Talk:XKeyscore

Source of the documents on Germany's access to program

Is Snowden actually the source of the documents describing Germany's ACCESS to X-Keyscore?

The wiki article says he is, and it seems to me probable that he is. But the English Der Spiegel article really isn't saying, in my reading of it. Is the German version more specific? I am not quite certain, and I am hesitant to remove that datum absent a discussion.

• http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agencies-used-nsa-spying-program-a-912173.html

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 05:18, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Source: The Guardian?

The first time XKeyScore (in this spelling) was mentioned in an article by The Guardian at 27th of June 2013. Ace von point (talk) 16:51, 21 July 2013 (UTC)

Good catch! This passing reference predates the O Globo article (which Greenwald co-wrote) considerably. 71.20.55.6 (talk) 00:56, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Job listings for XKeyscore

Mentioning here because information on the program is pretty lacking generally.

Interesting how fast the program started to appear on publicly accessible websites after being leaked.

• http://jobs.saic.com/job/Columbia-XKEYSCORE-Systems-Engineer-Job-MD-21044/2679775/
• http://jobs.raytheon.com/jobs/xkeyscore-systems-support-job-linthicum-maryland-1-3781448

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 01:43, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

An article with more meat.

• http://niqnaq.wordpress.com/2013/06/20/strange-creatures-crawl-out-of-the-woodwork-of-the-web-and-wriggle-in-the-unaccustomed-light/

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 01:56, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

X-Keyscore in UK

I think it is obvious that Tempora operated by GCHQ is part of X-Keyscore. Getting a citation may be harder, but the technical description is the same. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.47.125.210 (talk) 03:27, 23 July 2013 (UTC)

Full program

This link refers to the full take which has the same parameters as X-Keyscore. Perhaps a reference should be made. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.47.125.210 (talk) 03:30, 23 July 2013

Latest from the Guardian

These new disclosures, the presentation in particular ought to expand the article significantly, and move it beyond a stub.

• http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
• http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
• No prior authorization, or FISA court order is required. All you have to do is type a justification in the box that says "justification".
• 150 sites, and 700 servers (2008)
• Retroactive
  • ~3 days stored 'full take' (CONTENT)
  • ~30 days metadata
• Real time -- see new information related you query as it happens
• Capable of VERY broad queries (all encrypted word documents in Iran)
• Data volume prohibits forwarding of the largest queries
• Capable of returning a broad range of queries, google maps, web searches.
• May use actual hacking/and exploitation/malware "Show me a list of all exploitable machines in country X"
• Another mention of Turbulence, Trafficthief and Turmoil (first revealed in 2007, in Baltimore Sun)
• Frequently updated to allow new capabilities (update early and often)
• Ties in with other systems: Marina, specifically
• Exif tags. -- Very powerful. Often describe what type of camera or scanner the image was acquired from and/or the software it was edited with. In the case of smartphone pictures may have a GPS location.
• Integration with Google Earth
• Web interface
  • Slide XKS4-001 has a list of foreignness factors. Including "person is a user of storage media seized outside the US." Nothing in the list precludes US citizens from being targeted while abroad.
• Slide XKS8-001 has a list of corporate logos. Facebook, yahoo, twitter, myspace, cnn, wikipedia, Google earth, Gmail, @mail.ru
• Slide XKS10-001 outlines Trafficthief, Pinwale, Marina and Xkeyscore

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 18:48, 31 July 2013 (UTC)

More articles

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57596376/leaked-documents-give-new-insight-into-nsas-searches/

http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/07/presenting-xkeyscore-what-the-nsa-is-still-hiding.html

http://securitywatch.pcmag.com/security/314336-nsa-s-gigantic-surveillance-program-xkeyscore-revealed --71.20.55.6 (talk) 06:52, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

The Five Eyes

On the top of the slide presentation is the following line: Top Secret//COMINT//Rel to USA, AUS, CAN, GBR, NZL

This is a reference to the Five Eyes alliance. Ergo: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and New Zealand are aware of, and possibly are also users of, this program. --71.20.55.6 (talk) 07:01, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

Foreignness Criteria

• The person has stated he is located out the US
• Human intelligence source indicates person is located outside the US
• The person is a user of storage media seized outside the US
• Foreign govt indicates person is located outside the US
• Phone number country code indicates person is located outside the US
• Phone number is registered in a country other than US
• SIGINT reporting confirms person is located outside the US
• Open source information indicates person is located outside the US
• Network machine or tech info indicates person is located outside the US
• In direct contact w/agt overseas, no info to show proposed tgt in US

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data

http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/audio/video/2013/7/31/1375269316245/KS4-001.jpg

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 07:31, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

This has nothing to do with XKeyscore, if you look at the URL in the address bar in the picture, you can see the screenshot is actually from the Unified Targeting Tool (UTT). This once again shows how misleading The Guardian's articles are. P2Peter (talk) 02:03, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Look more closely. I regrouped the presentation so you can see it. There are three images that are from "The Unofficial XKesycore Users Guide." (now on the bottom row). The two with the justification, and this one. Notice that the browser window is actually a screencap inserted in a larger document. The first KS2-001.jpg has the title. Compare the fonts used in the descriptions. compare the designs used in the embedded images. These definitely come from the same source. And therefore all three relate to XKeyscore. Even if I accept that the foreignness factors are part of another program, the Justification in XKS really is just a box that says Justification. I notice you removed that too. Another Consideration: That the UTT has shown up in relation to both Prism and XKS, suggests strongly that the Unified Targeting Tool is shared, like the name suggests, between these two programs, and likely more. --Paulmd199 (talk) 03:54, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Another thought. Why would the foreignness criteria be different across tools anyhow? Isn't that a matter of NSA policy, allegedly supported by Congress and backed by the FISA court? In fact, they are remarkably similar to those in the policy document. (Exhibit A, page 2). (Has anyone uploaded these?).

I am going directly from the supporting documents, and not taking Greenwald's word. --Paulmd199 (talk) 04:13, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Thank you for your explanation. However, putting the three slides next to eachother shows that they are from different sources: the first two have a more modern look and a gray background, the third one (the UTT screenshot) shows an old windows interface and has a white background. Also the title above this screenshot has the (U) portion marking for Unclassified, which is not in the two previous ones. The picture with the XKeyscore User Guide indeed relates to XKeyscore, but the UTT is a separate program: UTT is a tasking tool, used for sending instructions to collection platforms. As such, UTT is used under the PRISM program and probably also for other collections. XKeyscore however is an analysing program, used for searching and analysing data which is already collected. The UTT is at the beginning, and XKeyscore is at the end of a data collection proces. See also the description in this article. From the PRISM slides we know that this program uses UTT, but there's no evidence for any specific connection between XKeyscore and UTT, other than their part of the collection proces in general. P2Peter (talk) 21:20, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

That's a screenshot of Internet Explorer 6 Which would suggest that UTT itself provides a web interface. And isn't necessarily windows based. (news flash: the NSA was using IE6?! One of the most vulnerable web browsers ever.) I will study those images more closely and get back to you. --Paulmd199 (talk) 01:37, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Yes, US government and military are widely using older microsoft systems, but these are security enhanced. P2Peter (talk) 01:04, 9 August 2013 (UTC)

The forms look different in the UTT screencap. (does UTT have an article yet?).

Since we appear to agree that the "Justification" form is a screencap of XKS itself, are you OK with reinserting language to that effect. (I've spotted your article independently, last night and am in process of studying it). Second: Are you OK with using the Policy documents (Exhibit A and B) As sources of information regarding how the NSA targets foreigners and "minimizes" collection on US persons. It would seem that this would play an integral role in articles regarding NSA Surveillance programs in general. An article in its own right which can be linked would probably be better. I will upload them in the Commons of the 2013 mass surveillance article later today (that article needs serious cleanup too). --Paulmd199 (talk) 02:01, 8 August 2013 (UTC)

Yes, the "Justification" form can be described in the article. Of course you can use the Policy documents as a source, but be careful: only use them for issues regarding Xkeyscore. I agree that it would be better to have some kind of article which describes the general procedure of the process of intelligence collection. Many media reports, including the main stories from the Guardian, are mixing things up, but programs like these have a more or less specific function. NSA (and other intel agencies) work in steps: Tasking > Collecting > Processing > Analysing. For each step there are separate programs/applications, so the first thing to do, is check what exactly a certain program is doing, for which of these steps it's used. I hope this maybe helpful for you. P2Peter (talk) 01:04, 9 August 2013 (UTC)

Article of interest

If true, this would appear to validate the Snowden's claims of suspicionless blanket domestic spying of web searches.

A woman in Brooklyn received a visit from Authorities after researching pressure cookers. Combined with her son's news searches on the Boston bombers, and her husband's searches for backpacks.

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/01/new-york-police-terrorism-pressure-cooker

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 20:35, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

This case appears to be FBI and we don't know how they investigated it. Most of Snowden's claims are not true. Until now there's hardly to no evidence which proves what he claims. The same thing again with XKeyscore: that's not the super data collecting thing as the Guardian says, but only a data analysing tool. P2Peter (talk) 23:06, 1 August 2013 (UTC)

In the case above: it is indeed hard to prove at the moment, and shouldn't be moved to the body of the article yet. That said: involvement of the FBI does not preclude the use of XKEYSCORE, nor would a "tip" from the British or others in the Five Eyes alliance, since the headers on the slideshow indicate that each intelligence is aware of its existence.

To date nearly every one of Snowden's claims has been validated, either by his documents themselves, by testimony before congress, or by additional governmental disclosures. I could go on in tremendous detail if you really want me to. I've spent some time with the documents. The slides from XKeyscore show that it is a full take system on internet content we can debate whether it has a role in acquiring the content, or is merely analyzing content acquired from other systems. A database of all Americans really is maintained by the NSA (page 3, last paragraph) The NSA really is collecting a log of all your phone calls . The various internet companies all deny involvement in PRISM but then there are the slides to contend with. There are also documents on boundless informant. . His documents also back up earlier disclosures, particularly those of Thomas Drake, Bill Binney, and Mark Klein. Additional supporting material can also be found on the senate site of Ron Wyden .

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 00:05, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

References

An updated version of the above article mentions that the FBI actually started investigating as a result of a tip from the father's employer. I suppose that's good news. --71.20.55.6 (talk) —Preceding undated comment added 15:17, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

Reactions

First....

Wikimedia will be incrementally enabling HTTPS services. Seems important somehow.

http://blog.wikimedia.org/2013/08/01/future-https-wikimedia-projects/

---71.20.55.6 (talk) 04:45, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

Reactions and analysis by experts.

http://delimiter.com.au/2013/08/02/xkeyscore-nsa-surveillance-leaks-australian-expert-reaction/

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 05:09, 2 August 2013 (UTC)

Article seems quite undeveloped so far

There is a lot of notable info in the CNN story but I think only the NSA response has been included here? Also the New Yorker article [1] seems absent. I'll check back in the next few days and try to help out. And what's with the Guardian "interpretation"? That could be said about every news article, I think...maybe I'm wrong? May122013 (talk) 04:42, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

It could use a your help. Actually, it could use other people's help too.

• Clarify the "revealing" section. Find out who really was First, I think Armbinder probably has first claim (i think his primary sources are public job postings and linkedin, find out more). Then the guardian had a one line log entry in an article. Next O Globo with a big reveal in Latin America, which turned up a few documents. And then the BIG reveal in the guardian.
• UPLOAD the rest of the images in the Guardian's article. And at least let us know where to find them. They are not subject to copyright, as they were created by the US government.
• expansion.
• hunt more sources regarding capabilities. That paragraph is based largely on MY reading of the slides themselves. I'm fairly geeky, but hardly a top expert.
• hunt info about reactions and effects around the world.
• All kinds of cleanup, grammar, wording.
• Determine with more certainty whether the tool is used solely for analytics, or if it also plays a role in collection itself. (Im my view the slides seem to confirm Armbinder's view of it being purely analytic)
• use info to expand the Pinwale, turbulance, marina other associated articles.
• Determine whether and how the system ties in with PRISM, or for that matter any other known NSA tools.
• find out what isn't mentioned above and include it, too. :)

--71.20.55.6 (talk) 11:30, 4 August 2013 (UTC)

Images Uploaded --Paulmd199 (talk) 04:28, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

Pinwale and Turbulence Expanded slightly --Paulmd199 (talk) 06:28, 6 August 2013 (UTC)

Xkeyscore does more than has been disclosed

Still digesting this. According to two former Intelligence Community (IC) computer engineering veterans with nearly half-a-century of experience between them, X-KEYSCORE is basically a search interface overlaid on top of NSA’s DNI SIGINT collection programs that allows an analyst to do far more than just troll the Internet -- it actually provides a searching capability that reaches deep into the entire global telecommunications grid.

• Not only internet, but all digital communications
• hijack microphones of mobile phones
• All Public Switched Telephone Networks including SWIFT and SITA
• Successor to "PINWHALE" [sic?]
• In view of engineer: 300 successes it probably true, but UNLIKELY to be attributed to just one software system.
  • My own observation would seem to confirm this; as 54 success stories for the bulk telephone collection became 13 with a homeland nexus, of those only ONE was a planned attack, and even that one success not definably attributable. (there was a also fellow who was caught sending $8K to terrorists)
• Doubts expressed on whether system lives up to billing
• Concern over scalability: And he saw other flaws, including the computational scalability of X-KEYSCORE. The phrase, "simply add a new server to the cluster” to scale the system linearly, he said, “is a tip off to me that when the system slows down, it is trivial and easy to add more hardware to make the system go faster.” But “Not quite,” he said, saying, “Throwing hardware at a computationally or volume bound ‘problem’ does not work." It's "Marketing baloney," he said.
• Concern over how well t he person who drafted the slides actually understood the system. “However, I would point out that whoever prepared that presentation probably had only a vague understanding of how the system actually works, but a very good understanding of how to sell a program. If we could actually see the technical details and talk to the analysts using it, we could make a better assessment. I am not saying he is wrong on this, but that his initial assessment may be based on inaccurate data. On the other hand, it would not be the first time that NSA has purchased a worthless pile of Vapor Ware, and then proceeded to sell its virtues to both Congress and the US public.” (Note: this might refer to theTrailblazer Project --Except for the bit about selling it to the PUBLIC)
• Concern over marketing Buzzwords like "Big Data"

A very detailed article, Also relevant to Pinwale.

http://www.hstoday.us/blogs/the-kimery-report/blog/exclusive-nsas-x-keyscore-does-far-more-than-just-siphon-the-net-but-is-it-working/f419986393a64eec5bf2630815d3da3e.html

--Paulmd199 (talk) 20:49, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Thank you for this new info. I will try to make sense out of it too. P2Peter (talk) 21:38, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Reports related to Xkeyscore

Extracts from various reports

• one foot in prison
• big and scary
• strong and powerful
• up to employees to tame
• do whatever they like
• Provides valuable and unique intelligence that other programs miss
• more precise than before - efficient
• Training in at least one instance borrowed from video games -- analysts acquire 'skillz', unlock achievements, etc.
• non-specific criteria and behavior detection.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/germany-is-a-both-a-partner-to-and-a-target-of-nsa-surveillance-a-916029.html --Paulmd199 (talk) 02:29, 13 August 2013 (UTC)

iPhone fingerprint scanner - privacy/security issues

The article should consider in more depth the possible privacy/security issues with the fingerprint scanner.

Does the NSA (and GCHQ) already have the ‘key’ to your iPhone?

If you have visited the USA in about the last 10 years, on clearing immigration you will have to have given the US a (digital) copy of your fingerprints.

So, if your fingerprints are to be the new ‘key’ to the iPhone (and other future gadgets to follow), who exactly has a copy of that ‘key’?

If the NSA already has the ‘key’ to your iPhone, it is not a great leap to imagine that software could be made so that that ‘key’ could be used remotely to access your data.

It has already been shown that these Governmental agencies have an unquenchable thirst to spy on their own citizens (let alone people outside of their country).

Likewise, if you obtained a UK biometric passport (or an UK ID card) then GCHQ will have a digital copy of your fingerprints. Also, in the UK, if you were arrested (but were never convicted of an offense), then the police have the right to take and keep your fingerprints.

If finger print technology becomes the gold standard means of authenticating your identity (e.g. to access email, banking as well as phone data), then your fingerprints could become the ultimate ‘skeleton key’ for all your data.

Again, the question remains, who already has that data and who could get a hold of it?

Unlike passwords, a fingerprint cannot be ‘reset’

What happens if your fingerprint data becomes compromised?

In traditional security systems, when a password has been cracked, it is a small matter to reset your password (or passwords). However, you can never ‘reset’ a fingerprint. If compromised, your finger prints will remain a permanent open backdoor to your personal security.

It seems that some people are happy for the UK Government (and successive Governments) to have such data, and to be spied on by them. However, what happens if someone else gets a copy of your fingerprints?

High-tech criminal fraud is already big business worldwide and criminal gangs are particularly adept at hacking, and so might actively seek to get your finger print data. With the advent of iPhone5S and iTunes allowing purchases using fingerprint data (and further business models no doubt set to follow) criminal gangs will be incentivized like never before to get your fingerprint data.

In the future, there may be more value in stealing your phone for its fingerprint data than stealing the phone itself. As for the phone re-sale market, you will have to be pretty sure that your fingerprint data is gone, or you may lose considerably more than you made selling your phone.

If your fingerprint data became compromised, perhaps you could try to block the use of your fingerprints as a means of authentication, but you would need to notify every person, business, and governmental organ that your fingerprints have been compromised. Good luck with that!

In the future, if fingerprints become the standard means of authenticating your identity, then you should take great care who you give that data to now, if stolen your life could become very difficult in the future.

iSpy an iPhone?

Also: Senator Al Franken, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology and the Law, has written to Apple boss Tim Cook explaining his security concerns: [2]

11:23, 24 September 2013 (UTC)