Siege of Constantinople (717–718)

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For other sieges of Constantinople, see Sieges of Constantinople.
Second Arab siege of Constantinople
Part of the Byzantine-Arab Wars
Date15 July/August[1] 717 – 15 August 718 AD
Location
Constantinople, Byzantine Empire
Result Decisive Byzantine-Bulgarian victory;
Climax of the Byzantine-Arab Wars.
Belligerents
Umayyad Caliphate Byzantine Empire
Bulgar Khanate
Commanders and leaders
Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik
Sulayman ibn Mu'ad
Umar ibn Hubaira		 Leo III
Tervel
Strength
120,000 men[2]
2,560 ships[3]		 unknown

The Second Arab Siege of Constantinople in 717–718 was a combined land and sea effort by the Arabs of the Umayyad Caliphate to take the capital city of the Byzantine Empire, Constantinople. The campaign marked the culmination of twenty years of attacks and gradual Arab encroachment on the Byzantine lands. The Arabs, led by Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik, invaded Byzantine Asia Minor in 716. The Arabs were initially hoping to exploit ongoing Byzantine civil strife in their favour, but the Byzantine general Leo the Isaurian, on whom they relied, tricked them and secured the Byzantine throne for himself. After wintering in the western coastlands of Asia Minor, the Arab army crossed into Thrace in early summer 717 and began to blockade the city, which was protected by the massive Theodosian Walls. The Arab fleet was neutralized by the Byzantine navy through the use of Greek fire, allowing Constantinople to be resupplied by sea, while the Arab army was decimated by famine and disease during the unusually heavy winter that followed. In spring 718 two Arab fleets that were sent as reinforcements were destroyed by the Byzantines and an additional army sent overland through Asia Minor was ambushed and defeated. Following attacks by the Bulgars on their rear, the Arabs raised the siege on 15 August 718. On its return journey, the Arab fleet was almost destroyed by natural disasters and Byzantine attacks. The failure of the siege altered the Caliphate's strategic outlook, as the goal of outright conquest of Byzantium was abandoned. Because it halted Muslim advance into Europe, the siege is often considered one of the most decisive battles in history.

Background

Following the First Arab siege of Constantinople (674–678) the Arabs and Byzantines enjoyed a period of peace. After 680 the Umayyad Caliphate was in the throes of the Second Muslim Civil War and the Byzantines enjoyed an ascendancy in the East that enabled them to extort huge amounts of tribute from the Umayyad government in Damascus.[4] In 692, as the Muslim Civil War was drawing to its close, with the Umayyad regime victorious, Emperor Justinian II re-opened hostilities. The result, however, was a series of Arab victories that meant the loss of control over Armenia and the Caucasian principalities, as well as the beginning of a gradual encroachment upon Byzantine lands. Year by year the Caliphate's generals, usually members of the Umayyad family, launched raids into Byzantine territory and captured fortresses and towns.[5] After 712 the Byzantine defensive system began to show signs of collapse: Arab raids penetrated further and further into Asia Minor, the border fortresses were repeatedly attacked and sacked, and Byzantine reaction became more and more feeble.[6] In this the Arabs were aided by the prolonged period of internal instability that followed the first deposition of Justinian II (r. 685–695, 705–711) in 695. During this time the Byzantine throne changed hands seven times in violent revolutions.[7] Nevertheless, as the Byzantinist Warren Treadgold comments, "the Arab attacks would in any case have intensified after the end of their own civil war ... With far more men, land and wealth than Byzantium, the Arabs had begun to concentrate all their strength against it. Now they threatened to extinguish the empire entirely by capturing its capital."[8]

Opening stages of the campaign

Gold solidus of Anastasius III, who prepared Constantinople for the coming Arab assault

The Arab successes opened the way for a second assault on Constantinople, an undertaking already initiated under Caliph al-Walid I (r. 705–715). Following al-Walid's death, his brother and successor Sulayman (r. 715–717) took up the project with increased vigour, allegedly because of a prophecy that a Caliph bearing the name of a prophet would capture Constantinople; Sulayman (Solomon) was the only member of the Umayyad family to bear such a name.[9] Arab preparations, especially the construction of a large fleet, did not go unnoticed by the worried Byzantines. Emperor Anastasius III (r. 713–715) sent an embassy to Damascus under the patrician and Eparch of Constantinople David of Sinope, ostensibly in order to plea for peace, but in reality to spy out the Arabs. Anastasius, in turn, began to prepare for the inevitable siege: the fortifications of Constantinople were repaired and equipped with ample artillery, while food stores were brought into the city and those inhabitants who could not stockpile food to last for three years evacuated from the city.[10] Anastasius also strengthened his navy and, in early 715, he dispatched it against the Arab fleet that had come to the shores of Lycia at Phoenix[11] to collect wood. At Rhodes, however, the Byzantine fleet, encouraged by the soldiers of the Opsician Theme, rebelled, killed their commander John the Deacon, and sailed north to Adramyttium. There they declared a former tax collector emperor as Theodosios III.[12] Anastasius crossed over into Bithynia in the Opsician Theme to confront the rebellion, but the rebel fleet sailed on to Chrysopolis. From there it launched attacks against Constantinople, until, in late summer, sympathizers within the capital opened up the gates to them. Anastasius held out at Nicaea for several months, until he agreed to resign and retire as a monk.[13] The accession of Theodosios, who by all accounts was both unwilling and incapable, as a puppet emperor of the Opsicians provoked the reaction of the other themes, especially the Anatolics and the Armeniacs under their respective strategoi Leo the Isaurian and Artabasdus.[14]

Map of Byzantine Asia Minor and Thrace ca. 740 AD

In these conditions of near-civil war, the Arabs began their carefully prepared advance: in summer 716 the vanguard under general Sulayman ibn Mu'ad marched into Asia Minor and the Umayyad fleet under Umar ibn Hubaira set sail along the coasts, while Maslamah ibn Abd al-Malik, the Caliph's brother, as the commander-in-chief, awaited developments with the main army in Syria.[15] The Arabs hoped that the disunity among the Byzantine army would play to their advantage. Maslamah had already established contact with Leo the Isaurian, but the Byzantine general in turn intended to use the Arabs for his own purposes. As his first objective, Sulayman targeted the strategically important fortress of Amorium, which the Arabs intended to use as a base during the oncoming winter. Amorium had been left defenseless in the turmoil of the civil war and would have easily fallen to Sulayman's forces, but the Arabs chose to use the opportunity to bolster Leo's position as a counterweight to Theodosios, and offered the city terms of surrender if its inhabitants would acknowledge Leo as emperor. The citizens of Amorium complied, but still did not open their gates to the Arabs. Leo himself came to the vicinity with a handful of soldiers soon after and, after a series of ruses and negotiations, managed to install a garrison of 800 men in the town. The Arab army, thwarted in its objective and with supplies running low, withdrew. Leo himself was able to make good his escape to Pisidia and, in summer, with the support of Artabasdus, he was crowned emperor.[16]

Gold solidus of Leo III

Leo's success was a stroke of luck for Byzantium, since Maslamah with the main Arab army had in the meantime crossed the Taurus Mountains and was marching straight for Amorium. In addition, as the Arab general had not received any news of Leo's double-dealing, he did not devastate the territories he marched through – the Armeniac and Anatolic themes, whose governors he still believed to be his allies.[17] On meeting up with Sulayman's retreating army and learning what had transpired, Maslamah changed direction: he attacked Akroinon and from there marched to the western coastlands to spend the winter. On his way he sacked Sardis and Pergamon. The Arab fleet wintered in Cilicia.[18] Leo, in the meantime, began his own march on Constantinople. At Nicomedia he found and captured, among other officials, Theodosios's son, and then marched to Chrysopolis. In spring 717, after short negotiations, he secured Theodosios's resignation and his recognition as emperor, entering the city on 25 March. Theodosios and his son were allowed to retire to a monastery as monks and Artabasdus was rewarded by being promoted to the position of kouropalates in addition to being given the hand of Leo's daughter, Anna.[19]

Siege

From the outset of their campaign the Arabs had prepared for a major assault on Constantinople. The Syriac chronicler Michael the Syrian mentions 200,000 men and 5,000 ships, a number certainly much inflated. Al-Mas'udi mentions 120,000 troops, and Theophanes the Confessor 1,800 ships. The supply train alone is said to have numbered 12,000 men, 6,000 camels, and 6,000 donkeys.[20] Whatever the true numbers, the attackers were considerably more numerous than the defenders; according to Treadgold the Arab host may have outnumbered the entire Byzantine army.[2] Although the siege consumed a large part the Caliphate's resources, it was still capable of launching raids against the Byzantine frontier in eastern Asia Minor during the siege's duration: in 717 Sulayman's son Daud captured a fortress near Melitene and in 718 Amr ibn Qais raided the frontier.[21] On the Byzantine side, the numbers are unknown. Aside from Anastasius III's preparations (which may have been neglected following his deposition),[22] the Byzantines could count on the assistance of the Bulgars, with whom Leo concluded a treaty that may have included terms of alliance against the Arabs.[23]

Depiction of the use of Greek fire, from the Madrid Skylitzes

In early summer Maslamah ordered his fleet to sail and join him and with his army crossed the Hellespont at Abydos into Thrace. The Arabs thoroughly devastated the countryside, gathering supplies, and sacked the towns they came across.[24] In mid-July or mid-August,[1] the Arab army reached Constantinople and isolated it completely on land by building a double siege wall, one facing the city and one the Thracian countryside, with their camp positioned between them. The Arab fleet under Sulayman (often confused with the Caliph himself in the medieval sources) arrived on 1 September, anchoring at first near the Hebdomon. Two days later Sulayman led his fleet into the Bosporus and the various squadrons began anchoring on the European and Asian suburbs of the city. As the Arab fleet's rearguard was passing the city, however, it was attacked by the Byzantines, who burned down twenty ships with 2,000 men using Greek fire. After this the Arab fleet became reluctant to engage the Byzantines, and all the squadrons were gathered in the safe harbour of Sosthenion on the European shore of the Bosporus. On 8 October Sulayman died and was succeeded in the fleet command by Umar.[25]

The Second Arab siege of Constantinople, as depicted in the 14th-century Bulgarian translation of the Manasses Chronicle

The Arab army was well supplied with provisions, which were reportedly piled up in high mounds in their camp, and had even brought along wheat to sow and harvest in the next year. The failure of the Arab navy to effect a blockade of the city, however, meant that the Byzantines too could ferry in provisions. In addition, the Arab army had already devastated the Thracian countryside during its march to Constantinople. The Arab fleet and the second Arab army, which operated in the Asian suburbs of Constantinople, were able to bring in some supplies to Maslamah's army, but their amount was limited.[26] As the siege drew into winter, negotiations were opened between the two sides, extensively reported by Arab sources but completely ignored by the Byzantine historians. According to the Arab accounts, Leo continued to play a double game with the Arabs. One version claims that he tricked Maslamah into handing over most of his grain supplies, while another that the Arab general was persuaded to burn them altogether, so as to show the inhabitants of the city that they faced an imminent assault and induce them to surrender.[27] The winter of 717/718 was extremely harsh, with snow covering the ground for over three months. As the supplies in the Arab camp began to run out, a terrible famine broke out: the soldiers ate their horses, camels, and other livestock, swept the snow of the fields they had sown to eat the green offshoots, and reportedly resorted even to cannibalism and the eating of their own excrement. As a result, the Arab army was ravaged by epidemics.[28]

The situation looked set to improve in spring when the new Caliph, Umar II (r. 717–720), sent two fleets to the besiegers' aid: 400 ships from Egypt under a certain Sufyan and 360 ships from Africa under Izid, all laden with supplies and arms. At the same time, a fresh army began its march through Asia Minor to assist in the siege. When the new fleets arrived in the Sea of Marmara they kept their distance from the Byzantines and their Greek fire and anchored on the Asian shore, the Egyptians in the Gulf of Niceomedia near modern Tuzla and the Africans south of Chalcedon (the modern quarters of Maltepe and Kartal). Most of the Arab fleets' crews were composed of Christian Egyptians, however, and they began to desert to the Byzantines. Notified by the Egyptians of the arrival of the Arab reinforcements, Leo launched his fleet in an attack against the new Arab arrivals. Crippled by the defection of their crews, and helpless against Greek fire, the Arab ships were destroyed or captured along with the weapons and supplies they carried. Constantinople was now safe from a seaborne attack.[29] On land too the Byzantines were victorious: their troops managed to ambush the advancing Arab army under a certain Mardasan and destroy it in the hills around Nicomedia.[30]

Constantinople could now be easily resupplied by sea, while the Arab army continued to suffer from hunger and pestilence. The Arabs also suffered a major defeat against the Bulgars, who killed, according to Theophanes, 22,000 men. It is unclear, however, whether the Bulgars attacked the Arab encampment due to their treaty with Leo or whether the Arabs strayed into Bulgarian territory seeking provisions.[31] The siege had clearly failed and Caliph Umar sent orders to Maslamah to retreat. After thirteen months of siege, on 15 August 718, the Arabs departed. The date coincided with the feast of the Dormition of the Theotokos, and it was to her that the Byzantines ascribed their victory. The retreating Arabs were not hindered or attacked on their return, but their fleet lost more ships in a storm in the Marmara Sea, others burned from ashes from the volcano of Santorini, and some of the survivors were captured by the Byzantines, so that Theophanes claims that only five vessels made it back to Syria.[32]

Aftermath

The Arab failure was a severe blow to the Caliphate's military might. The Muslim fleet was annihilated and, although the land army did not suffer losses in the same degree, Umar is recorded as contemplating withdrawing from the recent conquests of Spain and Transoxiana, as well as a complete evacuation of Cilicia and other Byzantine territories that the Arabs had seized over the previous years. Although his advisors restrained him from such drastic actions, most Arab garrisons were withdrawn from the Byzantine frontier fortifications. In Cilicia, only Mopsuestia remained in Arab hands as a defensive bulwark to protect Antioch.[33] The Byzantines even recovered some territory in western Armenia for a time. In 719 the Byzantine fleet raided the Syrian coast and burned down the port of Laodicea and, in 720/721, the Byzantines attacked and sacked Tinnis in Egypt.[34] Leo also restored control over Sicily, where news of the Arab siege of Constantinople and expectations of the city's fall had prompted the local governor to declare an emperor of his own, Basil Onomagoulos. It was during this time, however, that effective Byzantine control over Sardinia and Corsica ceased.[35] Besides this, the Byzantines failed to exploit their success in launching attacks of their own against the Arabs. In 720, after a hiatus of two years, Arab raids against Byzantium resumed, although now they were no longer directed at conquest, but rather seeking booty. The Arab attacks would intensify again over the next decades, until the Byzantine victory at the Battle of Akroinon in 740. Coupled with military defeats elsewhere and internal instability which culminated in the Abbasid Revolution, the age of Muslim expansion came to an end.[36]

Historical assessment and impact

The second Arab siege of Constantinople was far more dangerous for Byzantium than the first, since it was a direct, well-planned attack on the Byzantine capital. In 717–718 the Arabs tried to cut off the city completely, rather than limiting themselves to a loose blockade as in 674–678.[21] It represented an effort by the Caliphate to "cut off the head" of the Byzantine Empire, after which the remaining provinces, especially in Asia Minor, would be easy to capture.[37] The Arab failure was chiefly due to logistical reasons, operating too far from their bases in Syria. The superiority of the Byzantine navy and of Greek fire, the strength of Constantinople's fortifications, and the skill of Leo III in deception and negotiations also played an important role.[38]

In the long term, the failure of the Arab siege led to a profound change in the nature of warfare between Byzantium and the Caliphate. The Muslim goal of conquest of Constantinople was effectively abandoned and the frontier of the two empires stabilized along the line of the Taurus and Antitaurus Mountains, over which both sides launched regular raids and counter-raids. In this incessant border warfare, frontier towns and fortresses changed hands frequently, but the general outline of the border remained unaltered for over two centuries, until the Byzantine conquests of the 10th century.[39] On the Muslim side, the raids themselves soon acquired an almost ritual character, as a demonstration of the continuing jihad and a symbol of the Caliph's role as the leader of the Muslim community.[40]

The outcome of the siege was of also considerable macrohistorical importance. The Byzantine capital's survival meant that the Empire continued to serve as a bulwark against Islamic expansion into Europe until the 15th century, when it fell to the Ottoman Turks. The successful defence of Constantinople has been linked with the Battle of Tours in 732 as stopping Muslim expansion into Europe. As military historian Paul K. Davis writes, "By turning back the Moslem invasion, Europe remained in Christian hands, and no serious Moslem threat to Europe existed until the fifteenth century. This victory, coincident with the Frankish victory at Tours (732), limited Islam's western expansion to the southern Mediterranean world."[41] Consequently, historians often include the siege in lists of the "decisive battles" of world history.[42]

Notes

  1. ^ a b Theophanes the Confessor gives the date as 15 August, but this is probably meant to mirror the Arabs' departure date in the next year. Patriarch Nikephoros I records the duration of the siege as 13 months, implying that it began on 15 July. Mango & Scott (1997), p. 548 (Note #16)
  2. ^ a b Treadgold (1997), p. 346
  3. ^ Treadgold (1997), pp. 346, 347
  4. ^ Lilie (1976), pp. 81–82, 97–106
  5. ^ Lilie (1976), pp. 107–120; Blankinship (1994), p. 31
  6. ^ Lilie (1976), pp. 120–122, 139–140
  7. ^ Blankinship (1994), p. 31; Lilie (1976), p. 140; Treadgold (1997), pp. 345, 346
  8. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 345
  9. ^ Brooks (1899), pp. 20–21; Lilie (1976), p. 122; Treadgold (197), p. 344
  10. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 534; Lilie (1976), pp. 122–123; Treadgold (1997), pp. 343–344
  11. ^ This is may be a confusion with Phoenicia (modern Lebanon), famed for its cedar forests. Lilie (1976), p. 123 (Note #62)
  12. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 535–536; Lilie (1976), pp. 123–124; Treadgold (1997), p. 344
  13. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 536; Treadgold (197), pp. 344–345
  14. ^ Lilie (1976), p. 124; Treadgold (1997), p. 345
  15. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 538; Lilie (1976), pp. 123–125
  16. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 538–539; Lilie (1976), pp. 125–126; Treadgold (1997), p. 345
  17. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 539–540; Lilie (1976), pp. 126–127
  18. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 540–541; Lilie (1976), p. 127; Treadgold (1997), p. 345
  19. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 540, 545; Lilie (1976), pp. 127–128; Treadgold (1997), p. 345
  20. ^ Kaegi (2008), pp. 384–385; Treadgold (1997), p. 938 (Note #1)
  21. ^ a b Lilie (1976), p. 132
  22. ^ Lilie (1976), p. 125
  23. ^ Treadgold (1997), p. 347
  24. ^ Brooks (1899), p. 23; Mango & Scott (1997), p. 545; Lilie (1976), p. 128; Treadgold (1997), p. 347
  25. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 545–546; Lilie (1976), pp. 128–129; Treadgold (1997), p. 347
  26. ^ Lilie (1976), p. 129; Treadgold (1997), p. 347
  27. ^ Brooks (1899), pp. 26–28, 30; Lilie (1976), p. 129
  28. ^ Brooks (1899), pp. 28–29; Mango & Scott (1997), p. 546; Lilie (1976), pp. 129–130; Treadgold (1997), p. 347
  29. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), pp. 546, 548;Lilie (1976), p. 130; Treadgold (1997), pp. 347–348
  30. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 546; Lilie (1976), pp. 130–131; Treadgold (1997), p. 348
  31. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 546; Lilie (1976), p. 131
  32. ^ Mango & Scott (1997), p. 550; Treadgold (1997), p. 349
  33. ^ Blankinship (1997), pp. 33–34; Lilie (1976), pp. 132–133; Treadgold (1997), p. 349
  34. ^ Blankinship (1997), p. 287 (Note #133); Lilie (1976), p. 133; Treadgold (1997), p. 349
  35. ^ Treadgold (1997), pp. 347, 348
  36. ^ Blankinship (1997), pp. 34–35, 117–236; Kaegi (2008), pp. 385–386; Lilie (1976), pp. 143–144
  37. ^ Lilie (1976), pp. 140–141
  38. ^ Blankinship (1997), p. 105; Kaegi (2008), p. 385; Lilie (1976), p. 141; Treadgold (1997), p. 349
  39. ^ Blankinship (1994), pp. 104–106; El-Cheikh (2004), pp. 83–84; Toynbee (1973), pp. 107–109
  40. ^ El-Cheikh (2004), pp. 83–84; Kennedy (2001), pp. 105–106
  41. ^ Davis (2001), p. 99
  42. ^ Davis (2001), pp. 99–102; Fuller (1987), pp. 335ff.; Regan (2002), pp. 44–45; Crompton (1997), pp. 27–28; Tucker (2010), pp. 94–97

Bibliography

  • Blankinship, Khalid Yahya (1994), The End of the Jihâd State: The Reign of Hishām ibn ʻAbd al-Malik and the Collapse of the Umayyads, Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, ISBN 0-7914-1827-8
  • Brooks, E.W. (1899), The Journal of Hellenic Studies, XIX, The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies: 19–33 {{citation}}: |chapter= ignored (help); External link in |journal= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
  • Crompton, Samuel Willard (1997), 100 Battles That Shaped World History, Bluewood Books, ISBN 978-0-912517-27-8
  • Davis, Paul K. (2001), 100 Decisive Battles: From Ancient Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, pp. 99–102, ISBN 0-19-514366-3
  • El-Cheikh, Nadia Maria (2004), Byzantium viewed by the Arabs, Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ISBN 978-0-932885-30-2
  • Fuller, J. F. C. (1987), A Military History of the Western World, Volume 1: From the earliest times to the Battle of Lepanto, Da Capo Press, ISBN 978-0-306-80304-8
  • Kaegi, Walter E. (2008), "Confronting Islam: emperors versus caliphs (641–c. 850)", in Sheppard, Jonathan (ed.), The Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire c.500–1492, Cambridge University Press, pp. 365–394, ISBN 978-0-521-83231-1
  • Kennedy, Hugh (2001), The Armies of the Caliphs: Military and Society in the Early Islamic State, Routledge, ISBN 978-0-203-45853-2
  • Lilie, Ralph-Johannes (1976), Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber. Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinischen Staates im 7. und 8. Jhd. (in German), Munich: Institut für Byzantinistik und Neugriechische Philologie der Universität München
  • Mango, Cyril; Scott, Roger (1997), The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor. Byzantine and Near Eastern History, AD 284–813, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-822568-7
  • Regan, Geoffrey (2002), Battles that changed history: fifty decisive battles spanning over 2,500 years of warfare, Andre Deutsch, ISBN 978-0-233-05051-5
  • Toynbee, Arnold (1973), Constantine Porphyrogenitus and His World, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0-19-215253-X
  • Treadgold, Warren (1997), A History of the Byzantine State and Society, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, ISBN 0-8047-2630-2
  • Tucker, Spencer C. (2010), Battles That Changed History: An Encyclopedia of World Conflict, ABC-CLIO, ISBN 978-1-59884-429-0

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