Talk:Philosophy of mind

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Edited slightly to pack more information into the first sentence.--Levalley (talk) 23:29, 22 April 2009 (UTC)

Psychology and the mind

"Psychology is the science that investigates mental states directly" In which world can that be possible? How can you study scientifically something that isn't even material? and directly? Or either is it a science that studies behavior scientifically (and by those actions you can infer the mental states) or is it the study of the mind (when it can't possibly be scientific). WLoku (talk) 03:47, 28 May 2009 (UTC)

I agree that the wording here needs improvement. Looie496 (talk) 16:54, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

Besides that point, there are two other issues with the article. First, I think that is rather necessary to add some more references to some other monists, like Ryle in The Concept of Mind (there is a mentiont to Daniel Denett, but is rather ocasional). As a second issue, when we speak of behaviorism, we are not just "describing behavior". It do holds only to observable behavior, but it's not because "that's the only thing we can do", but because they say that all that we do is behavior. If this is an A-rated class article, we need to get some improvement here. WLoku (talk) 19:10, 1 June 2009 (UTC)

Bridging the gap between monism and dualism in solving the mind body problem

Dualists rightly state that a scientist's assertion that pain is the firing of C-Fibre neurones in the brain does not in any way explain the sensation of pain; why or how it occurs, or even what it is. This first order perception which a neuroscientist may posit is not really the consciousness, and I would go on to say rather that the consciousness is 'the perception of perception'. No matter how scientists have attempted to solve this 'perception of perception' in the past, they have utterly failed to do so by limiting themselves to the 3rd dimension, or as a dualist would say 'the physical plane'. The reason these solutions have failed is that they fail to capture the nature of the problem as miserably as my first example - that pain is a result of C-Fibre neurones firing in the brain. They will never satisfy a dualist, or indeed anyone who properly appreciates the problem by the nature of their stoic monism. I have a theory - and I am aware of the relevant articles propounding the invalidity of personal theories, by the way - which seeks to satisfy monists in terms of being strictly scientific and dualists in acknowledging a slight(if one takes the concept from a very contrived point of view) dichotomy between brain activity and consciousness. In the same way that objects represent the 3rd dimension and the passage of time the 4th dimension, I believe that the conscious phenomenon of 'feeling' is the representation of some dimension higher than 4 - lets say for arguement's sake 5 - one that, thus far, has not been visualized in any other form than in formulae relating to string theory and the like. One might then go on to argue that, if that is the case, and all objects exist in all dimensions, why don't all objects have a consciousness. And to this I say that they do, only, not the same as us. You see, we in our brains have a vast, complicated, but ultimately structured, network of thought, memory, vision and all the senses that other objects simply do not. I imagine that the 5th dimension requires a degree of structured complexity to come through as consciousness, just like particles must come together before atoms and objects can exist. Imagine the 5th dimension to be paparazzi and our chemical, 3rd dimension quantifiable sensations to be celebrities. The paparazzi require celebrities to be present in order to represent them in articles(imagine in this analogy that articles are the actual consciousness) - but the paparazzi still exist if celebrities are not present. This is the same as, for example, empty space existing without their being objects around to properly represent it, or time existing without any noticeable changes occuring in the environment. Other forms of the consciousness, different and abstract from ours, may exist, but not in inanimate objects, or artificial intelligence as I will explain later. Oh, and as for where the 3d representation of the consciousness is found, it is not in the brain. Huh? Yep. Every 'event' as we perceive it happens slightly differently to every atom: if you imagine yourself punching a wall - every atom in that wall and in your fist receives a slightly different measure of force from the one next to it, so it could actually be rationalised in this way to be several events, several million changes in the energy states of the wall atoms and your knuckle atoms. I regard the entire consciousness to be just one event(otherwise how could one facet of the consciousness, say thought, interact with another, for example memory - if it was not one event their would be no reasonable structure or, more specifically chronological consitency). So this begs the question, how can the consciousness occur inside the brain if the brain is made up of many millions of atoms? Certainly , every atom within the brain does not have the necessary structured complexity to fulfill the conditions of consciousness and the brain does not fulfill the condition of being one indevisable object for the conscious 'event' to occur - so what's up? The solution? Think Electromagnetic Field. It's shape on a moment to moment basis is determined by brain activity, and so represents the brain's complexity, but it is also one indevisable object, in fact, luckily for my theory, besides sub atomic particles it is one of the only 4 things to be fully indevisable (Gravity, EM, Weak and Strong nuclear).

I know this is only my theory, not significant when weighed against the heavyweights of the philosophy world, but I think it makes more sense than any alternative, and is just as worthy of a mention in the article as any other theory, despite its lack of following compared to them. People read encyclopedias to find out hard information, and if they can't get that, why put a filter on the speculative content in place in the article they are reading, because any one piece of speculation is just as likely to provide enlightenment as another, surely —Preceding unsigned comment added by Omg Pop (talk • contribs) 15:03, 24 July 2009 (UTC)

Please read WP:OR for why we cannot use that in the article. --Tryptofish (talk) 15:11, 24 July 2009 (UTC)

So what you're saying is that if went on to right a book expounding this theory, I could then cite it as a valid theory?

It's nothing personal, believe me. Those are the rules the project runs by, and I did not write them (although I agree with them). If you were to write a book, and it were published, another editor could cite it. --Tryptofish (talk) 15:16, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

You might be interested in the article on Electromagnetic theories of consciousness. Material there also needs to be based on reputable published sources, but since it is more focused on the ideas you are talking about, there is more room to go into detail. (Also, please remember to sign talk page messages by typing ~~~~ afterward.) Regards, Looie496 (talk) 14:52, 25 July 2009 (UTC)

Hi OMG Pop. Another possibility for you would be to develop your theory in the open survey topic on the best theories of consciousness at canonizer.com. The most important measure of the quality of a theory is how many people agree that it is a good theory. Publishing a book helps, but it is not absolutely necessary if lots of people agree with you (or are in your 'camp'). There is room there for all theories to stand together, as long as someone is willing to support them. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Brent Allsop (talk • contribs) 03:53, 4 August 2009 (UTC)

There's no God, and your human ideals are laughable

If such is the opinion of the "majority of modern philosophers", then I guess this article ought to cover the fact. However, I think the last part of the article pretty much gives the lie to the fact that said "modern philosophers" are those in the analytic tradition, and that everyone else doesn't count. I think this little gem says it quite well:

...while Malinowski has shown that an anthropologist can know a person's customs and habits better than the person whose customs and habits they are

Now, I am not a Post-Colonial theorist, but I can can quite clearly how such a person would respond. Something to the effect of, an anthropologist can study a person's habits and customs and come up with conclusions based on an epistemology that is inherently grounded in white, Western privilege. I personally don't hold this view, but I think there is something to be said for it. If this article remains as it is now, I think there should be some indication at the top of the page that no attempt is being made to represent the views of non Anglo-American philosophy on the matter, which the reader should only expect since this is an English Wiki. Corbmobile (talk) 15:00, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

If you think something in the article needs to be changed, could you please be clearer about what it is and how it ought to be changed? Regards, Looie496 (talk) 16:18, 29 November 2009 (UTC)

I believe that it should be made clear from the get-go that the "majority of modern philosophers" are monist means "the majority of modern analytic philosophers" are monist. Not near the bottom where it currently rests. Corbmobile (talk) 06:09, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

I changed "the majority of" to "many" -- will that suffice? (I also did some other copy-editing of the poorly written prose in the section.) Looie496 (talk) 17:19, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

Well, I don't think that quite addresses the problem. In every philosophy department but a handful in America and or England, the overwhelming majority is Physicalist/Monist (or so the article from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy this article is heavily copy-pasted from says). That certainly ought not to be brushed under the rug. I just would like it to be acknowledged in the article that, while the majority of philosophers who feel that science reflects reality (namely Analytical philosophers) are Physicalists/monists/atheists or whatever you'd like to call it, there is a whole other school of philosophy which holds science (or perhaps at least theoretical science) mostly reflects scientists' biases of culture, social status, race, gender, etc., and thus find the question of whether or not there is an extra-physical mind or just the brain wholly irrelevant. Corbmobile (talk) 20:05, 30 November 2009 (UTC)

The vast majority of the philosophers who work in Western universities are ontological physicalists (a.k.a. materialists). In stark contrast, the vast majority of lay-people are ontological dualists, (usually because dualism goes hand-in-hand with most religions). Thus, any reference to the "weight of numbers" is fraught with difficulties - do we refer to the dominant beliefs of the philosophers or of the general population of the world? I am not sure the "weight of numbers" is especially relevant, especially given that the vast majority of lay-people know very little about science, and the vast majority of scientists know very little about philosophy or the metaphysical problems it raises for science. If you don't believe me, try raising a few physical metaphysical problems with a boorish scientist and watch him squirm as you turn his conclusions on their head - it's easy and fun. —Preceding unsigned comment added by BlueRobe (talk • contribs) 23:20, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

Ockham's Razor

The "main argument" to support ontological dualism may be the argument, that, the dualistic conception of the non-physical mind is not occamistic while the Cartesian Ego cannot be explained in entirely physical terms. While this may not be the main argument for all philosophers of mind it does pose an intellectual challenge that occupies the intellectual dexterity of many philosophy students when they first confront the mind-body problem.

How is it possible that Wikipedia's Philosophy of Mind page has no reference to Ockham's Razor? This oversight seems extraordinary to me. —Preceding unsigned comment added by BlueRobe (talk • contribs) 06:13, 16 February 2010 (UTC)

Free will section requires update

I have recently tried to modify some original text I wrote expanding on (the critique of) the various definitions of free will provided in the free will section of this article ("Free will - updated the description of volition libertarianism"), but the change was reverted ("It is actually about the will, not the will power").

This section requires the modification of the definition of free will provided in c) "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will of a non physical agency". A non-physical agency having a (presumably free) will of it's own and affecting physical reality based upon this will does not deserve a separation classification - this is just a form of substance dualism and so it belongs to a) "not completely determined by natural laws and natural law is broken by dualistic sentient beings" [where definition a) is expanded to be independent of physical determinism/indeterminism - which are irrelevant constraints in substance dualism - see causation].

Case c) refers to the concept of libertarian volition which is the free will concept under non reductive physicalism (property dualism) in which non-physical ageny (subjective/non-observed) is mapped to physically indeterministic physical ageny (objective/observed brain), and provides some level of control over one or more volitions via "effort" (will power) - these may be called Self Forming Actions (SFA) - SFA involve will(s) yet these are not non-physical. (Eg Free Volition, Robert Kane (2007). Libertarianism. In John Martin Fischer (ed.), Four Views on Free Will. Blackwell Pub. [[1], page 39]).

Therefore, I changed c) to "determined by indeterministic natural law in line with the will power of a non physical agency".

Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 12:54, 2 April 2010 (UTC)

I think "will power" is a property whereas "will" expresses volition and intentionality. From a libertarian point of view, I believe it is the volition and intentionality of the non-physical agency that is important, rather than its having the property of "will power." That is why I reverted the change. If I'm mistaken, please let me know why - I would appreciate it. I'm also curious what others think about this. I also agree that the section needs to be updated. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 09:01, 6 April 2010 (UTC)

There are Libertarian models in which non-physical agency has it's own separate will/volition/intentionality. They all fall into category a) and require substance dualism (will is stored in memory and is physical therefore break down in casual interaction is required for alignment purposes between a separate non physical will and that stored in the brain). The model being described in c) is unique in that the will(s) itself is not special, the only process which is especially linked to non-physical agency in this model are those non-deterministic events described in physics / neuroscience (assuming any exist) that correspond to SFAs. This model enables the will(s) to be free under one definition of free will - ie 1) not bound by physical determinism, and 2) controlled to some extent by non-reducible agency; it is (they are) not merely indeterministic, which is the correct scientific description. This definition of free will is proposed as being in support of a form of ultimate responsibility (UR). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 13:37, 8 April 2010 (UTC)

Forgive me for saying so, but I believe the above passage does not argue clearly for changing "will" to "will power". Also, I see no answer to the argument I have provided for reverting the change. As it stands, I think I made the right choice for the article. D15724C710N (talk • contribs) 08:53, 9 April 2010 (UTC)

No problem - I did not directly answer your argument. This is possibly a semantics issue. I have equated 'will power' and 'effort' (see above) as all instances of will power require effort and all instances of effort require will power - but whether or not this equality is accepted, it is arguably confusing to use the phrase will power in this context because people will mistake it as a necessary property of will(s) rather than an action with respect to will(s) - which is as far as I am aware how the phrase is most commonly used in English. Suggest using 'effort' instead of 'will power' to avoid confusion (this is also what is used by Kane). Richardbrucebaxter (talk) 09:46, 9 April 2010 (UTC)

An interesting article on free will is here[2]. Should this be included?