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:My very best wishes, as a contributor to that section, I'm conflicted about it. I'm concerned that Berezovsky's involvement is discussed in numerous texts. Whether it is better to just drop the entire story, or to provide a detailed discussion, is a tough question. I'm concerned that someone will bring it up in future. [[User:Document hippo|Document hippo]] ([[User talk:Document hippo|talk]]) 14:59, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
:My very best wishes, as a contributor to that section, I'm conflicted about it. I'm concerned that Berezovsky's involvement is discussed in numerous texts. Whether it is better to just drop the entire story, or to provide a detailed discussion, is a tough question. I'm concerned that someone will bring it up in future. [[User:Document hippo|Document hippo]] ([[User talk:Document hippo|talk]]) 14:59, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
:Also, if this question ever arises again, a note to future contributors. Kulikov's statement that Berezovsky paid $10M to Chechen warlords is contested. Paul Klebnikov -- I'm not entirely sure here but would rather not check it this time -- wrote about $2M. Akhmadov was very vocal that the only money Basayev received from Berezovsky was $1M -- but that info he personally attests. Perhaps, Klebnikov's assessment could serve as the middle ground. [[User:Document hippo|Document hippo]] ([[User talk:Document hippo|talk]]) 15:09, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
:Also, if this question ever arises again, a note to future contributors. Kulikov's statement that Berezovsky paid $10M to Chechen warlords is contested. Paul Klebnikov (2000 book, p. 301) wrote that "Berezovsky had donated $1 million in cash, possibly more, to Shamil Basayev". Akhmadov claimed that the only money Basayev received from Berezovsky was $1M -- and that he personally seen bags of money in Basayev's house. [[User:Document hippo|Document hippo]] ([[User talk:Document hippo|talk]]) 15:18, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
::Does this section includes any well sourced allegations that Berezovsky funded terrorists to arrange these bombings? No, it does not, if I understand correctly. But then how it is relevant to the subject of the bombings (this page)? Yes, there were allegations about Berezovsky being engaged in talks with Basayev about starting the Dagestan war. But that's another page. [[User:My very best wishes|My very best wishes]] ([[User talk:My very best wishes|talk]]) 15:16, 10 September 2017 (UTC)
::Does this section includes any well sourced allegations that Berezovsky funded terrorists to arrange these bombings? No, it does not, if I understand correctly. But then how it is relevant to the subject of the bombings (this page)? Yes, there were allegations about Berezovsky being engaged in talks with Basayev about starting the Dagestan war. But that's another page. [[User:My very best wishes|My very best wishes]] ([[User talk:My very best wishes|talk]]) 15:16, 10 September 2017 (UTC)

Revision as of 15:22, 10 September 2017

Removal of info

I don't understand the reasoning behind the removal of this info. Why is this WP:CHERRYPICK? What information is not given? It's explicitly written that "In the last days of August, the Russian military launched an aerial bombing of the villages." Obviously it was deliberate as it was part of Dagestan war and the village was the centre of the insurgency in Dagestan. Alæxis¿question? 11:18, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

My two cents. After discussing the threats made by Wahhabis the book by Reddaway (p. 616) says:

On September 4, a week after the attack began, the first apartment bombings took place in the Dagestani town of Buinaksk, not far from the Wahhabi-controlled villages. Possibly the villagers had precise contingency plans for their fellow believers of other ethnicities—once the deterrent effect of their explicit threats to all who would listen over the previous year had failed—to set off bombs in revenge in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk. If that is so, then we believe it is impossible that the Moscow authorities did not know about the plans, at least in general terms. Even before Stepashin visited the district a year earlier, they must have been receiving numerous reports from, in particular, the FSB, the Interior Ministry, and probably the eavesdropping agency FAPSI. After all, the villages were the only off-limits area for officialdom, apart from Chechnya, in the whole of Russia. Thus the possibility arises that the Moscow decision to attack the villages was made with the deliberate intention of provoking a terrorist response that was partly or wholly anticipated. Alternatively, the decision could have been made impulsively, without reviewing the appropriate intelligence about the target. In either case, the officials in Moscow would have had plenty of reason to organize a cover-up. Individuals guilty of negligence or deliberate intent regarding the deaths of three hundred civilians obviously would have much to fear.

That Moscow deliberately provoked the attack is not a claim made by the authors or a view endorsed by them. It's one of two possibilities they considered. Other books (such as Paul Klebnikov's "Godfather of the Kremlin") consider lots of intriguing possibilities such as e.g. Berezovsky being behind the bombings.
I believe the removed text should be in the article.
Document hippo (talk) 00:32, 24 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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Strobe Talbott's take

Somehow missing from this article is the opinion of U.S. diplomats. Needless to say, the U.S. had boots on the ground in Russia who closely followed all the developments and informed the U.S. policy towards Russia. In that capacity, a most influential person was the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (also a friend of Bill Clinton). In 2002 (after retirement) he published a book of memoirs, "The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy", in which he reflected on the 1990s in Russia as seen from his position.

Since the book is not in public domain, I will cite here the relevant fragment:

THE REACTION IN RUSSIA to Putin's appointment ranged from shoulder-shrugging and head-scratching (just another "normal surprise") to prophecies of doom on the part of many of the young reformers ("a very, very big mistake" that would lead to the disintegration of the country, said Boris Nemtsov).

Yeltsin's announcement that he was not just appointing a prime minister but anointing a successor was taken as further evidence that he had lost his grip on reality.

In Washington, our initial judgment was that the implausibility of Putin's candidacy made some version of the Luzhkov-Primakov scenario all the more likely. In addition to Putin's dearth of relevant experience and connections, he didn't even look the part. Yeltsin, Yavlinsky, Nemtsov, Lebed, Luzhkov, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov—they were all endomorphs, with some combination of height, bulk and booming voice. Putin was slightly built and had the manner of a disciplined, efficient self-effacing executive assistant.

But Putin also had, on top of the full force of Yeltsin's backing, a gruesome bit of luck. The war in the North Caucasus burst back into flame, this time with a difference that made it as much of a political winner for Putin as it had been a loser for Yeltsin.

At about the time of Putin's appointment, Chechen forces under the militant leader Shamil Basayev crossed the eastern border into Dagestan, driving thousands of people from several villages and killing or wounding scores of Russian troops who were manning outposts in the region. In and of itself, the raid was a bolder version of one that Basayev had conducted in June 1995 when he took hostages during the Halifax summit of the G-7. That earlier episode was one of the few occasions when the secessionist struggle in Chechnya spilled into other parts of southern Russia. Because the Chechen conflict had been mostly contained within the republic's borders, many Russians had come to see, and oppose, the war that Yeltsin waged there in 1994-1996 as an attempt to cling to a remote and hostile fragment of the old empire.

However, the Chechens' foray into Dagestan in August 1999 seemed to be explicitly part of an aggressive strategy that would take a new round of warfare into the heartland of Russia. Basayev proclaimed a jihad to liberate the surrounding Muslim-dominated areas from Russian tyranny. That claim seemed all the more credible when it was followed within weeks by a series of bombings against apartment buildings in Volgodansk, Buinaksk and Moscow, killing some three hundred civilians.

The Chechens denied responsibility for the explosions. Some Russians and observers in the outside world suspected a covert provocation by the Russian security services, presumably on orders from their most prominent and powerful alumnus, Putin himself. Berezovsky figured in some of this speculation. In addition to being one of Putin's backers for the presidency, he had extensive ties among the Chechen warlords and therefore might have been able to prod or bribe them into providing the new government of Moscow with a pretext for what might be a popular war.

There was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory, although Russian public opinion did indeed solidify behind Putin in his determination to carry out a swift, decisive counteroffensive. It was organized by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of staff of the armed forces who had played the heavy during the confused drama in June when Russia "accidentally" deployed its troops into Kosovo ahead of NATO.

The Russian armed forces began a massive bombing campaign against Chechnya, killing thousands of civilians and adding to the nearly 200,000 refugees, many of whom fled to the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Once again, Grozny came under intense bombardment. In early October, thousands of Russian troops invaded Chechnya, secured what they called a buffer zone in the northern third of the republic and launched a pincer movement around Grozny. At the end of October, a rocket attack on a crowded market in Grozny killed dozens of people.

The incident bore an eerie resemblance to the Serb savageries that had galvanized the will of the international community to use force against Milošević. That similarity occurred to some Russian hawks, who had predicted earlier in the year that NATO's war against Belgrade over Kosovo was a warm-up for the one it would someday unleash against Moscow over Chechnya. Now they could imagine their worst fear coming true.

In fact, the West had neither the desire nor the means to engage diplomatically in the Chechen conflict, much less intervene militarily. The U.S. and its allies had no leverage on the rebel leaders, nor did we have sympathy either with their goal of independence or the raids in Dagestan that had precipitated the conflict. They had indisputably—and, it seemed, deliberately—brought down the wrath of the Russian armed forces on their people. That meant there was little we could do but cite Russia's obligations under various international covenants to protect civilian life and call on Moscow to let representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe into Chechnya to help deal with the refugee crisis and monitor the behavior of the Russian troops.

The Russians fended off these appeals on the grounds that they couldn't guarantee the safety of the OSCE mission. That was true enough, since most of the republic was in chaos, but it begged the question of Russia's indiscriminate use of violence against civilians, which was turning the entire population against Moscow and increasing popular support among Chechens for their leaders' demands.

— Strobe Talbott, "The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy"

The quotation can be easily verified and could be used as a raw source for further edits. I think it's essential that although it's a view not sympathetic to Russia by and large, the U.S. seem not to have bought into the theory of Russia security services involvement in the apartment bombings while the events took place. It's an important source which should be mentioned in the article. Document hippo (talk) 10:54, 6 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The US government officials, Strobe Talbott included, might well have had problems getting into the minds of those responsible for the bombings. There is no convincing evidence that Chechens were responsible, unless the Russians chose to keep it secret! There is also no evidence that they were capable of such acts. Also quite what they had to gain by blowing up the apartments of poor Russians has never been explained. On the other hand, Ryazan, at least, suggests that the FSB could have been responsible. Who benefitted from the apartment bombings? Certainly not the Chechens. Beslan proved that the FSB were willing and able to commit such acts, firing tank rounds and thermobaric RPG rounds into a school in which there were hundreds of innocent schoolchildren, simply to forestall Maskhadov's attempted negotiations.

RAB3L (talk) 17:30, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I have read your response, RAB3L. Please, tell me about Beslan. Do you suggest Maskhadov played any role in Beslan? That's something I have never heard of before. Document hippo (talk) 18:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
"The US government officials, Strobe Talbott included, might well have had problems getting into the minds of those responsible for the bombings." — Not actually. Some of them, like Talbott, were better-connected than most of the Russia experts.
"There is no convincing evidence that Chechens were responsible, unless the Russians chose to keep it secret!" — That's an argument every conspiracy theory makes.
"There is also no evidence that they were capable of such acts." — Paul Klebnikov disagrees with you.
"Also quite what they had to gain by blowing up the apartments of poor Russians has never been explained." — Spreading jihad to the North Caucasus, hopefully getting Russian scared with the effect of ending the war in Dagestan. (Like Yulia Latynina believes.)
"On the other hand, Ryazan, at least, suggests that the FSB could have been responsible." — On Ryazan, my position is only that we have to carefully study the details of the incident. I'm not taking a side there.
Thanks for your interest, Document hippo (talk) 18:34, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Clinton's speeches in the aftermath of bombings

The U.S. officialdom was pretty much unqeuivocal in its reaction to the Russian apartment bombings. The official stance was epitomized in two speeches by Bill Clinton:


Statement on the Terrorist Attacks in Russia (September 17, 1999)

On behalf of the American people, I want to extend our deepest condolences to the families of victims of recent bombings in Russia. Our thoughs and prayers are with the loved ones of the nearly 300 people whose lives were tragically lost.

The American people share the world's outrage over these cowardly acts. These attacks were aimed not just at innocent people across Russia; they also targeted fundamental human rights and democratic values, which are cherished by Russia and other members of the international community. We must not allow terrorists to achieve their underlying objective, which is to undermine democratic institutions and individual freedoms.

People across Russia who have been affected by these attacks are now beginning the hard task of rebuilding their lives. Their courage and resilience sets an exmple for all of us. President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Putin have also made important appeals to their countrymen that these attacks should not lead to new incidents of intolerance or bigotry and that the public should remain calm and unified in response.

In the days and weeks ahead, we will intensify our cooperation with Russian authorities to help prevent terrorist acts. The struggle against terrorism in a long and difficult road, but we must not lose our resolve. America stands ready to work with Russia to protect our citizens from this common threat.

— Bill Clinton, "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999"


Radio Remarks on Terrorist Attacks in Russia (September 18, 1999)

On behalf of the American people, I want to extend our deepest condolences to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in the recent terrorist bombings in Russia. We share your outrage over these cowardly acts. We know what kind of pain such tragedies can cause. Our own citizens have suffered from repeated acts of terrorism.

Not very long ago, a terrorist bombing took the lives of more than 160 Americans in our State of Oklahoma. The World Trade Center in New York City was bombed. Last year bombings at our Embassies in east Africa took the lives of American diplomats, along with hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians.

The crimes they suffered remind us that terrorism knows no borders, and that acts of terror anywhere are a threat to humanity everywhere. While we stand united with you in our grief, we also stand united with you in our resolve that terrorism will not go unpunished and will not undermine the work of democracy.

The United States in ready to work with Russia and the Russian people to stand against the scourge of terrorism. We are working with the allies elsewhere to make sure there is no safe haven for terrorists, and we want to work with Russia to isolate nations that support terror. Together, we can ensure that the future belongs to peacemakers not bomb throwers.

In the days ahead, our thoughts and our prayers will be with you as you work to rebuild from these terrible tragedies.

— Bill Clinton, "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999"

Document hippo (talk) 21:52, 6 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Views of the conspiracy theory in history textbooks

Gregory Freeze

A relevant excerpt from Beinfield Professor of History Gregory Freeze's text "Russia: A History":

The End of the Yeltsin Era

Boris Yeltsin's final months in office could hardly have been more tumultuous. After a band of Chechen commandos invaded the neighbouring Russian republic of Dagestan and inflicted heavy casualties, Yeltsin summarily dismissed the current prime minister Sergei Stepashin and appointed a virtual unknown, Vladimir Putin—the fifth prime minister in two years. Putin came from the former KGB, where he had served as an intelligence officer in East Germany, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, before resigning amidst the abortive coup of August 1991 ('As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided which side I was on') and joining the anti-coup forces led by Leningrad mayor Anatolii Sobchak. Putin subsequently became a top aide to Sobchak, with the specific charge of attracting foreign investment. After Sobchak lost re-election as mayor in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow to serve as an assistant to Pavel Borodin, a Yeltsin aide responsible for managing Kremlin properties. Putin quickly climbed the Kremlin hierarchy, appointed first as deputy chief of staff for relations with the subordinate regions (March 1997), next as director of the secret policy, the FSB (July 1998), and finally as the head of the Security Council (March 1999). In August the Chechnya crisis and Stepashin's dismissal catapulted Putin into the post of prime minister. Within a few weeks, after bombings (officially attributed to Chechen terrorists) in Moscow and other cities cost 310 lives, Putin persuaded Yeltsin to order federal forces to invade Chechnya and eradicate the source of the terrorism.

With Yeltsin's second and final term due to expire in July 2000, the Kremlin came to view Putin as a viable successor. Why Putin was chosen has been the subject of much speculation. The athletic 48-year-old Putin was certainly a striking contrast to the doddering, besotted, 69-year-old Yeltsin. Putin was articulate and well educated; he first received a degree in law, later earned a 'candidate' degree (Ph.D.) in economics, and had strong ties to influential liberal economists. His résumé glistened with experience: the service in Germany, Petersburg, and Moscow provided valuable preparation in critical areas of foreign and domestic policy. Putin also came across as a man of the people, willing—whether as cool calculation or a flash of temper—to use shocking vulgarities to make his point and an impression. He also acted like a president even before he became one: he wielded unprecedented authority as prime minister, playing a far more important and independent role in policy-making than had any of his predecessors. As Yeltsin looked for a successor, Putin's meteoric rise in popularity—from a Yeltsinesque 2 per cent approval rating in August 1999 to 50 per cent four months later—gave every reason to believe that Putin could prevail even in a hotly contested presidential election. Some of Yelstin's critics adduce an additional reason for choosing Putin: kompromat (compromising materials), including allegations that his government, not terrorists, perpetrated the bombings used to justify the invasion of Chechnya. This kompromat, they argue, guaranteed that as president Putin would not dare to turn against Yeltsin and the 'Family'.

While such accusations do not seem credible, they do highlight an important reason for Putin's skyrocketing popularity: the Chechen conflict enabled Putin to demonstrate his mettle in an all-out military campaign to establish Russian control over Chechnya and eradicate terrorism. Contemporary polls showed that the 'second' Chechen war elicited public support both for the campaign and the prime minister, whose decisive leadership promised a clear military victory. And the military campaign appeared to succeed: within months, after relentless artillery bombardment, Russian forces stormed the Chechen capital of Groznyi—from which they had been so ignominiously expelled earlier—and launched search-and-destroy operations against pockets of guerrilla resistance. Although Chechnya hardly became a model of tranquillity, Putin demonstrated a willingness to use massive force, on a far greater scale than in the first Chechen war, and these early victories propelled his approval rating ever higher.

All this provided a favourable background for the new Duma elections of 19 December 1999. This time the Kremlin was determined to ensure the election of a supportive Duma—in contrast to the hostile majorities that prevailed in the 1993 and 1995 elections. Within a month of Putin's appointment as prime minister, pro-Kremlin figures established a new party, 'Unity' (Edinstvo), to represent the regime in the election; it offered no specific programme other than to proclaim a commitment to the country's 'territorial integrity and national greatness'. Bankrolled by the oligarchs, bathed in favourable media coverage, and endorsed by a growing number of weathervane governors, the new party catapulted from nothing to win almost as many votes as the long-established Communist Party. Together with allied parties and independents, Unity headed a pro-government majority in the Duma and, given Putin's popularity (even among Communists), ensured a cooperative Duma—quite unlike what Yeltsin had had to endure.

In the flush of that electoral victory, Yeltsin used his new year's address on 31 December 1999 to drop a bombshell: he announced his resignation, effective immediately, with Prime Minister Putin (as the constitution stipulated) ascending to the office of acting president. Although Yeltsin rhetorically spoke of inaugurating a new millennium with a new president, the main purpose was to hasten the elections, which by law had to be held within three months of his resignation. Seeking to capitalize on Putin's popularity, perhaps fearful that it might fade by summer (especially if the country became mired in a protracted Chechen war), Yeltsin resigned early in order to ensure Putin's election. Putin immediately rewarded the former president: his first act was to guarantee immunity to Yeltsin and his immediate family from prosecution—a step widely regarded as a payback (if not precondition) for his early promotion.

With elections scheduled for 26 March 2000, Putin was the only real candidate. The few serious contenders, such as the former prime minister Evgenii Primakov and Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov, became the target of smear campaigns in oligarch-owned media and withdrew their candidacy. As in 1996, the nominally 'independent' media provided lavish coverage of Putin, from his everyday perorations to his bravado as co-pilot in a military jet flown to Chechnya six days before the election (a dramatic contrast to 'Tsar Boris'). Putin won a majority (53 per cent) in the first round and thus avoided a run-off such as Yeltsin had had to endure in 1996. Indeed, whereas Yeltsin barely edged out the communist Gennadii Ziuganov in the first round in 1996, Putin received nearly twice as many votes (39.7 million) as Ziuganov (21.9 million). Despite claims of vote-rigging, Putin was a clear winner; even if a run-off had been necessary, few doubt that he would have dealt Ziuganov a crushing defeat. Putin thus became president with both a cooperative Duma and a popular mandate; he had an unprecedented opportunity to embark on a new course and realize his vision of a new, more prosperous, and more powerful Russia.

— Gregory Freeze, "Russia: A History" (2009)

Document hippo (talk) 03:49, 8 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Paul Klebnikov

A quote from Paul Klebnikov's book "Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia" (pp. 304-306), which I think might be relevant for this article:

A week later, the French newspaper Le Figaro asked former Security Council chief Aleksandr Lebed if the Russian government had organized the terrorist attacks against its own citizens. "I am almost convinced of it," Lebed responded.

Lebed's pronouncement created a sensation—it was the first time a top Russian official had publicly voiced a suspicion that had merely been hinted at in the national press. Lebed's public relations staff later claimed that the general had been quoted out of context. Berezovsky flew to Krasnoyarsk, where Lebed was serving as governor, to talk to the maverick general. It is not known what the two discussed. But after Berezovsky's visit, Lebed fell silent; he remains conspicuously absent from the Russian political scene to this day.

Lebed's accusations were echoed several days later by Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who stressed the tremendous boost the terrorist incidents and the subsequent war hysteria gave to the Kremlin clan's political hopes. "Chechnya [is] a testing ground for all these political games, a pawn in all these preelection maneuvers [in Moscow]," Maskhadov told me. "Today there is indeed the smell of war. We will probably have a big war here, a big conflagration. But the fault is wholly with the Russians. All this fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism has been artificially created."

Maskhadov alternately blamed Berezovsky and the Russian "secret services" for the terrorist wave. The Chechen president did harbor an animus against Berezovsky, if only because of the tycoon's repeated support of the extremist elements in Chechnya at the expense of Maskhadov's own presidential authority. Moreover, now that he had been dragged into a new war with Russia, Maskhadov had an interest in demoralizing the Russian side by portraying the Kremlin as scheming behind the backs of Russian soldiers. Still, the allegation should be treated with respect—Maskhadov was an experienced observer of how Berezovsky and other members of the Yeltsin clan operated in Chechnya over the years.

It is hard to believe that Prime Minister Putin was behind the bombings. While it is true that the blast, more than any other event, ensured Putin's victory at the polls, there is nothing in the man's past to indicate that he would commit such a monstrous crime to gain power. On the contrary, Putin's past career betrays an unusual dedication to a fixed code of conduct (albeit an authoritatian one); there is nothing to suggest the bottomless cynicism necessary to massacre one's own people to promote one's career. If the explosions were organized by the Russians themselves, it is likely that they were the work of maverick members of Putin's camp. The new prime minister, after all, did not control all the levers of power in September 1999. He relied largely on the independent political bosses such as Berezovsky, acting for his benefit or in his name.

Some Russian newspapers speculated that Berezovsky may have been behind the bombings. If Berezovsky had arranged the September blasts, the crime would bind Putin to him forever. Even if Putin had known who was behind the explosions, he would not have been able to say anything at the time. The new prime minister was just finding his bearings in the Kremlin; a shattering revelation such as that the terrorist bombings had been organized by the Kremlin clique would have destroyed both Putin's political hopes and the Russian war effort against the Chechens. Neither could Putin reveal Berezovsky's role in the bombings (if in fact the tycoon was involved) later, after winning the presidential election, since he would have to admit that he had initially covered up the crime. Hence, if Berezovsky was in any way involved in the bombings, this secret would remain an iron bond attaching Putin to Berezovsky.

But all of this is speculation. There is simply too little evidence either way. The most likely explanation is that the attacks were in fact carried out by Chechen militants or by Islamic extremists acting on behalf of their embattled coreligionists. Both Shamil Basayev and other commanders such as Salman Raduyev had carried out terrorist assaults against the Russian civilian population in the past and had boasted of their exploits. The Wahhabi commander, Khattab, was linked to the notorious international terrorist Osama bin Laden. Chechen field commanders gloried in a murderous ferocity toward their foes. These men publicly executed Russian prisoners of war and civilian hostages by cutting off their heads with large hunting knives, and videotaped the procedure. Clearly, there were plenty of candidates in the bowels of the Chechen underworld capable of carrying out the 1999 apartment bombings.

— Paul Klebnikov, "Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia"

Document hippo (talk) 21:44, 22 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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More info

Expanding Strobe Talbott's claim

Here's how I'd like to rewrite the passage about Talbott's claim. Below are the sources:

According to Strobe Talbott, "there was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory". [1] Similar points were raised by British journalist Thomas de Waal [2][3] and other analysts. [4][5][6][7]

[1] There was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory, although Russian public opinion did indeed solidify behind Putin in his determination to carry out a swift, decisive counteroffensive.

Strobe Talbott, "Russia Hand"

[2] Meanwhile others in Moscow are still wondering whether there is a domestic political aspect to the crisis and whether rogue elements of the security services are in some way involved in an attemtp to provoke a state of emergency in Russia or the cancellation of elections.

There is absolutely no proof of this, but a little noticed article in the Moscow newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda by a respectable journalist Alexander Zhilin is now attracting attention.

BBC, "Russia's bombs: Who is to blame?", by Tom de Waal (1999)

[3] There was very little in the allegations made by Berezovsky, which had not been reported in small-circulation Russian newspapers and a book written by an ex-KGB officer over the last two years. <...> Chekulin's testimony was the nearest thing to a "smoking gun" but even he admitted that he had no direct documentary evidence directly related to the three apartment block bombings.

IWPR, "Berezovsky Alleges Chechen Plot" by Tom de Waal (2002)

[4] By no means is the author saying that Russian special services were involved in Basayev's attack on Dagestan or in the blasts at the apartment buildings in the Russian cities. Mere suspicions are insufficient for such an assertion. However, the Russian public's fixed opinion that "they attacked us," is also disputable. In any case, there is no proof whatsoever that official authorities in the Chechen Republic were involved in the aforementioned acts.

Military Review, "The Second Chechen War: the Information Component" by Emil Pain, Vol. 80 (2000)

[5] Of course, it was valid to state that there was some suspicion over the discovery of devices left in a Ryazan apartment block, which were similar to those used in Moscow, and appeared to have links with the Russian secret services. However, the more general inference drawn from this, that all the September bombings were carried out by the Russian authorities, was uncorroborated by evidence.

"Chechnya: From Past to Future" by Richard Sakwa (editor). Chapter 11, "Western Views of the Chechen Conflict" by Mike Bowker, University of East Anglia (2005)

[6] There has never been evidence that the houses were blown up by the FSB, but there has been no counter-evidence either.

"Politics and the Ruling Group in Putin's Russia" by S. White (editor). Chapter 3 "The Russian Federal Security Service under President Putin" by Eberhard Schneider (2008)

[7] Although it is possible that Russian security forces were complicit in the bombings, no direct evidence has ever been presented linking the government to the attacks.

"Russian way of war: post Soviet adaptations in the Russian military" by James Copp, U.S. Army Major (2013)

Document hippo (talk) 22:54, 22 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Review of the links supporting/mentioning the conspiracy theory

The statement about the conspiracy theory (before my recent edit) looked that way:

Yury Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Berezovsky, David Satter, Boris Kagarlitsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky, and the secessionist Chechen authorities claim that the 1999 bombings were a false flag attack coordinated by the FSB in order to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya. This war boosted the popularity of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was previously the director of the FSB, and helped the pro-war Unity Party succeed in the elections to the State Duma and helped Putin attain the presidency within a few months. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]

There are actually two claims made in this passage. The first one is that the bombings were a false flag attack. The second one is that the war in Chechnya boosted Putin's popularity and helped him and his party win the elections.

While the false flag attack theory is a subject of controversy, no one doubts that the bombings helped Putin gain popular support. So, I believe the two claims should be separated.

To separate the claims, it's necessary to review the links to see which of the two claims does each of the links support or mention.

Let's get started!


[6] Litvinenko's details on apartment bombings in Moscow, an interview with Sergei Kovalev, radio Echo of Moscow, 25 July 2002 [1]

S. Kovalev. Yes, of course. I think it would be natural to check that. Moreover, I don't want to speak about likelihood, truthworthy or even serious doubts of that material without a most thorough and very tedious analysis. FSB will check that, and we will check, to the extent of what's accessible for us. Now, about the belief in this or that version. Yes, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko claim: "FSB explodes Russia". I won't like to believe in that, but I try to be impartial, and I don't rule out that version. I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too. Experience shows it's a frequent situation. Generally, I'm not a big proponent of conspiracy theories. But Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's theory is a pure conspiracy. But regardless of what one feels is the preferred option, I believe that an investigator should follow the golden rule of a researcher, there's a similarity. There shouldn't be a more sharp and more demanding criticist of a hypothesis, than its author. Because it's he who knows all of the details. And he should strive to kill his own hypothesis, to destroy it. But if he doesn't succeed, then he exhales with a relief and says: "Well, now it's not a hypothesis, it's a proven thing, now it's a theory at least." One simply cannot see such desire on the side of the authors of the book. I won't even mention that the very book itself, the episodes which are known very well to me as a participant, there's incredible amount of fiction. For example, Budennovsk. It's pure fiction, and not even a single link. That's not how serious books are written, which pretend to be truthworthy.

T. Pelipeyko. Thanks, Sergey Adamovich. To sum it up, the very fact of errors in something else causes you to doubt that which was claimed by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky today?

S. Kovalev. I don't think such doubts should offend them. I think they have given the material to the commission so that it would be subject to impartial and fair minded analysis.

I think that should be mentioned in the article: "Sergey Kovalev expressed doubts over the conspiracy theory, citing an "incredible amount of fiction" in the book by Felshtinsky and Litvinenko".


[7] Reference to Boris Kagarlitsky's Novaya Gazeta article. [2]

Boris Kagarlitsky, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Comparative Politics, writing in the weekly Novaya Gazeta, says that the bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were arranged by the GRU (the Russian military intelligence service). He says they used members of a group controlled by Shirvani Basayev, brother of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, to plant the bombs. These killed 300 people in Buikask, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September.

Mr Kagarlitsky, who, from internal evidence in the article, is drawing on a source with close knowledge of the GRU, says that invasion of Dagestan by Shamil Basayev himself in August was pre-arranged with a senior Kremlin leader at a meeting in France in July.

Clearly, a voice in support of the conspiracy theory. However, it says GRU not FSB, which should be mentioned in the text.


[8] David Satter – House committee on Foreign Affairs" (PDF). [3]

For “Operation Successor” to succeed, however, it was necessary to have a massive provocation. In my view, this provocation was the bombing in September, 1999 of the apartment building bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk. In the aftermath of these attacks, which claimed 300 lives, a new war was launched against Chechnya. Putin, the newly appointed prime minister who was put in charge of that war, achieved overnight popularity. Yeltsin resigned early. Putin was elected president and his first act was to guarantee Yeltsin immunity from prosecution. In the meantime, all talk of reexamining the results of privatization was forgotten.

Support of the conspiracy theory.


[9] Felshtinsky & Pribylovsky 2008, pp. 105–111

Don't have that book.


[10] Video "In Memoriam of Alexander Litvinenko". Will let it pass for now and review it later.


[11] "Russian Federation: Amnesty International's concerns and recommendations in the case of Mikhail Trepashkin – Amnesty International" [4]

A very detailed summary of injustice experienced by indepent investigator Trepashkin. The article doesn't try to make a point about the apartment bombings being coordinated by the FSB, merely mentions that Trepashkin was investigating such allegations. Should be moved to the statement about Trepashkin.


[12] "Bomb Blamed in Fatal Moscow Apartment Blast" by Paddock, LA Times. [5]

Some opposition politicians have expressed concern that the war and bombings could give Yeltsin a pretext to declare a state of emergency, cancel presidential elections set for next summer and continue to rule. The Kremlin insists that Yeltsin plans to step down next year on schedule and hand over power to an elected successor.

That doesn't mention any theory saying that the FSB coordinated the blasts. The link should be moved to one of the leading sentences in the article because it was published after the first blast in Moscow.


[13] "At least 90 dead in Moscow apartment blast", from staff and wire reports, CNN, 10 September 1999 [6]

A hard-line Communist leader alleged that the blast was linked to a political feud between Luzhkov, the Kremlin and other forces. Luzhkov is considered a strong favorite to succeed Yeltsin after presidential elections next year, and he has accused Yeltsin and his circle of being jealous of his popularity. "Political hysteria is being fanned artificially, including by way of explosions, to cancel parliamentary and presidential elections through a state of emergency," Viktor Ilyukhin was quoted as saying by the ITAR-Tass news agency.

Ilyukhin didn't say either the FSB or GRU coordinated the bombings. Perhaps the claim deserves to be discussed separately. For now, the link should be moved to one of the leading sentences.


[14] Evangelista 2002, p. 81 [7]

In Russia, a country particularly susceptible to both conspiracy theories and genuine conspiracies, many observers began to wonder if the federal security forces had arranged the explosions. At least two candidate theories have been proposed.

The first is linked to Yeltsin's purported campaign to undermine his political rival, Moscow mayor Luzhkov. What better way to discredit the popular Luzhkov than to demonstrate that he could not keep his own residents safe from terrorist attacks? The second theory suggests a deliberate effort to provoke a "rally 'round the flag" effect on the Russian populace to solidify the rule of Yeltsin and his designated successor. Russian journalists once asked Putin himself about such theories. He reacted with characteristic bluster: "What? We blew up our own houses? Nonsense! Total rubbish! There are no people in the Russian secret services who would commit such a crime against their own people. The very suggestion is amoral and fundamentally nothing more than part of an information was against Russia."

Purin's denials failed to allay suspicions about the apartment bombings.

Evangelista mentions a conspiracy theory that federal security services arranged the explosions to solidify the rule of Yeltsin and his successor. Alright.


[15] "Did Putin's Agents Plant the Bombs?" by Jamie Dettmer [8]

Only days before, Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, had been forced in an interview to dismiss mounting domestic and international speculation that Russian security agents had been behind the deadly explosions last fall in Moscow and in two other Russian cities that left nearly 300 people dead and 500 injured. "Delirious nonsense!" the Russian leader had declared with his trademark firmness. "There are no people in the Russian secret services who would be capable of such a crime against their own people."

The link is broken and should be fixed. But, it mentions the theory of FSB involvement.


[16] "The consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia" by Joel M. Ostrow, Georgil Satarov, Irina Khakamada p.96

Evidence of FSB involvement and Kremlin complicity, however, is strong enough to demand it not be brushed aside as wild conspiracy theory, particulary in the absence of evidence to support Putin's claim.

Alright.


[17] McCain decries "new authoritarianism in Russia", John McCain's press release, 4 November 2003 [9]

Under President Putin, Russian citizens in Chechnya have suffered crimes against humanity at the hands of Russian military forces. It was during Mr. Putin's tenure as Prime Minister in 1999 that he launched the Second Chechen War following the Moscow apartment bombings. There remain credible allegations that Russia's FSB had a hand in carrying out these attacks.

Alright, I see the point. Meanwhile, the link is broken and should be fixed.

Document hippo (talk) 16:29, 23 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Meanwhile, neither of these sources says that the claims that FSB was behind the bombings were reiterated by Chechen authorities. I believe that caution should be exercised here because, in particular, Aslan Maskhadov had publicly accused Boris Berezovsky of financing the Dagestan incursion with ransom payments: Conflagration in Russia, Forbes, Nov. 1999 by Paul Klebnikov.

So Maskhadov speaks with a certain prejudice as he interprets recent events. But what he says is persuasive–and pretty disturbing: “These people, who have grown their beards long and are preaching the Great Jihad, are controlled and financed by someone else, including the oligarchs who surround Yeltsin in Moscow.”

When pressed, Maskhadov names the man he sees as the prime villain in the affair: tycoon Boris Berezovsky. For the past several years Berezovsky has been channeling ransom payments to terrorists in Chechnya who have kidnapped visitors. Berezovsky boasts of his rescue efforts, but, says Maskhadov, the ransom money has dark consequences: It finances the Islamic militias, which are now attacking Russia. (It is still unclear who carried out the bombings.) The chaos, says Maskhadov, is not all bad for the folks in power in the Kremlin. It may destabilize the country enough to force a delay in elections, elections that would probably put those folks out of power.

I believe that's not the only statement Maskhadov has made. My point is that the details of which statements were made by Chechen authorities are more nuanced than alleged in the article.

So, the fragment about "the secessionist Chechen authorities" should be removed, OR claims made by Maskhadov should be reviewed with greater consideration.

Document hippo (talk) 16:39, 23 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Mention of Khattab in the leading section

I'd like to add a couple of lines to provide the reader with the context of the bombings.

On August 7, 1999 Dagestan was invaded by two thousand radicals headed by Shamil Basayev and Ibn Khattab, a Saudi citizen who competed on an equal footing with Osama bin Laden. [1] From 3rd to 13th September Khattab made several threats against Russia, which mentioned "reprisals" and "explosions". [2][3][4]

[1] pp. 108-109, "Inferno in Chechnya: The Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings" by Brian Glyn Williams.

However, by this time, the Chechen rebels were not entirely on their own. The previous year a small band of approximately eighty Arab jihadi "brothers," led by a globe-trotting professional holy warrior named Amir (Commander) Khattab, had traveled to the country via Dagestan. The charismatic Khattab, a Saudi citizen whose real name was Thamir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, had previously fought volunteer jihad in eastern Afghanistan on behalf of the Afghan mujahideen rebels in the late 1980s. When that war was over, the jihadi paladin had traveled to neighboring Tajikistan to wage war alongside Islamist fighters who were trying to overthrow the post-Soviet Communist regime in that country in the early 1990s.

These events took place at a time when another Saudi citizen, Osama bin Laden, created a separate terrorist group known as Al Qaeda al Jihad (based in Sudan from 1992 to 1996), which was dedicated not to fighting Russians or Communists frontally, but to the expulsion of US forces from the Arabian peninsula. While bin Laden later asked Khattab to join his nihilist terrorist group in its war against America, the famous warrior rejected bin Laden's request. Khattab chose to continue his own frontline struggle against his traditional foes from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the Russians. Terrorism expert Fawaz Gerges has analyzed the Arabic language correspondence between these two distinct Saudi jihadi leaders and has concluded:

Khattab not only competed on an equal footing with bin Laden, but assembled a more powerful contingent of jihadis than the latter. In the 1990s the two Saudi jihadis communicated with each other and tried to pull each other into their own battle plans, but Khattab and bin Laden had defined the enemy differently and both were too ambitious to accept a subordinate role.

p. 135, ibid

The Wahhabi Invasion of Dagestan

The unsanctioned August 1999 Wahhabi invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya actually behan when one of the Dagestani leaders of the Chechnya-based "Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan" was lured back into the Tsumadi-Avaristan Wahhabi enclave of Dagestan by local authorities on August 2, 1999. Once there, the Dagestani police besieged his enclave and tried to arrest him and his followers. The Dagestani authorities then began to attempt to reestablish administrative authority in the surrounding Wahhabi region. This gave Basayev, Khattab, and Bagauddin Magomedov (the exiled Dagestani leader) the excuse they were looking for to launch their grandiose invasion of the Russian province of Dagestan with the aim of "liberating" it.

On August 7, 1999, between fifteen hundred and two thousand primarily Dagestani Wahhabis, joined by hundreds of Chechen radicals and a smaller number of Arabs, calling themselves the "Islamic International Peace Keeping Brihade" and driving armored personnel carriers and jeeps, crossed into the mountainous Avaristan region of the Russian province of Dagestan. At their head were Basayev, who was styled the "military emir" of the operation, and Khattab, his deputy. Russian television showed images of camouflage-wearing, bearded mujahideen, who were fighting under the black banner of international jihad, not the green wolf flag of Chechnya. Basayev proclaimed, "It is not a Chechen army, but an international corps," while Maskhadov's defense minister said, "We asked Basayev not to attack Dagestan." Tellingly, the name of the military invasion was Operation Ghazi Mogamed (Ghazi Mohammed or Mogamed was a nineteenth-century Dagestani ghazi, or holy warrior, who fought to expel the Russian invaders and establish shariah law in the land).

[2], [3] and [4] should be familiar to the editors of this article.

Document hippo (talk) 04:00, 25 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Conflicting report about Basayev and Voloshin July 1999 meeting in Nice

p. 167, Ilyas Akhmadov "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost"

I had with me an article from a Russian newspaper that contained pictures purportedly of Shamil meeting with Voloshin in Nice on July 4, 1999. I didn't believe this article was based on fact and I didn't think he had actually been in Nice, but I wanted to see his reaction to it. As he was reading it, he started to chuckle and called over to Khattab, "How do you like my legs?" Khattab didn't understand at first, so Shamil had to explain. "This article claims that this is a picture of me meeting in Nice with Voloshin. I'm the one in the shorts." They both laughed. Chechen men, and especially fighters, do not wear shorts. That was all that was said about this article. I don't take the Nice story seriously. Here are three simple facts explaining why: first, I saw Shamil in Vedeno in June, a few days prior to my June 27 appointment; second, Shamil was a participant in a rally for reconciliation that was held in Grozny on July 3; and third, I don't know of any instance when Shamil left the North Caucasus in the postwar years. On one occasion Shamil was invited to Moscow for the wedding of Tim Guldimann, the former OSCE representative who had played a crucial role in ending the war and signing the Khasavyurt agreement. Shamil had sent me there with an enormous carpet that was adorned with Shamil's face. I had gone to Moscow in his stead because he had not wanted to travel.

Document hippo (talk) 03:56, 26 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Chiesa's 1999 article

Террористы тоже разные

Джульетто КЬЕЗА, шеф-корреспондент московского бюро итальянской газеты "Стампа"

Терроризмов много. И все они разные. Хотя нередко у людей складывается о них путаные представления. Взять хотя бы бомбу в отеле "Интурист", подложенную, скорее всего, с целью уничтожить конкурента - политического или экономического. У таких акций ограниченная цель, они не являются частью какой-то более масштабной стратегии. Организаторы подобной операции не заинтересованы в том, чтобы спровоцировать бойню. Если же погибают невинные люди, прохожие, случайно оказавшиеся на месте взрыва, это считается "сопутствующим фактом" - таким, скажем, как гибель гражданских лиц во время натовских бомбардировок Югославии.

Все это я назвал бы "малым терроризмом", "терроризмом преступных банд", или, пользуясь итальянской мафиозной терминологией, "сведением счетов".

Но вот совсем иной пример терроризма (какие, к сожалению, очень хорошо известны в Италии) - взрыв бомбы во Владикавказе, унесший жизнь семидесяти ни в чем не повинных людей. Взрыв был устроен на рынке в час пик, и его очевидной целью было как можно большее число жертв. Перед нами то, что в Италии в годы расцвета терроризма называлось "стратегией напряженности". Здесь преступный акт задуман и осуществлен не просто группой уголовников. Как правило, речь идет о широкомасштабных и множественных акциях, цель которых - посеять панику и страх среди граждан.

У акций этого типа, как правило, очень мощная политическая и организационная база. Часто террористические акты, имеющие отношение к "стратегии напряженности", - это дело рук какой- нибудь секретной службы, как иностранной, так и национальной. Во втором случае речь может идти об отдельных группах секретных служб, действующих независимо от официального руководства и прикрывающихся своей "секретностью".

Терроризм этого типа (его еще иногда называют "государственным терроризмом", так как он затрагивает одновременно и государственные интересы, и структуры, действующие в тайных лабиринтах современных государств) - явление сравнительно новое. Можно сказать, что одними из первых этой стратегией стали пользоваться сразу же после окончания второй мировой войны секретные службы Израиля, а позднее - алжирский Фронт национального освобождения. Во многих случаях терроризм был побочным продуктом национально-освободительной борьбы или самой настоящей войны, как, скажем, палестинский терроризм в 60-70-х годах, ставший международным по определению. В наши дни одиссея палестинцев близится к завершению, но международный терроризм жив, как никогда. Все говорит о том, что он становится одной из перманентных форм международной политической борьбы.

Обо всем этом стоит напомнить в момент, когда стратегия террора все чаще заявляет о себе в России и в странах бывшего СССР. С высокой степенью уверенности можно сказать, что взрывы бомб, убивающих неповинных людей, всегда планируются политическими умами. Они не фанатики, они - убийцы, преследующие политические цели. Нужно оглядеться вокруг и попытаться понять, кто заинтересован в дестабилизации обстановки в стране. Это могут быть иностранцы (пусть и из стран ближнего зарубежья, например, с Кавказа), а могут и "свои", пытающиеся запугать страну, прежде чем с них за это спросится. Так было в Италии, так может быть и в России. И когда (как, например, недавно в Риме, где террористы убили скромного сотрудника министерства труда) призрак "красных бригад" вновь начинает тревожить людей по ночам, можно быть на 99,99 процента уверенными, что и за этим преступлением стоят особые политические планы и интересы.

Document hippo (talk) 23:35, 2 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]


Just thought I should translate Giulietto Chiesa's 1999 article:

Terrorists are different as well

There are multiple terrorisms. All of them are different. Although often people would confuse them. Consider for example the bomb in hotel "Intourist", which was most likely planted in order to destroy the competitor (political or economical). Such acts have a limited end goal, they are not a part of any kind of a broader strategy. Organizers of such an operation aren't interested in provoking a massacre. And if innocent people, bystanders who were unlucky to be at the place of the explosion die, that's considered "accompanying facts" — such as, let us say, deaths of civilians during NATO's bombings of Yugoslavia.

That's what I would call "small terrorism", "terrorism of criminal gangs", or using Italian mafia language, "settling a score".

But here's a completely different case of terrorism (the kind which is unfortunately very well known in Italy) — a bomb explosion in Vladikavkaz which claimed the lives of 70 innocent people. The explosion was arranged during the rush hour at a market, and its obvious goal was maximizing the number of victims. It's what was called a "strategy of tensions" during Italy's peak years of terrorism. Here the act of felony is conceived and performed not just by a group of criminals. Usually this means wide-scale and multiple acts, the purpose of which is to disseminate panic and terror among citizens.

Actions of such kind usually have a powerful political and organizational base. Often terrorist acts related to the "strategy of tensions" are the work of some secret service, either foreign or national. In the second case it could be separate groups of [in?] secret services which act independently of the official leadership and use their "secrecy" as a cover-up.

Terrorism of that type (which is sometimes called "state terrorism", since it involves both state interests and structures that act in hidden labyrinths of modern states) is a relatively new concept. One can say that secret services of Israel were among the first to use that strategy right after the end of the Second World war, and were later followed by Algeria's National Liberation Front. In multiple cases terrorism was a byproduct of national liberation struggle or a real war, such as e.g. Palestinean terrorism in 60-70s which became international by definition. In our days Palestineans' Odyssey seems to approach its end, but the international terrorism is alive like never before. Everything suggests that it becomes a permanent form of international political struggle.

That should be reminded in the moment when the strategy of terror asserts itself increasingly frequently in Russia and post-USSR countries. One can speak with high likelihood that bomb explosions which kill innocent people are always planned by political minds. They are not fanatics, they are murderers who pursue political goals. One needs to look around and try to figure out who is interested in destabilizing the situation in a country. That could be foreigners (even if they are from neighboring countries, e.g. from Caucasus) as well as "ours", who try to frighten the country before they would be taken accountable. That's how it was in Italy, and that's how it could be in Russia. And whenever (such as recently in Italy where terrorists killed a humble employee of the Ministry of Labor) the spectre of "Red Brigades" starts to disturb people at night, one can be 99.99% sure that there are special political plans and interests behind that crime, too.

Document hippo (talk) 01:12, 3 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Talk history

The early talk history reaches until 2005 but the oldest contribution in this page is from 2016. An archive link says that no archive has been created. Could you restore the old talk history or move it to a reachable archive? --Error (talk) 18:30, 26 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Maps

--Error (talk) 18:34, 26 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Basaev lured into Dagestan

Allegations by Tretyakov that Basaev was lured into Dagestan weren't removed. They were moved to a different section of the article.

I don't think the text really provides an important point that should be discussed that early. If you feel it does, I'm fine with that, though.

The more important (and separate) point is that the text itself is not WP:NPOV. Relevant points by Ware:

6. It is far from obvious that the Kremlin would have wished to lure Basayev into Dagestan in order to start the war. Moscow has long failed to understand Dagestan, and Russian officials and Caucasus experts had assumed that Dagestan was lurching toward instability and separatism. Even in Dagestan, it would have been difficult to predict, last July, how the Dagestani population would respond to an incursion from Basayev. Thus if it had intentionally fomented the insurgency the Kremlin would, from its own perspective, have been risking civil war in Dagestan, the dramatic expansion of rebel forces, and the creation of an internationally financed radical, hostile, sustainable, Islamic state with a Caspian seaport on its southern flank, severing it from its interests in the Transcaucasus. This would seem a desperate gamble indeed.

<...>

Hence, a simple explanation of events in August and September is that Basayev became over-confident as a consequence of surrounding himself with representatives of that small minority of Dagestanis who supported him, and who appear to have misled him concerning the support he was likely to receive from the broader Dagestani population. It is likely that Basayev concluded, as indeed the Kremlin appears to have concluded, that most Dagestanis would join him in an attack upon Russian forces, which indeed were not popular in Dagestan until later on when they began to defend the Dagestanis against Basayev. Thus Basayev undertook the invasion because, like virtually everyone else outside of Dagestan, he simplistically assumed that separatist elements in Dagestan were in he ascendance.

Document hippo (talk) 20:44, 6 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Further points by Ware

Related points:

And if the Kremlin were interested in bribing Basayev to commit a raid on Russian territory in order to fire popular opinion in support of an invasion of Chechnya, then surely it would have been preferable for the Kremlin to instigate a raid into Russian ethnic territories in Stavropol or Kalmykia. Anti-caucasian prejudices, and the general Russian expectation that Dagestan would follow Chechnya, would render Russians less likely to support Dagestanis against Basayev than to support members of their own national group.

<...>

7. It is equally difficult to understand why Basayev might have accepted a Kremlin bribe to invade Dagestan in order to justify a Russian invasion of Chechnya. Here the difficulty is not in imagining that Basayev, and indeed Dagestani Wahhabis, could be bribed by the Kremlin. That is well within the realm of possibility. The problem comes in imagining that any bribe could persuade Basayev to attack his ethnic and Islamic cousins in order to legitimize the Kremlin's destruction of his homeland. Surely Basayev would know that such an arrangement would be difficult to conceal, and he certainly would know that its revelation would mean the end of his life at the hands of his own compatriots and, probably at the hands of his own teip.

Any deal that might justify the Russian conquest of his homeland would seem to be completely out of character for Basayev. And contrary to published reports, Basayev's power within Chechnya was not clearly waning in the summer of 1999. Indeed, it appeared to be growing.

Document hippo (talk) 21:59, 6 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Rumors about the impending terrorist attacks

An important point in view of this edit: no, Giulietto Chiesa didn't warn about the possibility of a terrorist attack organized by Russia. Actually even Dunlop doesn't claim that.

If you want to keep that point, please, find the quote from Chiesa's article which proves he did indeed warn about such possibility (feel free to use my translation if you wish). If you want to keep that sensence preceded by "According to John Dunlop", please, find a quote from Dunlop which proves he did indeed allege that Chiesa warned there could be a terrorist attack organized by the Russian state.

If I'm wrong, it would be fairly easy for you to prove so, since you have all the sources at your disposal.

Document hippo (talk) 21:17, 6 July 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Pages 19-20 of The Moscow Bombings of September 1999 from which I quote in part "With a high degree of certainty, one can say that the explosions of bombs killing innocent people are always planned by people with political minds. They are not fanatics, rather they are killers pursuing political goals"

RAB3L (talk) 18:08, 15 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi there, RAB3L! Yup, you are correct, but in the article Chiesa spoke about various countries, not only Russia. It's a broad enough statement. If it was a warning, he surely made it fairly vague.
Meanwhile, I've answered to your comment at my talk page. Thanks for it, just mentioning my reply so that you don't miss it. Document hippo (talk) 18:18, 15 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi DH, I don't agree. Chiesa was talking specifically, in the middle of June, about bombings in Russia, according to Dunlop's account. There's no mention of any other specific country. He was, after all, the Moscow correspondent of Stampa.

RAB3L (talk) 19:01, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi RAB3L, I suggest you to read my translation of Chiesa's article, rather than the fragments cited by Dunlop. Chiesa spoke extensively about Italy -- after all he was the Moscow correspondent of Stampa of Italian origin -- and mentioned some other countries as well.
Note that you don't have to trust my translation, but could try to make one of your own. Document hippo (talk) 20:15, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Removing OR

While all good-faith contributions to Wikipedia are appreciated, this edit has added some WP:OR.

With due respect to its author, the OR contents should be moved to the talk page (here), until it can be adequately sourced. Here's the removed content:


Meanwhile, perhaps we could have a little bit of a discussion here in the talk?

It seems to me, that a trivial explanation would be that the explosives were prepared by Wahhabis beforehand, in the anticipation that they might become useful as the leverage against the Russian authorities (similar to Basayev's Budyonnovsk moment).

So, Wahhabis invested in the capability which might or might not have been used. And once the Russian army started to deal with their invasion into Dagestan, they blew up the buildings as an act of revenge.

Perhaps I used too many words, but hopefully made it clear that IMHO there's no necessary contradiction contained in Ware's statement. Stated like that, it's OR of course, but it's only the talk page so it should be excusable. ;-)

Document hippo (talk) 00:04, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. From this article: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Whos-Blowing-Up-Russia.pdf


"This story, which openly contradicted official statements (that the terrorist acts in Moscow were committed by Chechen terrorists as revenge for their defeat in Dagestan), was first aired on the morning of 16th September, a few hours before the explosion in Volgodonsk. Moskovskiy Komsomolets published an article with a sensational headline: “Was the Kremlin making bombs?”. With reference to an anonymous intelligence analyst, the article claimed that “together with the commonly accepted story [that Chechens wanting to avenge state operations in Dagestan were behind the Moscow bombings], a series of bizarre scenarios have been considered”. Specifically, “just three hours after the first bombing on Kashirskoye Highway, it was suggested that Chechen mujahidin had nothing to do with the terrorist acts in the capital. Over time, there is more and more evidence to support this”.

According to the anonymous analyst, “simulating an attack similar to the two explosions in Moscow proves that terrorists would have needed between four and four and a half months to plan them”. But “during that time, even if the Chechens were indeed planning to invade Dagestan, they would have only been in the very early stages”. This leads to the conclusion that the terrorist acts in the capital could not have resulted from the situation in Dagestan or in Chechnya, meaning the Moscow explosions could have been the work of the FSB. The Main Directorate for Special Programs of the President of the Russian Federation (GUSP), which the article mentions, could have played a role. A part of the GUSP is “the former 15th division of the KGB which operates the underground bunkers for top public officials in case of war. The experts from this division... know how to work with explosives. Furthermore, the administration is a “pocket” presidential intelligence agency subordinate only to the head of state”.

The material unambiguously claimed that “the terrorist acts in Moscow were almost certainly carried out by professionals”. In addition, the anonymous analysts put forward the idea that “it could have been done by men hired by the Russian security services”. Naturally, the President’s spokesman Dmitry Yakushkin was quick to announce that “any suggestion of the Kremlin’s involvement in the explosion is absolutely monstrous”. "

RAB3L (talk) 17:18, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"Even with explosives to hand, four weeks or less is wholly insufficient time for preparation of an apartment bombing. "
Yep, that's why I suggested that Wahhabis had more time to prepare. Satter somehow implies that the entire narrative of the invasion started in August 1999.
While the unrest in Dagestan has been brewing for quite a long time -- well over a year -- which provided a plenty of time to prepare the invasion and the accompanying terrorist attacks.
Multiple sources say that involvement of Wahhabis in the Dagestani business continued for quite a while.
Actually even the invasion itself was preceded by a stage of infiltration which began in June, but didn't draw much attention of the federal authorities because it was, eh, slow. We don't accurately consider that point, but we might.
Document hippo (talk) 19:11, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]


As an example that preparations did indeed start well before the events, consider this insightful excerpt from the Akhmadov book (p. 138-139). The exact date is not specified, but judging from the context it was around or before July 1998 (the time when Basayev moved to Serzhen Yurt). Emphasis mine:
Document hippo (talk) 19:23, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

But that's my opinion, of course. The point you tried to insert as OR is currently reviewed in the article in the section Theory of ibn-Khattab involvement/Criticism:

I don't see how it would help if it's repeated twice. Document hippo (talk) 20:28, 16 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

OK, so you are suggesting that the Wahhabis went ahead and manufactured and/or acquired explosives for future use. That's a very reasonable suggestion. But then, before the invasion of Dagestan, they somehow transfer some of those explosives to Moscow "just in case" they are required for future use. Questionable I'd say, given the risk of being found out. Even more questionable, to say the least, when the storage used, as fairly conclusively proved by Trepashkin, was rented by Romanovich, an FSB agent - unless of course the Wahhabis were collaborating with the FSB! It was easy to frame Gochiyaev; he had known Wahhabi sympathies. Fortunately the swapping of the identifit of Romanovich for that of Gochiyaev was found by Trepashkin. So no, as far as Moscow is concerned, this theory is a non-starter.

You should also be sceptical about the Wahhabis. Zakayev, as pointed out in the article, was under the impression that the Wahhabis were sponsored by the Russians. During a crackdown in 1998, the Maskhadov government rounded up some Wahhabis and expelled them to Jordan. They were all Arabs who spoke Russian and were in the pay of the Russians. They couldn't enter Chechnya directly because the borders were tightly sealed to outsiders. They all had Jordanian passports with Russian visas and had entered Chechnya by flying first to Moscow. They could not have done so without the FSB knowing.

It would also seem that the invasion of Dagestan was facilitated by the Russians. This is covered in Dunlop's book pages 71-73:

"That the rebels would be coming into Dagestan," the deputy minister of internal affairs of Dagestan, Major General Magomed Omarov, recalled in mid-2003, "was known to everyone several months before the events. That there would be a war in August was spokenof as early as the spring (of 1999) beginning with the operational workers from the power structures and ending with the women of the bazaars.""The information, naturally was passed on to the centre," he remembered, " but why the necessary reaction did not take place is a question not to be addressed by me."

Omarov also noticed that "three mnths [before the incursions] the troops were withdrawn from the Dagestan-Chechen border, troops which had stood there for a long time.""There are many more other questions," Omarov added, "the main one of which is: why were the rebels let in without hindrance and why were they allowed to leave freely."

Retired army colonel Viktor Baranets reported in September 1999 that, "The administration of the FSB of Dagestan had over the course of the last three years mre than 2,000 times informed Moscow about the growing activity of Chechen emissaries in the republic." Baranets, citing the text of a "confidential document", reports that on 5-6 June 1999, control over a section of the border 14 kilometers long in Tsumadinskii District was transferred from the Russian Border Guards, an elite unit, to the Tsumadinskii branch of the MVD of Dagestan. "And to the excursion there remianed precisely sixty days".

Florian Hassel, Moscow correspndent of the Frankfurter Rundschau, has reported meeting, in October 1999, five Dagestani policemen who had briefly fought Basayev's troops in the Mountains:

"Basayev's attack on Dagestan was apparently organised in Moscow," said one policeman, Elgar, who watched the Chechens retreatfrom the village of Botlikh on September 11. "Basayev and his people went back comfortably in broad daylight with about 100 cars and trucks and many on foot. They used the main road to Chechnya and were not fired at by our combat helicopters. We received express orders not to attack."

The commander of a Russian special operations team in Dagestan told a correspondent for Time magazine that one one scorching August day in 1999, "he had Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev in his sights....With a simple squeeze of a finger [he] could take out Basayev.... But [he] says that he received the following order over his walki-talkie: "Hold your fire". We just watched Basyev's long column of trucks and jeeps withdraw from Dagestan back to Chechnya under cover provided by our own helicopters."

Some invasion!

RAB3L (talk) 19:51, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Well, sure thing, preparing for too much time would be dangerous, too! So there was some sort of a sweet spot, the optimal time, not too short and not too long: enough to prepare the bombs, but not long enough to get busted. But a certain degree of risk was unavoidable for terrorists. And indeed, the authorities prevented some explosions by locating and defusing the bombs.
There's definitely a fair amount of "he said, she said" thing. I'm not even sure how to comment on Zakayev's claim, of course. Wahhabism was alright until there was a serious terrorist threat by Wahhabist jihadi. Zakayev assumes that the FSB had to take action against Wahhabis in mid-1990s — but there hardly was a reason to do so. It's also definitely possible that the authorities in Chechnya and Dagestan had better insight into the dangers associated with that religion than the Kremlin. Document hippo (talk) 21:14, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act for which the revenge was intended had even started? Of course, the longer the explosives were stored in the final position of use, the more the suspicion should be that the FSB were responsible. If the FSB explosives were found (as in Ryazan) there would be no consequences! Explosions were prevented because Gochiyaev warned the authorities! The culprits could have been caught (by setting a trap) but the FSB decided to make their "find" public, possibly to avoid the embarressment of catching their own people! Trepashkin tried to investigate Gochiyaev's phone records but the FSB were uncooperative. According to Trepashkin they have no interest in finding him!

RAB3L (talk) 19:31, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"So, in other words you agree that at least one act of revenge was initiated before the act?" -- I don't see an issue, actually. Preparations might be made well before the bombings, but the final decision could be made in a few days or hours before the bombings. Document hippo (talk) 20:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks for sharing Dunlop's viewpoint.
You might find it interesting to compare it against the explanations suggested by Robert Bruce Ware:
Document hippo (talk) 20:23, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

So in effect, Ware is supporting the conspiracy theory, at least as far as Dagestan is concerned. Your scenarios are meaningless conjecture. This was not a local arrangement. It was negotiated in Beaulieu with Voloshin. Dunlop: "It is necessary for me to report here that a representative of one of the French intelligence organisations, whose identity is known to me, subsequently confirmed to an experienced Western academic, that French intelligence does indeed possess evidence that coincides roughly with what Boris Kagarlitsky wrote." RAB3L (talk) 19:42, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

No, Ware is suggesting counter-arguments to the conspiracy theory, as far as Dagestan is concerned. Those scenarios are not mine, but Ware's. A point to note: I'm not Robert Bruce Ware and have no connections whatsoever to that person, other than that I've bought his book at Amazon. Document hippo (talk) 20:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Lastly, blaming the Russian authorities for not taking an action doesn't prove anything at all. Numerous analysts claim that the mood in Russia was consistently anti-war, as evidenced by opinion polls. It's also clear that politicians in charge of the situation were reluctant to act, until well, the situation demanded the direct military response. And meanwhile, it required changing the prime minister to put the war machine into action. In retrospect, yes, we might call the Russian authorities at the moment less than competent. Incompetence is not a crime, though. Document hippo (talk) 20:36, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Have you ever made an edit in this article that was anti Russian government? Some time ago there was someone who we worked out was a Dutch nationalist. Most likely a member of Geert Wilders party, which is sponsored by Russia. So I asked him if he was working quid pro quo for the chekists. He never replied and seems to have disappeared from Wikipedia.

RAB3L (talk) 19:50, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I follow the sources. All my edits are proved by the sources, unlike at least some of yours. Moreover, I encourage you not to trust me on my word but actually read the sources I cite. I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits.
Lastly, I am not sure who are you talking about ("Dutch nationalist"). Document hippo (talk) 20:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"I don't see an issue with making anti-Russian government edits." You are avoiding the question. RAB3L (talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The question I don't have to answer, honestly. However, I've introduced some token criticism of the Russian Government to this article. Will I be awarded a medal now or something? Document hippo (talk) 21:55, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

That's criticism? More like the exception that proves the rule! Why did they need a war instead of using television? Because Yeltsin's popularity was in single figures!

RAB3L (talk) 12:00, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, it's criticism of the way the Russian authorities handled the elections since mid-1990s. Yulia Latynina has a consistent record as an opposition journalist. In 2008, she received the Freedom Defenders Award from the United States Department of State!
You've asked for one example, I've provided it. You didn't like it, fine, you can browse my edit history and study my edits in detail. I don't see how I could help you with that.
Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So... at the very least Latynina made a good point which deserves to be heard. Document hippo (talk) 22:44, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"Lastly, Yelstin's popularity was in single figures in 1996, too. So..." - good point, or maybe not: http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html. It worked once but perhaps not a second time. So something else was required, perhaps postponement or cancellation of the 2000 presidential elections? RAB3L (talk) 19:13, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

RAB3L, how does the article you've linked to support your argument?
Document hippo (talk) 19:22, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Merger of Romanovich discussion

In the article the discussion of Trepashkin's claims about Romanovich appears twice, with a significant overlap (current revision).

First, in the section Related events -> Arrest of independent investigator Trepashkin:


Second, in the section Investigations and theories -> Attempts at independent investigation:


I propose the merger of these sections. Trepashkin's claims are viewed more extensively in the second place, so I suggest the related material should be moved there. Document hippo (talk) 22:19, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Especially since it was later revealed that Romanovich died a year before the bombings, I don't think it's an overly important point, and not the one that deserves multiple discussions. Document hippo (talk) 22:56, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

How do you know that the so-called death certificate was genuine? Why did it take 10 years to "discover" it? Suspicious or what? RAB3L (talk) 21:50, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

In my view, they could contact the authorities of Cyprus to obtain the relevant information, or perhaps even the certificates themselves.
I don't claim to know the backstory, but I think the two articles in September 2009 are related. Perhaps they did the research for the first one but couldn't complete it in time and had to publish the second article. There are other possibilities, too. I don't see much utility in playing the guessing game, though. Document hippo (talk) 22:01, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Worst of all, the material has been presented like that for years. Apparently it's not obvious to notice, no wonder it evaded everyone's attention. Document hippo (talk) 23:09, 17 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Done the merger: [10].
Document hippo (talk) 00:34, 18 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Meanwhile, I wondered, how did Dunlop address the report in Novaya Gazeta that Romanovich died in 1998? Well, he found it "rather strange" (p. 155) and asked a bunch of questions (p. 156) which he apparently didn't attempt to answer:

We can't even say he doubted that article because there are just questions that are left hanging in the air. Why didn't Dunlop ask Romanovich's wife? Why didn't he address Gefter or the editorial board of Novaya Gazeta? Etc, etc.

The problem is, you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read — and Novaya Gazeta has been the major venue researching the conspiracy.

What's ever strange in that journalists of Novaya Gazeta just honestly did their job, reporting the evidence they have got? Document hippo (talk) 12:01, 18 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"you cannot arbitrarily trust and distrust the same newspaper depending on whether you like or dislike what you read" - is that not exactly what you are doing? RAB3L (talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I'm glad to see you, RAB3L. However, I'm not sure what do you mean. Could you be more specific, please? Document hippo (talk) 21:52, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

It's apparently not too difficult to acquire false death certificates in Cyprus:

http://northcyprusfreepress.com/entertainment/art-music/north-cyprus-property-muhtars-issuing-false-death-certificates/

http://news.pseka.net/index.php?module=article&id=3609

Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?

RAB3L (talk) 21:06, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

It's standard journalist business. If Novaya Gazeta adheres to high standards, they would have made all the necessary checks. While if they do not, nothing of what they report can be reliable. Which pretty much nails it, because they have been one of the major sources in this article. Hope this helps. Document hippo (talk) 21:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
"Would Trepashkin not have been aware of when Romanovich died?" He seems to have relied on the word of mouth, which could be misleading sometimes. Document hippo (talk) 21:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"He seems to have relied on the word of mouth" - How on earth can you claim that? How do you know how he obtained the information? Complete B/S!

RAB3L (talk) 21:47, 23 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

It's a bit tricky part. In his articles and the book Dunlop refers to Korolkov's article "Фоторобот не первой свежести". Here's Dunlop's translation of the relevant part (I'm citing Dunlop's article, but the relevant part of the translation looks the same in the book, at p. 139):
Here's how the original text from Korolkov's article looks:
What's lost in Dunlop's translation is some uncertainty in Trepashkin's direct speect, like he has heard that from someone else and is not entirely sure if the information in correct. A more accurate translation would be: "And after half a year I have learned that Romanovich, who had left for Cyprus by that time, was allegedly run over by a car."
You don't use the word "allegedly" if you have hard evidence, like documents.
(BTW, here's the English translation of the Russian words "будто бы".)
Hopefully, I have addressed your concerns. Document hippo (talk) 11:31, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
P.S. Another wonderful aspect is, that assuming that Romanovich died in 1998, Trepashkin is still technically correct, because he hasn't specified (and might have been unaware of) the date of Romanovich's death! Document hippo (talk) 14:12, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The Russian word for "allegedly" is "предполагаемо"; strangely it's absent from your quotation! Romanovich or not, it doesn't alter the fact that the FSB attempted to fit up Gochiyaev, as Trepashkin conclusively proved. RAB3L (talk) 21:18, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

RAB3L, I've given you a link to the dictionary. But there's an easier way. Put the Russian sentence into Google Translate, and you'll read: "And six months later I learned that Romanovich, who by that time had left for Cyprus, had allegedly been crushed by a car."
"Предполагаемо" is an uncommon Russian word, it would be strange if Trepashkin used it in an interview.
The problem with the "Romanovich or not" approach is that the proponents of the conspiracy theory, like David Satter, are still talking about Romanovich! That's from his 2016 article:
That's why we cannot just drop claims about Romanovich from the description of the conspiracy theory.
Here's a better fact: Trepashkin thought he had a clue, but he'd got it wrong. Document hippo (talk) 22:07, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

If you use Systranet (http://www.systranet.com/translate/?session=ba187eb98110d60b--5d50190f-12e3a08ec4f--2290) you get a different answer. Supposedly might be a better term than allegedly, but as used it (or allegedly) only refers to the means of death rather than the death itself. Presumably Trepashkin was not present when Romanovich died! The other "surprising" aspect is that it took ten years for the death certificate to be "discovered".

You haven't got your "facts" right about Romanovich either: "The sting resulted in a raid on a Bank Soldi branch in Moscow in Dec 1995. Trepashkin claims that the raid uncovered bugging devices used by the extortionists, whose serial numbers linked their origin to the FSB or Ministry of Defense. Furthermore, a van outside the bank was monitoring the bugging devices. In the van was Vladimir Romanovich, an FSB agent who Trepashkin claims was working for the criminals. However, most of those arrested in the sting were released. Nikolai Patrushev took Trepashkin off the case, and began an investigation of Trepashkin instead.[2]" Of course if it was the normal practice of the FSB investigating itself, you would be correct! RAB3L (talk) 11:37, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" still implies uncertainty about circumstances of his death. What I suggest is that Trepashkin didn't have evidence. If he did have any evidence which would expose the 2009 Novaya Gazeta article as a fake, why didn't he reveal it?
Meanwhile, do you know how did Trepashkin's story change after 2009? I have read a more recent (2014) interview with Trepashkin at "Radio Freedom": [11]. He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop. No discussion of the controversial accounts of Romanovich's death (his pre-2009, and Novaya Gazeta's in 2009), and no claims whatsoever regarding Romanovich's death. Looks like he doesn't have reasons to doubt Novaya Gazeta — other than he might find discussing that story embarrassing for himself.
The simplest theory would be that certificates were first obtained in 2009, because it's the first time anyone started looking for them.
I don't think it's a tremendous effort to contact the authorities in Cyprus and ask them to provide details about Romanovich's death. It could still be done now — if either Dunlop, Satter or Trepashkin wanted to do that, they had a plenty of time to obtain that information.
I haven't said Romanovich wasn't FSB agent. Novaya Gazeta hasn't said that either. What they said is "We consider it necessary to apologize to the family of the deceased for that ... we mentioned his name in the context of ... possible connections of that person with Russia's FSB."
Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent. No, it doesn't, if you read it literally.
Why did Novaya make that point?
I think, after they learnt of Romanovich's death in 1998, they lost any interest whatsoever to other circumstances of his life. Instead of finding proof he was an FSB agent, they thought it's easier to apologize and forget about that.
Document hippo (talk) 22:58, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"as if machine[car] would crush [Romanovich]" - is a comment on the means of death, not when the death occurred. Clear? "He says that he saw a facial composite of fake-Laipanov, which he recognized as his ex-colleague Romanovich... After that, full stop." - What Trepashkin doesn't say is no evidence of anything. What is more important to the case is that an attempt was made to switch the identity of the person responsible for renting the basements. Trepashkin thought it might be Romanovich but his only evidence was a photofit, so he could have been wrong. In the same article, Trepashkin describes Romanovich as an FSB informer. "Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! It's interesting perhaps that Trepashkin considers that it would have been impossible to transfer explosives by road into Moscow, either before or during September. 89.241.95.151 (talk) 18:54, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"Dunlop thinks it means Romanovich wasn't FSB agent." - where does that come? Not from me! -- Alright. Dunlop doesn't think what I thought he thought.
I hope you are alright.
Document hippo (talk) 13:15, 1 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Found another place with duplicate information, which I removed. The same info can be found in the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war". I point out that no information is removed from the article. But there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. If the discussion about Yeltsin and Putin's role in the Second Chechen war seems to be more appropriate in any other place than the section "Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war", it could be moved there. But I repeat it, there's no reason to repeat the same info twice. It doesn't serve any end but irritates the reader. Document hippo (talk) 14:09, 18 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Another strange bit in the current revision (section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars"):


Regarding the bold part of the text, Felshtinsky only claims that FSB supported Putin. He doesn't say that the FSB supported Putin because the Family supported Putin. I can see some issues with that. That would imply the FSB was somehow dependent on the Family, which makes the Family the entity which ruled the FSB. Anyway, stated like that it's OR, because the claim is not supported by the reference.

Please think of how it could be fixed to reintegrate that or a similar thought into the article. Document hippo (talk) 00:00, 19 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Where does it say "that the FSB supported Putin because the family supported Putin"? That's just wilful mis-interpretation! Nothing more. Perhaps you have problems understanding English?

RAB3L (talk) 17:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for your reply, RAB3L. Indeed, the basic grammar structure of that passage is:
" why would the FSB have preferred Putin ...? ... Why? Because Putin was supported by the "Family" "
It means, that the FSB would have preferred Putin because Putin was supported by the "Family".
I don't think it requires extraordinary English skills to make that conclusion.
Document hippo (talk) 18:08, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

OK, both Putin and Primakov were FSB but Primakov was a lot older and not a long-term prospect perhaps. If Putin was backed by the "Family" and FSB and Primakov was only backed by the FSB, which of the two was the likely winner? Simple really!

RAB3L (talk) 19:20, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

It's still not a proof of the argument that Putin was favoured by the FSB because the Family preferred him. Even so, we have to rely on sources. Document hippo (talk) 20:47, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Further bit. Section "Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Analysts".


Very well. Here's what we are being told in the preceding section "Section Investigations and theories -> Theory of Russian government conspiracy -> Criticism -> Scholars":


There's a significant overlap. I propose a merger of these two fragments. Document hippo (talk) 00:16, 19 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Merged the two fragments into one. Document hippo (talk) 00:38, 19 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]


Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war

Under the above title:

Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:


Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? It's just a stupid statement and should be removed!

I have hopefully addressed your concerns below. Let's keep any further discussion there. Thanks, Document hippo (talk) 18:39, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Wrongly attributed claim about Yushenkov and Schekochikhin

In the current revision, section Analysts:


This statement is followed by the reference "Foiled Attack or Failed Exercise? A Look at Ryazan 1999". That reference says lots of things. For example,


The only thing it doesn't say is anything to support the claims made in the current revision of the article.

The first author of the cited fragment has inserted an unreferenced statement, and the second author might have inadvertently used the wrong link as the reference. It's actually no big deal at all. But until the correct link is found (which does prove the statement, so that we can correctly attribute it) I suggest that the cited fragment should be removed from the article.

Document hippo (talk) 17:53, 21 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Death of a Dissident by Goldfarb for the first sentence and https://www.bu.edu/iscip/digest/vol8/ed0810.html for the second sentence. Please restore.

RAB3L (talk) 19:38, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, but I'll have to find the page number of the book before I could proceed. Meanwhile, I perceive it as a sign of disrespect when I see a reference to the entire book, rather than the specific page number (or a small range of page numbers). Looking up the page numbers is the part of the job of the person providing the reference. Document hippo (talk) 19:55, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I admit you have the source for the second sentence. (UPDATE: made a self-revert on that sentence. Document hippo (talk) 20:24, 24 August 2017 (UTC))[reply]
But here's what Death of a Dissident says, pp. 277-279:


I don't see it as a clear-cut issue. Document hippo (talk) 20:11, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

If you refer back to the opening sentence of this section, all I said was that Yushenkov was assassinated, he was shot, but I didn't say who by. You are being way too defensive. Also why would you classify someone's medical records unless the cause of death was suspicious and the government was involved in his death? Pages 278-9. RAB3L (talk) 12:22, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

In those pages I can see that Yushenkov was killed, and Schekochihin's medical chart ended up "classified".
Alright. Made another self-revert / partial rewrite — that much I can say based on the provided source, and some other source I have looked up for Yushenkov's date of death. Document hippo (talk) 13:23, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
If you look at my edits (like I suggested), you could see that I spend a part of my time hunting for citations. I believe it's an essential point that the information in the Wikipedia articles should be WP:Verifiable. If you follow WP:Verifiability, we will be friends.
Document hippo (talk) 23:08, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Allegations that Russians planned the Second Chechen war

Under the above title:

Andrew Jack, former Moscow bureau chief for the Financial Times, quoted a "very senior official from the period" who dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned:


Stepahin's statements were made in early 2000 and were solely about Chechnya. There was, as far as I have found, no mention of any invasion of Dagestan. How could there be? It would have been secret but it appears that he was aware of it at the time. So how could statements made in early 2000 about Chechnya (only), have any effect on Dagestan in 1999? What it does suggest though is that there was a conspiracy!

RAB3L (talk) 18:16, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The core statement is "dismissed as bravado Stepashin's claims that the military operations were long planned" -- that's 100% relevant, and actually a direct quote from Jack's book. The further quotation merely serves to illustrate Stepashin's lack of grip on the reality. Document hippo (talk) 18:22, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, that applies to Chechnya and Chechnya only, not Dagestan. Stephashin knew what would happen in Dagestan at the time but the military could not be forewarned! How could they when they had seemingly made every attempt to hollow out the defences?? How could he have made it known that the Russians knew what was going to happen but did nothing? Jack's statement does in fact reinforce the suspicion that it was a conspiracy.

RAB3L (talk) 19:09, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

You suggest that Stepashin was actually a part of the conspiracy. It's an interesting theory. But, wouldn't it make the circle of conspirators dangerously wide? But that's only my thoughts. Such possibility cannot be ruled out. However, due to the Wikipedia:Biographies of living persons policy we would need a good source to claim that Sergei Stepashin was involved in the conspiracy. If you find one, feel free to contribute. Document hippo (talk) 19:41, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

No, I didn't suggest that Stephasin was part of the conspiracy, only that he knew about it: https://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n20/jonathan-steele/doing-well-out-of-war It seems he didn't have the stomach for war and was trying to avoid it; that's maybe why he was replaced as prime minister. RAB3L (talk) 17:52, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Please, could you cite the relevant fragment of the article which makes you think Stepashin knew about the conspiracy? Thanks, Document hippo (talk) 18:55, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"In the summer of 1999, Berezovsky, by then no longer a member of the government, says he was visited by a Chechen ally of Basaev, who asked him how Russia would react to a Chechen incursion into Dagestan. Berezovsky says he told his visitor it would be a crazy thing to do and would lose Chechens their international support. But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control. Berezovsky may be biased, but after he lost his job Stepashin himself told a Russian newspaper that the Kremlin had started planning a second invasion of Chechnya in March 1999, long before the Basaev offensive in Dagestan." RAB3L (talk) 12:25, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

What can I say? Steele has not said that Stepashin was a part of the conspiracy. What he has indeed said is that Stepashin got the information from Berezovsky. And then told him to get quiet. Doesn't that prove that Stepashin was ineffective in his job, like Jack's interlocutor claimed? Document hippo (talk) 12:42, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"But when Berezovsky contacted Sergei Stepashin, Putin’s predecessor as prime minister, Stepashin is supposed to have told him to keep quiet because everything was under control." Doesn't that imply that Stepashin already knew? Either your understanding of English is limited or you are guilty of willful mis-interpretation (again). 89.241.95.151 (talk) 17:25, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Glad to see you!
I've understood your point perfectly well, but I disagree with it.
You claim that Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion into Dagestan before it happened. Which supposedly means that he knew about the "conspiracy".
In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy.
That point is clearly stated in a book by David E. Hoffman, an American journalist who served as the Moscow bureau chief for the Washington Post.
Here's is an excerpt from pp.548-549 of his famous book, "The Oligarchs: Wealth and Power in the New Russia":
(Footnote 39)
Hope this helps!
Document hippo (talk) 19:00, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"In reality, Stepashin knew about a Chechen incursion, but it had no relation to any sort of a conspiracy." - How is the above proof of this statement? In any case, whether Stepahin was part of any conspiracy or not, doesn't prove either way whether there was a conspiracy. RAB3L (talk) 19:24, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

That's a point about conspiracies: they are not falsifiable, so no kind of an argument can convincingly disprove a conspiracy.
However, the above citation does prove that there were reasons for Stepashin's claims other than indications of a potential conspiracy.
Such as, Russia had intelligence, but taking a defensive action was complicated for purely military reasons.
Document hippo (talk) 19:35, 31 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, there were negotiations with Basyev about starting the War of Dagestan, but this should be only briefly mentioned on this page because the subject of this page is different. My very best wishes (talk) 03:34, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Allegations that Russians negotiated the incursion into Dagestan with Chechens

Under the above:

"Former foreign minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Ilyas Akhmadov believes the story about Basayev and Voloshin meeting in Nice wasn't based on fact, and Basayev hasn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shorts while Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously are that Basayev was a participant of a rally in Grozny a day before the alleged meeting, and that Akhmadov doesn't know an instance when Shamil Basayev left the North Caucasus in the years after the First Chechen War.[224]"

In the original Versiya article, there is no mention of Basayev being present in Nice. Therefore this non-fact cannot be used to prove that Basayev did not travel to France. According to Versiya, Basayev landed at Beaulieu, which is between Nice and Monaco, from a British or English yacht 'Magic' which had sailed from Malta. Beaulieu was the location of Khashoggi's villa. He was identified by both French and Israeli intelligence. Surikov also denied being in France but he lied; public records showed that he flew to Paris by Aeroflot and returned from Nice. How is it that Akhmadov was so aware of Basayev's every movement?

RAB3L (talk) 19:10, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Indeed, Versiya article said about Basayev being near Nice (Beaulieu-sur-Mer is located at a distance 9.7 km from Nice), rather than in the city itself. We might point out that Akhmadov has spoken about "Nice" rather than "a place near Nice". Still, there are no doubts he referred to that article. Assuming otherwise would be cherry picking.
"How is it that Akhmadov was so aware of Basayev's every movement?" -- Akhmadov was in a top leadership position. He got acquainted with Basayev during the First Chechen war. In 1999 he started serving as a Foreign Minister of Chechnya. As a top politician, he communicated extensively with Basayev. Document hippo (talk) 19:55, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Also, Akhmadov is not the only source claiming that the day before the alleged meeting Basayev attended a public rally. Document hippo (talk) 19:56, 22 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

So we can rely on Akhmadov's knowledge of Basayev's everyday movements more than that of the French and Israeli intelligence services? The Versiya articles mentions that Basayev was identified by his passport. How come that Basayev was able to travel to France without risking arrest when he was supposedly considered such a threat by Russia? Suspicious or what? The Russians only issued an international arrest warrant for him in February 2000: http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jan/20/news/mn-55816 You'll notice also that Surikov lied about travelling to France. RAB3L (talk) 17:41, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"So we can rely on Akhmadov's knowledge of Basayev's everyday movements more than that of the French and Israeli intelligence services?"
As Wikipedia editors, we must not add any text which would prioritize one version over the other, and which would constitute original research.
It's up to the reader to make his/her own judgement based on the facts reviewed in the article.
Similarly, I cannot tell you how to feel about this issue. Document hippo (talk) 18:28, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Russian-language sources such as "Open letter to Irina Smit from Chechenpress.org"[12] confirm the information that on July 3, 1999 Shamil Basaev attended a public (and televised) meeting in Grozny. Document hippo (talk) 18:46, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Also, while Akhmadov authored the book, he was a sufficiently high-profile figure for Zbigniew Brzezinski to write an introduction to the book (he is actually listed as a co-author). Document hippo (talk) 18:51, 24 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]
P.S. I've added a mention of a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research about a rally in Grozny on July 3, 1999, that was attended by Basayev. Just wanted to mention that while that institute doesn't have an English page, it is a real thing. Here's an English bio of its director which includes a bit of information about the institute [13]. Document hippo (talk) 12:35, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

WMD claims

From Fawaz Gerges, pp.59-60, "The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global" (2005), comparison of Ibn al-Khattab to Osama bin Laden:


From Walid Phares, p. 206, "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America" (2005):


I believe it would be a bit of overkill (no pun intended) to introduce the WMD claims to this article, but please don't tell me poor mujahideen had no reason to attack Russia. Document hippo (talk) 17:22, 25 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Mmmmmm...at Dubrovka it seems that the FSB had an agent on the inside, Ruslan Elmurzaev, who survived the siege, according to one of the negotiators, film director Sergei Govorukhin. Arman Menkeev, a retired GRU explosives expert made all of the "terrorist's" bombs, most of which lacked a vital component. After questioning by the FSB in Lefortovo, they commented that he was "loyal to the Russian government", adding that "He knows how to keep a military and state secret". Needless to say, he is not in custody. At Beslan, it was the FSB terrorists that fired tank rounds and thermobaric RPG's into a school containing hundreds of innocent schoolchildren, just simply to forestall Maskhadov's attempt at mediation. All in Dunlop's book on Dubrovka and Beslan. Not to mention all the wahahbis whose only route to Chechnya/Dagestan was via Moscow with a Russian visa! Back to the drawing board for you!

There's no better answer to the above than that of the late Dmitry Furman: "it proceeds from a model not of rational conduct by intelligent evil-doers but from the conduct of idiots, whose motives are impossible to understand.... The first idiocy is that of the terrorists.... For what reason did the 'Wahhabis' need to blow up houses in Moscow? Did they think that by doing so they would halt the war in Chechnya? Or, on the contrary, did they want to provoke it? But for what reason? To be sure, terrorists are evildoers and fanatics, but any evil deed must have some goal. Analogies with the events of 11 September or Palestinian terror do not help. In both of these cases the goal is clear.... But no rational goal is visible behind the organization of the Moscow explosions by 'Wahhabis'. The second "idiocy" contained in the official version is "the idiocy of the FSB." The Ryazan maneuvers (if they were that and not a failed terrorist act) are so ungainly that all attempts to explain them fail, since they presuppose almost unimaginable stupidity. Why then has no-one been sentenced to prison or even removed from his post for such a stupidity?" — Preceding unsigned comment added by RAB3L (talk • contribs) 13:36, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

RAB3L (talk) 13:24, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I'm not currently looking into Dubrovka and Beslan cases. I would need to do some research before I could comment on those claims (in case I would). Document hippo (talk) 13:34, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

It's you that brought them into the discussion, not me!RAB3L (talk) 13:39, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Didn't have the intention to expand the scope of the current discussion. Sorry for not making that clear. Document hippo (talk) 13:56, 28 August 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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The lead

  • This edit. Yes, the claims are sourced. If you wish, you can place them in the body of the page. I made the edit because: (a) the intro did not summarize the content of the page, but instead included a discussion of different positions on the subject, (b) the intro was too long, poorly written and not logical. If you can improve my last version by making it even shorter and more clearly written, please do. If you think some important info was missing, please tell what was missing, let's discuss it and possibly include. But simply reverting everything is hardly the way to achieve consensus here. My very best wishes (talk) 03:55, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The problem is, the alternative version gives undue weight to the conspiracy theory, which many of the editors who wrote at this talk page did oppose. People like Strobe Talbott, Ariel Cohen and Thomas de Waal are not less notable than Felshtinsky, Litvinenko or Berezovsky. There's no attempt to discuss, but rather than that, the lead provides indication of various attitutes towards the conspiracy theory. Document hippo (talk) 04:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Where does it tell that "false flag attack" theory was "the truth"? This version of intro only gives some factual information and tells that the "false flag attack" explanation exist/was suggested by such and such researchers. Well, if you think we should add that some other authors who believed that such explanation was wrong, I do not really mind. I would only suggest to include only such authors who wrote a book or at least a chapter of a book on the subject of this page. There are many people who did not study this subject, but only have a opinion (piece). They do not belong to the intro, and possibly even do not belong to the page. Would that be OK? My very best wishes (talk) 04:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Like I've previously explained at this talk page, conspiracy theories are not falsifiable. Therefore, no one could ever say that this particular explanation is wrong. No kind of an argument exists which would prove it wrong.

The only thing which can be said is that there's no evidence for it. Even David Satter wrote that there's no direct evidence of the theory of FSB involvement:[14]


And that's pretty much it. You don't need a chapter to say there's no evidence. Document hippo (talk) 04:58, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, sure. That's why my version does not tell there is a direct evidence of anything. Yes, sure, let's cite Satter exactly as you did. I do not mind. I am only telling that the lead must summarize content of the page. If we have something about about the research by Strobe Talbott or Ariel Cohen on this subject in the body of the page, then let's reflect this in the lead. But if we do not, this should not appear in the lead. My very best wishes (talk) 04:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Why, the lead does summarize the content of the article. The article does indeed review facts pertaining to the bombings, it does indeed provide some context, it does review the theory of FSB involvement, and it does provide a further discussion. Document hippo (talk) 05:13, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
How come? Where the body of the page tells about the research on the subject by Arien Cohen? I do not see it. What we are going to summarize? Where the body of the page tells about research by Thomas de Waal? I can see only one his quotation, and it is not consistent with summary about his opinion in the lead. Where it tells about "His [Putin] popularity, combined with Boris Berezovsky’s money, allowed the pro-Putin Unity Party to win the second place in the elections to the State Duma" and why this is relevant at all to this page and must be included in the lead? And so on. My very best wishes (talk) 05:20, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Frankly, I was puzzled why there was the statement that "The war in Chechnya boosted the popularity of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was previously the director of the FSB, and helped the pro-war Unity Party succeed in the elections to the State Duma and helped Putin attain the presidency within a few months." But what puzzled me more is that it was not historically correct, that's why I replaced it with a more accurate version. I don't think it really changed anything.
Talbott, Cohen and de Waal are notable because of their work in or around Russia, and because of their standing in the society. It's perfectly OK to briefly link to them in the lead. If you wish, I could further expand their views in the body of the article. Document hippo (talk) 05:35, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Once again, I am only telling that the lead should summarize content of the page, and it does not. Bringing random opinions (that are not explained and discussed in the body) to the lead is WP:SYN in the lead. I also do not think that a lot of personal opinions belongs to the body of the page. If someone did research on the subject and published a book or a chapter of a book about it (like Satter, Felshinsky, Litvinenko and some others), then yes, this should be described in the body and briefly mentioned in the lead. But if someone wrote an opinion piece (no matter "pro" or "contra" something), that does not belong to the page. My very best wishes (talk) 14:24, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
In addition, claims in intro are not consistent with sources. Here is publication by Thomas de Waal. OK, it can be used as source here, but it tells "Former Kremlin insider accuses President Putin of collusion in the 1999 bomb blasts that triggered the second Chechen war". This is not what the lead of this page tells about Thomas de Waal. My very best wishes (talk) 14:44, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Irrelevant content

I removed this section [15] because it was about connections between Berezovsky and Chechens, but not about subject of this page. Yes, it is widely known that he paid Chechens ransoms for hostages, but this is an entirely different story. My very best wishes (talk) 14:30, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]

My very best wishes, as a contributor to that section, I'm conflicted about it. I'm concerned that Berezovsky's involvement is discussed in numerous texts. Whether it is better to just drop the entire story, or to provide a detailed discussion, is a tough question. I'm concerned that someone will bring it up in future. Document hippo (talk) 14:59, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Also, if this question ever arises again, a note to future contributors. Kulikov's statement that Berezovsky paid $10M to Chechen warlords is contested. Paul Klebnikov (2000 book, p. 301) wrote that "Berezovsky had donated $1 million in cash, possibly more, to Shamil Basayev". Akhmadov claimed that the only money Basayev received from Berezovsky was $1M -- and that he personally seen bags of money in Basayev's house. Document hippo (talk) 15:18, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Does this section includes any well sourced allegations that Berezovsky funded terrorists to arrange these bombings? No, it does not, if I understand correctly. But then how it is relevant to the subject of the bombings (this page)? Yes, there were allegations about Berezovsky being engaged in talks with Basayev about starting the Dagestan war. But that's another page. My very best wishes (talk) 15:16, 10 September 2017 (UTC)[reply]
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