A Japanese army captain working undercover as a chef for a prominent Brazilian family until Brazilian security services detected him.
Jakuji Ochi – a Japanese Navy agent working undercover as a woodworker in Panama, also chief of a secret ring in Las Perlas Archipelago. Also in Panama were a Japanese family of fishermen who were a supposed part of this web.
Akashi Motojiro – Black Dragon member and agent specialized in Siberia and North Asia. Knowledgeable about China, Manchuria, Siberia. He established contacts throughout the Muslim world. These Muslim contacts would be maintained throughout World War II, both as operatives in their areas and as a hedge against Soviet aggression. Akashi eventually established networks through Europe too, that served the Black Dragons. The Black Dragons also formed close contact and even alliances with Buddhist sects throughout Asia.
Japanese Official Radio, Radio Tokyo (NHK), sent its foreign transmissions, with some cover messages, to Japanese Doho agents outside Japan.
Hiraya Amane – secret agent in Hankow, China. Wrote Zhong-guo Bi-mi She-hui Shi, the first true history of the Triads and other secret societies; this book was a special intelligence handbook. Hiraya also organized Tung Wen College in Shanghai that trained future agents for espionage in China. The Tung Wen would continue to operate until the end of World War II, training agents for operations throughout Asia.
Marcelle Tao Kitazawa – agent in Australia, linked with Seita, who led a spy web in New Caledonia. This claim appears to have been debunked in an Axis History Forum entry by Dachhase on 13 October 2012.
Kinoaki Matsuo – member of the ultra-nationalist Black Dragon secret society, and an officer in Japanese intelligence.
Mitsuru Toyama – chief of Black Dragon Society, an active agent linked with Japanese Secret Service and Japanese outside agents.
Shūmei Ōkawa – ultra-nationalist, agent instructor, and an agent in China and North Asia. [None of the "agent instructor" or "agent" claims are supported by the Wikipedia entry for Okawa dated 11 September 2017.]
Yoshio Kodama – Japanese gangster and Yakuza chief, he set up a massive network of Manchurian spies and informants spread across China.
Hideki Tojo – the Chief of the Japanese Army, Prime Minister and chief of the Kodoha Party; for a period chief of Kwantung Army and Kempeitai Intelligence service in Manchukuo. He also maintained during his military life direct control of the Japanese Secret Services (apart from the Emperor's command of such services) and received information first through his direct link with the Black Dragon Society and his own intelligence work with the Japanese Army during the conflict.
Kōki Hirota – former Foreign Minister and head of the Black Dragons (also guided intelligence services in the group), discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States with War Minister Hideki Tōjō. In a conference on August 26, 1941 at a session of the Black Dragon Society HQ in Tokyo, the War Minister ordered preparation to be made to wage a total war against the armed forces of the United States. December 1941 or February 1942, were considered adequate time for this operation. Tojo said he "will start the war with America, and after sixty days he will reshuffle the cabinet and become a great dictator", at same time if analyzed the last dates provided from Japanese secret agents about Soviet Far East and European colonies in Southeast Asia, in relation to this operation.
Previously in World War II on the Chinese mainland, Black Dragon posed one five column, so-called "China Wave-Men". They undertook some secret operations at favour of such group. Similar operations with revolutionaries were established from 1906 to the 1940s, targeting India, Indonesia and the Philippines amongst others. The Black Dragons began establishing subsidiary groups to support these regional actions.
Sadao Araki – undertook some secret actions during the Siberian Japanese expeditionary force period
Wellington Koo – as member of Lytton Commission during his diplomatic mission in Manchukuo, reported the frequent watching of suspicious Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and White Russian employees in the Hotel Moderne, Harbin. Similarly, Amleto Vespa as a Manchu/Japanese forces secret agent, confirmed the presence of such secret agents in places where the mentioned diplomatic commission stayed in country.
Kanji Ishiwara – undertook undercover actions and espionage in Manchukuo.
Kenji Doihara – member of a Japanese intelligence service in Manchukuo, working there and in Mainland China.
A Japanese undercover agent, disguised as a "housekeeper" watching Puyi in the imperial palace and writing periodic reports to superiors of Japanese secret services in Manchukuo about intimate details of Kangde Emperor.
Since 1920's, the intelligence services also used Doho or dokuku jin – (nikkei) cultural groups in the Pacific War as alternative secret agents. These were Japanese citizens with foreign nationality, with loyalty to the emperor and Japan; they lived around the world.
Other overseas Japanese agents of Black Dragon Society were the so-called "soshi" (Brave Knights). At the same time, referring to superior commander as the "Darkside Emperor" mentioned agents since the 1940s, operating worldwide, as far away as North America, South America, and Morocco. They formed covert ties with the Nazis.
Japanese Army – sent a secret mission to Germany via Siberia, leaving Tokyo on March 1, 1943. This operation was led by Major General Okamoto, who had been chief of the Second Bureau (Intelligence) at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War. His staff consisted of Colonel Kotani, Navy officer Captain Onoda, and Mr.Yosano, Foreign Office chancellor. Objectives of the mission were to investigate German ability to carry on the war; and to clarify Japan's real situation to the Germans. A third objective (concerning the arrangement of a separate peace between Germany and the Soviet Union) was eliminated just prior to the mission's departure. The Okamoto Mission reported its findings in a cable dated July 5. Many reservations were attached to the report, which concluded that German national power was lower than had been foreseen by the mission before it left Japan. Germany would accordingly encounter many difficulties in emerging triumphant without first overcoming the critical problems that were fast approaching: shortage of manpower, lowering of industrial war potential, insufficiency of liquid fuel, etc.
On October 15, 1943, IGHQ incorporated its Second Bureau's 16th Section (German and Italian Intelligence) into the 5th Section (U.S.S.R. intelligence), just as the German Army was failing in its early summer offensive against Orel. The Soviet Army, on the other hand, had seized the operational initiative. The feeling of the Japanese Army High Command was somewhat inclined to pessimism vis-a vis Germany. The Japanese Army committed a great error by placing excessive confidence in Germany. After the Allies had established a Second Front in northern France (June 1944) and a recent attempt on Hitler's (July 20 plot, 1944) - only then did the Japanese Army intelligence services and High Command conclude that Germany possessed scant prospects for victory.
^Brian P. Farrell, 2005, The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940-1942, Ch. 7, n.19 Farrell states: "The paper trail in archival records is PRO, WO172/18, Malaya Command War Diary Appendix Z.1, 10 December 1941; WO172/33, III Indian Corps War Diary, 12, 19, 23–24 December 1941;CAB106/53, 11th Indian Division history, ch. 4; CAB106/86, Maltby Despatch; IWM, Wild Papers, 66/227/1, Wild notes." (Access date: March 6, 2007.)