Talk:Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig

Complaints

He should not be praised. He led 60,000 to their death in one day alone. All while he sat in his comfy bed, eating the finest food and living in luxury. He was a fool. It was his fault that the Somme was a failure. No argument can excuse his blatant ignorance and lack of respect for his troops — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.192.108.75 (talk) 18:59, 11 October 2011 (UTC)

FUNNY, WEEKS AGO I HERE POINTED AT THE FACT THAT THIS IDIOT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HALF A MIO. MEN'S DEATH IN FIRST WW - WHY DOENST THIS NOTE APPEAR HERE NUMBAWAN SEPR 21 2005

According to the history, the first message on this talk page is yours right there. Are you sure you saved the edit? - Lucky13pjn 23:15, 20 September 2005 (UTC)

If anyone is "responsible" for those deaths, it's the German Army and its leaders. Bastie 21:12, 23 September 2005 (UTC) no mention of the firing squads he authorised gaffers10 191005

Actually, it can easily be argued that Mr. Haig was responsible for the deaths of thousands of men, simply because his tactics were uninspiring, and he did not think about his men at all. Research before you comment please. unsigned comment by Chardonnay (talk · contribs) i suggest you heed your own advice Chardonnay and look at the bigger picture. emotions are best left out of history.

If you're not happy with the article as it stands then use the edit button at the top of the page and change it. It could clearly be improved, but simply complaining on the talk page won't do anything to help. Leithp 11:16, 29 October 2005 (UTC)

If by "think about his men" you mean "stay on the defensive and wait for the tank to be invented", that would have meant losing the war by default. And incidentally, this is pretty much what the Allies did in WWII. The strategy certainly saved lives, but it had another unfortunate side-effect which I'm sure we're all aware of here. Bastie 15:28, 15 November 2005 (UTC)

The tank was in full usage during the great war, it just happened to be bloody useless as both the allies and the central powers noticed. --213.107.99.19 (talk) 21:50, 8 August 2009 (UTC)Moustan

What "Allies"??? You surely mean only the British and the French, and forgot the Americans and the Red Army.

As regard to Haig, no, we didn't mean "stay on the defensive and wait for the tank to be invented", we expected a minimum of respect for human life. After so many deaths since the first year of the war, even this imbecile should had learnt better how to conduct a offensive without useless sacrifice of life.

The reason that Haig cannot be held solely responsible for the British Empire deaths on the Western Frount is simply because he was not in complete control over his own actions a nd there are many others who accurately desrve a share of the blame. These include The German Army, The French, who demanded to set the location and time of, most of the attacks that the BEF made, The British Government, Haigs Superiors, who sent an army badly prepared, for the type of war it would be fighting, into combat. and made many foolish and bad decisions, for which Lloyd George, for one, was more than happy to pass the blame where possible, onto the Generals, for decisions which were his responsibility.

As for the reason, Haig did not find a way to conduct an offensive without great loss of life, All of the various armies in WW1 suffered massive casualities making offensives on the Western Frount, those who sugwest that he should have found another way, have an onus on them to show that such tactics wre available too him, and that he refused, without good reason to use those tatics. I have yet to see any such tactics put up, which stand up to critical examination

It's not so much about tactics, he was just incompetent. Take the battle of Somme, for example. First he wastes 1.5 million rounds of artilery ammunition by ordering a completely inefficient bombardment of the German bunkers and trenches, then he suddenly stops the bombardement, which let the Germans know that a major attack was coming, which allowed for them to take up their machine-gun positions. After he stopped the bombardment, he ordered the first wave of british troops to WALK (he actually and directly ordered the troops to walk) accross no-man's land, which was filled with swamps and barbed wire, with 60-150lb. packs. When the German's opened fire with their machine guns, the first wave of british troops were completely obliterated. After news of the elimination of the first wave, Haig just assumed that the british troops were too afraid to attack, and so he ordered the second wave, a battalion coming from Newfoundland, to walk to their deaths like the british wave. And so, five months later, after 600000 deaths on the Allied side... Haig's Somme campaign allowed the Allies to gain a whopping twelve kilometers. Pure incompetence.

This version of events is a combination of Blackadder Alan Clark and children's textbooks written in the 1960's. Study of WW1 and the reputation of Haig has moved on and the comments do need to reflect this rather than recite old discredited myths.

A utterly Haig biased review As a well read historian, who has attempted to bring some of the truth into this shameful article, and having seen it deleted within 24 hours. I can only assume that the Haig lies must be allowed to stand.

This article is not history, but lies and prevarication. There is no doubt about about what Haig was, to those who bother to study enough about the period.

But carry on lying

The well worn anti Haig myths are trotted out occasionally on this page. They get deleted not because of bias but because they are based on rubbish pedalled by long discredited historians like Laffin and Clark or even Blackadder. Whether Haig was a great commander of the stature of Wellington is a worthy topic for debate. What is not debatable is that under the leadership of Douglas Haig the British Army won the First World War defeating the best army in the world in the process. He must deserve credit for this. No-one is denying that mistakes were made but ultimatly he succeeded and the task he faced was incredibly difficult. There was really no easy cheap way to defeat the Germans and those who criticise his actions have yet to suggest what else he could have done.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:Douglas_Haig%2C_1st_Earl_Haig"

I have to laugh on reading the comment above me. Haig won the first world war did he? The first world war ended in an Armistice, with Haig himself quoting in his diary that the Germany Army "Is nowhere beaten" Haig was planning for a final offensive in 1920 as the end came. Have another read of Denis Winter's Haigs command, for a start, read a few other books as well. You could also consider that in addition to British and Empire troops the French army might, have made some contribution to end of the war, they certainly carried the heavier load. Haig spent the rest of his life after the war falsifying his diary. The result being an exceptional discrepancy between his written and typed diary versions. Leading to an official british history of the war which upholds the myths--84.57.41.29 (talk) 21:00, 14 June 2008 (UTC)nighthawkx15

Or rather, read something else - Denis Winter's "Haig's Command" is regarded as a travesty by most serious writers, although a trashy book of that kind usually surfaces once every ten years (the last was John Mosier's "Myth of the Great War"), claiming to be iconoclastic but in fact just telling a certain kind of reader what they want to hear. I dare say Haig did sift his diary to show himself in a better light - as do many public figures - but all this has been raked over by serious historians for decades, so it is a bit much to claim that there was still some great cover-up going on. Of course it is an exaggeration to say that Haig "won the war" as some of his more starry-eyed admirers claim, but nonetheless the forces under his command were engaging and driving back the main body of the German army in 1918, at a time when the French, who had indeed borne the main burden earlier in the war and were indeed still occupying a large proportion of the line (much of it quiet sectors like Alsace), were only conducting limited offensives alongside the Americans (it is true that the French took heavy casualties in the summer of 1918 at Second Marne).

They tried an ingenious way of getting round the terribly destructive trench warfare, it was called Gallipolli (probably spelt wrong). If done properly that might of worked but the general leading that was a moron and decided to twiddle his thumbs rather than aggressively advance and take the Turks by surprise. After that disastrous campaign Allied commanders were slightly adverse to alternative tactics, not to mention that technology simply hadnt caught up with the scale of fighting yet. (Bearing it mind that the First World War was a completely different type of war to the one that Haig had won his spurs in).Willski72 (talk) 17:53, 4 May 2009 (UTC)

Oh and surely if he was really such a terrible General he would of LOST! Remember that at one point (before the Americans had managed to pour troops in), the Russinas had surrendered and the French mutinied. The fact that the British army didnt join them is nothing short of a miracle. Admittedly he was far from the most inspired General the world has ever seen but he couldnt of been as bad as the other two!Willski72 (talk) 19:51, 9 May 2009 (UTC)

My main objection to the article is the continuation of the myth that anyone 'won' in WW1! The 11th November is known as Armistice day because on the 11th November 1918 an Armistice was signed by all parties calling an end to the conflict. Nobody 'won' - but because the Armistice was caused by the Revolution sweeping Germany which led to the abdication of the Kaiser and the creation of the very weak Weimar Republic, the Allied powers 'won' at Versailles. Haig was a butcher with very little respect from the men he commanded who survived. The 'Haig Fund' was formed not from altruism or guilt, but in an effort to recreate the Jingoism which had lead millions to march to their deaths, that Jingoism lives on today in the nauseating Poppy Appeal each November. So many veterans of WW1 were sickened by the Haig Fund they started the Peace Pledge Union and the white poppy appeal. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Trotboy (talk • contribs) 23:42, 8 November 2011 (UTC)

If that's your main complaint it's not going to get you very far - the consensus view, at the time and since, is that the Allies won the First World War - as is evidenced by the fact that Germany agreed to humiliating armistice terms: surrendering her fleet, army giving up heavy weapons and retreating behind the Rhine (with the Allies holding the bridges). The Allies were relieved because they didn't foresee that a worse war would come twenty years later, but at the time it seemed like a good idea to avoid further bloodshed.

The idea that Haig was regarded as a "butcher" is an invention from after his death (see discussion on National Army Museum website) - in the 1920s he was popular and respected by most. If you have any figures regarding the relative popularity of the British Legion and the Peace Pledge Union in the 1930s (or evidence that the Peace Pledge was really anti-Haig - he was criticised by some in the 1930s but, as noted, it was only really after WW2 that he was turned into a pantomime villain) then please draw them to our attention. I suspect, although I'm willing to be proved wrong, that it was the British Legion who represented the silent majority. Haig had various period vintage views about manliness and patriotism, which indeed played a role in his post-1920 activities along with an officer's paternalism and perhaps an element of guilt which he would never have publicly admitted, but I don't think many people who buy poppies today would regard themselves as "jingoistic".Paulturtle (talk) 16:01, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Haig's post-war charity

Haig's treatment of ex-servicemen post-World War I certainly contradicted his actions during the war. His dedication to the welfare of ex-servicemen post-war certainly contrasted with his apparent lack of compassion and understanding of what they were enduring when he was Commander-in-Chief of the BEF. Why the sudden change? Guilt, perhaps?? SoLando (Talk) 14:17, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

I think you're right, it was guilt from a man who led so many of his countrymen to death. 147,000 Scots died I believe, which made Scotland second only to Serbia in terms of deaths per head of population. He couldn't have failed to have noticed the devastating effect this had on the country, particularly on rural communities. In every village in Scotland, no matter how small, there is a memorial listing the names and the lists always seem to be huge for the size of the communities. Leithp 14:48, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

This is disgusting to read. Why would there be a need for Haig to feel any more guilty for his actions than other Commanders from any other country in WW1? Why can't credit be given to the man for doing something good without finding a reason to denigrate him. It's a good thing this is on the talk page and not in the article. Anomaly 54 19:01, 11 September 2006 (UTC)

About the only good thing I can say for butcher Sir Doug, is that there were worse commanders in that war than him. For instance- Robert Nivelle, Charles Mangin were argueably worse. One could also point to any number of lesser known, Italian, Turkish, Austrian or Russian commanders who were worse than Haig as well. But Haig remains very much a 19th century general in a 20th century war. He might have been great at Waterloo or on the Alma or at Ulundi, but on the Somme and at 3rd Ypres (or "Wipers" as the Tommys called it) he was a disaster. Though it may be highly inapproriate here to make a reference to light opera, I cannot help but think of Gilbert and Sullivan's Major General Stanley-"For my military knowledge, though I'm plucky and adventury, Has only been brought down to the beginning of the century...". So in this, I think Haig was more like unto Stanley than General Melchett. He certainly did not want or intend to become a "butcher", but he was thrown into circumstances for which his tactical mindset was unsuited, so he unwillingly became one. And it haunted him the rest of his days--R.D.H. (Ghost In The Machine) 16:36, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

Can I just thank both of you (yet again! :-)) Yes, his post-war knowledge of the sheer extent of the United Kingdom's losses (especially Scotland) must have had a tremendous effect on him, not to mention the fact that Haig was (I think) deeply religious. I hear his diaries give a fascinating insight into the man (if only they could be accessed online!). Speaking of when/where Haig could have been a "good" commander, do you think Haig might have had reasonoble success in the Middle East? His experience with the cavalry could have bore him in good stead in a region where the cavalry still maintained its importance. Though, of course, he'd of never accepted commanding such a "lowly" theatre. Well, the article is looking much better than it did a mere week ago. If you guys don't want to delve further into the article, I'll most certainly understand :-) Thanks for your work, guys! SoLando (Talk) 05:17, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

I doubt that he would have been better than Allenby in the middle-east. Haig was, famously, quite dense and I don't think he would have been as innovative or diplomatic as Allenby. That said, Haig was confined by the nature of the technology available to him and even the best WWI commanders took horrific casualties on the western front. Leithp 08:52, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Allenby and Haig did seem to share one unfortunate trait, which Haig has often been criticised about - the inability to verbally communicate what they wanted in an understanble manner. This is from Haig's intelligence chief John Charteris (who is just as controversial - known, among other titles, as Haig's "evil counsellor"):

Allenby shares one peculiarity with Douglas Haig, he cannot explain verbally, with any lucidity at all, what his plans are. In a conference between the two of them it is rather amusing. D.H. hardly ever finishes a sentence, and Allenby’s sentences, although finished, do not really convey exactly what he means. Yet they understand one another perfectly; but as each of their particular Staffs only understands their immediate superior a good deal of explanation of details has to be gone into afterwards and cleared up.

I remember hearing Lord Kelvin lecture. He had just the same peculiarity and had a sort of Greek chorus in the form of an assistant who explained in very broad Scotch exactly what Lord Kelvin meant. The only difference then was that the comments and chorus went on at the same time as the main motif. At these Army conferences no on dares to interfere, and all clearing up has to be done afterwards. All the same, Allenby’s preparations are as perfect as anything can be in war, and the Chief looks forward to a very big local success to-morrow.

It's quite an ironic statement when you considered they seemed to be such rivals, yet seemingly (at least according to Charteris) knew exactly what each other was attempting to convey. If Allenby really did suffer from this, which no commander wants, then he circumvented it through iniative, vision, charisma and the adoption of more innovative tactics - just like you said Leithp :-) Haig's lack of tact created too many acrimonious relationships, which blighted him throughout his tenure as Commander-in-Chief. I personally think he could have had success in the Middle East region - maybe Mesopotamia. Though Charles Townshend seemed to be a good commander (though his experiences as a POW contrasted predictably with that of his troops), he didn't appear to wield enough influence to prevent himself being pressured by the Indian Government into a push on Baghdad, while Haig had the ear of King George V (I hope that doesn't prompt any jokes relating to Haig's nickname ;-)). Yes, I know i'm clutching at straws here, but I always want to see the best in someone, that every indivudual has their worth - even "Butcher" Haig. SoLando (Talk) 10:47, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

This inability to communicate is, I think, something of a trait among British WWI and WWII commanders. In WWII Wavell (Allenby's biographer oddly enough), Auchinleck and Alexander were all accused of it. The best of the British generals in WWII learned from the mistakes of WWI and made a point of explaining plans clearly to their officers and soldiers. Montgomery, Slim and Horrocks being notable examples of people who were able to communicate clearly. Sorry if this is a bit off-topic. Leithp 11:20, 31 October 2005 (UTC)

Considering that, I'm amazed there was never anything during the period along the lines of: "Be a Loyal Briton - Don't Talk Coherently!" (Could have been part of the whole "Careless Talk Costs Lives" series in WWII :-D) Speaking of Slim, he is personally my favourite general. His article really needs expanding. It's quite remarkable how The Auk, Wavell and Alexander (if they really did "suffer" from this trait") circumvented communication problems to be (IMO) really capable commanders. By the way, I love to regularly get off-topic (who doesn't? ;-)). Regarding this article, I was going to put one of those "to-do" templates on here, but I think there only needs to be a new section below. SoLando (Talk) 12:05, 1 November 2005 (UTC)

To Do

This is the basic outline of what needs to be done.

World War I

Early encounters text needs to be substantiated with references; I adapted much of the text from John French, 1st Earl of Ypres.

• Early Encounters

Tensions quickly arose between Haig and French. Haig and Lord Kitchener, who was now Secretary of State for War, clashed with French over the positioning of the BEF. French argued to the war council) that it should be positioned in Belgium, where he had confidence in the country's many fortresses, while Haig and Kitchener proposed that the BEF would be better positioned to counter-attack in Amiens, stating that the BEF would have to abandon its positions in Belgium once the poorly-equipped Belgian Army collapsed, forcing the BEF into retreat with the loss of much of its supplies. During an inspection of Aldershot, Haig told King George V that he had "grave doubts" about French's competence.

• Stalemate (maybe another name)

1915-early 1916

• The Somme and Passchendaele

• Spring Offensive

• Counter-offensives: The final months (might need a better title)

Second Battle of the Marne and Hundred Days Offensive

Style issue discussion

There is a discussion going on here whether or not the first sentence of a biographical article should contain the full name of the individual and include any post nominal initials (eg. VC, KCB, OBE) or whether these should be relegated to later in the article. I have tried to point out that this is standard style and part of their full titles but there are “readability” concerns. This arose because of the Richard O’Connor featured article and one possible solution, a biobox, is now in place on that page. Please make your opinions known.Dabbler 12:25, 2 January 2006 (UTC)

Douglas Haig-a great British soldier.

I think this article is a fair and reasonably objective summary of Haig's career. It should be said, though, that it has taken decades to clear away the lies and misconceptions-refelected in some of the silly comments on this page-that have precluded a proper understanding of his achievments as a soldier.

The war, as Haig understood, could only be won by defeating the main German army on the Western Front. The problem was that all commanders-and Haig was initially no exception to this rule-tend to base their tactics on those used in previous wars. In 1914 nobody understood the kind of war that was about to unfold. By 1918, however, the British command on the Western Front was deploying tactics that was to do much towards defeating the Germans. Gone were the lengthy artillery barrages followed by wave after futile wave of infantry advances. By ensuring close cooperation between the artillery and infantry, Haig made steady and relentless progress against the Germans, and the British army made advances far greater than those of its French and American allies.

I have absolutely no hesitation in making the claim that the British Army had become one of the best in the world, largely owing to the leadership of Douglas Haig. A remarkable achievment when one considers that the country had little in the way military tradition, and that for several generations before 1914 the army's experience was confined, for the most part, to stamping out colonial bush fires. The 'contemptable little army' of 1914-numbering only four divisions-had come a long way.

In my estimation Haig, along with Sir William Slim of Burma, deserves to be ranked amongst the greatest British commanders. Rcpaterson 23:20, 11 May 2006 (UTC)

Have you read "Haigs Command: A Reassessment", Dennis Winter, Penguin 1999? He suggests that most of British WW1 history, including the official history, are based on heavily doctored evidence. His claims are based on a comparision of documents held in the usual British repositories (IWM, PRO etc) and duplicates made immediately after WW1 and held in Ottawa and Canberra. His key thesis is that following the end of the war, the Committe on Imperial Defense ordered a large scale cover-up and rewrite of British poilitical and military policy of the war. Matthew Donald 08:47, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Denis winter's work on Haig, is one of the most unscholarly texts produced on the subject, Laffin at least stuck to proper historical research. winter on the other hand, would synthesize sources to suit his thesis. it's all very well for a member of the pulic to read an agree with it, but when a histoian picks it up, the bulls**t shines through. i suggest going out and reading the vast array of criticism towards winter's book, from top scholars, many of whom are no fans of Haig, but dislike winter's sloppy tactics in what can only be seen as a vicious personal attack by someone who apparently has an axe to grind. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 209.42.124.19 (talk) 16:23, 18 March 2008 (UTC)

I have not; but I will-thanks. I will let you know what I think in due course. Rcpaterson 22:55, 14 May 2006 (UTC)

Winters' analysis of Hiags' command is devestating. He provides compelling evidence of monumental logistical stuff-ups, of a magnitude that lead to the failure of entire campaigns (eg Battle of the Somme). Some of Winter criticisms are probably unimportant - so what if Haig was a bisexual who was promoted through the patronage of Lord Escher (an Edwardian eminence grise who had a weakness for dashing hussars). Haigs legacy is dictated by his competence (or lack thereof), not his sexuality. Winter makes a good case for the lack of competence.

While I don't agree with everyting Winter proposes (especially his conspiracy theories), he does provide solid evidence of a cover-up following the end of WW1. The reasons and aims of the cover-up are another matter. There is far more work required comparing the offical histories with unmodified source documents than Winter has done (or had the time to do - there is many years work required here) before any conclusions on motives can be made. Matthew Donald 20:43, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for that useful summary. I have to say that, as a gut reaction, the alarm bells may not be ringing but they are certainly starting to swing! Haig, I know, remains a controversial figure, but it sounds as if the author of this book started with an 'agenda' and a fairly clear slate of preconceptions, which is the worst possible way to begin any form of historical research. Having said this, it would be wrong to pass a final judgement before reading the book. I promised to do this, and I will. The fact remains, however, that the British Army's achievment in both holding the Michael offensive, and in launching a sweeping counter-attack was remarkable. I personally can find no better assessment of Haig than that of Black Jack Pershing, who described him as the soldier who won the war. As for Haig's alleged incomptetence I am reminded of Abraham Lincoln's response when he was told that U. S. Grant was a drunk-'let me know what brand of whiskey he drinks and I'll send it to my other generals.' Rcpaterson 02:05, 17 May 2006 (UTC)

Apparently Correlli Barnett published a devastating indictment of the sloppy research, verging in some cases on deceitful quotation of sources, in Winter's "Haig's Command", in some literary journal back in the early 1990s. Have never seen a copy, though.

Hi Guys. I've made a slight cleanup, as I think this article had over-corrected and perhaps become a little apologist. I entered another citation and referenced it and made some cleanup. Main push of my edit is that although Haig should not be demonised for everything that he often is and although historians cited are correct in pointing out some of the difficulties Haig had to work with, he wasn't the great innovator the article was picturing him as, and is support of some of the war's genuine morons really does need to be answered for... Innovation credited to Haig in the article as it stood instead goes to subordinate generals such as Plumer - Haig's good work and "imagination" comes in ensuring these commanders had the support they needed from 1917 onwards, with the development of Bite and Hold, and Currie and Monash's work on combined arms later in the war. Xlh 14:07, 2 April 2007 (UTC)

Have deleted: "Additionally, Haig's supporters have made the point that when it came to the battles waged by Haig between the 1916 Somme Offensive, and 1917 Passchendaele campaigns, Haig was largely hamstrung into committing to these battles due to the need to support French initiatives endorsed by Lloyd George." A mistaken view I think, unless somebody can come up with some serious citation. Lloyd George committed the British forces to supporting the Nivelle Offensive, but had deep misgivings about the Somme and Passchendaele (though he did little besides wringing his hands rather than asserting Cabinet authority over the generals). Haig and Robertson were both committed to major offensives on the Western front as the only way to defeat Germany.

A couple of points. The French and British agreed to no large-scale offensives in 1918 so the prerequisite ineffective bombing was not used, but had it been abandoned as a tactic? And as to holding the St.Michael offensive. It can be said the rout of Gough's forces luckily resulted in an over extention of the unsupported German line. Not the first case of an effective German advance turning against themselves. It seems to me that both French and Haig were incompetent. Everyone initially waged an old world war, but the Germans adapted. Take Bruchmuller's artillery in the German 1918 offensive as opposed to Haig's at Passchendaele.Bostoneire 18:53, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The Michael Offensive, for whatever reason (British losses in 1917, Lloyd George hoarding manpower in the UK) enjoyed far greater numerical superiority - about fifty or sixty divisions hit Gough's Army - than Haig ever enjoyed. The British "adapted" their tactics in 1916, arguably a bit more slowly than the French and Germans, but then they'd been doing less fighting up until that point. The key point about bombardments was that what mattered was their intensity - tonnage of shell per square foot - not their length, and it took everybody a while to figure this out. Ironically the British had got the intensity right by accident at Neuve Chapelle early in 1915, but at the Somme they shelled for a week over too wide an area (because they wanted to get a wider breakthrough). So by the late war you would have 1) a brief (a few hours?) but intense bombardment, using High Explosive and poison gas to shock the defenders, then 2) the attackers would advance behind a creeping barrage. By 1917 the Germans were defending against these tactics using pillboxes and fortified zones rather than the trench "lines" of earlier in the war. The other key thing to grasp is that a great deal of battles like the Somme and Passchendaele then consisted of incessant German counterattacks by fresh divisions shuffled into the battle, which is why the casualties were much nearer parity than the one-sided slaughter of 1914, 1915 or the First Day of the Somme. The attackers would be protected from this by 3) a standing barrage. All this took much more co-ordination than had been the case earlier. You would also have shelling of German reserves moving up to the front, and counter-battery fire to knock out German guns, using sound-ranging and air spotting. By 1917-18 most of the time generals had a reasonable idea how much shelling would be needed (and Currie was able to predict the casualties in taking Passchendaele Ridge). For a good summary of the improvements made by British artillery by 1917, see the opening chapters of Prior & Wilson on Passchendaele (they also make the point that the Germans at Verdun had made a similar mistake of spreading their artillery too thin in a vain attempt to widen the offensive). For British infantry tactics (light machine gunners, grenadiers etc using tactics similar to the German stormtroopers, rather than the lines of riflemen of the early war) see Paddy Griffith. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 212.134.22.112 (talk) 23:56, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

Citations

This article, particularly the criticism section, desperately needs some citations. Eg. "However, other historians regard" which historians? I can't really fill in the blanks as I don't know which source the previous author was referring to. I think what's said ie the balance reflecting two different interpretations is actually fine but we need some names put to the arguments.Alci12 14:59, 18 May 2006 (UTC)

Date of Death

I have changed the date of death from 28 January to 29 January, in accordance with the Britannica entry on Haig. Danny 10:57, 25 July 2007 (UTC)

Casualties

The debate over proportionate casulaties in Normandy and the Somme seems to have been settled. The point is that after the number of troops and the length of time have been considered casualties were lower in WW1. Also the proportion of infantry was lower in WW1 than WW2. If you were a junior infantry officer or rifleman you were safer on the Somme. The essential point is that warfare between technically advanced armies in the twentieth century invariably resulted in large casualties on both sides and Haig was as subject to this as anyone else.

Indeed, and the casualties of 1916-18, when infantry and artillery tactics had become more sophisticated, were nothing like as one-sided as those of 1914-15 (IIRC the French had 500,000 killed in the five months' fighting of 1914 alone; Britain had 750,000 killed in the entire war, or 900,000 if you include Canada & Australia). The daily loss rates at Arras in 1917 (but of course Allenby was able to achieve great success when transferred to the different circumstances of the Middle East) were actually worse than those of the Somme or Passchendaele, and those of 1918 worse still. The sheer scale of the WW1 Western front often isn't fully appreciated - it needs to be compared to the battles of the Eastern Front in WW2 for a proper comparison. That's not to say that there aren't legitimate debates to be had about whether the British forces adopted new infantry and artillery tactics quickly enough, or whether Germany could have been defeated sooner by making greater effort on other fronts, but there was little alternative to the size of the butcher's bill on the Western Front.

I think the flaw in this arguement of casualites being an inevitable result of 20th century warfare and Haig being subject to this supposition is in the fact that both French And Haig continued to support failing offensives without successful results.Bostoneire 19:06, 26 September 2007 (UTC)

The inevitability of a vast butcher's bill is probably nearer a statement of fact than an "argument", unless somebody has an overwhelming tactical advantage which enables them to win a quick victory (Germans in 1940, Israelis in 1967, USA in 1991 etc). In WW2 the Soviets, not the Western Allies did literally 80% of the land fighting - nearly a million Soviet troops were killed (not casualties) in the battle of Moscow (winter 1941/2) alone, and other battles were almost as large. As to why Haig/Robertson carried on with "failing" offensives, it wasn't as obvious in (say) summer 1917 how much longer the war was going to go on as it is with hindsight. The state of German morale was a matter of some debate in western intelligence (it is true they had an inflated idea of German losses at the Somme), Russia had just become a democracy but it wasn't clear yet whether Russia would be invigorated or drop out, the French were being secretive about the extent of their mutinies but might perfectly easily have dropped out (see Terraine: "Road to Paschendaele" for a detailed documentary treatment of the political origins of this offensive). In the end Passchendaele turned into a mess (although, as with the Somme, the Germans were hurt pretty badly by it as well), but the British could hardly sit idly by and wonder whether the French and Russians were or weren't going to carry on fighting, or whether the Germans could have been defeated with one more push. And yes, you can make an argument that Passchendaele should have been called off at least a month sooner. Ultimately you don't often win wars without taking the offensive. Haig was always looking for a spectacular breakthrough - he was wrong in 1916 and 1917, but right in 1918, when the war ended faster than many others thought it would. Conversely Petain was right to be a pessimist in earlier years, but wrong in 1918, and found himself sidelined by Foch. Were there any cheaper ways of fighting? According to Prior & Wilson on Paschendaele, the casualty rates were actually little different when the "skilful" Plumer was in charge from when Gough had been looking for a great breakthrough earlier on. Or, as the French General Mangin put it: "Whatever you do, you lose a lot of men". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 195.40.200.91 (talk) 20:59, 3 October 2007 (UTC)

I notce that you mention lower casualties 1916-1917 than in the Hundred Days - Arras had the highest casualties measured by total divided by the number of days of battle. you might find this discussion interesting http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?s=b14e07473e3b275f0e21d43eeb141664&showtopic=159151&st=0 Keith-264 (talk) 09:20, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Somme 2,943/day, Arras 4,076/day, P'daele 2,323/day, 100 Days 3,645/day, p. 190 Forgotten Victory.Keith-264 (talk) 09:44, 27 October 2011 (UTC)

Yes, was aware of the Arras casualties and have added them in now. Stuck in a pile of books on the Somme and Third Ypres at the moment ... Paulturtle (talk) 15:28, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

I'm gatting ready for another splurge on the P'le page, air operations this time.Keith-264 (talk) 15:38, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Question

Could someone please tell me something? Two armies, as relatively well-matched (all things considered) as any in the history of modern warfare, bashing each other's brains out in a miserably unintelligent and tactically Neanderthal slugging match, led by some of the worst examples of "political generals" seen since the Napoleonic or American Civil Wars, until one side managed to get a boost in raw material that allowed them to "have the last 10,000 soldiers left alive", allowing them to essentially pass out on top of their opponent and suffocate him, could possibly label the man most directly responsible for this doctrine as "the man who won the war"?

As a student of military history, I'm the last one to say "You can't win a war anymore than you can win an earthquake", but considering the careful and deliberate strategy of Douglas Haig, I can safely and honestly say that he had nothing to do with winning World War I any more than the forest could be said to "win" a forest fire when the fire manages to die before every last stinking shred of vegetation does... Bullzeye ^{(Ring for Service)} 11:10, 15 October 2008 (UTC)

And so what would you have suggested he do instead if you were stood next to him in 1916 after Gallipolli and with Britian deeply in debt and her Navy playing chess with the German Navy and the French constantly nagging him to support them all the time and this being the first time in 50 years that Britain had engaged in large scale warfare and the first time ever that anything on this scale had happened and with an enemy equally as strong as his and heavily entrenched? Admittedly he could of done something but who's to say it wouldnt have ended up like Gallipolli or worse?Willski72 (talk) 18:01, 4 May 2009 (UTC)

Was Field Marshal Haig the Butcher of The Somme?

A popular argument. Was Haig a mass murderer? Or an excellent military leader that performed his duties to the best of his ability?

Should this argument be contained within the wikipedia article —Preceding unsigned comment added by 90.240.203.252 (talk) 14:49, 8 February 2009 (UTC)

Execution of 'cowards'

This guy signed the death warrant of Private Harry Farr, a man who was shot to death for having a medical problem, and likely many others. This probably deserves a mention in this article, it can't just be all praise. —Preceding unsigned comment added by TheJoak (talk • contribs) 04:41, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

Given the scale and length of the war it was inevitable that there large numbers of court martials for various offences, including cowardice in the face of the enemy. In a few cases the court martial convicted innocent people, just as civilian trials today sometimes convict innocent people. Haig had to sign the death warrants of soldiers sentenced to death. Haig took this very seriously, and apparently considered each case on its merits. This saved a great many lives as Haig refused to sign the warrant in cases where he thought that the convicted soldier did not deserve to have been shot.

The 'pardon' given to Harry Farr by Des Browne was purely symbolic. It was one given to all those executed regardless of the individual merits of the case. Des Browne told BBC Radio 4's Today programme that, after 90 years, "the evidence just doesn't exist inside the cases individually". However it was made clear that the pardon "does not affect any conviction or sentence."

Harry Farr was not "to death for having a medical problem", any more than Jean Charles de Menezes was "shot to death" for being Brazilian. The execution of Harry Farr was in some people's opinion a mistake. The evidence does not exist any more so we cannot be certain whether Farr's conviction was an error of justice. However, at the time when the evidence did exist, various people were 100% certain that Farr was guilty. These included:

• Those who took the decision to arrest and prosecute Farr.
• The court martial that convicted Farr.
• Field Marshal Haig.

Maybe they were all mistaken, maybe not. However the evidence available to them at the time convinced them that Farr was guilty and deserved to be shot.--Toddy1 (talk) 05:26, 26 February 2009 (UTC)

At the time individuals who were found to have deserted were shot unless there were clearly extenuating circumstances - eg. shell shock. Front line soldiers didn't have much sympathy for "deserters" either. Harry Farr is now thought by modern medical opinion to have been suffering from agonising pain caused by inner ear damage.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

MEMORIALS

I suggest that, in addition to mentioning the statue of Haig in Whitehall, there should also be mentioned the fine bronze equestrian statue of Earl Haig in his home city of Edinburgh. It stands close to Edinburgh Castle, and was the gift of Dunjibhoy Bomanji.M24M24M (talk) 21:03, 8 March 2009 (UTC)

Suggestion: Add Earl Haig Public School, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, built 1922. I attended this school and there is a bust of Earl Haig in the school lobby. Note that this school is different from Earl Haig Secondary School. Link to school webpage: http://www.tdsb.on.ca/SchoolWeb/_site/ViewItem.asp?siteid=9989&menuid=6057&pageid=5262

Thank you. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Unknownfte (talk • contribs) 17:12, 20 March 2012 (UTC)

Reputation

The section on Reputation contains weasel words and at least one logical fallacy in attacking Churchill's comments. the article is about Haig, not Churchill. The section needs to be cleaned up and well cited. Qwy47 (talk) 17:51, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

Hang on - Churchill's comments are his opinion about Haig. The context and/or fairness of the opinion are important too - though they need citations.--Toddy1 (talk) 18:52, 13 May 2009 (UTC)

The context is that Churchill was still a major politician in the early 1920s when he wrote "The World Crisis" (unlike Lloyd George - whose serious career was pretty much over and who was just score-settling and trying to write the first draft of history when he wrote his War Memoirs in the mid-1930s - the chapter on Haig is a masterpiece of snideness and faint praise). Churchill had to be polite about Haig, who was still alive, fill his book with the sort of impractical "If I were in power I would have done X" suggestions traditional in books written by politicians, and devote as much of the book as he decently could to justifying the Dardanelles - which had been a fiasco, had almost destroyed Churchill's career and had discredited political interference in strategy. In other words he had to acknowledge that there was a case for what Haig had done, but without writing that either he or Haig had been completely right or wrong. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 10:32, 20 May 2009 (UTC)

And, it should be added, "The World Crisis" contains a fair bit of tendentious argument about Western Front casualty statistics, for which Churchill was taken to task by Sir Charles Oman, but designed to prove that Haig was wasting human resources as we would nowadays say. The historiography of WWI statistics deserves an article to itself, but the Churchill figures were resurrected by John Mosier ("Myth of the Great War") at the start of this decade. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 171.192.0.10 (talk) 14:07, 21 May 2009 (UTC)

A good source on all this is Robin Prior's 1983 analysis "Churchill's World Crisis as History" (long out of print), which points out that Churchill was keen to praise Haig and Rawlinson for their successes in 1918 (by which time Churchill was of course a minister again), and in collaboration with the official historian Edmonds he toned down some of the criticism of the Somme (there is curiously little about Passchendaele in "The World Crisis", perhaps as Churchill was a minister by then and that offensive was a great source of vacillation and hand-wringing by the Lloyd George government). As far as impractical suggestions go, Churchill exaggerated the efficiency of the WW1 tank and made preposterous claims for how effective it could have been in 1917, and called for a second landing at Gallipoli in 1916, the latter a suggestion so absurd that he did not even make it at the time.

Very disappointed to see that a minor edit I made – including Denis Winter's name and book in the main article, rather than confining him to the booklist – has been reversed. Why? Clearly someone watching over this page thinks Winter is "unscholarly" but that is not a criticism of Winter's arguments per se; it's an ad hominem statement. Winter is using good soources (including the Australian version of various war diaries which, unlike their British counterparts, were not weeded or edited), and, so far as I can see making good use of them. It seems as though some think that anyone with a distinct point of view has "an axe to grind." I've read Winter's book through several times, and while I'm not entirely convinced there was any sort of conspiracy to conceal the truth, there is undeniable evidence he presents that various people "cleaned up" the official records of the Army in WW I, or made materials difficult to find. The evidence he does cite, in the main part of his book, shows that Haig was not just a fallible commander (which is not a mark against him necessarily; one wouldn't expect every General to be always in the right) but that he showed very little capacity to learn from his mistakes because he was, in a word, vainglorious, and therefore more concerned to protect his reputation than either to learn or to get things right. He not only tolerated officers who were not particularly good at their jobs, if he didn't like an officer, he tended to shunt them away from command and no matter whether they were good at their jobs or not. Since those who were in the front lines and were good at their jobs tended to be the ones who criticized his decisions the most, this virtually guaranteed a situation where the worst choices – or at least, not so good tactical choices as could have been made – were not only made, but made repeatedly. Haig may not have been a bad man, in any conventional sense, but his lack of intelligence, his incuriosity, his lack of real battlefield experience, his discouragement of innovation in either tactics or technology, his tendency to support and promote "gentlemen" rather than officers of proven talent and ability, are what led to the appallingly high level of casualties, and the repeated failure to devise tactics sufficient to break through the German lines. That in turn led to millions of dead. If his reputation is to be properly assessed, I think Winter's book and its criticisms need to be more thoroughly integrated into this section of the article. A paragraph ought to be enough, but to simply delete anybody's attempt to put Winter's thesis in, on the grounds that he is "unscholarly" is, to be blunt, Haigism at its worst: incuriosity masquerading as caution and scholarly good manners. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Theonemacduff (talk • contribs) 00:07, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

"(Haig')s lack of intelligence, his incuriosity, his lack of real battlefield experience, his discouragement of innovation in either tactics or technology." - whatever your opinions of Haig's (or Winter's) other merits, all of this is demonstrably false. For example Sir Douglas had served with distinction in the Boer War, whereas in the German Army you had to be Hindenburg's age (ie. called out of retirement) to have served as a junior officer in 1866 or 1870-1 - most German officers had precisely zero battlefield experience in 1914 (which perhaps saved them from making wrong deductions about the importance of shrapnel). In 1914-15 Haig commanded a corps and then an army without the tantrums exhibited by French and Smith-Dorrien, and was considered so valuable in that role that he was ruled out as Chief of Staff BEF and then as CIGS, and was an obvious choice as CinC BEF.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

"what led to the appallingly high level of casualties, and the repeated failure to devise tactics sufficient to break through the German lines. That in turn led to millions of dead." Not really. Devising tactics which worked was a slow process and not as obvious they appear with hindsight. But even when skilled commanders like Plumer, Monash or Currie were in charge the casualties were much the same (contrary to myth). The difference was that as the war went on commanders got better at making at least some progress and killing Germans. In WW2 there were far more soldiers killed - but we tend to forget them, because most of them spoke Russian.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

Of course records were weeded. They always are. Enormous amounts of paper are produced, and only some of it can be stored in perpetuity. Sometimes very bad choices are made in weeding. In addition, sometimes very senior officers get people to weed out inconvenient information.

Winter

Whatever one thinks of Winter's book, it is widely read, and meets Wikipedia requirements for being a reliable source. "Wikipedia articles should cover all major and significant-minority views that have been published by reliable sources."--Toddy1 (talk) 06:52, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I do not currently have access to Correlli Barnett's article in the Times Literary Supplement (19 April, 1991) where he criticises Winter's methods, which included "the misidentification of documents, misquotation of documents, the running together of passages from different documents without identification in any form that the material is from different sources, and misdating of material" in order to make them fit his thesis.[1] Other historians further corroborated Barnett's criticisms. Surely that means it is not a reliable source?--Johnbull (talk) 11:20, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

Barnett's hardly one to talk - he's gone on record that in his earlier works he got things wrong (he started out as an "Easterner"), and when his methodology and research for The Desert Generals came under attack from Nigel Hamilton (the biographer) he dismissed it as "nonsense" without explanation. I will see, however, if I can dig out the T.L.S. entry you refer to. --Simon Harley (talk | library | book reviews) 12:53, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

Academic Opinion

This section needs to be at least partially rewritten. Take this sentence as an example: "some of Haig's critics - who remain obsessed with the tank and the machine gun - fail to understand that throughout World War I, battles were dominated by artillery and the struggle to coordinate infantry and artillery attacks." Hardly objective. And hardly factual, too, as other commanders - e.g. Arthur Currie - managed actual successes with (by WWI standards) minimal casualties despite being ordered by Haig on suicide missions to take strategically unimportant objectives. 70.49.240.156 (talk) 23:31, 7 January 2010 (UTC)

I hadn't spotted that. But Haig was no fool, and missions were not "suicide". Haig didn't order any offensive without proper strategic plans. Unlike the Germans you wasted nearly 700,000 men in 1918 in an operation that had no strategic principles whatsoever. Yet their Generlas escape scrutiny. You're buying into the myth. Dapi89 (talk) 00:01, 22 January 2010 (UTC)

There is a swathe of academia who would agree Haig was no fool. There's also a swath of academic opinion that isn't limited to a few choice revisionists, who still maintain that while not dull or an idiot or even unimaginative, that Haig was indeed single-minded, supported true morons in the chain of command beneath him, and that while he should not be burdened with all of the ills of the British Army High Command in the Great War, he is at least partly answerable for some of it's failings. Not that you'd know it from this article, which has over the past year or so been hijacked by revisionism for revisionism's sake and turned into a big Haig-love-in. If you'll pardon the colloquialism, as it stands now, the article is POV, and looks more like a blog entry written by Fanboys. I'll note that every edit I've made to this article to insert some balance backed by notable, verifiable and reliable sources has since been deleted by mindless apologists, or the one or two remaining sentences, butchered until they no longer make sense. Not that I can so much as throw an Neutrality tag up because the article is protected. Xlh (talk) 09:29, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

" "some of Haig's critics - who remain obsessed with the tank and the machine gun - fail to understand that throughout World War I, battles were dominated by artillery and the struggle to coordinate infantry and artillery attacks." Hardly objective." Not so. I recognise that as a quote from some book of John Terraine's but I can't remember which one - it is a fair summary of the popular myth view - inspired a lot by the tragedy of 1 July 1916 - that Haig (and the other "donkeys") were idiots who sent their men to be mown down by machine gun fire because they put their faith in ineffective artillery bombardments and were too dense to wait for the tank to be invented or whatever. In fact, more intense and sophisticated artillery fire was what broke the deadlock as the war dragged on, with better-trained infantry the secondary factor. It is also the case that 60% of WW1 casualties were caused by artillery, and about 30% by machine guns.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

"And hardly factual, too, as other commanders - e.g. Arthur Currie - managed actual successes with ... minimal casualties". As noted above, even when skilled commanders like Plumer, Monash or Currie were in charge the unit casualty rates were much the same (it is a myth that their casualties were "minimal"). The difference was that as the war went on commanders got better at making at least some incremental progress and killing Germans as well as killing their own men.Paulturtle (talk) 16:50, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

Smoke and the Fire: Myths and Anti-myths of War, 1861-1945 by John Terraine. In this war the opposition weren't Iraqi children, they were German soldiers. For as long as they could contain Allied attacks by military means they did. It was only after ermattungskrieg wore the German army and German society down, that the army collapsed (like the Russian, Austria-Hungarian, Ottoman and to a lesser extent Italian and French armies before them). PS the mud, blood and poetry school is the revisionist one, the only war fought without voice control (so a war bedevilled by communications failures) school is the original one to which academic historians have pretty much returned.Keith-264 (talk) 23:03, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Casualties; Shell or trench mortar 58.51%, rifle or machine-gun bullet 38,98%, bombs or grenades 2.19%, bayonet 0.32% - p.282 OH 1916 I, fn1.Keith-264 (talk) 23:33, 15 November 2011 (UTC)

Football Team

The link to the disambiguation page reads "For other persons named Douglas Haig, see Douglas Haig (disambiguation)." - but the only other wiki article linked on the disambiguation page is about a lower league Argentine football team.

Should the link therefore read "For other uses, see Douglas Haig (disambiguation)."? This is used elswhere on wiki - but its not completely consistent from the small number of pages i've looked at. Is there any particular style protocol which would apply here?82.39.190.209 (talk) 22:47, 20 January 2010 (UTC)

Mess/POV

This article has two sections labelled "popular opinion", neither of which contain popular opinion, but rather the views of politicians and others. Then there is a separate section on popular views of Haig. I will consolidae these. Paul B (talk) 13:39, 9 February 2010 (UTC)

I think this article has actually gone "down hill" considerably in the last year or so. It used to address Haig's biographical details with a focus on his legacy that had most of the POV as to his reputation reasonably well balanced. This article now reads instead like a piece written by a bunch of apologist fanboys. While I'm not a strict subscriber to the Anti-Haig camp, I believe things have been skewed far too much, and this article is neither balanced nor NPOV. I'd place a Neutrality tag, but the article has been protected Xlh (talk) 09:21, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

{{editsemiprotected}}::I am requesting a Neutrality tag be placed on this semi-protected article and for there to be some restoration for some of the more negative critique of Haig that has been removed - As it stands the current pro-Haig bias in this article makes it seem more like an essay or blog in his defence. There at the very least needs to be some more substantial detailing of exactly why his reputation remains controversial, which means detailing those criticisms of his performance during the Great War without it being immediately followed by some selectively POV text as to why those criticisms aren't valid. Xlh (talk) 07:50, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

 Not done: The editsemiprotected template is for non-autoconfirmed users. Is there something preventing you from making these changes yourself? Celestra (talk) 12:26, 1 June 2010 (UTC)

Apologies Celestra, I misunderstood the level of protection on the page... My bad :) Xlh (talk) 12:28, 4 June 2010 (UTC)

User:Xlh's comments are inflammatory and complete nonsense. Its can easily be cited. Then the tag can be removed. What you believe is irrelevant. I'm citing it from now one, so any complaining can be avoided. Dapi89 (talk) 20:59, 29 June 2010 (UTC)

The notion that simply because an article can be correctly cited, that automatically means it's free of POV is what I would call complete nonsense. What I believe is not any more or less irrelevant than what you do. If you can explain as to why this article hasn't become POV by logically explaining point-by-point why the criticisms of Haig have been deleted one-by-one then by all means, remove the tag. Otherwise you're just as inflammatory and as nonsensical as you accuse me of being. I'm not after an article which crucifies the man. Neither he, nor his legacy deserve that. But some balance would be nice. Xlh (talk) 07:38, 14 July 2010 (UTC)

Nickname

This article currently has two nicknames for Haig which has a dead link reference. A WP:RS reference from the National Army Museum attributing Haig with the nickname "Butcher" keeps getting removed and labelled POV. Perhaps those that continue to do this could explain their actions here. Part of the mission statement for the museum says The National Army Museum presents historical fact and it seems that one of these facts is that Haig's nickname was Butcher. Bjmullan (talk) 22:06, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

Whether it is a fact needs proper sources - such as published books. The web pages of many organisations are done by the office junior, whom may have some inflated job title such as "senior analyst". Key questions about any nickname are:

• Who used this nickname?
• When did they use it?
• What is the evidence that they used it?

The nickname his colleagues used for him when he was a subaltern might be entirely different from one his troops used in 1918. Nicknames invented for propaganda purposes probably don't belong in the infobox but could be mentioned in the text providing the context was explained, for example "British Marxist revolutionaries in their propaganda in 1917..."

The onus should be on people who want to add a nickname to provide adequate justification.--Toddy1 (talk) 13:55, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

On the other hand, your rather pompous views on the mechanics of website creation only have credence if such websites are not actually read by anyone more senior on the staff, which seems somewhat unlikely. Under normal circumstances the NAM citation would be regarded as perfectly acceptable - that you personally don't like it is immaterial. Nick Cooper (talk) 14:18, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

This is controversial - the NAM citation would be regarded as perfectly acceptable for something non-controversial.

Please do not make personal attacks on people you disagree with.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:40, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

But it's OK for you to pompously denigrate those who work on websites? Yeah, that makes sense.... Nick Cooper (talk) 10:55, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I found a proper source (i.e. a book) for the nickname "The Chief": Winter, Denis, Haig's Command, a Reassessment, pub Penguin, 1992, ISBN 0-14-007144-X, p13: "'Dined with Haig and Braithwaite', wrote Guy Dawnay, GHQ's Deputy Chief of Staff in 1918. 'Chief in good humour. He is , however, the most inarticulate man I have ever met.'" Winter's book is one of the most biassed anti-Haig books available. This has been reverted by IP editor 82.43.153.113.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:39, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

A page of the website www.national-army-museum.ac.uk has been used as a source for the nickname "Butcher of the Somme" - The page cited does not use that phrase.--Toddy1 (talk) 23:56, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

1917 and Haig's intentions for 3rd Ypres.

1 May 1917, Haig diary note of letter to War Cabinet,

The enemy has already been weakened appreciably, but time is required to wear down his great numbers of troops. The situation is not yet ripe for the decisive blow. We must therefore continue to wear down the enemy until his power of resistance has been further reduced.

The cause of Gen. Nivelle's comparative failure appears primarily to have been a miscalculation in this respect, and the remedy now is to return to wearing-down methods for a further period, the duration of which cannot yet be calculated. I recommend that the pause which is forced upon us in vigorous offensive operations is utilised to complete measures for clearing the coast this summer. Success seems reasonably possible. Powell, G. Plumer The Soldiers' General (1990, 2004 edn) p. 169. Keith-264 (talk) 10:06, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

Vice versa

"It has been pointed out that we do not have figures for men who were shot on the spot by officers and NCOs for "cowardice in the face of the enemy" or vice versa."

'Vice versa' added to remind the reader that informal killings weren't recorded so it is unwise to assume that men didn't shoot officers and NCOs for the same reason.Keith-264 (talk) 16:00, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

Thank you for the explanation. Although I now understand this I still think it ought to be made more explicit. This meaning isn't at all obvious, IMO. Britmax (talk) 20:04, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

I was wondering too, but wanted to wait until I got home to check the Holmes book from which that section is largely sourced. The book only makes mention of killing of soldiers by officers and NCOs, which was doubtless more threatened than done - but it's not an analogous situation as an officer was actually entitled to shoot a man for cowardice (still is, I was assured about 15 years ago, by a colleague who'd attended Sandhurst). I assumed you meant fragging - murdering of overzealous, vainglorious or incompetent officers by soldiers. I've only heard a few stories about this happening in the army in WW1. There were stories of it happening in the German army from the Somme onwards, doubtless seized on with relish by Haig and Charteris in their reports.Paulturtle (talk) 23:26, 18 November 2011 (UTC)

The point I tried to make (succinctly) was that if the article should contain speculation about informal killings, it would be wrong to assume that such a crime would only be committed by officers and NCOs, since anyone with a gun 'could' do it for any reason. I didn't much like the top-down assumption that the practice (if it happened) would parallel the official chain of command or that squaddies were mute witnesses rather than agents in their own fate. 'Fragging' connotes a dereliction of duty by the perpetrator but again that's assuming that the chain of command is functioning properly. Keith-264 (talk) 08:43, 19 November 2011 (UTC)

It might be best to find a book which mentions soldiers murdering their superiors. Holmes contains some anecdotes about officers shooting men for "cowardice in the face of the enemy" - not murder under the letter of the law as he was within his rights. Apparently there are some anecdotes about fragging in "Shot at Dawn" but I don't have access to a copy. As for soldiers murdering cowardly officers, ???Paulturtle (talk) 14:53, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

If I see any I'll let you know but I expect that there is even less on record than on informal killings by the management. The point I'm making is that summary acts aren't dependent on official authority.Keith-264 (talk) 16:29, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

How are you getting on with the reading?Keith-264 (talk) 16:30, 20 November 2011 (UTC)

He should not be praised. He led 60,000 to their death in one day alone. All while he sat in his comfy bed, eating the finest food and living in luxury. He was a fool. It was his fault that the Somme was a failure. No argument can excuse his blatant ignorance and lack of respect for his troops — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.192.108.75 (talk) 18:59, 11 October 2011 (UTC) FUNNY, WEEKS AGO I HERE POINTED AT THE FACT THAT THIS IDIOT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HALF A MIO. MEN'S DEATH IN FIRST WW — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.126.255.198 (talk) 13:14, 3 December 2011 (UTC)

Recent edits

There's some interesting stuff tending to contradict Travers here, The Operational Role of British Corps Command on the Western Front, 1914-18 Andrew Simpson pp. 171-177, published and also free on ethos http://ethos.bl.uk/Home.do

British Intelligence and the German Army, 1914-1918 James Beach pp. 239-253 is also interesting (same source).Keith-264 (talk) 14:14, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

http://frontforum.westernfrontassociation.com/viewtopic.php?f=42&t=510 This is the review of the Harris book.Keith-264 (talk) 14:14, 14 February 2012 (UTC)

Section on 1917 describes Currie refusing to attack Passchendaele Ridge - then attacking it for a loss of 16,000 men as predicted. Contrast this with the stunning success of the capture of Messines Ridge in June for a loss of... 24,000 men and Canadian Corps's casualties at Vimy Ridge 7-14 April of 11,297. Considering that Passchendaele Ridge was the most defended part of the German western front in late 1917, it seems just as easy to read the British operation to capture it (the Second Battle of Passchendaele) as somewhat economical in men at least as far as the Canadian Corps is concerned.Keith-264 (talk) 08:26, 24 February 2012 (UTC)

James Marshall-Cornwall's criticisms of Charteris are refuted in Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War and the Secret Rescue from Russia of the Grand Duchess Tatania by Michael Occleshaw as is the myth that Haig wielded the dagger in French's dismissal.Keith-264 (talk) 08:37, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

Field Marshal Haig as a Great British Soldier

On this subject, I agree with RCPaterson. MacLennan123Maclennan123 (talk) 18:06, 1 May 2012 (UTC)