerable international controversy and embarrassed Secretary General Thant. Noronha had clearly exceeded his initial orders by seizing a bridge and crossing over the Lufira River.[29] Thant had assured the British and the Belgians that such an advance would not occur (both feared Tshombe would have UMHK property destroyed in retaliation), but ONUC commanders were apparently never informed of such a guarantee.[18] A UN spokesperson acknowledged that from a military perspective the operation had been "brilliantly executed" but stated that the UN regretted the "serious breakdown in effective communication and coordination between United Nations Headquarters and the Léopoldville office."[29] The following week Bunche investigated the incident. In his official report he concluded, "I have found beyond doubt that it is our machinery, that is at fault, far more than the individuals."[32]
Fate of ONUC
In February following the reassertion of the central government's authority in Katanga, the UN began phasing out its peacekeeping force, with the goal of completing a total withdrawal by the end of the year. At the government's request, the UN authorized a six-month extension to ONUC's deployment, albeit with a reduced number of personnel. The last troops left the Congo on 30 June 1964. The civilian aid mission remained longer to provide technical assistance to the government.[9]
Fate of Katanga
![](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/39/Reconciliation_stamp%2C_Congo_L%C3%A9opoldville_1963.jpg)
Tshombe and all of his ministers remained in Katanga immediately following the conclusion of hostilities.[3] He promised on CONAKAT's behalf to support the reunification of the Congo. As per the central government's decision, Katanga was divided into two provinces: North Katanga and South Katanga. Tshombe protested the "Balkanization" of the province, but cooperated and established his own provincial government in South Katanga by April. His rivalry with Association Générale des Baluba de Katanga (BALUBAKAT) leader Jason Sendwe, a northern Katangese politician, led to ethnic violence in Jadotville in which an estimated 74 people were killed. The following month ANC soldiers raided his residence on accusations that he was maintaining a private militia. Later, the central government seized documents revealing his continued contact with foreign mercenaries. Fearing arrest and claiming political persecution, Tshombe fled to Paris, France in June, eventually settling in Madrid, Spain. From there he developed plans with his Gendarmerie commanders for a return to power, further complicating the central government's efforts to absorb the force.[37]
Halfway through the year South Katanga was further divided into the provinces of Katanga Oriental and Lualaba (also known as the new South Katanga). Though they were opposed to such divisions, many Katangese leaders from the secession joined the new provincial governments. A new constitutional commission was established, and in March 1964 it was recommended that the Congo switch from its parliamentary system to a presidential model of government.[37]
In June 1964, following the withdrawal of ONUC, the communist Kwilu and Simba rebellions overwhelmed the ANC in eastern and central Congo. The weak central government was unable to effectively deal with the problem, so President Joseph Kasa-Vubu dismissed Prime Minister Adoula and requested Tshombe to replace him. Tshombe arrived in the capital on 24 June and assumed the premiership on 9 July.[38] The insurgencies were successfully quelled with the use of former gendarmes and mercenaries, but in October 1965 Kasa-Vubu dismissed Tshombe. In November, Colonel Joseph-Desiré Mobutu seized power in a coup and Tshombe returned to exile in Spain.[39] Though he had designs on a return to power, Tshombe was imprisoned in Algeria in 1967 and remained there until his death.[40]
Fate of Katanga's military
On 8 February 1963, General Norbert Moke and several of his officers pledged their allegiance to President Kasa-Vubu. In spite of the amnesty and incorporation of Katangese forces into the ANC, many gendarmes remained in hiding, occasionally clashing with government forces.[26] Of the 14,000–17,000 gendarmes, approximately 8,000 remained unaccounted for.[23]
During the meeting in Kolwezi, Tshombe had ordered that all remaining Katangese armed forces were to withdraw to Portuguese Angola. Jean Schramme was appointed to be commander of an army in exile, while Jeremiah Puren was ordered to evacuate what remained of the Katangese Air Force, along with necessary military equipment and the Katangese treasury. This accomplished via air and railway. Rhodesian operatives assisted in smuggling the gold reserves out of the country. The last of Schramme's mercenaries and gendarmes were evacuated on 25 January.[3] Other gendarmes spent the remainder of 1963 in Northern Rhodesia.[41]
Throughout 1963 gendarmes steadily crossed into Angola. Portuguese colonial authorities, eager to assist the anticommunist Katangese, organized them in "refugee" camps. By 1964, two of the four camps had become dedicated training facilities. Mercenaries traveled from Katanga to Angola via Rhodesia to relay messages between Tshombe, the gendarmes, and the mercenaries, with logistical support from Southern Rhodesia.[42] Around April, Tshombe appeared to have remobilised his forces.[43] Immediately after becoming prime minister in June, he ordered the exiled Katangese to return to the Congo and mobilized some of those that had been in hiding so that they could suppress the Kwilu and Simba rebels.[38] They were utilized successfully against the insurgencies, and following Tshombe's ousting from power they retained significant political distance from Mobutu's regime. Relations between the two parties quickly worsened, culminating in a bloody mutiny in July 1966.[44]
Following their defeat, straggling gendarmes retreated back into Angola.[45] Tshombe began planning to use them to stage an invasion of the Congo, but this was cut short by his imprisonment in 1967.[40] They reconstituted themselves as the Front de Libération Nationale Congolaise and made two attempts retake Katanga in the 1970s. Both failed, but secessionist insurgency activity continued.[46] Hostilities increased in 2006 after a new national constitution which promulgated the division of Katanga into four new provinces was adopted.[47]
In 2011 a militant named Gédéon Kyungu Mutanga broke out of prison. He remobilised local Mai Mai militias and formed the Mai Mai Kata Katanga to achieve secession.[48] Conflict in the region dramatically worsened, and in mid-2012 several UN humanitarian agencies began allocating numerous resources to help the civilian population. United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (known as MONUSCO under its French name) personnel provided logistical and advisory assistance to local government officials, police, and the military.[49] Many Katangese people hoped that the UN would, in light of their role in ending the original secession, help resolve the situation.[46] Kyungu and many of his forces surrendered in October 2016 to seek a peaceful solution.[50]
Notes
- ^ Numerous national forces participated in ONUC, the United Nations Operation in the Congo. For Operation Grandslam, this officially included troops from Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Ireland, Sweden, and Tunisia.[1] Logistical support was provided by the United States.[2] Troops from Malaysia and Nigeria fought in Katanga simultaneously to the operation.[3]
- ^ Total statistics on Katangese Gendarmerie and mercenary casualties are unknown.[4]
Citations
- ^ a b Thant 1978, p. 145
- ^ a b c d e Dorn 2016, p. 29
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Othen 2015, Chapter 26: Katanga '63
- ^ a b c d e f Dorn 2016, p. 32
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 31
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 40
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, pp. 59–60
- ^ Murphy 2005, p. xc
- ^ a b "Republic of the Congo – ONUC Background". United Nations. 2001. Retrieved 8 February 2017.
- ^ Briscoe 2003, p. 105
- ^ Briscoe 2003, p. 117
- ^ Packham 1996, p. 28
- ^ Meisler 2011, p. 126
- ^ Boulden 2001, p. 37
- ^ Boulden 2001, p. 38
- ^ a b c Mockaitis 1999, p. 35
- ^ a b c Packham 1996, p. 195
- ^ a b c d e f g Mockaitis 1999, p. 36
- ^ Packham 1996, p. 194
- ^ a b c Boulden 2001, p. 39
- ^ Dorn 2016, p. 36–37
- ^ a b c d e f g Dorn 2016, p. 30
- ^ a b Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 64
- ^ Dorn 2016, p. 28
- ^ Dorn 2016, p. 27
- ^ a b c d e O'Ballance 1999, p. 63
- ^ a b Meisler 2011, p. 132
- ^ a b Othen 2015, Chapter 25: Christmas in Elisabethville
- ^ a b c d e f g Mockaitis 1999, p. 37
- ^ United Press International 1963, p. 3
- ^ a b c Meisler 2011, p. 133
- ^ a b Boulden 2001, p. 40
- ^ Africa Diary 1963, p. 969
- ^ a b Kille 2007, p. 163
- ^ Chakravorty 1995, p. 27
- ^ a b Dorn 2016, p. 31
- ^ a b Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 63
- ^ a b Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 69
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 73
- ^ a b Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 77
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 61
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 67
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 68
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 75
- ^ Kennes & Larmer 2016, p. 76
- ^ a b Kennes & Larmer 2016, pp. 184–186
- ^ MONUSCO 2015, p. 1
- ^ MONUSCO 2015, p. 2
- ^ MONUSCO 2015, p. 3
- ^ "Haut Katanga: le chef de guerre Kyungu Gédéon se rend aux autorités provinciales" (in French). Radio Okapi. 11 October 2016. Retrieved 8 February 2017.
References
- Africa Diary. Vol. 3. Delhi: M. Chhabra. 1963. ISSN 0001-978X.
- Boulden, Jane (2001). Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia (illustrated ed.). Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275969066.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Briscoe, N. (2003). Britain and UN Peacekeeping: 1948–67 (illustrated ed.). Springer. ISBN 9780230005730.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Chakravorty, B. (1995). Stories of Heroism: PVC & MVC Winners (illustrated ed.). Allied Publishers. ISBN 9788170235163.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Dorn, A. Walter (2016). Air Power in UN Operations: Wings for Peace. Military Strategy and Operational Art. Routledge. ISBN 9781317183396.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Katanga Province (PDF), Kinshasa: MONUSCO, January 2015, retrieved 25 February 2017
- Kennes, Erik; Larmer, Miles (2016). The Katangese Gendarmes and War in Central Africa: Fighting Their Way Home. Indiana University Press. ISBN 9780253021502.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Kille, Kent J., ed. (2007). The UN Secretary-General and Moral Authority: Ethics and Religion in International Leadership. Georgetown University Press. ISBN 9781589014732.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Meisler, Stanley (2011). United Nations: A History (revised ed.). Grove Press. ISBN 9780802194992.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Mockaitis, Thomas R. (1999). Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword Or the Olive Branch? (illustrated ed.). Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 9780275961732.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Murphy, Philip, ed. (2005). British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa, Part I. Vol. 9. The Stationery Office. ISBN 9780112905868.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - O'Ballance, Edgar (1999). The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–98 (illustrated ed.). Springer. ISBN 9780230286481.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Othen, Christopher (2015). Katanga 1960–63: Mercenaries, Spies and the African Nation that Waged War on the World (illustrated ed.). The History Press. ISBN 9780750965804.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Packham, Eric S. (1996). Freedom and Anarchy (illustrated ed.). Nova Publishers. ISBN 9781560722328.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - Thant, (U) (1978). View from the UN. Doubleday. ISBN 9780385115414.
{{cite book}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help) - United Press International (9 January 1963). "Congo War At an End –Tshombe". The Desert Sun. Élisabethville. p. 2. OCLC 26432381.
{{cite news}}
: Invalid|ref=harv
(help)