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Heresthetic

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Heresthetic is an approach to understanding how political actors manipulate the decision-making process so they can win.[1] Heresthetic is a positive political theory, including aspects of game theory, public choice theory, rational choice theory, and social choice theory to political science.[2] Political scientist William H. Riker is considered the creator and one of the most prominent supports of theory.[3]

Description

Riker argues that herestheticians win because they compel or persuade others to join them in voting or political coalitions.[4] Heresthetic focuses both on the use of rhetoric and political strategy. Riker argues that there are three vital components to heresthetic.[1]

  1. Agenda control: political agents may structure debate in ways that highlight favorable or eliminate undesirable policy alternatives.[5] Depending upon the order that policy options are discussed, debate can produce different outcomes, including outcomes that are not preferred by the heresthetician.[5] The order of choice matters.[6] Riker's concept of agenda control differs from conventional accounts of agenda-setting involving policy-makers, which focus on how policy-makers’ agendas are influenced by exogenous factors, such as the media and public opinion.[7] Riker's focus is on how policy-makers affect the ordering of items on the political agenda, and how that ordering can be manipulated.[8]
  2. Strategic voting: in deliberative settings herestheticians can take advantage of voting procedures to influence outcomes.[9] For example, agents may vote against their own interest in the short-term to secure a better long-term position. Another element of strategic voting is vote trading.[10] Policy-makers may informally trade votes with others in exchange for future votes or benefits.[11] Strategic voting is common in legislative settings because of open rules and sequential voting procedures.
  3. Dimension manipulation: herestheticians can manipulate the dimensionality of political decision-making by introducing new dimensions or modifying existing framing.[12][13] Dimension manipulation can either expand a decision-making space by reconfiguring acceptable topics of debate and policy alternatives, or shrink dimensions by eliminating certain topics or alternatives.[14] The manipulation of dimensions is important because once an agent manipulates framing, it cannot be removed from debate.[15]

These components allow herestheticians to manipulate political outcomes by structuring debate, rhetorically or structurally, to be more advantageous to their preferred position.[1]

Example

The British Parliament is scheduling upcoming referendum votes to determine Scottish independence from the United Kingdom and if the UK should remain a member of the European Union. A member of parliament who has influence on how the votes will be structured, has a preference that Scotland will remain in union with the UK and that the UK will leave the EU. Scottish independence and the UK remaining a member of the EU is an undesirable outcome for the MP. While polling indicates that a majority of Scottish voters do not support independence, voters are more likely to support independence if the UK leaves the EU.[16] In order to receive his preferred outcome, the MP seeks for the referendum votes to be held in a sequence in which Scottish independence is determined first, and then UK withdrawal from the EU. This voting sequence demonstrates how herestheticians can manipulate the decision-making process so they can win.

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c Riker, William H. (1986). The Art of Political Manipulation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  2. ^ Eamonn Butler (2012). Public Choice—A Primer (PDF) (PDF). London: Institute of Economic Affairs. p. 36.
  3. ^ McLean, Iain C. (2002). "William H. Riker and the Invention of Heresthetic(s)". British Journal of Political Science. 32 (2): 535–558. doi:10.1017/S0007123402000224. JSTOR 4092252.
  4. ^ Riker, William H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  5. ^ a b Smith, Alex P.; Phillips, Stephen C. (2021). "Ways and Means: Teaching Political Strategy and Heresthetic by Simulating the Budget Process". Journal of Political Science Education. 17: 1–11. doi:10.1080/15512169.2021.1897602. S2CID 236762572.
  6. ^ Stoker, Gerry (2017). Why Politics Matters: Making Democracy Work. New York: Palgrave.
  7. ^ Rogers, Everett; Dearing, James (1988). "Agenda-Setting Research: Where Has It Been, Where Is It Going?". Annals of the International Communication Association. 11 (1): 555–594. doi:10.1080/23808985.1988.11678708.
  8. ^ Epstein, Lee; Shvetsova, Olga (2002). "Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme Court". Journal of Theoretical Politics. 14 (1): 93–122. doi:10.1177/095169280201400106. S2CID 154391466.
  9. ^ Enelow, James M.; Hinich, Melvin J. (1990). Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  10. ^ Riker, William H. (1982). Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
  11. ^ "Vote-Trading Ethics". The Washington Post. 2004-10-05. Retrieved 2021-02-25.
  12. ^ Edwards, Damian (2004). "Divide and Conquer: Heresthetic in the Antipodes". Political Science. 56 (2): 65–74. doi:10.1177/003231870405600208. S2CID 145158963.
  13. ^ Robertson, David B. (2006). "A Pivotal Politician and Constitutional Design". American Political Science Review. 100 (2): 303–308. doi:10.1017/S0003055406062186. S2CID 145452373.
  14. ^ Kiviniemi, Marc T.; Snyder, Mark; Johnson, Bethany C. (2008). "Motivated Dimension Manipulation in the Processing of Social Comparison Information". Self and Identity. 7 (3): 225–242. doi:10.1080/15298860701275873. PMC 3805978. PMID 24163591.
  15. ^ Paine, Scott C. (1989). "Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension". Journal of Politics. 51 (1): 36–49. doi:10.2307/2131608. JSTOR 2131608. S2CID 144765660.
  16. ^ "Brexit Has Reignited Scotland's Push for Independence". Foreign Policy. 2020-09-21. Retrieved 2021-02-25.