Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists

Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
Leader	first Bohdan Kravciv last Volodymyr Timtchyj
Headquarters
Colors	Red, Black

Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists or OUN ([Організація Українських Націоналістів, Orhanizatsiya Ukrayins’kykh Natsionalistiv] Error: {{Lang-xx}}: text has italic markup (help) or ОУН) was a Ukrainian political movement originally created in 1929 in the interwar Poland (modern western Ukraine). The OUN at one time accepted violence as an acceptable tool in the fight against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause as the revenge upon the occupation of Ukraine by Poland, Russia, and Germany. The OUN's stated immediate goal was to protect the Ukrainian population from repression and exploitation by Polish governing authorities in particular; its ultimate goal was an independent and unified Ukrainian state. In 1940, the OUN split into two parts, with the older more moderate members supporting Andriy Melnyk (OUN-M) while the younger and more radical members supporting Stepan Bandera (OUN-B). The latter group came to control the nationalist movement in western Ukraine including the OUN's military wing, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which was a major Ukrainian armed resistance movement.

History

Background and Creation

File:JevhenKonovalec.jpg

Yevhen Konovalets

In 1919, the West Ukrainian National Republic was conquered by Poland. One year later, a small group of exiled Ukrainian officers created the Ukrainian Military Organization, an underground military organization composed of Ukrainian veterans whose goal was to continue the armed struggle against Poland, to destabilize the political situation, and to prepare disarmed veterans for an anti-Polish uprising. The UVO was strictly a military organization with a military command structure. Its leader was Yevhen Konovalets, the former commander of the elite Sich Riflemen unit of the Ukrainian military, and was secretly funded by West Ukrainian political parties. Although it engaged in acts of sabotage, including the attempted assassination in 1921 of Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, it was more of a military protective group than a terrorist underground. When in 1923 the Allies recognized Polish rule over western Ukraine, many members left the organization, and the Ukrainian legal parties turned against its militant actions preferring to work within the Polish political system. As a result, the UVO turned to Germany and Lithuania for political and financial support, and established contact with militant anti-Polish student organizations, such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. After preliminary meetings in Berlin in 1927 and Prague in 1928, at the founding congress in Vienna in 1929 the veterans of the UVO and the student militants met in Vienna and united to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Although most of its members were Galician youths, its first leader was Yevhen Konovalets and its leadership council, the Provid, was composed mostly of veterans and was based abroad.

Pre-war Activities

At the time of its founding, the OUN was originally a fringe movement in western Ukraine, where the political scene was dominated by the mainstream and moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Party (UNDO). This party promoted constitutional democracy and sought to achieve independence through peaceful means. UNDO was supported by the Ukrainian clergy, intelligentsia, and the traditional establishment and published the main western Ukrainian newspaper, Dilo.

In contrast, the OUN accepted violence as a political tool against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause. Most of its activity was directed against Polish politicians and government representatives. Under the command of the Western Ukrainian Territorial Executive (established February 1929), the OUN carried out hundreds of acts of sabotage in Galicia and Volhynia, including a campaign of arson against Polish landowners (which helped provoke the 1930 Pacification), boycotts of state schools and Polish tobacco and liquor monopolies, dozens of expropriation attacks on government institutions to obtain funds for its activities, and some sixty assassinations. Some of the OUN's victims included Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish promoter of Ukrainian/Polish compromise, Emilian Czechowski, Lviv's Polish police commissioner, Alexei Mailov, a Soviet consular official killed in retaliation for the Holodomor, and most notably Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish interior minister. The OUN also killed moderate Ukrainian figures such as the respected teacher (and former officer of the military of the West Ukrainian People's Republic) Ivan Babii. Such acts were condemned by the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, who was particularly critical of the OUN's leadership in exile who inspired acts of youthful violence, writing that they were "using our children to kill their parents" and that "whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of the people."

As Polish persecution of Ukrainians during the interwar period increased, many Ukrainians (particularly the youth, many of whom felt they had no future) lost faith in traditional legal approaches, in their elders, and in the western democracies who were seen as turning their backs on Ukraine. This period of disillusionment coincided with the increase in support for the OUN. By the beginning of the Second World War, the OUN was estimated to have 20,000 active members and several times that number in sympathizers. Many bright students, such as the talented young poets Bohdan Kravtsiv and Olena Teliha (executed by the Nazis at Babi Yar) were attracted to the OUN's revolutionary message. In 1936 and 1937, the Poles used claims of OUN involvement to justify mass arrests of Ukrainians, particularly youths.

As a means to gain independence from Polish and Soviet oppression, before World War II the OUN accepted material and moral support from Nazi Germany. The Germans, needed Ukrainian assistance against the Soviet Union, were expected by the OUN to further the goal of Ukrainian independence. Although some elements of the German military were inclined to do so, they were ultimately overruled by Hitler and his political organization, whose racial prejudice against the Ukrainians precluded cooperation [fact].

Split within the OUN

Andriy Melnyk

Stepan Bandera

There had always been some tension within the OUN between the young radical Galician students and the older military veteran leadership based abroad. The older generation has the experience of growing up in a stable society and of having fought for Ukraine in regular armies; the younger generation had only known Polish repression and an underground struggle. The leadership abroad, such as general thought of itself as an unapproachble elite. Most of the Provid, such as general Mykola Kapustiansky, referred to themselves using their military titles acquired during the war (which the youthful members could never attain). They were also more politically moderate, and adhered to an officer's code of honor and standads of military discipline that prevented them from fully following the belief that any means could be used to achieve the goal. In contrast, the youths were more impulsive, violent, and ruthless. The older leaders living in exile admired aspects of Benito Mussolini's fascism but condemned Nazism while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired fascist ideas and methods as practiced by the Nazis. Despite such differences, the OUN's leader Yevhen Konovalets through his considerable political skill and reputation was able to command enough respect to maintain unity within the organization. This unity was, however, shattered when Konovalets was assassinated by Soviet agent Pavel Sudoplatov in Rotterdam in May, 1938. Andriy Melnyk, a 48 year old former colonel in the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and one of the founders of the Ukrainian Military Organization was chosen to lead the OUN despite not having been involved in political or terrorist activities throughout the 1930's. Calm and dignified, Melnyk was more friendly to the Church than any of his associates (the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was generally anti-clerical), and had even became the chairman of a Ukrainian Catholic youth organization that was regarded as anti-Nationalist by many OUN members. His choice was seen as an attempt by the leadership to repair ties with the Church and to become more pragmatic and moderate. However, this direction was counter to the trend within western Ukraine itself.

The Galician youths formed the majority of the membership. Due to their presence in western Ukraine rather than in exile abroad, they faced the danger of arrest and imprisonment. Yet, they were shut out of the leadership. After failing to come to an agreement with their elder leaders in the Provid, in August 1940 they held their own leadership conference, choosing Stepan Bandera, who as an iron-willed, extremist conspirator was in many ways the opposite of the cautious, moderate and dignified Melnyk. On the eve of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the OUN was thus divided into two competing and hostile factions: the "legitimate" OUN-M headed by Andrii Melnyk and the OUN-B (or OUN-R for "revolutionary") headed by Stepan Bandera. Each group had its strengths. The OUN-M retained the loyalty of some youths in Galicia as well as a majority of the youths in the regions of Bukovyna and Trancarpathia, whose political leader monsignor Avgustyn Voloshyn praised Melnyk as a Christian of European culture, in contrast to many nationalists who placed the nation above God. . The OUN-M's leadership was more experienced and had some limited contacts in Eastern Ukraine; it also maintained contact with German intelligence and the Germany army. The OUN-B, on the other hand, enjoyed the support of the majority of the nationalistic Galician youth, who formed the backbone of the underground nationalist movement. It had a strong network of devoted followers and was powerfully aided by Mykola Lebed, who began to organize the feared Sluzhba Bezpeky or SB, a secret police force modelled on the Cheka with a reputation for ruthlessness.

Within the Bandera group but somewhat apart from its political leaders such as Stepan Bandera or Mykola Lebed were a number of young Galicians whose interests were primarily pragmatic and military. The most prominant among them was Roman Shukhevych. This group was not yet very significant, although their importance would increase rapidly later, during the period of OUN war-time resistence.

During the German-Soviet War

The Early Years of the War and Activities in Central and Eastern Ukraine

After the invasion of Poland in September 1939, both factions of the OUN collaborated with the Germans and used the opportunity of the invasion to send their activists into Soviet-controlled territory. Both OUN factions, OUN-M and OUN-B, created their own special forces units, named "Roland" and "Nachtigall", respectively within the Wehrmacht. Eight days after Germany's invasion of the USSR, on June 30 1941, the OUN-B proclaimed the establishment of Ukrainian State in Lviv, with Yaroslav Stetsko as premier.

One of the versions of the “Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian State” signed by Stepan Bandera.

In response to the declaration, OUN-B leaders and associates were soon arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo. Many OUN-B members were killed outright, or perished in jails and concentration camps. Both of Bandera's brothers were murdered at Auschwitz. On September 18, 1941 Bandera and Stetsko were sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in "Zellenbau Bunker". With Bandera were all the most important prisoners of the third Reich, such as the ex-prime minister of France Leon Blum and ex-chancellor of Austria, Kurt Schuschnigg. Prisoners of Zellenbau received help from the Red Cross unlike common concentration camp prisoners and were able to send and receive parcels from their relatives. Bandera also received help from the OUN-B including financial assistance. The Germans permitted the Ukrainian nationalists to leave the bunker for important meeting with OUN representatives in Fridental Castle which was 200 meters from Sachsenhausen. , where they were kept until September 1944.

As a result of the German crackdown on the OUN-B, the faction controlled by Melnyk enjoyed an advantage over its rival and was able to occupy many positions in the civil administration of former Soviet Ukraine during the first months of German occupation. The first city which it administered was Zhitomir, the first major city across the old Soviet-Polish border. Here, the OUN-M helped stimulate the development of Prosvita societies, the appearance of local artists on Ukrainian-language broadcasts, the opening of two new secondary schools and a pedagogical institute, and the establishment of a school administration. Many locals were recruited into the OUN-M. The OUN-M also organized police forces, recruited from Soviet prisoners of war. Two members senior members of its leadership, or Provid, even came to Zhitomir. At the end of August 1941, however, they were both gunned down, allegedly by the OUN-B which had justified the assassination in their literature and had issued a secret directive (referred to by Andriy Melnyk as a "death sentence") not to allow OUN-M leaders to reach Kiev. In retaliation, the German authorities, often tipped off by OUN-M members, began mass arrests and executions of OUN-B members, to a large extent eliminating it in much of central and eastern Ukraine.

As the Wehrmacht moved East, the OUN-M established control of Kiev's civil administration; that city's mayor from October 1941 until January 1942, Volodymyr Bahaziy, belonged to the OUN-M and used his position to funnel money into it and to help the OUN-M take control over Kiev's police. The OUN-M also initiated the creation of the Ukrainian National COuncil in Kiev, which was to become the basis for a future Ukrainian government. At this time, the OUN-M also came to control Kiev's largest newspaper and was able to attract many supporters from among the central and eastern Ukrainian intelligentsia. Alarmed by the OUN-M's growing strength in central and eastern Ukraine, the German Nazi authorities swiftly and brutally cracked down on it, arresting and executing many of its members in early 1942, including Volodymyr Bahaziy, and the writer Olena Teliha who had organized led the League of Ukrainian Writers in Kiev. Although during this time elements within the Wehrmacht tried in vain to protect OUN-M members, the organization was largely wiped out within central and eastern Ukraine.

The OUN-B's Struggle for Dominance in Western Ukraine

As the OUN-M was being wiped out in the regions of central and western Ukraine that had been east of the old Polish-Soviet border, in Volhynia the OUN-B, with easy acces from its base in Galicia, began to establish and consolidate its control over the nationalist movement and much of the countryside. Unwilling and unable to openly resist the Germans in early 1942, it methodically set about creating a clandestine organization, engaging in propoganda work, and building weapons stockpiles. A major aspect of its programme was the infiltration of the local police; the OUN-B was able to establish control over the police academy in Rivne. By doing so the OUN-B hoped to eventually overwhelm the German occupation authorities ("If there were fifty policemen to five Germans, who would hold power then?"). In their role within the police, Bandera's forces were involved in the extermination of Jewish civilians and the clearing of Jewish ghettoes, actions that contributed to the OUN-B's weapon stockpiles. In addition, blackmailing Jews served as a source of added finances. During the time that the OUN-B in Volhynia was avoiding conflict with the German authorities and working with them, resistence to the Germans was limited to Soviet partisans on the extreme northern edge of the region, to small bands of OUN-M fighters, and to a group of guerillas knowns as the UPA or the Polessian Sich, unaffiliated with the OUN-B and led by Taras Bulba-Borovets of the exiled Ukrainian People's Republic.

By late 1942, the status quo for the OUN-B was proving to be increasingly difficult. The German authorites were becoming increasingly repressive towards the Ukrainian population, and the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such actions. Furthermore, Soviet partisan activity threatened to become the major outlet for anti-German resistance among western Ukrainians. By March 1943, the OUN-B leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German police in 1941-1942, numbering between 4,000-5,000 trained and armed soldiers, to desert with their weapons and to join the units of the OUN-B in Volyn. Borovets attempted to unite his UPA, the smaller OUN-M and other nationalist bands, and the OUN-B underground into an all-party front. The OUN-M agreed, while the OUN-B refused, in part due to the insistance of the OUN-B that their leaders be in control of the organization. After negotiations failed, the OUN commander Dmytro Klyachkivsky coopted the name of Borovets' organization, UPA, and decided to accomplish by force what could not be accomplished through negotiation: the unification of Ukrainian nationalist forces under OUN-B control. On July 6th, the large OUN-M group was surrounded and surrendered, and soon afterward mostof the independent groups disappeared; they were either destroyed by the Communist partisans or the OUN-B, or joined the latter. On August 18th, 1943, Taras Bulba-Borovets and his headquarters was surrounded in a suprise attack by OUN-B force consisting of several battalions. Some of his forces, including his wife, were captured, while five of his officers were killed. Borovets escaped but refused to submit, in a letter accusing the OUN-B of among other things: banditry; of wanting to establish a one-party state; and of fighting not for the people but in order to rule the people. In retaliation, his wife was murdered after two weeks of torture at the hands of the OUN-B's SB. In October 1943 Bulba-Borovets largely disbanded his depleted force in orer to end further bloodshed. In their struggle for dominance in Volhynia, the Banderists would kill tens of thousands of Ukrainians for links to Bulba-Borovets or Melnyk.

The OUN-B's Struggle Against Germany and the Soviet Union

Further information: Ukrainian Insurgent Army

By the fall of 1943 the OUN-B forces had established their control over substantial portions of rural areas in Volhynia and southwstern Polesia. While the Germans controlled the large towns and major roads, such a large area east of Rivne had come under the control of the OUN-B that it was able to set about creating a "state" system with military training schools, hospitals and a school system, involving tens of thousands of personnel. Its military, the UPA, which came under the command of Roman Shukhevich in August 1943, would fight against the Germans and later the Soviets until the mid-1950's. It would also play a major role in the ethnic cleansing of the Polish population from western Ukraine. For more information about the UPA, see: Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

After the Second World War

After the war, the OUN in eastern and southern Ukraine continued to struggle against the Soviets; 1958 marked the last year when an OUN member was arrested in Donetsk. Both branches of the OUN continued to be quite influential within the Ukrainian diaspora. The OUN-B formed, in 1943, an organization called the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (headed by Yaroslav Stetsko). The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations it created and headed would include at various times emigre organizations from almost every eastern European country with the exception of Poland: Croatia, the Baltic countries, anti-communist emigre Cossacks, Hungary, Georgia, Czechia, and Slovakia. In the 1970's the ABN was joined by anti-communist Vietnamese and Cuban organizations.

After the fall of Communism the OUN resumed activities within Ukraine, reorganizing itself there as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN). Until her death in 2003, KUN was headed by Slava Stetsko, widow of Yaroslav Stetsko, who simulataneously headed the OUN and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. The Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists is currently a member of Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine Bloc.

Ideology

The OUN grew from the 1917-1921 veterans, whose vision of an independent Ukrainian state had been short lived. According to its initial declaration, the primary goal of OUN was to establish an independent, united national state on ethnic Ukrainian territory. This goal was to be achieved by a national revolution, that would drive out the occupying powers and set up a government representing all regions and Ukrainian social groups. The OUN's leadership felt that past attempts at securing independence failed due to democracy, poor discipline and a conciliatory attitude towards Ukraine's traditional enemies. Accordingly, its ideology rejected the socialist ideas supported by Petliura and the compromises of Galicia's traditional elite. Instead the OUN, particularly its younger members, adopted the ideology of Dmytro Dontsov, an émigré from Eastern Ukraine.

Integral Nationalism

The Ukrainian nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had been largely liberal or socialist, combining Ukrainian national consciousness with patriotism and humanist values. In contrast, the nationalists who emerged in Galicia following the First World War adopted the form of nationalism known as Integral nationalism. According to this ideology, the nation was held to be of the highest absolute value, more important than social class, regions, the individual, religion, etc. To this end, OUN members were urged to "force their way into all areas of national life" such as institutions, societies, villages and families. Politics was seen as a Darwinian struggle between nations for survival, rendering conflict unavoidable and justifying any means that would lead to the victory of one's nation over that of others. In this context willpower was seen as more important than reason, and warfare was glorified as an expression of national vitality. Inegral nationalism became a powerful force in much of Europe during the 1920's and 1930's. Dmytro Dontsov and the OUN's conceptualization of this idea was particular in several ways. Because Ukraine was stateless and surrounded by more powerful neighbors, the emphasis on force and warfare was to be expressed in acts of terrorism rather than open warfare, and illegality was glorified. Because Ukrainians did not have a state to glorify or serve, the emphasise was placed on a "pure" national language and culture. There was a strain of fantastic romanticism, in which the unsophistiocated Ukrainian rejection of reason was more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by German or Italian integral nationalists.

Nationalism of the Deed

Dmytro Dontsov claimed that the 20th century would witness the "twilight of the gods to whom the nineteenth century prayed" and that a new man must be created, with the "fire of fanatical commitment" and the "iron force of enthusiasm", and that the only way forward was through "the organization of a new violence." This new doctrine was the chynnyi natsionalizm – the "nationalism of the deed." To dramatize and spread such views, OUN literature mythologized the cult of struggle, sacrifice, and emphasized national heroes.

Totalitarianism

The nation was to be unified under a single party led by a hierarchy of proven fighters. At the top was to be a Supreme Leader, or Vozhd. In some respects the OUN's creed was similar to that of other eastern European, radical right-wing agrarian movements, such as Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael, Croatia's Ustashe, Hungary's Arrow Cross Party, and similar groups in Slovakia and Poland. There were, however, significant differences within the OUN regarding the extent of its totalitarianism. The more moderate leaders living in exile admired some facets of Benito Mussolini's fascism but condemned Nazism while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired the fascist ideas and methods as practiced by the Nazis. The faction based abroad supported rapproachment with the Ukrainian Catholic Church while the younger radicals were anti-clerical and felt that not considering the Nation to be the Absolute was a sign of weakness.

At a party congress in August 1943, the OUN-B rejected much of its fascistic ideology in favor of a social democratic model, while maintaining its hierarchical structure. This change could be attributed in part to the influence of the leadership of Roman Shukhevych, the new leader of [[Ukrainian Insurgent Army |UPA]], who was more focused on military matters rather than on ideology and was more receptive to different ideological themes than were the fanatical OUN-B political leaders, and was interested in gaining and maintaining the support of deserters or others from Eastern Ukraine. During this party congress, the OUN-B backed off its commitment to private ownership of land, increased worker participation in management of industry, equality for women, free health services and pensions for the elderly, and free education. Some points in the program referred to the rights of national minorities and guarenteed freedom of speech, religion, and the press and rejected the official status of any doctrine. Nevertheless, the authoritarian elements were not discarded completely and were reflected in continued insistance on the "heroic spirit" and "social solidarity, friendship and discipline."

In exile, the OUN's ideology was focused on opposition to communism.

OUN and Antisemitism

Unlike the Croatian Ustashe or Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael to whom the OUN can be compared, the OUN's ideology did not emphasize antisemitism. Indeed, three of its leaders, General Mykola Kapustiansky, Rico Yary, and Mykola Skyborski, were married to Jewish women. According to the OUN, Ukraine's primary enemies were considered to be Poles and Russians, with Jews playing a secondary role. German documents of the period lead to the impression that extreme Ukrainian nationalists were indifferent to the plight of the Jews; they were willing to either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate for their political goals. The OUN was willing to support Nazi antisemitic policies if doing so would help their cause. For example, a resolution of the Second General Congress of OUN-B (April, 1941, Krakow) called the "Jews of the USSR the most faithful supporters of the Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of the Muscovite imperialism in the Ukraine." A slogan put forth by the Bandera group and recorded in the July 16, 1941 Einsatzgruppen report stated: "Long live Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles behind the river San, Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows", and the OUN members who infiltrated the German police were involved in clearing ghettoes and helping the Germans to implement the Final Solution. Once the OUN was at war with Germany, such instances lessened and finally stopped. An underground OUN publication in 1943 condemned "German racism, which carried anthropological nonsense to the absurd." There were many cases of Jews having been sheltered from the Nazis by the OUN-B's military wing UPA and Jews fought in the ranks of UPA .

See also

• Operation Wisła
• Massacres of Poles in Volhynia
• Roman Shukhevych
• Stepan Bandera
• Andriy Melnyk

External links

• Website of the OUN-M
• 65 years of OUN
• Newspaper Article about the Crimes and Execution of OUN activists in the 1930's

References

Inline

General

• Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, ISBN 0-300-08355-6.
• Orest Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, ISBN 0-8020-5808-6.
• Paul Robert Magocsi, Morality and Reality: the Life and Times of Andrei Sheptytskyi, Edmonton Alberta: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, 1989, ISBN 0-920862-68-3.
• Template:Pl icon Grzegorz Motyka, Służby bezpieczeństwa Polski i Czechosłowacji wobec Ukraińców (1945-1989), Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, Warszawa 2005, ISBN 83-89078-86-4
• Template:Pl icon Władysław Siemaszko, Ewa Siemaszko "Ludobójstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistów ukraińskich na ludności polskiej Wołynia 1939-1945, by Kancelaria Prezydenta Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Warszawa 2000, tom I i II, 1433 pages, photos, queles, ISBN 83-87689-34-3
• The Intermarium: Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism by Dr. Jonathan Levy