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Battle of Morotai

Coordinates: 2°19′0″N 128°32′0″E / 2.31667°N 128.53333°E / 2.31667; 128.53333
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2°19′0″N 128°32′0″E / 2.31667°N 128.53333°E / 2.31667; 128.53333 Template:FixBunching

Battle of Morotai
Part of World War II, Pacific War
A peninsula with eight ships beached on the shore in the foreground and over eleven ships anchored off the opposite shore. Smoke is rising from the peninsula.
LSTs landing supplies at Blue Beach, Morotai
DateSeptember 15, 1944 – October 4, 1944 (initial period), intermittent fighting continued until the end of the war
Location
Morotai, off North Halmahera, Maluku Islands
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
 United States
 Australia
 Netherlands		  Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Charles P. Hall (land)
Daniel E. Barbey (naval)

Takenobu Kawashima
(initial commander)

Kisou Ouchi (POW)
(from October 12)[1]
Strength
57,020 (initial force) ~500 at the time of
the Allied invasion,
later reinforced

Template:FixBunching

Template:FixBunching The Battle of Morotai, part of the Pacific War, began on September 15, 1944 and continued until the war ended in August 1945. The fighting began when United States and Australian forces landed on the south-west corner of Morotai, a small island in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), which the Allies needed as a base to support the liberation of the Philippines later that year. The invading forces greatly outnumbered the island's Japanese defenders and secured their objectives in two weeks. Japanese reinforcements landed on the island between September and November, but lacked the supplies needed to effectively attack the Allied defensive perimeter. Intermittent fighting continued until the end of the war, with the Japanese troops suffering heavy loss of life from disease and starvation.

Morotai's development into an Allied base began shortly after the landing, and two major airfields were ready for use in October. These and other base facilities played an important role in the liberation of the Philippines during 1944 and 1945. Torpedo boats and aircraft based at Morotai also harassed Japanese positions in the NEI. The island's base facilities were further expanded in 1945 to support the Australian-led Borneo Campaign, and Morotai remained an important logistical hub and command center until the Dutch reestablished their colonial rule in the NEI.

Background

Morotai is a small island located in the Halmahera group of eastern Indonesia's Maluku Islands. Most of the island's interior is rugged and covered in thick jungle. The Doroeba Plain in Morotai's south-west corner is the largest of the island's few lowland areas. Prior to the outbreak of war, Morotai had a population of 9,000 and had not been commercially developed. It formed part of the Netherlands East Indies and was ruled by the Dutch through the Sultanate of Ternate. The Japanese occupied Morotai in early 1942 during the Netherlands East Indies campaign but did not garrison or develop it.[2]

In early 1944 Morotai emerged as an area of importance to the Japanese military when it started developing the neighbouring larger island of Halmahera as a focal point for the defence of the southern approaches to the Philippines.[3] In May 1944, the Imperial Japanese Army's 32nd Division arrived at Halmahera to defend the island and its nine airstrips.[3] The division had suffered heavy losses when the convoy carrying it from China (the Take Ichi convoy) was attacked by US submarines.[4] Two battalions from the 32nd Division's 211th Infantry Regiment were initially deployed to Morotai to develop an airstrip on the Doroeba Plain. Both battalions were withdrawn to Halmahera in mid-July, however, when the airstrip was abandoned due to drainage problems.[5] Allied code breakers detected the Japanese buildup at Halmahera and Morotai's weak defenses, and passed this information on to the relevant planning staff.[6]

In July 1944, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the South West Pacific Area, selected Morotai as the location for air bases and naval facilities needed to support the liberation of Mindanao, which at the time was planned for November 15. While Morotai was undeveloped, it was preferred over Halmahera as the larger and significantly better-defended island was judged too difficult to capture and secure.[7] The occupation of Morotai was designated Operation Tradewind. The landing was scheduled to take place on September 15, 1944, the same day as the 1st Marine Division's landing at Peleliu. This schedule allowed the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet to simultaneously protect both operations from potential Japanese counter-attacks.[8]

As little opposition was expected, Allied planners decided to land the invasion force close to the airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain. Two beaches in the south-west coast of the island were selected as suitable landing sites, and were designated Red Beach and White Beach. The Allied plan called for all three infantry regiments of the 31st Division to be landed across these beaches on September 15 and swiftly drive inland to secure the plain. As Morotai's interior had no military value, the Allies did not intend to advance beyond a perimeter needed to defend the airfields.[9] Planning for the construction of airfields and other base installations was also conducted prior to the landing, and tentative locations for these facilities had been selected by September 15.[10]

Prelude

Opposing forces

At the time of the Allied landings, Morotai was defended by approximately 500 Japanese soldiers. The main unit was the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had gradually arrived on Morotai between July 12–19, 1944 to replace the 32nd Division battalions when they were withdrawn. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit comprised four companies and was manned by Japanese officers and Formosan soldiers. Small elements of several other infantry, military police and support units were also present on the island. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit's commander, Major Takenobu Kawashima, deployed the unit in the south-west sector of the island and used the other units to establish lookout posts and detachments around Morotai's coastline.[11] The largest of these outposts was on the island's north-east end at Cape Sopi, and consisted of about 100 men.[12] The Japanese force was too small and widely dispersed to be able to mount an effective defense, so the 32nd Division ordered it to build dummy camps and use other deceptions in an attempt to trick the Allies into thinking that Morotai was strongly held.[5]

A group of World War II-era ships at sea photographed from another ship. Two men wearing helmets are in the foreground.
A long line of Allied landing craft and transports approaching Morotai

The Allied force assigned to Morotai outnumbered the island's defenders by more than one hundred to one. The Tradewind Task Force was established on August 20 under the command of Major General Charles P. Hall and numbered 40,105 US Army soldiers and 16,915 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel. The Tradewind Task Force came under the overall command of the United States Sixth Army; its main combat elements were the XI Corps headquarters, the 31st Infantry Division and the 126th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the 32nd Infantry Division. These units were supported by engineers and a large anti-aircraft group. The Tradewind Task Force also included large numbers of construction and other line of communications units whose role was to swiftly develop the island into a major base. The 6th Infantry Division was designated the force reserve but remained on the mainland of New Guinea.[13] General MacArthur accompanied the force onboard USS Nashville but was not in direct command of the operation.[14]

The landing force was supported by powerful air and naval forces. The United States Fifth Air Force provided direct support while the Thirteenth Air Force and No. 10 Operational Group RAAF conducted strategic missions in the NEI and Philippines.[15] The naval force was designated Task Force 77 and was organised into two attack groups, four reinforcement groups, a support group and an escort carrier group. The attack and reinforcement groups were responsible for transporting the assault force and subsequent support units and comprised twenty-four destroyers, four frigates, two Australian LSIs, five APDs, one LSD, twenty-four LCIs, forty-five LSTs, twenty LCTs and eleven LCIs armed with rockets. The support group was made up of two Australian heavy cruisers, three US light cruisers and eight US and two Australian destroyers. The escort carrier group comprised six escort carriers and ten destroyer escorts and provided anti-submarine and combat air patrol. Task Force 38.4 with two fleet carriers, two light aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and thirteen destroyers was also available to support Task Force 77 if required.[16]

Preliminary attacks

Preliminary air attacks to suppress the Japanese air forces in the vicinity of Morotai began in August 1944. At this time, the Allies estimated that there were 582 Japanese aircraft within 400 miles (640 km) of Morotai, 400 of which were in the objective area. The Allied air forces conducted heavy raids on airfields in the Halmaheras, Celebes, Ceram, Ambon, Boeroe and other areas. US Navy carrier-borne aircraft also attacked Japanese air units based at Mindanao and mounted further attacks on Halmahera and Celebes. These attacks were successful, and by September 14 it was estimated that only 60 aircraft remained in the vicinity of Morotai.[17]

In order to preserve surprise, the Allies did not bombard Morotai prior to the invasion and conducted only a few photographic reconnaissance flights over the island.[18] An Allied Intelligence Bureau patrol had been landed in the island in June but the information it collected was not passed on to the Sixth Army. Although the Tradewind Taskforce had little information on the invasion beaches or Japanese positions, the Sixth Army did not land any of its own reconnaissance patrols on Morotai, as it was feared that these could warn the island's defenders that an attack was imminent.[19]

The Tradewind Taskforce embarked onto the invasion convoy at several bases in north-west New Guinea and subsequently conducted landing rehearsals at Aitape and Wakde Island in early September. The convoy gathered at Maffin Bay on September 11 and set out for Morotai the next day. Its voyage was uneventful, and the convoy arrived off Morotai on the morning of September 15 without being detected by Japanese force.[20]

Allied landings

A map of south-west Morotai illustrating the locations where the three US Army regiments landed on September 15, their D-Day objectives and the locations of the landing beaches and airfields named in the text.
Locations of the Allied landings on September 15, 1944

The battle of Morotai began at 6:30 on the morning of September 15. Allied warships conducted a two-hour-long bombardment of the landing area to suppress any Japanese forces there. This bombardment set some native villages on fire but caused few Japanese casualties as they did not have many troops in the area.[21]

The first wave of American troops landed on Morotai at 8:30 and did not encounter any opposition. The 155th and 167th RCTs landed at Red Beach and the 124th RCT at White Beach. Once ashore, the assault troops assembled into their tactical units and rapidly advanced inland. By the end of the day the 31st Division had secured all of its D-Day objectives and held a perimeter 2,000 yards (1,800 m) inland. There was little fighting and casualties were very low on both sides.[22] The Japanese 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit was unable to offer any resistance to the overwhelming Allied force, and withdrew inland in good order. Japanese 7th Air Division aircraft based at Ceram and the Celebes began a series of nightly air raids on Morotai on September 15, but these had little effect on the Allied force.[23]

The lack of resistance was fortunate for the Allies due to unexpectedly poor beach conditions.[24] While the limited pre-invasion intelligence suggested that Red and White beaches were capable of supporting an amphibious landing, they were in fact highly unsuitable for this purpose. Both beaches were muddy and difficult for landing craft to approach owing to rocky ridges and coral reefs. As a result, soldiers and equipment had to be landed through deep surf. This delayed the operation and damaged a large quantity of equipment.[25] Like many of his soldiers, General MacArthur was forced to wade through chest-high surf when he came ashore.[26] On the morning of D-Day a survey party determined that a beach on the south coast of Morotai was much better suited to LSTs. This beach, which was designated Blue Beach, became the primary Allied landing point from September 16.[27]

Men wearing military uniforms and carrying equipment walking down ramps from a ship into the sea
Infantrymen disembark into deep water on September 15

The 31st Division continued its advance inland on September 16. The division met little opposition and secured the planned perimeter line around the airfield area that afternoon.[28] From September 17, the 126th Infantry Regiment landed at several points on Morotai's coastline and offshore islands to establish radar stations and observation posts. These operations were generally unopposed, though patrols landed in northern Morotai made numerous contacts with small Japanese parties.[28] The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit attempted to infiltrate into the Allied perimeter on the night of September 18 but was not successful.[23]

A detachment from a Dutch Netherlands East Indies Civil Affairs Unit (NICA) was responsible for civil affairs on Morotai. This detachment came ashore on September 15, and reestablished Dutch sovereignty over Morotai's civilian population. Many natives subsequently provided NICA with intelligence on Japanese dispositions on Morotai and Halmahera and others acted as guides for American patrols.[29]

A topographic map of Morotai depicting the landings of US units in September, the Allied perimeter in the south-west of the island, concentrations of Japanese forces and routes used by the Japanese to withdraw from the Allied beachhead.
The movements of Allied and Japanese forces during the first weeks of the battle

On September 20, the 31st Division advanced further inland to secure an expanded perimeter. This was necessary to provide room for additional bivouacs and supply installations after General MacArthur's headquarters decided to expand airfield construction on the island. The advance met little resistance and was completed in one day.[28] On September 22, a Japanese force attacked the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment but was easily repulsed. The following day, a company from the 126th Infantry Regiment unsuccessfully attacked a fortified Japanese unit near Wajaboeta on the island's west coast. The 126th resumed its attack on September 24 and secured the position. US forces continued intensive patrolling until October 4 when the island was declared secure.[30] US casualties during the initial occupation of Morotai numbered 30 dead, 85 wounded, and one missing. Japanese casualties were much higher, numbering over 300 dead and 13 captured.[31]

The American ground troops did not require the heavy air support which was available to them, and the fast carrier group was released for other duties on September 17. The six escort carriers remained in support, but their aircraft saw little action. Four of the CVEs were released on September 25 and the remaining two on October 4.[32] The destroyer escort USS Shelton was sunk by Japanese submarine RO-41 on October 3 while escorting the CVE group.[33][34] Several hours later a TBF Avenger from the escort carrier USS Midway attacked USS Seawolf 20 miles (32 km) north of where Shelton had been torpedoed, in the mistaken belief that she was the submarine responsible. After dropping two bombs, the TBF guided USS Richard M. Rowell to the area and the destroyer escort sank Seawolf after five attempts, killing all the submarine's crew. It was later determined that while Seawolf was traveling in a designated "submarine safety lane", the CVE pilots had not been properly briefed on the lane's existence and location, and that the submarine's position had not been provided to USS Richard M. Rowell.[35]

The US Navy established a PT boat base at Morotai on September 16 when the tenders USS Mobjack and Oyster Bay arrived with motor torpedo boat squadrons 9, 10, 18 and 33 and their forty-one boats. The PT boats' primary mission was to prevent the Japanese from moving troops from Halmahera to Morotai by establishing a blockade of the 12 mile-wide strait between the two islands.[36]

Elements of the 31st Division embarked from Morotai in November to capture several islands off New Guinea from which Japanese outposts could observe Allied movements. On November 15, 1,200 troops from the 2nd Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment and attached units were landed at Pegun Island in the Mapia islands; the next day, Bras Island was attacked. The Mapia Islands were declared secure on November 18 after resistance from 172 Japanese troops of the 36th Infantry Division was overcome. On November 19, a force of 400 US troops built around F Company, 124th Infantry Regiment occupied the undefended Asia Islands.[37] These were the first offensive operations overseen by the Eighth United States Army, and the naval commander for both operations was Captain Lord Ashbourne of the Royal Navy on board HMS Ariadne. Radar and LORAN stations were subsequently established on the islands.[38]

Base development

An aerial photo of two parallel airstrips with a body of water at the right
Wama Drome in April 1945

The rapid development of Morotai into a major military base was a key goal of the operation. Pre-invasion plans called for the construction of three large airstrips within forty five days of September 15, with the first to be operational immediately after the landing. The plans also included accommodation and supply facilities for 60,000 Air Force and Army personnel, a 1,900-bed hospital, bulk fuel storage and handling installations and ship docking facilities.[39] In order to construct these facilities the Tradewind Task Force included 7,000 engineer service troops, of whom 84 percent were American and the remainder Australian.[10]

Work began on the air base facilities before Morotai was secured. Surveying parties began transit surveys of the airfield sites on September 16 which determined that their planned alignment was unworkable.[10] Plans to complete the Japanese airfield were also abandoned as it would have interfered with the larger airfields which were to be built to the east, and it was instead cleared and used as an emergency "crash strip". Work on the first new airstrip (called Wama Drome) began on 23 September after the site was cleared. By 4 October, Wama Drome's runway was operable for 5,000 feet (1,500 m) and was supporting heavy bomber raids on Balikpapan in Borneo. Construction of the even larger Pitoe Drome, which was completed with two runways parallel to Wama Drome's, began in late September and by October 17 it had a usable 7,000-foot (2,100 m) runway.[40] Construction work was accelerated from October 18 after the United States Third Fleet withdrew from providing direct support to the planned amphibious landings on Leyte Island.[41] When the two airstrips were completed in November they boasted three large runways and hardstandings for 253 aircraft, including 174 heavy bombers.[42] Although the air base construction required the destruction of native villages, the American and Australian airfield engineers were assisted from October 1 by about 350 native laborers recruited by the NICA detachment.[29]

Other base facilities were erected concurrently with the construction of the airstrips. Work on fuel storage facilities began shortly after the landing, and the first was ready on September 20. A jetty for oil tankers and a larger tank farm were completed in early October, and storage facilities continued to be expanded until November, when the capacity for 129,000 barrels of aviation gasoline was available. Several docks capable of accommodating Liberty ships were constructed on Morotai's west coast, and the first was completed on October 8. In addition, twenty LST landing slots were constructed on Blue Beach to speed the loading and unloading of these ships. Other major construction projects included a rather extensive road network, a naval installation, 28,000 square feet (2,600 m2) of warehousing, and clearing land for supply dumps and bivouacs. A 1,000-bed hospital was also built after the original plan for a 1,900-bed hospital was scaled down. The main difficulties encountered were overcoming the mud caused by unusually heavy rains and finding sufficient potable water (clean water) supplies.[43]

The large advancement in the American plans for the Philippines Campaign (1944-45) meant that Morotai Island played a significantly smaller role in the Liberation of the Philippines than had been originally envisioned. The invasion of Mindanao was replaced in September 1944 by a greatly-advanced invasion of Leyte Island in the central Philippines in late October. The airfields on Morotai were the closest American ground airfields to Leyte, though Leyte was outside of fighter plane and light bomber range from Morotai. Fighter planes and bombers based on Morotai attacked targets strickly in the southern Philippines, such as on Mindanao in support of the landing at Leyte on October 25.[44] After airfields had been captures or constucted on Leyte, airfields on Morotai were also used as a rest and refueling fields for fighter planes and bombers flying to airfields in the Philippines for combat.[45]

Subsequent fighting

Japanese counterattack on Morotai

The Japanese military recognized that its forces in the Philippines would be threatened if the Americans and Australians developed airfields on Morotai. In an attempt to disrupt the airfield construction program, the Japanese Army commanders on Halmahera sent considerable numbers of reinforcements to Morotai between late September and mid-November. These troops included the main body of the 211th Infantry Regiment, the Third Battalion of the 210th Infantry Regiment, and three raiding detachments.[23] The commander of the 211th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Kisou Ouchi, assumed command of the Japanese forces on Morotai on October 12.[46] Allied codebreakers were often able to warn the forces at Morotai of attempts to run the blockade,[6] and PT boats destroyed a large number of the barges which were used to transport troops from Halmahera at night. (Shipping troops in the daytime was out-of-the-question for the Japanese because the USAAF and RAAF had complete air supremacy over the entire Morotai area, and those air forces would quickly wipe out any Japanese shipping in the daytime.) The U.S. Navy's PT boats, however, were unable to completely stop the Japanese from moving troops across the channel from Halmahera.[47]

A topographic map of Morotai showing the locations where the Japanese reinforcements mentioned in the text landed and the following movements of these forces, as well as the U.S. Army perimeter in Morotai's southwestern corner, and the movements of American troops.
Locations of Japanese reinforcement landings

The doomed Japanese counteroffensive on Morotai was not successful, of course. The Japanese troops brought to Morotai already suffered from high rates of tropical diseases, and it also proved to be impossible to bring them enough supplies through the Austalian and American air and naval blockades. As a result, while the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit raided the U.S. Army's perimeter on several occasions, those reinforcements were unable to mount any larger attacks, and thus they could do nothing to impede the continuing airfield construction work. The Japanese Army troops on Morotai then withdrew into the central part of the island - where many of the Japanese soldiers died of tropical disease and/or starvation.[48] The last Japanese supply barges from Halmahera reached Morotai on May 12, 1945.[49]

In late December 1944, the US 33rd Infantry Division's 136th Infantry Regiment was brought from New Guinea to Morotai to attack the Japanese 211th Infantry Regiment in the western coast of the island. After landing on the Morotai's west coast, the American regiment moved into Japanese-held territory on December 26, and then advanced on the Japanese position from the southwest and the north. The 136th Regiment was supported by a battalion of the 130th Infantry Regiment advancing overland from the Doroeba Plain, some Army artillery units positioned on the islands off Morotai's coast, and one about a hundred native porters.[50] The 3rd Battalion of the 167th Infantry Regiment also participated in this operation, and it made a difficult march from Morotai's southern coast into the interior to prevent the Japanese from scattering into small groups in the island's mountains.[51]

In early January 1945, the American force determined that two battalions of the Japanese 211th Regiment were on Hill 40, about four miles north of the American perimeter. The attack on this position began on January 3 when the 136th Infantry Regiment's 1st and 2nd battalions advanced from the southwest and encountered strong resistance. The regiment used a large quantity of ammunition in this attack, and aerial resuppling was needed to replenish the regiment's supplies. Both American battalions resumed their attack the next day with the support of a highly effective artillery bombardment, and reached the main Japanese position in the afternoon. During this period the 3rd Battalion of the 136th Regiment advanced on Hill 40 from the north, and this regiment destroyed the Japanese 211th Regiment's 3rd Battalion in a series of battles. This Japanese battalion had been moved to the coast to receive supplies from Halmahera, and it mounted several unsuccessful attacks on the American battalion's beachhead after it landed in December.[52]

The 136th Infantry Regiment completed its attack on Hill 40 on January 5. The Regiment's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced from the west and southwest and the 3rd Battalion from the north, meeting little resistance. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued north to pursue any Japanese remnants until January 14, by which time the regiment claimed to have killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured ten against a loss of 46 Americans killed, and 127 wounded or injured.[53] The 3rd Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment linked up with the 136th on 7 January after overrunning the main Japanese radio station on the island on 4 January.[54] In mid-January, the 136th Regiment was withdrawn into the Allied perimeter where it rejoined the 33rd Division, which was staging through Morotai en route for the U.S. Army landing in Luzon.[55]

Japanese air raids and U.S. Army mopping up

The 7th Air Division of the Japanese Army continued to raid Morotai at night for months after the U.S. Army's invasion of the island. This Air Division conducted 82 small, nuisance air raids on Morotai involving 179 sorties (hence, an average of just two aircraft per air raid) between September 15, 1944, and February 1, 1945. The aircraft used in these raids flew from Ceram and Celebes, and they landed at airfields on Halmahera for refueling before proceeding to Morotai. Fifty-four of the Japanese air raids caused no damage at all, and others resulted in the destruction of just forty-two USAAF or RAAF warplanes, and some damage to just thirty three more planes. The American and Australian casualties from these air raids totaled to 19 soldiers and airmen killed and 99 wounded.

The most successful raid was conducted on the night of 22 November, when 15 Allied warplanes were destroyed and eight damaged. The regular stream of small air raids by the 7th Air Division atopped near the end of January 1945, though the final air raid occurred on March 22. The USAAF radar-equipped night fighter squadrons sent to Morotai had only limited success in defending against these very small air raids since they flew in at low altitudes from Halmahera and they were usually detected on ground radar only shortly before they entered the Morotai area.

A sizable set of batteries of U.S. Army radar-directed antiaircraft guns were set up on Morotai to defend the airfields, the troops, and the airmen. This Army antiaircraft artillery (AAA) shot down most of the 26 Japanese aircraft taken down over Morotai. [56] The official history of the USAAF's night fighter squadrons states that defending Morotai from these nuisance air raids by the Japanese "was probably the most difficult task undertaken by American night fighters during World War II" due to the difficulty of detecting incoming raiders.[57]

The number of PT boats based at Morotai was reduced to a single squadron by February 1945 - with the others moving forward to patrol Philippine waters - but that remaining stayed active at Morotai through the end of the war. As well as patroling around Morotai, the PT boats went on missions in the eastern Dutch East Indies to raid Japanese-held coastal locations and to support Australian and Dutch scouting parties ashore. In May 1945, PT boats were also sent to rescue the Sultan of Ternate along with his court and his harem after he had been mistreated by the Japanese.[58] By the end of the war, the PT boats based on Morotai had conducted nearly war 1,300 patrols, and they had destroyed about 50 Japanese barges and 150 small craft off the coasts of Morotai and Halmahera.[59]

The 31st Infantry Division remained at Morotai until April 12, 1945, when it was sent to take part in the final liberation of Mindanao from the Japanese Army, and the 31st Infantry was replaced by the new 93rd Infantry Division.[60] The 93rd Infantry Division was an Afro-American division, with white officers, and it was applied mainly in security (such as large air base defense) and construction assignments during World War II.[61]

Once moved to Morotai to replace the 31st division, the 31st Infantry carried out aggressive patrols outside of its defensive perimeter with the goal of destroying all remaining Japanese troops on Morotai. At that time, most of the Japanese soldiers on Morotai were staying along the island's western coast, and they generally stayed close to vegetable gardens owned by the natives. The 93rd Infantry repeatedlyt sent armed patrols along Morotai's western and northern coasts beginning in April, and these patrols fought scattered skirmishes with small groups of Japanese soldiers.

One of the 94th Infantry Divisions's goals set by its commanding general was to capture the highest-ranking Japanese soldier on Mortai, Lieutenant Colonel Ouchi, and he was captured by a patrol from the division's 25th Infantry Regiment on 2 August 1945. Lt. Col. Ouchi was the highest-ranked Japanese Army officer ever to be taken prisoner by the U.S. Army during the War in the Pacific.[62]

Aftermath

A group of men wearing military uniforms with a ship in the background
The Japanese commanding officers at Halmahera land at Morotai to surrender to the 93rd Division

Morotai became a backwaters Allied air base once Leyte had been overrun by the U.S. Army, and then MacArthur's troops moved northward to Mindoro Island, and next to Luzon, the most important island of the Philippines. Also on Luzon, the Americans had airfields from which to attack important Japanese Army and air bases on Formosa and in Korea, and also Japanese shipping in the South China Sea. By this time in the war (1945), the entire Imperial Japanese Navy was practically inert, and Japanese air power was very much on its way to the same condition.

Bombers of the American Thirteenth Air Force and the Australian First Tactical Air Force (formerly the No. 10 Operational Group of the RAAF) remained based on Morotai, and these repeatedly attacked targets in the Dutch East Indies - especially any targets having to do with petroleum production - and the southern Philippines until mid-August 1945, when the Japanese Empire sued for peace. Beginning in April 1945, Morotai was also used as base by the infantry divisions of the Australian Army's I Corps to carry out the Borneo Campaign,[45] which landed Australian troops on three coastal areas of Borneo that were important locations of petroleum production, refining, and distribution. By the end of the Borneo Campaign, the Japanese had lost their oil-producing areas on Borneo on top of the ones that they had lost earlier on New Guinea. Combined with the American blockade of Japan by submarine, warplane, surface warship, and naval mines dropped by bombers into the waters of the Japanese Home Islands, all Japanese war industries and military units were being relentlessly starved of the oil that they they needed to run. The situation of the Japanese Empire was hopeless.

In preparing for their Borneo Campaign, Australian Army construction engineers expanded the army base facilities (barracks, mess halls, supply dumps, warehouses, hospitals, etc.) on Morotai to support the invasion of Borneo. The Australians and the Americans constructed so many Army camps and airfields in Morotai that some Australian Army camps were constucted outside of what had been the U.S. Army's outer defense perimeter for many months in 1944 and '45.[63]

Morotai was the site of a number of military surrender ceremonies following the official Surrender of the Japanese Empire. About 660 Japanese troops on Morotai surrendered to the Americans and the Australians on Morotai following August 15.[64] The 93rd Infantry Division also accepted the surrender of the about 40,000 Japanese troops on the island of Halmahera on 26 August, following its Japanese Army commander's being brought to Morotai on a U.S. Navy PT boat.[49]

After the Japanese Empire's official surrender on Tokyo Bay on 2 Setember 1945, on 9 September 1945 the Australian General Thomas Blamey accepted the surrender of the entire Japanese Second Army in a ceremony held on the sports fields of the Australian I Corps on Morotai.[65]

Private Teruo Nakamura, the last confirmed Japanese holdout against surrender on Morotai, or elsewhere, was captured by Indonesian Air Force airmen on 18 December 1974.[66][67]

Morotai remained an Australian base for some months following the Japanese surrender. The Australian military force responsible for the occupation and military administration of the eastern Dutch East Indies had its headquarters on Morotai until April 1946, when the Dutch colonial government was re-established.[68][69] Morotai was also one of the sites where the Australian and Dutch East Indies authorities carried out war crimes trials of Japanese military personnel and civilian officials who had been involved in atrocites in the Dutch East Indies.[70]

Notes

  1. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), p. 73.
  2. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 456–457.
  3. ^ a b Smith (1953), p. 460.
  4. ^ Willoughby (1966), p. 273.
  5. ^ a b Willoughby (1966), pp. 348–349.
  6. ^ a b Drea (1992), p. 153.
  7. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 450–451.
  8. ^ Taafe (1998), p. 218.
  9. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 475–477.
  10. ^ a b c Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (1951), p. 272.
  11. ^ Smith (1953), p. 460 and Willoughby (1966), pp. 349–350.
  12. ^ Rottman (2002), p. 253.
  13. ^ Krueger (1979), p. 126 and Smith (1953), p. 463.
  14. ^ Manchester (1978), p. 337.
  15. ^ Smith (1953), p. 464.
  16. ^ Morison (2002), pp. 21–22, Krueger (1979), p. 127 and Royal Navy Historical Section (1957), pp. 173 and 257.
  17. ^ Royal Navy Historical Section (1957), p. 175 and Taaffe (1998), p. 219.
  18. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 482–483.
  19. ^ Krueger (1979), p. 125.
  20. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 481–482.
  21. ^ Taafe (1998), p. 219.
  22. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 483 and 487.
  23. ^ a b c Willoughby (1966), p. 350.
  24. ^ Heavey (1947), p. 128
  25. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 483–485.
  26. ^ Manchester (1978), p. 388.
  27. ^ Smith (1953), p. 487.
  28. ^ a b c Smith (1953), p. 488.
  29. ^ a b Smith (1953), pp. 490–491.
  30. ^ Krueger (1979), p. 130.
  31. ^ Smith (1953), p. 489.
  32. ^ Craven and Cate (1953), pp. 312–314.
  33. ^ Royal Navy Historical Section (1957), pp. 175–176.
  34. ^ "Shelton". Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships. US Navy. Retrieved February 5, 2009.
  35. ^ Morrison (2002), pp. 27–28.
  36. ^ Bulkley (2003), p. 368.
  37. ^ Royal Navy Historical Section (1957), p. 176 and 31st Infantry Division (1993), pp. 23 and 101.
  38. ^ Smith (1953), p. 451.
  39. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (1951), p. 270.
  40. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (1951), pp. 276–277.
  41. ^ Craven and Cate (1953), p. 313.
  42. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (1951), p. 277.
  43. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters, Army Forces Pacific (1951), pp. 277–280
  44. ^ Smith (1953), pp. 491–493.
  45. ^ a b Morison (2002), p. 25.
  46. ^ Lee (1966), p. 525 and 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), p. 73.
  47. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), p. 68.
  48. ^ Hayashi (1959), pp. 120–121 and Willoughby (1966), pp. 350–352.
  49. ^ a b Bulkley (2003), p. 442.
  50. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), pp. 68–77.
  51. ^ 31st Infantry Division (1993), p. 101.
  52. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), pp. 74–81
  53. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), pp. 80–83.
  54. ^ 31st Infantry Division (1993), p. 102.
  55. ^ 33rd Infantry Division Historical Committee (1948), pp. 85–87.
  56. ^ Craven and Cate (1953), pp. 315–316.
  57. ^ McFarland (1998), p. 37
  58. ^ Morison (2002), pp. 28–29.
  59. ^ Bulkley (2003), p. 373.
  60. ^ Stanton (1984), p. 111.
  61. ^ Bielakowski (2007), p. 19.
  62. ^ Lee (1966), pp. 525–527.
  63. ^ Stanley (1997), p. 48.
  64. ^ Lee (1966), p. 528.
  65. ^ Long (1963), p. 553.
  66. ^ "The Last Last Soldier?". Time. January 13, 1975. Retrieved September 1, 2008.
  67. ^ Post et al. (2010), pp. 429–430
  68. ^ Hasluck (1970), pp. 602–607
  69. ^ Post et al. (2010), p. 29
  70. ^ Post et al. (2010), pp. 408–409

References

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