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=== ''The Clash of Civilizations'' ===
=== ''The Clash of Civilizations'' ===
{{see details|Clash of Civilizations}}
{{see details|Clash of Civilizations}}
In [[1993]], Huntington ignited a major debate amongst [[international relations]] theorists with the publication in ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' of an extremely influential and often-cited article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" The article contrasted with another political thesis regarding the core dynamics of post-Cold War [[geopolitics]] expressed by [[Francis Fukuyama]] in ''[[The End of History]]''. Huntington later expanded the article into a full-length book, published in [[1996]] by [[Simon and Schuster]], entitled ''The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order''. The article and the book articulated his views that post-Cold War conflict would occur most frequently and violently along cultural (often civilizational, e.g., [[Western World | Western]], [[Muslim World |Islam]], [[Chinese History | Sinic]], [[Indian History| Hindu]], etc.) instead of ideological lines, as under the [[Cold War]] and the bulk of the [[20th century]]. Huntington believes that this cultural organization better describes the world than the classical notion of variegated sovereign [[state]]s. He surmised that to understand conflict in our age and in the future, cultural rifts must be understood, and culture (instead of the state) must be accepted as the locus of [[war]]. Thus, he warned that Western nations may lose their predominance if they fail to recognize the irreconcilable nature of this brewing tension.
In [[1993]], Huntington ignited a major debate amongst [[international relations]] theorists with the publication in ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'' of an extremely influential and often-cited article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" The article contrasted with another political thesis regarding the core dynamics of post-Cold War [[geopolitics]] expressed by [[Francis Fukuyama]] in ''[[The End of History]]''. Huntington later expanded the article into a full-length book, published in [[1996]] by [[Simon and Schuster]], entitled ''The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order''. he article and the book articulated his views that post-Cold War conflict would occur most frequently and violently along cultural (often civilizational, e.g., [[Western World | Western]], [[Muslim World |Islam]], [[Chinese History | Sinic]], [[Indian History| Hindu]], etc.) instead of ideological lines, as under the [[Cold War]] and the bulk of the [[20th century]]. Huntington believes that this cultural organization better describes the world than the classical notion of variegated sovereign [[state]]s. He surmised that to understand conflict in our age and in the future, cultural rifts must be understood, and culture (instead of the state) must be accepted as the locus of [[war]]. Thus, he warned that Western nations may lose their predominance if they fail to recognize the irreconcilable nature of this brewing tension.


Critics (see ''[[Le Monde diplomatique]]'' articles) call ''Clash of Civilizations'' the theoretical basis to legitimize aggression by the US-led West against [[China]] and the world of Islam. However, Huntington has also argued that this shift in geopolitical structure requires the West to strengthen itself internally, abandoning democratic universalism and incessant interventionism. Other critics have argued that his taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account of internal dynamics and tensions within civilizations.
Critics (see ''[[Le Monde diplomatique]]'' articles) call ''Clash of Civilizations'' the theoretical basis to legitimize aggression by the US-led West against [[China]] and the world of Islam. However, Huntington has also argued that this shift in geopolitical structure requires the West to strengthen itself internally, abandoning democratic universalism and incessant interventionism. Other critics have argued that his taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account of internal dynamics and tensions within civilizations.

Revision as of 23:23, 13 December 2006

File:P-1985Huntington.jpg
Dr. Samuel P. Huntington in 1985

Samuel Phillips Huntington (born April 18, 1927) is a political scientist known for his analysis of the relationship between the military and the civil government, his investigation of coups d'etat, and his thesis that the central political actors of the 21st century will be civilizations rather than nation-states. As an advisor to Lyndon Johnson and in an influential 1968 article, he justified heavy bombardment of the countryside of South Vietnam as a means to drive the peasants and supporters of the Viet Cong into urban areas. More recently, he garnered widespread attention for his analysis of threats posed to the United States by modern-day immigration. He is a professor at Harvard University. Huntington came to prominence as a scholar in the 1960s with the publication of Political Order in Changing Societies, a work that challenged the conventional view of modernization theorists that economic and social progress would bring about stable democracies in recently decolonized countries.

Notable arguments

Political Order in Changing Societies

In Political Order in Changing Societies Huntington argues that order is the most important characteristic of states. Order is threatened when the level of mobilization exceeds the level of institutionalization within a society. Huntington is concerned that, as a result of economic development, political mobilization will increase faster than the appropriate institutions can arise, thus leading to instability. As a solution he advocates a stronger emphasis on institution building in development, most importantly the establishment of stable party systems. He remains highly skeptical of less institutionalized political mobilization and protest, which made him the target of heated criticism by student activists at the time of the book's publication in 1968. Political Order is widely considered one of the classic works in post-war political science and is still required reading for most graduate students in political science in the U.S. During 1977 and 1978 he worked at the White House as coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council.

In the 1970s, Huntington applied his theoretical insights as an adviser to several governments, democracies as well as dictatorships. In 1972 he discussed with representatives of the Medici government in Brazil that had approached him and one year later he produced a paper entitled "Approaches to Political Decompression", in which he warned against the risks of a rapid liberalization and proposed gradual steps and a strong party state after the image of the Mexican PRI. After a drawn-out transition process, Brazil became fully democratic in 1985. Huntington has frequently cited Brazil as a success and alluded to his own role in his 1988 presidential address to the American Political Science Association, commenting that political science had "played a modest role in this process". Critics such as the British political scientist Alan Hooper point to the fact that Brazil today has an especially unstable party system, in which the best institutionalized party, Lula da Silva's Partido dos Trabalhadores, emerged in opposition to the controlled transition process. Moreover, Hooper claims that the lack of civil participation in today's Brazil goes back to the top-down transition process.

The Clash of Civilizations

In 1993, Huntington ignited a major debate amongst international relations theorists with the publication in Foreign Affairs of an extremely influential and often-cited article entitled "The Clash of Civilizations?" The article contrasted with another political thesis regarding the core dynamics of post-Cold War geopolitics expressed by Francis Fukuyama in The End of History. Huntington later expanded the article into a full-length book, published in 1996 by Simon and Schuster, entitled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. he article and the book articulated his views that post-Cold War conflict would occur most frequently and violently along cultural (often civilizational, e.g., Western, Islam, Sinic, Hindu, etc.) instead of ideological lines, as under the Cold War and the bulk of the 20th century. Huntington believes that this cultural organization better describes the world than the classical notion of variegated sovereign states. He surmised that to understand conflict in our age and in the future, cultural rifts must be understood, and culture (instead of the state) must be accepted as the locus of war. Thus, he warned that Western nations may lose their predominance if they fail to recognize the irreconcilable nature of this brewing tension.

Critics (see Le Monde diplomatique articles) call Clash of Civilizations the theoretical basis to legitimize aggression by the US-led West against China and the world of Islam. However, Huntington has also argued that this shift in geopolitical structure requires the West to strengthen itself internally, abandoning democratic universalism and incessant interventionism. Other critics have argued that his taxonomy is simplistic and arbitrary, and does not take account of internal dynamics and tensions within civilizations. The influence of Huntington's ideas on US policy has been likened to that of British historian A.J. Toynbee's controversial religious theories of the early 20th century on Asian leaders.

Who Are We and immigration

The latest book by Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity was released in May 2004. The subject is the meaning of American national identity and the possible threat posed to it by large-scale Latino immigration, which Huntington warns could "divide the United States into two peoples, two cultures, and two languages." Like The Clash of Civilizations, this book has also stirred controversy, and some have accused Huntington of xenophobia for insisting on defining the American nation in terms of Anglo-Protestant culture (a concept distinct from race) and reducing the dynamics of immigrant adaptation to a binary of assimilation versus non-assimilation, brushing aside huge volumes of scholarship that show far more complexity. It has also been noted that, while he writes approvingly of the achievements of the civil rights movement, he seems to show far greater concern for the preservation of Anglo-Protestant culture than for racial equality and the citizenship rights of non-whites.

The National Academy of Sciences controversy

In 1986, Huntington was nominated for membership in the National Academy of Sciences. Nominations are voted on by the entire academy, but most votes, which are by scientists who are mainly unfamiliar with the nominee, are token votes. This status quo was disturbed when Serge Lang, a Yale University mathematician, began challenging Huntington's nomination. Lang campaigned for others to deny Huntington membership and was eventually successful, with Huntington being nominated and rejected twice.

Huntington's prominence as a Harvard professor and (at the time) director of Harvard's Center for International Studies contributed to the coverage by publications such as The New York Times and The New Republic.

Lang was largely inspired by the writings of Neal Koblitz, another mathematician, who accused Huntington of misusing mathematics and engaging in pseudo-science. Lang's accusations included claims that Huntington had distorted the historical record and used pseudo-mathematics to make his conclusions appear more convincing. Lang's side of the controversy is covered in his book Challenges.

Huntington's supporters included Herbert Simon, a 1978 Bank of Sweden Nobel Laureate in Economics. The Mathematical Intelligencer offered Simon and Koblitz an opportunity to engage in a written debate, which they accepted.

Quotes

  • "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."
  • "The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do."
  • Hypocrisy, double standards, and "but nots" are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq but not for Israel; free trade is the elixer of economic growth but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue for China but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is massively repulsed but not against non-oil-owning Bosnians. Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle. (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, P. 184)
  • "In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous...Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism." (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, P. 310)
  • "In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the Philippines. Islam has bloody borders." (Clash of Civilizations, original 1993 Foreign Affairs article)
  • "Cultural America is under siege. And as the Soviet experience illustrates, ideology is a weak glue to hold together people otherwise lacking racial, ethnic, and cultural sources of community." (Who Are We? America's Great Debate, P. 12)

Selected publications

See also