Rational egoism

For other forms of egoism, see Egoism.

In ethical philosophy, rational egoism is the principle that an action is rational if and only if it maximizes one's self-interest. The view is a normative form of egoism. However, it is different from other forms of egoism, such as ethical egoism and psychological egoism. While psychological egoism is about motivation and ethical egoism is about morality, rational egoism is a view about rationality.

Philosophy

Rational egoism is discussed by the nineteenth-century English philosopher Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics. A method of ethics is ‘any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings “ought” – or what it is “right” for them – to do, or seek to realize by voluntary action’ . Sidgwick considers three such procedures, namely, rational egoism, dogmatic intuitionism and utilitarianism. Rational egoism is the view that, if rational, ‘an agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself alone important in choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain’.

Sidgwick found it difficult to find any persuasive reason for preferring rational egoism over utilitarianism. Although utilitarianism can be provided with a rational basis and reconciled with the morality of common sense, rational egoism appears to be an equally plausible doctrine regarding what we have most reason to do. Thus we must ‘admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory’ .

One objection to the theory is its apparently arbitrary nature. If it is arbitrary to act only in the interests of brown-haired people, or of people born in January, or of people called 'Tod', why is it not equally arbitrary to act only in my own self-interest? It fails to be arbitrary only if I can give a reason, but I can give no other reason than the theory itself. It could be objected that I have a natural preference for myself (just as I have a natural preference for brown-haired people, or people called 'Tod', perhaps). But there are two counter-objections. First, the objection still does not show how the preference is not arbitrary. Simply noting that I like people called 'Tod', without giving any reason or justification, seems entirely arbitrary. What makes a preference for myself any less arbitrary? Second, I might simply lack a natural preference for myself. In that case, a distinction between myself and others would clearly be arbitrary, and the rationalist egoist theory would fail to apply to me.

Two further objections to rational egoism are given by the English philosopher Derek Parfit, who discusses the theory at length in Reasons and Persons. First, from the rational egoist point of view, it is rational to contribute to a pension scheme now, even though this is detrimental to my present interests (which are to spend the money now). But it seems equally reasonable to maximise my interests now, given that my reasons are not only relative to me, but to me as I am now (and not my future self, who is in effect a different person). Parfit also argues that since the connections between my present mental state and the mental state of my future selves may decrease, it is not plausible to claim (as rational egoism does) that I should be indifferent between my present and future selves.

Social sciences

Rational egoism is the standard behavioral postulate of neoclassical economics and of rational actor theory in political science. The economic assumption of rational egoism is often referred to in terms of the implied model of the individual, homo economicus, a term that has been used at least since Pareto (1906).

In both fields, the postulate has been criticized and defended on a range of empirical and philosophical grounds. For example, in political science, the assumption of rational egoism gives rise to the paradox of voting - given the low probability of being decisive, relative to the personal benefit from a change in the outcome, voting in elections is not rational unless the number of electors is very small. Supporters of rational egoism, however, might point out that this argument is not sound because cultural influences might incentivize voting. Additionally, Scott Aaronson notes that the likelihood of one vote being decisive is on the order of the square root of the number of voters, due to the central limit theorem. However, the utility of a vote could be expected to scale linearly with the number of voters, implying that one should vote because its importants outweighs the chance that it will make a difference.

Criticism

A general reaction to rational egoism is the erroneous belief that it allows people to do anything they want to maximize their pleasure.

Prisoner's dilemma

Egoists debate whether or not the prisoners dilemma can be applied to the philosophy of rational egoism.

It is purported that the possibility exists for situations to arise where acting on selfishness will not yield the best result.. An example of this situation, known as Prisoner's dilemma, is discussed in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. In this situation, two suspects in an investigation are taken into custody and split up. Each is offered a plea bargain individually, if they turn state's evidence and betray the other. If they both betray, they each serve 2 years in prison. However, if the other suspect doesn't betray, then the one betraying goes free and the other serves 10 years. If neither betrays, then they will only spend six months in prison. The dilemma can be summarized as thus;

	Prisoner B Stays Silent	Prisoner B Betrays
Prisoner A Stays Silent	Both serve six months	Prisoner A serves ten years Prisoner B goes free
Prisoner A Betrays	Prisoner A goes free Prisoner B serves ten years	Both serve two years

This purports to show that circumstances may exist in which rational pursuit of self-interest does not lead to a Pareto optimal solution.

See also

• Ethical egoism
• Psychological egoism
• Objectivist ethics

• Invisible Hand
• Ayn Rand
• Prisoner's dilemma

References and further reading

• Baier, Kurt (1990). "Egoism" in A Companion to Ethics. Peter Singer (ed.), Blackwell: Oxford.
• Brink, D. 1992, “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Essays on Henry Sidgwick, ed. B. Schultz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Gauthier, David (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Gert, Bernard (1998). Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Oxford University Press.
• Kagan, S., 1986, “The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality,” Ethics 96: 746-759.
• McKenzie, Alexander J. (2003). "Evolutionary Game Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). link
• Moseley, Alexander (2006). "Egoism". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.). link
• Mueller, D. (1989). Public Choice II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
• Rand, Ayn (1964). The Virtue of Selfishness. New American Library.
• Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Parfit, D., 1986, Reply to Kagan, Ethics, 96: 843-846, 868-869. *Shaver, Robert (1998). Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History. Cambridge University Press.
• Shaver, Robert (2002). "Egoism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). link
• Sigwick, H., The Methods of Ethics. London, 1874, 7th ed. 1907.
• Smith, Tara (2006). Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
• Sober, E. & D.S. Wilson (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press.

External links

• Egoism in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Egoism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• The Red/Black Game
• Game Theory and Objectivism
• Ayn Rand Lexicon entry (an encyclopedia of Ayn Rand's writings) on Selfishness (rational egoism)