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Battle of Magdhaba

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Battle of Magdhaba
Part of Sinai and Palestine Campaign
Painting of soldiers on camels in desert
Camel corps at Magdhaba by H.S. Power, 1925
Date23 December 1916
Location
Sinai peninsula, Egypt
Result British Empire victory
Belligerents
 British Empire
 Australia
 New Zealand
 Ottoman Empire Ottoman Empire
Commanders and leaders
Australia Harry Chauvel Ottoman Empire Khadir Bey
Strength
3 mounted brigades
1 camel brigade		 2,000
Casualties and losses
22 dead
121 wounded		 97 dead
300 wounded
1,282 prisoners

The Battle of Magdhaba (officially known by the British as the Affair of Magdhaba) took place on 23 December 1916 south and east of Bir Lahfan in the Sinai desert, some 18–25 miles (29–40 km) inland from the Mediterranean coast and the town of El Arish.[1][Note 1] This British Empire victory against an isolated Ottoman Empire garrison, secured the town of El Arish during the Sinai and Palestine Campaign of World War I.

In August, a joint Ottoman and German Empire Army had been forced to retreat back to Bir el Abd, after the British Empire victory at the Battle of Romani. Subsequently the defeated force retired further eastwards to El Arish, while the captured territory stretching from the Suez Canal was consolidated and garrisoned by the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. Patrols and reconnaissances were carried out by the British Empire force to protect the continuing construction of the railway and water pipeline and to deny other ways across the Sinai desert to the Ottoman forces by destroying water cisterns and wells.

By December, construction of the infrastructure had sufficiently progressed to enable the Allied advance to recommence during the evening of 20 December. By the following morning, the mounted force had reached El Arish to find it abandoned. A strong Ottoman Army garrison in a defensive position was located at Magdhaba, some 18–30 miles (29–48 km) inland to the south east (on the Wadi el Arish). After a second night march by the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the attack on Magdhaba was launched by Australian, British and New Zealand mounted troops, against a well-entrenched Ottoman force defending a series of six redoubts. During the day's fierce fighting, the mounted infantry tactics prevailed (riding as close to the front line as possible and then dismounting to make their attack with the bayonet supported by artillery and machine guns), assisted by aircraft reconnaissances. All the well-camoflaged redoubts were eventually located and captured and the Ottoman defenders surrendered in the late afternoon.

Background

Map of the Sinai from the Suez Canal zone to Rafa when the railway reached Bir el Mazar

At the beginning of the First World War, the Egyptian police controlling the Sinai Peninsula had withdrawn, leaving the area largely unprotected. In February 1915, a German and Ottoman force unsuccessfully attacked the Suez Canal.[2] After the Gallipoli Campaign a second joint German and Ottoman force again advanced across the Sinai Peninsula to threaten the Suez Canal during July 1916. This force was defeated at the Battle of Romani in early August after which the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division under the command of Major General Henry Chauvel had pushed the Ottoman Army's Desert Force commanded by Kress von Kressenstein out of Bir el Abd and across the Sinai desert to El Arish.[3][4]

Laying the railway across the Sinai

By mid-September 1916 the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division had pursued the retreating Ottoman Army from Bir el Abd along the northern route across the Sinai Peninsula to the outpost at Bir el Mazar. The Maghara Hills, in the interior of the Sinai Peninsula, were also attacked in mid-October by a British force based on the Suez Canal. Although not captured at the time, all these positions were eventually abandoned by their Ottoman garrisons in the face of growing British strength.[5]

Consolidation of British territorial gains

Along the British lines of communication, which stretched across the Sinai from the Suez Canal, garrisons were established. Patrols and reconnaissances were regularly carried out to protect the continuing advance of the railway and water pipeline, built by the Egyptian Labour Corps.[5] These supply lines were marked by railway stations and sidings, airfields, signal installations and standing camps where troops could be accommodated in tents and huts. At this time the Egyptian Expeditionary Force had a ration strength of 156,000 British Empire troops, plus 13,000 Egyptian labourers in the Egyptian Labour Corps.[6]

Ottoman positions in the Sinai

Distant view of Hafir el Aujah, Ottoman desert base
Ottoman military town of Hafir el Aujah, principal desert base

Ottoman operations in the Sinai were sustained and supported by their principal desert base at Hafir El Auja, located on the Ottoman Empire side of the Egyptian frontier. El Auja was linked to Beersheba, Gaza, northern Palestine and the Ottoman Empire by road and railway.[7][8][Note 2]

This was the major Ottoman garrison in the Sinai and supplied and supported smaller garrisons in the area with reinforcements, ammunition and rations, medical support, and periods of rest periods away from the front line. If left intact, the Ottoman forces at El Arish, Magdhaba and El Auja could seriously threaten the British advance along the north route towards the Egyptian frontier with the Ottoman Empire.[9][10][Note 3]

Problems of an advance to El Arish

Water

Map of Magdhaba and surrounding area
Keogh's Map 3 shows the desert – Magdhaba and the railway from Auja to Beersheba.

The area of oases which extended from Dueidar, 15 miles (24 km) from Kantara along the Darb es Sultani (the old caravan route), and on to Salmana 52 miles (84 km) from Kantara could sustain life. But from Salmana to Bir el Mazar, (75 miles (121 km) from Kantara) there was little water, and beyond the Mazar area there was no water, till El Arish was reached on the coast 95 miles (153 km) from Kantara.[11]

Before the British advance to El Arish could begin this absence of a water supply between El Mazar and El Arish had to be addressed. The countryside within 20 miles (32 km) of El Arish was thoroughly explored, and all wells tested and noted; by mid-December, the pipeline's eastward progress made it possible to store sufficient water at Maadan (Kilo. 128). By this time, it was also possible to concentrate sufficiently large numbers of Egyptian Camel Transport Corps camels and camel-drivers to carry water forward in support of the attacking force.[12][13][14]

Conditions

Photograph of desert tent, mounted soldiers and camels
German station at Abou Augeileh

The campaign across the Sinai desert required great determination (as well as conscientious attention to detail by all involved) to ensure that ammunition, rations and every pint of water and bale of horse fodder required was available when needed. The British Empire base was some 30 miles (48 km) to the west of El Arish; almost at the limits of their lines of communication). Mounted operations so far from base in such barren country were extremely hazardous and difficult.[Note 4]

For long-range desert operations, it was necessary for all supplies to be well-organised and suitably packaged for transportation on camels (moving with the column or following closely behind). It was vital, also, that the soldiers were well trained for these conditions. If a man was left behind in the inhospitable Sinai he might die in the burning desert sun during the day or bitter cold at night. If a water bottle was accidentally tipped up or leaked, it could mean no water for its owner for perhaps 24 hours in those extreme temperatures.[15]

Nevertheless, mounted troops worked to provide protective screens for the construction of the infrastructure, patrolling the newly occupied areas and carrying out reconnaissance to augment aerial photographs used to improve maps of the newly-occupied areas.[16] In one instance the Australian Flying Corps carried out detailed reconnaissance in the area of El Kossaima, Hafir el Auja and Abu Aweigila on 15 November, when 24 photographs of all camps and dumps were taken.[17]

British War Office policy

The British War Office's stated policy in October 1916 was to maintain offensive operations on the Western Front while remaining on the defensive everywhere else.[18] However, the battle of attrition on the Somme, coupled with a change of Britain's Prime Minister; David Lloyd George succeeded Herbert Asquith on 7 December, all influenced a policy reversal. Attacks on Germany's weak points away from the Western Front became desirable. Encouraged to seek success in the East without any reinforcements, the commander of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, General Archibald Murray thought that an advance to El Arish would heighten the threat to the southern Ottoman Empire and, if not prevent, at least slow the transfer of German and Ottoman units to other theatres of war.[19][6]

Eastern Force and Desert Column

After the victory at Romani, Lawrence (who had commanded No. 3 Section of the Suez Canal Defences) was transferred to the Western Front and Murray moved his headquarters back from Ismailia on the Canal to Cairo. This move was to enable Murray to be in a more central position to carry out his duties, as his responsibilities extended from the Western Frontier Force, waging the continuing campaign against the Senussi in the Egyptian Western Desert, to the Eastern Force in the Sinai Peninsula.[20][21][22]

During October, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell was appointed to command the newly-created Eastern Force.[23] With his headquarters at Kantara, Dobell became responsible for the security of the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula.[5]

Yesterday we were inspected by General Chauvel who is just back from his trip to England. We were all pleased to see him as he is well liked by both officers and men. A chap feels pretty safe with a leader like him. I saw him riding backwards and forwards under heavy fire at Romani and Bir-el-Abd and it seemed that he did not know what danger was. Now that he is back we don't think it will be long before we are at the Turks again.

Trooper Ingham[24]

Eastern Force consisted of the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division (commanded by Major General W. Douglas), the 52nd (Lowland) Division (commanded by Major General W. E. B. Smith), the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (commanded by Major General H. G. Chauvel), the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General E. A. Wiggin), the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General C. L. Smith).[25][26] Murray considered this force to be under strength by at least a division for an advance to Beersheba, but felt he could gain El Arish and form an effective base on the coast for further operations.[18][6]

Chauvel had been granted six weeks' leave, and he travelled to Britain on 25 October, returning to duty on 12 December 1916.[27] Five days before Chauvel's return, on 7 December 1916, Murray appointed the newly promoted Lieutenant General Phillip Chetwode commander of the newly-formed Desert Column. Chetwode had commanded cavalry on the Western Front, pursuing the retreating Germans after the First Battle of the Marne.[28] This new command structure of the Desert Column grouped the 53rd (Welsh) Infantry Division serving in the Suez Canal Defences) (commanded by A. E. Dallas), with the 42nd (East Lancashire) and 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Divisions, the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, the 5th Mounted Brigade and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.[28]

Prelude

By early December 1916 construction of the railway had reached the wells at Bir el Mazar which were the last water sources available to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force before El Arish. Bir el Mazar was about half way between Kantara on the Suez Canal and the Egyptian\Ottoman territorial border. At the time British intelligence reported Ottoman Army plans to strengthen the garrison at Magdhaba, by extending the railway south east from Beersheba (and Hafir el Auja) towards Magdhaba.[9][11]

Advance to El Arish

Mounted patrols to the outskirts of El Arish discovered 1,600 well-entrenched Ottoman troops holding the town, supported by forces based 25 miles (40 km) to the southeast on the banks of the Wadi el Arish at Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila.[6]

On 20 December, a week after Chauvel returned from leave, the advance to El Arish began when the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division left Bir Gympie at 21:45. They moved out without the 2nd Light Horse Brigade, which was in the rear assisting with the patrolling of the lines of communication, which now stretched 90 miles (140 km) back to Kantara on the Suez Canal.[Note 5] So it was the 1st and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade and the newly formed three battalions of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade with the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery of mountain guns which made the 20-mile (32 km) trek to El Arish.[29][30]

On the day they set out, Australian airmen reported that both the Maghara Hills (in the centre of the Sinai Peninsula) and the 1,600 strong Ottoman garrison at El Arish, appeared to have been evacuated.[31][32]

As the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division approached Um Zughla at 02:00 on 21 December a halt was called until 03:30, when the trek continued to El Arish and forward troops entered the town, unopposed, at 07:45 to make contact with the civil population and organise water supplies for the British Empire force. Only one prisoner was captured while lines of observation were set up, which maintained a close watch over the country east and south of El Arish. By 16:00 the 1st and 3rd Light Horse, New Zealand Mounted Rifles and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigades were in bivouac at El Arish, the only casualties during the day being two members of the 1st Light Horse Brigade, who were blown up by a stranded mine on the beach.[33]

Walled town of El Arish, with camel and men in foreground
View of El Arish

The day after El Arish was occupied, on 22 December, the leading brigade of the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division reached the town and, together with the 5th Mounted Yeomanry Brigade, provided a garrison which began fortifying the position.[34] At 10:00, Chetwode landed on the beach opposite the Australian and New Zealand Divisional Headquarters to begin his appointment as commander of Desert Column.[35][25] Chetwode reported that he had arranged a special camel convoy with rations and horse feed to arrive at El Arish at 16:30 that day, with a view to the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division advancing on Magdhaba, 18 miles (29 km) away. With essential rations organised, the division commanded by Chauvel marched out at 00:45 on the night of 22/23 December after reconnaissances had established the Ottoman force which had moved out of El Arish had moved to the south east along the Wadi el Arish. On 23 December, the first ship from Port Said landed supplies at El Arish.[28][25][30]

Ottoman force

Falls' Map 12 shows the Ottoman defences in green and Chauvel's attack in red

After their retreat from El Arish, the Ottoman garrison moved down the Wadi el Arish 25 miles (40 km) south east of El Arish, to Magdhaba and Abu Aweigila, about another 15 miles (24 km) further away from the coast, also on the banks of the wadi.[32] At Magdhaba the garrison had been increased from 500 to about 1,400 Ottoman soldiers; there may have been as many as 2,000, consisting of two battalions of the 80th Infantry Regiment (27th Infantry Division, attached to the 3rd Infantry Division for most of 1916). The 2nd Battalion, commanded by Izzet Bey (about 600 men) and the 3rd Battalion, commanded by Rushti Bey, were supported by a dismounted camel company. Two squads from the 80th Machine Gun Company were stationed at Magdhaba, while the remainder of the company had moved north to Shellal. The defending force was supported by a battery of four Krupp 7.5 cm Gebirgskanone M 1873 mountain guns on loan from the 1st Mountain Regiment, since the 80th Regiment's own artillery battery was stationed at Nekhl. Attached to the Ottoman garrison at Magdhaba were a number of military service units (including elements of the 3rd Company of the 8th Engineer Battalion, 27th Medical Company, 43rd Mobile Hospital and the 46th Cooking Unit). The garrison was commanded by Kadri Bey, commanding officer of the 80th Infantry Regiment.[36][37]

The first indications of the Ottoman Army's withdrawal from El Arish had been seen by Allied planes as early as 25 October so their retirement was not a sudden, panicked reaction. The series of well-situated and developed redoubts making up the Ottoman garrison position at Magdhaba, reflected considerable planning, as these were almost impossible to locate on the flat ground near the Wadi el Arish.[38][39]

These six fortified redoubts which were situated on both sides of the wadi, were linked by a series of entrenchments. The whole position extended over an area of about 2 miles (3.2 km) from east to west and was more narrow from north to south. They had been inspected the day before the attack (on 22 December 1916) by Kress von Kressenstein, commander of the Ottoman Desert Force, who drove from his base at Hafir el Auja. At the time he expressed satisfaction with the garrison's ability to withstand any assault.[4][40][Note 6]

Being about 40 miles (64 km) from the British railhead and 25 miles (40 km) from El Arish, Kress von Kressenstein probably did not think a force large enough to successfully attack the garrison, could be organised so quickly and be prepared to move to the attack, before their main force had established a supply base at El Arish. In this he underestimated the speed, flexibility and determination of the Australian, British and New Zealand forces.[41] They would also have been unaware of the arrival of a new British commander, Chetwode and his staff, and Chetwode's vital forward planning to organised the necessary logistical support for an immediate long range attack.[42]

British Empire force

The assault on Magdhaba was to be made by the 1st Light Horse Brigade (1st, 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Regiments), the 3rd Light Horse Brigade (8th, 9th and 10th Light Horse Regiments), the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (Auckland, Canterbury and Wellington Mounted Rifles Regiments), and the three battalions of Imperial Camel Corps Brigade. These regiments were supported by the Inverness and Somerset Batteries, Royal Horse Artillery, and the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery.[43][44][Note 7]

Diagram of troop deployment in the shape of a hand
Guard systems for marching column

Chauvel's mounted force moved out from El Arish just after midnight, following an unexpected delay caused by incoming columns of the 52nd (Lowland) Division, which crossed the long camel train carrying water. Nevertheless, the mounted division, (riding for 40 minutes, dismounting and leading their horse for ten minutes and halting for ten minutes every hour) reached the plain 4 miles (6.4 km) from Magdhaba, at about 05:00 on 23 December. The column had been successfully guided by brigade scouts, until the garrison's fires became visible for about an hour, indicating they did not expect an attacking force to set out on a second night march, so soon after the 30 miles (48 km) ride to El Arish.[25][40]

The attacking force was supported by the Royal Flying Corps 5th Wing stationed at Mustabig. This was a composite formation of the No. 14 (British) Squadron and the Australian Flying Corps's No. 1 Squadron (also known as No. 67 Australian Squadron). It was ordered to provide close air support, long-range scouting and long-range strategic bombing. One British and ten Australian planes had dropped a hundred bombs on Magdhaba on 22 December and during the battle they bombed and machine gunned the area, but targets were difficult to find.[45][46]

Battle

At 06:30 the No. 14 (British) Squadron and the Australian Flying Corps' No. 1 Squadron attacked the Ottoman defences, drawing some fire which revealed the locations of machine guns and trenches and five redoubts were identified. The redoubts were arranged around the village, which had the only water supply in the area. During the day pilots and their observers provided frequent reports (14 were received between 07:50 and 15:15) giving estimated positions, strength, and movements of the Ottoman garrison. These were most often given verbally by the observer, after the pilot landed near headquarters, as the aircraft did not at this time have wirelesses.[45][47]

Magdhaba, with camels in foreground
Magdhaba village

Following Chauvel's plan, a strongly enveloping action began.[48][49] The main attack (coming from the north and east) was made by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (commanded by Brigadier General Edward Chaytor), which moved in line of troop columns. They were supported by the 3rd Light Horse Brigade and machine gun squadrons armed with Vickers and Lewis machine guns, all under the command of Chaytor. Their attack began on the virtually featureless battleground (except for the village and the Wadi El Arish), when British Empire artillery opened fire at the same time as Chaytor's group moved towards the Ottoman garrison's right and rear.[50][51]

While being heavily fire on, some of the mounted troops found cover and dismounted about 1,600 yards (1.5 km) from the redoubts and entrenchments, while others got as close as 400 yards (0.37 km) before dismounting to attack on foot.[Note 8][50][51] At the same time, units of the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade were moving straight on Magdhaba, in a south easterly direction (following the telegraph line), and by 08:45 were slowly advancing on foot in line, followed by the 1st Light Horse Brigade, in reserve.[50][51]

Battle map of Magdhaba
Map of Magdhaba, showing Ottoman redoubts in green and attacking forces in red

At 09:25 Chaytor ordered a regiment to circle the entrenched positions and move through Aulad Ali to cut off the enemy's retreat to the south and south east. Brigadier General J. R. Royston (commander of 3rd Light Horse Brigade) led the 10th Light Horse Regiment with two sections of Machine Gun Squadron. This group succeeded in capturing Aulad Ali and 300 prisoners.[52]

Ottoman batteries and trenches at Magdhaba were difficult to locate, but by 10:00 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was advancing towards their firing line. At this time, an aerial report described small groups of the garrison beginning to retreat, and as a result the still-mounted reserve, the 1st Light Horse Brigade was ordered to move directly on the town, passing the dismounted Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units on their way. After meeting severe shrapnel fire as they trotted over the open plain, they were forced to take cover in the Wadi el Arish where they dismounted, continuing their advance at 10:30 against the Ottoman left. Meanwhile the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units continued their advance over the flat ground for 900 yards (820 m), section by section, covering fire provided by each section in turn.[47][50]

Cavalry at a distance
Advance of the 9th Light Horse Regiment (3rd L. H. Brigade)

By 12:00 all brigades were hotly engaged, as the 3rd Light Horse commenced a sweep round the garrison's right flank. An hour later the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units' right had advanced to reach the 1st Light Horse Brigade and 55 minutes later the fierce fighting was beginning to tell on the Ottoman garrison. There continued to be reports of small numbers of troops retreating, but by 14:15 the 10th Light Horse Regiment was moving across the Wadi el Arish, round Hill 345 to attack Redoubt No. 4. At 14:55 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade units were within 500 yards (460 m) of the Ottoman defences and, together with the 1st Light Horse Brigade, at 15:20 they attacked the garrison's No. 2 redoubt. Ten minutes later the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (with fixed bayonets) attacked the trenches to the east of the houses and the 10th Light Horse Regiment (advancing from the south) captured two trenches on that side, effectively cutting off retreat to the Ottoman garrison.[51][53][54]

At 16:00 the 1st Light Horse Brigade had captured No. 2 redoubt, and Chaytor reported capturing buildings and redoubts on the left. After a telephone call between Chauvel and Chetwode, pressure continued to be exerted and an attack by all units took place at 16:30. The Ottoman garrison held on until the dismounted attackers were within 20 yards (18 m), but by that time, there was no doubt that the Ottoman Army was losing the fight, and the garrison began to surrender in small groups. All organised resistance ceased 10 minutes later and as darkness fell, sporadic firing petered out, while prisoners were rounded up and horses collected and watered at the captured wells. Chauvel rode into Magdhaba and gave the order to clear the battlefield.[51][53][54][Note 9]

Group of Ottoman military officers
Military staff at Magdabah before the attack

British Empire casualties totaled as high as 163 but there may have been 146 of whom 12 were killed and 134 were wounded. Five of the killed and seven of the wounded were officers, while 17 other ranks were killed and 117 wounded. Included in the total of 146, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade suffered the loss of two officers and seven men killed and 36 other ranks wounded.[28][55][56]

No more than 200 Ottomans escaped before the surviving garrison of 1,250 was captured; there may have been as few as 1,242 and as many as 1,282 Ottoman prisoners.[57][58] Those captured 43 officers included Khadir Bey, Izzat Bey, Rushti Bey (commanders of the 80th Regiment, the 2nd and the 3rd Battalions). Over 300 Ottoman Army soldiers were killed; 97 were buried on the battlefield, and 40 wounded were cared for.[28][37][41][56]

Return to El Arish

Divisional Headquarters, Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division with an escort left Magdhaba at 23:30 and arrived at El Arish at 04:10 on 24 December 1916.[48][56][59]

The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division had left El Arish carrying only one water bottle per man, which was insufficient water to cover a round trip to Magdhaba of at least twenty-four hours. Additional water was organised by Desert Column staff, and sent from El Arish to Lahfan; a water convoy from Lahfan ordered to move to Magdhaba at 15:10 was reported to be on its way at 15:30.[60]

It was only after filling up from the water convoy that the New Zealand Mounted Rifles and 3rd Light Horse Brigades were able to leave Magdhaba and ride back to El Arish in their own time.[48][56][59]

Material assistance had been given to the returning columns by the 52nd (Lowland) Division in form of the loan of camels, fantasses, sandcarts and gun horse teams, the latter going out on the infantry division's commanding generals' initiative to meet the returning teams.[56][Note 10]

Clearing the battleground

A dressing station had been set up 3 miles (4.8 km) west of Magdhaba, by the New Zealand Field Ambulance Mobile Section and the 1st Light Horse Field Ambulance treated 80 wounded during the day of battle. In these field ambulances urgent surgery was performed, tetanus inoculations administered and patients given nourishment. During the night after the battle these cases were evacuated in sandcarts and torturous cacolets to El Arish, with the No. 1 Ambulance Convoy assisting.[Note 11][61][62]

Part of the 1st Light Horse Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Granville, two squadrons of the Auckland Mounted Rifle Regiment, and one squadron from the 3rd Light Horse Brigade bivouacked for the night at Magdhaba. The following morning, they continued clearing the battlefield, when a convoy of supplies was ordered from El Arish to support these troops.[56][59] The remaining wounded (44 Allied and 66 Ottomans, collected on 23 and 24 December) were taken to an Ottoman hospital within the fortifications and later were sent to the dressing-station. From there, at 17:00 the ambulance convoy set out on its 23 miles (37 km) march to the receiving station.[61][62]

The sandcart convoy on the beach taking the wounded back from El Arish on 29 December

The convoys were met a few miles from El Arish by sandcarts lent by the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division, so the wounded who had endured the cacolets travelled in comfort to the receiving station, arriving at 04:00 on 25 December. The 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division supplied medical stores and personnel to assist and although arrangements were made for evacuation to the railhead two days later, evacuation by sea was planned. This had to be postponed due to a gale with rain and hail on 27 December and it was not until 29 December that the largest single ambulance convoy organised in the campaign (77 sandcarts, nine sledges and a number of cacolet camels) moved out in three lines along the beach with 150 wounded. A few, who could not be moved, were evacuated the following day to Kantara on the Suez Canal.[61][62]

Aftermath

In an address to the troops after the battle, Chetwode expressed his appreciation for the mounted rifle and light horse method of attack. He said that in the history of warfare he had never known cavalry to not only locate and surround the opponent's position, but to dismount and fight as infantry with rifle and bayonet.[63]

With the victory at Magdhaba the occupation of El Arish, the first town captured on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea was secured, and the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division and 5th Mounted Yoemanry Brigade quickly fortified the town. The Royal Navy arrived on 22 December 1916, and supplies began landing on the beaches on 24 December. With the arrival of the railway on 4 January 1917 followed by the water pipeline, El Arish quickly developed into a major base for the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.[64][35]

After their defeat aerial reconnaissance found Ottoman forces moving their headquarters from Beersheba, while the garrison at Hafir El Auja was slightly increased. Other Ottoman outposts at El Kossaima and Nekhl remained, along with the strong defensive system of trenches and redoubts at El Magruntein (defending Rafa on the frontier between Egyptian and Ottoman territory).[65][66]

Battle honours

On 28 September 1917 Chauvel wrote to General Headquarters –

The point is now that, during the period covered by Sir Archibald's Despatch of 1–3–17, the Australia and New Zealand Troops well know that, with the exception of the 5th Mounted Brigade and some Yeomanry Companies of the I.C.C., they were absolutely the only troops engaged with the enemy on this front and yet they see that they have again got a very small portion indeed of the hundreds of Honours and Rewards (including mentions in Despatches) that have been granted. My Lists when commanding the A. & N.Z. Mounted Division, were modest ones under all the circumstances and in that perhaps I am partly to blame but, as you will see by attached list, a good many of my recommendations were cut out and in some cases those recommended for decorations were not even mentioned in Despatches.

Notes

Footnotes
  1. ^ The Battles Nomenclature Committee assigned 'Affair' to those engagements between forces smaller than a division; 'Action' to engagements between divisions and 'Battle' to engagements between corps.[Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922 p. 7]
  2. ^ El Kossaima has been described as railhead [Bruce 2002, p. 81] but Keogh's Map 3 shows railhead at El Auja. Both Wavell and Powles refer to 15 miles (24 km) of line being destroyed on 23 May 1917 on the railway from Beersheba to Auja. [Wavell 1968, p. 90, Powles 1922, pp. 110, 113]
  3. ^ Map 3 shows the position of Auja, Magdhaba and Beersheba.
  4. ^ By comparison, cavalry actions during the European Wars of 1866 and 1870 and the American Civil War raids took place in fairly close proximity to the units' bases and in country where there were not the extremes of climate and geography, where food and water were readily available.
  5. ^ The 2nd Light Horse Brigade was based south of el Ruag and the Bardawil, at Hod el Hassania with units patrolling the area to Bir el Magerbra in the south and Hod el Ge'eila, Hod Willegha, Bir Jameil, Hod um weigh Gamel and Bir Bayud in the east.
  6. ^ Kress von Kressenstein has been criticised by English language historians for withdrawing his troops and leaving the garrison at Magdhaba isolated. [Bruce 2002 p. 83, Keogh 1955, p. 76–7]
  7. ^ The Inverness battery fired 498 rounds during the action. [Falls 1930 Vol. 1, p. 258]
  8. ^ While fighting dismounted, one quarter of the yeomanry, light horse and riflemen were holding the horses; a brigade was then equivalent in rifle strength to an infantry battalion. [Preston 1921 p.168]
  9. ^ Chauvel has been criticised for deciding to break off the action prematurely but before the order could reach the troops, by 16.30 the battle was won. [Hill 1978 p. 89, Grainger 2006, p. 4, Downes 1938, p. 592] and for withdrawing after the battle [Bruce2002 p. 84, Bou 2009, p. 158, Cutlack, 1941, p. 50]
  10. ^ Fantasses were oblong metal containers carried by camels, one strapped on either side of the hump. [Carver, 2003 illustration No. 60 between pp. 186–7]
  11. ^ Cacolets were contraptions tied to camels so that wounded could ride on them; either sitting up or lying down, one on either side of the hump.
Citations
  1. ^ Battles Nomenclature Committee 1922, p. 31
  2. ^ Falls 1930, pp. 13–4, 28–50
  3. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 56
  4. ^ a b Kress von Kressenstein 1938, pp. 207–8
  5. ^ a b c Powles 1922, p. 47
  6. ^ a b c d Keogh 1955, p. 71
  7. ^ Falls 1930 Vol. 1, p. 85
  8. ^ Library of Congress Photograph Album, pp. 41–9
  9. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 46
  10. ^ Keogh 1955, p.26 Map 3
  11. ^ a b Downes 1938 pp. 555–6
  12. ^ Downes 1938, p. 590
  13. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 72
  14. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 44–5
  15. ^ Powles 1922, p. 66
  16. ^ Keogh 1955 p. 62
  17. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 45-6
  18. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 79
  19. ^ Wavell 1968, pp. 57–9
  20. ^ Bruce 2002, p. 80
  21. ^ Keogh 1955 p. 60
  22. ^ Downes 1938 p. 589
  23. ^ Hill 1978, p. 85
  24. ^ Hill 1978, p. 86
  25. ^ a b c d Powles 1922, p. 50
  26. ^ Falls 1930 Vol. 1, pp. 380–406
  27. ^ National Archives of Australia B2455 Chauvel H.G.; Statement of Service 18/12/1925; pp. 121–2
  28. ^ a b c d e Woodward 2003, p. 53
  29. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 1 and Appendix 25 Sketch Map
  30. ^ a b Falls 1930 Vol. 1, pp. 252–3, 271
  31. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 48
  32. ^ a b Falls 1930 Vol. 1, p. 251
  33. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 2
  34. ^ Keogh 1955, p. 74
  35. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 82
  36. ^ Turkish General Staff 1979, p. 429
  37. ^ a b Dennis et al 2008, p. 405
  38. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 43–4
  39. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 69–70
  40. ^ a b Falls 1930 Vol., 1 p. 253
  41. ^ a b Bruce 2002, p. 84
  42. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 31
  43. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 48–9 and Map of Magdhaba
  44. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, pp. 3–4 and Appendix 25 Sketch Map
  45. ^ a b AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, pp. 3–8
  46. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 45–9
  47. ^ a b Powles 1922, p. 51
  48. ^ a b c Hill 1978, p. 89
  49. ^ Bruce 2002, p. 83
  50. ^ a b c d AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 4
  51. ^ a b c d e Powles 1922, pp. 51–3
  52. ^ Falls 1930 Vol. 1, pp. 254, 256
  53. ^ a b AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, pp. 6–8
  54. ^ a b Falls 1930 Vol. 1, pp. 256–7
  55. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 55–6
  56. ^ a b c d e f AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 8
  57. ^ Cutlack 1941, p. 49
  58. ^ Powles 1922, pp. 55–6
  59. ^ a b c Powles 1922, p. 54
  60. ^ AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary Appendix 24, p. 7
  61. ^ a b c Downes 1938, pp. 592–3
  62. ^ a b c Powles 1922, p. 61
  63. ^ Powles 1922, p. 57
  64. ^ Carver 2003, p.194
  65. ^ Cutlack 1941, pp. 49–51
  66. ^ Gullett 1941, p. 230

References

  • "AWM4/1/60/10 Anzac Mounted Division War Diary". Canberra: Australian War Memorial. December 1916.
  • American Colony (Jerusalem) Photo Department (1914 – 1917). "World War I in Palestine and the Sinai Photo Album". Washington D. C.: The Library of Congress. OCLC 231653216. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  • The Official Names of the Battles and Other Engagements Fought by the Military Forces of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914–1919, and the third Afghan War, 1919: Report of the Battles Nomenclature Committee as Approved by The Army Council Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. London: Government Printer. 1922. OCLC 29078007.
  • Bou, Jean (2009). Light Horse: A History of Australia's Mounted Arm. Australian Army History. Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521197083.
  • Bruce, Anthony (2002). The Last Crusade: The Palestine Campaign in the First World War. London: John Murray Ltd. ISBN 0719554322 9780719554322. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
  • Carver, Michael, Field Marshal Lord (2003). The National Army Museum Book of The Turkish Front 1914–1918 The Campaigns at Gallipoli, in Mesopotamia and in Palestine. London: Pan Macmillan. ISBN 0283073470 9780283073472. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  • Cutlack, F.M. (1941). "The Australian Flying Corps in the Western and Eastern Theatres of War, 1914–1918". Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918 Volume VIII. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 220899617.
  • Dennis, Peter (2008). The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (2nd ed.). Melbourne: Oxford University Press, Australia & New Zealand. ISBN 9780195517842. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Downes, R.M. (1938). "The Campaign in Sinai and Palestine". Official History of the Australian Army Medical Services, 1914–1918 Part II in Volume 1 Gallipoli, Palestine and New Guinea. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 156587074. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Falls, Cyril (1930). Military Operations Egypt & Palestine from the outbreak of war with Germany to June 1917. Official History of the Great War Based on Official Documents by Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Vol. 1. London: HM Stationary Office. OCLC 610273484. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Grainger, John D. (2006). The Battle for Palestine, 1917. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 1843832631 9781843832638. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
  • Gullett, H.S. (1941). Chapter XIV – Magdhaba "The Australian Imperial Force in Sinai and Palestine, 1914–1918". Official History of Australian in the War of 1914–1918 Volume VII. Canberra: Australian War Memorial. OCLC 220900153. {{cite web}}: Check |url= value (help)
  • Hill, A. J. (1978). Chauvel of the Light Horse: A Biography of General Sir Harry Chauvel, GCMG, KCB. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press. ISBN 0522841465 9780522841466. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
  • Keogh, E. G. (1955). Suez to Aleppo. Melbourne: Directorate of Military Training by Wilkie & Co. OCLC 220029983. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Kress von Kressenstein, Friedrich Freiherr (1938). Mit den Tèurken zum Suezkanal. Berlin: Schlegel or Vorhut-Verl. OCLC 230745310.
  • Powles, C. Guy (1922). The New Zealanders in Sinai and Palestine. Official History New Zealand's Effort in the Great War, Volume III. Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Ltd. OCLC 2959465. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthor= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  • Preston, R. M. P. (1921). The Desert Mounted Corps: An Account of the Cavalry Operations in Palestine and Syria 1917–1918. London: Constable & Co. OCLC 3900439.
  • Pugsley, Christoper (2004). The Anzac Experience: New Zealand, Australia and Empire in the First World War. Auckland: Reed Books. ISBN 0790009412 9780790009414. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
  • Turkish General Staff (1979). Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Turk harbi. Sina–Filistin cephesi, Harbin Başlangicindan İkinci Gazze Muharebeleri Sonuna Kadar. Vol. Sinai-Palestine Front from the beginning of the war to the end of the 2nd Gaza Battle, Volume 4, 1st Part. Ankara: IVncu Cilt 1nci Kisim.
  • Wavell, Field Marshal Earl (1968). E.W. Sheppard (ed.). The Palestine Campaigns. A Short History of the British Army (3rd ed.). London: Constable & Co.
  • Woodward, David R. (2006). Hell in the Holy Land: World War I in the Middle East. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 9780813123837 0813123836. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
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