Talk:Nuclear program of Iran

The Bush Administration Non-Proliferation Initiative

I am unsure whether this program is active and how relevant it is specifically to the Iranian program. Is there any parallel with the Proliferation Security Initiative? If so, I believe this should be merged in to that and there should be a brief summary under U.S. views here.--69.208.138.130 (talk) 14:21, 4 February 2009 (UTC)

I think most of this section doesn't really belong. I had suggested adding an article on nuclear fuel cycle policy, or a section on fuel cycle policy in the article on Nuclear energy policy, and making the section here a simple cross reference. It remains of some historical interest, because it was part of the Bush Administration's policy response to Iran's nuclear program. It was intended to isolate Iran by providing an alternative to an indigenous enrichment program that other countries embrace. Instead, Iran skillfully used these initiatives to argue that the West was opposed not just to Iran's enrichment program, but was aiming to deny nuclear technology to developing countries. Many took up Iran's side of the "haves" versus "have-nots" debate.

The initiative is loosely related to PSI in that both were Bush Administration nonproliferation initiatives, and both featured prominently in his February 11, 2004 speech at National Defense University "President Announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of WMD" (the first and fourth initiatives). It might make sense for someone to compile an article on actions that followed from that speech, which dominated Bush Administration nonproliferation policy from then on. NPguy (talk) 03:10, 8 February 2009 (UTC)

The section is HIGHLY relevant to Iran's nuclear program because it is the basis and reason for the arguments against Iran's nuclear enrichment program. It is the context.

The Bush nonproliferation initiatives are not really the basis for those arguments. They were proposed after Iran's enrichment program came to light in part as an attempt to prevent "future Irans." NPguy (talk) 01:23, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

That's nonsense. The efforts to restrict fuel cycles predates the Bush administration, as the section you've deleted clearly stated. It goes back to 1980. From the Iranian view, this whole controversy is about depriving Iran of an independent nuclear fuel cycle capability, not an anti-proliferation measure. This view is widely shared by other countries, and yet you've decided to totally remove that context from this article even though it was well-cited, supported, and part of Iran's position. Why is that? In short, you've totally removed the fact that Iran;s -- and potentially "other Irans'" nuclear fuel cycles -- are part of a greater North-South conflict.

We are talking about whether policy initiatives put forward by President Bush in 2004 were basis for opposition to Iran's enrichment program. They couldn't have been, since the opposition predates the policy initiatives. Of course the longstanding U.S. opposition to the spread of enrichment technology was part of the U.S. nonproliferation policy framework, and therefore relevant to Iran. NPguy (talk) 21:31, 7 May 2009 (UTC)

Just for some clarity, I was the one who argued for merging this with Proliferation Security Initiative or giving it its own article because it just seemed slightly out of place here. Anyways, I wouldn't object if you readded it or summarized it here, I was just trying to help reorganize the article and didn't see how relevant it would be, especially with a new administration.--99.162.60.191 (talk) 02:36, 9 May 2009 (UTC)

Economist op-ed

There are two relevant passages from this op-ed:

IF YOU are locked eyeball to eyeball with an adversary as wily as Iran, it does not make much sense to do something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends. But that, it is now clear, is precisely what America's spies achieved when they said in December that, contrary to their own previous assessments, Iran stopped its secret nuclear-weapons programme in 2003.

In his final state-of-the-union speech this week, George Bush called on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment “so negotiations can begin”—a far cry from the fiery “axis of evil” speech he unleashed against Iran, Iraq and North Korea six years ago. This will add to Iran's belief that the NIE has made it harder for Mr Bush to brandish the military option that he has insisted remains “on the table”. The threat of force had put some steel into the six-power diplomacy. Presuming Mr Bush's guns to be now truly spiked, his critics at home are cheering along with the Iranians.

Criticizing the American intelligence community and advocating the threat of the usage of force are perfectly acceptable, but they give this op-ed a stance which clearly isn't in-line with the official position of at least the intelligence portion of the American government. If this isn't going to be under a section entitled "US and European viewpoint", then it seems perfectly reasonable to point this out.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 05:51, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

Objections to edits by 75.2.7.232. I think the grammatical changes you made to the articled were nonconstructive at best, at worst they changed the meaning of the sentences. To make the article easier to read, and to include all the information of the original grammar, I just reverted the whole edit. I also object to the method in which you inserted this quotation.

An op-ed published in January 2008 in The Economist, critical of the American intelligence community for doing "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends", opined that "learning to enrich uranium—a hugely costly venture—still makes questionable economic sense for Iran, since it lacks sufficient natural uranium to keep them going and [they] would have to import the stuff."

The wording you chose to use, and how you chose to intertwine the quotations add unneeded POV to the article. I think if you wish to include the economic opine from the economist fine, but craft a better way of framing the "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends" part or leave it out.

The info you added about the yellow cake is good, it just does not belong in that section. The fact needed tag was a good addition and I would not object to its inclusion. TWilliams9 (talk) 06:04, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

So could you provide a specific wording from the article which you find acceptable and which conveys its viewpoint? Adding its advocation of the treat of usage of force seems perfectly acceptable to me, but I was hoping you would propose something you find acceptable instead of simply saying what doesn't work.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:06, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

Another sample proposal:

An op-ed published in January 2008 in The Economist, which saw threats of force against Iran as beneficial to the negotation process, opined that "learning to enrich uranium—a hugely costly venture—still makes questionable economic sense for Iran, since it lacks sufficient natural uranium to keep them going and [they] would have to import the stuff."

Also, the quote seems to be fairly redundant with the ISIS report, so removing it would be another option to me.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:10, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

Both of those are fine with me, as the particular part of the quotation i was objecting to is gone. I didn't like the "something that emboldens your opponent and sows defeatism among your friends" part, you have now worded that in a much better manner. TWilliams9 (talk) 06:16, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

I just removed it since this is mutually acceptable, it seems redundant with the ISIS, and it is not completely representative of the U.S. and European viewpoint since it criticizes some of their stances.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 06:20, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

I disagree. The article does not duplicate the ISIS report. The Economist op-ed argues on the grounds of cost that Iran's enrichment program does not make sense as part of a nuclear power program. The ISIS report points out that Iran lacks sufficient proven uranium resources to fuel a nuclear power program. I have restored the citation.

As to the question of whether this is a "western" view, I think it accurately reflects the dismay in many countries - including the U.S. government - that the poorly worded NIE was misinterpreted as saying Iran was no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. So I continue to believe that the qualification is unnecessary and irrelevant in the paragraph in question. It is relevant to the discussion of the NIE, and it would make sense to insert it there.

I would also like to complain that IP editor 75.2.7.232 felt he or she had sufficient basis for deleting this citation based on the discussion above. Since I was the person objecting to the change, and had not yet participated in the discussion, I found this presumptuous. Even without my participation, I don't see anything in the discussion to justify that conclusion. NPguy (talk) 04:03, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

The Economist is clearly a Western view as it is a Western source, but the point that it is in disagreement with the American intelligence community (which it opines is "emboldening the opponent" and "sowing defeat among friends"), and the American intelligence community has since reaffirmed most of the major findings if you are to believe Dennis Blair's testimony before Congress. I also believe almost all the Western governments have come out against threats of force as a way to manipulate Iran (which the article clearly espouses). The content was removed because I proposed this or another wording and TWilliams said either proposal seemed okay to him. I will just tag the material until we can find a mutually acceptable wording (any proposal you have about characterizing the op-ed would be welcome, or you could refer to three proposals which have already been put forward).--75.2.7.232 (talk) 04:52, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

The article was clearly in line with western thinking about Iran - more so than the U.S. NIE. The idea that the threatened use of force can be constructive may not be the mainstream view, but the United States has consistently refused to rule out the use of force. In any case, the argument quoted - that Iran's enrichment program does not make economic sense - is the consensus of western governments. NPguy (talk) 04:02, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

As much as you may argue an op-ed is representative of official governmental policy in a number of countries, the op-ed directly contradicted and criticized the [still official stance] of the United States of activities within Iran. It is also worth noting that "failing to rule out" is not the same as advocating a threat of force, and that even if it were European governments[1][2][3] have taken exception with even "failing to rule out". The op-ed is and wants to be out of sync with the governments, so we should characterize its opinion as such.

I've made three proposals so far. A fourth proposal would be for you to just cite the governments which you claim say this.--75.2.7.232 (talk) 05:09, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

On the point for which this quote is being used - the economic illogic of Iran's enrichment program - it reflects western views. The other issues are not relevant to the point at hand. I see no problem. NPguy (talk) 01:17, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

You aren't providing a source to show it is in-sync with the Western viewpoint and it is not in-sync with the Western viewpoint on a host of other issues. It should either be pointed out that it disagrees with the Western viewpoint (at least on a host of other issues), or another source which is more reflective/shows it is the Western viewpoint should be used..--99.130.160.222 (talk) 03:21, 22 February 2009 (UTC)

OVERVIEW INACCURACY AND BIAS

The claim that the UNSC's demand that Iran abandon enrichment is just as "In every previous case of safeguards non-compliance involving clandestine enrichment or reprocessing" is patently false and shows an agenda. BOTH N KOREA AND LIBYA HAD A WEPONS PROGRAM, UNLIKE IRAN, AND SO THE COMPARISON IS NONSENSE. SIMILARLY, BOTH S. KOREA AND EGYPT HAD ENGAGED IN UNDECLARED WEAPONS-RELATED ACTIVITIES, BUT WERE NOT EVEN REPORTED TO THE UNSC. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 12.26.54.10 (talk) 16:11, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

The statement as written was correct and not misleading. North Korea, Iraq and Libya were found in violation of their safeguards agreements not for weaponization work but for pursuing undeclared enrichment and/or reprocessing (ENR). These are the fuel cycle technologies that can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons, which is why doing them in secret has generally been considered prima facie evidence of a nuclear weapons program. Weaponization is a relatively small step, and evidence of weaponization has never been considered a requirement for finding a safeguards violation. In particular, North Korea was found in violation of its safeguards obligation on three separate occasions, in 1993, 1994 and 2003, with no direct evidence of weaponization. The 1994 Agreed Framework called for an end to all ENR activities.

The safeguards failures by South Korea and Egypt were relatively minor, and they were not found in non-compliance with their safeguards obligations. Egypt's did not involve enrichment or reprocessing. South Korea's included undeclared ENR experiments in the 1980s and undeclared laser enrichment experiments in 2000. Some have agued that these should have been considered non-compliance. Even if they had been, this would not be an exception to the general statement because the undeclared ENR activities were (or already had been) halted.

Finally, the words "UNLIKE IRAN," suggest that the author knows that Iran does not have a nuclear weapons program. This negative claim is unprovable, and there is significant circumstantial evidence (undeclared ENR) against it. NPguy (talk) 03:57, 21 February 2009 (UTC)

The FINAL AUTHORITY on the matter -- the IAEA itself -- has repeatedly and consistently stated that the undeclared activities in Iran HAD NO RELATION TO A WEAPONS PROGRAM and here you are claiming that it is "circumstantial evidence" of something. Your attempt to portray the UNSC as being evenhanded in dealing with Iran also portrays your bias especially compared to your previous statementsi n which you claimed that ALL safeguards non-compliance has to be reported to the UNSC and when everyone knows that Egypt, S Korea and Taiwan were all involved safeguards noncompliance that was NOT reported. Your attempt to equate Iran with Libya, Iraq and N Korea is simply not justifiable. Also, your insistence on simply removing citations to articles that cast doubt on the legality of UNSC resolutions against IRan further prove your bias. YOU ARE BIASED AND SHOULD NOT BE EDITING THIS ENTRY.

ALSO I fixed the BIAS in the overview which only presented the US claim as the basis of the controversy. Sorry, this controversy has at least 2 sides, Iran's included. And, only PORTIONS of Iran's enrichment program were not declared. Iran's uranium mines, and plans to build coversion and enrichment facilities etc were ALL PUBLIC and announced openly on the radio. Thus it is FALSE to suggest that the entire enrichment program was undeclared.

Why keep making excuses for Iran?

A certain IP editor seems determined to represent Iran's position rather than a balanced representation of the facts. Most recently, my factual summary of the latest IAEA report was edited to include every possible reference that might be considered exculpatory. Anyone reading the report can see that it is overwhelmingly negative toward Iran, yet the summary now suggests a glass half full. While the references are not incorrect, they convey an inaccurate impression. Someone is going to an awful lot of effort to do this.

One suggestion: if there are questions about edits, let's discuss them on the discussion page and not in the summary of changes. There were several responses to my summaries that were not actual summaries of the changes made by the IP editor. This is not how editors should behave. NPguy (talk) 03:35, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

As there are multiple IP editors, I am not sure which user you specifically mean. Generally speaking, the article is entitled "Nuclear program of Iran", so a significant Iranian perspective would most certainly be one of the well-sourced perspectives presented.

If the edit being referred to is the edit, "you - →claiming: something is false doesn't mean it is false. especially when multiple reliable sources say exactly the opposite" then it would be in response to edit summmaries claiming "This is also false, possibly a misquote. Iran would have to do one of those three things, not all three" and "delete false statement". If this is the case, then the latter edits shouldn't remove something on the claim that it is false when disputing sources are not at all provided and when multiple supporting reliable sources are provided. Something isn't false just because an editors claims, wants, or believes it to be false. It is debated when multiple reliable sources question the veracity of the claim, such as claims of doom focusing around Iranian breakout capabilities which are questioned in different ways by multiple experts.

So, if something has been published in multiple reliable sources, it shouldn't be removed by an "expert" solely on theirs assertions or beliefs, which multiple reliable sources disagree with them on. Perhaps the expert could bring their concerns (and hopefully sources) to the discussion page first.--99.130.160.222 (talk) 13:09, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

On another thought, a certain registered editor has had a habit of claiming sourced material is false[4][5]. Is there any evidence at all to support these claims? If not, why is there a habitual removal of well-sourced material on the unsupported claim it is false?--99.130.160.222 (talk) 13:26, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

It would be helpful to summarize here the substance of the issue being disputed. I recall, for example, deleting the statement that 90% enriched uranium is required to make a nuclear weapon, which cited an article in Tehran Times. The claim is false and the source is not reliable. I think it reflects poorly on the original editor who inserted this statement that he/she didn't know it was false. It in no way reflects poorly on me that I did. NPguy (talk) 04:00, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

The statement is included in multiple sources, including Fox, CBS, Federation of American Scientists, IISS, etc. You haven't justified your claim once, but you must be pulling one over on all these people. The burden is on you. And making claims, whether right or wrong, does not give you the right to remove material. So you still haven't justified your claim.--99.130.160.222 (talk) 04:26, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

I'd still be happy if you could justify your claim. If not, your constant removal of sourced material is going to lack much, if any, credibility. Your other edits appear to be fairly constructive.--99.130.160.222 04:54, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Enriched uranium can be used for a nuclear weapon if it has a practically finite critical mass. The threshold for high-enriched uranium is 20%, roughly the point at which the critical mass becomes impractically large (750 kgs - without a reflector). The bare critical mass of pure -235 is just under 50 kg (15 kgs with a reflector). The critical mass varies smoothly with enrichment and remains relatively low even at 50% enrichment. See figure 2 of this NTI fact sheet.

Iran would obviously still be below the needed concentration, as the source points out

Most nuclear power plants use uranium fuel enriched to about 3–5 %. This material cannot be used for nuclear explosives.

The source also says that nuclear weapons not made from WEU are fairly rare, and this is consistent with all of the other sources. If you wish to add a disclaimer about the percentage varying this is fine, but your removal still seems unjustified as there are plenty of other options besides removal.--99.130.160.222 (talk) 04:26, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

Anyways, the wording you switched to is fine now that it is sourced. It would have happened a lot more quickly if you could have just added the source.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 05:51, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

This article is getting more and more incoherent

This article has no coherent structure. The history merges with a discussion of issues and a recitation of various parties' views. And recent edits only reinforce this incoherence. Instead of allowing a brief recitation of facts in one section (a brief summary of the latest IAEA report, for example), editors have insisted on introducing an Iranian viewpoint. The place for that is elsewhere in the article. Editors should try to make the article more - not less- coherent. That involves separating fact from opinion and organizing opinions in single place, rather than repeating the variants of the same argument throughout. NPguy (talk) 04:32, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

It has also become much too long to be useful to most readers. This may not e Wikipedia at its worst, but it's pretty awful. NPguy (talk) 04:34, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

Speaking to the February 2009 IAEA report section, the Iranian viewpoint section would generally be for information specific to Iran's viewpoint on its nuclear program in general, not for a response which is this specific. WP:NPOV requires that where multiple or conflicting perspectives exist within a topic each should be presented fairly. In these cases, no viewpoint should be regarded as true and each viewpoint should be attributed to its source so that the reader can decide. Response to an event is usually found directly after an event for relevancy and also provides consistency with style in other articles. For the article in general, a reorganization may help. Specifics would have to be provided and there would have to be a process to make sure information didn't just disappear.

And rather than removing sourced material which you claim is false without providing justification, you should refer to WP:PRESERVE. It advises you should rephrase or correct the inaccuracy while keeping the content, move the text within an article or to another article, add more of what you think is important to make an article more balanced (providing sources), request a citation by adding the tag, or discuss the material on the article's talk page in order to come to a consensus. I haven't blanketly removed some of your unsourced material, so I think you could at least make minor changes to sourced material rather than just completely deleting it.

Lastly, if you could provide justification to your claim above that multiply sourced information is false it would be appreciated.--99.130.160.222 (talk) 14:38, 27 February 2009 (UTC)

I note that major exceptions to the WP:PRESERVE policy are for information that is irrelevant or redundant. Most of my deletions have been in that category. Before adding something, think about where it belongs and whether it duplicates what's already there. Not everything needs to be stated in every section. NPguy (talk) 03:10, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

I agree with duplicate or redundant, but relevancy is obviously highly subjective. It would be much more for you to propose another place for it. Otherwise, it might be argued that the entire U.S. stance, and especially polemic op-eds, on Iran's nuclear program is irrelevant.--99.130.160.222 (talk) 04:15, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

Israel's arsenal as related to its views

The reason that I moved the phrase "which is widely believed to possess 100 to 200 nuclear weapons" (regarding to Israel) some lines down, is that to me it seems that putting it completely on top reveals a certain amount of criticism. It reflects something like: "Before we outline anything about what Israel might have to say on Iran, we must remind the reader that this country itself is no moral authority when it comes down to WMD's: they have so much nucleair potential on their own soil". It seems like a warning for the reader, and I think there's no need for that. As we can see, the US is not treated that way; India in the second sentence. We agree that Israel's arsenal is relevant enough to be mentioned somewhere in the concerned section. But not so hasty. Nethency (talk) 19:08, 28 February 2009 (UTC)

It seems information should be presented up front to introduce the reader, but you raise a valid point and there should be some consistency so this seems fine.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 05:58, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

Chronological ordering

I had to revert the U.S./European viewpoint section back to the non-chronological version because the new version was very fragmented and hard to understand. Comepletely unrelated events followed each other, and there wasn't much flow. I think putting the section in to chronological order is a wonderful idea, but things would have to be clustered conceptually as well and not just by the date of the source.

I do think this can be done, and it might make more sense to work iteratively from this version instead of from the other.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 16:15, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

I won't defend the overall organization of this article, but trying to make that section chronological made no sense at all. In the current structure, some sections of this article are chronological, and others are thematic. The section in question was organized thematically. Putting it in chronological order left it incoherent. Please, don't try it again.NPguy (talk) 22:23, 2 March 2009 (UTC)

A chronological order to themes might make sense, but by source it makes no sense.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 21:13, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Who said this?

In a recent change, one editor added the following:

In March 2009, several senior aides to Barack Obama were linked to a report which warned that Israel might attack Iran within the next two years and which argued for increasing sanctions against Iran. The report warned against any agreement "legitimising even limited [uranium] enrichment on Iranian soil" and also warned that "incremental improvements in the offers to Iran carry the grave risk of feeding Tehran's impression that the longer it waits, the better the offer will be".

I have been unable to get to this FT article, even after trying to register at the FT site. I'd like to know who is being quoted and what they are supposed to have said. Senior aides would to President Obama might include National Security Advisor Jones or WMD "czar" Samore. Dennis Ross is better considered a senior aide to Secretary Clinton. NPguy (talk) 23:19, 3 March 2009 (UTC)

Try clicking the first Google hit here to freely access the article. It's worth noting the report was written by a group and that other officials bring rather different views (Charles Freeman, for example), but it is certainly a view these officials would personally bring with them. Adjusting the wording or noting another view being brought in would seem fine.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 04:15, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

More information about the report from its publisher, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy:

"Preventing a Cascade of Instability: U.S. Engagement to Check Iranian Nuclear Progress" is the report of the Presidential Task Force on Iranian Proliferation, Regional Security, and U.S. Policy, whose endorsers include key Obama administration officials like Robert Einhorn[6], the new undersecretary of state for nonproliferation, and Gary Samore[7], the new NSC "czar" for nonproliferation.

The official report is unreleased as of yet.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 04:25, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

The major concern was to have some material about what the new administration was considering, and some press releases have also accomplished this. I'd leave it to you whether you think the material should stay since it is somewhat speculative in nature. The fact that the State Dept said Iran doesn't need any enrichment and that Europe is pressing for more sanctions would seem to imply the report will mostly be adopted (though talks of an Israeli attack are probably just that, talks).--76.214.161.60 (talk) 05:35, 4 March 2009 (UTC)

I don't see the FT article as a useful interpretation of the primary source - the WINEP report. Samore was not one of its authors, and Einhorn and Ross are listed as having approved an earlier draft. Most of what you've put into that paragraph strikes me as ephemera - somewhat interesting today but of little lasting interest. I would stick to official sources. NPguy (talk) 04:42, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

Samore has been listed in press as being a previous endorser before joining the new administration, but this fact doesn't seem the most important to include or dispute to me. I agree with the ephemera sentiment, but I would argue the content should stay while there is not much of an official and public stance being given by the U.S. (until a "policy review" is complete/the U.S. moves forward with negotiations/sanctions/...)--76.214.161.60 (talk) 05:18, 5 March 2009 (UTC)

This article is already way too long and incoherent. I don't think adding ephemera helps. NPguy (talk) 02:51, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

There's some fairly old ephemera which could go too, so perhaps it would make more sense to worry about this first. For example(s), the 2007 NIE could be summarized more and statements about past sanctions or negotiations could be more summarized. It's also not clear that U.S+European and G8 really warrant two separate sections. "The Bush Administration non-proliferation initiative" may belong under the U.S. viewpoint or in its own article.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 12:57, 6 March 2009 (UTC)

You may want to consider a proposal I made last year for how to reorganize this article. I didn't get very far, in part because some people objected to deleting old ephemera. See the topic "This article is a mess" in discussion archive 4. Here's what I proposed (the section numbers have changed since then, but the concept is clear enough):

• Overview (current section 1)
• History
  • Pre-NPT (up to 1972) (mostly current section 2.1)
  • NPT-Revolution (1972-1979) (most of current section 2.2)
  • Revolution to current period (1979-2002) (sections 2.3, 2.4 and some of 2.5)
  • IAEA investigation (2002-2006) (part of 2.5)
  • UNSC period (2006-present) (end of 2.5.1.2, 4.1.1, 5.3.1, 4.1.2)
  • Current activities (section 6)
• Legal issues (these are currently scattered through the history and views sections)
  • IAEA safeguards compliance
  • NPT compliance
  • UN Sanctions
  • Peaceful use rights and the NPT
• Political issues
  • Iran's position (2.5.1.1 and 5.1)
  • Western views
  • EU3+3 (a.k.a P5+1) position (part of 5.3)
  • EU3 position (2.5.1.3 and part of 5.3)
  • U.S. position (part of 5.3)
  • Middle Eastern views (5.2)
  • NAM position (5.4)
• End Matter (references, links)

NPguy (talk) 03:23, 7 March 2009 (UTC)

Just for clarification, did you make any proposal about current sections 2.6-2.11? I don't see a section 5.2 or 5.3 in the current article. What about the current section 6? Could you update this a bit and mention speficially what might be removed/added as well? Thanks,--76.214.161.60 (talk) 02:05, 9 March 2009 (UTC)

Just a quick note: I don't have time right now, but you might look in the history of the article to see what it looked like in February 2008, when I made the suggestion. NPguy (talk) 21:41, 9 March 2009 (UTC)

I did, and I agree with the general sentiment of a reorganization being helpful. But (when you have time) discussion would need to take place with an updated list and brief discussion of what might be added/removed. For example, the list of nuclear facilities in Iran (section 6, currently at least) seems relevant but does not seem to currently be in your proposal.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 14:08, 11 March 2009 (UTC)

I don't expect to have time to focus on this for at least several weeks. The list of nuclear facilities is now a separate article. NPguy (talk) 21:59, 11 March 2009 (UTC)

The point would be a summary of the list of facilities would clearly be relevant to this article so hopefully you wouldn't be proposing removing them. Anyways, I'd be happy to discuss this when you have time to update your proposal.--76.214.161.60 (talk) 01:35, 12 March 2009 (UTC)

I just came by and made some changes before reading talk. Naughty. Anyway who cares what people said at some event now that the WINEP report is released and has been ref'd and speaks for itself.

I think the outline abouve from NPguy is pretty good. This whole viewpoints section is a mess and POV, not to mention not up to date. Except Israel needs its own section obviously since it keeps threatening to bomb Iran! I already made it its own section.

If someone wants to create an article called "History of Views on Iran Nuke program" go for it, though making it more organized and less POV would be nice. CarolMooreDC (talk) 16:46, 15 March 2009 (UTC)

Could someone please organize the article?

I’ve read the most recent discussion: ‘Who said this?’ (3 March ’09 till 15 March), on organizing the article into something useful for the average reader. Any structuring would be better than, like now, no serious structuring to speak of. The idea of Npguy (7 March) is perhaps not perfect, but a whole lot better than the … mess … we have now. Me I’m not enough an expert on this topic to undertake a reorganization – I gave it a little try though, on March 2nd. Could, please please, one of you experts give a big try on organizing the article?? --Corriebertus (talk) 13:16, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

THERE HAS TO BE REFERENCES TO THE EFFORTS BY THE US TO RESTRICT URANIUM ENRICHMENT, AND THE REACTION OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES TO THAT. OTHERWISE YOURE DEPRIVING THE TRUE CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.99.165.166 (talk) 22:15, 11 April 2009 (UTC)

Npguy rightly said, 27 February ‘09: the article gets too incoherent. 7 March he sort of repeats his remark, and makes a proposal. No one appears fundamentally against his proposal for reorganizing. I don’t object to his proposal either, but I make also another proposal, which looks like this:

• 1. Overview.
• 2. History (facts, and supposed or disputed facts, all together in one chronological line). As soon as certain (supposed) facts are being disputed, or provoke reactions from other states, politicians, scientists, commentators, organizations (IAEA, UN (Security Council), G8, etc.) etcetera: list all those reactions under the related (supposed) fact, in some sort of organized way.
• 3. Views, opinions etcetera on the issue 'nuclear power in Iran' as a whole, not specifically in reaction to one (supposed) fact: organize them like, for example:
  • A. States and governments
  • B. Politicians
  • C. Scientists and commentators
  • D. Organizations (IAEA etc.)

(For each reacting entity or person, give its or his reactions chronological.)

Current chapter 3 (nucl.p. as a political issue) can be moved completely to existing article Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Current chapter 5 obviously should be turned into a separate article. Chapter 6, being very concise now, can stay.

I suggest this: those who object to either Npguy’s or my proposal: come up with a better idea. If after some time (a few weeks at the most) no one has come up with a better idea, that would mean that NPguy as well as I receive the permission to go ahead with his proposed reorganization. Whoever (Npguy, or me, or maybe some better proposal presented here) gets his reorganization ready first, gets the right to put it in place of the existing article, and gets some sort of protected status for his work from the Wikipedia management. --Corriebertus (talk) 14:15, 12 April 2009 (UTC)

Please see WP:OWN. "Some sort of protected status for his work from the Wikipedia management"? Most likely not. The brief proposal you gave looks good, but it might still be good to hash out sub-sections as well.--68.251.187.176 (talk) 14:27, 12 April 2009 (UTC)

All right: if Wiki management won’t help to protect hard work, I mean to say this: if someone is going to invest a lot of time into a revision, he should get some support and help afterwards from other discussiants here, who will help protect his work from attempts to destroy it, by people who haven’t taken part in this discussion. ‘Hash out sub-sections’: sorry, I’m not a native speaker, and I’m not sure what you mean. I’m sure that during the process of reorganizing, sub-sections will almost automatically emerge. If you mean to agree on certain sub-sections beforehand, I invite you to come up with your suggestions. I think also, the man/woman who will revise the article, should be mandated, by us discussiants here, to throw away unsourced remarks on disputed topics, as much as he/she deems desirable (like mr 98.99.165.166 suggested, above, 11 April, 22:15). --Corriebertus (talk) 17:08, 12 April 2009 (UTC)

Any user can be bold and start the reorganization, I was just suggesting having an idea of the subsections before hand to avoid needless edits. (I agree with the second structure which was proposed in general) If a consensus emerges after the reorganization due to a better article structure then the edits will naturally be protected while if they are lacking then they will naturally be revised. All in all though, the article will be written by a group and not one person. If there is unsourced material, editors should just tag it with {{cn}} or remove it if it has been unsourced for awhile, it seems false, or it is especially disputed.--68.251.187.176 (talk) 02:41, 13 April 2009 (UTC)

Wouldn't the first step be to rename the article to something fair and balanced like "Nuclear Proliferation and Nuclear Weapons Programs in Iran"? Hcobb (talk) 15:03, 13 April 2009 (UTC)

Hard to tell if this is in jest.--134.68.77.128 (talk) 16:33, 13 April 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, I guess you're an exchange student at Purdue. You see when an American uses the exact phrase "fair and balanced", what follows isn't. Hcobb (talk) 00:31, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

Answering Hcobb: I don’t think renaming the article is a priority now, everyone who wants to find this article in Wikipedia will easily find it now, regardless of its title. The article deals with not only (supposed) proliferation and (supposed) nuclear weapons but with everything relating to nuclear power in Iran.

Apart from reconstruction, which I’ll perhaps be starting soon, I would propose that many of the existing (sub)sections are (much much) too long. Do you agree? A section is well readable for an average reader when its length is somewhere between hundred and three hundred words. Would you agree? (The longest subsection in the actual article is now 2649 words!) Any section longer than a few hundred words should be either: 1) Summarized, 2) Split up into sub-sections, 3) Turned into a new article, leaving a short summary of it in the original article. Do you agree? --Corriebertus (talk) 05:53, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

Some information isn't appropriate for the article and should be summarized or restructured, and the sections should obviously be shorter for readability; however, my personal reaction would be on a case-by-case basis (how does it get reorganized and what happens to the information?). A History of viewpoints on Iran's nuclear program was suggested, so maybe this would be a starting point for viewpoint information.

If there is a perception that content is disappearing without discussion, then some editors are bound to feel their toes are being stepped on (see Wikipedia:PRESERVE for suggestions in avoiding this). So if it can be figured out first great, if not it just takes longer to figure out but it can still be done.--68.251.187.176 (talk) 13:15, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

I agree: we should work on a case-by-case basis. Whatever information is going to be removed or given a new place, I’ll be clear about why and where to. In my suggested new structure (see 12 April, 14:15), ‘(History of) viewpoints on Iran’s nucl progr’ will probably be placed in chapter 3 when they seem to comment on Iran’s nuclear program as a whole, and placed in chapter 2 directly under a described (supposed) fact when they seem to be a direct reaction on that. References up and down between these chapters when that would seem desirable.

By the way, I’m happy that mr/mrs 68.251.187.176 placed chapter ‘Restricting enrichment technology’ on page Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. I’ve added a link to that article, under ‘See also’. --Corriebertus (talk) 20:28, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

There are a lot of different history threads here, IAEA, UNSC, Iran, USA and so on. I'd go for a brief history of "Nuclear Programs of Iran", the current known facts, announced plans by Iran, and finish up with the viewpoints of each group as say Iran, UN and agencies, "The West" and the rest. Then push everything else out into splinter articles. Hcobb (talk) 23:38, 14 April 2009 (UTC)

I think, Hcobb’s idea doesn’t really contradict with mine: create a clear picture of the current known facts etc., and create a clear picture of the viewpoints of several important groups. And when it seems expedient, push large stories out into separate articles. We have to start out from the existing article, though. I intend to start at the top of the article, that is to say chapter 2, and try, step by step, to ‘unweave’ the ‘facts’ and the ‘viewpoints’, wherever this seems useful. Perhaps it will appear useful also, to give some ‘viewpoints’ immedeately after certain facts, and give the more general viewpoints in a separate ‘chapter 3’. We’ll see when we get there. I’ve already worked through section 2.2 (the 1970s). For clarity, I had to add little bits of information, like the fact that mr. Baghat is an Iranian professor, and that he made those statements in 2006. I also decided to remove one sentence that was obviously redundant. The procedure I’ve followed in this section may seem a bit ‘overdone’ for such a short section; in later and much longer sections however this procedure will be exactly what we need, to make the article surveyable and useable for any reader. --Corriebertus (talk) 19:52, 15 April 2009 (UTC)

That seems like the right sort of approach. I came here to note, though, that material I moved from Mohamed ElBaradei (as being largely off-topic) was immediately deleted, but it hardly belongs back in the ElBaradei article. Some, maybe most of it isn't really helpful and what's left may duplicate existing material, but I feel someone focusing on the topic should have a look and see if there isn't anything worth rescuing: [8]. cheers Rd232 ^talk 01:54, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

I’ll comment later on “seems like the right sort of approach…” from revered Rd232. Firstly now, I suggest to continue the discussion started by Rd232 on that material (Mohamed ElBaradei etc.) in the new section below which I created: Where to put ‘reactions to the IAEA role …’?, because that discussion is not on the topic of this section, which is: reorganizing the article. --Corriebertus (talk) 13:25, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

On 12 April, 14:15 (above in this discussion), I suggested that current chapter 3 (Nuclear power as a political issue) be moved to existing article Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Again looking at that chapter 3, I have a different idea now. This chapter 3 seems to be an attempt to make some (political) ‘point’. Which point I don’t know and don’t want to know, because political speeches of editors shouldn’t be in the Wikipedia. The first sentence (“Iran’s nucl pr started in 1950s and ..”) might be true but should in that case be somewhere in the chapter History. Second sentence (“.. has been controversial”) might be true but should in that case be somewhere in the lead section. Third sentence (“…there have been allegations … pursuing .. nuclear weapons ..”) might be true but should then be somewhere in chapter 4, ‘Views on Iran’s nucl p program’. Anyways, this article is called “Nuclear program of Iran”, so it describes that program, and some relevant comments on it. This speech is not a relevant comment on the Iranian program, and I propose to remove the whole chapter. --Corriebertus (talk) 16:57, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Something is dawning on me. After a long introduction, in sentence eight of chapter 3, mention is being made of a position (a repeated statement) of the IAEA. (Unfortunately without source reference.) We do not yet have a section covering “IAEA’s view on Iran’s nuclear power program”. So let’s change this complete chapter 3 into a new section 4.5: (View of ) IAEA. (The old 4.5 becoming 4.6). Then remove everything out of that new section 4.5 that doesn’t tell us opinions of IAEA – probably some 90%. --Corriebertus (talk) 19:46, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Obviously the Iranian position about its own program would also be included, either in response to the investigation or in a separate section following the IAEA section. Including the U.S. rhetoric provides a context of the IAEA investigation, but it has become slightly outdated and maybe there is a better place for it? I don't know.--68.251.185.77 (talk) 20:52, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

Would it be sensible to split out physics (what do they have and what would it take to make a reactor or a bomb), law (what the UN has mandated) and policy? (What people are talking about) Hcobb (talk) 02:03, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Consistent with this and previous discussions, I'd like to separate facts from opinions. Since technical and legal facts are closely linked, I'm not sure it makes sense to separate them. However I think the "opinion" section should be organized around issues, rather than around who holds the opinion. For example, it should deal with whether (and how significantly) Iran violated its safeguards agreement and similarly the NPT in one section. It could deal with the issue of fuel cycle "rights" in a separate section. This might be linked to a section on the legitimacy of UN Security Council action. Finally, there could be a section on alternative proposals to resolve the Iran nuclear issue. All this is a lot of work, which I would love to contribute to but simply don't have the time to do much more than edit. NPguy (talk) 11:19, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Why the erroneous name change

This article was - and should be - titled "Nuclear program of Iran." Even if you believe that Iran's nuclear program is completely civil in nature (a controversial view), there is more to it than nuclear power. There are research reactors, fuel cycle activities, and other non-power applications of nuclear energy. I tried to revert this change, but apparently I do not have the authority to do so. Someone should. NPguy (talk) 09:22, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

I may be stupid, but I don't see nor understand your problem. The title is at the moment like you prefer it to be: "Nuclear program of Iran". Also on April 15, 22:47 it bore this title, then you made an edit "trying to correct a name change" but you did not change the name, as far as I understand what I see ... ?? --Corbertholt (talk) 12:49, 18 April 2009 (UTC) (Excuse me for messing: I have two user names, Corbertholt and Corriebertus, I forgot to take care and use only Corriebertus in the English Wikipedia. Sorry. --Corriebertus (talk) 13:29, 18 April 2009 (UTC))

On 22:00, 11 April 2009, Anthony Appleyard [9] moved the article to "Nuclear power in Iran". On 08:57, 18 April 2009 NPguy moved the article back and Anthony Appleyard fixed his move.

I didn't do the move, but it looks as if the idea was to match the naming for every other country (The United States, The Czech Republic, Pakistan, India, Ukraine, ...). Consistent naming makes sense. The point should be made that while there are or may be research reactors, fuel cycle activities, and other non-power applications of nuclear energy, there are also nuclear power usages of nuclear energy in Iran. Again, the edit seemed to be made for consistency sake.--68.251.185.77 (talk) 14:22, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

This discussion seems to technical for me. Looking up Appleyard’s change (18 April, 9:32) I can’t see any change made there by him/her. That ‘difference between pages’-page says something about “moved A to B over redirect: req”. I have no idea what that means, but before and after the ‘move’ I see the title being ‘Nuclear program of Iran’. --Corriebertus (talk) 16:19, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

• "req" above means "requested" (in Wikipedia:Requested moves) Anthony Appleyard (talk) 09:19, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

Anyways, Anthony Appleyard changed the name of the article to "Nuclear power in Iran", NPguy changed some of it back, and then Anthony finished changing it back to "Nuclear program of Iran". I wouldn't worry too much about the technical details of it, but you basically just click "Move" when you are signed in if you want to give an article a different title.--68.251.185.77 (talk) 16:53, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

I don't see why the names of the articles need to be consistent, particularly when their content is not consistent. The renaming of this article was particularly egregious since it effectively endorsed Iran's claim that it's nuclear program is just about nuclear power, rather than about developing a weapons capability. And I think the article on Pakistan should probably be renamed "Nuclear program of Pakistan," since it covers more than nuclear power. Wikipedia seems to be missing any discussion of India's nuclear weapons program. NPguy (talk) 11:26, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Anyways, Anthony Appleyard seemed to find your reasoning convincing enough since he helped you rename the article. I find the title inconsequential, and I agree the other articles could probably use some work as well. I was just trying to clarify gor Corriebertus.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 16:31, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

All the Nuclear power in Country articles should be consistently named. All of them involve other aspects other than power, and there is no reason to name this article any differently than all of the other articles. From a U.S. centric point of view, Iran was part of the "axis of evil", and from an Iran centric point of view, guess which country is the "axis of evil". Hint, it isn't Iran. From an NPOV we need to treat every country and every article from an unbiased point of view, and name them the same. Originally this article started out only as about Iran's attempt to get nuclear weapons, but long ago that was split into separate articles, and as the hatnote at the top states "this article is about nuclear power in Iran". There is no reason to not name it as such. Nuclear program of Iran is the "erroneous name". 199.125.109.135 (talk) 04:43, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Nuclear power in the United States doesn't cover weapons and it touches on the fuel cycle only to the extent that it refers to other articles. Once there are multiple nuclear reactors in Iran then there will need to be a Nuclear power in Iran article to include all of them. Hcobb (talk) 19:37, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

An IP editor wrote: "All the Nuclear power in Country articles should be consistently named." Why?? To quote Emerson, "A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds." NPguy (talk) 20:07, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

I resemble that remark. A lot of little minds use this encyclopedia. Why shouldn't there be consistency? I'm not sure that Rihanna is proud to be advertised as having an IQ of 97, but half the population is by definition, less than 100 IQ. Not everyone can be as smart as you are. Or even as smart as I are. The nuclear weapons program is in a separate article. This article is only about nuclear power in Iran. Whether they have one reactor, none, or many, that is what the article is about. 199.125.109.124 (talk) 14:31, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

There really is Iran and weapons of mass destruction for allegations about a potential program, though I think some of that could be mentioned here as well. This article should mostly focus on the power and the program though. NPguy has been unaware that Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol should be voluntary around 2003, was unaware that Iran was in the same category as other states in this time period (according to the IAEA), seemed unclear about what level is commonly taken to constitute HEU, and now seems unclear about when the IAEA Secretariat is reporting noncompliance in non-Iran cases. So we can all be willfully or claiming ignorance.--134.68.77.134 (talk) 14:43, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

Where to put ‘reactions to the IAEA role …’?

(I propose to continue this discussion – started 18 April ’09 01:54 under section Could someone please organize the article? – in this separate talk-section.)

Dear sir or madam Rd232, You added a long story (991 words): Reactions to IAEA role in addressing the nuclear program of Iran, immediately after section The February 2009 IAEA report, in chapter History. Firstly: your title is fuzzy, the title should better have made clear at once from which actor(s) the given reactions are coming. Secondly: if the reactions are specifically made to the Feb 2009 report, you should have made your story a sub-section of that section, and not a following independent section. If however the reactions are made to the IAEA role in general, we first need a section, somewhere, describing what that IAEA role or stance or position in general is. Preferably in todays chapter 4: ‘Views and opinions etc.’ As long as we haven’t anywhere a section describing the IAEA position in general, it’s impossible to place, anywhere, a (sub)section commenting on that supposed ‘position’! Thirdly: your story – even without having read it – is obviously too long and therefore unreadable for 99% of the readers; in addition to bearing a clearer title, it should in itself again be divided into 3 or 4 subsubsections… --Corriebertus (talk) 13:13, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

This material was being merged from Mohamed ElBaradei and none of the editors who wanted it merged here (myself included) seemed to care if it was really merged or not. Much of it has been covered here, or is just extended reaction from or about ElBaradei. While useful, it seems slightly extraneous.--68.251.185.77 (talk) 14:23, 18 April 2009 (UTC)

That section (from the ElBaradei article) was useless. Best to ditch it. NPguy (talk) 11:27, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

Overview and non-compliance

The overview contains a general statement that in past cases of safeguards noncompliance the state in question was expected to end sensitive fuel cycle activities. There have been five such cases: Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya and Iran. An IP editor edited this to contradict the general statement by adding references to Egypt and South Korea. But those were not cases of safeguards non-compliance, as determined by the Board of Governors. This article - particularly the overview - is not the plase to debate whether they should have been reported as non-compliance or whether they are exceptions to the general statement. Even if they had been called "non-compliance," they would not be counterexamples, since neither country is currently engaged in enrichment or reprocessing. Please discuss before editing further. NPguy (talk) 19:34, 19 April 2009 (UTC)

According to the Deputy Director General, Head of the Department of Safeguards, at the International Atomic Energy Agency from 1999 to June 2005, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specific cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea and Egypt to the board. So indeed there was non-compliance and the Board of Governors dealt with it differently in each instance. While this is in their purview, that doesn't mean it should just be skipped over since you seemingly don't want to mention it for some reason. If you want to find another source which says the Board of Governors decided not to follow up on the reporting this is perfectly fine. But the material shouldn't be removed. Just attributed and worded to match the source.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 02:43, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Actually, the Secretariat did not report "non-compliance" in any of these cases. Despite the Agency's statutory obligation to report non-compliance, ElBaradei decided in 2003 to insist that a decision on a "non-compliance" finding was left to the Board of Governors. Instead he used words like "failure." This - a departure from previous practice - is a significant criticism of ElBaradei's approach to safeguards compliance issues. I believe Goldschmidt is in effect criticizing ElBaradei for this practice. Others have made similar criticisms. By the way, Goldschmidt is the former Deputy Director General for Safeguards at the IAEA.

But the fact remains that there was no non-compliance report in the cases of Egypt or South Korea. Perhaps there should have been, but the Board judged that the safeguards failures fell below the threshold of non-compliance in those cases, whereas they exceeded that threshold in the cases of Iran and Libya. What this means is that, legally speaking, Egypt and South Korea are not exceptions to the general statement in the overview.

The overview is already too long. It started as a relatively simple statement, but in response to one disputatious editor I was compelled to add supporting detail. It really seems extraneous to a summary/overview section to go into this level of detail. That's why I'm reverting, again. NPguy (talk) 19:32, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Goldshmidt is sourced and a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, along with thirty years of experience in the private sector and in international organizations, and a doctorate degree. Though I don't think this should be necessary, I have added a second source from Henry D. Sokolski/the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. Sokolski heads NPEC and was a former Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and later received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service. He was a member of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, and also currently serves as an Adjunct Professor.

For record, Goldschmidt says

The head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, recently insisted that it is necessary to “give the International Atomic Energy Agency sufficient legal authority to ensure that non–nuclear-weapon states use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. The IAEA and the Security Council together must be able to effectively deter, detect and respond to possible proliferation cheats.”

and

The Board should therefore adopt two resolutions, the first requiring member states to provide more information on past and future transfers of nuclear material and equipment, and a second unequivocally recognizing that previous failures and breaches committed by South Korea and Egypt constituted cases of noncompliance with their safeguards agreements.

So Goldschmidt was actually adopting ElBaradei's view that the Secretariat should be given more power and consistency in declaring safeguard noncompliance, not criticizing him (Goldschmidt thinks such an explicit declaration may currently be outside the Secretariat's purview and that it is actually the Board of Governors which should grant this ability to the Secretariat).

What is important is that there is a clear and very well reliably sourced debate about this, and it should obviously be acknowledged. You can't just include one side. You should either agree to attribute his arguments (in one form or another) or agree to remove the other material which paints a one-sided view of the issue. Presenting only one side of an argument is an WP:NPOV issue.

After rereading your post, I see that you may feel this is just too much detail. If that is the case, then simply move this sentence with the sentence before it (the one about Iraq, Libya, and North Korea) deeper in to the article or remove them both. But you can't and shouldn't ignore the fact that there is a debate. As Goldschmidt points out, acknowledging these concerns could close inconsistencies and leads to stronger nonproliferation.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 20:07, 20 April 2009 (UTC)

Whatever the opinions of Goldschmidt and Sokolski, Egypt and South Korea were not found in non-compliance with their safeguards agreements by the competent authority, the IAEA Board of Governors. But more important, the debate over whether they were in fact in non-compliance (where my sympathies lie with Goldschmidt) is extraneous to the point being made, that for non-compliance findings involving enrichment and reprocessing activities, the resolution of the non-compliance was supposed to involve ending those activities. That may be a debate worth having, somewhere, but is not relevant here. If you wanted to make some of the discussion relevant, I suppose you could say that in a case that some argue should have been considered non-compliance (South Korea), where the activities involved enrichment and reprocessing, the resolution of the compliance question was based on the fact that those activities had been terminated. The Egypt case did not involve enrichment or reprocessing. NPguy (talk) 21:00, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

The fact that the IAEA Board of Governors chose not to report to the Security Council is the entire point of the debate because some argue that this was an inconsistency and an odd precedent. While the Board of Governors is free to make its own decisions, the fact that the Board of Governors is evaluating a threshold on a case-by-case basis differently each time is most certainly worth mentioning. Perhaps you could propose a wording which you are comfortable with or a few sources of your own.

For more clarification, Goldschmidt, who is actually and widely recognized as an expert, says:

Whether or not the word 'non-compliance' is used in the report transmitted to the board in Step 2 is irrelevant, as demonstrated in the case of Libya, which admitted to working on an undeclared nuclear-weapons programme for many years. This was an indisputable case of non-compliance with Libya's Non-Proliferation Treaty and safeguards undertakings. However, in the director general's report to the board in February 2004, the word 'non-compliance' was not used; rather, it was stated that 'Libya was in breach of its obligation to comply with the provisions of the Safeguards Agreement', which is synonymous. Certainly to be 'in breach of one's obligations to comply' and to be in 'noncompliance' is a distinction without a difference.

The Board of Governors makes a formal finding, but the Secretariat must also find "non-compliance" for the material to make it to the Board of Governors. The difference at the Board of Governors is the whole debate which is being noted (from two reliable sources, one being the former head of Safeguards within the IAEA).--75.2.19.152 (talk) 22:04, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

Overview and non-compliance (2)

I think my comment above addresses the changes I made. I still believe this discussion is extraneous here and could be summarized with a one line statement that "in all other cases of safeguards non-compliance involving sensitive fuel cycle activities (enrichment or reprocessing), the resolution involved, or is expected to involve, halting those activities," and a cross-reference to a discussion elsewhere. Perhaps we need an article on IAEA safeguards, with a section on compliance, where this discussion would fit in naturally.

Unfortunately, the sources for some of the information I have added are IAEA reports to the Board of Governors, which are not available to the public. For example, unlike the Iran report, the South Korea and Egypt reports referred to "failures" but not "breaches." In the case of South Korea, the Board concluded

The Board shared the Director General’s view that given the nature of the nuclear activities described in his report, the failure of the Republic of Korea to report these activities in accordance with its safeguards agreements is of serious concern.
At the same time, the Board noted that the quantities of nuclear material involved have not been significant, and that to date there is no indication that the undeclared experiments have continued.

The case of Egypt is different because it did not involve enrichment or reprocessing. There's another case one could add to the list: Romania, which in 1992 informed the IAEA of undeclared irradiation and lab-scale reprocessing experiments undertaken by the previous (Ceaucescu) regime. In this case also the activity had stopped before it was reported to the Board. The Board made a non-compliance report.

I agree with the statement above that the Director General has an obligation to report "non-compliance" to the Board. That's what Article XII.C of the Statute requires. ElBaradei's failure to use the word "non-compliance" in the cases of Libya and Iran was an unfortunate departure from past cases, from 1991 through February 2003, to use the word "non-compliance" in reporting to the Board. His use of weasel words "breach" and "failure" gave the Board an excuse not to find non-compliance in Iran in November 2003, and set back efforts to respond to Iran's non-compliance by nearly three years.

I think Pierre Goldschmidt has a lot more credibility on this issue than Henry Sokolski, so I'm surprised that references to statements by Goldschmidt have been replaced with references to statements by Sokolski. In particular, I disagree with the Sokolski statement quoted in the first footnote. Who is the author if the Survival article in the second footnote? NPguy (talk) 19:03, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

I didn't see this comment here or I would have read and replied to it before editing the article. Goldschmidt should obviously have had access to most of the same reports that you claim to, and he was probably fairly instrumental in their development since he was the one in charge of Safeguards at the IAEA from 1999 to 2005. The Survival piece is actually the exact same as the piece which is linked to on Carnegie and is of course written by Goldschmidt, I just accidentially grabbed it twice.

Though this is just my reading, Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute says

The inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors. The Board shall call upon the recipient State or States to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred. The Board shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

Article XII doesn't give the Board of Governors the ability to make a formal finding until after the IAEA Secretariat has found its own version of "non-compliance". Article XII requires that the Board of Governors report to the UN Security Council and General Assembly as well as to all IAEA Member States any non-compliance with an IAEA safeguards agreement which it may then find to have occurred. So all findings of non-compliance found by the IAEA Board of Governors are legally required and essentially automatically go to the Security Council, and to make it to this stage the IAEA Secretariat must first find its own version of non-compliance. The Iran reports did not contain the word non-compliance yet the Board was able to make a formal finding, thus the word need not appear in the reports (Goldschmidt says this). This explains why the Secretariat found its own version of non-compliance which then directs the matter to the Board. What happens is that the Board makes a decision on a case-by-case basis as it is supposed to, but some argue that the threshhold they create is subjective and inconsistent.

Anyways, there has to be an earlier form of non-compliance for the Board of Governors to then be allowed to make a formal finding which then requires the report to go to the Security Council. What we are trying to describe is the difference in each case, or point out that such a threshhold can exist. So the Board of Governors chose (as it is perfectly allowed to) to act differently in each circumstance because it judged or deliberated each one on a threshhold on a case-by-case basis. This is all that is trying to really be reflected in the article. I would be perfectly willing to try to find a summary to reflect this as long as it also notes South Korea and Egypt in some form.

So, how about

In all sensitive fuel cycle activities (enrichment or reprocessing) cases where the IAEA Board of Governors has made a formal finding of non-compliance, the resolution has involved or is expected to involve halting those activities; however, not all instances of non-compliance reported by the Secretariat are formally found to be non-compliance by the IAEA Board of Governors.

I think the case of Iran is more serious than that of South Korea or Egypt, but I think the criticism or perception that the Board of Governors handles its findings differently and on a case-by-case basis should at least be briefly acknowledged in one form or another.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 21:14, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

Your reading of Article XII.C is close, but not quite right. The best way to read this provision is that it contains two separate authorities on non-compliance. The inspectors, via the Director General must report non-compliance. The Board has an independent authority to "find" non-compliance in such a report or, even absent such a report. The fact that the same word is used does not mean that the conclusions have to be identical. Another way to explain it is that the Statute gives the Board decision making authority, and it would be inconsistent with that authority to say that the Board had no choice but to rubber stamp the report of the inspectors.

The significant break from precedent, and from what the Statute requires, came between February and November 2003. In February, the Director General reported "non-compliance" by North Korea, consistent with every past report to the Board. By November, the Director General had decided that he should not prejudice the Board's prerogative by using the word "non-compliance," so instead he used the words "breach" and "failure." He argued - as Goldschmidt has - that it is the substance of the DG's report that counts, not whether the word "non-compliance" is used.

I think it is significant that the later reports, on South Korea and Egypt, used the word "failure" but not "breach." Clearly the DG was suggesting that the problems were less significant. There are arguments - which I find reasonable but not persuasive - for making the threshold of "non-compliance" a relatively high one and concluding on that basis that the "failures" in South Korea and Egypt did not constitute "non-compliance." The closest other case was Romania, which I mentioned above. The line between Romania on the one hand and Egypt and South Korea on the other is very narrow.

I am choosing not to edit the overview further for now. I still think the details now in that paragraph are out of place. I would prefer a simple general statement, that in cases of non-compliance (or almost non-compliance) involving enrichment or reprocessing activities, the resolution normally requires that those activities stop, and that Iran, in seeking to continue enrichment after being caught with a secret enrichment program, is the exception, out of step with nonproliferation norm and precedent. NPguy (talk) 21:03, 23 April 2009 (UTC)

Both of our readings on Article XII.C are really irrelevant since they remain unpublished, and I essentially agree with your reading. The whole idea of where to set the threshhold for non-compliance belongs to the Board of Governors, and this is where it should belong at least right now since that is where Statute says it belongs right now.

Again, the point of the matter is that there is a debate going on about where exactly that threshhold for noncompliance should be at. You personally feel that the threshhold for South Korea and Egypt was too low and agree with the Board of Governors, while Goldschmidt happens to argue that they should have been high enough on the threshhold to at least render a formal finding of noncompliance for precedent purposes. Goldschmidt feels this would strengthen nonproliferation in general.

The fact of the matter is that there are two authorities on non-compliance, and the inspectors, via the Director General must report non-compliance. The inspectors and Director General did exactly this for South Korea and Egypt when they presented their report to the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors then used its discretion to determine to not make a formal finding of non-compliance, or the Board used its decision making authority to not rubber-stamp the report of the inspectors. All of this is fine. But then, some have come out with a debate in reliable publications that maybe the Board of Governors should have also made findings of non-compliance in these cases as well. This may or may not be a valid viewpoint or criticism, but it is a reliable one which is verifiable to multiple external sources, and it is atleast worthy of mention.

So, it would be perfectly fine to say that some previous cases have involved a referral to the Security Council and a resolution requiring a ceasing of problematic activities. But when there is a reliably sourced debate about associated precedents, it should be mentioned and incorporated in the article. The problem with "all" is that it may be somewhat misleading, it skims over the debate, and it is really a synthesis of sources. If you could find a reliable source for your argument, then it could at least be directly attributed in the article with "so-and-so says". I would still encourage you to find a source to directly attribute your argument or propose other summary wordings.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 12:38, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

There's one point where I think you have the facts wrong. The IAEA did not report "non-compliance" to the Board in either the South Korean or the Egyptian case. Those reports did not use the word "non-compliance" or close synonyms. If these were, as Goldschmidt argues (and I tend to agree), cases of non-compliance, both the Secretariat and the Board abdicated their responsibility to report them as such.

I wish I had the time to write a Wikipedia article about IAEA safeguards and include a section on non-compliance. NPguy (talk) 22:15, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

"The IAEA did not report "non-compliance" to the Board in either the South Korean or the Egyptian case. Those reports did not use the word "non-compliance" or close synonyms." The Iranian report didn't use the word non-compliance either, so how was the Board of Governors able to find non-compliance under your reading?--75.2.19.152 (talk) 22:30, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

Under the IAEA Secretariat's current legal reading, the inspectors and the Director General do not have ultimate authority to find "non-compliance" and should not usurp the prerogatives of the Board. The Board had not choice but to operate under this interpretation and exercise its authority independent of - and absent - a formal "non-compliance" report from the DG. To put it another way, the Statute does not prevent the Board from exercising its prerogative to report non-compliance even when the Secretariat abdicates its responsibility in that regard. NPguy (talk) 22:41, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

Not to quote Goldschmidt as gospel, but he was director of Safeguards in the Secretariat during the given time period, so he is probably a reliable source about viewpoint of the Secretariat at that time. Anyways:

Clarifying the technical and statutory basis by which the IAEA exposes noncompliance is one immediate way the nonproliferation regime can be strengthened. According to Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute, reporting a state to the Security Council for noncompliance with its safeguards undertakings can be seen as a process comprising the following steps, the last three of which can be taken in sequence or simultaneously:
1. Agency inspectors report any noncompliance to the Director General through the head of the Department of Safeguards.
2. The Director General transmits the report to the Board of Governors.
3. The Board makes a formal fnding of noncompliance.
4. The Board calls upon the state in question “to remedy forthwith any noncompliance which it fnds to have occurred.”
5. The Board reports the noncompliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.
Since 2003, the IAEA Secretariat has reported specifc cases of noncompliance with safeguards agreements by Iran, Libya, South Korea, and Egypt to the Board (step 2). The actions taken by the Board in each case were not consistent and, if they go uncorrected, will create unfortunate precedents.
Whether or not the word “noncompliance” is used in the report transmitted to the Board in step 2 is irrelevant, as demonstrated by the case of Libya, which admitted to working on an undeclared nuclear weapons program for many years.

I have also read that the IAEA Secretariat simply did not want to put any prejudice in to the Board's process, but I do not remember the source of the information. Anyways, do you have a link to the Secretariat's current legal reading?--75.2.19.152 (talk) 22:49, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

Goldschmidt is essentially arguing that you can report non-compliance without calling it such. The Libya and Iran reports had a synonym "breach." The Korea and Egypt ones did not. I do not have a source (just my own clear recollection) on the point of not prejudicing the Board. As I have noted, it was a novel legal claim, inconsistent with practice up to that point. NPguy (talk) 23:03, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

Ok, right. Anyways, Goldschmidt personally felt they were all cases of non-compliance and he was in charge of Safeguards. To me it appears there would have to be a report of informal and inoperative non-compliance (not referred to explicitly to avoid a prejudice as you suggest) by the Secretariat for the Board of Governors to then make a formal finding of non-compliance which it then elected to do with Iran. This is just the way it appears from my reading, but you could be right as well, or maybe we are both wrong. My point is just that there is a debate and that it should be documented in one form or another. The level of ambiguity with the term noncompliance that Iran was able to play off of was one of Goldschmidt's criticism in his article, but I think that is really irrelevant to the discussion.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 23:09, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

Requested move

The following is a closed discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the proposal was no concensus Anthony Appleyard (talk) 09:20, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

• Oppose. It should be evident from past discussions on this page that there is no consensus to change the name of this article from "Nuclear program of Iran" to "Nuclear power in Iran." The content of the article matches the current title better than the proposed one. This distinguishes it from most articles with the title "Nuclear power in [COUNTRY X]." There is no POV in this name. NPguy (talk) 06:29, 22 April 2009 (UTC)
• Support. Extreme POV to even want to distinguish it from every other article about nuclear power in XXX. 199.125.109.126 (talk) 19:25, 22 April 2009 (UTC)
• Weak support. Allegations of possible weapons usage are more appropriate for Iran and weapons of mass destruction.--75.2.19.152 (talk) 20:00, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

Allow me to respond to these two comments. First, it is not POV to look at the contents of an article and conclude on that basis whether the title is appropriate. The contents of this article address many things aside from nuclear power. Second, in my view it is POV to try to discuss Iran's nuclear program and deny that there are questions about whether it is entirely peaceful in nature. The IAEA Director General has acknowledged those questions and said it is incumbent on Iran to resolve them.

On the face of it, it might make sense to split this article - edit it down to one purely about nuclear power. But then where do we put the discussion of Iran's nuclear research and fuel cycle activities? In an article on Iran and WMD? That would seem even more prejudicial, implying that Iran's enrichment program is unequivocally part of a WMD program. It would also make the WMD article even more unwieldy.

So to me the least POV option is to leave the title unchanged.

If we want to enforce a foolish consistency (to quote Emerson) in article titles, the best thing would be to change all the "Nuclear Power in X" articles to "Nuclear Program of X." Then there would be no implication of singling out Iran for special treatment. I think that is unnecessary, since most of those other articles really are about nuclear power, but I would not oppose it. NPguy (talk) 21:16, 23 April 2009 (UTC)

That, in fact is the point. The best thing is to either change all the other articles to nuclear program of XXX or change this one to nuclear power in Iran. However, changing all of them to "program of" would never fly, because "of XXX" means specifically, officially by the government of XXX, while "in XXX" means licensed by XXX. However, in this case that is too fine a distinction to go through each of the countries and determine if all of the nuclear industry is specifically operated only by the government of that country, or not, which would be a moving target anyway. I have often stated that to everyone in Iran, and to everyone in the West it can be suggested that the only reason for a nuclear industry is to obtain nuclear weapons, but that is not the official statement of the government of Iran, which is that it is solely for the purpose of obtaining nuclear power. However, saying that the purpose is solely for nuclear weapons is specifically a personal opinion, making it a POV. We don't name butterflies "icky monarch" just because we think they are, we use encyclopedic neutral tone of voice. Ditto for nuclear power in Iran - we have to distance ourselves from any personal view and treat the subject in an unbiased manner. That is why just wanting this article to be named differently from all the others is a POV. Please bear in mind that the people in Iran don't necessarily share the same true blue view of the U.S. that people in the corn belt of Iowa might, and Wikipedia now has a potential audience of 1 Billion people who now have Internet access. With respect to editing the article, editors often have taken out material that is solely related to any alleged attempt to obtain nuclear weapons, but in any nuclear power article article it is certainly appropriate to make the connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons. In particular, there is in fact no difference that I know of between the enrichment of Uranium to reactor grade and the enrichment to weapons grade - you simply stir the pot a little longer. However, that is what inspectors are for - to monitor the final product to insure that is not being done. So that bit is entirely appropriate to the article as well. 199.125.109.102 (talk) 13:16, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

You wouldn't have to rename every "nuclear power in" article. You could limit it to the countries that have significant nuclear fuel cycle activities. The underlying problem is that there is a false dichotomy between nuclear power and nuclear weapons programs. The fuel cycle is inherently ambiguous and can contribute to either. And when you have a country with a fuel cycle program that doesn't fit its power program, that makes it particularly difficult to conclude that the fuel cycle program is purely civil. It raises suspicions that should not be swept under the rug with a misleading article name. NPguy (talk) 22:21, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

I fail to see any significance to having "significant nuclear fuel cycle activities". That would be like naming coal power in XXX, coal program of XXX if they had a coal mine and coal power in XXX if they didn't? It certainly is not the purpose of WP to have "suspicions". 199.125.109.99 (talk) 20:22, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

The analogy with coal is a red herring. Coal mining doesn't produce fissile material. There are many (most) countries with nuclear power that do not have significant fuel cycle activities. The more important thing is that Iran has a major fuel cycle R&D program and a small nuclear power program. In many ways they don't fit together. Focusing on nuclear power pretends that they do. NPguy (talk) 20:34, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Organizing the article

Since months, maybe years, many editors on this page have agreed that the article is looking kind of horrible, unorganized, unsurveyable, hardly useful, the article is much too long, many sections are much too long. I came up with a raw idea of what a reorganized article might look like, in the previous discussion Could someone please organize the article? on 12 April. No one came up with fundamental objections against that. On 15 April I started out along this idea by organizing section 2.2 (1970s), there were no objections raised, on the contrary.

So today I decided to organize section 2.3 (old title: 'Post-1979 Revolution') along the same basic idea. While doing so, I also made some more minor improvements on section 2.2. Mainly, I’ve again simply tried to split up the section 2.3 in: plain facts; (re)actions in 1979-89 from Europe, IAEA, U.S.; reactions (on events from 1979-89) since 2000 from Europe and Argentina. In some cases, I have double placed some information in two subsections. In some cases it appeared inevitable to change a sentence structure, to add bits of information from a formerly adjacent sentence, etc. Some information I’ve had to replace to sections ‘1970s’, ‘1990-2002’, and ‘2002-2006’. Some information, concerning Eurodif, seems off topic here, I will place that in article Eurodif (in the next hour). One sentence I’ve left out completely: “Their cancellation came after certainty that the Iranian government would unilaterally terminate the contract themselves, following the revolution, which paralyzed Iran's economy and led to a crisis in Iran's relations with the West.” It is an ungrammatical and not informative sentence. “Certainty” is not a point in time. I’ve also changed the title and contents of subsection ‘Iranian reactions since 2000’, leaving out some too vague utterances of mr. Bahgat. --Corriebertus (talk) 13:50, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

I really don't think this is an improvement. In fact, I think it takes part of the article that was pretty cherent and makes it mimic the parts that are pretty incoherent. The problem was never in the earlier parts of the article, which present a largely factual and chronological narrative on Iran's nuclear program. The current reorganization seems artificial in breaking up chronologically and causally linked material into pieces depending on who the actor was. I would revert this section and focus instead on making the post-2002 text look more chronological, while pulling out from the chronological narrative various repetitive policy arguments, and organizing those policy arguments coherently into new sections.

As an example of the problem with the current organization, there is now a section break between a brief paragraph on the IAEA role and a short section on the U.S. response. The two are part of a single episode, with a single source, and should be in a single paragraph. What needs fixing here is not to divide who said or did what but to correct the factual misrepresentations of the source document. For example, it was not an IAEA document that laid out a plan to develop Iranian fuel cycle capabilities, but an Iranian one.

I won't revert, pending further discussion, but I really think this is not helpful. NPguy (talk) 21:10, 26 April 2009 (UTC)

I'm at least going to rename some of the sections. I don't know why it says (re)action--71.156.94.174 (talk) 03:12, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for reacting. The section 2.3 consisted of 882 words. You (NPguy) say, section 2.3 in the old situation (until 25 April) was a "largely factual and chronological narrative", "pretty coherent".

Well excuse me, perhaps I'm too stupid then for Wikipedia, but I consider the old version of the section highly incoherent and highly unchronological. (Which ofcourse doesn't prove yet that my version is better, I agree to that.) How can you claim it was 'chronological' when so many of the stated facts even go without a date, and the rest keeps jumping forward and backward in time? Already the first sentence speaks of "after the Revolution" (no date), then in the same sentence jumps to 1983; the next sentence an "IAEA report" without date; sentence four talks again of "after 1979" without date, the following sentences regress to years 1973, 1977 etc. etc.

Observing that the old version consisted of seven subsections, one might argue that each of these separate subsections were in itself more or less coherent. But simply putting seven, more or less coherent, mini stories behind each other does not, in my opinion, make a coherent section!

What is (in the old version) the connection between subsection 1 (Iran-IAEA-U.S.) and subsection 2 (France-uranium-Eurodif-Belgium-Cogéma-etc)? And why comes nr. 1 first, and not nr.2? I've no idea, but if you consider the old situation coherent, you must have an answer to that.

If a section of 882 words, 38 sentences, is coherent, as you state, it must be possible to divide it into smaller parts. It is our job, us encyclopedia-makers, to organize long and difficult stories (like section 2.3, and like the whole article) into something structured and surveyable for the not-smart, not-omniscient, even for the rather stupid wiki reader (that is, for most wiki readers), by at least making surveyable subsections in it. I can accept that you don't very much appreciate my attempt for splitting up into subsections. But in that case, I expect from you a better proposal for organizing this section into subsections.

Of course everyone may criticize my proposal, but just saying it is no good and not proposing something better, that's not wiki. I've sincerely tried to select from that long section (882 words) what seemed the most vital and drastic events for the nuclear activities in Iran: restart; no fuel from U.S. nor from France; Kraftwerk withdraws; U.S. and Kraftwerk and France withhold money Iran is entitled to; Iran turns to taking hostages; Iraq destroys the reactors.

The rest I considered still important, but slightly less important and vital. So I pushed that into those subsections. Still there to find when you're interested in it.

Ofcourse every selection and every splitting up is arbitrary and disputable. But making encyclopedia is making choices. Refusing to make choices renders an article into a totally unreadable heap of letters and words and sentences. That's no encyclopedia, that's nothing.

You speak of misrepresentations of facts. Nobody will stop you to correct misstated facts. But that is not what I was working at. I just took for granted what I found, assumed it was factual correct, and only tried to organize what was supposedly correct into something organized and surveyable for an average not omniscient wiki reader.

Whatever you propose to do with section post-2002: please go ahead. 1972 words, a completely untransparant nightmare. Make it surveyable.

By the way, mr/mrs 71.156etc, I don't mind much about the changing of '(re)action' into 'reaction'. --Corriebertus (talk) 20:54, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

I went back and looked again, and my comment stands. The previous organization was more coherent that the current one, which has so many trivial headings that it is completely scattered. It would be more coherent to return to the previous text and insert two or three subheadings. The 1979 revolution is a reasonable breakpoint.

At least that's my opinion. What do others think (aside from me and Corriebertus)? NPguy (talk) 21:18, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

I'm glad my edits weren't too contentious. I think NPGuy's problem is that information may be organized by source and date, but that information which is related logically or by event may have been broken up. I do think that organizing information by event or likewise may be more logical, but I think the problem may be knowing what is related if you don't have as much knowledge about the material. So I think the best thing to do might be for NPGuy to list a little bit more of what he is talking about for CorrieBertus, or for CB to try to do a bit more background research when possible.

I should have more time to actually compare the versions and make comments within a few days, real life is kind of hectic right now.--76.214.104.121 (talk) 02:59, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

On 26 April, NPguy argued: the article formerly was pretty coherent; my (Corriebertus’) revision makes it incoherent, it breaks up “causally linked material”. He pointed to the example of the formerly first paragraph (“After … Iran informed the IAEA … / … in 1983 the IAEA even planned … an IAEA report stated … / … the United States persuaded …”), now to be found separated in section 'Post Revolution 1979-89' and subsections 'IAEA reactions 79-89' and 'U.S. reactions 79-89'.

I could understand that criticizm, but strongly disagree with it, as I pointed out on 27 April. I consider the main goal of an encyclopedia to be, to give an easy overview of main facts on some topic to the not experted reader. If such a reader is interested in ‘the history of the Iranian nuclear program’ he should be enabled to quickly find the main events of 1950-1970, of 1970-79, of 1979-89, 1990-1999, etcetera. A consequence of pursuing that priority can be that messages which formerly stood together, and perhaps were, or seemed, causally linked, are in the new version more separated from each other.

So I extracted from section 2.3 (882 words, 38 sentences) what I considered the main events, in 209 words, eight sentences. The rest I put away in five subsections, still all there for the interested reader. I believe my approach serves the not-experted reader a whole lot better.

‘Causal link’ in the mentioned example between part 1 (Iran informed…) and part 2 (IAEA planned…) is in my version less visible. But how sure are we of such ‘causal link’? We are not; it was just the standing behind each other of these messages that suggested causal link. If someone has reliable information pointing to any causal link, he is welcome to add that to the article. It might be a ground to adjust the section or the article once again. Causal link, in mentioned example, between part 2 (IAEA) and part 3 (U.S.) is still unmistakeably clear in my new version.

Ofcourse I can accept detailed criticizm on the choices I’ve made in separating main from secundary events, and in splitting the rest up into subsections.

On 27 April I challenged NP, to tell me what was so ‘coherent’ in the old version. He does not respond to that on 27 April, just repeats his opinion that the previous organization was “more coherent”. I’m sorry, but if you can’t describe its ‘coherence’, it becomes less plausible that it wás coherent.

NPguy on 27 April also starts about “so many trivial headings”, suggests making another division with “two or three subheadings”, for example “the 1979 revolution” as a breakpoint. Wake up, sir: this whole section is already behind that revolution, so that can’t serve as breakpoint. I already asked NP on 27 April: if you want some other subdivision, be specific and tell us how you propose then to split the section up into parts. NP doesn’t answer, just vaguely speaks of some other ’subheadings’. We are still waiting for your proposals, sir.

“So many” headings NP says: I’ve made five. Why would that be “so many”, implying “too many”? You want four, three? Tell us which three, and why.

The headings are “trivial” you say, and that doesn’t sound like a compliment either. My headings describe as simply as possible what is to be found in the (sub-)sections. If that is not what an encyclopedia section heading should do, then what should an encyclopedia heading do? --Corriebertus (talk) 16:04, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

When I have time I'll comment in more detail. But there are now 12 headings covering the period 1970-2002, where it seems to me two would be sufficient (1970-79 and 1979-2002). You don't need signposts for all the other artificial distinctions separating actions by various actors instead of telling coherent story. NPguy (talk) 21:18, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

I appreciate the effort and note that it is always much easier to be a critic. That being said, I do think 12 headings is a bit much, but I also think the other section was pretty incoherent too. The problem is its always hard to do this in a way that multiple people are happy with. So it might be best to wait a few days for feedback to get some specifics, and then go at it again if you still want.--76.214.104.121 (talk) 01:49, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Npguy, you are annoyed by the 13 headings covering the period 1970-2002, and I can understand that, and also mr/mrs 76.214etc agrees with that. (Section 2.2 and 2.3: 11 headings over some 1200 words in total.) The ‘fault’ here lies however not in those so many headings, but in the abundancy of text, words, information they try to ‘head’. A subsection containing between 100 and 300 words is totally normal, as I argued before (14 April, see above). (Other arguments you bring up again that I have answered to already once or twice I won’t keep answering to seven more times.)

If someone feels the urge to condense those 1200 words text in a responsible way to say 600 words, I would, again, not object to such an effort. I chose, as we see, to organize the abundant information which earlier editors apparently have judged all indispensable for the article, while apparently forgetting that an encyclopedia article should in the first place always stay surveyable and readable and organized for the hardly informed reader. And a unorganized heap of more than say three or four (very important) bits of information, or a sequence of not connected coherent mini-stories, does not make a practicable encyclopedia article, nor a practicable (sub-)section in such article.

Let’s, however, not despair. My idea is, to carry on one bit more with this organizing, working through period 1990-2000 in the same manner (that section seems short already), then composing a fine summary of the whole 1950-2000 period, and then pushing away this whole long and annoying story with its 13 or 15 headings into a separate article, in conformity with the widely heaved sigh that this article is much much much too long, and in accordance with standard wikipedia philosophies. --Corriebertus (talk) 12:30, 3 May 2009 (UTC)