Two-level game theory

Two-level game theory is a political model of international conflict resolution between states derived from game theory and originally introduced in 1988 by Robert Putnam.^[1]

Putnam had been involved in research around the G7 summits between 1976 and 1979. However at the fourth summit, held in Bonn in 1978, he observed a qualitative shift in how the negotiations worked.

The model views international negotiations between states as consisting of simultaneous negotiations at both the intranational level (i.e. domestic) and the international level (i.e. between governments).^[2] Over domestic negotiations, the chief negotiator absorbs the concern of societal actors and builds coalitions with them; at the international level, the chief negotiator seeks an agreement that is amongst the possible "wins" in his state's "win-set". Win-sets are the possible outcomes that are likely to be accepted by the domestic interest groups who either must ratify the agreement or provide some other form of government backing.^{[citation needed]} International agreements occur when there is an overlap between the win-sets of the states involved in the international negotiations.^[3]

References

^ Putnam 1988; Williams & Covarrubias 2009, p. 275.
^ Méndez 2017, p. 8.
^ Méndez 2017, pp. 8–9.

Bibliography

Méndez, Álvaro (2017). Colombian Agency and the Making of US Foreign Policy: Intervention by Invitation. Abingdon, England: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-21573-8.
Putnam, Robert D. (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games". International Organization. 42 (3): 427–460. doi:10.1017/S0020818300027697. ISSN 1531-5088. JSTOR 2706785.
Williams, Matthew A.; Covarrubias, Jack (2009). "Rebalancing America's War on Terror: President Obama". In Lansford, Tom; Watson, Robert P.; Covarrubias, Jack (eds.). America's War on Terror (2nd ed.). Farnham, England: Ashgate. pp. 261–282. ISBN 978-0-7546-7787-1.

Da Conceição-Heldt, Eugénia; Mello, Patrick A. (2017). "Two-Level Games in Foreign Policy Analysis". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.496. ISBN 9780190228637.
Wilson, Ann Conner (2010). Putnam's Two-Level Game: Case Studies of Serbian and Russian Reactions to the Kosovar and Chechen Independence Movements (MA thesis). Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University. Retrieved 22 October 2018.

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[FOOTNOTEPutnam1988WilliamsCovarrubias2009275-1] Putnam 1988; Williams & Covarrubias 2009, p. 275.

[FOOTNOTEMéndez20178-2] Méndez 2017, p. 8.

[FOOTNOTEMéndez20178–9-3] Méndez 2017, pp. 8–9.

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v t e Topics of game theory
Definitions	Congestion game Cooperative game Determinacy Escalation of commitment Extensive-form game First-player and second-player win Game complexity Graphical game Hierarchy of beliefs Information set Normal-form game Preference Sequential game Simultaneous game Simultaneous action selection Solved game Succinct game Mechanism design
Equilibrium concepts	Bayes correlated equilibrium Bayesian Nash equilibrium Berge equilibrium Core Correlated equilibrium Coalition-proof Nash equilibrium Epsilon-equilibrium Evolutionarily stable strategy Gibbs equilibrium Mertens-stable equilibrium Markov perfect equilibrium Nash equilibrium Pareto efficiency Perfect Bayesian equilibrium Proper equilibrium Quantal response equilibrium Quasi-perfect equilibrium Risk dominance Satisfaction equilibrium Self-confirming equilibrium Sequential equilibrium Shapley value Strong Nash equilibrium Subgame perfection Trembling hand equilibrium
Strategies	Appeasement Backward induction Bid shading Collusion Cheap talk De-escalation Deterrence Escalation Forward induction Grim trigger Markov strategy Pairing strategy Dominant strategies Pure strategy Mixed strategy Strategy-stealing argument Tit for tat
Classes of games	Auction Bargaining problem Global game Intransitive game Mean-field game n-player game Perfect information Large Poisson game Potential game Repeated game Screening game Signaling game Strictly determined game Stochastic game Symmetric game Zero-sum game
Games	Go Chess Infinite chess Checkers All-pay auction Prisoner's dilemma Gift-exchange game Optional prisoner's dilemma Traveler's dilemma Coordination game Chicken Centipede game Lewis signaling game Volunteer's dilemma Dollar auction Battle of the sexes Stag hunt Matching pennies Ultimatum game Electronic mail game Rock paper scissors Pirate game Dictator game Public goods game Blotto game War of attrition El Farol Bar problem Fair division Fair cake-cutting Bertrand competition Cournot competition Stackelberg competition Deadlock Diner's dilemma Guess 2/3 of the average Kuhn poker Nash bargaining game Induction puzzles Trust game Princess and monster game Rendezvous problem
Theorems	Aumann's agreement theorem Folk theorem Minimax theorem Nash's theorem Negamax theorem Purification theorem Revelation principle Sprague–Grundy theorem Zermelo's theorem
Key figures	Albert W. Tucker Amos Tversky Antoine Augustin Cournot Ariel Rubinstein Claude Shannon Daniel Kahneman David K. Levine David M. Kreps Donald B. Gillies Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin Harold W. Kuhn Herbert Simon Hervé Moulin John Conway Jean Tirole Jean-François Mertens Jennifer Tour Chayes John Harsanyi John Maynard Smith John Nash John von Neumann Kenneth Arrow Kenneth Binmore Leonid Hurwicz Lloyd Shapley Melvin Dresher Merrill M. Flood Olga Bondareva Oskar Morgenstern Paul Milgrom Peyton Young Reinhard Selten Robert Axelrod Robert Aumann Robert B. Wilson Roger Myerson Samuel Bowles Suzanne Scotchmer Thomas Schelling William Vickrey
Search optimizations	Alpha–beta pruning Aspiration window Principal variation search max^n algorithm Paranoid algorithm Lazy SMP
Miscellaneous	Bounded rationality Combinatorial game theory Confrontation analysis Coopetition Evolutionary game theory Glossary of game theory List of game theorists List of games in game theory No-win situation Topological game Tragedy of the commons

References

Bibliography

Further reading