Talk:Falsifiability

Archive 1 to January 2004
Archive 2 to May 2006

Memetics

Memetics is falsifiable because one could prove that it does not follow deductively from its premises, which are pretty straightforward (humans evolve via natural selection, ideas transferring from human to human that impact natural selection with themselves be selected accordingly)

Furthermore, it could be falsified using specific, though quite intensive, experiments and data mining. Examples of such experiments can be found here: —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.39.212.101 (talk) 12:20, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

http://cfpm.org/jom-emit/1998/vol2/lynch_a.html#HEADING18 —Preceding unsigned comment added by 74.39.212.101 (talk) 12:14, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

All men are mortal

At first glance "all men are mortal" may seem non-falsifiable, but if we look and think more closely we find something unexpected: the statement is completely falsifiable. Falsification of the statement "all men are mortal" is impractical, but is nevertheless possible. You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing. To finally drive home the argument, you, as the last human on earth would have to commit suicide - and the human race would end with you. QED.

That is the most flawed argument I have ever heard from someone trying to be intelligent.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Again, I agree that the above falsification of the statement that "all men are mortal" is impractical (and a tad destitute of compassion for misery & suffering), but the simple fact is that the statement can hypothetically be falsified. Better and briefer (but more controversial) statements could be:

1 - "God exists" - Non-falsifiable

2 - "God does not exist" - Falsifiable

I hope this helps. Otherwise, the article is almost perfect. TranscendTranslation 01:56, 16 November 2007 (UTC)

The comment I have here is that observation that NOT "all men are moral" by seeing one man die leads to the obvious conclusion that SOME men are mortal, not that ALL men are mortal. this is an important point. §74.13.89.115 (talk) 06:50, 21 November 2007 (UTC)

This comment outclasses the above, despite its tangent on verficationism.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Your comment above isn't perfectly clear to me. Nevertheless, my point is that the statement "all men are mortal" can be falsified by experimentation. Quite obviously, it is NOT falsified just by considering a single dead man, no-one is saying that. However, it IS falsified by killing all men (a theoretically possible but clearly callous/impractical task). Once all men have died, the human race ends with you, so you can be sure there will be new men to complicate the issue. Finally, this whole consideration is semantic, the overall point is that the 'God' examples are certainly true, whereas the mortal/immortal example are not.TranscendTranslation (talk) 18:26, 24 November 2007 (UTC)

Wrong. That is absolutely illogical and incorrect.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

When you've reduced the set of "all men" to the empty set, assertions about its members are meaningless... and in fact, not falsifiable! 67.98.226.14 (talk) 00:55, 5 December 2007 (UTC)

Another good point by an anonymous user!Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

You're example "God does not exist" is also non-falsifiable because of the very nature of what people call god. God is so that "I don't understand" becomes "I understand", for that reason the proof which generates the faulsensee of the statment also generates a "we don't understand yet" response, and the choice taken is irrelevant because the 2 competing ideas "god"(proves the statement false) or "a lack of understanding" (doesn't prove it false) cannot be compared for the choice is based on personal beliefs and facts. For example any observation made to prove it false, "oh look, frogs from the sky", can be explained through a scientific method because the very existance of miracles are explained through probabilities and if one isn't happy with the probability explanation, argument of manipulation with human (or even non-human) technology can be use. If you witness god it could be drugs, if you and your friend witness god how can you argue that the 25foot tall guy in robes wasnt actually a giant robot. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.226.149.107 (talk) 22:11, 22 April 2008 (UTC)

Win!Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

There is a lot of confusion here between logic and falsifiablelity. The statement “All people are mortal” is falsifiable. I need only find one person who is not mortal to show that the statement is false. The fact that there has never been an observation of a non-mortal person just goes to supporting the statement. Killing every one on the planet would not show the statement is falsifiable; it would just be another piece of evidence supporting the argument.206.195.19.43 (talk) 10:24, 24 April 2008 (UTC)

Observing an alleged immortal person for any finite duration of time is not enough to verify if that person is indeed immortal. The statement "all men are mortal" is unfalsifiable because the claim that "there is a man that is immortal" is unverifiable, given the absence of observations of unlimited duration in time. Applying the same principle of falsifiability to the claim "all observations are of finite duration in time" leads to the same problem. Valid falsification of the claim "all men are mortal" is not knowledge accessible to mortals. But for immortals, even if they believe (or know) they are immortal, there is never any present act of falsification, for the act of falsification is delayed to an ever distant future.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:11, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

The concept of an immortal man, required to falsify the proposition 'all men are mortal', is entirely non-cognitive by virtue of immortality having no ostensive examples in reality; we can't after all point out an immortal man for the reason explained above, an observation made over a finite period is not logically coherent to claiming immortality. Thus an immortal man cannot be observed, and hence cannot provide the basis for an empirical falsification method. So in this respect at least the original statement can't be falsified. Apathy92 (talk) 09:54, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

"The concept of an immortal man...can't be falsified." = TruthKmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 09:00, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Quote: "an immortal man cannot be observed". Response: It is more accurate to say, "a man cannot be observed to be immortal". Just observing someone does not prove they are mortal, although it is very, very, very, very, likely that they are mortal anyway.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 09:03, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for the pointer :) Apathy92 (talk) 11:28, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Also, I'm grappling a little with this- Quote: "You simply need to wipe out every other human being in existence till you are the last one standing"- it occurs to me that if you reduce the human race to being non-existent any assertions about the set become meaningless and unfalsifiable as a result. Am I along the right lines here? Apathy92 (talk) 11:56, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Cause and Effect

Is it true that the notion of cause and effect is not falsifiable? If one were to observe an effect with no apparent cause would one be able to conclude that cause and effect is false? Or would the general consensus be that the cause of the observed effect has simply not been discovered?

Is that ok to add this:

First known mention of falsification test in history comes from Koran in Surah Nisa chapter 4 verse 82 which any one in the world can try. “Do they not reflect upon the Qur'an? If it had been from (any) other than Allah, they would have found within it much contradiction." Basically it clamis that today if any one wants to prove that the Qur’an is not the word of God, he just has to point out a single contradiction in the Qur’an.

I reverted you edits, because they did not fit the tone of the article, and framed falsificationism in an inappropriate way. Also, I find it very difficult to believe the first time someone admitted they could be proven wrong was in the Qur'an. --John.Conway 09:47, 2 May 2007 (UTC)

Naïve Falsification

I read this entire section, but am still unclear on what makes a falsification naïve; the term isn't clearly defined in its section.

I'm unclear on the whole damn thing. This is what I'm able to figure out...

U -> ~O

If the canadian goose is extinct, no canadian geese will be seen.

O

A canadian goose is seen.

~U

The canadian goose is not extinct.

V -> O

If the media reports a canadian goose is seen, then a canadian goose is seen.

V -> ~U

If the media reports a canadian goose is seen, then the canadian goose is not extinct.

U -> ~V

If the canadian goose is extinct, then the media will not report a sighting of one.

...

...

...SO??

Please someone ground this out with examples or explication so we simple-minded college-educated folk can figure out what you're trying to tell us or take it out! —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.163.241.201 (talk) 06:22, 8 March 2008 (UTC)

Despite your uncertainty on interpreting this section. You have it completely right! Congratulations!Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 18:16, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

Conspiracy theories

This sentance:

Conspiracy theories are often essentially unfalsifiable because of their logical structure.

makes no sense.
1) Conspiracy theories (like other theories) can have very different logical structures.
2) What does "often" mean? Often according to whom?
--Pokipsy76 09:44, 2 June 2006 (UTC)

PaineDisciple If the social and political "powers that be" have almost unlimited possibilities of collectively "conspiring," why is it so difficult to understand that ordinary people tend to be interested in them and even to create them? Could it be that, contrary to the "big lie" which is hard to refute because it is beyond the capability of ordinary people to refute it, "conspiracy theories" involving government or corporate and financial elites are so big that they are beyond the capability of the average person (even the "average intellectual") to confirm or deny? Are they simply to much trouble or too dangerous to deal with by elite people concerned for their social status? It does seem that there is a social class basis to the automatic rejection of political or elitist conspiracies. The comforting stereotype for elitists is that only "uneducated" people would believe in large-scale, collective conspiracies by the "powers-that-be." Maybe it would be useful to distinguish between "conspiracy theories" and "scapegoat theories." The latter are what really cause most of the trouble in society. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 (talk) 18:20, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

Language too complex

"In science and the philosophy of science, falsifiability, contingency, and defeasibility are properties of empirical statements such that they must admit of logical counterexamples. This stands in contradistinction to formal and mathematical statements that may be tautologies, that is, universally true by dint of definitions, axioms, and proofs. No empirical hypothesis, proposition, or theory can be considered scientific if it does not admit the possibility of a contrary case."

The language here is too complex. It's full of philosophical buzz-words, which are supposed to make the writing sound precise and intelligent... but really we're just going to alienate anyone who hasn't already been schooled in this philosophical language. I'm going to try to dumb it down a bit. (e.g. "stands in contradistinction" = "contrasts")

Amen. Ironic too that more than one of the great philosophers discussed in the article were notable for simple writing styles. This was not b/c they were incapable of complex thought but b/c they chose to try to remain accessible. Specifically, as to the above quote, it's arguably in violation of WP:LEAD guidelines for accessiblity -- one hopes not for long (Popper et. al, RIP). Aim should be to inform & attract, not drive away. --Thomasmeeks

PaineDisciple There is a very strong tendency in modern times, for ALL types of experts to develop the most complex jargon possible. In my view, this parellels the development of organized religion where "priesthoods" try to make the religious ideas as mysterious as possible so that the masses of believers cannot possibly figure it out on their own (or can never be completely sure if they've got it right). This guarantees the privileged status of the "priesthood." If modern science is going to follow this path, it is no wonder that the "masses" will get tired of it. It is also true that the attitude of elitism tends to make scientists think of themselves as a kind of "infallible" priesthood. Carl Sagan, in "Science as a Candle in the Dark," said that scientific truths do not have to be taught as if they were handed down from Moses (or something to that effect). The scientific method and sceptical attitude is what should be taught in schools and to the public. I believe this is happening less and less today and that those scientists who are sincerely concerned with public support of science as a necessity in a democratic republic are "shooting themselves in the foot" if they don't challenge the elitist, "religious" attitude of scientists. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 (talk) 18:03, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

"Contingent" is different from "Falsifiable"

In this article, we're acting like "contingent" and "falsifiable" mean the same thing. But they don't. A contingent statement is anything that's not a tautology (or a conclusion whose truth depends on whether the premises are true or false). So "grass is green or not green" is not a contingent statement (nor is it falsifiable).

However, "young children go through an Oedipal complex" *is* a contingent statement, even if it's not falsifiable. This statement is not true if young children don't go through an Oedipal complex, and therefore is contingent, even if there's no way to prove that young children don't go through an Oedipal complex. Thus it's possible for a statement to be contingent but not falsifiable.

I say these should have two separate articles.

Actually, it turns out "contingency" already is its own article, so I'm just going to delete it from this one.

The intro asserts the Popper POV

The intro says:

No empirical hypothesis, proposition, or theory can be considered scientific if it does not admit the possibility of a contrary case.

But this is the Karl Popper's POV, we can't assert the Popper's POV in the intro without specifying that it is controversial between scientist and philosophers.--Pokipsy76 18:16, 10 June 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. That needs changin'.

Why "many"? Explanation needed.

Someone have replaced

Some philosophers and scientists, most notably Karl Popper, have asserted that no empirical hypothesis, proposition, or theory can be considered scientific if it does not admit the possibility of a contrary case.

to

Many philosophers and scientists, ...

on what grounds should "many" be preferred to "some"?
"Some" don't give any numerical information. "Many" meakes people think that they are "a lot", but a lot compared to what? An explanation si needed, otherwise I think we should return to the more neutral "some". --Pokipsy76 07:15, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

Maybe the words "A number of..." works here. It sounds to me like we're close to an objective summary sentence there. ... Kenosis 13:33, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

Apart from Popper what other scientists and/or philosophers had this point of view? Why does the article speaks just of Popper and the followers?--Pokipsy76 13:45, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

There are at least a few ways of saying this accurately. "Karl Popper, and others who followed in his line of reasoning, advocated ..." seems like a reasonably accurate one too. ... Kenosis 17:48, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

That would be OK, I think.--Pokipsy76 18:16, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

Agreed. Somewhere in that approximate range of language is a reasonably accurate presentation for the reader. Thanks, ... Kenosis 18:54, 23 June 2006 (UTC)

Macroevolution/Darwinism

Some have taken this principle to an extreme to cast doubt on the scientific validity of many disciplines (such as macroevolution and physical cosmology).

One of those "some", it might be worth pointing out, was Popper himself. From Unended Quest:

"From this point of view the question of the scientific status of Darwinian theory—in the widest sense, the theory of trial and error-elimination—becomes an interesting one. I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical research programme—a possible framework for testable scientific theories."

I know that this probably just giving another stick to intellectually dishonest Creationists, but as an honest intellectual I thought this might be worth pointing out. Popper later elaborated that he thought many of the individual theories developed within the framework of evolutionary theory are testable, but the overall framework itself he did not think was. It is not a rejection of Darwinism. As he later elaborated in "Natural selection and the emergence of mind":

"The fact that the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwnists and even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology. ... Since the explanatory power of a tautology is obviously zero, something must be wrong here ... I mention this problem because I too belong among the culprits, influenced by what these authorities say. I have in the past described the theory as 'almost tautological' and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural selection could be untenable (as is a tautology) and yet of great scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. It raises detailed problems in may fields, and it tells us what we would accept of an acceptable solution of these problems. I still believe that natural selection works in this way as a research programme. Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the testability and the logical status of the theory of natural selection; and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation."

Just thought I'd post that here, in case it motivated anyone to make any small adjustments. --Fastfission 13:46, 5 September 2006 (UTC)

Doesn't this selection of the article violate the wikipedia:words to avoid page under the extremist section? It implies that people take this method of thinking to an extreme, compared to someone else's definition of "not extreme." This term should be removed. Rockymountains 02:24, 6 October 2006 (UTC)Rockymountains

Too technical

I've read this page 3 times and I still can't fathom what falsifiability is... I think it needs a clear and simple definition at the beginning of the article. Kat, Queen of Typos 22:45, 9 November 2006 (UTC)

The introduction certainly needs a re-write. It was a gift from our good friend [[::User:Jon Awbrey|Jon Awbrey]] ([[::User talk:Jon Awbrey|talk]] · [[::Special:Contributions/Jon Awbrey|contribs]]),[1] who never used a five letter word when a half-dozen polysyllabic pronouns could say the same thing. Banno 22:02, 10 November 2006 (UTC)

Not all swans are birds

That a swan must be a bird (i.e. swan implies bird) implies that if it is not a bird, then it is not a swan. However, in some uses of this word "swan", it does not refer to birds at all, but rather:

“ 2. (noun) Slang term for a female who was once unattractive but somehow became very attractive (referencing the "Ugly Duckling" story). ”

Of course, this does not change the fact that science works, regardless of variable meanings of the word "swan".Kmarinas86 03:55, 24 November 2006 (UTC)

"Even so, the statement all swans are white is testable by being falsifiable" -- In the opening lines, it is implied that testable and falsifiable are interchangable terms. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 61.9.212.224 (talk) 02:21, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

Examples section is mostly original research

I've restored the "needs sources" header to the Examples section. It all sounds quite nice, but the various analyses and the applications to various fields lack references from reliable sources. "So-and-so assesses falsifiability in such-and-such field thusly.(cite)" would be good. Multiple, concurring so-and-sos and thuslys would be better. What this section has, though, is almost entirely original analysis - which really does need to go. - Kelly Ramsey 08:22, 11 February 2007 (UTC)

Economics

Many of the comments in the examples section are highly questionable. For example the comment on economics was clearly not written by an economist. Utility maximisation is not necessarily an assumption in economics or even in "rational expectations theory". A better example might be the new versions of the efficient market hypothesis that allow time varying expected returns and therefore prevent tests of the predictability of the difference between realised and equilibrium returns. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Derryp (talk • contribs) 21:30, 22 October 2007 (UTC)

Nitpick on physics section

The physics section of the article states that F=ma is sometimes taken to be a fundamental (yet falsifiable) law. As it turns out, it's already been falsified. Special relativity states that force is not actually equal to the mass of the object times its acceleration, but rather the derivative of its momentum with respect to time. Consider an object moving at 0.99999 times the speed of light. A force, no matter how large, will not accelerate it by much, but it will significantly alter its momentum. The only reason I didn't change the article is because I think it's valid, given the expected depth of the subject matter. Nevertheless, if there is someone who can elegantly incorporate special relativity's perspective into the article, I think it could be fruitful.--134.173.200.44 08:15, 15 February 2007 (UTC)

I believe this article considers F=ma as a definition. In that sense, "Force" is rather a naming of the quantity "Mass X Acceleration". And well, big mass times small acceleration could still be big, and that's the change in momentum.DyC Ei 23:14, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Deleting the Subsection I'm extremely puzzled by the whole physics section here, A section about falsifiability in physics would be good, but after I read this section, I don't think I've learned anything. If F=ma is indeed a definition, as the article claims, then it's not really relevant to the falsifiability discussion at all; you can't falsify a definition, since it's always true by definition; at most you can show that it's not useful, and that some other definition is more useful. This has in fact happened with F=ma, if you consider it not to be a law of physics but a definition of a "force"; it was useful in Newtonian physics, but in relativistic physics F=dp/dt is more useful. F=ma is more generally, though, a statement of conservation of momentum, which very explicitly is testable. Except for this statement (which is cited only as "occasionally it is suggested", an example of WP:Weasel words), the rest of the section can be summarized as "in physics, falsifiability is good".

As a net result, I don't think this subsection says anything at all. So I'm deleting it as content-free. Geoffrey.landis (talk) 15:09, 7 December 2007 (UTC)

Forbid?

from the first bullets: "Falsifiable propositions must forbid an observation." How do falsifiable propositions forbid observations? I thought the very nature of such propositions was to admit of and rely upon observations, and conceivable counterinstances? Somaticvibe 19:04, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

Wikirot. Another article all gone to hell. Banno 19:35, 24 March 2007 (UTC)

An observation that would falsify the universal statement would have to be "forbidden" by it. That is to say, that if some observational requirement be met, the universal statement cannot be true and would therefore be rejected or falsified. What makes a universal statement falsifable, such as the statement that "All muslims must exist in Israel" would be the fact that they cannot be true if an observation is made of a situation that would be impossible if the statement were true (e.g. muslims are observed in Iraq). If a statement does not "forbid" an observation, it is not testable by observation simply because in that case there could not be an observation that would show it to be false. "Forbid" does not mean "prove impossible".Kmarinas86 05:00, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

To elaborate further, one of the reasons why scientists make any attempts to observe is that certain procedural methods of observation are believed to have the capacity to generate a result that is for or against a hypothesis. The observation is for the hypothesis (A: "Jumping off a cliff must cause me to fall even further below the level of that cliff") if it matches its expected (or deduced) result (e.g. I still fell as my head was below the altitude of the platform I jumped from). Falsification requires that an observation be forbidden (B: "It is impossible for one to observe me to jump off from one cliff and land on another one that was 5 feet away and 1 foot higher. One cannot see me do it."). Contradicting B would in turn contradict A. Modus tollens.Kmarinas86 05:19, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

Necessary?

In the criticism section, an argument against Falsifiability is that "...falsifiability cannot distinguish between astrology and astronomy, as both make technical predictions which are sometimes incorrect." Would it make sense to respond to this saying that falsifiability might be a necessary condition rather than a sufficient one for something to be considered something?

I apologize for my lack of clarity. Feel free to go ahead and delete this if it doesn't make sense. Pete4512 07:21, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

Well there has been the impression among those who jump to conclusions that "Falsifiability is sufficient". However, that is not what the article says:

Popper uses falsification as a criterion of demarcation

And in the same way, it IS what the article says:

Verifiability came to be replaced by falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation

See, it's easy to get the wrong impression.

So, yes, it would make sense to point that out.Kmarinas86 08:36, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

There are other criteria, but falsifiability is a necessary criteria. Without it one cannot be certain whether one is dealing with objectively verifiable reality or with metaphysical and/or pseudoscientific speculations and beliefs. Belief often downplays experimentation and prefers to use rationalization, circular reasoning and speculation.

The process of creating knowledge involves the use of various rules of logic, used in such a manner as to sift through vast amounts of often confusing information, to produce universally useful bits of knowledge. These bits of knowledge can then be used, like building blocks, to build a reliable foundation upon which to base a repetition of the process. If some of the bits of knowledge in the foundation, with time, prove to be false, they are discarded.

Many of the rules of logic used by scientists are also used by quacks in everyday life. Otherwise they would not be able to communicate or function. So their rejection of scientific logic is somewhat hypocritical. Their immunity to cognitive dissonance allows them to at the same time be logical in one setting and illogical in another. They are simply less concerned than a good scientist is, with discerning the difference between perceived fact and proven fact. The importantce of falsification is not understood or deemed necessary by them. -- Fyslee (collaborate) 09:12, 26 March 2007 (UTC)

The new tightening of discussion and primary-source references to Popper and Watkins in Hypothetico-deductive model might clarify. --Thomasmeeks 00:47, 28 March 2007 (UTC)

PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 (talk) 18:07, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

Removed content

Some have used this principle to cast doubt on the scientific validity of many disciplines (such as macroevolution and physical cosmology), although some counter that macroevolution is falsifiable, claiming that it could not have occured in the past if tommorow, an animal gave birth to a mythological chimera.

What is in here that is implying that macroevolution isn't falsifiable? It could very well be, provided that it forbid an observation (such as an animal giving birth to a mythological chimera), and given if the observation occured, the nature of macroevolution as it pertains to the origin of higher order taxa would be beyond doubted.Kmarinas86 01:00, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

It's just too weasel-wordish, and the chimera example is pure original research. it gives the impression also that the argument that macroevolution is not falsifiable is even heard in the sciences. that's undue weight. several issues here. that's why I removed it.--Urthogie 01:41, 17 April 2007 (UTC)

Featured Article Candidate?

Ummm? How about no?Kmarinas86 08:11, 29 April 2007 (UTC)

'"God doesn't exist" is falsifiable'

On another hand assertion 'God does [not] exist' is falsifiable. [Note that a not seems to be missing here!] This assertion can be falsifiable by demonstrated [sic] the God.

If any evidence surfaced suggesting that God existed, this would show that God is a natural phenomenon, and certainly not a "God" as most people would intend the word to mean - it would probably just be a member of some previously unknown species (such an organism existing by itself is unlikely), and we would not really call it a "God".

The statement is just as unfalsifiable as its negation. But I may be misinterpreting the claim. Is it really justified to claim that this statement is falsifiable?

Colin 00:25, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

'God does not exist' is falsifiable. If he appears and talks to us and does some miracles that would show he exists. Of course 'God exists' is not falsifiable. Xavier cougat 19:15, 1 June 2007 (UTC) Xavier cougat 19:16, 1 June 2007 (UTC)

I know which statements the article is claiming is falsifiable. I have presented an argument above that "God does not exist" is not falsifiable, at least not without a very particular definition of "God" that would seem counterintuitive. I do not believe an entity appearing and claiming to be God would falsify a claim that God does not exist, because this entity would just be something natural, not the mystical stuff people want to call "God".

I would just remove the claim myself, but I was hoping somebody would have a better explanation (or a citation) that this claim is actually falsifiable. Colin 17:19, 2 June 2007 (UTC)

This might be a little amateurish, but I hope the following argument helps. The statement 'God does not exist' is falsifiable IMHO since God cannot be verified to be unobservable. In other words, 'God is observable' is itself not falsifiable. Of course, this meaning of God varies amongst cultures. I think references to God being unobservable should be qualified as assumptions since a lot of people (many of who try to convert others to some form of theism) actually believe they have 'observed God'.

I do agree that 'An unobservable God does not exist' is not a falsifiable statement. This is probably a more accurate statement and makes the article more explicitly clear.

It would be much easier to accept and understand the article, if 'God' were replaced by 'flying spaghetti monster'. 'An FSM exists' is not falsifiable since one cannot positively verify it's absence, but 'An FSM does not exist' is falsifiable since an FSM is observable. Theuse of an FSM instead of, say, a 'dog' is simply to make the article 1337 :) Viggyjiggy 16:29, 5 June 2007 (UTC)

If you saw a pasta on a flying plate [saucer ;)] over your house, does that make it god?◙◙◙ I M Kmarinas86 U O 2¢ ◙◙◙ 01:12, 28 June 2007 (UTC)

If you saw something that looked, felt, behaved like a chair, would that make it a chair? According to you, the answer is NO, it could be something else in disguise. If God was to manifest into physical form and this form looked, felt, behaved (, etc) as it needs to for it to be accurately described as a physical manifestation of God - then it is fair to say it is God. When it comes to God, people are always more critical/picky than they are for everything else... (Just to drive the point home: logically, it is perfectly consistent to hold that "god does not exist" is completely falsifiable ... At least hypothetically - I wouldn't hold your breath.)TranscendTranslation 01:57, 16 November 2007 (UTC)

"If you saw something that looked, felt, behaved like a chair, would that make it a chair? According to you, the answer is NO, it could be something else in disguise." Right. Just because I "saw" something does not mean that observation made it to be that way. That's a kind of sophism. And conversely, just because it appears to be a chair in many aspects does not mean that it cannot in any way be a chair; the maintain so would be untenable. People of all ages, but especially children, make mistakes when learning words. One example is by concluding that they saw a cow, when it was really a bison. Among adults, another type of mistake would be to conclude that what they saw in the sky was swamp gas, when it is really the remnants of fuel dumping from a multi-stage rocket. Given the ambiguity surrounding the terms used in alleged falsifiable (or alleged unfalsifiable) statements, there is no universal prescription to determine which of any such statements are falsifiable. Falsification of statement can only occur in principle if an act of verificationism can unequivocally make tenable the observation of a condition which the statement claims to be impossible. If want to avoid such ambiguities, a common lexicon would better be established, with emphasis on operational definitions. Strict standards with respect to the use of words must be coupled with the precision control of laboratory settings in order to maintain hard sciences as better at advancing our understanding of the world in comparison to soft sciences, historicism, philosophy, and religion. The only way these other studies of human thought would be hard sciences is from the perspective of some entity who relates to all that we know in the same way that scientists relate to their own controlled experiments. The degree of operational intelligence that must be gathered to make that possible is not fathomable except through perspectives most likely regarded as devotedly limited to the paranormal, mystical, or exclusive (i.e. secret knowledge). A abject failure to be taken seriously in this area is recognized by labels such as crackpottery, fraud, quackery, historical revisionism, and science by press conference.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 19:15, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

The problem here is that "falsifiable" relies on a surrounding framework. For instance, even if God did appear and shout "I exist" at everyone in the world (while performing miracles to prove it's him), it wouldn't be publishable scientifically as a falsification of "God does not exist" because you can't independently repeat the experiment later. Furthermore, the following day one could argue "it was an illusion/conspiracy ... show me evidence better than my fallible memory and your fakable video tape" and the statement would return to being un-falsified again. What makes "God does not exist" unfalsifiable is the framework around "what would be accepted as falsifying evidence". Indeed, for instance, Christians would assert that Xavier cougat's scenario (earlier in the thread) has already happened -- that God has appeared, spoken to us, and worked miracles -- but that we are now in that "day after" situation claiming it didn't really happen. Effectively telling the (hypothetical) God "but you've got to work miracles on demand and unceasingly or as soon as you stop we'll claim it was just an illusion/conspiracy/didn't really happen". —Preceding unsigned comment added by 124.171.142.223 (talk) 03:32, 18 July 2009 (UTC)

"Little Green Men"

I am a confused of the example given in the article. It is obvious that if "the Earth has not been visited by little green men" is a scientific theory, so is the opposite "...has been visited by...". So how could one be falsifiable and the other couldn't?

DyC Ei 22:52, 19 June 2007 (UTC)

To falsify that something has not visited the earth requires you to make a single observation in a small portion of the earth. To falsify that something has visited the earth requires you to make an infinite number of observations in all portions of the earth. The latter is an impossibility for us.◙◙◙ I M Kmarinas86 U O 2¢ ◙◙◙ 02:07, 28 June 2007 (UTC)

I do not attempt to reject arguments on their falsifiability in that sense. However, I also do not think that they are not both scientific. To clarify my point: I can not trust Karl Popper & co. Or has it got to do with the word "empirical"? I would be pleased to know more (well, for the article) BTW, strictly "the earth has been visited by LGM" can still be falsifiable, depending how it is considered whether an observation could be scientifically interpreted. I think. For example, if the planet spawning little green men is seen not to contain a spaceship, *and if we can say it implies there shouldn't have been any before, possibly learned from other stuff*, the theory is falsified. How this is completely rejected would be interesting... I am afraid to assert myself, after all. But sadly, it is off-topic.DyC Ei 23:34, 1 July 2007 (UTC)

Okay, I've now read "Necessary?". Ignore the above to your own convenience. Sorry. DyC Ei

The statement "the Earth has not been visited by little green men from planet X" may be falsifiable if you can show that the LGM from Planet X are not capable of space flight. But all that means is that the LGM who did visit the Earth did not come from planet X. They must have come from another planet. Banno 23:05, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

The text is an introductory one. Can you think of another example? Banno 23:05, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

Is the statement "Human settlements on Earth have not been visited by little green men between 1900 and 1999" falsifiable?

No. The reason is that anything that happens after the 1990's has no bearing on the falsity of that statement. Implication always occur from causes to effects, not the other way around. It's no longer the 1990's. Therefore, the only way this could be known is by faith, regardless of any proofs that existed and were demonstrated at the time.◙◙◙ I M Kmarinas86 U O 2¢ ◙◙◙ 18:46, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

So is it generally the case that history is not falsifiable? --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 22:28, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Yes.◙◙◙ I M Kmarinas86 U O 2¢ ◙◙◙ 22:50, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Please actually read Popper's works before you present his ideas in such a severely distorted manner. I suggest Popper Selections, which should be a minimum if you want to edit such articles. Forget the nonsense that you find on popular web pages. It's simple as that: To state that some idea is not falsifiable, even if correct, is not in any way an argument to reject a claim; it is not a valid criticism, and can be understood so only from a justificationist perspective. Falsifiability has no epistemological significance at all. --rtc 23:45, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Rational scepticism project

I'm interested that it has been given a "start" rating. Why? What does it need? Banno 23:19, 11 July 2007 (UTC)

Theism

The 1st paragraph is very badly argued

If God is conceived of as an unobservable transcendental being, then one could not disprove his existence by observation. The assertion 'God exists' would be unfalsifiable because of the nature of God. On the other hand, the assertion 'God does not exist' is falsifiable. This assertion can be falsifiable by demonstrating the existence of God.

If God is not directly observable, but influences the course of the history, "God exists" would be falsifiable. A classic attempt at falsification is the (negative) theodician argument -- that if God existed the world would be a better place.

The last two sentences simply contradict the first. 1Z 14:51, 17 July 2007 (UTC)

Can research ethics preclude falsifiability?

If an experiment to falsify a hypothesis might violate the Nuremberg Code or other recognized research ethics, does this make the hypothesis unscientific on account of unfalsifiability? --Damian Yerrick (talk | stalk) 16:36, 20 July 2007 (UTC)

No, it just makes it rather difficult to do so. 130.216.191.182 10:09, 26 July 2007 (UTC)

Popper and confirmation

The article states:

"Sokal and Bricmont write, "When a theory successfully withstands an attempt at falsification, a scientist will, quite naturally, consider the theory to be partially confirmed and will accord it a greater likelihood or a higher subjective probability. ... But Popper will have none of this: throughout his life he was a stubborn opponent of any idea of 'confirmation' of a theory, or even of its 'probability'. ... [but] the history of science teaches us that scientific theories come to be accepted above all because of their successes." (Sokal and Bricmont 1997, 62f)"

But, IIRC, a largish section of one of Popper's books (Logic of Scientific Discovery or Conjectures and Refutations) contains quite a bit of dense probability talk aimed at providing a measure of confirmation of a theory. Obviously, someone needs to take a gander at the original sources (I left mine in storage in California) to confirm what I recall. If that does indeed match up, then what we have is a relatively straightforward demonstration that the assertion by S&B above is overwrought and does not belong in this article. It's possible that I got confused and at the end Popper says that all the probability work shows that confirmation can't be considered even in principle, but that isn't my recall offhand. --Wesley R. Elsberry 13:36, 13 August 2007 (UTC)

Popper explicitly denied that the degree of confirmation (a misleading terminology, which he first used, but then rejected) or degree of corroboration of a theory is a logical probability, several times and as explicit as it can be. This degree is merely a report of the tests that have been performed on the theory.

What then of corroboration? "Why do corroborations matter?" [...] It must be remembered that it is part of falsificationist epistemology that the passing of a test does nothing to secure, confirm, or in any way brighten the prospects of a theory. Nonetheless the question can be answered satisfactorily.

The answer is that corroboration doesn't matter, even in the practical realm. It has no epistemological significance at all, as Popper always insisted. But testing matters, and has undeniable methodological significance. We want true theories. Testing is important because it is only be subjecting our theories to tests that we have any opportunity of eliminating those that are false; and the more severe the tests, the more generous the opportunity. We might put things this way: when a theory fails a test, we learning something but end up knowing nothing (since what we knew, our theory, has been eliminated). But when a theory passes a test (when, that is to say, it is corroborated), we learn nothing (since we already knew what the result of the test was going to be) but we continue to know something. Corroboration is doubtless needed if science is to exist, for if no theory were ever corroborated there would be no science; but it makes no contribution to the growth, or to the progress, of science. (David Miller: Critical Rationalism, section 6.3)

In recent years, it turned out that the key point of Popper's philosophy is really his anti-justificationism,

• "We must regard all laws and theories as guesses." (Objective Knowledge, 9)
• "There are no such things as good positive reasons" (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 1043)
• "In short, positive reasons are neither necessary nor possible" (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 1974, p. 1041)
• "The truth of any scientific theory is exactly as improbable, both a priori and in relation to any possible evidence, as the truth of a self-contradictory proposition" (ie., 0 or "almost" impossible)
• "Belief, of course, is never rational: it is rational to suspend belief." (The Philosophy of Karl Popper, 69)
• "I never assume that by force of ‘verified’ conclusions, theories can be established as ‘true’, or even as merely ‘probable’." (Logic of Scientific Discovery, 33); by ‘true’ in quotation marks he means justified true belief; not absolute, objective truth, by ‘probable’ in quotation marks, he means logical probability à la bayesianism; not that statistical theories such as "this dice when thrown here will show 1 with probability 1/6" cannot be true.
• "[O]f two hypotheses, the one that is logically stronger, or more informative, or better testable, and thus the one which can be better corroborated, is always less probable—on any given evidence—than the other." (Logic of Scientific Discovery, 363)
• "[I]n an infinite universe [...] the probability of any (non-tautological) universal law will be zero." (Logic of Scientific Discovery, 363)

This is the central element that distinguishes him from all other philosophers. As Bartley puts it, Popper provided "the first non justificational philosophy of criticism in the history of philosophy." (William W. Bartley: Rationality versus the Theory of Rationality, In Mario Bunge: The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), section IX). Popper says that it is never rationally justified to accept a theory. It is always an act of free will and of personal responsibility. Popper's philosophy is concerned only with suspending the belief in a theory if it has been successfully criticized. Popper is misunderstood so often and so badly because basically all the world is justificationist today, and thus basically anyone reads his ideas in a false justificiationist interpretation. --rtc 03:06, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

Rtc, I happen to really, really like you and much of what you've said in our previous exchanges, though I recognize that is irrelevant to this discussion. At the moment, the problem, IMO, is that Popper's criticisms of what he perceived to be misunderstandings of his earlier advocay of falsifiability are not appropriate for the lead section of this article. Therefore, I'm removing the newly inserted material in the lead and will put it below on this page so it can be discussed as to where it might possibly be appropriate. Sincerely yours, ... Kenosis 04:04, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

My point was more narrow. Sokal and Bricmont are certainly correct about general tenor, but what I was pointing out that there was a possibility that Popper had taken the trouble to consider confirmation or corroboration. I think I was careful before to emphasize that my recall of the specifics may be faulty, but I still think that it warrants a few minutes time of someone who may have the two cited books on hand to pop them open and have a look to see. --Wesley R. Elsberry 17:39, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

He does, and he rejects the view that corroboration is a logical probability. (chapter X—not to be confused with the chapter VIII about statistical probability statements—, new appendices *VII, *IX, *XVI, *XVII, *XVIII, *XIX) Admittedly, he still presents corroboration as a "measure of the rationality of our beliefs" (new appendix *IX). However, Bartley has clarified that, to make sense out of Popper's position in a coherent way, "[i]f one is to avoid unprofitable hermeneutics here, one must ignore these passages."[2] So in this aspect, S&B are true to how Popper at least should be understood. If you want to read a rebuttal of S&P's negative judgement on Popper, have a look at [3]. Note: I am using the most recent German edition of the original Logik der Forschung. It contains many additions that seem not to be present in Logic of Scientific Discovery. The book I have ends with new appendix *XX, added shortly before Popper's death. Please pressure the publisher of the English version to bring it up to date if you can! --rtc 23:05, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

PaineDisciple Why not just stick to the scientific routine that first we have an hypothesis (an "educated guess"); then when some substantial PROOF (obviously "falsifiable") has been demonstrated, it is a "theory"; and finally, when it has been thoroughly tested and is capable of predictions, it is called a scientific "law?" —Preceding unsigned comment added by 66.99.3.7 (talk) 18:10, 26 January 2009 (UTC)

Removed material from the lead

I've removed Rtc's just-added material from the lead section of the article. Only problem I have with it is that Popper's response to what he percieved as misunderstandings of what he originally meant do not belong in the article lead. I think another appropriate place can be found in this article for Popper's counter-counterarguments. The just-removed material I'm referring to is as follows:

Popper warned that his demarcation criterion had been misunderstood completely. Falsifiability is not a criterion of rational acceptability, nor of scientific recognition, scientific authority or meaningfulness. (Such a view was held for a short time by Hans Albert, but abandoned again.) It must not be confused with the criterion of ‚reinforced dogmatism‘ that Popper uses to demarcate Pseudoscience and Pseudorationality. With William W. Bartley's addition of pancritical rationalism, the criterion of falsifiability has become rather unimportant in critical rationalism and is significant only from a historical perspective.

To avoid the confusion that occurs when falsifiability is understood as a demarcation criterion for science, David Miller, the closest student and former assistant of Popper, now holds that "[i]f falsifiability is to provide [...] a criterion of demarcation in the strict sense, it should rather be between the empirical and the non-empirical." ... 04:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

In my opinion, this material is well sourced and has excellent potential somewhere else in the article, after the basics of "falsifiability" have been presented and after the response of other notable sources has been introduced in the article. ... Kenosis 04:19, 22 August 2007 (UTC)

sourcing and OR

For example, "all men are mortal" is unfalsifiable, since no amount of observation could ever demonstrate its falsehood. "All men are immortal," by contrast, is falsifiable, by the presentation of just one dead man. However, the unfalsifiable "all men are mortal" can be the logical consequence of a falsifiable theory, such as "all men die before they reach the age of 150 years". Thus, unfalsifiable statements can almost always be put into a falsifiable framework. The falsifiable does not exclude the unfalsifiable, it embraces and exceeds it.

The thing that bothers me about this is that in science the hypothesis 'all men are mortal' seems to be falsifiable. At least the way experiments are done. We do not have to prove this to an absolute certainty. Now we have not boiled every ounce of water on the earth to prove that it boils at 100 C. So if I say 'all water boils at 100C' that is not falsifiable? What we do is boil enough, enough times to conclude that that all water has the same characteristics.

http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Falsifiability&diff=171235969&oldid=170176711

and this was a good explanation. it really made the point about physical laws. My point is are we being to strict about the OR rule. A good explanation that agrees with sources but stated in a different way should be OK. Massachew 17:44, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

If you find a drop of water that doesn't boil at 373 K (100 C) and 101 kPa, then you have falsified "all water boils at 100 C and standard pressure". To falsify "all men will eventually die of aging-related illness", you'd need to find an immortal man and demonstrate that he is immortal. How would you go about that? --Damian Yerrick (serious | business) 17:57, 13 November 2007 (UTC)

My point is that if we have evidence that millions of men have died it is reasonable to conclude that all men die. Most of our science is done this way. I guess I am saying falsifying is overrated. Like saying no humans have 18 chromozones would be an unscientific statement according to Popper. Massachew 01:21, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

A falsifiable statement is of the form "There exists no X that has property P, and here is how to measure property P." For example, "there exists no hominid that has 18 chromosome pairs" could be falsified by finding a hominid, taking a karyotype, and finding 18 chromosome pairs. The statement "all men are mortal", on the other hand, is of the form "there exist no man who will not die of old age at some point in the future". It is impossible to see a man's future. --Damian Yerrick (serious | business) 04:29, 14 November 2007 (UTC)

Falsifiability of Evolution

I think the specific falsifiability examples relating to evolution are directly contradicted by the article itself, as they are (what the article calls) "uncircumscribed existential statement, such as there exists a green swan".

E.g.; Dawkins says "If there were a single hippo or rabbit in the Precambrian, that would completely blow evolution out of the water. None have ever been found." True, but the trouble with that is to test that would require we search the entirety of the Precambrian (just as we would need to search the world to disprove the green swan statement). The lack of hippos or rabbits in the Precambrian is supporting evidence, but not an adequately falsifiable prediction of evolution. The key issue here is that evolution must make a specific prediction that "you will see something if you look here". Negative assertion of validity "can't find evidence to the contrary so it must be true" is a classic folly (and it's kind of mistake that Dawkins would make, which Sagan would not have)

I would suggest dumping these arguments for some actual falsifiable predictions of evolution. There are plenty of such strong testable predictions; here's a few:

Evolution predicts a (geologically) recent common ancestor of apes and humans. Molecular biology identifies DNA as the mechanism for inherited traits. Therefore if common decent is true, our DNA should be more similar to great apes than other mammals. If it this is not the case, then common decent is falsified. DNA analysis shows this to be the case however (and remarkably so), and evolution passes a falsifiable test.

A more specific example of the above human-ape DNA ancestry is evolution's predictions regarding the differences in human and other great ape chromosomes. Humans have 23 pairs and the other apes have 24. Evolution makes a prediction that the missing chromosome should exist somewhere in the human genome, if it is not there (a reasonable sized search space compared to all the Precambrian), then common decent must be modified or abandoned. This was found on Chromosome 2 and is widely considered strong evidence of common decent.

Other examples include the prediction of transitional fossils, evolution predicts that if you look at rocks of the right age in the right places you should find Transitional fossils, the lack of transitional forms would serve to disprove evolution (note that this is the opposite of Dawkins' statements which is that you should need to *find* hippos to prove evolution false, here you need to fail to find something to disprove).

I suggest we change the evolution examples to at least one, if not two of these above (or other similar) examples. Does anyone object or have comments?

--Robbins 05:36, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

I like the idea of some additional examples, but I'm not sure I like the examples you propose. Your argument against the "Rabbit in the Precambrian" example is faulty. Finding a Precambrian fossil of a modern rabbit most certainly would falsify evolution, your assertions nonwithstanding. That would be a classic example of falsification. The DNA similarity between great apes and humans is a good example (and I think it should be added), but I find the chromosome-24/chromosome-2 argument extremely unpersuasive; it's not at all obvious how the prediction is derived from the Darwinian theory of evolution. Finally, a lack of transitional fossils would unfortunately say nothing about falsifiability. The theory of evolution predicts that transitional forms exist, but it would only predict that transitional fossils existed if there were some reason to make the statement that all animals are fossilized on death. But of course that's not true-- fossilization is actually very rare, and even so, strata are abraded and eroded away. Finding a fossil definitely tells you something was there, but not finding a fossil doesn't definitively tell you something wasn't there. Geoffrey.landis (talk) 23:46, 13 December 2007 (UTC)

What if an alien move the rabbit fossil from one geologic strata to another? Naive falsification isn't so great. You can ALWAYS add an ad hoc hypothesis so that a hypothesis is still supported. History of nature or of anything else is INHERENTLY unfalsifiable, and it will always be so, without the addition Kmarinas86 (talk) 23:57, 17 December 2007 (UTC)

What an unholy synthesis of a lack of knowledge about Popper's work with fashionable positivistic ideas and the prevalent misreading (rather nonreading) of Popper. "The lack of hippos or rabbits in the Precambrian is supporting evidence". Are you aware that Popper explicitly denied the very existence of evidence and scientific data, and the possibility of support? Are you aware of the degree that Popper rejected the fashionable philosophy of science? Are you aware that Popper wrote more than a few articles about evolution himself, that he rejected naturalistic evolution and accepted much of the criticism of creationists? Did you know that he developed his own theory of evolution, the such-called spearhead theory of evolution, and that it includes an attempt to solve the problem of macroevolution? --rtc (talk) 15:33, 21 December 2007 (UTC)

moved section

I disagree strongly with the edit [4]. You attempt to protect the mainstream misreading of Popper against the facts. You obviously moved it down to criticism to play down its significance. It is not a criticism, it is a clarification. --rtc (talk) 16:37, 21 December 2007 (UTC)

I'm sorry you disagree with the edit. The material you added seems reasonable to put in the article, but it does not belong in the introduction-- the third sentence-- before the index. I put it in under "criticisms" because that seemed closest to the right place to put it, but if you think a different section works, that's fine with me.

I didn't move it down "to play down its significance," I moved it down because it's doesn't belong in the introduction.

As for your remark that your material is apparently correcting what you call "the mainstream misreading of Popper"-- in that case, if the mainstream reading of Popper is a "misreading" then it this apparently does belong in under criticism.Geoffrey.landis (talk) 00:47, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

So let's be explicit: Do you want to suggest that falsifiability has to be described in the way the mainstream misreads and abuses it, and that Popper's desparate struggle against this should be described only as a criticism? I'd suggest we take mainstream misunderstandings of a position only as an indicator for its relevance, never for its content, and if we describe the position, we describe it as it was actually held, not as it was misunderstood. The mainstream misunderstanding of Popper is "well known and well documended" (M. Artigas, The ethical nature of Karl Popper's theory of knowledge, p. 15). --rtc (talk) 02:37, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

This is better. However, the logical flow of an article is that is should first clearly explain what falsification is, and then discuss the criticisms. This section is apparently a critique of falsification (and the fact that you are quoting Popper makes it no less a critique-- Popper can critique his own theory, and the ways in which other people use his theory).

The new version seriously looks to me like you're trying to push a POV. It should go under critiques.Geoffrey.landis (talk) 03:33, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

This is not a critique, it is Popper's own view, and it was his view already when he published The Logic of Scientific Discovery, which says this clearly in the footnotes there. The original German version of the book which contained the mistake without comments had only very limited circulation. If you understand as POV presenting as falsifiability something that contradics the "mainstream interpretation" of it then I will gladly admit that I am trying to push POV. Just because it is an inconvenient truth that the mainstream misrepresents and abuses falsifiability so badly, it does not mean that Popper's actual views on the matter may be made a second-class citizen by grading them down to a mere "criticism". Do you think that this article should describe falsifiability or do you think that it should describe "the ways in which other people [ab]use [it]"? --rtc (talk) 13:52, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

A separate article devoted to Popper's views of falsifiability may be in order and the current one replaced by a disambiguation page that relates the concept of falsifiability to differing contexts.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 20:18, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

This section violates neutral point of view quite flagrantly with the sentence beginning "Yet for certain preconceived reasons, hardened creationists...". No citation, no evidence, just a declaration that those creationists are hardened and have preconceived reasons. The previous sentence's strenuous emphasis "not necessary" could also be a non-neutral attempt at an authoritative statement with no citation. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 203.143.164.250 (talk) 05:07, 15 July 2009 (UTC)

Naïve falsification

While naïve falsification is a view attributed mistakenly to Popper in his early years by some authors, he never actually held this view. In appendix *XIV of the Logic of Scientific Discovery, which is still missing in the English version, he literally calls claims that this was once his view complete nonsense. The article is reluctant to say this. I further suggest a rename of the article to Falsificationism, which is the Poppperian philosophy applied to science, which includes not only Falsifiability (the criterion) but also Falsification (the methodology). These two belong together. --rtc (talk) 02:45, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Stanford description

There's a reasonably good discussion of falsifiability on the Stanford University Department of Philosophy web site.[5]. Their definition is simple: "A theory is scientific only if it is refutable by a conceivable event. Every genuine test of a scientific theory, then, is logically an attempt to refute or to falsify it, and one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory." That's clearer than what Wikipedia has now.

A theory is an aggregate of hypotheses, some of which are central premises underpinning the entire theory (e.g. In the way the Cosmological principle is to the Big Bang Theory). The majority of hypotheses in a given theory are not critical to the whole set. For example, the understanding of relativity does not disprove every hypothesis of Newton's understanding. Finding a fossil in the wrong place in geological strata need not disprove Evolution so as long as evolution does not need to be the sole determinant of the placement of fossils.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 20:26, 19 June 2009 (UTC)

They then go on to a discussion of the hard part of the problem - evaluating whether one theory is "better" than another. It's easy to generate theories which are hard to falsify, but don't predict much. In their words, "for Popper any theory X is better than a ‘rival’ theory Y if X has greater empirical content, and hence greater predictive power, than Y." This is followed by a long discussion of the philosophical history of trying to get hold of the concept of "better" in some formal way. The article currently does not address this well.

There's a practical issue ignored in the article. Engineering is based on theories with predictive power. Engineering is about knowing whether a bridge will hold up or a circuit will work before building it. Only falsifiable theories have reliable predictive power. Hence, engineering is based on falsifiable theories. Philosophers tend to ignore this part, and engineers take it as a given, so it's not mentioned much. I'll look for a cite. --John Nagle (talk) 17:57, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Whoever claims that "one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory" (which is naive falsification) has never actually read the Logic of Scientific Discovery, which says for example "If accepted basic statements contradict a theory, then we take them as providing sufficient grounds for its falsification only if they corroborate a falsifying hypothesis at the same time." (section 22). That is, it is never sufficient to present a counter-instance; a falsifiable explanation for the occurrence of this counter-instance is needed. The claim that "Engineering is based on theories with predictive power. Engineering is about knowing whether a bridge will hold up or a circuit will work before building it. Only falsifiable theories have reliable predictive power. Hence, engineering is based on falsifiable theories." is also false on closer inspection, and it is wrong that philosophers have ignored this issue. "There is simply no such thing as the scientific knowledge required for the manufacture of a television set or a can of beans; no amount of science will ever tell us how to tackle the job--there may be countless ways that will succeed. All that science can do is to tell us what lines of approach we do well avoid. That is, we do not rely on, or even apply, scientific hypotheses when we act; we exploit them. I should dub this insufficiently appreciated truism the slavery theory of applied science." (D. Miller, Critical Rationalism, 2.2g) It is further false that "Only falsifiable theories have reliable predictive power." No theory, not science, not any other, gives reliability; and predictive power is not exhausted by falsifiable theories. "Science offers no security. Science has no authority." (David Miller: Being an Absolute Skeptic. Science 284 (4 June 1999), pp. 1625–1626) --rtc (talk) 19:18, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Actually, that quotes Popper out of context. Back up about one page. He's struggling with the problem of experimental error, or, as he puts it, "non-reproduceable single occurrences". He wants the falsifying data to demonstrate some repeatability, which implies some definition of "repeat" for that type of data. He calls this a "low level empirical hypothesis". He's not insisting that a theory cannot be falsified until a "better" theory is available to replace it. --John Nagle (talk) 20:14, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

I am not at all quoting Popper out of context, in fact, I am quoting him in the larger context of the whole book. I did not claim that he is "insisting that a theory cannot be falsified until a 'better' theory is available to replace it", although you have got quite the right idea if you think into this direction, and it is almost what Popper says (he says that one should not give up even a falsified theory as long as there is no better theory to replace it—Doing it would lower the content and hence violate methodological rules). The statement we are discussing is "one genuine counter-instance falsifies the whole theory". Now let's assume that by "falsifiable explanation for the occurrence of this counter-instance is needed" I meant falsification in the methodological sense (as it is described in the article as "Thus, while advocating falsifiability as the criterion of demarcation for science, Popper explicitly allows for the fact that in practice a single conflicting or counter-instance is never sufficient methodologically to falsify a theory, and that scientific theories are often retained even though much of the available evidence conflicts with them, or is anomalous with respect to them.") while you meant it in the logical sense, and let's further assume that you are right that the place I quoted speaks of falsification in your sense and that I was slightly in error there, and let's also assume that the quoted text which I criticized in fact talked about falsification in the logical sense. Then, even if we read "genuine counter-instance" as what you call "falsifying data [that] demonstrates some repeatability", it is then still false. Popper clearly discusses (section 18) the claim that the whole theory is falsified by a counterexample, and rejects it in this generality with several objections, which are primarily that the theory may consist of independent axioms and that the contradiction can then be traced back to a specific one; and further that the theory can be decomposed into theories of smaller generality by analyzing its consequences, of which the problematic one can be identified, corrected and the theory re-assembled into a new one. So in any case, the statement I criticized does not properly describe Popper's views and "The logic of his theory is utterly simple: if a single ferrous metal is unaffected by a magnetic field it cannot be the case that all ferrous metals are affected by magnetic fields" is not quite right; if at all, it holds only for theories of low complexity and generality. --rtc (talk) 22:52, 23 December 2007 (UTC)

Recent edits

I have defended recent edits by a revert because they seemed to me a good attempt to improve the article. However I have some concern about them. 1) The paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" speaks about Popper's view, while the title sugget we are speaking about the "general" purpose. We should change the name of the paragraph to emphasize that we are talking of a particular POV. 2) Should we assume that the topic "falsifiability" is a subtopic of Popper Falsificationism? Or is it a more general topic? If it is more general (that0s what I think) then the paragraph "Purpose of falsifiability and common misconceptions" should be a subparagraph of "Falsificationism". --Pokipsy76 (talk) 13:33, 24 December 2007 (UTC)

I'd previously moved this "common misperceptions" essay back into a later place in the article, in the section on criticisms--with extensive notes saying hey, guy, look, I'm not deleting your stuff, I'm just moving it later in the article where it belongs-- but this guy who keeps sticking it in seems to have some kind of hobby-horse POV he's pushing, and keeps pasting it back into the beginning of the article where it makes little sense. So this time I just cut it completely; it's mostly irrelevant anyway, and the article doesn't suffer from having it deleted. Geoffrey.landis (talk) 16:11, 30 December 2007 (UTC)

Ok but now I can't understand why did you delete the paragraph.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 17:06, 30 December 2007 (UTC)

See, Popper originally developed falsifiability in the context of an attack on scientism (the view that science is based on evidence or can be based on evidence, or at least strongly supported by evidence). Perversely, it then became almost universally understood as in line with scientism, something that made Popper very sad. And describing the facts now is "hobby-horse POV", because this being the majority opinion legitimizes to describe this myth as the truth and so abuse Popper's name to support the views he criticized? --rtc (talk) 10:42, 6 January 2008 (UTC)

Ok, I understand your concerns, I agree we can mention the misconception. I wask just suggesting to move them in the appropriate subsection.--Pokipsy76 (talk) 10:59, 6 January 2008 (UTC)

I have no problem at all about putting it into the appropriate subjection, but "criticism" is certainly not the appropriate one. Popper's own views on the matter are not criticisms of falsifiability. --rtc (talk) 11:24, 6 January 2008 (UTC)

The appropriate subsection from my point of view is "falsificationism".--Pokipsy76 (talk) 11:43, 6 January 2008 (UTC)

150 years example

"all men die before they reach the age of 150 years" Exactly how is this example falsifiable rather than simply empirical? —Preceding unsigned comment added by CSears (talk • contribs) 17:07, 11 February 2008 (UTC)

What do you mean by "rather than simply empirical"? where do you see a difference between something being empirical and something being falsifiable? According to Popper, both words mean the same and are interchangeable. --rtc (talk) 16:43, 20 February 2008 (UTC)

And the 150 years example can be falsified by producing Mel Brooks' 2000 Year Old Man and thus it is testable.

can we have a reference or quote for this "The Popperian criterion excludes from the domain of science not unfalsifiable statements but only whole theories that contain no falsifiable statements". Why couldn't we just add some true falsifiable statement to a theory, thus making the theory "scientific". I will edit in a couple of days if no feedback 79.70.50.117 (talk) 05:30, 1 March 2008 (UTC)

based on which source will you edit the article? --rtc (talk) 06:53, 1 March 2008 (UTC)

Falsibiability and Physics

One of Popper's major reasons for criticising verificationism is that a universal law cannot be verified by finite evidence, given that it makes infinite predictions. At first sight, no such problem is there for falsificationism: a single anomaly proves a universal law wrong. However, contemporary physics does make certain predictions, such as the statement "Magnetic monopoles exist." This is a claim that can never be falsified, and as such, Popper must denounce it as unscientific. I can't recall reading this in the article, as it makes falsificationism a less probable conception of the scientific method.DDSaeger (talk) 23:57, 5 April 2008 (UTC)

Merge with Testability

PRO The testability article does not present sufficient information in order for it to stand on its own. As it is mentioned in the lede of this article as a synonym for falsifiability (or at least part of falsifiability), it should be merged into this article. Neelix (talk) 16:36, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

PRO I agree. It should be merged and a redirect added. lk (talk) 14:19, 10 May 2008 (UTC)

CON I'm not sure there is anything to merge into this article or that there is a clear concept on the Testability article. I'd just make it a redirect. Pdbailey (talk) 01:07, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability. Falsifiability is an important strand of philosophical thought of one of the greatest thinkers of the twentieth century. Its application revolutionized science (e.g. the collapse of the Newtonian paradigm and its replacement with relativity) and is still the harsh "rock of reality" upon which all unsound scientific theories eventually founder. Testability is similar, however it is more of a grab-bag collection of practical problem-solving tools than it is a philosophical bedrock; it is the "applied mathematics" of testing as opposed to the "pure mathematics" of Falsifiability. For Wikipedia to have a page on Popper without a link to his central conceptual idea of Falsifiability would be like having a page on Henry VIII without directly mentioning his six wives, other than as a sub-section under mistresses, concubines, and other female companions. Jackmaturin (talk) 07:52, 12 May 2008 (UTC)

CON I don't think Falsifiability should be merged with Testability either. There is an important strand in the testability article which is missing - I may add it when I get time - which is that testability is also a term used to describe how testable a physical system is (not just a hypothesis). In engineering it is a term used to discuss built in test methodologies and other self check schemes. It may also be a measure of how easy a product is to test by external methods. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 213.120.209.210 (talk) 11:11, 22 May 2008 (UTC)

CON Added highlighting of the positions above. Ours is based on an anticipated build out of the Philosophy of Science here. Testability and Falsifiablity are distinct concepts, in Our English usage, with Testability the empirical projection of Falsifiability plus serendipitous discovery. A theoretical position could be falsified even though there was no known way to empirically test it. 74.78.162.229 (talk) 15:54, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

CON should be kept if only for the fact that it was Popper's technical term. In addition testablitity is only good for experimental science (chemistry & physics) and does nothing for observational sciences (geology, astronomy, and much of ecology/biology).--OMCV (talk) 19:33, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

I have removed the merge tag on the testability article as consensus here seems against the merge. Deamon138 (talk) 23:19, 13 August 2008 (UTC)

Is "people have souls" nonfalsifiable?

In the intro it is suggested that "people have souls" is a nonfalsifiable statement. But a limited and perhaps impractical falsification may exist, depending on what is meant by "soul". A soul is usually described as a nonmaterial entity that contains the identity of a person, and which animates (but is independent of) the person's material body. If a soul existed, reincarnation and resurrection would be possible. So one could (for example) test whether a possibly reincarnated person remembers things from their past life. If no one ever reported this, it would be a falsification of the theory. Granted it is impossible to check all bodies that ever existed to see whether they contain reincarnated souls, but the same difficulty confronts a person trying to check whether all swans are white.

So what is it about "people have souls" that makes it so much less falsifiable than "all swans are white"?141.211.61.254 (talk) 02:42, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

In fact, not all swans are birds, see for example The Swan (TV series).Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 17:50, 6 May 2008 (UTC)

“All swans are white” is easily falsifiable because there are well-established conventional definitions of what constitutes “white” and what constitutes a swan. “People have souls” is unfalsifiable because there’s no clear and/or agreed upon definition of what constitutes a “soul”.

Furthermore, claims of having lived past lives are unverifiable because there’s no way to distinguish between someone who would have actually lived a past life, and someone who just studied the life of a dead person very thoroughly. I could claim I was Napoleon in a past life and bring up a multitude of facts about Napoleon’s life, but nothing can prove that I actually was Napoleon. This would be impossible to verify because anybody whose life can be researched by someone verifying the claim, could have been researched by the person making the claim as the basis for their claim. Anybody whose life cannot be researched is a dead end as far as research goes so there's no way to prove having lived a past life there. — NRen2k5^(TALK), 22:36, 25 May 2008 (UTC)

What about the definition I presented in my last comment? It's not as clear and agreed-upon as a swan's definition, but I don't think it's critically lacking in clarity or universality either. You can note a million questions I haven't yet answered about a soul, but I'm sure I could ask a million questions about a swan that wouldn't be in the common definition either. No definition is complete, perfect, or comprehensive.

Further, it is possible to distinguish between someone (call him John) who was Napoleon in a past life and someone who merely studied his life. For example, John might know some verifiable facts about Napoleon which are not in history books because they are presently unknown or known but of little interest. John might claim that he (as Napoleon) used a certain rare perfume and stored it in a secret drawer of his desk shortly before his death in exile at Saint Helena. The perfume could then be found and John's claim very strongly verified. Furthermore, John's relatives testify that he has never left his country, let alone traveled to Saint Helena. This would be very strong testable evidence of John's claim to have lived as Napoleon, no? 141.211.61.254 (talk) 22:31, 26 June 2008 (UTC)

Look up verificationism to see what you are describing.Kmarinas86 ^(6sin8karma) 21:33, 1 July 2008 (UTC)

Paraphrased list of Popper's observations

This article is densely written, or perhaps I'm just too dense to give it justice. This summary of Popper's position from a old version of the philosophy of science article seemed more straightforward to me:

Popper described falsibility using the following observations (paraphrased from Conjectures and Refutations):

1. It is easy to confirm or verify nearly every theory — if we look for confirmations.
2. Confirmations are significant only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is, if, unenlightened by the theory, we should have expected an event which was incompatible with the theory — an event which would have refuted the theory.
3. "Good" scientific theories include prohibitions which forbid certain things to happen. The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
4. A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory.
5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify or refute it. Theories that take greater "risks" are more testable, more exposed to refutation.
6. Confirming or corroborating evidence is only significant when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory; "genuine" in this case means that it comes out of a serious but unsuccessful attempt to falsify the theory.
7. Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their advocates — for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, or at least lowering, its scientific status.

68.167.254.2 (talk) 08:04, 6 July 2008 (UTC).

Quantum Mechanics

Wikipedia:Reference_desk/Science#Quantum_Mechanics

Question moved to the appropriate location.--OMCV (talk) 23:34, 9 October 2008 (UTC)

Logic

In the article as it currently stands (4-28-09) under the "Logic & mathematics section" contains the statement:

"In this way of looking at things, logic is a science that seeks after knowledge of how we ought to conduct our reasoning if we want to achieve the goals of reasoning. As such, the logical knowledge that we have at any given time can easily fall short of perfection. Thus rules of logical procedure, as normative claims about the fitness of this or that form of inference, are falsifiable according to whether their actual consequences are successful or not."

The most straightforward interpretation of this claim is incorrect. Truth value is defined by reference to the laws of logic. Therefore, any "falsification" of the laws of logic must first make reference to the laws of logic and is therefore self-contradictory. The intended meaning of "the rules of logical procedure" is vague; however, the statement itself must be changed to avoid being misleading at best and completely false at worst.

Dialegomai (talk) 14:12, 28 April 2009 (UTC)

Thanks for starting a discussion about this matter. I have reverted your edit as it is unsourced. Please find a V & RS and format it properly so that it shows up in the references section. The best thing to do before adding such an edit is to try it here and see if it gains acceptance and if the reference is formatted properly. In the end this type of addition will "stick" better, as it is a consensus version and it will be protected by other editors. Please propose your edit here and let's try to make it work properly. We'll help you. -- Brangifer (talk) 00:51, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

__________________________

This edit does not require an external source. This is a simply and directly provable deduction as a 2 premise syllogism:

Premise: The law of non-contradiction (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction) is false. Premise: The law of non-contradiction states that what is false (non-true) is not true (and vice versa). Conclusion: What is false is non-false (i.e. true).

Thus is it demonstrated that any falsification of the law of non-contradiction is self-contradictory; therefore the law of non-contradiction is non-falsifiable. The other two axioms (law of identity and of excluded middle) can be demonstrated by similar arguments.

My proposed change (which you undid) is as to replace the incorrect sentence with:

"However, the laws of logic themselves (the rules of inference and logical axioms) are not subject to falsifiability per se. That is, since truth values are defined in relation to the laws of logic any "falsification" of these laws would represent a self-contradictory situation though this conclusion has been argued against by philosophers such as W.V._Quine."

I will be the first to admit that the formatting needs some tweaking. I will give you a day or so to review this before correcting it again. Dialegomai (talk) 01:41, 29 April 2009 (UTC)

Logical Possibility

I've heard two different interpretations of the article's opening sentence:

Falsifiability (or refutability) is the logical possibility that an assertion can be shown false by an observation or a physical experiment.

1. Falsifiability is when there is nothing in the logical nature of an assertion that would preclude an observation or physical experiment from showing said assertion to be false.
2. Falsifiability is when there is nothing in the logical nature of an assertion that would preclude a currently practical observation or physical experiment from showing said assertion to be false.

The first says the only criteria is the assertion itself, that what is not falsifiable today will never be falsifiable. The second adds consideration of our technological capabilities, that what is not falsifiable today may be tomorrow. I've always understood the first to be the correct interpretation, but I've heard it argued that Popper was referring only to things that are of current practical value to science. Even if he were not, they say, there is nothing useful in the first interpretation. I understood the issue to be about potential value, not actual value. Some ideas, by their very nature, are incapable of ever being meaningful. Other ideas may or may not be meaningful, but at least the possibility exists. The ability to distinguish between these two classes is what is useful.

I post this seeking the opinion of others. How is the aforementioned opening sentence to be interpreted?