Wikipedia:Community de-adminship/RfC
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This is a Request for comment (RfC) on a proposal to implement Community de-adminship (CDA) on the English Wikipedia. Community de-adminship (a form of Administrator Recall), would be a method for the Wikipedia community to remove the administrator tools from existing Administrators who have lost the confidence of the community.
- You can read the CDA proposal here.
- You can read an FAQ about the proposal, prepared by editors who worked on it and support it, here.
This page opened for comments 18:50, 22 February 2010 (UTC), and will close 23:59, 22 March 2010 (UTC).
 | Before voting in the poll, please, read this page. It's such a well-written page that will get you up to speed on what has been deliberated upon for months. |
The proposal
The community is being asked whether a proposal for community-based removal of administrator privileges, called Community de-Adminship (CDA) should be implemented as policy on the English Wikipedia.
If WP:CDA is adopted this will require two other amendments:
- The Wikipedia:Guide to Community de-adminship will be described as a "guide to current practice" in the same way that Wikipedia:Guide to requests for adminship is at present.
- It will also be necessary to amend the policy Wikipedia:Administrators to include reference to the WP:CDA process. This step will be undertaken as a technical matter at that page as and when needed.
Closure
When the debate here is concluded, it will be closed in the usual way. If sufficient consensus has not been reached after thirty days, and further discussion would be useful, it will be extended.
If the RfC ends in consensus to implement, such implementation will then be subject to review by the Bureaucrats and Jimmy Wales.
Discussion
Comments by some of the editors who prepared the proposal
This discussion follows on from those at:
There, a poll was conducted that attempted to evaluate the levels of community support for various proposals seeking to create a method by which the community at large (as opposed to Arbitration Committee) could pass comment on the actions of and if necessary remove the tools from, existing Administrators.
The main conclusions of this poll were as follows:
- The status quo, (i.e. no such process being available) whilst garnering some support, was very unpopular. 77% of respondents did not support its continuation.
- Only one proposal achieved a greater degree of support than opposition – "Wikipedia:Community de-adminship" (CDA) – which received a majority of 13, and the support of 65% of those who considered it. This proposed process was designed as a "mirror image" of the existing Wikipedia:Requests for adminship (RfA), and part of its appeal was evidently its familiarity.
The reasons for dissatisfaction with the status quo are complex and varied, but a view was regularly expressed that if the community at large has the authority to appoint administrators through the RfA process, then the community should also be able to remove their powers.
This led to lengthy discussions at:
which attempted to iron out various issues in the then existing Guide to Community de-adminship. This resulted in:
- Some wording changes and clarifications as identified above (Section: Update from WT:CDADR). Few of these were controversial.
- An increase in the nomination period from 3 days to 7 days.
- More emphasis on pre-nomination attempts to resolve any disputes.
- Most complex of all, a more specific statement about how the outcome shall be judged. Various options were considered and two specifics are identified as part of this RfC (see below).
In many cases the above discussions were a conflict between:
- The desire to make the process simpler or easier to implement in order to avoid allowing those perceived as having abused their Administrative tools to continue without fear of sanction, and
- The desire to avoid a system in which Administrators, who almost inevitably find themselves taking on potentially controversial tasks on the community's behalf, are discouraged from taking action for fear of reprisals via a Recall method that is too easy for aggrieved editors to make use of when they don't get their way.
The resulting changes to the Guide to Community de-adminship were a compromise between these two poles.
Flaws in this process noted by TenOfAllTrades
The nature and development of the CDA process
| Caution: Imagining CDA as a 'reverse RFA' or mirror image of RfA is misleading and harmful. |
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The CDA proposal has been portrayed as a 'mirror image' or 'reverse' of the RfA process. This representation is potentially quite harmful, as it implies certain symmetries. While at the most simplistic level one could argue that the two processes are equal and opposite – one flips the switch on, one turns it off – in practice the circumstances surrounding each case are very different.
The glib assumption that since the effect of the two processes mirror one another then the mechanics of the processes ought to mirror one another too does not stand up under scrutiny. It is a specious, even dangerous false analogy. |
| Proposal development was hampered by set-in-stone votes barring review of previous decisions. |
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While this proposal has nominally been under development since at least mid-November, in practice the process being voted on now is essentially identical to the proposal drafted by Uncle G on 5 October 2009: [1]. Despite the many issues raised below, any suggestion of substantial changes to the proposal have been rejected as the issue was 'already decided'. A series of rigidly-structured majority votes have been used to introduce minor tweaks (number of days for nomination, adjusted eligibility rules, suggested percentages for 'consensus' to reduce Bureaucrat discretion, etc.), but there has never been any question of – or opportunity to – modify the original process in light of subsequent discussion. Kim Bruning recently offered perhaps the most insightful analogy; I will allow those words to speak for themselves: [2]. |
| Policy proponents have not identified any specific situations where CDA would be useful, nor any metrics against which it should be evaluated. |
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The proposal's proponents have repeatedly rejected calls to describe any specific situations – past, present, or future – where they believe that CDA could be used to benefit the Wikipedia community. In their FAQ, they explain this reluctance on the basis that such discussions might lead to "abusive sidetracks". At some point, the community will find out how this proposal will be employed. I think it would be far better to be open about this before it becomes policy rather than after — and it isn't fair to ask Wikipedians to vote on this pig in a poke. As recently as 2 February, Hammersoft was still trying to get the proposal's proponents to express clearly and straightforwardly what the purpose and goals of the process should be. He was asking how we should define success or failure of the process — what problems is it expected to solve? His request was briefly rebuffed, and ignored. |
Issues of procedural fairness
By far my greatest concerns about this process turn on its gross unfairness to its participants — especially the administrator being examined. The proponents of the process have been very concerned about creating a process which is very rapid, which has a low barrier to entry, which sysops should find genuinely threatening, and which has a 'democratic' appearance. Unfortunately, the result is a process that does not contemplate an administrator who wants to defend his actions, situations where there is misconduct by multiple parties (particularly by the nominators), or any interest on the part of participants in examining the evidence or discussing the situation.
| Accusers enjoy a privileged, protected position from which to attack. |
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The sole issue open for consideration in the CDA process is whether or not the subject admin is to be desysopped: yes or no. While the CDA proposal offers the vague acknowledgement that the nominees' conduct will also be subject to scrutiny, the plain fact is that this process only generates one actionable response to one specific yes/no question. Unlike all other dispute resolution procedures on Wikipedia (RfC, RfArb, AN/I, etc.), the only party who can face sanction as a direct outcome of CDA proceedings is the sysop. An unjustly accused admin – or even a justly accused admin who is not solely to blame – has no directly parallel venue in which to address the conduct of his accusers. Taking nominators to AN/I during the course of the CDA is bound to provoke an inconclusive but destructive firestorm. Any other option (RfC/U, RfArb) which might allow the community to deal with nominators' misconduct will run much more slowly than CDA. An admin who survives CDA might then have relitigate the same issues at RfArb. An admin desysopped by CDA will be accused of seeking revenge if he attempts to address the nominators' misconduct. A CDA will muddy the waters and exhaust the community's interest in dealing with any non-admin portion of the dispute. |
| Canvassing is essential to ensure the participation of involved parties, but will unbalance the decision-making portion of this process. |
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This process operates on short timelines. The nomination window is a maximum of seven days long, and the voting period is a further seven days. In order for a nomination to be successful, editors who share concerns about a particular admin will need to be able to organize themselves to marshal their arguments and evidence. This will require coordination and requests for participation. Similarly, the admin under scrutiny should be able to invite the participation of other editors who may have insight into or experience with the dispute in order to present a thorough, balanced defence. Whether such coordination occurs on-wiki, by email, over IRC, or at Wikipedia Review, it will happen. Moreover, in the preparation of a complaint (and in the presentation of a response), broad solicitation of involved and interested perspectives and testimony will often be highly desirable. To allow the community to fairly judge an administrator's actions, we want to have access to as much relevant detail as possible. Unfortunately, once all of these editors have become involved in the preparation of a nomination (or a rebuttal), there is no way to ask them all to return to blissful ignorance for the voting stage of the CDA. The first, and loudest, voters on CDA are almost certainly also going to be the most deeply-involved parties. |
| CDA voters are self-selected, not community-selected. Many voters will be partial and biased. |
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As a corollary to the above point, it should be noted that participation in the voting is not in any way limited beyond the bare 'usual' blanket editing restrictions barring socks and banned/blocked users. While this has occasionally been presented as making the process 'fair' or 'representative' or allowing for a 'jury of one's peers', in practice we must acknowledge that there will be three rough groups voting in any given CDA.
Far from being an impartial and independent jury, these three groups will each have their own goals and their own particular axes to grind. The number of fully neutral, uninvolved individuals who will be willing to take the time to find the CDA nomination, review all of the evidence in detail, engage in discussion where necessary to clarify any points of confusion, and then vote (with attendant risk of future abuse from the 'other' side) is vanishingly small — and unfortunately much smaller than the three camps I've identified. Note that this stands in stark contrast to the process by which (for example) Arbitrators are chosen. |
| There's no place for the admin to defend himself on the CDA nomination page. |
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The CDA nomination form includes no place for an admin to offer a response or defense. It's just nomination, signatures, diffs of notifications, and 'evidence in support of the nomination', followed by votes. In other words, it's easy to drop in, see the nomination, the list of accusations, the cherry-picked evidence, and vote — all without even an inkling that the admin might have had something to say on his own behalf. |
| Detailed discussion and evidence will be shuffled off to a talk page. |
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An extended statement from the nominators – and any statement of defense or presentation of counter-evidence – will be stored on the talk page. This arrangement discourages any close inspection or analysis of evidence. Many voters who show up may not even be aware that such discussion is going on. Separating the discussion from the voting page may give the superficial impression of a smoothly-running, uncontentious process, but it discourages the openness and transparency that should be the ultimate aim. |
| Voting begins before discussion of or challenges to the evidence. |
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CDA offers no requirement or guarantee that an admin facing this process will be allowed time to prepare and present a statement in his own defense. After the nomination is filed, there is no time allotted to discuss or examine evidence before the process jumps directly into voting. In an attempt to produce a process which is conspicuously 'faster' than the existing alternatives, corners have been cut. |
| There is no opportunity for compromise solutions. |
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Editors may agree that there are problems with a particular admin's conduct, but feel that alternative approaches (short of, or different from, desysopping) could be more beneficial. This lack of nuance is harmful. It could be that Wikipedia would well-served by imposing a topic ban or an interaction ban to keep an admin out of a contentious area. Some manner of probation subject to future review may be equally effective. If the only binding outcome possible is desysopping, it puts the community in an awkward place — do we let the defendant go free, or do we send him to the gallows? Parole, probation, community service? Not on the table. |
| There are too many bites at the apple. |
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How many times does an admin need to face the axe? There is no provision to protect admins from double jeopardy. As noted above, a CDA started as part of a larger dispute may require the same issues to be litigated twice: once in CDA, again in a follow-up RfArb. Other parts of the proposal seem to suggest that CDA can be used to desysop after a failed attempt via RfArb. |
| This process cannot handle sensitive or confidential information effectively. |
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The usual venue for handing desysopping – ArbCom – has established protocols and procedures for handing sensitive information. Under the heading of 'sensitive' I would include information that is specifically governed by the Privacy Policy, along with emails between users, IRC logs, methods for detecting sockpuppets, etc. At CDA, the vote marches on during the whole period of time that the admin is seeking permission from email authors, participants in IRC conversations, or checkusers to refer to sensitive or restricted-access information in his own defense. Should an admin describe in detail and in public the method used to identify a recurring sockpuppeteer, just to save his own neck? |
The final accounting
The way in which CDA proposes to close its discussions is flawed and prone to failure.
| The thresholds are wild-assed guesses. |
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In technical terms, the thresholds coded into this proposal are 'wild-ass guesses', based loosely on the thresholds that apply at RfA. Given that this is a novel process with no historical precedent on Wikipedia, it seems presumptuous to assume that similar numbers with a similar 'discretionary range' should apply here as at RfA. It also betrays something of a lack of trust in the ability of 'crats to determine what constitutes 'consensus'. Are the 'crats expected to determine if a consensus exists, or just to count votes and add a veneer of respectability to the process? |
| The decision has a single point of failure: one individual's judgement. |
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Ultimately the decision comes down to a single bureaucrat's call — yes or no, thumbs up or thumbs down. The 'crats seem to generally be good, competent people, but even good people have off days. With the exception of emergency desysoppings and the very arguable authority of Jimbo himself, we do not recognize the authority of any individual on Wikipedia to desysop. It always requires a formal, clear, final vote by the Arbitration Committee (even the emergency desysoppings are subject to ratification). This proposed process would place that ultimate authority and responsibility – for the first time – in the hands of a single bureaucrat. I would be the first to acknowledge that members of the ArbCom are at times just as flawed, biased, sloppy, grumpy, petty and human as any other senior editors — including the 'crats. However, the requirement for deliberation and a majority vote of the ArbCom before their motions and remedies take effect means that their individual defects can (hopefully) cancel each other out. The lone 'crat in this proposal doesn't have the backstop of a committee sharing the responsibility or officially making the call. While the single Bureaucrat may engage in public or private consultion before rendering a decision, it's ultimately down to him. Moreover, the first avenue for appeal is also to that single 'crat — one editor (under tremendous pressure and intense scrutiny) is allowed to reverse a decision on his own. |
The role of Bureaucrats
By far the most visible role of Bureaucrats on Wikipedia is in the evaluation of Requests for Adminship and the promotion (or not) of new admins. They have both the technical and policy means to grant the sysop bit within the framework of existing policy. What they cannot do - under policy and by deliberate design of the wiki software permissions - is remove the sysop bit once granted.
What this CDA proposal aims to do is grant bureaucrats a new power to enact desysopping decisions. This represents a substantial expansion and shift in their powers and responsibilities.
| Bureaucrat selection did not contemplate this responsibility. |
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When editors have been granted the Bureaucrat rights on Wikipedia, it has generally been through an RfB process. This process has generally focused almost exclusively on whether or not the candidate can carry out the existing roles and responsibilities of a 'crat — largely on whether or not they will judge RfAs in accordance with the established traditions in that area. Two current 'crats didn't even pass through RfB; they were selected as enwiki's original 'crats so that we would have a way to create admins. None of the current 'crats was ever questioned about his or her views on or potential role in deciding CDA cases. The community has not had a chance to examine them in that light, nor have we had an opportunity to endorse them (or not) to carry out such a responsibility. |
| Traditional 'crat roles do not involve dispute resolution, inter-editor conflicts, or significant 'weighing' of evidence. |
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For better or worse, the traditional role of the Bureaucrat has not' been to exercise his own judgement to any signficant extent. After subtracting off sockpuppets, the expected role of the 'crat is to count votes and declare a promotion where the fraction of support exceeds 70-75%. The post is largely ceremonial, rather like a constitutional monarch who on paper holds substantial reserve powers, but who principally rubber-stamps decisions made by raw voting. In the vanishingly few cases where a bureaucrat has seen fit to pass a candidate with less than 70% support it has prompted an uproar. I know of no cases where a 'crat has failed an RfA candidate with 80% (or more) support. The community's expectations of our 'crats in evaluation of an RfA are generally that they will act as 'moist robots' and just count the votes. If an RfA falls into what is the only 'true' discretionary range of roughly 70 to 75%, the 'crat can close as 'no consensus to promote', or just toss a coin. The community doesn't compel detailed explanation, and the understanding is that a borderline candidate can edit heavily for a few months and then come back for his successful RfA. Oddly enough, the current wording of this proposal (and a source of much |
| Bureaucrats should not be required to review their own decisions. |
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As the members of the community who did make the final call on whether or not an RfA was successful (vote-counting based or not), the 'crats would be placed in an uncomfortable position by the CDA process. If the original promoting 'crat thought his original decision was good, he might engage in public or private lobbying of his fellow 'crats. If the original promoting 'crat felt that the original promotion was in error, his judgement would again risk carrying far more weight than it should. The 'crats need to be able to work together and to provide a united front to the community; it helps to maintain our trust in their judgement and their ability to fairly close RfAs. CDA will be much more divisive and controversial than RfA. The proposed expansion of powers and responsibilities will encourage greater inter-bureaucrat conflict, and potentially damage the trust in (and reliability of) the RfA process. Finally, we face the extremely unpleasant prospect of Bureaucrats called before the ArbCom to defend their decisions and participate in appeals. I can see no way that such an eventuality will benefit the project. If people are unhappy with the way CDAs are closed, are we going to have to develop a Community DeBureaucratship protocol? |
Simpler approaches have not been tried
The proponents of CDA have spent a substantial amount of time and effort to construct this elaborate proposal, but we are still left with the serious flaws detailed above. More unfortunately, they have rejected any suggestion that their goals could be accomplished by different, simpler means. Indeed, I believe it is possible to achieve the goals of this process without any need to write new policy at all.
| An RfC followed by ArbCom motion serves the same purpose, with greater flexibility and resistance to abuse. |
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This approach has been suggested by Jehochman, among others. It requires no new policy whatsoever. In a user/admin RfC, one of the statements can simply be "Based on the evidence presented, I do not feel that JoeBlow should remain a Wikipedia admin. ArbCom should withdraw his adminship." or some variant. If this statement is heavily endorsed by the RfC participants, the matter can be presented to ArbCom at the close of the RfC. An RfC isn't on a fixed clock, so there is also the opportunity to suggest and consider alternative remedies. (Note that non-desysopping remedies may not need to be forwarded to ArbCom; they can be enacted after a suitable announcement and brief discussion at WP:AN.) The RfC should present evidence of misconduct, an opportunity for the admin to respond, the chance for other parties to comment, and a clear statement that the community supports desysopping. If the ArbCom finds the evidence and statements persuasive, it may proceed by motion. The ArbCom can simply desysop, or can impose probation or restrictions it feels will resolve the problem(s) identified. The ArbCom will also be able to sanction other parties whose conduct has been brought up in the RfC, restoring a fundamental balance that is lacking in CDA. Arbitrators were explicitly selected by the community to resolve these sorts of disputes. They are not self-selected, they are not bound by raw numbers recruited by canvassing, and they are required to recuse themselves where there may otherwise be a perception of bias. This process separates the involved parties from the decision to impose sanctions. If the ArbCom feels that there are more complex issues that should be examined, they can open a full case. Much of the evidence-gathering and a great deal of discussion will be available from the RfC, so one hopes and expects that the remainder of the case (workshopping and closure) should be able to proceed briskly. |
| Consensus-driven change to Wikipedia:Administrators can guide Arbitration and other processes. |
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While some might argue that policy modification violates the 'no new policy required' standard, I offer this alternative as still being substantially more lightweight than a new full-on CDA bureaucracy and framework. One of the major arguments raised in favor of CDA is the claim that ArbCom are reluctant to desysop admins who have not misused the tools. I do not believe this to be entirely correct, however it is certainly true that bright-line abuses of admin tools tend to lead to desysopping. Our administrator policy explictly lays out the standards of conduct we expect from Wikipedia administrators (Wikipedia:Administrators#Administrator conduct) and notes that consistent failure to meet those standards "may result in the removal of administrator status". If there is a concern that ArbCom are not applying that policy with sufficient enthusiasm, the community can propose changes to emphasize, endorse, enhance, or otherwise strengthen the admin conduct provisions of the policy. Admins who consistently fail to meet the standards (new or existing, as the case may be) can and should be brought to the attention of ArbCom if other stages of dispute resolution fail to achieve improvement. |
| We have CDA already: The ArbCom just enacted a rapid, community-driven desysop request. |
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On 20 January, an issue was raised at AN/I regarding a history of misconduct by a Wikipedia administrator, Craigy144. [3] The misconduct did not seem to involve any use of administrator tools or privileges, however the brief AN/I discussion generally concluded that Cragy144 should not retain his sysop bit. The matter was transferred the same day to ArbCom. The ArbCom declined a full case, opting instead to handle the situation by open motion. After allowing a week for Craigy144 to offer a response or explanation for his conduct, a summary motion was filed on 28 January. The motion passed with unanimous approval on 30 January: [4]. It seems that in situations where an administrator falls seriously short of community standards – even without misusing his admin buttons – and fails to respond to constructive criticism or take steps to remedy his misconduct, the ArbCom is ready, willing, and able to desysop. From filing to desysop was less than two weeks — this process actually ran faster than a CDA would have. The onus is on the community, however, to be clear about what its standards are, and what it considers to be a desysop-worthy problem. |
In summary
For this long list of reasons, I find that the proposed process and structure are unfair and untenable, and unlikely to benefit Wikipedia. Virtually all of these points were brought up during discussions about the CDA process, but no resolutions were forthcoming. I must therefore oppose this proposal. TenOfAllTrades(talk) 20:13, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I'm going to try to refrain from making a habit of disputing every criticism raised, but I do feel compelled to point out one thing. In the second part of the first group, the issue is raised of the conduct of one editor. That editor does not speak for the other editors who support this proposal (as neither do I) and in fact is now an opponent of it. --Tryptofish (talk) 20:23, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I actually was in the process of amending that out when I saw your comment here. I don't think that this process should be accepted or rejected based on the (mis)behaviour of one individual. TenOfAllTrades(talk) 20:34, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Thank you for that. If, as the RfC goes along, editors would like for me or other supporters to respond to any of the other points you have raised, I'll be happy to give it a try, but I figure it would be premature and maybe kind of badgering for me to do that now. --Tryptofish (talk) 20:37, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I actually was in the process of amending that out when I saw your comment here. I don't think that this process should be accepted or rejected based on the (mis)behaviour of one individual. TenOfAllTrades(talk) 20:34, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Thanks for preparing this material. I think there is a lot of meat here: first, with regard to the diminished fairness of this process versus the existing. Second, with regard to the manner in which this proposal, while attempting to derive authority by styling itself as an offshoot or modification of an existing process, actually has little to no relation to any currently existing process; its closest forebear is probably the dramatically failed Wikipedia:Quickpolls. It's quite unpredictable how this will act in practice and the proponents have consistently refused to engage with any attempt to explore this issue. Christopher Parham (talk) 20:25, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
Poll
Support
- Support. It makes very good sense that the same community that confers administrator status at RfA should have the ability to retract that status when confidence has been lost. This proposal have been very carefully thought through, incorporating lessons learned from previous proposals. I urge editors to actually read the proposal: I think that you will find that many of the criticisms raised by opposers are actually not problems with the proposal as it is written. --Tryptofish (talk) 19:05, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I agree with Tryptofish. This proposal provides a very moderate process--at least two thirds of the community need to disapprove of an admin for desysopping even to be considered. Ucucha 19:26, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support. ArbCom could be in the business of evaluating whether admins who haven't directly abused the tools have nevertheless lost community trust, but is poorly poised to do so and a separate process is better. This is not a response to a particularly recent or major crisis but simply remedying the mistake made when initially designing the RfA process: the community grants adminship but cannot take it away. Eluchil404 (talk) 19:32, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support The details don't really matter, since they will be changed after this is adopted regardless. The fact that "administrator" privileges are effectively given permanently right now is simply too problematic. This process is way over-processed right now, and I in no way endorse it's current structure, but even an imperfect system is better then nothing.
— V = IR (Talk • Contribs) 22:06, 22 February 2010 (UTC)- But how can we have a simple CDA process? The details are everything, surely. To adopt it first and work on it later cannot be right. There are other Admin Recall solutions that can be worked on (including RfA), so it is not really 'CDA or nothing'. Matt Lewis (talk) 22:13, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support a CDA process. The actual details of the process will be subject to modifications and evolution over time but this is a good place to start. — Martin (MSGJ · talk) 22:46, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support per Martin. Willking1979 (talk) 23:17, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support a CDA process. Bureaucrats have earned ridiculously high support and trust from the community; granting them the power to remove the sysop bit will do more good than bad. In my mind, this is comparable to the re-evaluation of featured articles. Standards have changed, and the community continues to evolve. Details will be ironed out through RFC processes like this one. ...but what do you think? ~BFizz 23:28, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support. The core problem with RfA is that it does not allow us to be bold in electing admins because we cannot revert our decision later should it prove to be a mistake. Is CDA a perfect way to remedy this? No. But it's a reasonable approach. RfA is deeply imperfect itself, but as yet we have developed no better process for appointing admins either.
I think RfA could be much improved, and the admin ranks greatly broadened, just by giving us the option to withdraw our trust from candidates, once we saw that it was being abused. It's unreasonable to expect us to be able offer our trust to any candidate on an irrevocable basis. Admins serve at the discretion of the community -- yet the community has no ability to enforce that discretion.
As a recently appointed admin, I want the community to have the power to hold me to their standards on a ongoing basis. If they can be trusted to give me the tools, why can they not be trusted to withdraw them if I fail to live up to their standards? "Admin immunity" has to come to an end. CDA is long, long overdue.--Father Goose (talk) 23:32, 22 February 2010 (UTC) - Support on the basis that, however imperfect this is at the start it will become better as time passes, and a process for formal revocation of use of the tools is most assuredly required. Fiddle Faddle (talk) 23:44, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support. My principal objection would be that with a sufficiently noticed poll, a majority should be adequate to remove tools, or even less than that when well-supported by cogent arguments, that's enough hysteresis for protection against frivolous removal. But this proposal is better than nothing, clearly. It provides for self-review, and if it turns out to be damaging, that can be fixed. There will be no mass removals from this process without that additional review of how it is working, good design. --Abd (talk) 23:45, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support, I think Father Goose puts it extremely well. It has long struck me as ridiculous that the community has had no workable method of establishing loss of trust in admins, and this has actually harmed the standing of admins in general. DuncanHill (talk) 23:49, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support Accountability is the issue here. Community de-adminship will hold admins accountable to the community and will help prevent them from taking actions that don't have the community's support. Of course the details would have to be worked out not to prevent witch-hunts and the like, but it is important to have a way for the community to recall an admin who hasn't performed to an acceptable standard. ThemFromSpace 00:02, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- I don't agree with the idea that this is redundant to ArbCom procedures--it's useful to have a community-driven process, because it's important to decentralize power and because often ArbCom is bogged down or moves slowly. Just because relying on them has worked sometimes in the past (and I'm sure sometimes it has not worked, too) doesn't mean it's going to continue to, or that it's going to be as good as if we had an additional, community-driven process. I don't expect to see a lot of desysopings from this since the bar is really high for passage and since consensus is so hard to obtain on this project, but it's better than nothing (and that's why I don't share the concerns of some opposers that this process will make it too easy to deadmin people who don't deserve it). I'm also seeing in the opposes some quibbles with the procedure, from people who don't object to the notion fundamentally. I think that type of thing may be throwing the baby out with the bathwater and preventing progress. delldot ∇. 00:10, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- support this isn't the same as arbcom. Arbcom can be slow and they can reject cases the community wants heard.--Crossmr (talk) 00:16, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support This sounds like a good idea, as long as it is not abused. Brambleclawx 00:26, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- Support I think that one of wikipedia's biggest problems is that it is extremely hard to oust a poor admin. Santa Claus of the Future (talk) 00:37, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
Oppose
- ArbCom have been more willing to desysop administrators who have shown to use the tools poorly. Generally speaking, if an RfC comes to the consensus that an administrator no longer holds the trust of the community, ArbCom will desysop them. I don't personally believe there is a problem to fix. I fear that if this proposal was to move forward, a lynch mob mentality would result and administrators who deal with controversial issues would regularly be brought through the community deadminship process. I also fear that administrators who make one mistake would also be sent through the deadminship process. All in all, I believe it will lower morale in the admin corps. Whilst the RfC, then to ArbCom route might not be ideal, I believe it serves as a good check and balance. Ryan PostlethwaiteSee the mess I've created or let's have banter 19:09, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- This proposal is likely to be harmful on a number of levels, discouraging adminstrators from boldly responding to sensitive and complex issues, while encouraging those who would use wiki-process to pursue personal grudges and vendettas. The current system, meanwhile, is humming along very nicely. I know of no administrator in the past 2-3 years whom ArbCom did not desysop, when presented with evidence of flagrant abuse of the tools, or place on probation which would lead to desysopping "next time," when presented with evidence of severe error or other inappropriate use. Christopher Parham (talk) 19:21, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- For the reasons exhaustively detailed above (#Flaws in this process noted by TenOfAllTrades) I must oppose this proposal. TenOfAllTrades(talk) 20:14, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose: I've put a lot of work into CDA since I found it flagging a little in a 'Motion to Close' at the end of Dec (over 100 hours - and this is important to note), and a lot of it is still in there. In my experience the proposal hasn't been that carefully considered (serious discussion on the central Canvassing issue was very 'last minute'), and at least one major consensus has been ignored - the desire for a higher 'threshold' percentage (clearly to me, 85% was a conservative 'mean average' of the voting results - not 80%, but the vote itself was disputed. A lot of people rather prefered the Bureaurats to make the decision, not the "percentages" so-to-speak, and felt it shouldn't be too low). During my work on CDA, I have defended CDA quite passionately at times (eg "don't so be angry and cynical in your opposition", "we must give it a go" etc), but my eventual realisation is that CDA cannot work. A CDA-related AN/I on me made me realise what I had been blind to: the rapid amount of support (almost instant support) designed with no other intention than to get a decent editor into trouble. Selfish perhaps - but it was a real epiphany regarding CDA. It wasn't the editors that concerned me (I expected certain people to turn up) - it was the admin involved in it all. It was so unpleasant that I asked myself "does Wikipedia really need this?". A decent Canvassing section (and despite attempts, this CDA proposal doesn't quite have one) can possibly prevent a number of editors causing mayhem even before an official CDA starts (enough to be worth trialing CDA anyway). But it cannot stop admin - who are easily in contact - behaving badly, and supporting each other instinctively, and as various 'favours', as they so often do. We cannot be in denial about these things. Admin are editors too, and are fully capable of attacking another admin unfairly (and extremely bitterly too), and I cannot believe that any Bureaucrat would want that to be played out in such a public forum. CDA will prejudice Wikipedia itself - before, during and after the CDA, and the Bureaucrats decisions could become impossible to make fairly. The Crats just wouldn't be interested in it. I worry that chasing decent-but-awkward admin will even be the 'norm' with CDA nominations, as most of the 'canny' admin could easily escape CDA anyway. Decent admin are easier to catch. CDA is not the only possible version of Admin Recall though, and RfA (the actual 'Request For Adminship' process) can still be improved, regardless of any form of Admin Recall that might be in existence. Basically, CDA is an unwashable bandage on a structural complaint. We need to get to the root of the problem: the quality of the RfA process (esp in the past, where it was much easier to become an admin), and the actual wisdom in awarding someone we don't really know such a veritable booty in the first place (eg such powerful and varied block tools, and a "job for life" over a sensible term). Matt Lewis (talk) 20:29, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose: I largely agree with TenOfAllTrades's analysis. I also feel that there's far too much drama on Wikipedia already, and CDA would simply add to this, without, I think, giving us much benefit in return. Scog (talk) 21:31, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- To be direct, I simply don't trust the Community to not abuse this ability. They (collectively; as one) are too quick to rush to judgment (generally speaking). Given the arbitration committee's willingness to desysop as of late, as Ryan P. points out above, I'm comfortable that any administrators who really should have their rights removed will have them removed. - Rjd0060 (talk) 23:08, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- A solution just screaming out for a problem.--Wehwalt (talk) 23:11, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose - I agree with a lot of what TenOfAllTrades has said. I also take issue with the supporters' proposed stance of "working out the details later". This is certainly a case of where the details matter, and at present, this is only going to lead to more drama. (Note: this doesn't imply that I have a solution, only that I think the proposed idea is worse than doing nothing). -- Bfigura (talk) 23:12, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Not true that supporters all think details are to be done later. --Tryptofish (talk) 23:15, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- While I'm not trying to say that all supporters were in favor of working out the details later, at least two currently are. I'm merely stating that I disagree with them (not trying to put words in anyone's mouth). -- Bfigura (talk) 23:18, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Not true that supporters all think details are to be done later. --Tryptofish (talk) 23:15, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Bureaucracy creep. The ArbCom is perfectly sufficient. Kafziel Complaint Department 23:14, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose: I believe the net harm to the encyclopedia will outweigh the benefits of weeding out a few bad apples. ArbCom is sufficient, and I hate to see abuse paralyze the already understaffed and overworked admin corps. bahamut0013wordsdeeds 23:15, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose I was expecting to support CDA. After reading the comments by TenOfAllTrades above, i think the current proposal is fatally flawed. I do think that a revised proposal, which deals with some or all of his concerns, might be worth enacting, but in light of the recent Craigy144 case, i am not convinced that there is as much urgency about this as IMO there once was. DES (talk) 23:16, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I want to be clar, i suport the idea of CDA in principle, i have long though that some sort of community-driven process for removal of admin tools was needed. But I can't support thsi proposal, particularly not on a promise "oh we'll fix the details later". And the problem was worse when the ArbCom would only desysop for the most egriguious misuse of the tools. DES (talk) 00:55, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- While the proposal has some subconscious immediate appeal (live by the sword, die by the sword), the fact that no bright line is drawn—nor is there a mechanism proposed for defining one—makes this difficult to support. At a minimum there ought to be a mechanism to attract the attention of a random sampling of impartial editors to review the CDA, and a clear mechanism for them to interact with the agrieved (including none at all) and agree on the true facts of the matter, and how that relates to a de-sysopment verdict. —EncMstr (talk) 23:41, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I agree with many of TenOfAllTrades's points, especially those regarding procedural fairness. I'm also not a big fan of the "requiring 10 people to support before the process actually starts" part. On one hand it helps to prevent frivolous requests, on the other hand, it runs the risk of starting inertia toward support before the process even begins. One of the main reasons that ArbCom elections switched to a secret ballot was so that the early voters wouldn't have the ability to set inertia and have their comments in the prominent position at the top of the section where they might have a disproportionate effect on later voters. This has a similar risk, except it would always force it in one direction. Given that ArbCom seems more willing to deal with cases through motions, I don't think this process is necessary as it may have been a year or so ago. Mr.Z-man 23:45, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I'm very much worried about any proposal which would place administrators at the mercy of any mob that has an agenda to push. I would support a proposal for some sort of streamlined (and more orderly) RfC-like mechanism which makes the community's will known — something which this proposal approaches — but not make it binding without the check and balance of the committee being the final word.
Frankly, the relative inertia of the committee in cases of desysoping is a good thing; and there is nothing that would prevent the committee to simply "rubber stamp" by motion the result of any process that was fairly run and where concerns were properly heard. — Coren (talk) 23:51, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I like the general idea of community-driven de-admining, but cannot support this proposal. In particular, I'm sure we would see admins who take action against any large, vocal group facing CDAs, causing a natural reduction in admin boldness. (This is a corollary to TenOfAllTrades's point about procedural fairness.)
Designing a robust CDA procedure would be quite difficult and (I suspect) not a productive use of our time. I think Coren's suggestion (immediately above) is a much better option. CWC 00:14, 23 February 2010 (UTC) - Oppose- I agree with many of the points put across by TenOfAllTrades. I believe ArbCom is sufficient in dealing with admins who should have their adminship removed. I think the system proposed would be too easy to abuse. OohBunnies!...speak 00:39, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose drama magnet. Andrew Lenahan - Starblind 00:39, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- I am afraid that this will become Wikipedia's grand theater of High Drama. I am also concerned that editors who have been justifiably sanctioned by administrators, including some who are very frequent guests at AN/I and similar fora, will use this mechanism against good cops. There are plenty of persistent troublemakers with more than the requisite account age and edit count, and well more than 10 of them can be rounded up in short order. I don't want administrators, or other editors for that matter, spending unnecessary time in recall proceedings, when they can better spend that time enforcing Wikipedia's policies and guidelines and improving Wikipedia's articles. The existing mechanisms are sufficient to deal with the very small minority of administrators who abuse their authority or tools.—Finell 00:56, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- I count two critical flaws. First: the committee is an important check on any movement that seeks the removal of administrator rights, but it is entirely ignored in this proposal as it stands. Second: the proposal holds that 65% in support of a desysopping means that there is a consensus to remove sysop rights. Hardly—anything lower than eighty would be unacceptable.
A community de-sysopping process should exist. And this proposal has clearly had a lot of work put into it. (Those editors who are its proponents have my thanks for their efforts in tackling what has long been an elephant in the room.) But a CDA process must incorporate a requirement to have the advice and consent of the arbitration committee in relation to every desysopping, as otherwise we will suffer quite grievously from the problems that Ryan Postlethwaite and Coren envisage. And we need to set the bar much, much higher, to reduce the incidence of trigger-happy desysoppings. A good start, but adjustments are needed. AGK 00:54, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
- Oppose - This seems less like a reasonable tool for quality control and more a way for people angry at admins to go on the offensive. I see the word "community" in here but I'm not seeing the mechanism that somehow accurately represents the will of something so large. Is there no intermediate step that could be tried first before resorting to this mob magnet? Rob Banzai (talk) 01:00, 23 February 2010 (UTC)
Neutral
- Personally, I've never had a problem with an administrator & so there's not much chance I'd nominate one for CDA. Having said that, if this CDA passes or fails? I won't complain eitherway. GoodDay (talk) 19:29, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- Neutral. While having this method to de-sysop ones who seem to be unfitting for this "rank" seems to be a good idea, I don't think someone who would actually be prove to be incompetent would be given sysop rights. SpecB (talk) 23:23, 22 February 2010 (UTC)
- I like the idea, but the opposers bring up good points. There needs to be a better defined plan to limit abuse of a de-adminship system. Griffinofwales (talk) 00:13, 23 February 2010 (UTC)