Talk:Battle of Waterloo

Good Article

From the history of the page:

09:00, 31 May 2010 TreasuryTag (→Further reading: This article was linked from WP:GA, so it is having {{good article}} added per Wikipedia:Bot requests/Archive 36#GA symbol, using AWB)

See also Talk:Battle of Waterloo/Archive 9#Featured Article

Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Battle of Waterloo/archive1

When was this article promoted to Good Article? Does the history of the suggested changes to the article to make it a good article exist (like the archive for featured article?)? -- PBS (talk) 11:36, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

I can't find it either, but according to this version of this talk page it was "Nominated by an unspecified nominator at 2007-08-29". I had a quick look at the archives but couldn't find Waterloo there. Looking at the bottom section of that page, I assume Kierano was at least involved in the nomination. Maybe you should ask at his/her talk page. --Fama Clamosa (talk) 12:17, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

There is a section in this talk page's archive on what needed to be done: Talk:Battle of Waterloo/Archive 6#GA review dated 29-Aug-2007. -- PBS (talk) 13:00, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Apparently, the article was reviewed and promoted by Jackyd101 on September 21, 2007. A few diffs:

• Talk:Battle of Waterloo ‎ (→GA Review (2): GA passed)
• Talk:Battle of Waterloo ‎ (article milestones)
• Wikipedia:Good articles ‎ (add Battle of Waterloo)

I guess the suggested changes in Archive 6 were intended for a potential FA nomination.

--Fama Clamosa (talk) 22:26, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Citations and harvnb templates

I have just been through the process of wrapping the references in the reference section of the article English Civil War in the template {{citations}} and then I wrapped the in-line citations in the {{harvnb}} template (diffs). As an aid for the reader, this puts in a link from the short in-line citation to the full source reference in the references section. But it is time consuming to do, so I'll start the process but would appreciate some help. -- PBS (talk) 11:44, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

One of the side effects of using the templates is that it homogenises the format of the in-line citations which tidies up the appearance of the ==Notes== section. -- PBS (talk) 21:00, 31 May 2010 (UTC)

Battle honours etc

This source J. Booth, (1817) The battle of Waterloo: also of Ligny, and Quatre Bras, containing the ... pp. 277–288 contains a list of awards promotions etc given to British Officers and regiments in the wake of the Waterloo Campaign. I'm not sure if any of it needs to be in this article or perhaps into another article, or just footnoted. But editors of this article may find it interesting even if the information is not included in Wikiepdia. -- PBS (talk) 00:31, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

Casualties

I don't want to appear to be biased, but in The Battle: A New History of Waterloo Barbero states that Wellington and Blucher lost around 24000 men. Wellington: 3500 dead, 10200 wounded, 3300 missing (17000). Blucher: 1200 dead, 4400 wounded, 1400 missing (7000). That's 24000 casualties. These figures are even cited in the text. Guard Chasseur (talk) 05:54, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

That isn't bais that is a legitimate concern with a respected cited source. The problem is there are about a few more histories here. Let the other editors chime in and we can make a decision on what needs to be done.Tirronan (talk) 12:35, 17 September 2010 (UTC)

Armies

These second paragraph is not clear:

...Of these, 25,000 were British, with another 6,000 from the King's German Legion. All of the British Army troops were regular soldiers and 7,000 of them were Peninsular War veterans.[16] In addition, there were 17,000 Dutch and Belgian troops, 11,000 from Hanover, 6,000 from Brunswick, and 3,000 from Nassau.[17] William, Prince of Orange showed personal bravery in the battle.

These Coalition armies had been re-established in 1815, following the earlier defeat of Napoleon. Most of the professional soldiers in these armies had spent their careers in the armies of France or Napoleonic regimes, with the exception of some from Hanover and Brunswick who had fought with the British army in Spain.

The British Army was part of a coalition army and the British Army had not been "re-established in 1815, following the earlier defeat of Napoleon". "Most of the professional soldiers in these armies had spent their careers in the armies of France or Napoleonic regimes" , most of the professional soldiers (who would have been British, KGL) in these armies had not "spent their careers in the armies of France or Napoleonic regimes". If this second paragraph means the Dutch, Belgian and Nassauian troops then it should say that. -- PBS (talk) 23:45, 26 September 2010 (UTC)

I have had a go at a minor rewrite of the paragraph that stated "These Coalition armies..." It probably needs more. As only 7,000 British soldiers were Peninsular War veterans, quite a lot although professional soldiers may not have been in a major battle. This should be teased out a bit (Ie it was not just Jonny foreigner who was inexperienced). I am not sure if the Dutch Army (or the other armies) had been reconstituted or if it was an amalgamation of pre-existing forces. I think more research needs to be done to find out what the secondary sources actually say about where these armies came from and if they claimed previous battle experience of fighting together as units. For example the Prussians had been allied for Napoleon for a time, But few thought that any Prussian regiment would go over to Napoleon. The only reason this is relevant is it was thought that some of the French speaking Belgian regiments could not be trusted. -- PBS (talk) 21:43, 26 October 2010 (UTC)

I think Barbaro is one of the better sources in comparing the armies. Much of Wellington's old force was either coming back from New Orleans or from Canana. Much of the Brit forces were gathered from reserve and garrison battalions at home if memory serves, its getting late here so I will check for you in the morning. Many of the Dutch Belgians had seen service under Napoleon but many were Landwehr or equivalent types just brought together. Of the 3 armies there that day the shipwreck were the Prussian forces, and even at that they had gotten some experience and fought harder with the loss of the Rhinelander that didn't want to be there. I do remember that Barbaro stated that the 3 armies were about equal, something I at 1st disagreed with, but as time goes on I'm coming to his view.Tirronan (talk) 04:47, 27 October 2010 (UTC)

Ok the Armies of Hanover and Brunswick were recent reconstructions under professional officers and most of the enlisted were recent recruits hired for life or long service in the most traditional of ways and of varying nationalities. The KGL was considered among the best. Barbero p.32-33

reconnaissance

The Prussian defeat made Wellington's position at Quatre Bras untenable, so the next day he withdrew northwards, to a defensive position he had personally reconnoitred the previous year - a year before??? TeunSpaans (talk) 20:28, 28 September 2010 (UTC)

so it is reputed by multiple books.Tirronan (talk) 00:50, 29 September 2010 (UTC)

And given that out of preference Wellington liked the tactic of negating the French deployment of a grand battery by placing his men on a reverse slope a tactic he had used many times before, (it also made if difficult for French officers to judge when to give the order to redeploy from column to line -- (they came on in the same old way)) and that at the top of the escarpment there was the sunken lane ditch, the battle site was just the sort he liked. That he had reconnoitred it a year before is less incredible than the possibility that he stumbled on it by change retreating from Quatre Bras towards Brussels.

Wellington's infantry were in fact ON the summit of Mont St. Jean ridge (west of La Haye Sainte ) PRIOR to the mass French cavalry charges in that sector. While Picton and Bylandt's brigades were in shelter behind the cover of the hedge lined crest of the Ohain ridge on the East half of Wellington's positions prior to the French battery bombardment, the front line battalions on Mont St.Jean were on top of the ridge suffering from the French cannonfire after D'Erlon's attack had failed. Wellington withdrew those brigades of Halkett, Kielmansegge, and Ompteda to the reverse slope of Mont St.Jean as was witnessed by Ney who mistook the 'disappearance' of those troops to be a retreat of Wellington's center ( in combination with the column of wounded, prisoners and stragglers he could likely make out streaming north on the Brussels highway). — Preceding unsigned comment added by Joey123xz (talk • contribs) 20:58, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Some primary sources that Wellington was in Brussels and reconnoitring the countryside around about can be found in Supplementary despatches, correspondence, and memoranda, Volume 9, by Arthur Wellesley of Wellington On page 187 Wellington writes from Courtrai to the Earl of Bathurst on 20th of August saying that "I am just setting out for Paris ... I have seen a good deal of the country and will send you my report from Paris ... Whatever may be the military consequences of our tour, we have made noise enough in the country, and the people are convinced of our intention to defend it".

When he got to Paris he wrote a memorandum to Lord Bathurst as promised, it was dated 22 September 1814 and titled "On the Defence of the Frontier of the Netherlands" it is catalogued in The Dispatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, During his various campaigns in India... and France from 1799 to 1815 by Arthur Wellesley and John Gurwood. The memorandum starts on page 125 and continues for a further four pages. In it he identifies good defensive positions for an army in the field "There are, however, good positions for an army at La Trinité and at Renaix behind Tournay; another between Tournay and Mons, on the high grounds about Blaton; there are many good positions about Mons; the course of the Haine from Binch towards Mons would afford some good ones; about Nivelle, and between that and Binch, there are many advantageous positions; and the entrance of the forêt de Soignies by the high road which leads to Brussels from Binch, Charleroi, and Namur, would, if worked upon, afford others." And of course "the entrance of the forêt de Soignies" is a description for Mont-Saint-Jean and the Waterloo battle field. -- PBS (talk) 10:22, 29 September 2010 (UTC)

Also See this 1815 post battle account: "Battle of Waterloo; or, Correct narrative of the late sanguinary conflict on ..." by W. A. Scott (Lieutenant-General), p 149 (footnotes): "'The position of Waterloo,' says Lord Bathurst in the House of Lords, 'was one well known to his Grace. In the summer of last year, his Grace went there in his way to Paris, and on that occasion he took a military view of it.— He then declared, that if ever it should be his fortune to defend Brussels, Waterloo would be the position he would occupy'."

So the information has been common knowledge since shortly after the battle, even though the dispatches were not published until later. -- PBS (talk) 19:30, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Casualties 2

Since no one's piped in the issue regarding allied casualties, I suggest 22,000-24,000 dead, wounded or captured. But the current citation is incorrect, as Barbero states there were 24,000 allied casualties, so this needs to be changed. -- Guard Chasseur (talk) 05:45, 13 October 2010 (UTC)

Plagiarism Concern

As I have been doing some research on the Battle of Waterloo, I have been checking out a number of sites and have become a bit concerned that much of this article was seemed to mirror that from http://www.battleofwaterloo.org/ including the organization, format and content. In just comparing the introductions of each, I was struck by the extreme similarities in verbiage, sequencing and even quotes. In addition, I did not see the site credited as a reference. I am not trying to cause trouble as much as just raise a concern. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 173.58.108.134 (talk) 07:38, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

Yes, similarity is striking, but considering that this article has grown organically, and actually uses better English, ( When Napoleon was returned to power in 1815, plenty of states had opposed his comeback. Since then, the Seventh Coalition was formed and armies began to mobilize. There are two huge forces assembled near the northeast border of France. These forces were under the command of Blucher and Wellington. Napoleon had planned to attack the said forces before they can unite with the other members of the Coalition in coordination of France invasion.) I get the inpression that that page is more than likely taken from our text, via a translator into and back out of another language. Thanks for bringing it to our notice, but I think we are safe. IdreamofJeanie (talk) 08:11, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

I wrote most of the Prussian sections and most of the last section, back years ago. You may look at the history of the article to see this. Since that time I have seen this article reproduced verbatim and with changes while not being attributed. It will not the be 1st time I've seen my own writing here staring me back in the face under someone else's name. We are public domain and it comes with the Territory. I've been involved with this article over the last 4 years and watched it grow.Tirronan (talk) 15:22, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

Well I looked, that is my writing and of the others here, the only Plagiarism is on that website, and yes it has been translated from another language at back.--Tirronan (talk) 20:47, 18 October 2010 (UTC)

Anglo-Allied?

considering that there were just as many allies troops at this battle as there were British, why does this article use the term "anglo allied" to refer to Wellington's army? Or does that reflect that it had a British commander? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Voucherman (talk • contribs) 19:52, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

Actually 2/3's of it was from other nations, but it sounds better than the Anglo,Dutch, Belgium,Kassle Hessian,Nassau, ect. I'm sure you get the point.Tirronan (talk) 20:08, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

but doesn't that put unfair emphasis on the British contribution? Voucherman (talk) 20:31, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

It doesn't really matter as the phrase is in use in essentially all English language publications concerning the battle, and an encylopaedic article must reflect this. It is arguable that in the absence of the British contribution (and many of the "Anglo" soldiers were Irish or Scots) the army would not have existed at all.Urselius (talk) 22:33, 1 December 2010 (UTC)

Usage of 'Belgian' prior to 1830.

This article (a very interesting read by the way) makes use of the term 'Belgian' prior to 1830 (the establishment of Belgium) therefore I have some questions. As far as I can see, this article uses 'Belgian' in two senses.

1. To refer to the troops fielded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands as a whole.
2. To refer to certain divisions fielded by said Kingdom which are claimed to have borne this name.

Could someone please provide a citation for the second use, with the addition of what is precisely to be understood by 'Belgian' here? As for the first use. Belgians are not an ethnicity, nor were they a nation at this time. So using wording like the 'Dutch-Belgian troops' for the Royal Dutch Army at Waterloo is like using 'English-Scottish-Welsh-Irish troops' for the British army. With the exception that those actually were defined groups of people at the time.

Could someone please tell me, why this wording was chosen? Cheers, G.Burggraaf (talk) 15:08, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

I am probably one of the least sensitive editors on this article about the usage of names. That being said there are readers out there and a few editors as well that are very sensitive about naming conventions. There are other editors that are far more knowledgeable about the Dutch-Belgian units than I, but some of those units were indeed designated as Belgian. If you want to start a edit war insisting on certain naming conventions that appeal to you for whatever (assuming good) reason is just about certain to cause one. I'd prefer not to start such things over names. We had a Russian Editor that decided that English names for Battles were far too lax and proceeded to rename battles to more reflect the proper (Russian) convention. Now it was all done in good faith mind you but the howls were deafening and I laughed so hard my sides were hurting. Just be aware that the naming conventions used on this article are the common ones and probably best left as is in most cases.Tirronan (talk) 18:01, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

If there were regiments called "Belgian Xth" then by all means, they should be referred to as such. However, if confusion has or can arise from the other uses of 'Belgian' in this article/time, then it should be either changed or explained to avoid it being seen as an anachronism.G.Burggraaf (talk) 18:13, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Contemporary accounts make the distinction: for example see the 1815 account "Battle of Waterloo; or, Correct narrative of the late sanguinary conflict on ..." by W. A. Scott (Lieutenant-General.) p. 150. -- PBS (talk) 19:04, 31 December 2010 (UTC)

Allied or Coalition's Army

Being the british less than 1/3 of the allied army, I suggest a more democratic name than anglo-allies.

See http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/Waterloo_myths_2.html#_Peter_Hofschroer_explains_why_Waterloo_is_German_victory -Ilhador- (talk) 06:29, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

See above #Anglo-Allied?. -- PBS (talk) 07:55, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Also, even if the size of the British Army was small most of the other powers were only able to field their own troops due to varying levels of British financial aid. Therefore the number of soldiers provided by the British is not a true measure of the importance of the British contribution to the war against Napoleon or to the Waterloo campaign in particular.— Preceding unsigned comment added by Urselius (talk • contribs) 09:16, 2 February 2011

I wrote the initial sections about the Prussian involvement, over some stiff objections, so I don't think anyone is going to call me an Anglophile. However, the British did organize, help equip, and led that army, Anglo-Allied is close enough.Tirronan (talk) 16:34, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Hougoumont

The last edit, by User: Guard Chasseur is correct in my opinion. From what I've read, there seems to be no direct evidence indicating Napoleon's intentions with regards to the Hougoumont attack. Several authors (inc. Jean-Claude Damamme) state that it was Prince Jerome who took the initiative to storm the position. The Emperor habitually delegated battlefield tactic detail to his subordinates and Damamme speculates that, although General Reille was Jerome's commander, he did not order him to stop, since he was the Emperor's brother. Anyway, all that aside, the Emperor's initial orders were that Reille's IInd Corps was to advance in order to keep itself in line with d'Erlon's I Corps, which was preparing its main attack against Wellington's left. So, yes, good edit.--Alexandru Demian (talk) 08:41, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

So in your opinion all credit goes to Napoleon for his brilliant decisions and all damnation falls on his subordinates for their mistakes, because they were the cause of his defeat and downfall. This is the standard Napoleon apologists stance and often coupled to the piles distraction.

I have reinstated the deleted text as it is not exactly OR or a small minority view -- as a Google book search of Waterloo "battle within a battle" shows. To save time I simply took the first book returned that had a full page of text and that states it was a diversionary attack, but there are many more. -- PBS (talk) 11:41, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Napoleon apologists are, in my opinion, just as lame as Napoleon bashers. I am interested in historical accuracy. I don't rule out the Hougoumont attack as a diversion theory. FYI, I wrote the battle of Waterloo Featured article on Romanian wikipedia from scratch and, given the sources I had then (3-4 years back), I too stated that it was a diversionary attack, a statement that is in the article today. Some of my more recent reading has made unsure about this, although I still accept it as a possibility. I do think that Napoleon has made some critical errors at Waterloo, including errors about choosing some of his commanders and staff and other decisions. But these errors were mostly at the level of grand strategy, which was usually his only major preoccupation in a battle. I'll do some research about this in a while. Best regards, --Alexandru Demian (talk) 22:59, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Diversion or not, no definite statement about the purpose of Reille's offensive, given that we have no idea what went through Napoleon's head that day. Guard Chasseur (talk) 10:25, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

We don't have to know went through Napoleon's head that day. We only have to summarise what reliable sources state about the attack. -- PBS (talk) 10:52, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

It would be interesting to know what Bonaparte had to say in Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France en 1815, avec le plan de la bataille de Mont-Saint-Jean why he chose to attack Hugomont before any other position. -- PBS (talk) 11:18, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

So long as there is good citation we can certainly accommodate it. I am not at all certain that it is correct, most of my reading seems to incline towards Jerome's decision, as with the calvary charge being ordered by the calvary reserve commander. In one sense however both of you are correct, both Napoleon and Ney watched the events without much of a comment and regardless Napoleon bears responsibility for the conduct of his commanders under his direct command. One of the constants with this battle will remain, Napoleon in his memories blames those around him for the defeat, he made no mistakes whatsoever. Groucy paid dearly for that and to this day I hear the same old crap, so regardless of what sub-commander actually ordered said attack, Napoleon allowed it when he could have and probably should have intervened, it is still his fault.Tirronan (talk) 12:30, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

(outdent)I wanted to expound on this just a bit, this battle and the Battle of Borodino share some of the same issues in that there were characters involved that deliberately skewed the truth to preserve their reputations. It colors and confuses the battle just as it does in the other history. Through out this series of battles (remember that the Battle of Wavre was going on at the same time with some 50,500 troops, and this battle was influenced by the Battle of Ligny 2 days before) is characterized by the decisions of independent decisions of sub-commanders throughout. Wellington didn't make a huge blunder, in not concentrating... Napoleon didn't make a mistake in leaving Groucy too far away to support... you get my drift here with self serving commentary after the fact that has colored the battle to this day. I never understood how so many Russian's got the truth of the Battle of Borodino wrong until I really looked at the history of the histories, yes the dreaded Historiography, of the Battle to understand the mountain of lies propagated from day 1 of that battle. The argument here is a reflection of the lies of the past. I would suggest that we consider a section on the Historiography were this can be explained in detail.Tirronan (talk) 15:26, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

There are two sides to the Goumont attack, as far as the French are concerned:

• Napoleon's intention. Historian Jacques Logie states that there is only one written note indicating Napoleon's orders to his Corps commanders that morning. It states (I am translating from French): "As soon as the entire army will be deployed for battle, at around 1300 hours, after the Emperor will give the order to Marshal Ney, the attack will begin, in order to gain control of the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, where the crossroads lie. To that effect, the 12-pounder batteries of the IInd Corps and those of the VIth Corps will be reunited with those of the Ist Corps. The 24 cannons will open fire on the troops of Mont-Saint-Jean, and Count d'Erlon will commence his attack by taking forward his leftmost division and supporting it, according to circumstances, with the other divisions of the Ist Corps. The IInd Corps will will move forward at the same time, in order to keep itself aligned with the Ist Corps. The sapper companies of the Ist Corps will get ready to barricade themselves immediately at Mont-Saint-Jean". A Post Scriptum signed by Marshal Ney is added, saying: "Count d'Erlon must take note of the fact that it is on the left rather than on the right that that the attack will begin. Communicate this news to General Reille."

I thus draw the following conclusions:

• Napoleon's objective was to take the village of Mt Saint-Jean, which was actually behind Wellington's line, which was, as authors say, unknown to Napoleon.
• d'Erlon's attack was the main one. Reille was to keep himself in line with him.
• d'Erlon's objective was NOT to turn and roll up Wellington's flank (like Davout had done against Rosenberg-Orsini at Wagram) but rather to try and pierce his centre with one division, by taking Mt Saint-Jean and then fixing Wellington's left wing. d'Erlon was free to organise his attack, by choosing to engage his other 3 divisions as he saw fit, according to battlefield developments.
• Ney added a PS, emphasizing that d'Erlon's attack must begin on the left and Reille had to act accordingly to support him. It

• The execution. From the written orders, we can clearly see how the Emperor was delegating tactical detail, in order to allow his commanders to make the best tactical decisions, based on battlefield developments. The orders for the IInd Corps are extremely brief, but Napoleon had had a long discussion with Reille and Jerome that very morning. In the written order, there is no mention of a diversionary attack on Hougoumont, although Logie speculates that this was one. Not Barbero... I now have several sources stating that the intention of Reille (and maybe Napoleon) was to simply take the woods at Hougoumont, in order to protect the flank of d'Erlon and to allow him to pivot on Reille's Corps, as he pushed back Wellington's flank. It was however Jerome's uninspired initiative to try and take the "castle", which was not a part of Napoleon's orders and resulted in unnecessarily high losses.

In conclusion, I do agree with Tirronan that we should have a Historiography section. I also think that we should add more flesh to the section explaining the Hougoumont attack.--Alexandru Demian (talk) 23:19, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

In all fairness I believe that both points should be covered there is certainly enough support for it.Tirronan (talk) 23:26, 6 February 2011 (UTC)

Initially, the main attack was directed at the left flank rather than the centre. It is possible that Napoleon envisaged some form of double envelopment of Wellington's forces (Reille's men were supposed to remain abreast with those of d'Erlon's). But given that the allied forces were hidden behind the ridge, Napoleon needed to unmask the enemy's positions.

At around 4:00, Napoleon moved to attack Wellington's centre. Such a move required him to take La Haye Sainte but also Hougoumont. These two positions controlled the ridge masking the allied army. Hougoumont protected the allied right-centre, and some strategic heights overlooking the allied army (from which Napoleon could advance his artillery as he had done after the fall of La Haye Sainte).

Given that Napoleon ordered Jerome to take Hougoumont 'at all costs' (supposedly), that he personally ordered artillery to set fire to Hougoumont's defences, and that he had a clear view of the movements of his left flank, I highly doubt that the Hougoumont offensive was a diversion. Additionally, Hougoumont was positioned on the forward slope; only a totally ignorant general would expose his troops in order to defend the village. More likely, Napoleon was remaining open to a variety of possibilities by attacking Hougoumont (makes sense, considering that he couldn't make out Wellington's positions), but redoubled his efforts to take the village when he moved against the allied centre.

But by all means list the different points of view. Guard Chasseur (talk) 02:18, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

Left is mentioned here a lot. Who's left? From the French view Hougoumont was to the left of La Haye Sainte. From d'Erlon's part of the front left was probably slightly to the left of La Haye Sainte but close to the centre of Wellington's front.

AD, you write "Napoleon's intention. Historian Jacques Logie states that there is only one written note indicating Napoleon's orders to his Corps commanders that morning." There are also post battle memoirs such as Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire ..." to cover intention.

AD you also claim "Napoleon's objective was to take the village of Mt Saint-Jean, which was actually behind Wellington's line, which was, as authors say, unknown to Napoleon." While Napoleon may not have know precisely where Wellington's lines were he must have known that they were in front of the village! For two reasons, he had scouts (if he could not see Wellington's forward deployments) and if Wellington was not deployed in front of the village of Mont-Saint-Jean his criticism of Wellington deploying with a forest to his back would not would not be pertinent as village of Mont-Saint-Jean (not the farmhouse) was close to the edge of the Forêt de Soignes.

AD you wrote "in order to protect the flank of d'Erlon and to allow him to pivot on Reille's Corps, as he pushed back Wellington's flank." But if d'Erlon was attacking on his left he would not be pushing Wellington's flank back, but punching through the centre straight up the Charleroi-Brussels road to Mont-Saint-Jean, so while Reille's Corps (if it were able to advance up the escarpment which was quite steep behind Hougoumont) would be protecting his flanks, there would be no pivoting.

GC I agree with you that Hougoumont lay in front of some strategic heights but it is unlikely to have been a direct path (because they were heights), more likely if Hougoumont had fallen two options were open to the attackers an attack the French left (Allied right) of the Charleroi-Brussels road to support d'Erlon or an attack further left up the Nivelles road. BUT as Hougoumont did not fall, but La Haye Sainte did and the French did attack the centre I do not see how you can say that "to attack Wellington's centre. Such a move required him to take La Haye Sainte but also Hougoumont". Not sure about your comment "only a totally ignorant general would expose his troops in order to defend the village" Wellington's use of the reverse slope was not that well understood (or more generals of the era would have used the tactic to negate French field artillery and confuse their advances) and besides Napoleon did not rate the Sepoy General.

This article is already too large, so I think that details about Hougoumont should go into that article. If we are going to have a historiography section then it has to be a short overview for an article about the historiography of the Battle of Waterloo because there has probably been more written about this one battle than all of the other of the Napoleonic wars put together and trying to write a neutral summary of the the historiography without it being too larger for this article would be very difficult -- PBS (talk) 22:08, 8 February 2011 (UTC)

PBS, Napoleon did speak about it in St. Helena. I remember reading that he said something about fixing Wellington's attention on Hougoumont, but this is a post factum statement and might actually have not been his true intention on the morning of the battle. The maps the French had available actually provided surprisingly little information about the Hougoumont complex and led one to believe that it was a village rather than a great farmhouse with several adjacent buildings. In any case, although the farmhouse is visible on the site of the battlefield today (from where the French stood), it was, at the time of the battle, completely hidden by the treeline of the park. Napoleon did not know that he was dealing with a mighty, fortified farmhouse, surrounded by a perimeter wall.

Second thing: Whatever was Napoleon's intelligence on the morning of the battle, there were elements suggesting that Wellington might move his line back to the village Mt.-St.-Jean, where he could make his stand. General Haxo, commanding the Sappers of the Guard, reconnoitered a sector of the battlefield and reported that no earthworks had been carried out, and Marshal Ney also went on an early morning mission and came back convinced that Wellington was about to retreat.

As for the third thing, d'Erlon had received verbal instructions during the morning conference. He was probably instructed to take his divisions up in echelon, with his right leading and turn Wellington's flank. Napoleon then had a change of heart, thus the written order and Ney's Post Scriptum emphasis that the attack should begin on the left, rather than on the right. Had d'Erlon pierced Wellington's centre at La Haye Sainte, he would have virtually isolated the Anglo-Allied weak left, which the other divisions of d'Erlon would have pushed back. With Reille in control of what looked like a village surrounded by a small forest, d'Erlon could then safely pivot on this position, going northwest. Note that there is virtually no indication that d'Erlon was aiming to outflank the Anglo-Allied left. Whatever was the plan, there was surely nothing definitive about it on the morning of the battle. There were just too many unknown elements and things that could go wrong... as they actually did. One facet of Napoleon's battlefield genius resided in the fact that he remained open to all possibilities ("I pity the general who comes on a field of battle with a predefined system.").

Nevertheless, since there is some debate about this and the article is already long enough, as you say, I'm more than happy to focus on other articles, which need more urgent attention than this one.--Alexandru Demian (talk) 10:34, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

"Wellington's use of the reverse slope was not that well understood (or more generals of the era would have used the tactic to negate French field artillery and confuse their advances) and besides Napoleon did not rate the Sepoy General". Napoleon understood the effectiveness of Wellington's reverse slopes. He was surrounded by people who had faced the duke in the past and himself used reverse slopes (admitedly, not in the same way that Wellington did and not for quite the same purpose). I don't believe reverse slope tactics originated with Wellington either. As for "Napoleon did not rate the Sepoy General", I disagree; he had praised the duke on several occasions (ok, this is getting off topic).

The article need not go into depth about Reille's siege of Hougoumont. However, it's worth mentioning that in a classic Napoleonic battle Napoleon would pin the enemy frontally and allow him to draw in his reserves, after which he would launch a flank attack against the enemy's line of communications. Such a move would force the enemy to draw his reserves back to defend his flank, thereby destroying the 'equilibrium' in the enemy's front line, leaving Napoleon in the position to launch his reserves at the breach created in the enemy's front.

At Waterloo, Napoleon evidently expected the attack to begin on his left, at Hougoumont. In taking Hougoumont, Wellington would be forced to bring in his reserves to defend right flank. Had this happened, Napoleon would have been able to launch d'Erlon against the duke's weak left flank, seizing Mont St Jean. Wellington's reserves would have been diverted to defend his line of communications with Brussels, allowing Napoleon to launch his reserves against Wellington's weakened right flank. Such a move would have trapped and destroyed the bulk of the allied army. It is likely that Napoleon envisaged such a course of action.

Of course, the arrival of the Prussians would have upset this plan, forcing Napoleon to prematurely attack Wellington's left (Prussian presence was detected early on), before Hougoumont had fallen and Reille had pinned Wellington's right. Blucher drew Napoleon's reserves away from the battle and prevented him from manoeuvring. Thus, all Wellington was facing throughout the battle was Napoleon's pinning attacks (except the middle guard's assault).

This is purely hypothetical, but it illustrates how Napoleon might have desired to take Hougoumont and at the same time divert Wellington's reserves. Guard Chasseur (talk) 23:33, 12 February 2011 (UTC)

Way off topic but... strategically it made sense for Bonaparte to force Wellington to retreat along his lines of communication away from the Prussians. Breaking through Wellington's left flank would have achieved this. However talking a couple of years after the Battle Wellington said that if he had had to retreat he would have retreated with the bulk of his army towards the Prussians, leaving his right flank to retreat towards the Channel (Chesney, Charles C. (1997). Waterloo Lectures. London: Greenhill Books. Rep Sub edition. ISBN 1-85367-288-2. Preface to the Third Edition (March 13, 1847) page xii). This of course would have been a daring strategy, and not the sort of thing that Wellington is noted for. But of course in the long run if the Prussian army had stayed in the field, with the first Russian army only weeks away, it is a Coalition strategy that could have worked, although I doubt that there would have been 12 field marshal batons in it. -- PBS (talk) 01:15, 13 February 2011 (UTC)

That's quite interesting. I'm not sure I believe Wellington, considering the weakness in his left flank and the difficulty to retreat through the forest of Soignes. And the bulk of Wellington's troops were concentrated on his right and centre. I'm not sure what the move would have achieved in the long run, given that a great part of the allied army would have retreated to the sea.

In the hypothetical battle I've mentioned above, Napoleon would indeed have cut the Anglo-allies from the Prussians. However, it's unlike Napoleon to not be thinking of decisive victory; an assault against Wellington's left would not achieve this. To defeat Wellington's army in detail, Napoleon's reserves would have marched against Wellington's right while d'Erlon cut the British off from the Prussians (trapping the bulk of Wellington's army in the process).

Anyway, this definitely is getting off track. All we can say is that Napoleon remained open to a number of possibilities by attacking Hougoumont. Guard Chasseur (talk) 04:39, 13 February 2011 (UTC)

British vets

Do we know why so few vets from Spain and Portugal were present for this final campaign? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.8.192.142 (talk) 17:16, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

I believe a lot of the British units had been sent to America for the end of the War of 1812 and various operations in the West Indies. I don't have a source for that to hand, but I definitely remember reading that somewhere. rpeh •T•C•E• 19:11, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

About 30,000 were sent to the America's where they participated in the Battle of Platsburg, The Burning of Washington, the Battle of Baltimore, and the Battle of New Orleans. In fact General Packingham was the Duke's brother in law and served under him in Portugal. He died on the field in New Orleans.Tirronan (talk) 21:05, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Thanks guys! Should this info prehaps be added to a small note somewhere near the mention of the vets in the article? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.8.192.142 (talk) 23:10, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

It's definitely worth mentioning (I believe Wellington complained about the situation) but it needs proper sourcing. rpeh •T•C•E• 23:14, 3 April 2011 (UTC)

Commander in Chief

The Prince of Orange was not a commander in chief. Look at William II of the Netherlands, where he is clearly identified as the commander of I Corps. That makes him subordinate to Wellington, and even if he was commander of the Dutch forces, it was Wellington who was commander in chief, and who therefore gets the entry in the infobox. rpeh •T•C•E• 10:25, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

Nobody says he was. He was commander in chief of the Netherlands troops taking part in the battle, which were one of the substantial allied contingents in the battle, and as such should be, in my opinion, represented in the infobox.

I don't want to disrupt Wikipedia to illustrate my point, but removing of William makes the same sense as if someone would try to remove Blücher, arguing that as he was subordinated to Wellington (an overall C-i-C of the allied armies in Netherlands), being solely a commander in chief (of the Royal Prussian Army of the Lower Rhein), and therefore non-necessary to include in the infobox.78.128.177.136 (talk) 11:08, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

No, that would be an entirely different matter. Wellington and Blucher commanded two different armies, and although they operated together, there was no unified command structure. Orange's command was part of Wellington's command, which is why it doesn't make sense to call him a commander in chief.

Take a look at the Order of Battle. The Allied and Prussian commands are listed separately, but I Corps is part of the Allied army. Yes, I know I've cited WP twice in my arguments, but it's all adequately sourced elsewhere - this is just quicker. rpeh •T•C•E• 11:26, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

William was commanding Netherlands army troops present at the Waterloo. I believe that as a representant of one of the Allied nations he should be mentioned in the infobox, as the Template:Infobox military conflict clearly specifies "commanders of the military forces involved", with no particular limitation on operational armies commanders.

I do not refute that William was operationally commanding only a corps - as anyone who reads my contributions to the discussion can readily find out.78.128.177.136 (talk) 07:53, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

p.s.:Are you completely sure the Allies were really stupid and did not posses any unified chain of command? 78.128.177.136 (talk) 07:53, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but there's a clear consensus here that William is not going to be added to the infobox. As you say, it's for the commanders of the military forces involved, and there were precisely three armies at Waterloo: the French, the Allied and the Prussian. By your logic we should be adding the commanders of the troops from Belgium, Hannover, Nassau and Brunswick to the box too.

And yes, I'm completely sure there was no unified chain of command for the Allied and Prussian armies. That's why Wellington and Blucher exchanged messages to keep each other informed about what their armies were doing rather than having one person order both armies to conform. There's a huge difference between a common strategic goal and a unified command chain. rpeh •T•C•E• 08:00, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

Yes, consensus is consensus.

They were three field armies at the Waterloo - Armée du Nord, Niederrhein-Armee and the Anglo-Batavian Army, but the Anglo-Batavian was composed from forces of several nations, one of which was the Netherlands.

As far as my logic is concerned, perhaps only the inclusion Duke of Brunswick would be necessary.78.128.177.136 (talk) 08:09, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

p.s.: If I can illustrate my point by example rather than by words, so easily twisted by my honourable opponents here- at Trafalgar Spanish admiral Gravina was -without a slightest doubt - subordinated to French admiral Villeneuve, who was C-i-C of the Franco-Spanish Fleet, yet Gravina is included in the infobox. Are you going to remove him, just because he hadn't held an independent command? 78.128.177.136 (talk) 08:19, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

OTHERSTUFFEXISTS is not an acceptable argument. rpeh •T•C•E• 08:50, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

Can you specify why you believe my example invalid? Thanks.-78.128.177.136 (talk) 08:53,

22 April 2011 (UTC)

The c-in-c of the army of the United Netherlands was the king not Prince William. The king was not present, and William was subordinate to Wellington. If you add William then you also have to add General Hill, and all the French Corps commanders - viz Ney (commanding one wing of the French army), D'Erlon, Reille, Lobau, Milhaud etc. the command box then becomes entirley ludicrous. We have been here before. Take the hint.Urselius (talk) 20:54, 20 April 2011 (UTC)

I didn't say he was, did I? My point is/was (with the possible exception of one edit summary) and will be that he was commander of the Netherlands contingent taking part in the battle.78.128.177.136 (talk) 07:53, 22 April 2011 (UTC)

The Prussian Army didn't report to Wellington neither did it's 1st Corp, its command structure was wholly separate and operated as a separate command both before, during, and after, the battle. None of this maybe said of the Dutch command. That being said, despite some horrible old English histories assertions, the Dutch forces contributions were beyond all expectations.Tirronan (talk) 03:52, 21 April 2011 (UTC)

I think you're misunderstanding the argument. The comment about the Prussian army was to show that they were separate commands, and I wasn't talking about the Prussian I Corps, I was talking about the Allied I Corps, commanded by William of Orange. Neither has anybody said anything negative about the Dutch and Belgian troops that took place in the battle. rpeh •T•C•E• 07:31, 21 April 2011 (UTC)

I think this discussion insn't even worth having, as things are very clear : there were two armies present - one under Blucher, one under Wellington. There was no unified command structure for the 2 armies, whose commanders needed to cooperate if they wanted to beat Napoleon. Each army was composed of various Corps. If we add one Corps commander, we need to add in the others. Let alone Ney, who was de facto field commander for much of the French army during much of the battle. Neither can one say that William's command extended to all the Dutch-Belgian forces in Wellington's army. Remember Prince Frederick's 17,000-men Dutch-Belgian contingent that Wellington left at Hal, for fear that Napoleon might manoeuvre against his communications? They were not subordinated to William but to Wellington. Best,--Alexandru Demian (talk) 08:02, 21 April 2011 (UTC)

The discussion was essentially over: I started it because an IP user added William to the Infobox and reinstated it twice when it was removed. I think I'd already proved the point that all the rest of us are trying to make - it's just that other people are finding new ways of saying the same thing. rpeh •T•C•E• 08:15, 21 April 2011 (UTC)