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==Importance to Bahá'í Faith==
==Importance to Bahá'í Faith==
The religion [[Bahá'í Faith]] in 1918 and today has it's administrative and spiritual center in the environs of Haifa, Israel (then of Palestine.) As a direct result of the events of the Battle, the leader of the religion at the time was personally rescued after death threats were made against him in case the Ottoman side was to lose. Inaddition because of [[`Abdu'l-Bahá]]'s preperations against famine by social chaos come in war time and his generosity in sharing food stores built up he was knighted by the British Empire, though it was a title he never used.[http://www.homestead.com/watsongregory/files/knighthood.html], [http://www.upliftingwords.org/AbdulBaha.htm].
The religion [[Bahá'í Faith]] in 1918 and today has it's administrative and spiritual center in the environs of Haifa, Israel (then of Palestine.) As a direct result of the events of the Battle, the leader of the religion at the time was personally rescued after death threats were made against him in case the Ottoman side was to lose. In addition because of [[`Abdu'l-Bahá]]'s preperations against famine by social chaos come in war time and his generosity in sharing food stores built up he was knighted by the British Empire, though it was a title he never used.[http://www.homestead.com/watsongregory/files/knighthood.html], [http://www.upliftingwords.org/AbdulBaha.htm].


Inaddition to the practical implications, the Bahá'ís have some reason to believe the battle was one way the prophecies of the Battle or Armageddon were accomplished.[http://bahai-library.com/bsr/bsr09/9B3_lambden_armageddon.htm].
Inaddition to the practical implications, the Bahá'ís have some reason to believe the battle was one way the prophecies of the Battle or Armageddon were accomplished.[http://bahai-library.com/bsr/bsr09/9B3_lambden_armageddon.htm].

Revision as of 03:29, 27 September 2006

Battle of Megiddo
Part of First World War
DateSeptember 19-21, 1918
Location
Result British victory
Belligerents

United Kingdom British Empire

France France

Arab insurgents
File:LateOttomanFlag.png Ottoman Empire
German Empire
Commanders and leaders
Edmund Allenby Otto Liman von Sanders
Strength
12,000 mounted troops
57,000 infantry
540 guns
3,000 mounted troops
32,000 infantry
402 guns
Casualties and losses
782 killed
382 missing
4,179 wounded
Surrender of Ottoman forces

The Battle of Megiddo of September 19 - 21, 1918, and its subsequent exploitation, was the culminating victory in British General Edmund Allenby's conquest of Palestine during World War I. His forces made a massive push into the Jezreel Valley from the west, through the Carmel Ridge, then engulfed the Turkish forces in the valley (mentioned as the site of the Battle of Armageddon in the Book of Revelations) and on the River Jordan. When he was made a viscount, Allenby took the name of this battle as his own, becoming the First Viscount Allenby of Megiddo.

Allenby's operations succeeded at very little cost, in contrast to many offensives during the First World War, and were widely praised as a forerunner of the Blitzkrieg methods of World War II.

Situation - September 1918

After capturing Jerusalem at the end of 1917, Allenby's forces were greatly weakened when many of his infantry units had to be sent to reinforce the British armies on the Western Front, after the Germans launched their Spring Offensive. Allenby's tank force was also shipped off to France, not to be returned before the Armistice came into effect. In spite of this, Allenby tried to maintain the pressure on the retreating Turks by twice sending cavalry across the Jordan River to capture Amman and Es Salt. Both attacks were defeated.

At the same time, the Turkish command changed. Erich von Falkenhayn, who wished to continue the retreat to shorten his lines of communication and reduce the need for static garrisons, was replaced by Otto Liman von Sanders who reasoned that continued retreat would demoralise the Turks, ruin their draught animals, and also encourage the Arab revolt. His forces now dug in, and even regained some ground near the Jordan.

Over the following summer, Allenby's forces were built back up to full strength. Two Indian infantry divisions were transferred from the Mesopotamian Campaign to replace two divisions (the 52nd and 74th) which had been sent to the Western Front. Two Indian mounted divisions were transferred to Palestine from the Western Front (where there was little scope for mounted troops) and were reorganised to incorporate some of Allenby's Yeomanry units. Except for the 54th Division which had retained all its British units, Allenby's depleted infantry divisions were rebuilt with new units from India, with three Indian battalions to every British battalion.

As this reorganisation proceeded, most of what action there was took place in the deserts east of the Jordan. Under the overall leadership of the Emir Feisal, the regulars of the Arab Northern Army under Jaafar Pasha maintained a blockade of Ma'an (after a failed attack earlier in the year), while irregulars under T. E. Lawrence forayed from Aqaba against the Turks' Hejaz railway. A British Imperial Camel Corps battalion participated in some of these raids near Amman. The Turks themselves mounted a brief attack at Abu Tellul near the Jordan, but were defeated by Australian Light Horse units with heavy casualties to a German jager unit.

Meanwhile, squadrons of the Royal Air Force and the Australian Flying Corps established superiority over the outnumbered and outclassed Turkish and German aircraft detachments in Palestine.

The British Plan

Allenby intended to break through the western end of his front, near the Mediterranean coast, and pass his cavalry through the gap to seize the communication centres of El Afule and Beisan, thus trapping the Turkish armies west of the Jordan.

To make the task of this breakthrough and exploitation easier, Allenby made laborious efforts to deceive the Turks as to his intentions, as he had done at the Third Battle of Gaza. To fix the Turks' attention on the wrong end of the front, the Anzac Mounted Division in the Jordan valley simulated the activity of the entire mounted corps. Troops marched openly down to the valley by day, and were taken back by lorry at night. Dummy camps and horse lines were constructed. Meanwhile, Lawrence sent agents to openly buy up huge quantities of forage near Amman. As a final touch, British newspapers and messages were filled with reports of a race meeting to take place in Gaza on September 19.

The Allied forces enjoyed undisputed air supremacy by this time. Turkish reconnaisance aircraft could not even take off without being engaged by British or Australian fighters, and could therefore not see through Allenby's deceptions, nor spot the true Allied concentration which was concealed in orange groves and plantations.

Almost the entire Turkish fighting strength was in the front line. As tactical reserves, there were only two German regiments, and an understrength cavalry division near Amman. Further back there were only some "Depot Regiments", not organised as fighting troops, and scattered garrison units. All Turkish units were understrength and demoralised by desertions, sickness and shortage of supplies.

On September 17, the troops were deployed as follows:

Turkish Order of Battle Allied Order of Battle

Eighth Army (Jevad Pasha) - Plain of Sharon

  • XXII Corps
    • 46th Division
    • 7th Division
    • 20th Division
  • Asia Korps
    • 19th Division
    • 16th Division
  • German "Pasha II" detachment (regiment)

Seventh Army (Mustafa Kemal Pasha) - Judaean Hills and Jordan Valley

  • III Corps
    • 1st Division
    • 11th Division
  • XX Corps
    • 26th Division
    • 53rd Division
  • German 146 Infantry Regiment

Fourth Army (Jemal Kuchuk Pasha, "the Lesser")

  • VIII Corps (Jordan River)
    • 24th Division
    • 48th Division
    • Composite Division
  • II Corps (Amman, Ma'an, Tafileh, Jebel Hauran)
    • 27th (Amman) Division
    • Ma'an and Hauran detachment
  • 3rd Cavalry Division

Allenby's forces

  • XXI Corps (Lieutenant General E. S. Bulfin) - main attack in Plain of Sharon
  • French Detachment du Levant - independent
    • (Mixed infantry and cavalry brigade)
  • XX Corps (Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode) - subsidiary attack
    • 10th Division
    • 53rd Division
  • Chaytor's Force - eastern flank
  • Desert Mounted Corps (Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel) - exploitation force
  • Arab Northern Army (Emir Feisal, T. E. Lawrence)

The Opening Attack

On September 17, Arabs under Lawrence and Nuri Said began destroying railway lines around the vital rail centre of Deraa. Lawrence's initial forces (a Camel Corps unit from Feisal's Army, an Egyptian Camel Corps unit, some Gurkha machine gunners, British and Australian armoured cars and French mountain artillery) were soon joined by Rualla and Howeitat tribesmen, and local insurgents.

As the Turks reacted, the units of Chetwode's Corps made attacks in the hills above the Jordan, further diverting the Turks' attention to this flank. At the last minute, an Indian deserter warned the Turks about the impending main attack, but was not believed.

At 4:30 AM on September 19, Allenby's main attack opened. A barrage by 385 guns stunned the defenders, and the infantry quickly broke through their lines. Within hours, the cavalry were moving north along the coast, with no Turkish reserves to check them. Meanwhile, Allied aircraft bombed Turkish headquarters and their main telephone exchange, effectively cutting their commanders off from their troops and each other. By the end of the first day, the bulk of the Turkish Eighth Army was in disorderly retreat eastward into the hills of Judaea.

Destruction of the Turkish Armies

Progress of Battle, 19th to 24th September 1918

During the early hours of September 20, the Desert Mounted Corps had secured the defiles of the Carmel Range. Late that day, they passed through these to capture El Afule and Beisan, complete with the bulk of two Depot Regiments. A brigade of the 5th Mounted Division attacked Nazareth, Liman von Sanders's HQ, although Liman himself escaped, and another (the Imperial Service Cavalry brigade) captured the vital port of Haifa the next day.

The last formed troops of the Seventh Army attempted to retreat directly east across the Jordan. On September 21, a large column was spotted by Allied aircraft in a defile west of the river and destroyed by continuous air attacks. (Not many soldiers died, but all transport, guns and heavy equipment was abandoned, and the survivors were scattered and leaderless.)

Over the next four days, the Fourth Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division rounded up large numbers of demoralised and disorganised Turkish troops in the Jezreel Valley.

Liman had attempted to hold the line of the Jordan around the Sea of Galilee. A charge at last light on September 26 by Australian Light Horse captured the town of Samakh, breaking this line.

Exploitation

Allenby now ordered his cavalry to cross the Jordan, to capture Amman, Deraa and Damascus. Meanwhile, Third Indian infantry division advanced north on Beirut and the 7th Indian Division advanced on Baalbek.

The Turkish Fourth Army had begun to retreat on September 22. Chaytor's force crossed the Jordan as the Turks abandoned the crossings, and captured Amman on September 26. The Turkish detachment from Ma'an, finding its retreat blocked south of Amman, surrendered intact to Chaytor rather than risk slaughter by Arab irregulars.

4th Mounted Division moved to Deraa, which had already been abandoned to Arab forces, and then advanced north on Damascus in company with them. The retreating Turks committed several atrocities against hostile Arab villages; in return, the Arab forces took no prisoners. An entire Turkish division (along with some German and Austrians) was massacred near the village of Tafas on September 27th, with the Turkish governor of Syria, Djemal Pasha, narrowly escaping; the Arabs repeated the performance the next day, losing a few hundred casualties while wiping out nearly 15,000 Turks in these two battles.

The 5th Mounted Division and Australian Mounted Division moved directly on Damascus. On September 30, the Australians circled north of the city and intercepted the garrison as they tried to retreat through the Barada gorge. Damascus fell the next day. Jemal Pasha fled, having failed to inspire last-ditch resistance.

Overall, the campaign resulted in the surrender of 75,000 Turkish soldiers.

Last actions

5th Mounted Division and Arab detachments advanced north, capturing Aleppo on October 26. They then advanced to Mouslimmiye, where Mustafa Kemal had rallied some men under XXII Corps HQ. Kemal held his positions until October 31, when Turkey capitulated.

Importance to Bahá'í Faith

The religion Bahá'í Faith in 1918 and today has it's administrative and spiritual center in the environs of Haifa, Israel (then of Palestine.) As a direct result of the events of the Battle, the leader of the religion at the time was personally rescued after death threats were made against him in case the Ottoman side was to lose. In addition because of `Abdu'l-Bahá's preperations against famine by social chaos come in war time and his generosity in sharing food stores built up he was knighted by the British Empire, though it was a title he never used.[1], [2].

Inaddition to the practical implications, the Bahá'ís have some reason to believe the battle was one way the prophecies of the Battle or Armageddon were accomplished.[3].

References

  • Bryan Perrett, Megiddo 1918 - the Last Great Cavalry Victory, [Osprey Military Campaign Series 61], Oxford: Osprey, 1999. ISBN 1-85532-827-5
  • Cyril Falls, Armageddon, 1918, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1964.
  • B. H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War, Pan Books Ltd. London, ISBN 0-330-23358-4
  • Roderic Maude, The Servant, the General and Armageddon, George Ronald Pub Ltd; ISBN: 0853984247
  • Stephen Lambden, "Catastrophe, Armageddon and Millennium: some aspects of the Bábí-Bahá’í exegesis of apocalyptic symbolism", BAHÁ'Í STUDIES REVIEW, Volume 9, 1999/200