Rational egoism
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In ethical philosophy, rational egoism or egotism is the principle that an action is rational if and only if it maximizes one's self-interest[1]. The view is a normative form of egoism. However, it is different from other forms of egoism, such as ethical egoism and psychological egoism.[2] While psychological egoism is about motivation and ethical egoism is about morality, rational egoism is a view about rationality. Ethical egoism is also different from amoralism.
Philosophy
Rational egoism is discussed by the nineteenth-century English philosopher Henry Sidgwick in The Methods of Ethics[3]. A method of ethics is ‘any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings “ought” – or what it is “right” for them – to do, or seek to realize by voluntary action’ [4]. Sidgwick considers three such procedures, namely, rational egoism, dogmatic intuitionism and utilitarianism. Rational egoism is the view that, if rational, ‘an agent regards quantity of consequent pleasure and pain to himself alone important in choosing between alternatives of action; and seeks always the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over pain’[5].
Sidgwick found it difficult to find any persuasive reason for preferring rational egoism over utilitarianism. Although utilitarianism can be provided with a rational basis and reconciled with the morality of common sense, rational egoism appears to be an equally plausible doctrine regarding what we have most reason to do. Thus we must ‘admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent intuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct; and from this admission it would seem to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of Practical Reason, manifested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory’ [6].
Criticism
Two objections to rational egoism are given by the English philosopher Derek Parfit, who discusses the theory at length in Reasons and Persons[7]. First, from the rational egoist point of view, it is rational to contribute to a pension scheme now, even though this is detrimental to my present interests (which are to spend the money now). But it seems equally reasonable to maximise my interests now, given that my reasons are not only relative to me, but to me as I am now (and not my future self, who is a "different" person). Parfit also argues that since the connections between my present mental state and the mental state of my future self may decrease, it is not plausible to claim that I should be indifferent between my present and future self.
Social sciences
Rational egoism is the standard behavioral postulate of neoclassical economics and of rational actor theory in political science. The economic assumption of rational egoism is often referred to in terms of the implied model of the individual, homo economicus, a term that has been used at least since Pareto (1906).
In both fields, the postulate has been criticized and defended on a range of empirical and philosophical grounds. For example, in political science, the assumption of rational egoism gives rise to the paradox of voting - given the low probability of being decisive, relative to the personal benefit from a change in the outcome, voting in elections is not rational unless the number of electors is very small.[8] Supporters of rational egoism, however, might point out that this argument is not sound because cultural influences might incentivize voting. Additionally, Scott Aaronson notes that the likelihood of one vote being decisive is on the order of the square root of the number of voters, due to the central limit theorem. However, the utility of a vote could be expected to scale linearly with the number of voters, implying that one should vote because its importance outweighs the chance that it will make a difference.[9]
See also
Notes
- ^ Baier (1990), p. 201; Gert (1998), p. 69; Shaver (2002), §3; Moseley (2006), §2.
- ^ Baier (1990), p. 201; Gert (1998), p. 69; Shaver (2002), §3; Moseley (2006), §2.
- ^ Sidgwick 1907
- ^ (1907, p. 1)
- ^ (ibid., p. 95)
- ^ ibid., p. 508
- ^ Parfit 1984, parts II and III
- ^ Mueller (1989).
- ^ http://scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=364
References and further reading
- Baier, Kurt (1990). "Egoism" in A Companion to Ethics. Peter Singer (ed.), Blackwell: Oxford.
- Brink, D. 1992, “Sidgwick and the Rationale for Rational Egoism,” in Essays on Henry Sidgwick, ed. B. Schultz, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gauthier, David (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gert, Bernard (1998). Morality: Its Nature and Justification. Oxford University Press.
- Kagan, S., 1986, “The Present-Aim Theory of Rationality,” Ethics 96: 746-759.
- McKenzie, Alexander J. (2003). "Evolutionary Game Theory". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). link
- Moseley, Alexander (2006). "Egoism". The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. J. Fieser & B. Dowden (eds.). link
- Mueller, D. (1989). Public Choice II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Parfit, D., 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Parfit, D., 1986, Reply to Kagan, Ethics, 96: 843-846, 868-869. *Shaver, Robert (1998). Rational Egoism: A Selective and Critical History. Cambridge University Press.
- Shaver, Robert (2002). "Egoism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). link
- Sigwick, H., The Methods of Ethics. London, 1874, 7th ed. 1907.
- Smith, Tara (2006). Ayn Rand's Normative Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
- Sober, E. & D.S. Wilson (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Harvard University Press.