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Nguyễn Chánh Thi

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Nguyễn Chánh Thi
AllegianceFrench Army, Vietnamese National Army, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Years of service1940–1966
RankLieutenant General
CommandsAirborne Brigade (1955–1960), 1st Division (1964), I Corps (1964–1966)
Battles/warsBattle of Saigon (1955), 1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt, 1964 South Vietnamese coup, September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt, February 1965 South Vietnamese coup attempt, Buddhist Uprising

Lieutenant General Nguyễn Chánh Thi (February 23, 1923 – June 23, 2007) was a South Vietnamese officer in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). He is best known for frequently being involved in coups in the 1960s and being a key member of various juntas that ruled South Vietnam from 1963 until 1966, when he was overpowered by Vietnam Air Force chief and Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky in a power struggle and forced into exile in the United States.

Thi joined the French Army at the age of 17 and was captured by Imperial Japan after they invaded French Indochina during World War II. After several months he escaped. He later transferred to the French-backed Vietnamese National Army of the State of Vietnam, which later became the ARVN and South Vietnam respectively. A paratrooper, Thi fought for then Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem against the Binh Xuyen organized crime syndicate in the 1955 Battle for Saigon. This winning performance so impressed Diem that he thereafter regarded Thi as an adopted son and put him in charge of the Airborne Brigade. In November 1960, Thi was one of the leading figures as the paratroopers launched a coup against Diem. The rebels gained the upper hand but were defeated after Diem started negotiations and falsely promised reforms in order to buy time for loyalists to rescue him. Thi fled into exile in neighbouring Cambodia, but returned three years later after Diem's deposal and execution. He became the deputy commander of I Corps under Nguyen Khanh, and helped his superior to overthrow Diem's conquerors three months later. Thi became the commander of the 1st Division, before taking control of I Corps later in the year.

During the year after Khanh's rise to power, Thi helped him put down several coup attempts, making him a key player in South Vietnamese military politics. In February 1965, he helped defeat a coup attempt by Lam Van Phat and Pham Ngoc Thao, and then also helped to force Khanh to resign. Over the next year, Ky and Thi were the foremost officers in the junta, and in June 1965, Thi declined an opportunity to serve as prime minister after being nominated by his fellow officers. He thought that it was better to let a rival take the job and then step in after they had failed, but this plan backfired and Thi never received a second opportunity. In early 1966, Ky orchestrated Thi's removal and announced that Thi would be going to the US for medical treatment, but in reality into exile. This led to civil unrest in I Corps, where Thi was popular and seen as a supporter of the Buddhist majority. The disquiet escalated into open rebellion of the government by military units in the I Corps, allied to Buddhist activists opposed to Ky's junta who were calling for civilian government and an end to the US-driven war expansion policy. After three months of virtual civil war, Thi agreed to emigrate to the United States, where he lived for the rest of his life.

Early life

Thi was born on February 23, 1923 in Hue, then the capital of Vietnam and the seat of the Nguyen Dynasty.[1] At the time, Vietnam was part of the colony of French Indochina and his father was a low-level mandarin in the French-controlled monarchy and had served in French Army in World War I.[2] Thi joined the French Army at 17, and soon after, during World War II, Imperial Japan invaded Indochina and wrested control from France.[3] Thi was a Japanese prisoner of war for several months until he escaped amidst the confusion of a bombing raid on the military jail.[1] According to family documents, Thi was captured and imprisoned by the communist Vietminh of Ho Chi Minh for three months at the end of the war in 1945 as they declared independence as part of the August Revolution.[1] At the time, a power vacuum emerged as the defeated Japanese withdrew from Vietnam. France attempted to reassert its colonial grip over Indochina, while various Vietnamese groups jockeyed for power at the head of an independent country.[3] In 1946, full-scale conflict erupted between the Vietminh, who had declared independence under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), and France and their State of Vietnam (SOV) of Emperor Bao Dai, an associated state in the French Union. Thi served in the SOV's Vietnamese National Army, and rose steadily up the ranks.[1]

Diem era

A portrait of a middle-aged man, looking to the left in a half-portrait/profile. He has chubby cheeks, parts his hair to the side and wears a suit and tie.
Ngo Dinh Diem, the President of South Vietnam from 1955 to 1963 and regarded Thi as an adopted son.

In 1954, the Vietminh defeated the French Union forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and the French decided to withdraw from Vietnam. Under the provisions of the Geneva Accords, the Vietminh's DRV would take control of the northern half of the country, and the SOV the south, pending reunification elections in 1956.[4] In the meantime, the State of Vietnam remained unstable, as the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects had their own private armies and de facto states in the Mekong Delta, while the Binh Xuyen organized crime syndicate controlled the national police, had their own military, and dominated the rampant drug trade, prostitution and illegal gambling in the southern capital Saigon.[5] In April and May 1955, Thi fought for Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in paratroop units against the Binh Xuyen in the Battle for Saigon after Diem gave them an ultimatum and then had to force them to surrender. The VNA paratroopers decsively defeated the Binh Xuyen and this performance so impressed the lifelong bachelor Diem that he thereafter referred to Thi as "my son".[6][7] Diem promoted Thi to the rank of colonel and put him in charge of the Airborne Brigade.[1] The Central Intelligence Agency however, was not so impressed, and one of their reports described Thi as "an opportunist and a man lacking strong convictions".[8] An American military advisor assessed Thi as "tough, unscrupulous, and fearless, but dumb".[8] In October 1955, Diem deposed Bao Dai in a fraudulent referendum overseen by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and declared himself the President of the newly-proclaimed Republic of Vietnam. The VNA thus became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and after Diem cancelled the reunification elections, the Vietnam War ensued.[9]

Failed coup attempt against Ngo Dinh Diem

Main article: 1960 South Vietnamese coup attempt

In 1960, Thi was the commander of the Airborne Division, and his deputy, 28-year-old Lieutenant Colonel Vuong Van Dong,[6] convinced him to lead a revolt against Diem. Dong had become discontented with Diem's arbitrary rule and constant meddling in the internal affairs of the army. Diem promoted officers on loyalty rather than skill, gave orders directly to individual commanders, and played senior officers against one another in order to weaken the military leadership and prevent them from becoming effective, in case they wanted to challenge his rule. Dong later asserted that his sole objective was to force Diem to improve the governance of the country.[10] Dong was clandestinely supported by his brother-in-law Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Trieu Hong and Hong's uncle Hoang Co Thuy, members of the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (VNQDD, Vietnamese Nationalist Party), an anti-communist political organization whose members were marginalized by Diem.[11] The coup was organized with the help of some VNQDD and Dai Viet Quoc Dan Dang (Dai Viet, Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam) members, civilians and officers alike.[11] Dong enlisted the cooperation of an armoured regiment, a marine unit and three paratrooper battalions. The operation was launched on November 11 at 05:00.[10][11]

The coup was ineffectively executed;[10] although the rebels captured the headquarters of the Joint General Staff at Tan Son Nhut Air Base,[11] they failed to block the roads leading into Saigon and cut off loyalist reinforcements. Thi's men also failed to disconnect phone lines into the palace, which allowed Diem to call for aid from loyal units.[10] After taking the key military points, the paratroopers headed towards Independence Palace.[8] At first, their forces did not attack, believing that Diem would capitulate.[10] Most of Thi's soldiers had been tricked into thinking that they were attacking in order to save Diem from a mutiny by the Presidential Guard.[11] When the attack finally started, Diem was nearly killed in the opening salvoes when gunfire hit his bed, but he had arisen just a few minutes earlier.[8] The paratroopers' first assault was repelled by loyalists despite their numerical advantage.[6][8] Thi and Dong held fire;[6][8] they brought in reinforcements and attacked again, but the loyalists held firm.[8] In the meantime, Thi's rebels had captured the national police offices, the studios of Radio Saigon and the barracks of the Presidential Guard. They had also put most of the Saigon-based generals under house arrest.[12]

Apparently poised for a military victory, the rebels hesitated. Dong wanted to storm the palace and capture the president and his family. Thi on the other hand, was worried that Diem could be killed in an attack. Thi felt that despite Diem's shortcomings, the president was South Vietnam's best available leader, believing that enforced reform would yield the best outcome.[13] The rebels wanted Diem's younger brother and chief advisor Ngo Dinh Nhu and his wife Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu—widely regarded as the powers behind Diem's rule—out of the government, although they disagreed over whether to kill or deport the couple.[6] Thi demanded that Diem appoint an officer as Prime Minister and remove Madame Nhu from the palace. Saigon Radio broadcast a speech authorized by Thi's Revolutionary Council, claiming that Diem was being removed because he was corrupt and suppressed liberty. Worried by the uprising, Diem sent representatives to negotiate.[14][15]

After lengthy negotiations, the parties agreed to a ceasefire.[16] In the meantime, loyalist forces headed towards the capital.[16] Diem promised to end press censorship, liberalize the economy, and hold free and fair elections. Diem refused to sack Nhu, but he agreed to dissolve his cabinet and form a government that would accommodate members of the Revolutionary Council. In the early hours of November 12, Diem taped a speech detailing the concessions, which Thi broadcast on Saigon Radio.[13][16] When the loyalists reinforcements rolled into the capital on tanks and armmored vehicles and began to wrest the initiative, the rebels began to break.[13][17] After a brief but violent battle that killed around 400 people, the coup attempt was crushed.[14] This included a large number of anti-Diem civilians; Thi exhorted them to bring down the Ngo family by charging the palace, and 13 were gunned down by the loyalist soldiers as they invaded the grounds.[16]

After the failed coup, Dong, Thi and several other prominent officers fled to Tan Son Nhut and climbed aboard a C-47.[17] They fled to Cambodia, where they were given asylum by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, a long-time Diem opponent.[18] Diem promptly reneged on his promises, and began cracking down on dissidents.[10] Almost three years after the incident, Diem opened the trial for those involved in the coup on July 8, 1963. Thi and his fellow exiled officers were found guilty and sentenced to death in absentia.[19] In the meantime, Thi survived in Cambodia as a farmer for three years.[1]

1964 coups with Nguyen Khanh

Main article: 1964 South Vietnamese coup

Diem was deposed and killed in a coup in November 1963,[20] allowing Thi to return to South Vietnam and resume his military service.[21] Soon after returning to Vietnam, Thi found himself involved in another coup plot as the link between Nguyen Khanh and Do Mau, two generals disgruntled with their position under the military junta of Duong Van Minh that had overthrown Diem.[22] Mau was one of the principal tacticians in the 1963 coup; although he did not command troops, through his role as Diem's director of military security he had a thorough knowledge of the backgrounds of the ARVN officers and their strengths, weaknesses and characteristics,[23] which had allowed him engineer the previous coup. Minh's junta feared Mau's shrewdness and tried to sideline him as Minister of Information, a relatively unimportant position.[24]

Disgruntled, Mau began recruiting for a coup,[24] targeting Khanh, who had been moved to the I Corps in the far north of South Vietnam to keep him far away from Saigon and the opportunity to stage a coup.[23][25] Khanh made no attempt to hide his annoyance at not being given a more important job,[23] and had long been regarded as an ambitious and unscrupulous officer by his colleagues.[25][26][27] Mau persuaded the junta to install Thi as Khanh's deputy in I Corps. He tricked the junta by reasoning that as Khanh had played a large part in putting down the 1960 revolt, Thi would be an ideal mechanism for keeping the disliked Khanh in check. Privately, Mau predicted that Thi would be a bridge between him in Saigon and Khanh in Hue. He was correct in thinking that the 1960 conflict would be irrelevant as allegiances shifted over time and that the pair would work together for their current aims.[24]

The trio were joined by General Tran Thien Khiem, the disgruntled commander of the III Corps that surrounded Saigon,[24] and an assortment of Marine, Air Force and Special Forces officers and their units. Other notable recruits were former Diem loyalist and the chief of the Civil Guard, Duong Ngoc Lam, who was under investigation for corruption, and General Duong Van Duc, who had recently returned from exile in Paris.[28] The cabal scheduled the coup for 04:00 January 30.[29] On January 29, Thi followed Khanh to the capital. The plotters and their agents met in obscure locations spots around town. On the night of January 29, the rebel troops assumed their positions around Saigon. A number of American officers and embassy officials were alerted to be in their offices at two o'clock in the morning. At 03:00, Khanh took over the Joint General Staff Headquarters at Tan Son Nhut, and by dawn, the coup had succeeded without a shot as Minh's junta was caught unaware.[30] On February 2, 1964, Thi was appointed to be commander of the 1st Division based in Hue, as part of I Corps. He stayed in the post until October 21; on November 14 he took command of the entire corps.[31] This corps oversaw the five northernmost provinces of central Vietnam and the 1st and 2nd Divisions.[2]

Defeating the September 1964 coup

Main article: September 1964 South Vietnamese coup attempt

In August, Khanh tried to give himself more powers, which resulted in widespread riots and demonstrations, with Buddhist activists prominent. This forced him to back down and make concessions, and he ended up in a weaker position than before. Among the concessions he made was to remove or demote some Catholic officials who had been close to Diem's religiously discriminatory rule, angering the minority Catholic community.[32] Among those demoted were Catholic Generals Lam Van Phat and Duong Van Duc, and they launched a coup attempt backed mainly by Catholic elements against Khanh before dawn on September 13.[33][34] They took over the city without any firing, and used the national radio station to proclaim the deposal of Khanh's junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders, including Thi.[35]

However, Phat and Duc could not apprehend Khanh, and the Americans decided to support the incumbent.[35] Thi and Air Force chief Nguyen Cao Ky were then prominent in helping to crush the coup. Ky and Thi's role in putting down the coup attempt gave them more leverage in Saigon's military politics. Indebted to Ky, Thi and their so-called Young Turks for maintaining his hold on power, Khanh was now in a weaker position. Ky's group publicly called on Khanh to remove "corrupt, dishonest and counterrevolutionary" officers, civil servants and exploitationists, and threatened to remove him if he did not enact their proposed reforms.[36] Some observers accused Ky and Thi of deliberately orchestrating or allowing the plot to develop before putting it down in order to embarrass Khanh, portray themselves as heroes, and earn themselves prominence on the political stage.[37][38] In later years, Cao Huy Thuan, a professor and Buddhist activist based in the northern town of Da Nang in I Corps, claimed that Ky and Thi met with him a few days before the coup, and had discussed their plans for joining a coup against Khanh.[39]

Dissolution of the High National Council

Main article: December 1964 South Vietnamese coup

Thi was part of a group of younger officers called the Young Turks—the most prominent apart from himself included IV Corps commander General Nguyen Van Thieu, Ky and Admiral Chung Tan Cang, the head of the Republic of Vietnam Navy. They and Khanh wanted to forcibly retire officers with more than 25 years of service, ostensibly as they thought them to be lethargic, out of touch, and ineffective. However, the unspoken and most important motive was because they viewed the older generals as rivals for power and wanted to conceal their real reasons.[40] Specific targets of this proposed policy were Minh and other senior officers in his short-lived junta Tran Van Don, Le Van Kim and Mai Huu Xuan.[41]

The signature of the military-appointed civilian Chief of State Phan Khac Suu was required to pass the ruling, but he referred the matter to the High National Council (HNC), a junta-appointed civilian advisory body, to get their opinion.[42] The HNC turned down the request. This was speculated to be due to the fact that many HNC members were old, and did not appreciate the generals' negativity towards seniors.[43] On December 19, the generals dissolved the HNC.[40] The operation was commanded by Thi—who had travelled into Saigon from I Corps—and Ky. The national police, which was under the control of the army, moved through the streets, arresting five HNC members and other politicians and student leaders they deemed to be an obstacle to military rule.[42][44] Minh and the other aging generals were arrested and flown to Pleiku, a central highlands town in a Montagnard area and forcibly retired, while other officers were simply imprisoned in the capital.[45] The junta's forces also arrested around 100 members of the National Salvation Council (NSC) of Le Khac Quyen; the NSC was a new party active in central Vietnam in the I Corps region with an anti-war expansion ideology and was aligned with Thi and the Buddhist activist monk Thich Tri Quang. As Thi was active in the purge, it was believed that Quyen had fallen out with Thi.[46]

The deposal prompted US Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor to angrily berate Thieu, Thi, Ky and Cang in a private meeting and threaten to cut off aid if they did not reverse their decision. Although nettled by the outburst, Thi also took a perverse pleasure in riling Taylor. He was seen by a CIA officer soon after, grinning. When asked why he was happy, Thi said "Because this is one of the happiest days of my life...Today I told the American ambassador that he could not dictate to us."[1] The dispute escalated as the junta threatened to expel Taylor and Khanh went on a media offensive. A CIA informant reported that the arguments with Taylor had incensed the volatile Thi so much that he had privately vowed to "blow up everything" and "kill Phan Khac Suu, Tran Van Huong and Nguyen Khanh and put an end to all this. Then we will see what happens."[47] However, the dispute galvanized the officers' nationalist sentiment and they rallied around the embattled Khanh for a time. They ignored Taylor's threats without repercussions as the Americans were too intent on defeating the communists to cut funding.[48]

During this period, Thi became notorious for his involvement in infighting. A CIA dossier compiled in the 1960s said that Thi "is like a card player, placing his bets now on this leader, then on another; he plays his subordinates in the same manner. His only real objective is to continue the game."[1] Time described him as "vain, ambitious, an inveterate intriguer".[49] The New York Times described him as "a coup specialist".[2]

In late January 1965, Buddhist protests against junta-appointed civilian Prime Minister Tran Van Huong over plans to expand conscription and the war against the communists broke out across South Vietnam, and were at their largest in I Corps, a Buddhist and anti-war expansion stronghold. In Hue, matters degenerated into a riot as 5,000 demonstrators attacked the U.S. Information Service Library and burned 8,000 books. Khanh and Thi were thought to have turned a blind eye to the rioting in order to allow the disorder to ruin the Huong government and allow them to inherit power.[50] Khanh then decided to have the armed forces replace Huong, and on the morning of January 27, Khanh staged a bloodless putsch with the support of Thi and Ky.[51]

1965 coup against Nguyen Khanh

Main article: 1965 South Vietnamese coup

By this time, Taylor's relationship with Khanh had already broken down over the issue of the HNC,[52] and the US became increasingly intent on a regime change as Khanh was becoming more reliant on Buddhist support, which they saw as an obstacle to their war expansion plans.[53] In the first week of February, Taylor told the leading officers that the US was "in no way propping up General Khanh or backing him in any fashion".[54] Despite their mutual alignment with Buddhist activists,[55] Thi was known to have become personally hostile to Khanh by this time.[56]

Shortly before noon on February 19, Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao and Phat used tanks and some infantry battalions to seize control of the military headquarters, the post office and the radio station of Saigon.[57][58] The rebels failed to capture Ky,[59] who fled to Tan Son Nhut, where he ran into Khanh, and the pair flew off together, while some senior junta figures were arrested there.[60][61][62] Thao made a radio announcement stating his desire to get rid of Khanh, whom he described as a "dictator",[57] while some of his fellow rebels made comments eulogizing Diem and indicating that they would start a hardline Catholic regime. This alarmed Thi, as the tone of the comments indicated that the rebels might punish people such as Thi who had fought against Diem in the past.[63]

The Americans decided that while they wanted Khanh out, they did not approve of Thao and Phat, so they began to lobby Ky and Thi, the two most powerful officers apart from Khanh, to defeat both sides.[56] While Ky used air power to stop the coup forces, and moderated and prevented the coup forces and Khanh’s loyalists from entering into exchanging fire,[64] the Americans consulted with Thi and General Cao Van Vien, the commander of III Corps surrounding Saigon to assemble units hostile to both Khanh and the current coup into a Capital Liberation Force.[64] The Americans provided Thi with a plane so that he could fly in from his I Corps headquarters in Da Nang to lead ground forces against both the rebels and Khanh.[64]

Three Asian men with black hair standing from left to right. The first is in profile, wearing a beret. He has three stars as a Lieutenant General and has a moustache. The next man is facing towards the camera smiling. He is clean shaven and has three stars. A third man on the right has his back to the camera and is wearing a cowboy hat. All are wearing military fatigues.
Thi (left) and Thieu (right) during the 1960s. Both were prominent in Saigon military politics in the 1960s.

Late in the night, Phat and Thao met Ky in a meeting organized by the Americans, and insisted that Khanh be removed from power. The coup collapsed when, between midnight and dawn, anti-coup forces swept into the city; it was generally thought that the rebels did not put up a fight after being assured that Khanh would be ousted.[57][65][66] Early in the morning, Thi, who gained the support of Ky, proposed a motion within the junta to remove Khanh and force him into exile, and the final vote was unanimous—Khanh was absent from the meeting.[57][67] Ky, Thi and Thieu then became the key figures in a junta that continued with Suu and Prime Minister Phan Huy Quat as a civilian front, although General Tran Van Minh became the nominal commander-in-chief of the armed forces.[57][67][68]

Thi was a senior member in the ten-man ruling junta, which wanted to expand the military effort against the communists, something that was opposed by the Buddhist protestors. Thi performed a balancing act, and accommodated the Buddhists, wanting them to see him as a friend. He allowed the students to publish a magazine that was highly critical of military rule.[2] Thi also manoeuvred to have a trusted subordinate Colonel Pham Van Lieu installed as the head of the national police—a body controlled by the army and effectively a military unit—increasing his political power.[49] The Buddhist activist leader Thich Tri Quang said that "Thi is nominally a Buddhist, but does not really care about religion".[69] In June 1965, Quat and Suu resigned due to persistent disputes with the military and one another, and Thi had an opportunity to take power.[70] He was seen as having a similar level of political influence to Ky, and was voted in as prime minister by the ten-man junta. However, he declined the job offer upon the private advice of Lieu, who told him that the political conditions were not ideal and that he should let one of his rivals take control and fail before stepping in himself. However, according to historian George McTurnan Kahin, "to his [Thi's] own bitter disappointment, he was never given a second chance".[71]

In the same year, US ground forces were introduced in combat roles in 1965, and the first US Marines came ashore at Da Nang in Thi's I Corps. The flamboyant Thi organized for the American troops to be greeted by military bands, welcoming banners and teenage girls with garlands of flowers. This caused embarrassment to US officials who felt that the introduction of combat troops and resultant American casualties would not be received well by the public when contrasted with Thi's fanfare. Soon after the Americans were in position, Thi tipped off Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt about a major movement of Vietcong insurgents near Chu Lai in Quang Tri Province near the border with North Vietnam.[1][72] This resulted in Operation Starlite, generally regarded as the first offensive action undertaken by the Americans in the Vietnam War.[1] Occurring between August 18 and 24, it resulted in the 1st Vietcong Regiment being pushed to the coast.[72]

Buddhist Uprising of 1966

Main article: Buddhist Uprising

Air Marshal Ky, then the prime minister and the most powerful member of the junta—Thieu was the figurehead chief of state—feared Thi as a rival.[1] Many political observers in Saigon thought that Thi wanted to depose Ky, and regarded him as the biggest threat to the other officers' factions and the junta's stability.[49] According to Ky’s memoirs, Thi was a "born intriguer" who had "left-wing inclinations".[73] Time magazine published a piece in February 1966 that claimed that Thi was more dynamic than Ky and could seize power at any time.[74] The historian Robert Topmiller thought that Ky may have seen the article as destabilizing and therefore decided to move against Thi.[74] Thi was known to have the "deep-rooted" loyalty of his soldiers.[73] A large part of the South Vietnamese military was comprised of the Regional and Popular Forces, which were militia that served in their native areas, and they appreciated a commander with whom they had a regionalistic rapport.[73] The support from the Buddhists, his troops and the regional tendencies gave Thi a strong power base and made it hard for the other generals and the Americans to move against him.[73]

Middle-aged man with side-parted black hair and moustache, in a black suit, white shirt and brown tie. To the left is a clean-shaven Asian man with black hair and a green military cap.
Nguyen Cao Ky, Thi's fiercest rival.

The historian Stanley Karnow said: "Both flamboyant characters who wore gaudy uniforms and sported sinister moustaches, the two young officers had been friends, and their rivalry seemed to typify the personal struggles for power that chronically afflicted South Vietnam. But their dispute mirrored more than individual ambition."[75] Both were also known for their colorful red berets.[1] There were reports that Thi was showing insubordination towards Ky. The US military commander in Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, said that Thi once refused to report to Ky in Saigon when requested.[74] On one occasion, Ky came to I Corps to remonstrate with him, Thi turned towards, addressed his staff and asked mockingly "Should we pay attention to this funny little man from Saigon or should we ignore him?"[49] Thi made this comment rather loudly, within earshot of Ky, and the Vietnamese politician Bui Diem thought that the prime minister viewed Thi's comment as a direct and calculated challenge to his authority.[74] Time said that Thi "ran it [I Corps] like a warlord of yore, obeying those edicts of the central government that suited him and blithely disregarding the rest".[49] Kahin said that Ky may have feared that Thi would secede from Saigon and turn central Vietnam into an independent state. The CIA analyst Douglas Pike, who worked in Vietnam, speculated that this would have been a large part of Ky’s thinking, as Vietnamese people have often had strong regional tendencies.[74]

Ky mustered the support of eight of the generals on the 10-man junta, meaning that along with his vote, there were nine officers in favor of Thi's removal.[2] With Thi the only non-supporter, Ky and his colleagues removed Thi from the junta and his corps command on March 10, 1966.[1] Thi claimed that during this meeting, knowing that the other generals were hostile to him, he nettled them by chastising their commitment to the country. He said that the populace would never support the generals' war effort as long as they lived so comfortably, and he mocked them for ostentatiously flying their wives and mistresses to Hong Kong for shopping expeditions.[76] The junta put Thi under house arrest pending his deportation from the country, and then appointed General Nguyen Van Chuan, the erstwhile commander of 1st Division and a Thi subordinate, as the new I Corps commander.[76]

Middle-aged man with greying and receding dark hair combed back. He has drak bushy eyebrows. He wears a green dress uniform, with suit and tie, is clean-shaven, and has four stars on his shoulder to indicate his rank.
William Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam, disapproved of Thi and supported his removal from command.

The Americans supported Thi's removal as they regarded him as being soft on communism,[1] and a "virtual warlord".[1] US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Westmoreland and the Defense Secretary Robert McNamara were supportive of the Ky-Thieu regime, their prosecution of the war against the communists and support of a US escalation, and they opposed Thi, regarding him as not being firm enough against communism.[73] The Americans wanted to ease Thi out of the corridors of power by offering him an economic future in the US and free education for his children.[73] On the other hand, Thi had the support of Walt, who commanded American forces in I Corps and was the senior advisor to Thi's forces.[73] Unlike his countrymen, Walt thought highly of Thi's character and abilities as an officer.[73]

Ky said that Thi was leaving the country to receive medical treatment for his nasal passages.[1] An official announcement said that the junta "had considered and accepted General Thi's application for a vacation".[49] Thi retorted that "The only sinus condition I have is from the stink of corruption."[1] With the health story exposed as a sham, Ky gave a series of reasons for dismissing Thi, accusing him of being too left-wing, ruling the central regions like a warlord, having a mistress who was suspected of being a communist, and being too conspiratorial.[74] Ky did not say that Thi supported negotiations as a means of ending the war, but he did have a history of removing officials and military figures who promoted such a policy.[74]

Thi's dismissal provoked the Buddhist Uprising, led by the "Struggle Movement".[2] Thi was immensely popular in the Buddhist stronghold of Hue, a city of approximately 120,000, and civil unrest erupted throughout the region. When he returned to the former imperial capital five days after being relieved of his command, around 20,000 supporters mobbed him, shouting and trying to touch him.[2] This was part of a gamble by Ky to allow Thi back to his home city in an attempt to placate the dismayed locals, but it did not work.[77] A general strike incapacited 90% of Da Nang, the largest city in central Vietnam and the second biggest in the entire country.[1]

A Buddhist student leader cried "Do you want the general to stay with us?" to which the students and other protestors answered, "Yes! Yes!"[2] Thi told the large crowd "Think about our country, not about me".[1] During the tongue-in-cheek speech, he made sarcastic references about his need to go to the US for health reasons.[77] He told a journalist that he would accept "any position which is useful for the country", leading some to think that he wanted Ky or Thieu's job.[1] According to Time magazine, Thi's speeches showed that he "was obviously torn between a desire to rally support for a comeback and his soldier's distaste for adding to dissension".[78]

The various dissidents formed a pro-Thi, anti-Ky organization called the Military-Civilian Struggle Committee, better known as the Struggle Movement.[73] Their message and influence quickly spread as they called for the end of military rule and took over radio stations.[73] Some I Corps units supportive of Thi then decided to join the Struggle Movement and ceased military operations against the Vietcong, instead starting a stand-off against Ky. Throughout April and May there were tense incidents as the factions came close to warfare.[73]

Thi publicly disassociated himself from the Buddhists.[73] However, he remained in I Corps and was still regarded as a significant political influence and motivating factor for the Struggle Movement. By June, ARVN loyalists, with the help of the American forces, prevailed.[2] Their superior numbers convinced many in the Struggle Movement to back down and realign with the government, and those who refused were militarily defeated, often in street-to-street fighting.[79]

Exile

After the uprising was crushed, Thi was deported to the US and lived in a small apartment on Connecticut Avenue on Washington's Dupont Circle.[1][2] Although the apartment was small, Kahin, who interviewed Thi after his exile, described it as "handsome".[80] However, The New York Times described it as "shabby".[2] Thi left his ARVN uniforms in his closet in Vietnam and disposed of all his medals. The only thing he kept from his military career was an army blanket.[2] As part of his removal from South Vietnam, the American government gave him a substantial living allowance and paid for all his children's education fees. Around 1973, the payments were suddenly discontinued.[81] During his life in Washington, Thi spent much of his time at the Library of Congress, reading books about Asian history.[2] Outspoken and still supported by many Buddhists, Thi tried to return to South Vietnam in February 1972, but troops of the Catholic President Thieu surrounded his plane on the tarmac and prevented him from disembarking;[1] the plane eventually took off and returned to the US.[1]

Thi lived in the American capital until 1975, when he moved to Arkansas. He lived in the southern state for a short period before settling in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. He worked in a variety of jobs and occasionally made speeches at universities and to Vietnamese American organizations and meetings.[1] According to his relatives, Thi remained popular among the Vietnamese American community, most of whom came to the US after the fall of Saigon and were anti-communist. His family said their refugee compatriots often recognized him, and usually refused to let him pay for meals at their restaurants.[1] Thi's first marriage to Oanh Nguyen ended in divorce.[1] They had five children, four sons and a daughter.[2] He later remarried Catherine Nguyen, who bore him a daughter.[2] In all, Thi had six children and 12 grandchildren.[1] He died at the Hospice of Lancaster County from heart ailments on June 23, 2007.[1][2]

Notes

  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab Sullivan, Patricia (2007-06-27). "South Vietnamese Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi". Washington Post. Retrieved 2009-10-11.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p Martin, Douglas (2007-06-26). "Obituaries: Nguyen Chanh Thi, 84, was ousted as general in South Vietnam". The New York Times. Retrieved 2009-10-11.
  3. ^ a b Jacobs, pp. 26–40.
  4. ^ Jacobs, pp. 43–44.
  5. ^ Jacobs, pp. 61–62.
  6. ^ a b c d e Jacobs, p. 117.
  7. ^ Halberstam, p. 23.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g Moyar (2006), p. 109.
  9. ^ Jacobs, pp. 90–100.
  10. ^ a b c d e f Karnow, pp. 252–253.
  11. ^ a b c d e Hammer (1987), p. 131.
  12. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 110.
  13. ^ a b c Jacobs, p. 118.
  14. ^ a b Langguth, pp. 108–109.
  15. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 111.
  16. ^ a b c d Moyar (2006), p. 112.
  17. ^ a b Moyar (2006), p. 113.
  18. ^ Hammer, p. 132.
  19. ^ Hammer, pp. 154–155.
  20. ^ Blair, p. 70.
  21. ^ Karnow, pp. 460–464.
  22. ^ Shaplen, pp. 229–234.
  23. ^ a b c Shaplen, p. 230.
  24. ^ a b c d Shaplen, p. 231.
  25. ^ a b Karnow, pp. 354–355.
  26. ^ Logevall, p. 161.
  27. ^ Shaplen, p. 228.
  28. ^ Shaplen, pp. 231–232.
  29. ^ Karnow, p. 352.
  30. ^ Shaplen, p. 233.
  31. ^ Tucker, pp. 526–533.
  32. ^ Moyar (2004), pp. 760–764.
  33. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 326.
  34. ^ Kahin, pp. 228–232.
  35. ^ a b Moyar (2006), p. 327.
  36. ^ "South Viet Nam: Remaking a Revolution". Time. 1964-09-25. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help); Missing or empty |url= (help)
  37. ^ Karnow, p. 396.
  38. ^ Kahin, p. 232.
  39. ^ Kahin, p. 498.
  40. ^ a b Moyar (2004), p. 769.
  41. ^ Kahin, pp. 245–260.
  42. ^ a b "South Viet Nam: The U.S. v. the Generals". Time. 1965-01-01.
  43. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 344.
  44. ^ Shaplen, p. 294.
  45. ^ Karnow, p. 398.
  46. ^ Shaplen, p. 295.
  47. ^ Kahin, p. 257.
  48. ^ Karnow, pp. 398–399.
  49. ^ a b c d e f "The Saigon Thi Party". Time. 1966-03-25. Retrieved 2009-10-11. {{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  50. ^ Moyar (2004), pp. 774–775.
  51. ^ Moyar (2004), p. 775.
  52. ^ Kahin, pp. 255–260.
  53. ^ Kahin, pp. 294–296.
  54. ^ Kahin, p. 298.
  55. ^ Kahin, p. 296.
  56. ^ a b Kahin, p. 301.
  57. ^ a b c d e Shaplen, pp. 310–312.
  58. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 363.
  59. ^ "South Viet Nam: A Trial for Patience". Time. 1965-02-26.
  60. ^ Kahin, p. 300.
  61. ^ VanDeMark, p. 81.
  62. ^ Tang, p. 363.
  63. ^ Kahin, pp. 300–301.
  64. ^ a b c Kahin, p. 302.
  65. ^ Moyar (2006), p. 364.
  66. ^ VanDeMark, p. 82.
  67. ^ a b Kahin, p. 303.
  68. ^ Langguth, pp. 346–347.
  69. ^ Moyar (2004), p. 781.
  70. ^ Kahin, pp. 340–343.
  71. ^ Kahin, p. 344.
  72. ^ a b Tucker, p. 383.
  73. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Brush, Peter (2005). "The 1966 Buddhist Crisis in South Vietnam". Historynet. Retrieved 2010-07-16. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
  74. ^ a b c d e f g Topmiller, p. 34.
  75. ^ Karnow, p. 460.
  76. ^ a b Topmiller, p. 35.
  77. ^ a b Topmiller, p. 38.
  78. ^ "South Viet Nam: Smoke, Fire & Welfare". Time. 1966-03-25.
  79. ^ Kahin, pp. 428–432.
  80. ^ Kahin, p. 429.
  81. ^ Kahin, pp. 418, 429.

References

  • Blair, Anne E. (1995). Lodge in Vietnam: A Patriot Abroad. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press. ISBN 0300062265.
  • Halberstam, David (2008). The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0742560074. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York City, New York: E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0525242104.
  • Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0742544478.
  • Kahin, George McT. (1986). Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York City, New York: Knopf. ISBN 039454367X.
  • Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York City, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0670842184.
  • Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam: the War, 1954–1975. New York City, New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 0684812029.
  • Logevall, Fredrik (2006). "The French Recognition of China and its Implications for the Vietnam War". In Roberts, Priscilla (ed.) (ed.). Behind the Bamboo Curtain : China, Vietnam, and the World Beyond Asia. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. pp. 153–171. ISBN 0804755027. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  • Moyar, Mark (2004). "Political Monks: The Militant Buddhist Movement during the Vietnam War". Modern Asian Studies. 38 (4). New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press: 749–784.
  • Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521869110.
  • Shaplen, Robert (1966). The Lost Revolution: Vietnam 1945–1965. London: Andre Deutsch.
  • Topmiller, Robert J. (2006). The Lotus Unleashed: The Buddhist Peace Movement in South Vietnam, 1964–1966. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 0813191661.
  • Truong Nhu Tang (1986). Journal of a Vietcong. London: Cape. ISBN 0224028197.
  • Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social and Military History. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1576070409.
  • VanDeMark, Brian (1995). Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195096509.


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