Talk:1947 Poonch rebellion

POV

This article currently is out of sync with the section Indo-Pakistani War of 1947#Rebellion in Poonch, which contains scholarly coverage with disparate views. The sources used here are not reliable for historical information. Neither do they cover all view points. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:01, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

@Vamsee614: as I have already said above, the sources are not of good quality. Even though Snedden is a scholar, you can't keep on using his web page article. You need to find his book or some peer-reviewed article. The content you are taking from there is indeed problematic. (He says, almost all the princely states acceded to India or Pakistan by 15 August. No, they didn't. Only one state acceded to Pakistan, that was Junagadh. I think this web page article is substandard.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:51, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

All Kashmir conflict articles are highly contentious. You need to use the best quality sources, and cross check with multiple sources. No more web pages, or op-eds, or newspaper histories. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:54, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Motivations

"A further factor motivating Poonchis was the creation of Pakistan and the Maharaja’s reaction to their support for it. The transfer of British power to the new dominions of India and Pakistan, coupled with Hari Singh’s vacillation on the accession, inspired much interest, even fervour, among the people of J&K. In Poonch, many people were already identifying themselves with Pakistan." This is there in the book also. Check for yourself. -- Vamsee614 (talk) 21:12, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

The Poonchis wanted to separate and merge with Punjab already in the 1930s. It is clearly established in the content you have copied from the First Kashmir War. So there is nothing new here. What is new is the idea that the Maharaja "vacillated". He didn't. He wanted to remain independent. That is quite firmly established in multiple sources. I can also produce sources that say that every group in J&K supported him in this decision, except for the Muslim Conference. So, the "fervour among the people of J&K" in Snedden's claim is hyperbole. He doesn't have any evidene for it. "In Poonch, many people were already identifying themselves with Pakistan" is fine. That is the only thing that is factual. The rest is Snedden's POV. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:29, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Agreed. — Vamsee614 (talk) 05:29, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Regarding this edit, why are we keeping the happenings of July before that of June in the article? — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:52, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

This is not a June vs July issue. But the second world war needs to come first. Also, I think that 60,000 professional soldiers in a district is an important factor in the rebellion, stated by multiple RS. So, we shouldn't dilute that. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:08, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

That's true. But the Maharaja ordered to disarm the soldiers specifically in July (not until then; they arrived with arms after WW2 long back), most presumably after the 'No Tax' campaign was launched in June. He must have got particularly alarmed with that new development among his subjects, and that led to the order. So I think we shall have to keep the lines on WW2 and 60,000 soldiers first, and then proceed according to the timelines. — Vamsee614 (talk) 20:51, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

Schofield (pg 41) also suggests the same. — Vamsee614 (talk) 21:00, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

Ved Bhasin

And how is Ved Bhasin an unreliable source ?! -- Vamsee614 (talk) 21:17, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

See WP:HISTRS. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:30, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Bro, Ved Bhasin is not just a senior journalist, he is also a primary source(WP:PRIMARY). He was a live witness to many of the happenings in Jammu. We won't take his POV, but when he states something as an occurrence, how can we label it as unreliable unless we have another more reliable and conflicting source? -- Vamsee614 (talk) 05:29, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

See WP:PRIMARY. You are not allowed to interpret primary sources.

You should also note that Ved Bhasin was a student leader in the Jammu City. He had no first hand knowledge of what happened in Poonch. He doesn't say where his information about Poonch came from. He is writing 70 years after the events. All these factors mean that no great weight can be placed on his coverage, especially statements like "the Maharaja demobilised Muslim soldiers suspecting their loyalty". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:06, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

Ved Bhasin's observations regarding the Jammu & Kashmir happenings appear to have come after a lot of research on the subject with hardly any unreliability. It is a known fact that Hari Singh disarmed the Muslim soldiers and even redistributed the collected arms to Hindus and Sikhs for 'self defense'. I don't think it is strange to state that he suspected their loyalty.

It is also observed here — "Another feature of the heightened anxiety was that in Jammu, the Muslim civil officers and policemen, whose loyalty was suspected, had also been sacked. The state administration had not only demobilized a large number of Muslim police but a large number of the Muslim soldiers serving in the state army were disarmed and had been deserted and humiliated, leaving mainly Hindus and some Sikh officers. In one instance, the Jammu cantonment Brigadier Khoda Bukhush was replaced by a Hindu Dogra officer. There were also reports that the Maharaja of Patiala was not only supplying weapons, but also that a Sikh Brigade of the Patiala princely state troops was operating in Jammu and Kashmir." — Vamsee614 (talk) 11:09, 25 February 2017 (UTC)

Ved Bhasin is giving personal recollections, rather than reporting results of any kind of research or investigation, decades after the events. You can regard him as a WP:PRIMARY source, and use it as the policy states (for additional support).

I have given you information from Ahmad Hassan Dani, an impeccable scholarly source, that there were conspiracies among the Muslim officers of the Army. Ignoring that information and merely stating that the Maharaja suspected their loyalties is one-sided and misleading. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:03, 25 February 2017 (UTC)

No no, suspicions arised due to conspiracies only. I'm not saying there were no conspiracies. They were definitely there. And that might be the undoubted reason why Hari Singh suspected all Muslim officers. That's all I'm saying. — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:01, 25 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Patiala troops

Regarding Patiala troops, multiple sources say that one battalion (which could be anywhere between 300 to 800 soldiers) of Patiala troops was in Kashmir. When Alastair Lamb raised a stink about in the 1990s, I remember researching into it (in a high-quality library that I had access to), and finding that these forces were requested by Hari Singh. His own troops were scattered around the border and none were left to guard Srinagar, hence he asked Patiala for help. Hari Singh faulted his former Army Chief Henry Lawrence Scott for doing the "scattering" and complained about it in multiple places. I was personally convinced about it at that time and concluding that Lamb was wrong. Lamb claims that it was done at New Delhi's behest.

There was a separate episode where I found an involvement of Vallabhbhai Patel (writing from memory). After Pakistan imposed a blockade, Hari Singh had requested arms supplies from India. India agreed to send them, and orders were issued. But the British general (either Lockhart or Bucher) didn't do it, claiming some difficulty or the other. Hari Singh appealed again, and Nehru quizzed why the arms weren't sent. Patel said there were "all sorts of difficulties" in doing it, and it was at this point that he asked Patiala to send arms supplies that Kashmir needed. This was all above board, and the letters document it. However, there was nothing about sending troops in the documentation.

Now that you have mentioned it, I have done a search, found this from Shubh Mathur:

An often overlooked fact is that there were aleady Indian troops on the ground in Jammu and Kashmir well before the controversial date of the signing of the Instrument of Accession. The state of Patiala had acceded to India in August 1947 and by September, the former Maharaja of Patiala's troops, now de jure Indian forces, were helping Hari Singh put down the armed rebellion in Poonch (Bose 2005; Schofield 2010).

I have checked Bose 2005 and there is no mention of Patiala troops. I have also checked all the books of Bose, thinking he might have gotten the details wrong. No Patiala anywhere. Schofield has only reference to Patiala troops, which says:

Over the next two days they [tribal forces] took Garhi and Chinari. Their main column proceeded on towards Uri, where according to their 'commander' Khurshid Anwar, they encountered 'the first Sikh Regiment of Patiala State'.[17] No one has confirmed when the Patiala state forces arrived, but Alastair Lamb considers the presence of such 'exotic forces' as a covert operation, which, since the Maharaja of Patiala's accession to India, meant they were in fact forces which came under the control of the Indian Union.[18]

So the Patiala troops were in the Kashmir Valley, not in Poonch. So, Shubh Mathur gets it wrong again.

But, re-read the Schofield paragraph again, and the propaganda becomes clear. Khurshid Anwar, the head of the Muslim League National Guard was commanding a 5000-strong Pakistani tribal force invading Kashmir. So this is an attempt to deflect attention from him. Why not claim that the Maharaja already had Indian forces on his soil? Then it becomes all reasonable to have sent Pakistani forces to counter them. Nice try.

By the way, the princely state forces were not under Indian command at that time. Yes, the states had ceded defence and external affairs to India. So, legally, they needed India's permission to send their troops elsewhere. And, I suppose one could fault India for failing to enforce its legal obligations. But this is nothing like what Pakistan and its British officers had done. The "neutral" "third party" British scholars have no option but to cover for them. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:48, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Accessions

• Even the line which you contested - "Their expectations were heightened when, by 15 August 1947, almost all of the rulers of Princely India had made accessions to India or Pakistan" - is there in the book. Apparently, everything in that web page is extracted as it is, from the book. By the way, between May 1947 and the transfer of power on 15 August 1947, the vast majority of princely states signed Instruments of Accession. A few, however, held out. Like some border states, Hyderabad, Kashmir, Jodhpur and Piploda. You are right, only one state, Junagadh acceded to Pakistan. The rest of the vast majority had acceded to India. -- Vamsee614 (talk) 22:15, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

It may be there in the book. But it is wrong. See the Princely states of Pakistan page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:31, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Exactly. So, the heavens weren't falling on 15 August 1947. The Poonchis agitated because they wanted to. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:43, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

And who is denying that? Anyways, "Muslims responded by purchasing fresh weapons from arms bazaars in neighbouring NWFP province." - after having a reliable source(Snedden's book), please tell me how this line is dubious. –– Vamsee614 (talk) 05:29, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

It seems that Christopher Snedden is denying it. His theory is that the Poonchis were agitating for Pakistan. The evidence says that they were agitating against taxes. His theory is faulty, based on false premises.

If you look at his book, the majority of his sources are Muslim Conference sources, in particular Sardar Ibrahim's book. He only uses the State government sources for confirmation. He ignores the British government sources. For example, the British High Commissioner's evidence, covered by Rakesh Ankit, is found nowhere in his book. So, I maintain that his book is a biased source. It cannot be treated as neutral third party source. It is also out of date, being based on his PhD thesis done in 1982. You need corroboration from other sources before using his theories. And, when his theories are contradicted by recent sources such as Rakesh Ankit or Ian Copland, the latter take priority. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:59, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Arms

The info about Poonchis buying guns from NWFP is sourced to Sardar Ibrahim in Snedden's book. He doesn't say how many guns they were able to buy. When Sardar Ibrahim met Akbar Khan, he asked for 500 guns. So, reason dictates that the number of guns he was able to obtain from NWFP must have been significantly smaller (perhaps 100, perhaps 50). 500 was a big number of Ibrahim. He claimed that, if only they could get 500 guns, they could overthrow the Maharja's government. Akbar Khan instead gave him 4,000 guns. These facts are not mentioned in Snedden's book. Either biased or inadequate research. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:07, 22 February 2017 (UTC)

Thank you. Please add the complete information required regarding 'firearms' in the article. Add/refine the necessary content and see that all the tags (neutrality, systemic bias, weasel words etc) get resolved. — Vamsee614 (talk) 11:09, 25 February 2017 (UTC)

Well, this POV-ridden subject is not a high priority for me. I am limiting myself to cross-checking your contributions, but it is your baby. :-) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:06, 25 February 2017 (UTC)

Can you please quote the exact lines from the sources regarding the firearms deal? I mean the ones that tell about Sardar Ibrahim asking Akbar Khan 500 guns and Akbar Khan giving him 4,000 and all. I don't have access to that book and I need the lines to develop the article. Thank you. — Vamsee614 (talk) 01:01, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Please reply to this. I need your quotes here to cite pages and write content there.

References

@Vamsee614: Regarding this edit, I don't see it clearly established anywhere about what arms the Poonchis obtained from NWFP and when. Moreover, the people that claim this are also the ones who are suppressing the information that Pakistan supplied arms to the rebels. So, if this is to stay, we need better sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:39, 8 March 2017 (UTC)

"After Muslims in western Jammu rearmed in August, they initially fought the Maharaja’s forces locally until some leading Poonchis organised them into an ‘army’. Poonchis had begun preparing to retaliate after the ruler’s brutal suppression of their ‘no tax’ campaign. They started to rearm themselves in August, chiefly by purchasing weapons from NWFP arms bazaars." - this is there in Snedden's book sourced to Sardar Ibrahim. Yeah, I know that Snedden did not observe about 'Pakistani supply of arms' (mostly due to inadequate research). But since he wrote that account specifically mentioning the 'NWFP bazaars' and 'August', I presumed that it cannot possibly be totally untrue, though it may not carry much weight as much he says. So I added that account with the word some, since I thought its better not to omit any account completely. — Vamsee614 (talk) 19:35, 8 March 2017 (UTC)

Ok, I see this in Schofield and Das Gupta too. Das Gupta sources it to Richard Symonds' Statesman article. So, the time frame July-August seems right. However, the number of arms obtained from the Frontier could not have been significant, because the revolt was quelled after the death of 20 protestors, and September had been quiet. The revolt started again in October only after Akbar Khan's rifles arrived. The precise date is 6 October. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:31, 8 March 2017 (UTC)

Das Gupta (pg 83) does not source this claim to Symonds. He cites Sheikh Abdullah's speech on 21st October in which he says, "people of Poonch [...] crossed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people". Das Gupta also writes (in the same page) that Poonchis refused to deposit their arms in July when Hari Singh ordered them to do so, and instead organised themselves into "militant mobile groups" in West Poonch and "harassed" the Dogra troops from then itself. But unfortunately he offers no source to this claim!

Yes, frontier arms could not have possibly played a significant role. That is why I wrote 'some weapons' while adding that content in the article. — Vamsee614 (talk) 08:28, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

I take everything on pages 82, 83 etc. to be sourced to Symonds. Similar accounts appear in Schofield as well. "Militant mobile groups" seems like a good description to the groups. They are described in more detail in Rakesh Ankit's article.

So, we can gather that there was considerable unrest (what with 10,000 people gathering at Bagh). So, even without arms, the Maharaja had a big problem on his hands. But his reaction seems to have been to blame it all on Pakistanis that incited them. I suppose India does the same thing now. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:50, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

Haha, exactly. And I don't think those 'arms' accounts were taken from Symonds, please think once again. All of them appear to have come from Sardar itself, in all sources. Anyhow it doesn't matter much. — Vamsee614 (talk) 11:28, 9 March 2017 (UTC)

Jammu massacres

@Kautilya3: There is this POV which was probably first put forward by our Snedden, which says that after Jammu massacres started, they intensified the Poonch rebellion. It is there in Kashmir conflict article also, as written by you:

A large number of Muslims were killed. Huge number of Muslims have fled to West Pakistan, some of whom made their way to the western districts of Poonch and Mirpur, which were undergoing rebellion. Many of these Muslims believed that the Maharaja ordered the killings in Jammu and instigated the Muslims in West Pakistan to join the uprising in Poonch and help in the formation of the Azad Kashmir government.[50](Snedden:Unwritten History; pp 48-57)

PS:- I have no access to that book right now. Don't you think we should add this content in this article somewhere, just with some appropriate length? --- Tyler Durden (talk) 04:47, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

You are right. But we need more detail for this article, rather than the wishy-washy statement that was in Kashmir conflict. I will look into it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:21, 20 May 2017 (UTC)

Snedden says, (p.48):

While inter-religious violence in Jammu Province affected all communities in 1947, this section largely, but not totally, focuses on a possible 'massacre' of Muslims in Jammu's four eastern, Hindu-majority districts. This event was important: it inspired Jammu Muslims to defend themselves and to form the Azad Kashmir movement in the 'liberated' Muslim-majority areas of western Jammu Province.

No detail and no citations. But I think when I add detail about the November attacks, some Jammu Muslims might come into the picture. It appears that Habibur Rehman, the Chief of Staff based at Gujrat, was a Jammu Muslim. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:32, 21 May 2017 (UTC)

This content alone is vague. I think, Snedden wrote that based on Sardar Ibrahim's account which says that he prepared Poonchis to 'defend themselves' as he was "thoroughly convinced" that there was a conspiracy between the State forces and the RSS, which can be quite obviously taken as Jammu massacres. Not by assuming the involvement of Jammu Muslims in November attacks, this is however my assessment. And I feel its better to mention about this appropriately in one line in 'Commentary' section and leave it with that. By the way, isn't there anything else in this context in the book, apart from what you quoted? --- Tyler Durden (talk) 11:36, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

Good thinking. I found some more detail in the following section. (p.58)

One major reason for the formation of the Azad Kashmir movement was fear. As noted, from the start of anti-Muslim violence in Jammu province, some Muslims believed that Maharaja Hari Singh had a plan to 'take quick and strong action, [and] liquidate the whole Moslem population by massacring large numbers and pushing out the rest into Pakistan'. Hari Singh first planned to deal with the '100,000 ex-servicemen' living in areas close to Pakistan, then he would 'turn [his attention] to the rest of the Moslem population' whom, Muslims believed, he intended to massacre.[161: Kashmir's Fight for Freedom, Azad Kashmir Government, p.2] The ruler would then allow the 'surplus Sikh' population from West Punjab to replace the Muslims.[162: Hafizullah, Towards Azad Kashmir, pp.55, 83]

And, it goes on like this. There is nothing new here. It is the same paranoia we have seen in Sardar Ibrahim's book (and he very likely provided the input into these AJK documents as well). There is nothing here about the "four eastern, Hindu-majority districts" of the Jammu province. It seems that Snedden just made up that part of his theory.

There is also some interesting stuff that Shams Rehman has uncovered, by digging through Yusuf Saraf's book. There were two D-days:

• 6 October, when the Poonch Rebellion started, and
• 22 October, when the tribal invasion was launched.

He connects the two provisional governments of AJK with these events. The first one was launched to provide cover for the Poonch Rebellion, and the second one to cover for the tribal invasion. Snedden seems clueless about these things, even though he cites Saraf's book. Here is something quite striking:

For example [of the change from pro-independence to pro-Pakistan], on 21st August 1947 some workers of Muslim Conference met at Eidgah, Mohallah Wanganpura [in Jammu city Srinagar] and formed an underground war council which issued a pamphlet by the title of declaration of war. (Saraf, p: 561).

There is also this:

After the celebrations of Pakistan Day in Baramulla, Mr Saraf met Choudhary Hamidullah who according to Saraf told him that “sympathetic people in Frontier and Punjab should create trouble on the State borders adjacent to their areas to attract the Dogra army in bulk so that the Poonch ex-servicemen get an opportunity of advancing upon Srinagar.” (p:561).

"Pakistan Day" must be 14 August. So, apparently, Hamidullah was also part of the conspiracy, not just Sardar Ibrahim. Hamidullah also gave Yusuf Saraf a letter to be delivered to Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, asking the latter to organise attacks along the border so that the Poonchis could focus on taking Srinagar. Qayyum Khan said that it was a "foolish" idea and asked Hamidulalh to come in person to discuss it properly! You are welcome to guess why it was "foolish".

Given all this, can we understand why the Maharaja did what he did? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:36, 22 May 2017 (UTC)

As to why Qayyum Khan called it foolish, perhaps he assessed then itself that doing so would drive Maharaja towards India. Obvious guess.

About Maharaja, he went mad. After all these happenings, he decided to do whatever it takes to prevent internal rebellions in rest of the Jammu. The best measure he could take is to drive away all Muslims by creating terror, to stop any conspiracies. As you said earlier, do rioting, kill some, and the rest will automatically go away. Usual partition massacres. He probably might have sought revenge too, for the rebellion, as Copland states. He became a fanatic like others during partition, when he let thousands of Muslims die. The words of Mahajan, who was part of the administration and following Maharaja's instructions, are somewhat an indication to this. I have always maintained that Hari Singh lost his mind and acted like a 'terrorist'. I still do. Feel free to call me or think of me as judgemental and prejudiced. :-P

And what is your opinion on Sardar Ibrahim's account of RSS-State troops conspiracy during April-June itself? Do you think there's some truth to it, or he completely made it up, taking advantage of the Jammu massacres that occurred during October-November? Or we can't say? Because the insertion of content in discussion, depends majorly on this factor. --- Tyler Durden (talk) 03:02, 23 May 2017 (UTC)

From Self and Sovereignty (p.482):

Two recent converts to the League, Firoz Khan Noon and Abdul Qayyum Khan of the NWFP, publicly ‘advocated that Muslims should arm for civil war’ and ‘prepare…to fight the Hindus’ if they resorted to violence. In Gujrat, Noon ‘urged every Muslim boy to buy a sword and keep it with him’. Even Daultana was heard making intemperate speeches, but then thought it better to stress restraint on the grounds that if Muslims ‘disturbed the peace they would only be harming the cause of Pakistan’.[38]

The trouble with most studies on Kashmir is that the authors are either ignorant of the partition context, or they disregard it and treat Kashmir as an island. It wasn't an island. During the Ramchandra Kak premiership, "Jinnah caps were visible everywhere". The Pir of Manki Sharif sent his agents to Kashmir in March 1947. Mirza Hassan Khan was the chair of a "revolutionary council" made up of the State Force officers. Chaudhri Hameedullah was inviting Abdul Qayyum Khan to attack Kashmir borders and draw the State troops away from the capital. (I read this as the Pakistani tactic in Indian sources and previously didn't believe it. Now we know that it was true.)

Most studies of Kashmir also think of the Maharaja as a dimwit. But I don't think he was. He knew exactly what was happening in the State and was taking defensive measures. The RSS was, for him, a civil defence unit to fight against the rebellious Muslims. The RSS was there since 1940 and would have certainly infiltrated into the State machinery. Even other officials that weren't part of it, would have known that the RSS was part of the 'deep state'. We can call it "conspiracy" if we want, but if we compare the situation with the other princely states of East Punjab, the RSS in Kashmir was much more under control. If we say the Maharaja went "mad", he apparently didn't go mad on Kashmiri Muslims, but only the Jammu Muslims. Snedden gives us a one-sided picture, mostly based on the Azad Kashmiri propaganda. But the facts tell us that the "conspiracy" was entirely on their side. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:58, 23 May 2017 (UTC)

I agree that many studies do not cover this aspect of Kashmir conflict history. Yes, all these "conspiracies" or "self-defence measures" are in the context of partition. They took place on both sides of the border. On one side government is involved, and on the other side government (Indian government, not J&K government) is uninvolved. Who or what started them first, is a complex POV debate. However the originating point of all these conspiracies/self-defence measures, the partition itself, was a conspiracy according to one perspective, and self-defence measure according to pro-partition perspective. So I don't want to get into this complicated story.

But... If we say the Maharaja went "mad", he apparently didn't go mad on Kashmiri Muslims, but only the Jammu Muslims. - that doesn't make him any less mad. It just makes him more of a political fanatic rather than communal fanatic. Nothing can change that he favoured the killings of tens of thousands of innocents. My position/prejudice on him does not alter, not a bit.

True, Snedden's narrative is biased. Nobody can deny that. --- Tyler Durden (talk) 13:38, 23 May 2017 (UTC)

Neutrality issues

I want to remove the 'disputed neutrality' and 'systemic bias' tags to this article at this stage. So I request any editor to review the whole article and suggest modifications if any, to resolve the neutrality issues. Thank you. Vamsee614 (talk) 13:35, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Please comment on this. — Vamsee614 (talk) 13:45, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

We are not there yet. Pakistan's agency in the rebellion is not yet covered. Sources tell us that the Muslim Conference was essentially a wing of the Muslim League, which was waging an undeclared war from across the border. The article portrays it as a purely indigenous development. I will work on it a bit. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:51, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

Now that you have found the page number of the Raghavan book, please compare what it says and what the article says. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:26, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: "Scholar Srinath Raghavan states that the "gathering head of steam" was utilised by the local Muslim Conference led by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan to further their campaign for accession to Pakistan, and that, towards the end of August, the Muslim league activists also joined in from Pakistan. " - I think I put the same in the article, as per source, and it clearly states that there was involvement from Pakistan! — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:35, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

What about the rest? Akbar Khan, Mian Iftikhar Malik, Liaquat Ali Khan? You want to add that the Maharaja brutally suppressed the rebellion, but omit the fact the rebellion turned "violent" before then. The First Kashmir War article says that the Muslim Conference wrote to Liaquat Ali Khan on 25 August warning him that Kashmir would be lost, and he initiated actions in response. Isn't it clear that the Muslim Conference and Pakistan had teamed up at the highest levels? These are not just random raids from across the border! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:44, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

Bro, firstly, this is an article only on Poonch rebellion, not the first Indo Pak war. So I'm not sure if all that stuff on Mian Iftikhar Malik, Liaquat Ali Khan, the plans etc is relevant. Anyhow I added that. And no matter how much we try, two facts don't change. One is that Hari Singh was a terrible ruler who was never liked by the Poonchis since the beginning. Poonchis didn't want him since 1930s. Second is that, though Pakistan desperately tried to use force to take the region, its true that it had a lot of support from the people of Poonch. — Vamsee614 (talk) 21:23, 26 February 2017 (UTC)

I agree that the content needs to be refined to refocus on Poonch. But all these things are interconnected. That is why I felt that a separate article on the Poonch Rebellion is unproductive. But, now that we are here, we need to keep working on it. (I have seen at least one source that said that Mian Iftikharuddin is the one that introduced Sardar Ibrahim to Akbar Khan. I still need to confirm. So he is very much a player.) Secondly, I am not convinced that Pakistan was desperately trying to take Kashmir. Jinnah's strategy was to work on the Maharaja, apply pressure in various ways. There was no hurry. The time was on his side. But the Poonchis precipitated the issue and forced Liaquat Ali Khan to goof up. So, the Poonchis are very much at the centre. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:15, 27 February 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: Bhattacharya — this would have been the source, what else? And for some reason this source doesn't appear so professional to me. No citations, too much dramatic descriptions and all! — Vamsee614 (talk) 05:27, 27 February 2017 (UTC)

I have already commented on it at your talk page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:56, 27 February 2017 (UTC)

References

Pro-Pakistain chieftains

It turns out that that content was actually add by me in the Azad Kashmir page when I was still a newbie editor. It suffers from close paraphrasing as well as undue admiration fro Sumantra Bose. Unfortunately, the scholarly consensus is against Bose. Snedden expresses various doubts about the first provisional government, and the Kashmiri activists have even more serious misgivings. Neither is it clear that this government had anything to do with the Poonch Rebellion, except for the fact Sardar Ibrahim was chosen as the prime minister (and he didn't use a pseudonym). It looks like Ibrahim and Gilkar were the only enthusiasts and the others were lukewarm. I think it is best to mention these two, and leave the rest of the "chieftains" alone. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:40, 27 February 2017 (UTC)

I don't get it! Why the conspiracy? Why even to falsely portray that there was a first provisional government on 3rd October? I mean, what's the objective in doing so? Its unclear to me, and so I'm asking.

That aside, that was a quite strange and interesting read! Is it true? I knew Jinnah was not directly involved in these operations, but I thought he was being briefed, at least to a minor extent. But 'give Kashmir to Quaid-e-Azam as surprise'? Ah, seriously! What were they smoking?

By the way, need a small help, I'm not getting notified when someone posts on this page, though I have put it on my watchlist. I'm always checking manually. Can something be done about this? — Vamsee614 (talk) 18:00, 1 March 2017 (UTC)

I don't know what you mean by conspiracy. The article is saying that the first provisional government was a response to the Junagadh provisional government in India, directed top-down. It looks like most of the players were uncomfortable about it, but Gilkar and Ibrahim took the bait. Gilkar seems to be a bit of an idealist and idealogue, and he vanished from the scene. The second government was again directed top-down, in order to provide political cover for the tribal raid.

Jinnah knew something was going on, but he chose not to be informed about the details in order to keep "his conscience clear" [1]. What he knew or didn't know is always open to debate. The fact is that he flew from Karachi to Lahore on 26 October. Before leaving, he had a meeting with the MIM leaders from Hyderabad, who staged their "October coup" in Hyderabad that night. There was supposed to have been a "big bang" on 27 October or soon thereafter, with the two largest princely states falling into Jinnah's lap. I think whether he "knew" or not doesn't matter. He was smart enough to figure it out. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:15, 1 March 2017 (UTC)

Note my edit to the 19 July entry in the Timeline. The notion that the Muslim Conference declared in favour of Pakistan on 19 July isn't clear cut, based on Balraj Puri's evidence. In fact, I have seen some other writers say that the "convention" in Srinagar wasn't a controlled meeting of delegates, but anybody could walk in. Since the meeting was in Srinagar, Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah basically packed the meeting with his own followers, who weren't even political activists of any kind, in order to win the resolution in favour of Pakistan. It isn't clear to what extend the real Muslim Conference was supporting it. Sardar Ibrahim, on the other hand, always acted as if he was the real acting president of the Muslim Conference and didn't care a dime for Choudhary Hamidullah. Rakesh Ankit calls him an "eloquent fanatic". -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:39, 1 March 2017 (UTC)

No, what I fail to understand is, was there any real 'taking control' of regions by rebels before any of the two proclamations, or did they just hold meetings and made announcements as a strategy for political reasons? Or is everything ambiguous and nothing can be said beyond doubt? — Vamsee614 (talk) 06:28, 2 March 2017 (UTC)

We can assume that Akbar Khan's 4,000 riles and the "condemned" ammunition would have been delivered to the rebels before the end of September. So, the rebels outnumbered all of the State garrisons in Poonch & Mirpur put together. From that point on, the rebels controlled the countryside and the "besieged" garrisons only held the towns. It is hard to say how much control they might have had by 3 October announcement, but by 24 October, they essentially controlled the present day Azad Kashmir (except for the garrisoned towns). -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:46, 2 March 2017 (UTC)

Okay, thanks. I got it. "Following this victory, the pro-Pakistan rebels of the western districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur proclaimed a provisional Azad Jammu and Kashmir government in Rawalpindi on October 3, 1947." - Just tell me whether this line should be kept or removed? — Vamsee614 (talk) 19:51, 2 March 2017 (UTC)

It can stay for now. I will add a footnote with the names. But that entire section needs to be reworked with more details on the rebellion. The provisional government is really a side note. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:24, 2 March 2017 (UTC)

References

Additional information

The first and last paras in the 'Preparations for an armed revolt' section - Mian Iftikharuddin going to Kashmir, Shaukat Hayat Khan and Liaquat Ali Khan's approval of plans - I think all this is additional information (not Akbar Khan's guns). They are all connected to tribal invasion and First Kashmir War, but I'm not sure if they are directly related to the Poonch rebellion. The readers can be aware of those parallel occurrences for a broader idea of what was happening, but I feel they should better be added as footnotes in the article, rather than directly in the content. Vamsee614 (talk) 04:25, 5 March 2017 (UTC)

What you copied from the First Kashmir War page is quite inaccurate in details. Liaquat Ali Khan ordered a "three-pronged attack", of which one prong were the Poonchis, the second the Pashtun tribals and the third Shaukat Hayat Khan's Punjabi groups. The Punjabi groups merged into the Poonch rebellion, and some (unknown number of) Pashtuns were also part of it. For example, Pashtuns were very much a part of the sack of Mirpur, where 20,000 Hindus/Sikhs got killed, and the sack of Kotli, where 30,000 Hindus/Sikhs got killed. So there are no clear boundaries between the Poonch rebellion and the First Kashmir War. Neither did the rebellion end at any point before the War itself did. Give me a couple of weeks when I will get time to fix things. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:28, 5 March 2017 (UTC)

Sure. I have studied the sources available and known to me (Shuja Nawaz, Raghavan and Bhattacharya) and they matched with the content of the article. I am not aware of this three ponged attack and the sources that said about it. So I thought it is adequate. And we shall better limit the scope of this article, up to the phase of the rebellion - when first Azad Kashmir government was formed and Hari Singh lost control over Poonch and the surrounding regions. The later stages, we shall brief under aftermath. They can be covered in detail in First Kashmir War article. Regarding 30,000 non Muslim killings near Kotli and Rajouri, I read that in two Indian military sources while studying about Jammu massacres and was shocked to see that figure. I searched but didn't come across neutral sources which observed the same. If you know a very reliable source that states a similar figure, please tell me because I have been longing to confirm this report. Thank you. :-) Vamsee614 (talk) 17:19, 5 March 2017 (UTC)

Idon't know what you mean by the "phase of the rebellion". What event signifies the end of the rebellion?

As I have said right off hand, this article is a WP:POV fork of First Kashmir War. But I have accepted it on the grounds that more detail about the Poonch stuff can be added here, which may too much for the main article. The state forces had garrisons throughout the area, and after the rebellion/war started, some of them fell and some of them held out and were relieved by the Indian forces. The rebels, along with other Pakistani groups, fought both the state forces and the Indian forces. The Poonch town itself held out and became part of the Indian-controlled Kashmir. The rebels were fighting until the ceasefire.

So the war did not end the rebellion. It only intensified it. So, how can you limit the scope? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:40, 5 March 2017 (UTC)

1) When the content of the article about a specific topic is in sync and consistent with another article of a broader subject, it does not qualify as a POV FORK. If there is a problem in this regard, you may kindly point it out.

2) By 'limiting the scope', I meant keeping the main focus. See the timeline which the article discusses in its present stage. August-September-October, i.e., from the stage when "first sign of trouble broke out in Poonch" to Hari Singh losing his control over a major part of the Poonch region. And you yourself have framed and written the subheadings of that 'stages of revolt' section. You approved it too. So what new/faulty have I proposed?

3) I know, this argument of drawing lines b/w the war and the rebellion is pointless and endless. And it is not the issue. But my goal in creating this article was to focus and elaborate on the initial stages of the rebellion/war in Poonch, till Hari Singh acceded to India, and before India entered into the picture in Poonch (as the article is at present). Of course, the rebellion had support from Pakistan and was joined by Pakistani groups, but still it was a rebellion, with local support, against the existing establishment. You also stated that, by Oct 24th, rebels essentially controlled the region. This can be seen as a significant breakpoint (I'm not saying 'an endpoint'. It is definitely not.) due to a major transition in rebellion/war later. In the next stages, India and Pakistan directly fought against each other through out the J&K border, and of course, the rebels were fighting on the Pakistan side. But it is more of a war than a rebellion. You may call this WP OR, or state any other Wiki policy that I'm currently not aware of, I won't deny to that. And I won't defend that. However you are a very senior editor, and if you wish to expand about the happenings in Poonch during the whole war timeline in the article, I'm nobody to object. But please remember that the overall content of the article becomes vague with no meaningful difference from that of First Kashmir War, and the article's objective becomes trivial and gets diluted. With that, I'm leaving it to your good wisdom. Thank you. Vamsee614 (talk) 21:04, 5 March 2017 (UTC)

Well, as I said previously this subject is POV-ridden. We have practically no information available about it except for Sardar Ibrahim's memoirs. All the scholars have been basciall repackaging what he wrote. Nobody knows anything else. The only other source is Henry Lawrence Scott but his account stops at the end of September. We have no information after that. The October section, the real rebellion, has no content. So, on the whole, this article is a paper tiger. Smoke and mirrors.

However, you chose to call this article "Poonch Rebellion" rather than "Poonch uprising", the term used by Snedden. So that gives us an opportunity to cover the later aspects of the rebellion. Your position that they shouldn't be covered is inexplicable. The POV that has been pushed based on Snedden's book, e.g., [2], needs to be countered. Snedden never mentions Sardar Ibrahim meeting Akbar Khan. His account is completely one-sided. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:22, 6 March 2017 (UTC)

We have been countering it and adding all accounts that say facts which contest Snedden's POV. We had already mentioned Sardar Ibrahim meeting Akbar Khan and all other Pakistani involvement aspects in detail. And I'm very glad that you said, you'll further improvise it. Also I was not so particular about the name, bro. As I saw there was already an article with the name Poonch Uprising, I simply used this different name. Anyways, as I have said, I'll believe that you'll proceed with your good sense, and it will make this article better. Vamsee614 (talk) 10:17, 6 March 2017 (UTC)

200 vs 2000

@Vamsee614: Please add a quotation from your source, because it isn't visible to me. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:06, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

@Kautilya3: It's in the first para of the page itself, mate.

On Iftikharuddin's return from Srinagar to Murree, Khan gave him copies of his plan titled 'Armed Revolt inside Kashmir'. It was based on the availability of the rifles: 2,800 of the rifles would be allotted for taking on the Maharaja's 9,000 strong army. Khan's calculation was that 2,000 Muslims in the army would anyway join the revolt and the rest, spread out in penny packets, could be overwhelmed by attrition.

— Vamsee614 (talk) 17:18, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

Oh, good. I also found the exact wording in Akbar Khan's book (p.14):

The Maharaja's Army was said to be about 9,000 strong of which 2,000 or so Muslims could be expected to remain comparatively passive or even to desert if all went well. The remaining 7,000 were believed to be widely scattered and could be overcome by the Kashmiri people little by little.

Funny that Shuja Nawaz should misprint it in a journal article as well as in his book. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:21, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

Cool... — Vamsee614 (talk) 17:27, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

By the way, Akbar Khan seems like such a cool guy. :-P I wonder how he wrote a detailed book on all such covert operations! — Vamsee614 (talk) 18:44, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

Yes. And, his plan was also eminently sensible. If only Pakistan had implemented it, things could have been a lot different. (Kashmir could have remained independent while the Maharaja's power would have been weakened, and the MC and the NC could have figured out how to share power.) -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:26, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

Yeah, I agree. — Vamsee614 (talk) 20:06, 11 March 2017 (UTC)

References

Azad Army

@Kautilya3: Sardar might not have organised the whole force. But according to Sardar, the so-called 'Azad Army' which was formed (perhaps from many ways) amounted in around 50,000 men. And it is considerably observed in RS.

According to Sardar Ibrahim, during September 1947, some 50,000 men were organised into a people’s militia variously known as the ‘Azad Army’, ‘Azad Forces’ or ‘Azad Kashmir Regular Forces’. This locally-officered volunteer ‘army’ comprised 90 per cent ex-servicemen, except in Bagh, where the percentage was lower.

—Snedden (pg 44)

In June 1947 they (Poonchis) commenced a 'no-tax' campaign that rapidly escalated, courtesy of some heavy-handed reprisals by the darbär's police, into a widespread popular insurgency, spearheaded by a well-armed guerrilla force of Indian Army veterans led by local zamindar Sardar Qayyum Khan. This so-called Azad Army would eventually number in excess of 50,000.

Why should we entirely omit this account? — Vamsee614 (talk) 08:47, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

We need the detail about when it became 50,000. We know that Ibrahim asked for 500 guns, and there is no known misprint there. Two more zeroes have been added! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:44, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

We also need clarity on Sardar Ibrahim's whereabouts. He was in Murree at the beginning of September. On 23 October, he was being woken up in the night by the Commissioner of Rawalpindi. I can't see how he could organise an army in Poonch while shuttling between Murree and Rawalpindi. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:48, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

I'm not sure such analysis of ours can be appropriate. Snedden says its during September. That means its Sardar Ibrahim's claim that it became 50,000 in September. And Sardar isn't saying he organised all 50,000 people. He is saying that they were organised (across the region) amounting nearly to that number. Yes, he asked for 500 guns. But we know, that's nowhere near the figure of number of rebels who fought against the Maharaja troops (who were 9,000 in number, and if we assume at least 5,000 fought against rebels, and we know State troops lost all control within weeks). I don't think we can match that 500 to this number, it is possible that Sardar was requesting guns particularly for the people he took with himself to Murre (something like that). And there might certainly be other groups of rebels being assembled in the region, like "village guerrilla bands", without Sardar's direct involvement.

We know that there were 60,000 demobilised soldiers in Poonch and Mirpur left with their arms. And we don't know how many of them handed over their weapons after Hari Singh's order. Some sources (like Schofield) say many of them did not, and started using them from then itself. Also it is to be noted that they had war experience, to even lead guerrillas.

What I'm trying to tell is, it was all an informal and irregular war. We don't know, in detail, what forces fought with exactly which weapons. So its better to write such claims, as they are. — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:49, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Also, as a lighter query, I'm not understanding why sources are calling 'Associate Press of Pakistan' as API instead of APP. It would be helpful if you can throw some light in this regard. — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:55, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

No, checking and cross-checking sources is entirely appropriate, especially in a contentious subject like this, where we know there is all kinds of propaganda and misinformation floating around. Snedden has been too credulous with his sources and sometimes goes farther than what they even say.

Shuja Nawaz and Zaheer are right now the best sources we have for the Pakistani side of the operations. And, of course, we have loads of Indian sources that we can cross check against.

By the way, the State Forces had one brigade in Poonch, about 800 men. So, 4000 rebels would have far outnumbered them. In total, in Poonch/Mirpur/Jammu, they had three brigades. But they were distributed in various places. So the rebels had a considerable advantage. Even after the Indian army came into the action, they couldn't break through. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:16, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Regarding you last question, the APP didn't exist yet at the time. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:51, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Well fine, I'll go with you. But lastly, I would like to point that we didn't crosscheck the number and we don't have any source that counters that claim. No source has given another number (anything apart from 50,000) to say that the present one is wrong. We are only going by the assumption that 'Sardar Ibrahim has lied.' On a side note, did you see how Snedden(pg 44) tried his best to establish that all this was purely an indigenous affair till its end? :-D

According to Sardar Ibrahim, during September 1947, some 50,000 men were organised into a people’s militia variously known as the ‘Azad Army’, ‘Azad Forces’ or ‘Azad Kashmir Regular Forces’. This locally-officered volunteer ‘army’ comprised 90 per cent ex-servicemen, except in Bagh, where the percentage was lower. A ‘very small percentage of Pakistani volunteers’ fought with them, as may have twelve women. According to the Azad Kashmir Defence Minister, Colonel Ali Ahmad Shah (a former captain in the J&K State Force), the ‘Azad Forces had been recruited locally or had risen spontaneously’. They comprised ‘seasoned troops’ with experience fighting in both world wars and the serious ‘Waziristan Operations’ (1920-21).

— Vamsee614 (talk) 19:11, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

It is uncertain if the Pakistanis’ assistance was sanctioned at senior levels.

Funny! The Colonel himself had written a book about it in 1975, and clearly described all the plans, mentioning names & numbers (4,000 guns and all). — Vamsee614 (talk) 19:24, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Yeah, it makes you wonder what these scholars have been smoking. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:12, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

I don't doubt that there were 50,000 Azad rebels eventually. But Pakistan first had to find 50,000 guns! On 22 October, when the invasion was launched, Messervy was in London asking for weapons from Britain (a convenient absence, obviously). So, you know where those guns came from. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:17, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Nehru says:

At that time [of the UNCIP resolutions, January 1948] our information was that Pakistan forces numbered about 50,000 including 27,000 'Azad' forces, 20,000 Pakistan regular army and 3,000 Scouts.

So you have a contradiction now. Subsequently, Nehru says that the Azad Forces were trained and reequipped to take up the positions of the Pakistan Army. Ayub Khan says that, when he took over at the end of 1949, Azad forces numbered 50,000. [3]. So, apparently, the Azad Forces were expanded after the cease-fire. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:20, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Yeah, now this really is an interesting rebuttal. Thank you. :-) — Vamsee614 (talk) 23:40, 14 March 2017 (UTC)

Yeah, this should tell you that Snedden is being proved wrong again and again. So, you need to stop inserting his POV. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:30, 15 March 2017 (UTC)

Sure, I won't insert his POV. But we should just inform that 'Azad Army' is first formed in September-October during the rebellion in Poonch. I wrote "thousands of rebels". I think that should be a reasonable wording to balance things here (even you estimated that there were around 4,000 rebels based on the number of guns). — Vamsee614 (talk) 14:41, 16 March 2017 (UTC)

References

Background

@Vamsee614: I am beginning to review all the edits you have made in March, as I didn't have time to do so earlier. The Background section is too long and is a bit meandering. There is also too much content taken from Rakesh Ankit's magazine article, which is not corroborated by other sources, and in some instances seems wrong. For example, Ankit claims that the Raja of Poonch had a direct relationship with the Viceroy of India, which is contradicted by the extensive discussion of Snedden in Appendix I. If the INC and NC had supported the Poonchis' demand to merge with Punjab, we need corroboration from other sources with citations. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:47, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

Regarding your comment: Well sourced and relevant content was removed. In an article exclusively on Poonch affair, a bit detailed discussion is not unnecessary, relevance needs to be determined by what information has bearing on the main subject, which is the Poonch rebellion. There is a separate article on Poonch jagir, where you can put any other information that is of importance to it. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:56, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

Let me break this into the lines edited.

The campaign was also supported by Indian National Congress and Sheikh Abdullah's Jammu & Kashmir National Conference during 1937-47.

I'm not so sure what's ambiguous about this claim of Rakesh Ankit. He must have written it after hearing it from some source. I don't think he could have been mistaken about it. Anyways we can reduce it to a footnote as you did and try to find a corroboration from other sources.

As a result, scholar Rakesh Ankit says, the Poonchis had pursued employment in the British Indian Army.

This is a relevant line to the rebellion, since it is talking about why so many Poonchis pursued employment in the army. And I think it gives reader a good and interesting information.

In June 1947, the Poonchis launched a ‘no tax’ campaign.

You did not explain why you removed this line. There was also a discussion that took place between us regarding this in this very talk page. If you have any doubts regarding its reliability, please tell me.

Thousands of rebels were organised into a people's militia known as the 'Azad Army'.

I added this line only after a lot of discussion in this talk page with you. You can see that in the section right above this one. I wrote "thousands of rebels" for an NPOV since you also opined that the number would be around 4000 rebels. I don't think the wording is still unsafe. So I don't know why you removed it.

Cheers! — Vamsee614 (talk) 13:45, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

You can ignore the third and fourth issues for now because those deletions were in error. The first issue is settled. As for the second issue, this is one of the issues of overweight on Rakesh Ankit. Snedden's book gives a more thorough analysis of why Poonchis had to go for the Army (quite similar to how Mirpuris ended up in Britain). There were a variety of factors and you can't reduce them all to taxation. In any case, I don't think this page is where that discussion should take place. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 18:28, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

See History of Poonch District#Economy for a quick summary. Looking at that article, it seems that the taxation was not heavy either, by Kashmir standards. (In Kashmir itself, something like two-thirds was appropriated by the State.) But the difference might be that in Poonch the landholdings were small. Rakesh Ankit is certainly confused here. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:08, 26 March 2017 (UTC)

Yes, I saw that section. Fine.

By the way, as you have already added in the article, it is the many common Muslims who complained that the deposited arms were being redistributed among Hindu and Sikh families. It can be seen in Kashmir before Accession book also, which you mentioned in my talk page. So their collective testimony was either true to a good extent, or all of them were somehow lying/confused (I believe the former). In any case, "one of my heroes", Sardar Ibrahim, did not make up this fact to justify his rebellious actions. :-P — Vamsee614 (talk) 04:32, 27 March 2017 (UTC)

References

National Conference and Congress support

I am going to get rid of the footnote [b] that implies obliquely that the NC and Congress supported the Poonchi demand to merge into Punjab. I think Rakesh Ankit's discussion is not at all clear and there is plenty of evidence against such an implication.

• The National Conference General Council in 1939 declared that Poonch illaqa is an inalienable part of J&K and the dual administration in Poonch is source of great trouble to the people and must be ended.
• Naya Kashmir was divided into two parts—the Constitution of the State and the National Economic Plan. The proposed constitution of the state would grant a single citizenship to all inhabitants of Jammu, Kashmir, Ladakh, and the Frontier Regions, including the Poonch and Chenani ilaqas (regions).

Getting rid of the dual administration is exactly what the Maharaja did in 1940, but that got him nothing but trouble. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:30, 8 April 2017 (UTC)

What about INC? Anyways fine, remove it. I agree that the footnote is dubious. — TylerDurden10 (talk) 23:31, 8 April 2017 (UTC)

References

Raja of Poonch

Based on Ankit, the article says: Despite being a 90% Muslim populated region, most of the administrative and police staff under the Raja of Poonch were Hindus and this was said to be a source of discontent among Poonchis.

However, we know that Khan Muhammad Khan was appointed the Police inspector of Poonch and later nominated to the Praja Sabha. While we have no idea how many other Muslims might have been employed by the state, we do know that on 30 July 1940, a "huge gathering" of "Poonch Public" passed a resolution where they expressed "profound sorrow" that their "beloved Raja" was being treated as a jagirdar. The Maharaja was apparently unpopular in Poonch, but not the Raja of Poonch.

Once again, I think this is rather too sweeping a statement to take from a magazine article.-- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:30, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

I see, okay. So you think, the line has to be moderated, or removed? --- Tyler Durden (talk) 16:20, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

I took care of it. In general, weaker sources should only be used for factual information, not interpretations. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:44, 10 April 2017 (UTC)

References

NWFP arms bazaars

Currently there is this sentence in the August 1947 section: Poonchis purchased some weapons from the neighbouring NWFP arms bazaars.[1], sourced to India-seminar. I have finally located the corresponding info from Snedden's book (p.44) where it is said:

They started to rearms themselves in August, chiefly by purchasing weapons from NWFP arms bazaars.[57: Ibrahim Khan, The Kashmir Saga, p.69-70]

He says specifically that this happened in August. However, The Kashmir Saga p.69-70 has nothing about this. I have however located something close on p.60:

In the villages, in August 1947, some leading men, particularly ex-Serviceman, began to collect money to buy arms from tribesmen of the former Frontier Province.

This only states the intent to buy arms from the Frontier, not the act. So we can't be sure that arms were purchased in August. However, we have corroboration from State sources that it happened in September. So I will move this sentence to the September 1947 section. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:06, 13 April 2017 (UTC)

 Done I did. — Tyler Durden (talk) 05:18, 13 April 2017 (UTC)

Detail?

Drivers refused to use the Srinagar–Rawalpindi road because of reports of disturbances and attacks by raiders.

in note: The state government had dispatched a large number of state troops to Kohala and Ramkot on the Domel Abbotabad road to ensure that the armed raiders did not cross the border.

@Kautilya3: In the new section, I think, it is not clear as to who the raiders were (from where they were coming & who sent them?) and when they were attacking? The previous line in the para says The Pir of Manki Sharif was also reported to have sent agents provocateurs to frontier districts of Kashmir to prepare their Muslims for a 'holy crusade'. So "agents provocateurs" were planned and sent to prepare armed raiders in border districts of Kashmir. Then, the state had dispatched troops to ensure which raiders did not cross the border, when the raiders were supposed to be made inside the border?

And I think, the content of this section also belongs in the Jammu massacres page, because of the Hindu & Sikh rufugees stuff. What do you say? — Tyler Durden (talk) 13:56, 18 April 2017 (UTC)

Ok, I will change attacks by raiders to simply "raids". The original sentence from Jha is:

Motor drivers are refusing to use the Srinagar-Rawalpindi road because of reports of raiders burning lorries and destroying bridges and culverts.

As for the Jammu massacres page, there is no evidence that these disturbances affected Jammu. The refugees mainly came from the Rawalpindi and Hazara districts, areas immediately to the west of Azad Kashmir districts. And, they came via the Domel and Kohala bridges. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:47, 18 April 2017 (UTC)

Still the section lacks clarity to see the relation of its content with the Poonch rebellion. The Pir of Manki Sharif was also reported to have sent agents provocateurs to frontier districts of Kashmir to prepare their Muslims for a 'holy crusade'. Kashmir responded by sealing the border with the provinces, and sending more troops to the border areas. The stream of Hindu and Sikh refugees coming from the Rawalpindi and Hazara districts also spread unease in the State. Is the paragraph trying to say that the communal tensions caused due to the arrival of refugees, and the state's militarisation of the region were some of the factors that drove the Muslims of Poonch and Mirpur districts to a rebellion? If that is so, I think it should be made somewhat more clear. Please read it from the perspective of an average Wikipedia reader. --- Tyler Durden (talk) 15:58, 18 April 2017 (UTC)

This is still the Background section, the context in which the rebellion occurred. We are still missing loads of stuf that happened in Spring. I am still researching it.

To answer your questions, I don't know of any communal tension that occurred in Kashmir. But I think the state's Hindus and Sikhs began to see Pakistan as a threat and decided that any local Muslims that were suspected of collaborating with Pakistan were to be eliminated. I don't have any RS that say it in those words. But I can see it as a subtext in the Muslim narratives. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:25, 18 April 2017 (UTC)

I think the state's Hindus and Sikhs began to see Pakistan as a threat and decided that any local Muslims that were suspected of collaborating with Pakistan were to be eliminated. - This was a background factor for the Jammu massacres, right? Or for the Poonch rebellion also?

And the new para you added made things clearer. Thanks, Tyler Durden (talk) 04:12, 19 April 2017 (UTC)

The timelines are quite different. The Poonch border was affected in March 1947 (from Hazara and Rawalpinidi districts). Jammu was affected only after August. By then the Partition violence was in full swing. And the massacres occurred in October, after Poonch was already in rebel hands. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:14, 19 April 2017 (UTC)

COPYVIO?

Danish.mehraj26, KA$HMIR, JosephusOfJerusalem: Would you care to explain what WP:COPYVIO you have found in this article? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 20:07, 19 December 2017 (UTC)

I am struggling to find a sentence which is not at least 80/90% like the sentences from the source. KA$HMIR (talk) 15:36, 20 December 2017 (UTC)

Then it should be easy to show us examples. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:54, 20 December 2017 (UTC)

Any results yet? Shellwood (talk) 22:25, 20 December 2017 (UTC)

No, Joseph and Danish have yet to respond, and KA$HMIR won't show us examples. Unless we find actual evidence that there is indeed a copyvio in this article, then it will remain as is. --🎼Yexstorm2001🎼 (talk) 23:32, 20 December 2017 (UTC)

Sudhans

Astore Malik you have added this content:

Together with Muslims from Bagh and Mirpur it was the Sudhans of Poonch who were at the heart of this campaign.

References

Those page numbers don't make sense. The book has only 435 pages. If you don't have the actual page numbers as in the published book, please provide a quotation. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:23, 15 July 2018 (UTC)

July 1947

I reverted an edit claiming that Ibrahim Khan held a meeting of a "general assembly" at his residence in July 1947. I know that there are claims in this regard in Azad Kashmir. But they are squarely contradicted by the acting General Secretary of Muslim Conference, Ishaque Qureshi:

Qureshi says that the much trumpeted meeting of the MC general council which allegedly decided to accede to Pakistan, and on which Pakistan's case for Kashmir rested at that time, had never taken place. “All the leaders were in jail and we were the only ones active outside..."

The scholars that scoured through Dawn and Pakistan Times of that period found no news of the supposed general council meeting. So this is entirely dubious. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:53, 15 January 2019 (UTC)

References

Result infobox

It’s important to add that the rebellion was a victory for the rebels in the infobox since the rebellion had succeeded in freeing the region from the maharajas rule and establishing Azad Kashmir. Ukiyology1 (talk) 18:22, 29 August 2023 (UTC)

To call it a victory for one side or the other, we need to have reliable sources that say so. And such discussion needs to be already present in the body before you can contemplate fiddling with the infobox. The infobox summarises the article; it doesn't invent something new. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 19:06, 29 August 2023 (UTC)

Agree with Kautilya3 (talk) about not adding victory for one side on Infobox RogerYg (talk) 10:43, 20 October 2023 (UTC)