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Populism, defined either as an ideology,[1][2][3][4] or (more uncommonly) a political philosophy,[5][6][7] or a type of discourse,[3][6] i.e., of sociopolitical thought that compares "the people" against "the elite", and urges social and political system changes. It can also be defined as a rhetorical style employed by members of various political or social movements. It is defined by the Cambridge dictionary as "political ideas and activities that are intended to represent ordinary people's needs and wishes".[8] It can be understood as any political discourse that appeals to the general mass of the population, to the "people" as such, regardless of class distinctions and political partisanship - "a folksy appeal to the 'average guy' or some allegedly general will".[9] This is in opposition to statism, which holds that a small group of professional politicians know better than the people and should make decisions on behalf of them. Nevertheless, populist discourse frequently - specially, but not always, in the Latin American case - buttresses an authoritarian, top-down process of political mobilization in which the leader addresses the masses without the mediation of either parties or institutions.[10]

Academic definitions

Academic and scholarly definitions of populism vary widely and the term is often employed in loose, inconsistent and undefined ways to denote appeals to ‘the people’, ‘demagogy’ and ‘catch-all’ politics or as a receptacle for new types of parties whose classification is unclear. A factor held to diminish the value of ‘populism’ in some societies is that, as Margaret Canovan notes in her 1981 study Populism, unlike labels such as ‘conservative’ or ‘socialist’, the meanings of which have been ‘chiefly dictated by their adherents’, contemporary populists rarely call themselves ‘populists’ and usually reject the term when it is applied to them by others.[11]

Some exceptions to this pattern of pejorative usage exist, notably in the United States, but it appears likely that this is due to the memories and traditions of earlier democratic movements (for example, farmers' movements, New Deal reform movements, and the civil rights movement) that were often called populist, by supporters and outsiders alike. It may also be due to linguistic confusions of populism with terms such as "popular".[12]

Due to the attention on populism in the academic world, scholars have made advances in defining the term in ways that can be profitably employed in research and help to distinguish between movements that are populist and those that simply borrow populist ideas. One of the latest definitions of populism comes from Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell who, in their volume Twenty-First Century Populism, define populism as an ideology that "...pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice".[13]

Rather than view populism in terms of specific social bases, economic programs, issues, or electorates—as discussions of right-wing populism tend to do[14]—this conception of populism is in the tradition of scholars such as Ernesto Laclau,[15] Pierre-Andre Taguieff,[16] Yves Meny and Yves Surel,[17] who have all sought to focus on populism per se, rather than simply as an appendage of other ideologies such as nationalism or neo-liberalism.

Given its central tenet that democracy should reflect the pure and undiluted will of the people, populism can sit easily with ideologies of both right and left. While leaders of populist movements in recent decades have claimed to be on either the left or the right of the political spectrum, many populists claim to be neither "left wing", "centrist" nor "right wing."[18][19][20]

Styles and methods

Some scholars argue that populist organizing for empowerment represents the return of older "Aristotelian" politics of horizontal interactions among equals who are different, for the sake of public problem solving.[21] Populism has taken left-wing, right-wing, and even centrist[22] forms, as well as forms of politics that bring together groups and individuals of diverse partisan views.[23] The use of populist rhetoric in the United States has recently included references such as "the powerful trial lawyer lobby",[24][25] "the liberal elite", or "the Hollywood elite".[26] An example of populist rhetoric on the other side of the political spectrum was the theme of "Two Americas" in the 2004 Presidential Democratic Party campaign of John Edwards.

Populists are seen by some politicians as a largely democratic and positive force in society, while a wing of scholarship in political science contends that populist mass movements are irrational and introduce instability into the political process. Margaret Canovan argues that both these polar views are faulty, and has defined two main branches of modern populism worldwide — agrarian and political — and mapped out seven disparate sub-categories:

Agrarian

Political

  • Populist democracy, including calls for more political participation through reforms such as the use of popular referendums.
  • Politicians' populism marked by non-ideological appeals for "the people" to build a unified coalition.
  • Reactionary populism, such as the white backlash harvested by George Wallace.
  • Populist dictatorship, such as that established by Getulio Vargas in Brazil.[27]

Fascism and populism

It is believed by some that populist movements can be precursors for, or building blocks for, fascist movements.[28][29][30] Conspiracist scapegoating employed by various populist movements can create "a seedbed for fascism."[31] National socialist populism interacted with and facilitated fascism in interwar Germany.[32] In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. The Nazis "parasitized the forms and themes of the populists and moved their constituencies far to the right through ideological appeals involving demagoguery, scapegoating, and conspiracism."[33] According to Fritzsche:

The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization....Against "unnaturally" divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public....[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people's community...[34]

History in Europe

Classical populism

The word populism is derived from the Latin word populus, which means people in English (in the sense of "nation", as in: "The Roman People" (populus Romanus), not in the sense of "multiple individual persons" as in: "There are people visiting us today"). Therefore, populism espouses government by the people as a whole (that is to say, the masses). This is in contrast to elitism, aristocracy, synarchy or plutocracy, each of which is an ideology that espouse government by a small, privileged group above the masses.

Populism has been a common political phenomenon throughout history. The Populares were an unofficial faction in the Roman senate whose supporters were known for their populist agenda. Some of the most well known of these were Tiberius Grachus, Gaius Marius, Julius Caesar and Caesar Augustus, all of whom eventually used referendums to bypass the Roman Senate and appeal to the people directly.

Early modern period

Populism rose during the Reformation; Protestant groups like the Anabaptists formed ideas about ideal theocratic societies, in which peasants would be able to read the Bible themselves. Attempts to establish these societies were made during the German Peasants' War (1524–1525) and the Münster Rebellion (1534–1535). The peasant movement ultimately failed as cities and nobles made their own peace with the princely armies, which restored the old order under the nominal overlordship of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V, represented in German affairs by his younger brother Ferdinand.

The same conditions contributed to the outbreak of the English Revolution of 1642–1651, also known as the English Civil War. Conditions led to a proliferation of ideologies and political movements among peasants, self-employed artisans, and working class people in England. Many of these groups had a dogmatic Protestant religious bent. They included Puritans and the Levellers.[citation needed]

Religious revival

Romanticism, the anxiety against rationalism, broadened after the beginnings of the European and Industrial Revolutions because of cultural, social, and political insecurity. Romanticism led directly to a strong popular desire to bring about religious revival, nationalism and populism. The ensuing religious revival eventually blended into political populism and nationalism, becoming at times a single entity and a powerful force of public will for change. This paradigm shift was marked by people looking for security and community because of a strong emotional need to escape from anxiety and to believe in something larger than themselves.[citation needed]

The revival of religiosity all over Europe played an important role in bringing people to populism and nationalism. In France, François-René de Chateaubriand provided the opening shots of Catholic revivalism as he opposed enlightenment's materialism with the "mystery of life", the human need for redemption.[35] In Germany, Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher promoted pietism by stating that religion was not the institution, but a mystical piety and sentiment with Christ as the mediating figure raising the human consciousness above the mundane to God's level.[36] In England, John Wesley's Methodism split with the Anglican church because of its emphasis on the salvation of the masses as a key to moral reform, which Wesley saw as the answer to the social problems of the day.[37]

Rejection of ultramontanism

Chateaubriand's beginning brought about two Catholic Revivals in France: first, a conservative revival led by Joseph de Maistre, which defended ultramontanism, which is a religious philosophy placing strong emphasis on the supremacy of the Pope, and a second populist revival led by Felicite de Lamennais, an excommunicated priest. This religious populism opposed ultramontanism and emphasized a church community dependent upon all the people, not just the elite. It stressed that church authority should come from the bottom up and that the church should alleviate suffering, not merely accept it. Both of these religious principles are based on populism.[38]

Latin America

Populism has been an important force in Latin American political history, where many charismatic leaders have emerged since the beginning of the 20th century, as the paramountancy of agrarian oligarchies had been dislocated by the onset of industrial capitalism, allowing for the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie and the activation of an urban working class,[39] causing the emergence of reformist and multi-class nationalist politics, centered on a charismatic leadership,[40] such as Aprismo in Peru, the MNR in Bolivia, and the political movements gravitating around Getulio Vargas in Brazil, Perón in Argentina, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, Ecuador's Ibarra and others.[41] Ideologically, Latin American populism, with its emphasis on nation-building under an authoritarian leadership as a prerequisite for technological modernization, betrayed the earlier influence of Comtean positivism. Socially, for many authors - such as Brazil's Octavio Ianni - populism should be understood as the political alliance between an emerging industrial bourgeoisie and a newly organizing urban working class, in which the former accepts social reforming for the latter's sake as long as the working class remains politically subbordinated to both a more or less authoritarian State and private enterprise,[42] in a process of controlled inclusion of the "masses" into the political system,[43] a cooptating process some Marxist authors like Brazil's Francisco Weffort ascertain was accepted by the newly urbanized working class given their lack of a previously developed class consciousness.[44]

Despite efforts to charter an ideological pedigree to Populism in Latin America, as has been attempted by some, working, e.g., with concepts taken from Perón's Third Position.,[45] Latin American countries have not always had a clear and consistent political ideology under populism. Populist practitioners and movements in Latin America usually adapt politically to the prevailing mood of the nation, moving within the ideological spectrum from left to right many times during their political lives. If populist movements in 1930s and 1940s Latin America had apparent fascist overtones and based themselves on authoritarian politics, as was the case of Vargas' Estado Novo dictatorship in Brazil (1937–1945),[46] or of some of Peron's openly expressed sympathies,[47] in the 1950s populism adapted - not without considerable unease from its political leadership[48] - to heightened levels of working-class mobilization. Therefore the fact that 1960s populism was associated mainly with radical, left-leaning petty-bourgeois nationalism, which emptied the State of its function as a coercive class-rule apparatus and saw it instead as an organ of representation of the Nation as a whole.[49] Such was the case, for instance, of the Goulart government (1961–1964) in Brazil, Goulart being described as a fiery populist who identified - mainly rhetorically - with the dispossessed and tried to foster a reformist agenda through ties to the organized Left.[50] The fact that Goulart was eventually ousted by the military points, in the views of some authors, to the fact that he , as well as other populist leaders of the time, faced a jeopardy: they were reformists who, in the pursuit of their agenda, had to encourage popular mobilization and class conflict they ultimately abhorred.[51] Therefore the fact that populism was eventually identified by the 1970s military dictatorships as "demagogery" and as a risk to the stability of the existing social order.[52]

If "left", reformist and nationalist populism never died out altogether during the 1970s Latin American military dictatorships - as offered proof by the prompt and successful return of a populist like Brazil's Leonel Brizola to electoral politics in the early 1980s[53] - a different streak of populism appeared in the post-military disctatorship era.This 1980s populism, in the persons of leaders like Argentina's Carlos Menem or Brazil's Fernando Collor, adapted itself to prevailing neoliberal policies of economic adjustment, setting aside nationalistic reforms and retaining the need for charismatic leadership policies, mass support and a concern for the plight of the "common people".[54] In the 1990s and 2000s, with the emergence of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela - albeit Chavez refuses himself to be labelled as "populist"[55] - reformist and nationalism Latin American populism has resurfaced with new patterns, as what is called by some authors socialist populism[56][57] that appeals to masses of poor by promising redistributive policies[57] and state control of the nation's energy resources.[58] - a blueprint that had already appeared, however - albeit with no openly "socialist" rethoric, viz., in the nationalist policies - including the launch of the State-owned oil-company Petrobrás - that were the hallmark of Vargas' second term as Brazil's democratically elected president (1951–1954) and that led to his eventual suicide.[59]

In some countries, Populism has been fiscally supported in Latin America during periods of growth such as the 1950s and 1960s and during commodity price booms such as in oil and precious metals. Political leaders could gather followers among the popular classes with broad redistributive programs during these boom times. Conversely, in others countries, Populism has been historically associated with countering the relative decline of export agriculture with deficit spending and import-substitution policies aimed at developing an internal market for industrial consumer goods.[60] Populism in Latin America has been sometimes criticized for the fiscal policies of many of its leaders, but has also been defended for having allowed historically weak states to alleviate disorder and achieve a tolerable degree of stability while initiating large-scale industrialization. Though populist fiscal and monetary policies may be criticized by conservative economic historians and policy makers, who seem in it the ultimately dysfunctional subordination of economic policy to political goals,[61] some authors acknowledge populism to have allowed non-radical leaders and parties to co-opt the radical ideas of the masses so as to redirect them in a non revolutionary direction.[62] - something that would exclude from the spectrum of "populism" governments committed to the social revolution blueprint, such as Allende's Unidad Popular government in Chile and Ortega's first revolutionary government in Nicaragua. It's generally regarded that populists hope "to reform the system, not to overthrow it".[63]

Often adapting a nationalist vocabulary and rhetorically convincing, populism was used to appeal to broad masses while remaining ideologically ambivalent. Notwithstanding, there have been notable exceptions. 21st century Latin-American populist leaders have had a decidedly - even if mostly rhetorical[64] - socialist bent.[56][57]

When populists take strong positions on economic philosophies such as capitalism versus socialism, the position sparks strong emotional responses regarding how best to manage the nation's current and future social and economic position. Mexico's 2006 Presidential election was hotly debated among supporters and opponents of populist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador.[65]

Inequality

Populism in Latin American countries has both an economic and an ideological edge. Populism in Latin America has mostly addressed the problem, not of capitalist economic development as such but its inclusiveness,[66] in the backdrop of highly unequal societies in which people are divided between a relative few wealthy groups and masses of poor, even in the case of societies such as Argentina, where strong and educated middle classes are a significant segment of the population.[67] Therefore the key role of the State in Latin American populism, as an institution mediating between traditional elites and the "people" in general.[68] In appealing to the masses of poor people prior to gaining power, populists may promise widely-demanded food, housing, employment, basic social services, and income redistribution. Once in political power, they may not always be financially or politically able to fulfill all these promises. However, they are very often successful in providing many broad and basic services.[69][70]

US policy

Since one of the ideological hallmarks of Latin American populism was the empowerment of the national and its identification with the state,[71] including nationalization of the land, natural resources and key industries as common practice,[72] it was seem almost from the start by American policy makers to offer a challenge to US hegemony over the Americas. The US has intervened in Latin American governments on many occasions where populism was seem threatening its interests: the interventions in Guatemala, when the populist Arbenz government was overthrown by a coup backed by the American company United Fruit and the American ambassador in 1954, and the support given by the US to the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état[73] are just two cases of American intervention. Another example of US intervention has been seen in Colombia, particularly since the assassination of the populist leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan in April 1948. Gaitan supported land reform and other initiatives that posed a threat to American interests - although it's claimed that Gaitán, a Liberal as well as a populist, ultimately opposed generalized political violence and died severed from his grassroots basis of support.[74] Anyway,Gaitan's assassination is alleged to have been a CIA plot.[75]

Populist "socialism"

Populism has remained a significant force in Latin America. Populism has recently been reappearing on the left with promises of far-reaching socialist changes as seen in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, and in Bolivia under Evo Morales- a process, however, seem by some as contardictory in that it tries to meld the populist traditional celebration of folk wisdom and charismatic leadership with doctrinaire socialism.[76] And, in fact, "socialist" changes in today's Venezuela have mostly included the expenditure of oil revenue to benefit the working poor as a form of social welfare to help enable an eventual (and imprecise) socialist transformation. For some authors, as far as ideology is concerned, Chávez's political blueprint is more of a "throwback" to traditional populist nationalism and redistributivism.[77] The Venezuelan government often spars verbally with the United States and accuses it of attempting to overthrow Chavez after supporting a failed coup against him. Chavez has been one of the most outspoken and blunt critics of U.S. foreign policy. Nevertheless, a large commodity trade continues between Venezuela and the U.S. due to the economic constraints of oil delivery and the proximity of the two countries.[78]

As populist tradition ascertains the paramountancy of the "people" (instead of class) as a political subject,[79] it suffices to say that, in the 21st century, the large numbers of voters living in extreme poverty in Latin America has remained a bastion of support for new populist candidates. By early 2008 governments with varying forms of populism and with some form of left leaning (albeit vague)social democratic or democratic socialist platform had come to dominate virtually all Latin American nations with the exceptions of Colombia, El Salvador and Mexico.[80] This political shift includes both more developed nations such as Argentina's Front for Victory and Chile with its Socialist Party, and smaller income countries like Bolívia with its Movement towards Socialism and Paraguay with the Patriotic Alliance for Change. Even in middle-income Mexico, a populist candidate like Obrador, albeit defeated, neverthless appeared as part of a strong neopopulist reaction.[81] Nevertheless, populist candidates have been more successful in poorer Latin American countries such as Bolivia (under Morales), Ecuador (under Correa) and Nicaragua (under Ortega). By the use of broad grassroots movements populist groups have managed to gain power from better organized, funded and entrenched groups such as the Bolivian Nationalist Democratic Action and the Paraguayan Colorado Party.[82]

Countries in Latin America with high rates of poverty, whose governments maintain and support unpopular privatizations and more orthodox economic policies that don't deliver general societal gains, will be under pressure from populist politicians and movements[83] accusing them of benefiting the upper and upper-middle classes[84][85] and of being allied to foreign and business interests.[86][87]

Mexico

In Mexico, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's candidacy sparked very emotional debates throughout the country regarding policies that affect ideology, class, equality, wealth, and society. Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's most controversial economic policies included his promise to expand monthly stipends to the poor and elderly from Mexico City to the rest of the country and to re-negotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement to protect the Mexican poor.

The ruling party in Mexico, the National Action Party (PAN), portrayed him as a danger to Mexico's hard-earned economic stability. In criticizing his redistributive promises that would create new entitlement programs somewhat similar to social security in the US (though not as broad in scope) and his trade policies that would not fully uphold prior agreements (such as NAFTA), the economic debate between capitalists and socialists became a major part of the debate. Felipe Calderón, the PAN candidate, portrayed himself as not just a standard-bearer for recent economic policy, but as a more proactive candidate, to distance himself from the main criticisms of his predecessor Vicente Fox regarding inaction. He labeled himself the "jobs president" and promised greater national wealth for all through steady future growth, fiscal prudence, international trade, and balanced government spending.[citation needed]

During the immediate aftermath of the tight elections in which the country's electoral court was hearing challenges to the vote tally that had Calderon winning, Lopez Obrador showed the considerable influence over the masses that are a trademark of populist politicians. He effectively led huge demonstrations, filling the central plaza with masses of sympathizers who supported his challenge. The demonstrations lasted for several months and eventually dissipated after the electoral court did not find sufficient cause from the challenges presented to overturn the results.[88][89]

United States

The populist tradition and its rebirth

There have been several versions of a populist party in the United States, some inspired by the Populist Party of the 1890s. This was the party of the early U.S. populist movement in which millions of farmers and other working people successfully enacted their anti-trust agenda.[citation needed]

Other early populist political parties in the United States included the Greenback Party, the Progressive Party of 1912 led by Theodore Roosevelt, the Progressive Party of 1924 led by Robert M. La Follette, Sr., and the Share Our Wealth movement of Huey Long in 1933–35[citation needed].

George Wallace, Four-Term Governor of Alabama, led a populist movement that carried five states and won 13.5% of the popular vote in the 1968 presidential election. Campaigning against intellectuals and liberal reformers, Wallace gained a large share of the white working class vote in Democratic primaries in 1972.[90][91]

Populism continues to be a force in modern U.S. politics, especially in the 1992 and 1996 third-party presidential campaigns of billionaire Ross Perot[citation needed]. The 1996, 2000, 2004, and the 2008 presidential campaigns of Ralph Nader had a strong populist cast. The 2004 campaigns of Dennis Kucinich[92][93][94][95] and Al Sharpton also had populist elements. The 2004 and 2008 Democratic presidential candidate John Edwards has been described by many[96] (and by himself) as a "one economic community, one commonwealth"[96] populist.

Comparison between earlier surges of populism and those of today are complicated by shifts in what are thought to be the interests of the common people. Jonah Goldberg and others argue that in modern society, fractured as it is into myriad interest groups and niches, any attempt to define the interests of the "average person" will be so general as to be useless.[citation needed]

In 1984, the Populist Party name was revived by Willis Carto, and was used in 1988 as a vehicle for the presidential campaign of former Ku Klux Klan leader, and later member of both the Republican Party and the Democratic Party, David Duke. Right-wing Patriot movement organizer Bo Gritz was briefly Duke's running mate. This incarnation of populism was widely regarded as a vehicle for white supremacist recruitment. In this instance, populism was maligned by the use of a definition of "the people" that was not the prevailing definition.[citation needed]

Another populist mechanism was the initiative and referendum driven term limits movement of the early 1990s. In every state where term limits were on the ballot, the measure to limit incumbency in Congress passed. The average vote was 67% in favor. However, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down term limits in 1995 in the court case U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.[97]

In 1995, the Reform Party of the United States of America (RPUSA) was organized after the populist presidential campaign of Ross Perot in 1992. In the year 2000, an intense fight for the presidential nomination made Patrick J. Buchanan the RPUSA standard bearer. As result of his nomination as party candidate there were many party splits, not only from Buchanan supporters after he left the party, but also moderates, progressivists and libertarians around Jesse Ventura who refused to collaborate with the Buchanan candidacy. Since then the party's fortunes have markedly declined.

In the 2000s, new populist parties were formed in America. One was the Populist Party of America in 2002; another was the Populist Party of Maryland formed to support Ralph Nader in 2004, which ran candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, U.S. Senate and state delegate in the 2006 elections. Other examples are the American Populist Party, founded in 2009, and the American Populist Renaissance, founded in 2005.[98][99] The American Moderation Party, also formed in 2005, adopted several populist ideals, chief among them working against multinational neo-corporatism. Much of the Tea Party movement has used populist rhetoric, particularly in areas and states where Democrats are in power. For instance, in New York, Carl Paladino and his conservative-populist Taxpayers Party of New York have used the motto "Paladino for the People" and have attempted to woo common people to vote for them by pitting them against the state government and the special interests that have influence in it.

Some think-tanks such as the Cato Institute in America or the CEE Council in Europe have argued that the increasingly populist polarization of both Congress and the US body politic at large could hinder the Obama administration's plans to reform health care and revamp bank regulations[100]

Germany

Further information: [[:Völkisch movement]]

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, a Lutheran Minister, a professor at the University of Berlin and the "father of gymnastics", introduced the concept of Volkstum, a racial notion that draws on the essence of a people that was lost in the Industrial Revolution. Adam Mueller went a step further by positing the state as a bigger totality than the government institution. This paternalistic vision of aristocracy concerned with social orders had a dark side in that the opposite force of modernity was represented by the Jews, who were said to be eating away at the state.[101] Populism also played a role in mobilizing middle class support for the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany.[102] In this case, distressed middle–class populists during the pre-Nazi Weimar period mobilized their anger at government and big business. According to Fritzsche:

The Nazis expressed the populist yearnings of middle–class constituents and at the same time advocated a strong and resolutely anti-Marxist mobilization.... Against "unnaturally" divisive parties and querulous organized interest groups, National Socialists cast themselves as representatives of the commonwealth, of an allegedly betrayed and neglected German public....[b]reaking social barriers of status and caste, and celebrating at least rhetorically the populist ideal of the people's community...[34]

France

In the late 18th century, the French Revolution, though led by wealthy intellectuals, could also be described as a manifestation of populist sentiment against the elitist excesses and privileges of the Ancien Régime.[103]

In France, the populist and nationalist picture was more mystical, metaphysical and literarian in nature.[104] Historian Jules Michelet (sometimes called a populist[105]) fused nationalism and populism by positing the people as a mystical unity who are the driving force of history in which the divinity finds its purpose.[103] Michelet viewed history as a representation of the struggle between spirit and matter; he claims France has a special place because the French became a people through equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because of this, he believed, the French people can never be wrong. Michelet's ideas are not socialism or rational politics, and his populism always minimizes, or even masks, social class differences.

In the 1950s, Pierre Poujade was the leader of the right-wing populist movement Union de Defense Commercants et Artisans (UDCA).[106] Jean Marie Le Pen (who was UDCA's youngest deputy in the 1950s)[107] can be characterized as right-wing populist[108] or extreme-right populist.[107]

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Religious Rhetoric in American Populism: Civil Religion as Movement Ideology, Rhys H. Williams and Susan M. Alexander,1994, Society for the Scientific Study of Religion
  2. ^ Anthropology and development: understanding contemporary social change, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan
  3. ^ a b CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, Andras Bozoki, Terms: Winter and Spring 1995, Department of Political Science, Budapest, CENTRAL EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY
  4. ^ The Reinvention of Populism: Islamist Responses to Capitalist Development in the Contemporary Maghreb, Alejandro Colás, 2001
  5. ^ Merriam-Webster's collegiate encyclopedia, Merriam-Webster, Inc
  6. ^ a b Reasons for popularity of populist parties – Comparison of Poland and Estonia, Monika Kaliciak, p. 3
  7. ^ American Heritage Dictionary, entry "Populism"
  8. ^ populism – Cambridge Dictionary Oline: Free English Dictionary
  9. ^ Daniel A. Smith, Tax crusaders and the politics of direct democracy. New York: Routledge, 1998, page 41.
  10. ^ Karen Kampwirth, ed., Gender and Populism in Latin America. Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010, page 2.
  11. ^ Canovan, Margaret, 1981,Populism, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, p.5
  12. ^ Boyte, Populism and John Dewey
  13. ^ Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell, 2008, Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy, New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, p.3
  14. ^ Kitschelt, Herbert (with McGann, Anthony), 1995, The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michighan Press
  15. ^ Laclau, Ernesto, 2005, On Populist Reason, London: Verso
  16. ^ Taguieff, Pierre-Andre, 2002, L'illusion populiste, Paris: Berg International
  17. ^ Meny, Yves and Surel, Yves, 2002, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, London: Palgrave Macmillan
  18. ^ Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism.
  19. ^ Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe.
  20. ^ Kazin, Michael. 1995.The Populist Persuasion: An American History.
  21. ^ Harry C. Boyte, "A Different Kind of Politics", Dewey Lecture, University of Michigan, 2002. Online at Project MUSE (login needed to see PDF file)
  22. ^ "The basic ideology of the middle class is populism.... Their ideal was an independent small property owning class consisting of merchants, mechanics, and farmers. This element...now designated as middle class, sponsored a system of private property, profit, and competition on an entirely different basis from that conceived by capitalism....From its very inception it opposed "big business" or what has now become known as capitalism." David J. Saposs, quoted in "Political Man", Lipset
  23. ^ Richard L. Wood, Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in America, 2002
  24. ^ Ignore the Lawyers, Help the People – The powerful trial lawyers lobby must not be allowed to stymie tort reform.
  25. ^ Trial Lawyer Lobby Scores Several Big Victories — But Signs Of Hope In A Tough Election Year
  26. ^ And The Winner Is…The Hollywood Elite, January 27, 2009
  27. ^ Canovan, Populism, pp. 13, 128–138
  28. ^ Ferkiss 1957.
  29. ^ Dobratz and Shanks–Meile 1988
  30. ^ Berlet and Lyons, 2000
  31. ^ Mary Rupert 1997: 96.
  32. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 149–150.
  33. ^ Berlet 2005.
  34. ^ a b Fritzsche 1990: 233–235
  35. ^ Three Minute Declamations for College Men, H. C. Davis,J. C. Bridgeman, The Mysteries of Life, Chateaubriand
  36. ^ "THE ROOTS AND FRUITS OF PIETISM", Ronald R. Feuerhahn, Concordia Historical Institute & the Luther Academy, September 17–18, 1998, PIEPER LECTURES 1998
  37. ^ Methodism and the Mob – what it really takes to change a culture, Lex Loizides' Blog, November 30, 2009
  38. ^ Origins of liberal dominance: state, church, and party in nineteenth-century Europe, Andrew Gould
  39. ^ Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Bureaucratic authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in comparative perspective. Bekeley: University of California Press, 1988, ISBN 0-520-04260-3 , pages 9/10
  40. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo. University of North Carolina Press, 1992, ISBN 0-8078-4368-7, page 4.
  41. ^ Walter Laqueur,ed. Fascism: A Readers' Guide : Analysis, Interpretations, Bibliography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, ISBN 0-520-03642-5, page 255
  42. ^ Rafael Torres Quintero & Rafael Quintero López, El mito del populismo: análisis de los fundamentos del Estado ecuatoriano.Quito: Universidad Central del Ecuador, 1980, page 27
  43. ^ Mehmet Uğur & Nergis Canefe, eds., Turkey and European integration: accession prospects and issues. London, Routledge, 2005, ISBN 0-415-32656-7, page 51
  44. ^ Alberto Aggio, Agnaldo de Sousa Barbosa, Hercídia Mara Facuri Coelho Lambert, Política e sociedade no Brasil, 1930-1964. São Paulo: Anna Blume, 2002, ISBN 85-7419-242-2, page 74
  45. ^ [links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3816(195311)15%3A4%3C582%3APA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23]
  46. ^ Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, Derechas y ultraderechas en el mundo. Mexico: Siglo XXI, 2004, ISBN 968-23-2519-6, page 140
  47. ^ Íñigo Bolinaga, Breve historia del fascismo. Madrid: Nowtilus, 2008, ISBN 978-84-9763-452-6, page 242
  48. ^ In 1952, viz., Vargas' Labor Minister in Brazil saw his tasks in fervently anticommunist terms: to battle ideologies opposed to "traditions" of social peace - John D. French, Drowning in laws: labor law and Brazilian political culture. University of North Carolina Press, 2004, ISBN 0-8078-5527-8 , page 81
  49. ^ Francisco Weffort, O populismo na política brasileira. Rio de Janeiro:Paz e Terra, 1978, page 43.
  50. ^ Stephen G. Rabe, The most dangerous area in the world: John F. Kennedy confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999, ISBN 0-8078-4764-x , page 66
  51. ^ John D. French, The Brazilian workers' ABC: class conflict and alliances in modern São Paulo, page 262
  52. ^ Mary P. Lassiter,ed., Economics, politics and social issues in Latin America. New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2007, ISBN 978-1600211829 , page 25
  53. ^ Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985. New York: Oxford University Press US, 1989 , ISBN 0-19-506316-3 , page 265
  54. ^ Jolle Demmers, Alex E. Fernández Jilberto, Barbara Hogenboom, eds. Miraculous metamorphoses: the neoliberalization of Latin American populism. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001, ISBN 1-85649-887-5, page 11
  55. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9, page 51
  56. ^ a b Héctor E. Schamis – Populism, socialism and democratic institutions
  57. ^ a b c ARTICLE: Populism and Anti-Americanism in Modern Latin America, by Justin Lance
  58. ^ Populist Left in South America, The Big Question: Should We Be Worried by the Rise of the Populist Left in South America?, By David Usborne, The Independent UK, Thursday 04 May 2006
  59. ^ Thomas F. O'Brien, The century of U.S. capitalism in Latin America. University of New Mexico Press, 2002, ISBN 0-8263-1996-3 , page 101
  60. ^ Luiz Renato Vieira, Consagrados e malditos: os intelectuais e a Editora Civilização Brasileira. Brasília: Thsaurus, 1998, ISBN 85-7062-139-6, page 41
  61. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991, ISBN 0-226-15844-6, page 16
  62. ^ Populist Policies In The Transition To Democracy, Daniel Mejía and Carlos Esteban Posada
  63. ^ Rüdiger Dornbusch & Sebastian Edwards, eds. The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, 47.
  64. ^ Jeffery R Webber,"Venezuela under Chávez: The Prospects and Limitations of Twenty-First Century Socialism, 1999-2009", Études socialistes, Vol 6, No 1 (2010)
  65. ^ January 24, 2007: Mexican Political Polarization Limited to Elites Despite Contested Election, APSA Press Release
  66. ^ Dornbusch & Edwards, The Macroeconomics of populism in Latin America, page 1
  67. ^ CURRENT ECONOMIC ISSUES IN ARGENTINA A TEACHING MODULE, Z. Edward O'Relley, November, 2001
  68. ^ Elizabeth Montes Garcés, ed., Relocating identities in Latin American cultures. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2007, ISBN 1-55238-209-7 , page 74
  69. ^ DEALING WITH POLITICAL FERMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: THE POPULIST REVIVAL, THE EMERGENCE OF THE CENTER, AND IMPLICATIONS OR U.S. POLICY
  70. ^ The Impact of "Populism" on Social, Political, and Economic Development in the Hemisphere, Vladimir Torres
  71. ^ James M. Malloy, ed. Authoritarianism and corporatism in Latin America. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977, ISBN 0-8229-5275-0 , page 11
  72. ^ Víctor Alba, Historia del movimiento obrero en America latina. Eng. trans., Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1968, page 31
  73. ^ Brian Loveman, For la Patria: politics and the armed forces in Latin America. Wilmington: Scholary Resources, Inc., 1999, ISBN 0-8420-2773-4 , page 186
  74. ^ James D. Henderson, Modernization in Colombia: the Laureano Gómez years, 1889-1965. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001, ISBN 0-8130-1824-2, page 287
  75. ^ Anisseh van Engeland & Rachael M. Rudolph, From terrorism to politics. Aldershot: Ashgate, n/date, ISBN 978-0-7546-4990-8 , page 136
  76. ^ Kirk Andrew Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-76503-9 , page 84
  77. ^ Steve Ellner & Daniel Hellinger, eds., Venezuelan politics in the Chávez era: class, polarization, and conflict. Boulder: Lyne Rienner, 2003, ISBN 1-58826-297-9, page 67
  78. ^ Venezuela-US trade under the microscope, By Greg Morsbach
  79. ^ Carlos De La Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America, 2nd. Edition. Ohio University, 2010, ISBN 978-0-89680-279-7 , page xii
  80. ^ More leftist leaders in Latin America – Americas – MSNBC.com
  81. ^ Scott Mainwaring &Timothy Scully, eds., Democratic Governance in Latin America. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-8047-6084-3, page 254
  82. ^ Latin America gets another leftist leader Fernando Lugo's victory in Paraguay adds to the leftward tilt
  83. ^ Patricio Navia and Ignacio Walker, Chapter 8, Political Institutions, Populism, and Democracy in Latin America, in Scott and Timothy R. Scully (ed), Democratic Governance in Latin America, Stanford University Press, 2008, pg. 2 – 3
  84. ^ En 16 años, los gobiernos neoliberales democratizaron el hambre. Discurso de Daniel Ortega en Estelí, Radio La Primerísima, 7 julio de 2007
  85. ^ Pemex y los GOBIERNOS NEOLIBERALES, ALBERTO TORRENTERA
  86. ^ Bolivia y el mandato progresista en Latinoamérica, Mark Engler and Benjamin Dangl, 13 de abril de 2006
  87. ^ La Reforma del Estado desde la perspectiva neoliberal, Roberto ESCAMILLA PÉREZ, jueves 3 de abril de 2008, ¡Babor!
  88. ^ Dog Brothers Public Forum, Mexico
  89. ^ The Challenge of Closely Fought Elections, Whitehead, Laurence Project MUSE – Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 2, April 2007
  90. ^ Behind the backlash: white working-class politics in Baltimore, 1940–1980 Por Kenneth D. Durr, pg 183
  91. ^ America's Forgotten Majority, June 2000, by Joel Rogers and Ruy Teixeira
  92. ^ Willie Nelson's populist beliefs lead him to underdog Kucinich., Star-Telegraf
  93. ^ Gore Vidal for Dennis Kucinich: A farsighted populist and pacifist., The Nation November 8, 2007 01:44 PM
  94. ^ Kucinich Took On Powerful Interests in Mayoral Race, by Cheryl Corley, September 26, 2007
  95. ^ http://blog.4president.us/2004/dennis_kucinich/index.html 2004 Presidential Campaign Blog. Dennis Kuchinich
  96. ^ a b February 7, 2007, three forms of populism in the 2008 campaign (scroll down)
  97. ^ Congressional Term Limits Struck Down; Supreme Court's 5–4 Ruling Upsets Laws in 23 States, Joan Biskupic, The Washington Post, May 23, 1995
  98. ^ American Populist Renaissance on MySpace, MySpace Groups
  99. ^ American Populist Renaissance official website
  100. ^ Template:Fr icon 'Financial Orthodoxy and Bank Regulation: the Lessons from the Glass Steagall Act' (PDF), retrieved 2010-01-04
  101. ^ Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus, Cornelia Schmitz-Berning
  102. ^ Fritzsche 1990: 149–150, 1998
  103. ^ a b SYNTHÈSE : LE PEUPLE ! QUEL PEUPLE ? HISTOIRE D'UN MOT
  104. ^ Le mythe du peuple et la société française du XIXe siècle, JSTOR
  105. ^ Le populisme, voilà l’ennemi !, April 1996, Le Monde diplomatique
  106. ^ Fascism, populism and the French Fifth Republic: in the shadow of democracy, Catherine Fieschi
  107. ^ a b French shopkeepers on the march, Mary Dejevsky, Sunday, 5 November 1995, The Independent
  108. ^ Europeanized Nationalism? – European Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Notion of European Identity

References

  • Albertazzi, Daniele and Duncan McDonnell. 2008. Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 023001349X ISBN 978-0230013490
  • Berlet, Chip. 2005. "When Alienation Turns Right: Populist Conspiracism, the Apocalyptic Style, and Neofascist Movements." In Lauren Langman & Devorah Kalekin Fishman, (eds.), Trauma, Promise, and the Millennium: The Evolution of Alienation. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
  • Boggs, Carl. 1982."The New Populism and the Limits of Structural Reform," Theory and Society Vol. 12:3 (May)
  • Boggs, Carl. 1986. Social Movements and Political Power: Emerging Forms of Radicalism in the West. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Boyte, Harry. C. and Frank Riessman, Eds. 1986. The New Populism: The Politics of Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 1989. CommonWealth: A Return to Citizen Politics. New York: Free Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 2004. Everyday Politics: Reconnecting Citizens and Public Life. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
  • Boyte, Harry C. 2007. "Populism and John Dewey: Convergences and Contradictions", Seventh Annual University of Michigan Dewey Lecture.
  • Brass, Tom. 2000. Peasants, Populism and Postmodernism: The Return of the Agrarian Myth London: Frank Cass Publishers.
  • Coles, Rom. 2006. "Of Tensions and Tricksters: Grassroots Democracy Between Theory and Practice," Perspectives on Politics Vol. 4:3 (Fall), pp. 547–561
  • Canovan, Margaret. 1981. Populism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. ISBN 0-15-173078-4
  • Denning, Michael.1997. The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century. London: Verso.
  • Emibayer, Mustafa and Ann Mishe. 1998."What is Agency?" American Journal of Sociology Vol. 103:4, pp. 962–1023
  • Grieder, William. 1993. Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy. Simon % Schuster.
  • Khoros, Vladim1r. 1984. Populism: Its Past, Present and Future. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
  • Kling, Joseph M. and Prudence S. Posner. 1990. Dilemmas of Activism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Laclau, Ernesto. 1977. Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism. London: NLB/Atlantic Highlands Humanities Press.
  • Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. On Populist Reason. London: Verso
  • Miscoiu, Sergiu, Craciun, Oana, Colopelnic, Nicoleta. 2008. Radicalism, Populism, Interventionism. Three Approaches Based on Discourse Theory. Cluj-Napoca: Efes
  • Rupert, Mark. 1997. "Globalization and the Reconstruction of Common Sense in the US." In Innovation and Transformation in International Studies, S. Gill and J. Mittelman, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Taggart, Paul. 2000. Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press. ISBN 0-335-20045-1.

Europe

  • Betz, Hans-Georg. 1994. Radical Right-wing Populism in Western Europe, New York: St. Martins Press. ISBN 0-312-08390-4, ISBN 0-312-12195-4
  • Fritzsche, Peter. 1990. Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505780-5
  • Fritzsche, Peter. 1998. Germans into Nazis. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

United States

  • Berlet, Chip and Matthew N. Lyons. 2000. Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort. New York: Guilford Press. ISBN 1-57230-568-1, ISBN 1-57230-562-2
  • Dobratz, Betty A, and Stephanie L. Shanks–Meile. 1988. "The Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and the American Nazi Party: A Comparison to American Populism at the Turn of the Century." Humanity and Society, 20–50.
  • Evans, Sara M. and Harry C. Boyte. 1986. Free Spaces: The Sources of Democratic Change in America. New York: Harper & Row.
  • Ferkiss, Victor C. 1957. "Populist Influences on American Fascism." Western Political Quarterly 10(2):350–73.
  • Fink, Leon. 1983. Workingmen's Democracy: The Knights of Labor and American Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
  • Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1976. Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
  • Goodwyn, Lawrence. 1978. The Populist Moment: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America. New York and London: Oxford University Press.
  • Hahn, Steven. 1983. Roots of Southern Populism: Yeoman Farmers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850–1890. New York and London: Oxford University Pres
  • Hofstadter, Richard. 1955. The Age of Reform: from Bryan to F.D.R. New York: Knopf.
  • Hofstadter, Richard. 1965. The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays. New York: Knopf.
  • Jeffrey, Julie Roy.1975. "Women in the Southern Farmers Alliance: A Reconsideration of the Role and Status of Women in the Late 19th Century South." Feminist Studies 3.
  • Kazin, Michael. 1995. The Populist Persuasion: An American History. New York: Basic Books. ISBN 0-465-03793-3, ISBN 0-8014-8558-4
  • Marable, Manning. 1986. "Black History and the Vision of Democracy", in Harry Boyte and Frank Riessman, Eds., The New Populism: The Politics of Empowerment. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
  • Palmer, Bruce. 1980. Man Over Money: The Southern Populist Critique of American Capitalism. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
  • Rupert, Mary. 1997. "The Patriot Movement and the Roots of Fascism." Pp. 81–101 in Windows to Conflict Analysis and Resolution: Framing our Field, Susan Allen Nan, et al., eds. Fairfax, Virginia: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution.
  • Stock, Catherine McNicol. 1996. Rural Radicals: Righteous Rage in the American Grain. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-3294-4
  • Miscoiu, Sergiu, Craciun, Oana, Colopelnic, Nicoleta. 2008. Radicalism, Populism, Interventionism. Three Approaches Based on Discourse Theory. Cluj-Napoca: Efes.
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