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Fritz Fischer

My understanding is that Fischer was living a lie as he wrote the statements that are being referred to in this article. That is to say that he was hiding his Nazi past (First the FreiKorps, then the Bund Oberland, then the infamous SA or Brown Shirts [of Krystal Nacht], and then the Nazi party itself). His writings, often critical of Nazism, were part of his assumed identity as a "I-was-never-a Nazi". IF we want to quote Fischer's views we should mention he lied continuously over the course of his last 44 years.Werchovsky (talk) 08:41, 30 November 2008 (UTC)

Hello Mr. W. Coincidentally, I just ordered a book on Amazon.com by Fritz Fischer called "From Kaiserreich to third reich: Elements of continuity in German History, 1871-1945. I also recently read Meinecke's "The German Catastrophe". Germany has lost 35% of it's pre-1914 territory. If not for the right-wing thinking of the Junker class, Germany today would most likely have its pre-1914 borders. And many german lives would have been spared. To quote George V on the Kaiser, "he has ruined his country and he has ruined himself"76.94.18.217 (talk) 06:46, 4 December 2008 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 06:46, 4 December 2008 (UTC)

With all due respect, the question of Fritz Fischer's honesty or lack thereof has nothing to do with his Sonderweg view of German history. The question of what were Fischer's views during the Third Reich is not really germane to Fischer's view of history after 1945. People often change their views and values. Take for example, another historian mentioned in this article, Hans-Ulrich Wehler who by his own admission was an enthusiastic member of the Hitler Youth, but now holds diametrically the opposite of the views of his youth. Fisher's lack of honesty (which incidentally the page on himn grossly exaggerates somewhat; the 1999 version of The Encyclopaedia of Historians and Historical Writing, which was published when Fischer was still alive says he was a supporter of the Nazi regime, and if memory serves me correct, I remember reading obituaries in 1999 saying the same thing) puts him in a bad light about the question of what he was doing in the Third Reich, but that really does not disqualify his views about Germany and the origins of World War I. Anyhow, Fischer took tremendous abuse from other German historians and the German public (his publisher's office was firebombed by right-wing extremists for publishing Griff nach der Weltmacht) in the early 1960s for saying that Germany caused World War I, so to say his views were just an act never to cover for a Nazi past is really a most unfair belitting of Fischer. Fischer was a totally obscure historian before 1961, and if he struck to the standard line that every other German historian subscribed to before 1961, he would have remained obscure, and nobody would have cared about his Nazi past because nobody would ever heard of him. Really, the question of Fischer's past is not really relevant to this article--A.S. Brown (talk) 00:28, 10 February 2009 (UTC)

The Wikipedia article linked by A.S. Brown to Fischer states that Fischer's Nazi past was exposed after his death in 1999. Let's restore the passage undermining Fischer's credibility (as there are passages undermining the credibilitiy of more honest men such as Fay) until a citation can be found stating that, prior to the publication of Fischer's key works concerning kriegschuld, Fischer was already exposed as a member of the Freikorps, the "Bund Oberland", the SA, and the NSDAP. Since the article quotes Fischer saying that Bethmann was the "Hitler of 1914", and mentions his drawing a connection between "1914 and 1939", Fischer's credibility and views toward Hitler are germane to the weight given to Fischer's opinions on the subject.Werchovsky (talk) 20:19, 10 February 2009 (UTC)

In what way does Fischer's work show any bias stemming from this background? I would have thought any effect if there was any would have been in the opposite direction.--Loje (talk) 23:55, 11 February 2009 (UTC)

The primary issue is credibility not bias; Fischer was a daily liar on an overlapping subject. Bias can go off in a number of directions. Perhaps he did not want to remain obscure? The sentence that A.S. Brown deleted was very simple and factual and did not draw any conclusions. It did not contain the strawmen that A.S. Brown referred to above.Werchovsky (talk) 01:34, 13 February 2009 (UTC)

Yes, the sentence was simple and factual, but it does invite conclusions. Having the page say Fischer was "dishonest" about his Nazi past is true, but placing it in the article like the way it was placed was clearly meant to imply that Fischer was "dishonest" about the war's origins. The POV nature of this edit is clearly exposed by the fact you have not attempted to apply this same method to any of Fischer's opponents. One of Fischer's leading critics, Karl Dietrich Erdmann, through he is not mentioned here was also a Nazi. The best known of Fischer's critics, Gerhard Ritter was for a time was a supporter of the Nazi regime. Moreover, if you really want to insist on mentioning something that is not germane about the subject on Fischer on this page, you should have the courage of your convictions and insert this sentence as while: "Ritter was not honest. He kept secret his support for the Nazi regime and his extreme anti-Semitic memorandums to Carl Friedrich Goerdeler on future German constitution calling for Jews to have no civil rights at all after the overthrow of the Nazi regime". Ritter was most dishonest about that, and kept his memos to Goerdeler a secret right to his grave. Indeed, the fact that Ritter expressed these odious anti-Semitic views calling for to take one example, the continuation of the Nuremberg Laws after the overthrow of Hitler only came out in the 1990s. The question of Ritter's anti-Semitism and his post-1945 dishonesty about his war-time views about Jews is not relevant to this page (though it is relevant to his page), which is why it is not being mentioned here. Likewise, the same goes for Fischer.

Moreover, there some inconsistencies to your argument. Before accusing me of strawman arguments, you make want to consider your own statement criticizing Fischer's "I-was-never-a Nazi" stance, which was one that he never took. Maybe he was not honest about the details, but it was not a secret that Fischer was in fact a supporter of the Nazi regime during his lifetime. The very fact that Fischer was allowed to publish two books about Prussian educational reformers during the Nazi era testifies to this. By the way, the claim that Fischer was a Freikorps member strikes me as a bit implausible given that Fischer was born in 1908, and the Frekorps were abolished in 1921. Either that, or Fischer must have been a very young Freikorps member. Anyhow, Griff nach der Weltmacht is not really about the war's origins. The book is really a study of how various socio-economic pressure groups influenced the making of German foreign policy before and during World War I; the book has 23 chapters, and only one is about the war's origins. Indeed, the provocative title was added by the publisher, and even then, the book would have probably been ignored when it was published in November 1961 had not certain right-wing German newspapers took it upon themselves to castigate Fischer for "fouling his own nest". Had it not been for the press campaign, Fischer would have remained obscure. If Fischer really wanted to make himself famous, he would devoted most, if not all of his book to the war's origins, and ignored all the boring stuff about how the German government tried to balance off the "moderate" demands of those Germans who felt that Germany should conquer most of the world against the "extremists" who wanted Germany to conquer the entire world. The first book that Fischer wrote entirely about the war's origins was Germany's War of Illusions in 1969, which was in large part his response to the attacks on him during the so-called "Fischer Controversy" of the early 1960s.

Leaving that aside, there is the second inconsistency. On one hand, it is being asserted through inference that since Fischer was lying about one thing, he could have been lying about the war's origins. And on the other hand, the a priori possiblity that Fischer could have been lying is being presented as a definite fact. Fair enough, it somebody is being dishonest about one thing, that might mean they are dishonest about other things as well. But it does not necessarily mean so, as you seem to be asserting.

Coming to the crux of the matter, are you saying that those documents that Fischer uncovered showning that Germany caused the war to be forgeries? If so, please present some proof. The documents that Fischer found have been accepted as geninue by all of the historians who looked at them. As early as 1973, the British historian John Röhl was writing about Fischer's thesis had more or less accepted by all German historians (foreign historians had accepted Fischer's thesis in 1961). Some of the historians who accepted Fischer's arguments include John Röhl,Lucy Dawidowicz, Francis Carsten, Pierre Renouvin, Alan Bullock, Rudolf Neck, Jacques Droz, Fritz Fellner, A. J. P. Taylor, Holger Herwig, Hajo Holborn, William Keylor, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Fritz Stern, John Lukacs, Hans Kohn, Fritz Epstein, Wolfgang Mommsen, Carl Schorske, Hans Gatzke, Gordon A. Craig, Klaus Epstein, Imanuel Geiss, Theodore Hamerow, Leonard Krieger, William Langer, Volker Berghahn, Otto Pflanze, Hans Rosenberg, and John Snell. Fisher must have quite an accomplished liar to fool all of these eminent specialists in German history with all these allegdly "forged" documents showing Germany wanted war in 1914. Indeed as far as I am aware, nobody has ever raised the charge of forgery against Fischer, and the documents he found are geniune. Ritter, who was probably Fischer's most fiercest opponent, in his attacks against Fischer in his essay "Anti-Fischer", which can be found in the book The Outbreak of World War I edited by Holger Herwig does not accuse Fischer of forgery, and instead accuses Fischer of misinterpretation. If you are really interested in Ritter's case against Fischer, check out the page on him since I have included a summary of Ritter's essay on his page. But please note that Ritter focuses on details, and ignores some of the larger bits of evidence like what was said at the German War Council of December 8, 1912.

Indeed, if one looks at the minutes of the meeting of the German War Council which met on December 8, 1912 and was attended by all of the Reich's top leadership, which it was declared that Germany would start a war of aggression in the summer of 1914. Originally, the council wanted to start a war right there and then in December 1914, but objections from Grand Amiral Alfred von Tirpitz that the German Navy needed time to prepare for war led to the war being put off to the summer of 1914. Moreover, the means suggested by the War Council about how to start a war sound eerily liked what happened in 1914. The War Council suggests that Austria-Hungary attack Serbia, in the knowledge that the most likely result would be Russian mobilization, which would then be used as a pretext to launch a war. In light of what the War Council of December 8, 1912 says, the claim that Germany was just the innocent victim of Allied aggression publicized with such vigor during and after the war is simply not tenable, if ever was.

Finally, since you are so anxious to talk about "dishonest" historians, you make want to consider a letter written by Ritter to Hans Rothfels on March 26, 1962, just before publishing his article "Eine neue Kriesgsschuldthese?" attacking every aspect of Fischer's work. Ritter wrote:

"I am alarmed and dismayed by your letter of 21 March. If Bethmann, as you write, in July 1914 had the 'desire' [Wunsch] to bring about war with Russia, then either he played without conscience with the fate of the German people, or he had simply incredible illusions about our military capablilities. In any case, Fischer would then be completely in the right when he denies that Bethmann seriously wanted to avoid war...If what in your view, Riezler's diary reveals is correct, I would have to discard my article, instead of publishing it...In any case we are dealing here with a most ominous [unheimlichen] state secret, and all historical perspectives are displayed [verschieben sich], since...Bethmann Hollweg's September Program then appears in a wholly different light"

So in other words, Ritter admitted in private that his attacks on Fischer were not warranted because the documentary evidence supported Fischer. So, please tell me, who's being "honest" or is being "dishonest" about the war's origins. One historian, Fischer looks at the documentary evidence, and reports what he saw. The other, Ritter looks at the same documents, admits that Fischer is right, and then goes ahead to attack him for being "dishonest" about the war's origins. --A.S. Brown (talk) 17:36, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

The sentence A.S. Brown deleted was: "Fischer kept his membership in the FreiKorps, the Bund Oberland, the SA, and the Nazi party a secret to his death." I would ask A.S. Brown to assume good faith in edits to the article rather than leveling an accusation of POV. It seems to me with the recent edits the historiography section has now become disproportionately long and is not well written.Werchovsky (talk) 19:19, 17 February 2009 (UTC)

With all due respect, as you yourself indicated above, your intention with the offending sentence was to imply that Fischer was "liar" about not only past Nazi Party (true), but was also a "liar" about the war's origins (not true).

With all due respect, this was is commonly known as syllogism. Fischer "lied" about membership in the Nazi Party, which must mean that he was lyning when he said Germany started World War I. Now, to be fair, it is quite possible that because somebody is dishonest about one's thing, that they might be dishonest about other things. But it does necessarily follow that because somebody is dishonest about one thing, then they are always dishonest about other things. If you present me with solid proof that the documents that Fischer uncovered showing quite clearly that the German government intended to start a world war as early as 1912 were faked, then I might agree with you. Incidentally, the fact that the German government had decided upon war as early as December 1912 means that talk about that has been branded since 1914 about how Russian mobilization in the summer fo 1914 drove a supposedly reluctant and peace-loving Germany into war is nonsense. But you haven't presented any proof like those documents are forgeries because everybody who has examined those documents says they are genuine, which would meant that Fischer was telling the truth when he said Germany started a war of aggression. Besides for the fact that Fisher's dishonesty about Nazi Party member is not very relevant here, again you have not bothered to explain why this procedure is being applied only to Fischer. I gather by your comments here and everywhere on this page that you dislike Fischer, and you want to discredit his interpretation of the origins of World War I.

But as I have already pointed out, Ritter was just as dishonest about his past support for National Socialism and his virulent anti-Semitism, and yet I noticed you noticed you have no interest in saying that Ritter was being dishonest in being a critic of Fischer. Anyhow, moving from the ireleveant to the releveant, the fact that Ritter who went to extreme lengths to try to discredit Fischer (indeed tried very hard to block Fischer from visiting the United States in 1964 because he didn't like what Fischer had to say and was lied about doing that), but admitted in private that Fischer was correct might well suggest who was being more honest and who was being dishonest in the "Fischer Controversy". The problem with Ritter (and most other German historians of his generation) as a historian was when he was faced with the choice between his German ultra-nationalism and being a good historian, he always choose the former. Indeed, his major objection to Fischer appears to have been that the next generation of Germans would not be intense nationalists in the same way he was. To be fair to Ritter this was true, but given that German nationalism has given the world the two most bloodiest wars in history and the Holocaust, it is questionable about how much of a loss that is.

The fact that this procedure (lack of honesty about being a Nazi and ant-Semitic therefore discredits one's historical views) is applied only to historians whose interpretation you dislike strikes me as a form of POV pushing. The same point about applied just as just as against Ritter as against Fischer, but as I noted before, you only seemed to be interested in applying this procedure to Fischer. How come? For the sake of civility, I'll withdraw that charge, and apologize for any wrong I may have done. But the next thing that you want to go and discredit Fischer, please do that to consider what the documents that Fischer found in the late 1950s say, and not bring in ireleveant information.

Again, I'll assume good faith in your concerns about the historiography section, but again it is noteworthy that when I digged up information that you dislike that only now does it become a matter of concern. But given that the section is about historiography, and given that the German government during the Weimar and Nazi periods went to massive lengths to distort the historical record is surely a matter of grave importance for the historiography section. Anyhow, your the one who asked for the citation about German government support for Sidney Fay and Harry Elmer Barnes, making me go look up Holger Herwig's excellent essay on the subject. Incidentally, I could bring in the fact that Barnes was such a passionate Germanophile that he later embraced Holocaust denial as a form of defending the reputation of his beloved Fatherland. But it strikes me as unfair to seek to discredit Barnes's work in the 1920s (which was very shoddy by the way-A.J.P Taylor once rightly called Barnes's The Genesis of the World War of 1928 "the most preposterously pro-German book ever written", and that was before Barnes went and disgraced himself by claiming that six million Jews were not murdered by the Germans because the Germans are such lovely people,and would NEVER, NEVER, NEVER do such a thing) by mentioning what he'll later championed in the 1950s-60s. But since we on the subject of Barnes, let's us notice the striking similarities between Holocaust denial and those who seek to deny that Germany was the aggressor of 1914. Both are promoted by self-proclaimed friends of Germany like Barnes. Both involve surpassing the truth and manipulating the evidence. And both are totally discredited by all serious historians. Turning back to your concerns, I'll assume good faith, and work the section over to make it better. --A.S. Brown (talk) 23:44, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

How much money did Sidney Fay receive from the German Government and what form did the payments take?Werchovsky (talk) 03:16, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Did A.S. Brown really just delete the footnoted material I quoted during this discusion from the Fischer Wikipedia Biography under the summary "Expand"?

To draw an equivalency between Holocaust denial and the view that apportionment of WWI warguilt should be broad (as opposed to placing all guilt for WW1 on Germany) is offensive; the Holocaust and Hitler have a special ignominious place in modern history. In addition to being offensive, it is nonsense.

It is a fairly simple matter, for example, to apportion some of WWI warguilt to Serbia, who promoted to Chief of Military Intelligence a regicidal (1903 assassinations) ultranationalist with a leadership role in a terrorist organization which sponsored a series of attacks on Serbia's much larger neighbor contravening Serbia's March 1909 declaration to the Great Powers. Surely Serbia had some duty to rein in its military officers and punish them for their bad deeds promptly rather than leaving them in their posts and only arresting and executing them in 1917. Surely the Great Powers had some responsibility to ask Serbia to investigate and come back into compliance with the March declaration between June 29 and July 22, 1914, but Russia refused to even discuss the subject and the French Ambassador's reports on the involvement of the regicides of 1903 went into the circular file back in Paris. Albertini, who wrote the most detailed work I have found on the Origins of WWI, who was not a special friend of Germany, and who somehow hasn't made it into the historiography section despite the massive expansion made to it, found fault at various stages with the actions of the various statesmen and generals of both the Franco-Russian Alliance and the Austro-Hungarian-German Alliance. (Since Albertini died before completing his work their is no conclusion and no overall assessment of warguilt.)

First things first, last Friday, I added some new material to the Fischer page. While I was at it, I noticed that basically the same material was repeated twice. There was a paragraph saying Fischer joined the Nazi Party, and another paragraph saying the same thing at the bottom of the page, linking to the same source. This seemed a bit repeative, so I removed the same paragraph. My edit summary was bascially correct as I did indeed expanded the article. I was going to add that I deleted a paragraph that I felt was unnecessary, but I was in a hurry because the library was on the verge of closing, so I didn't. That's all. What this has to do with the article, I don't know other then perhaps this is a means of trying to discredit me. I don't like what you are trying to imply here, but if you rather want, go put the deleted paragraph, if that really bothers you.

Second, I never said Fay was bribed by the Germans, if that is what you are trying to imply. Given Fay's Germanophile tendencies and his deep opposition to Article 231, that was probably not necessary. True, in the 1920s, then as now, bribery is widely accepted as a legitimate way of doing business. Even to to day, German corporations are allowed to use bribery as a tax write-off. And in the 1920s, when the so-called Black Tom sabotage case come up for international arbitration, when the United States sought financial redress for acts of sabotage committed by Germany during the First World I, the Germans won the case by simply bribing the judges. However, I have no proof that Fay received bribes, and I never said it, please do not words in my mouth.

Given the Germans operated in the 1920s, it would not surprise me that the German government did offer bribes to historians, but I have no proof of that, so I not that into the article. What I said what the historians likely to favorable to the German thesis (Germany did not start World War I) like Fay, who was an ardent Germanophile received much better access to the German archives then did historians who were not. Likewise, those historians who took the German side like Fay and Barnes received research funds while others did not. The fact that the German government purchased copies of Fay's book to hand out embassies all over the world can taken as a sign of how favorable Fay's work was to the German side, and how well it fitted into the message the Germans wanted to project in the 1920s. Certainly, after poor Hermann Kantorowicz expressed a different take on the subject, he was not allowed never the archieves even again, Kantororwicz was lucky to have kept his job at Kiel University. I don't have any proof of any wrong-doing on the part of Fay, and please note that I did not say that. However, given as I have noted before, that the German government engaged in a massive deception effort with all sorts of documents being kept away from historians or destroyed, Fay's book must be regarded as heavily compromised by his use, ever knowing or unknowing of a very tainted source. Or to put in another way, since Fischer and the 1960s, nobody has reached the same sort of conclusions that Fay did. This is because examining the German archives in their entirety as opposed to the bits that the German Foreign Ministry wanted one to see does not allow one to reach those conclusions. Rather then confront that issue, you are putting words in my mouth as a way of dismissing the implications of Herwig's article, and what it does to Fay's book, based as upon the products of that deception campaign. The fact that you prefer Fay over Fischer (note your remark about Fay as a "more honest man" then Fischer) may of course be a personal preference, in which case you are welcomed to it, but I rather suspect that you like Fay's arguments more more then you do Fischer's. But the problem is that Fay wrote in the 1920s, which at the risk of sounding repeative, there was much in the German archives that was closed, which makes Fay's work very dated. Fischer looked at much that was not open in the 1920s, which makes his work more timely. And for your information, since the 1960s, most historians have judged Fischer to be much better source then Fay for just that reason.

I do not mean to make it sound like I am engaging in a personal attack, but I must wonder why you insist on basing your arguments on very old sources like Fay's book, which was published in two volumes in 1928 and 1930, or Albertini's work, which was published in the 1940s.Based on your remarks, I gather you are using those sources. It is noticable that more recent books, published since 1961 do not appear. Of course, I only basing this on the book you have referred to, so if are using my recent books, please accept my most humble apologies. Again, when I put in material that is unfavorable to Germany, you suddenly expressed some concern about the length. Let's take a guess about what material you would want trimmed to shorten the section, would it happen to be the paragraphs about the German deception in the 1920s or Ritter's admission that Fischer was right? Now, I am being criticized for not making it bigger.There is a very simple reason why I have not brought Albertini in because I don't have access to his book, or a summary of his book right now. True, Albertini finds fault with both sides, but I think you neglected to mention he finds more fault with the German and Austrian then with the other.

I will respond to the rest of your arguments tomorrow because I have much more to say, but I do must get some sleep.--A.S. Brown (talk) 04:37, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Good point made Mr. W. Serbia's declaration of March 1909 was made to the 'Great Powers'. It was not made to Austria(who didn't recognize treaties such as the Treaty of Berlin anymore than Germany recognized the Belgian and Luxembourg Treaty of neutrality.76.94.18.217 (talk) 06:22, 19 February 2009 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 06:22, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

In the last free elections in Germany of 1933 I believe the Nazis received about 44% of the vote, which was a lot in a parliamentary state where you have 10 parties as opposed to a country like the U.S.A. where you only have two major parties. And if you ever watch the movie 'Hitler the last Ten Days'(1973) with Alec Guiness, the narrator Alistair Cooke claims that Hitler at some point in the late 30's had 90% of the German people behind him. So why should it be any wonder that Fischer may have been a Nazi to some degree or atleast may have 'gone with the flow'? Especially in a totalitarian state where your job and well-being depend upon being cooperative with the system.

The German people were well aware of Hitler's anti-semitic views. They were in most of his speeches. They were in Mein Kampf. They were in the Nuremburg Laws. And yet he was popular. Fischer should be applauded for the fact that he later resisted public opinion and engaged in debate that many were afraid to. He was speaking of his own generation which he was in a position to know very well. This is not to unjustly excorriate the German people. America had atrocious laws based on race and had engaged in slavery when most of the civilized world had outlawed it for hundreds of years.76.94.18.217 (talk) 04:48, 19 February 2009 (UTC)edwardlovette76.94.18.217 (talk) 04:48, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

First thing, I am been somewhat unwell as of late, and then very badly pressed for time, so please excuse my tardiness in replying here. To start with, this technique of inserting passages into my paragraphs disagreeing with me, is besides for being immensely rude in and of itself and being highly characteristic of extremely childish and immature people in attempting to have the “last word”, is also highly disruptive of my line of argument by disrupting the continuity of my arguments by inserting their opinions into my text. Since it is rude to delete other’s people’s posts, I have accordingly removed all of the opposition’s comments from my paragraphs. But since everything the opposition has to say is in response to what I have written and what being unintelligible if removed from their context, for the sake of politeness I also added the relevant passages from what I have written.

So here we go.

With all due respect, as you yourself indicated above, your intention with the offending sentence was to imply that Fischer was "liar" about not only past Nazi Party (true), but was also a "liar" about the war's origins (not true).

This is an incorrect inference. I will call it inference #1Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Besides for the fact that Fisher's dishonesty about Nazi Party member is not very relevant here, again you have not bothered to explain why this procedure is being applied only to Fischer. I gather by your comments here and everywhere on this page that you dislike Fischer,

This is inference #2, another incorrect inference. I don't know enough about Fischer to like or dislike him.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

I gather by your comments here and everywhere on this page that you dislike Fischer, and you want to discredit his interpretation of the origins of World War I.

This is inference #3, a third, somewhat incorrect, inference. I don't know enough about his interpretation to want to discredit it; I do however think it is important that as the reader sees quotes such as Bethmann was the "Hitler of 1914" that the reader understands the person-being-quoted's association with the subject matter.Werchovsky (talk)

The fact that this procedure (lack of honesty about being a Nazi and ant-Semitic therefore discredits one's historical views) is applied only to historians whose interpretation you dislike strikes me as a form of POV pushing.

This is inference #4, a 4th false inference. I have no idea about Ritter. If he was a closet Nazi, by all means mention it.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Again, I'll assume good faith in your concerns about the historiography section, but again it is noteworthy that when I digged up information that you dislike that only now does it become a matter of concern.

A fifth inference attempting to read my mind. I have been concerned about the historiography section for a long time. Most articles I look up don't have this kind of section. This topic may have a special need to have one, but it is far too long, badly written and too focused on Fischer-Ritter and popular histories.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

What this has to do with the article, I don't know other then perhaps this is a means of trying to discredit me. I don't like what you are trying to imply here, but if you rather want, go put the deleted paragraph, if that really bothers you.

The deleted paragraph contained the information we were arguing about, his CLOSET Nazi status, the other paragraph you left in did not mention his status was closet.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Second, I never said Fay was bribed by the Germans, if that is what you are trying to imply.

I don't know who wrote that Fay was financed by the Germans, but its relevance depends on how much he was paid. If we don't know how much or if it was immaterial it should be deleted. So, I ask again. How much?Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

However, I have no proof that Fay received bribes, and I never said it, please do not words in my mouth.

I never said you said it was a bribe. I didn't put words in your mouth, however you very nearly put some in mine here.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

This is because examining the German archives in their entirety as opposed to the bits that the German Foreign Ministry wanted one to see does not allow one to reach those conclusions. Rather then confront that issue, you are putting words in my mouth as a way of dismissing the implications of Herwig's article,

Again,I have put no words in your mouth. Please read more carefully

I do not mean to make it sound like I am engaging in a personal attack, but I must wonder why you insist on basing your arguments on very old sources like Fay's book,

I have not insisted on basing my arguments on Fay. What are you talking about?Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Again, when I put in material that is unfavorable to Germany, you suddenly expressed some concern about the length. Let's take a guess about what material you would want trimmed to shorten the section, would it happen to be the paragraphs about the German deception in the 1920s or Ritter's admission that Fischer was right? Now, I am being criticized for not making it bigger.

Who criticized the historiography section for being too short?Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

There is a very simple reason why I have not brought Albertini in because I don't have access to his book, or a summary of his book right now.

It is in print.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

True, Albertini finds fault with both sides, but I think you neglected to mention he finds more fault with the German and Austrian then with the other.

This might be true but it is very hard to assess.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

I will respond to the rest of your arguments tomorrow because I have much more to say, but I do must get some sleep.--A.S. Brown (talk) 04:37, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Please don't keep drawing inferences that might be false.Werchovsky (talk) 23:35, 19 February 2009 (UTC)

Now, for the most part, I see no point in attempting to rebut what is written above. The opposition seems for the most part to be concerned with my alleged “false inferences” about what he/she/it/whatever is attempting to say. I’ll stand by everything I wrote, as I am quite good at reading the sort of arguments people are making-one has to be when one works in sales. Indeed, the very fact that the opposition has invested so time in attempting to rebut my alleged “false inferences” is in the opposition’s own sort of perverse way elegant testimony to what how accurately I can interpret what the opposition is trying to say. The other thing that the opposition has paid tribute, albeit inadvertently is its inability to counter my arguments, hence its rather hopeless attempt to change the topic of this discussion from its lame attempt to promote its Deutschland über alles POV view of the war’s origins via a smear job on Fritz Fischer (more about that below) to my so-called “false inferences” about the opposition is saying or attempting to say. It is so very typical of childish people that when they started to lose an argument that they suddenly tried to change the subject usually along the lines that “That you don’t I am really thinking, na-na-nada!” as way of trying to gain the upper hand by changing the topic. The above comments such as “Please don't keep drawing inferences that might be false” will stand as immortal testimony to the general level of maturity of the opposition.

I really have no interest in participating in such a stupid, sterile and futile debate about so-called “false inferences”, especially given the general maturity level of the opposition, and what rather debate rather more substantial issues that might improve this page. I really have no interest in such an uninteresting and unimportant subject as one goes in the mind of the opposition. I dislike false pretences and insinuations, and normally like to point out what people are implying as opposed to saying as a way of having a honest debate. Only two points of the opposition’s points, I like to respond to, as the rest are unworthy of any sort of reply. First, the opposition claims to be indifferent to Fischer. To which, I will note that for somebody the opposition professes to be indifferent to, the opposition has certainly gone of its way to pour mud over him. Anybody who has the read the opposition’s comments on Fischer above, where Fischer is depicted as a pathological liar and Nazi scumbag who fabricated his claims about German responsibility either of a desire for fame and/or because of some sort of secret Nazi agenda will little difficulty in realizing what the opposition’s feelings are about Fischer. Or in other words, please don’t insult my intelligence with claims to be indifference to Fischer. Second, concerning Ritter, how gracious of the opposition to invite me to sink down to its level, but as I have already noted, the issue of Ritter’s anti-Semitism is irrelevant here, so I can no need to insert such material here. Third, I’ll just like to say that I do not believe nonsense like ESP (which is equivalent to belief in Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy and that poor innocent Germany was the victim of Allied aggression in 1914), and even I did possess such a power to read minds, I’ll would still have absolutely no interest in what goes on in the mind of the opposition.

Even without the aid of ESP and despite my lack of interest in the subject of what goes in the head of the opposition, I’ll still have a pretty idea of what goes on in the head of the opposition. I’ll say that the opposition is a German apologist through and through, and its only interest is to promote the widely discredited thesis that the Germans, who are widely known for their great hatred of war throughout their history, were the innocent victim of Allied aggression in 1914. All one has to do is look at the contents of this talk page, where the opposition tiresomely takes the German side time after time on every single issue. Even the opposition is such a Germanophile that it even tries to claim that Germany had the right to invade Belgium-the nerve of Belgium in refusing to submit to German demands, didn’t they know that the Germans are the Herrnvolk and are always in the right about everything, and everybody else has a duty to bow down to German demands. I saying this, I am not attempting to make an inference or read the opposition’s mind, everything the opposition the says and does supports this interpretation. The opposition in all of its numerous posts here has taken the German side every single time, and has never said anything critical of Germany. The opposition just its idol Sidney Bradshaw Fay and the rest of the 1920s “revisionists” professes to take the view that the responsibility for the war is “broad” (I have more to comment on that below), i.e. everybody is responsible, but in practice, the term “broad” is defined to mean that only the Allies are responsible, and that Germany, poor innocent little peace-loving Germany really has little or no responsibility for the war. Or take the paragraph from Barbara Tuckman’s book about German atrocities in Belgium, which the opposition wanted to see deleted. Now, the paragraph should have been deleted because it was irrelevant to the subject of the historiography of the war’s origins dealing as it does with events that took place after the war, but I’ll rather suspect that the opposition’s real reason in wanting to see that paragraph deleted was it made the opposition’s beloved Vaterland look bad. Likewise, consider the following lines which read very much like POV written by an Anglophobic German that “Fischer believed that many members of the German government had overtly the same expansionist plans that the British had”. This line is doubly incorrect. First, it has Fischer saying something that the did not (i.e. he never said anything about any aggressive British policy towards Germany; quite the contrary, he claimed the opposite). Second, I’m not aware of any reputable historian today who claims that Britain had an aggressive policy against Germany. But note the opposition’s lack of outrage over doubly incorrect lines that slander Britain as compared to the all too vigorous defence of Germany. And this from someone who is a single issue contributor whose only interests are this page and those related to it.

The only time the opposition has anything critical to say about Germans is those Germans who are honest enough to admit that their country was responsible for the war, hence the ridiculous sentence that sparked this whole debate. What the opposition is trying to do is a reductio ad absurdum argument. The proponents of Germany’s responsibility for the war are reduced down to Fischer, whose is in turn is reduced down only to his Nazi Party membership, which thereby discredits the whole notion that Germany was responsible for the war. The fact that Fischer changed his views after 1945, that he was influenced by the documents that he laid his eyes when he wrote his books, and the fact that his findings have been endorsed by numerous historians over the years who have examined the same documents are points that I have suggested before, and are points that the opposition stubbornly and obdurately refuse. The opposition would shoot the messenger rather then consider the message approach. But of course, the opposition has no choice, but take such an approach for to admit that Fischer was influenced by what he found in the previously closed German archives would be admit that Fischer was right. Hence, the adamantly repeated claim that Fischer was “dishonest”, that in some vague and undefined way that Fischer saw and that Fischer wrote were two different things, and his findings are to disregarded by the reader.

Before going any further, let’s consider the patently insincere arguments of the opposition. On one hand, the opposition says his line "...did not draw any conclusions" about, yet at another point, the opposition openly admits that the purpose of the line is “undermining Fischer's credibility”. To say that these claims are contradictory is to course state the obvious, and of the two claims only the latter is correct. How can a line invite the reader to draw no conclusions while undermine Fischer's crediblity? Does the opposition hold my intelligence in such contempt that it thinks that I won't notice these things? The only reason why someone would insert a line saying Fischer was “not honest” in the historiography section is tell the reader that was less then truthful about what he wrote about Germany’s role in 1914. Indeed, the opposition admits that just it was trying to do by stating the issue is Fischer’s “credibility”, so therefore the line does very much invite the reader to make conclusions. Moreover, I am not aware of this book or article that makes these conclusions that Fischer’s Nazi past in someway cancels out his work on the war’s origins. Indeed, the very fact that the line is not referenced at all is a reflection that this is original research on the part of the opposition. Not only this is original research, but it also original research based on another Wikipedia article, which is also against the rules. Indeed, based on the opposition’s comments here, I would no say that the opposition knows nothing about Fischer beyond what is written here and on Fischer’s page, since all of the opposition’s comments refer only to those two sources. I would even look a step further, and say that the opposition is engaging not only in original research, but something even worse, and that is speculation about Fischer. Witness the opposition’s comment about “Perhaps he [Fischer] did not wish to remain obscure”, thereby implying that Fischer just falsely claimed that Germany started the war as a way of becoming famous. This is speculation pure and simple, made worse by the opposition’s patent ignorance of the individual he is attacking. The opposition began its attack on Fischer by claiming he “living a lie” in claiming to be an anti-Nazi all along. Fischer never made a claim, as anyone familiar with his work would know, and I would like to challenge our self-appointed Fischer expert to produce a statement whereas Fischer says he was anti-Nazi throughout his life.

Let's consider the following contradictions. At one point, the opposition wrote "I don't know enough about Fischer to like or dislike him I don't know enough about Fischer to like or dislike him" (which as I have already noted, the opposition has gone out of its way to pour mud on somebody the opposition professes to be indifferent to). And at one point, ehe opposition wrote: "Fischer was a daily liar on an overlapping subject". So the opposition knows Fischer was "daily liar", yet doesn't know enough to about Fischer to like or dislike him. And how does the opposition knew that Fischer was a "daily liar"? Please explain? How can the opposstion know that Fischer lied to everybody everyday of his life for the last 44 years of his year, yet not know enough to like or dislike Fischer? Finally, the line about an "overlapping subject" supports what I have said enough times, that the purpose of this sentence is to imply that Fischer was less then honest in his scholarship.

Returning to the subject of reading minds and making inferences, we might turn to the opposition’s apparent ability to read the mind of Fischer. Through the opposition has disallowed the interpretation above that Fischer was promoting some of Nazi agenda in his writings, we seemed to have come back to that again. Note the lines about “closet Nazi” and his true relation to the subject when Fischer called Bethmann-Hollweg the “Hitler of 1914”. How does the opposition know that Fischer was secretly subscribing to the doctrines of National Socialism right up to his death in 1999? The opposition can apparently not only read minds, but read minds through time, and knows that right up to the death of his death on December 1, 1999 Fritz Fischer was still a Nazi at heart. As the line about the true relation to the subject, may I kindly please point out that the subject of the line is Bethmann-Hollweg, not Hitler. The point that seems to be made here is that Fischer was still a Nazi in 1969 when he wrote that (how does the opposition know what was going in the mind of Fischer in 1969?) or that Fischer’s prior Nazi Party membership in some way disqualifies him from saying anything about Nazis period.

Perhaps the opposition would like to consider the following scenario. A German leader influenced by völkisch ideology and with dreams of world-wide expansion starts a war of aggression with the aim of ethnic cleansing Poland of all Poles, Jewish and Catholic and settling millions of German colonists in their place as a way of providing Lebesnraum for Germany. Who am I talking about? Bethmann-Hollweg in 1914 or Hitler in 1939. Answer: both. The reason why Fischer called Bethmann-Hollweg the “Hitler of 1914” is due to the very simple fact that he discovered that as one of the reasons why Bethmann-Hollweg had declared one of the reasons why German needed to start a war in 1914 was to annex Congress Poland, expel all of the local people, and colonized the region with millions of Germans. These plans for the ethnic cleansing of Poland, which Bethmann-Hollweg fully supported and which Fischer discovered in the 1950s bear a striking resemblance and similarity to what the Germans did carry out in Poland after September 1939. And please further note that contrary to popular opinion, the Holocaust was not the personal brainchild of Hitler, but rather emerged as the product of the workings of the German state as it attempted to carry out ethnic cleansing schemes in Poland and elsewhere. Look at the Nisko Plan and the Madagascar Plan, and even better perhaps please familiarize himself with work of leading experts on the Holocaust like Christopher Browning, Richard J. Evans, Martin Broszat, Götz Aly and Ian Kershaw all of have found the responsibility for the “Final Solution to the Jewish Question” involved thousands of thousands of German officials who not fulfilling some masterplan of the part of Hitler, but were rather improvising the policy that led to the Holocaust. Indeed, Evans in his acclaimed book, In Defence of History notes that if Hitler had never come to power, that given the incredible rage and hatred felt by the German people towards Jews, Poles, etc that it was inevitable that Germany would attack Poland and carry out the sort of ethnic cleansing schemes that led to the Holocaust. So it is quite possible, indeed very likely that if Bethmann-Hollweg gotten a chance to execute the ethnic cleansing schemes he was all so edger to execute once Germany won the war, then the Holocaust would occurred during the Second Reich rather the Third. So, the reason why Fischer called Bethmann-Hollweg the “Hitler of 1914” was because he was indeed the Hitler of 1914. And if I make a further note, at present this article makes no mention about the German plans for ethnic cleansing of Poland as one of the causes of the war. I rather think that this striking omission should be fixed as soon as possible. While we at it, I think some mention should be made of the German plans, which the General Staff had been busy working on ever since 1901 for the conquest of the United States. It’s not a direct cause of the war, but it does illustrate that the Allied claim made during the war that Germany wanted world conquest was not far off the mark, and more importantly it shows both the irrationality of the German leadership in the years running up to the war. The idea that Germany could send an army across the Atlantic to conquer the United States was sheer folly and insanity, but it is noteworthy that both the political and military leaderships of the Reich thought was both possible and desirable.

Turning to the opposition’s other points. First, let’s consider this plaintive comment “Why can’t the responsibility for the war be broad”. As acrimonious as these exchanges might be, they should be illuminating for those interested in basic historical methods. To answer the opposition’s answer, my response is responsibility for historical occurrences must be determined on the basis of what the historical evidence indicates. And if responsibility for the war is assigned to Germany and Austria-Hungary, it is because that is the evidence shows. The opposition talks like that there is some sort of law that says that the responsibility for wars must be “broad”. If the historical evidence showed that anyone was at fault, then it would be correct to say that, but it doesn’t. If responsibility for all wars are “broad” as the opposition suggests, then one must write that Poland was just guilty of starting World War II as Germany, whereas all of the historical evidence shows that it was Germany and Germany alone that was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939. The same principles apply for the First World War. Before going any further, given the very pronounced pro-German propensities of the opposition, this claim that responsibility for the war is “broad” is rather insincere. “Broad” imply everyone is at fault, whereas the way that the opposition defines “broad” in practice means only the Allied states are at fault. Anyhow, the opposition may to acquire some knowledge of the more recent scholarship. As early as 1967, Andreas Hillgruber was writing it was not longer acceptable to claim that all of the Great Powers were equally at fault, and that Germany was indeed responsible for World War I. And please note that Hillgruber was an opponent of Fischer’s. And what about Volker Berghahn who has commented that since Fischer, one no longer needs to visit the capitals of all the Great Powers in 1914 to do research, and stops in Berlin and Vienna are sufficient. Likewise, Hoger Herwig wrote in 1997 that all respectable historians now accept that Germany and Austria-Hungary bear sole responsibility for the war.

Getting to the matter at hand about the so-called “broad” responsibility for the war, there is at present no mention in this article about the repeated messages from Berlin to Vienna in July 1914 encouraging Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia as soon as possible. If Germany was really committed to peace, and if Russian mobilization was such a threat to Germany that it forced a reluctant Reich to go to war in 1914, then why did the German leaders do their utmost to egg on the Austrians (not that they needed more encouraging) to commit the act, which was most likely to cause Russian mobilization. And I think further attention needs to be paid to what war plan the Germans wanted the Austrians to activate. Before going any further, I think it best that I acquainted the reader with Austrian war plans. The military of the Dual Monarchy was divided into three groups, the A-Staffel based in Galicia, the Minimalgruppe Balken based in Bosnia and the B-Staffel held in reserve. The Austrian general staff had two war plans, one War Plan B which called for sending the B-Staffel to join the Minimalgruppe Balken for a war against Serbia, and War Plan R, which called for sending the B-Staffel to Galicia to join the A-Staffel in a war against Russia. War Plan R called for an Austrian offensive into the Russian Poland intended to link with German offensive coming down from East Prussia. The German General Staff during pre-war staff talks with their Austrian counterparts had to encourage the Austrians to take an offensive as opposed to defensive stance had lied to their Austrian allies about the Schlieffen Plan (yet another triumph for the honesty of those bastions of Prussian honour!), and did see fit to mention that they were planning to be on the defensive in the East. In the German messages to Vienna calling for an attack on Serbia, it was War Plan R that the Germans actually wanted to see activated. Which would strongly suggest that the German military could care less about a war to punish Serbia for the murder of Franz Ferdinand, and knew that the most likely result would be a war with Russia. There is no other reason why the Germans would encourage the Austrians to declare war on Serbia while at the same time active War Plan R. Having said that much, it was actually War Plan B that the Austrians activated, which would indicate that the Austrians wanted to see a war against Serbia alone. And I think that this illustrates the biggest weakness in Fischer, namely he treats Austria-Hungary as entirely subordinate to Germany, and assumes that the Austrian leadership knew what the most like result of an Austrian attack on Serbia would be. The fact that the leadership of the Austria-Hungary activated War Plan B despite heavy German pressure to active War Plan R would strongly suggest otherwise.

And then I must turn to the matter of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand or the “Sarajevo outrage” as the opposition like to call it. Please note how the opposition is all happy to hear the moralistic language of condemnation when writing of Allied states’ alleged responsibility for the war, which it eschews when writing of the Central Powers-a powerful sign of the general bias of the opposition. Likewise, note the opposition’s use of the term Kriegsunschuldlegende (War Lie Guilt), and the general use of the term guilt, a word with powerful moral and legal connotations that it carries. I prefer to approach the issue in a non-moralistic way, and so I used the word responsibility rather then guilt, but that’s just me. Before going any further, I would to retell a story once told by E. H. Carr, a man whom I otherwise detest, but it’s a good story that serves as a useful way of determining historical causation. Carr once spoke of a man named Robinson who went out to buy some cigarettes on a dark night. While he was walking by a sharp turn in the road, he was stuck and killed by a drunk driver in car with defective brakes. Now, there was an inquest held to determinate about how to prevent a repeat of Robinson’s death. There are heard suggestions about tougher laws against drunk driving, tougher regulations about automobile brakes, maybe the sharp turn in the road should be straightened out. And then walks in a man who announces that the reason of Robinson’s death was his desire to go out and buy cigarettes, and suggests this be banned. Carr’s point is his story that when it comes to causation, historians have to sort out the incidental, accidental and the irrelevant from the really important causes of an occurrence. In focusing on the death of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand as the key causal event, the opposition is taking that exactly the same approach as the man who suggests banning going out for a walk to buy cigarettes as the best way of avoiding a repeat of Robinson’s death. At best, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand is incidental to the causes of the war, at worst totally irrelevant.

I disagree. The assassination is a manifestation of Austro-Serbian enimty. Considering Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in the months leading up to the war, it is clear that, for fear of another Balkan League, Austria was at least willing to attempt to remedy the situation. In addition, the assassination provided a strong pretext for war, which allowed the "War Party" in Vienna to persuade the Emperor, as it had failed to do on numerous other occasions in the past. This is important, because even an illegal occupation of Albanian territory in defiance of the Monarchy didn't lead to war. And the "no assassination, no war" is, indeed, a little strange. However, claiming the opposite - ie. implying that war was inevitable, is also baseless.Nicaea (talk) 18:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

In staking upon the assassination of Franz Ferdinand as the key causal event, the basic counter-factual assumption here is no assassination, no war. Furthermore, the opposition seems to be rather interested in long-discredited conspiracy theories that both the governments of Serbia and Russia were behind the Union or Death group. No evidence has ever emerged linking Russia to assassination of Franz Ferdinand. It is true that the Serbian government did have some idea of the assassination plot, and warned Austria-Hungary in advance there would be attempt on the life of Franz Ferdinand during his visit to Sarajevo, which the Austrian government disregarded. If the Serbian government really wanted to see Franz Ferdinand die, then why the warning? Anyhow, Serbia despite the statements of its leaders was in no state for war in 1914. The Serbian treasury was near bankruptcy and the Army had taken very heavy causalities in the two Balkan Wars and putting down an Albanian revolt in the Kosovo which had broken out in December 1913. More importantly, in June 1914 the bulk of the Serbian Army was still deployed in the Kosovo trying to put down the Albanian revolt, or in other words in entirely the wrong place to face Austria-Hungary. If the Serbian government had wanted to see Franz Ferdinand killed, and knowing full well that such an incident could be used as a pretext for war by Vienna, then they would deployed their Army facing Austria-Hungary. True, by the time war did begin, the Army had been redeployed from the Kosovo, but that was because a month passed before Austria-Hungary declared war. And why did a month pass? Because the Austrian General Staff wanted to see the harvest gathered up before mobilizing the reserves. Otherwise, Austria-Hungary would attacked Serbia right at the end of June/beginning of July 1914. But the Serbs could not have known and in fact did not know about the Austrian General Staff’s preference for gathering up the harvest before starting a war. In their minds, an Austrian attack could have began at any moment, in which cause had it come at the end of June/beginning of July the Serbian Army was in the wrong place facing Albania.

Nor could Russia wanted a war in 1914. There is old saying that amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics. A modern Army in order to properly fight a war requires enormous logistical efforts to keep going-such as bringing up reinforcements, weapons, ammo, food, medicine, spare parts, etc. In 1914, the best way of supplying a army was via rail-road. Russia in 1914 didn’t have much in the way of railroads, and those railroads that she have ran north-south rather then east-west. Because of the lack of east-west railroads, any war with Germany Russia would be at very serious logistical disadvantage. By contrast, Germany with its well-developed rail networks had serious logistical advantages facing both France and Russia. Indeed, the very reason why the Schlieffen Plan was aimed at France was because the German General Staff knew that Russia with its shortage of east-west railroads would a great difficulty in both sending troops to the front, and more importantly keeping them properly supplied. So in other words, all talk from German historians about how Russia was menacing Germany from 1894 when she signed the alliance with France is nonsense. If Russia wanted to be a menace to Germany from 1894 onwards, she would have madly been building east-west rail-roads to create the proper logistical network to support an offensive against Germany. The Russians didn’t see fit to get around to launching a scheme to build more east-west railroads until 1912. And even then, the impetus behind the Great Military Programme as the five year scheme to modernize the Russian Army and build more east-west railroads was purely defensive. Because of the aggressive behaviour of Germany, the Russian government reluctantly decided to spent the necessary roubles for the Great Military Programme as a way of deterring Germany from war. The German General Staff was not blind to the implications of the Great Military Programme, and from 1912 onwards been urging that Germany launch a “preventive war” to destroy Russia before the Great Military Programme was completed in 1917. So in other words, in 1914, the existing rail networks meant that Germany would have the logistical advantage and Russia the disadvantage. Might that suggest who wanted war and who didn’t in 1914? One nation’s general staff wanted a war before the other could improve its military effectiveness while the other said that it would be best to avoid a war before the Great Military Programme was completed. Even if Russia was planning to attack Germany (which it was not), simple common sense would dicate that it would be best to wait until 1917 rather then 1914. And in fact, when war did come in 1914, the shortage of east-west railroads did impose huge logistical difficulties on the Russian Army, indeed through this is little talked, but one of the principle causes of Russia’s defeats in the First World War was she lacked the necessary logistical infrastructure to support her armies in the field.

But still, one can argue that the death of Franz Ferdinand was still the key causal event in causing the war. But for that argument to work, one needs proof that neither Germany nor Austria-Hungary had any plans to start a war before June 28, 1914, and here the evidence supports the opposite conclusions. To start with, the drafting of the Austrian ultimatum that was delivered to Belgrade that served as the prelude to war had started several weeks before the death of Franz Ferdinand. In other words, in the spring of 1914 before Franz Ferdinand was shot, Austria-Hungary had already decided upon war with Serbia. The assassination just provided a really convenient pretext to do something that Austria had already chosen to do.

No. This is a total misrepresentation of Austrian policy. The Matscheko Memorandum, which is referred to, was not bellicose in the slightest, and was a diplomatic iniative to try create a counter-league to Serbia in the Balkans and thereby neutralize her as a threat to the Monarchy. There was nothing in it about war with Serbia. It was changed after the assassination towards the policy that created the "demarche" to Serbia.Nicaea (talk) 18:19, 1 November 2009 (UTC)

And as just for Germany, it has already been noticed here how on December 8, 1912 the great German War Council had decreed that come the summer of 1914, Austria would be encouraged to find some excuse to attack Serbia (little did the Germans know that a great excuse would come with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand), and this would most likely cause Russian mobilization, and that in turn would be used as a excuse for plunging the world into war. I have noticed here that the opposition just like every other apologist for Germany in 1914 has an obsession with the mobilization time-tables with the implication that Russian mobilization left Germany, poor innocent hapless Germany that abhors war to the bottom of her peace-loving soul no other choice to go to war. This all seems to be me to an attempt to construct a labyrinth to entrap those who wish to debate this issue. My approach is better, let’s blow the labyrinth up. Even Niall Ferguson in his otherwise ridiculously pro-German book, The Pithy of War notes that the Germans were only using Russian mobilization as an excuse, and that even if Russia had not mobilized, then Germany would still mobilized. And since German mobilization declared as German troops mobilize, they would start moving into Belgium as they were called up, for Germany to mobilize was to choose war. The argument that Russian mobilization forced Germany into war only works if one accepts the premise that Germany only mobilized in response to Russian mobilization whereas the German documents all show that Germany was going to mobilize regardless of what Russia did or didn’t do.

And there is the rather bizarre claim made by the opposition, not here, but elsewhere that “Russia and France were planning to dismember Germany”. So in other words, the war was a war of Franco-Russian aggression against that great peace-loving nation of Germany. To this, I will merely quote from the 1996 book Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II by the noted historian of Germany James Retallack that no respectable historian claims any of the Entente powers were planning to attack Germany in 1914 (Retallack, James Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II page 82). I could say something rather nasty here, but for the sake of civility, I won’t. But then, this entire page reads like it was written by something out of the David Hoggan school of German apologetics posing as history. To take one example, this page that claims that Anglo-German naval race was caused when Germany decided to build a fleet capable of protecting her world-wide commercial interests, and that the British were offended at this. That statement is total nonsense because it implies that the naval race was an unwarranted British reaction to a German need to protect her merchant marine. To start with, whoever wrote that sentence is a German apologist or very ignorant. All of the ships of the German High Seas Fleet were “short-legged”, i.e. had very little coal-carrying capacity which meant that they could not go without frequent stops to stock up on coal. So unless German commercial interests were confided to the North Sea, then the High Seas Fleet would be of very use in protecting Germany’s world-wide commercial interests. The truth is that the High Seas Fleet was not built to protect German commerce the world over. The real reason was because Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz’s Risk Theory, i.e. if Germany had a very powerful fleet, then it would be too risky for Britain to risk a war with Germany. As Tirpitz himself in a 1897 memo to the Kaiser, the main purpose of the German Navy was to be able to unfold its greatest “…strength between Heligoland and the Thames”. And why did Germany wanted a Risk Fleet. So she could blackmail Britain into making concessions to her the world over. So in other words, the German High Seas was meant to serve anti-British foreign policy objectives right from the moment that Tirpitz was appointed State Secretary for the German Navy in 1897. But you would never know that from this page. Now of course, I can hear the opposition’s objection that if the German Fleet was short-legged, then how could the German Army expect to go conquer the United States without a long-legged fleet? Now, that is a perfectly good question, and the answer is that German government was extremely badly organized, and the German Army didn’t talk to the German Navy, and vice-versa. To take another example, the German Navy had made all sort of plans for in the event of a war with Britain to seize Denmark and Norway ever since the 1890s, and had just assumed that the German Army would provide the troops. When war came in 1914 and the Navy was most disappointed to find that the Army didn’t have the manpower free for invading Scandinavia. The Germans were not just war-mongers, but badly organized war-mongers as while.

Turning to Lugi Albertini, I am probably going to sound somewhat rude here, but given the opposition’s astounding lack of knowledge, I rather have no choice. Albertini s book was published in Milan in two volumes in 1942-43. The opposition may or may not know this, but Italy was ruled by a Fascist dictatorship that had allied itself with Germany. In fact, from 1940-43 Italy and Germany were on the same side in World War II. Needless to say publishing a book that blames Germany for World War I might be not the most friendly of acts towards one’s ally. So of course, Albertini was forced into diluting his views by Fascist censorship.

Which brings us to the question of what was the Nazi view of World War I’s origins. The opposition has made great play with Fischer’s Nazi past, and lovingly recounts all of the extreme-right groups Fischer was in, no doubt to invoke the moral odium that National Socialism entails against Fischer (whom the opposition claims not to like or dislike). Since it has been implied here that Fischer’s work was some sort of secret Nazi apologia, I would like to show the reader what the Nazi take the war’s origins really were. In 1935, the British ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps summed up the contents of a German pamphlet entitled Deutschkunde uber Volk, Staat, Leibesubungen, which amongst other things addressed the war’s origins. The section dealing with that subject from the pamphlet read:

"Not Germany, but England, France and Russia prepared for war soon after the death of Bismarck" But Germany has also guilt to bear. She could have prevented the world war on three fronts, if she had not waited so long. The opportunity presented itself often-against England in the Boar War, against Russia when she was engaged against Japan...That she did not do so is Germany's guilt, though a proof that she was peaceful and wanted no war" (Dispatch of Phipps to Hoare December 16, 1935 Doc 275 C 8362/71775/18 British Documents on Foreign Affairs, Volume 46, Germany 1935, University Publications of America, 1994 page 394).

And if I dare may say, this is the direct opposite of what Fischer wrote. Furthermore, please note that the Nazi version is almost the same version as the opposition’s-the only difference is that Nazis added Britain to the list of countries committing aggression against the Reich in 1914. And note always, the opposition’s use of the word Kriegsunschuldlegende (War Guilt Lie) or its varient Kriessunschulde (War Guilt) to refer to allegations of German responsibility for the war, the same term used by the Nazis. Which is one of the more perverse things going on around here, that under the cover of anti-Nazism someone is trying to promote what is basically the same version of the war’s origins as the Nazis.

Which brings us to another of the opposition’s claims, namely that “bias can go off in any direction”. Judging from the opposition’s earlier remark about “more honest men like Fay”, it is fair to assume that the opposition ascribes to the amateur view of historians’ work. It is a recurring tendency on the part of amateur historians to assume that good historians have a totally objective view who weight the evidence coolly and dispassionately with no bias at all. When an amateur historian encounters a historian whose work he or she dislikes, usually they will scream triumphantly that so and so was biased, and that proves that so and so was a bad historian. But what the amateurs didn’t know is that all historians are biased, and those supposedly neutral historians they cite as good historians are just biased in the direction that the amateur approves of. Yes, it is true that Fischer was biased in the 1960s. He very much believed that National Socialism was not the result of one madman hijacking Germany in 1933 (which is what must Germans liked to believe in 1961), and the roots of National Socialism went much deeper into German society, culture and history then popular opinion was willing to accept at the time. Now, having said that much, there is room for empiricism in history, and through all historians are biased in one way or another, there can be a measure of objectivity. As it happens, the evidence that Fischer found supported his biases.

Which brings us to Sidney Fay, another biased historian whom the evidence does not support at all. Fay was a Germanophile educated in Germany and a friend, admirer and almost certainly the lover of that well known homosexual Kaiser Wilhelm II (when Wilhelm declared he loved men in uniform, he really meant it). Now, first thing, the opposition repeatedly refuses to answer my question about why it saw fit to insert irrelevant material damaging to Fischer here and nothing about Ritter, but my question is purely rhetorical. The opposition’s silence is quite eloquent enough because the opposition can’t answer that question. A honest answer would be that the purpose of this method was to discredit Fischer, whose interpretation of the past the opposition dislikes. However, having somewhat higher standards then some other contributors around here, I will endeavour to answer the opposition’s questions. True, the opposition didn’t say that Fay was bribed. But I think that any reader will conclude that the line that line was phrased “How much money did the Germans pay Fay?” seems to imply that Fay was bribed, perhaps reflecting perhaps a curiously mercenary understanding of the role that research funds play in shaping the historians’ work. If the opposition is referring to research funds, why not say how “How much in the way of research funds did Fay receive?”. If the opposition is not referring to research funds, then I have no clue as to the opposition is talking about. Now, being a honest person, at present I can not say how much in the way of research funds that Fay received. Now, I can hear the opposition’s cries of joy and delight right now, proudly enjoying its triumph over me. But let me note the following. First thing, this is not a honest question. If the opposition was really interested in that matter, it would look up itself. Indeed, as the opposition admits itself, the very purpose of the question is get references that it dislikes about Fay deleted. This to put it bluntly, is an obscure matter that I simply do not have the time to research. And the opposition says that I am out of line in stating that denying German responsibility is like Holocaust denial.

May I note that making the litmus test for historical credibility being based on obscure, arcane and difficult to research matters is one of the hallmarks of the methodology of Holocaust denial. It is extremely common for example that when a Holocaust survivor recalls that how some German proved his German patriotism by murdering some Jews in cold-blood, then the Holocaust denier would demand absolute proof that this person’s memory is correct, and they can’t prove beyond their memory, then their testimony should be disregarded. Knowingly or not, the opposition has adopted the same methodology. Let me further add that perhaps the opposition may like to acquaint itself with the work of the so-called Kriegsschuldrefernt (War Guilt Desk) of the German Foreign Ministry, which was set up to promote the view that responsibility for the war was “broad” (i.e. it was all the Allies’ fault or alternatively Germany borne only very small share of the war responsibility). And why did the German Foreign Ministry have such a section? Because Germany wanted to do away with Part V of the Versailles Treaty, which imposed sharp limits on the size of the German military and the weapons they were allowed to possess. And why do away with Part V? So Germany could plunge the war into a bloodbath even greater then the First World War.

Let me speak by way of analogy. There is a vicious animal that attacks and devours other people, so as a result the animal is caged in to prevent it from attacking others. And then along comes a professor from Harvard, let’s name him Fay, who argues that the monstrous beast didn’t attack anybody, and that in fact the people the beast attacked were really attacking it. Now as a result of Fay’s numerous books on behalf of the beast, many people become convinced that the beast was really at fault, and so it is freed from the cage. Which allows the beast to go on in even greater rampage. People like Fay and Barnes have quite a lot of blood on their hands by lending their prestige to the work of the Kriegsschuldrefernt, and thus convincing the world that it was safe to let Germany do away with Part V of Versailles. The question of the differences between Weimar and Nazi foreign policy are meaningless here as both intended to do essentially the same things once Germany was rearmed, that is wage aggression against everybody in Western and Eastern Europe.

Moving on to the subject at hand, what Fay had to work with was carefully edited collection of documents from German Foreign Ministry, and never he nor any other historian would allow to view records from the General Staff, the War Ministry, the private papers of Bethmann-Hollweg (which were almost entirely destroyed) and the Navy Office. As one example of the way, these documents were edited, take for example one Foreign Ministry document that was edited by make it seem like Germany was opposed to annexing any part of China after the Boxer Rebellion, whereas the original shows that Germany wanted to annex most of northern China in 1900. And moreover, if Germany was so innocent of the war in 1914, why all this editing and destruction of documents in the 1920s? Surely, Germany should have shown its hands were clean in 1914 by throwing up the archives? And since the opposition is so fond of pointing out Fischer’s Nazi past, it may want to consider the fact that the man who headed the Kriegsschuldrefernt-funded front organization, the Center for the Study of the Causes of the War for most of the Weimar Republic, Major Alfred von Wegerer continued to hold that job under the Third Reich. Clearly, there was enough overlap in views to make Wegerer acceptable for the Nazis. Anyhow, as Holger Herwig in his essay “Clio Deceived” notes that the precise sums involved in this deception campaign are still not known as this was done under the table (nobody was supposed to know that the Foreign Ministry was paying the bills at Wegerer's center-yet another triumph for German honesty), but it is known that in 1921 the German Foreign Ministry spent 1 marks at home on rebutting the “war guilt lie”, and another 200, 000 marks abroad. Please note that this at the same time when Germany was supposedly being bankrupted by Allied repatriations, which is another German lie. One of the few specific cases where the record does survive is the 48, 000 Marks used to bribe the Soviet government in 1924 to produce false documents showing that Russia had “imperialistic war aims” against Germany in 1914. Which does beg the question, if Russia was really was so aggressive against Germany in 1914, which was the bribe needed to produce forgeries to support that contention? And there is the case of a rather disreputable former Serbian diplomat living in Berlin named Miloš Boghitschwitsch who was bribed with gold to write articles proving that the Serbian government was behind the murder of Franz Ferdinand, which begs the question why the use of such disreputable methods if the case was supposedly so crystal-clear?

Likewise, the Center for the Study of the Causes of the War, which was supposedly an independent think-tank received 23, 000 Marks in 1924-25, 34, 400 Marks in 1925 and 84, 000 Marks in 1929-30. If you want to put that in perspective, the average monthly income for a German in the 1920s was 120 Marks. Typically historians who worked for the Center got about 300-400 Marks per article they wrote rebutting the “war guilt lie”. Another front organization for the Kriegsschuldrefernt was the Arbeitsausschuss Deutscher Verbande (ADV) got 20, 000 Marks in 1924 to 72, 000 Marks in 1929. In 1925, Kriegsschuldrefernt spent through either the ADV or the Center for the Study of the Causes of the War spent 500, 000 Marks in providing research funds to foreign historians expected to write pro-German histories. And one of those historians was Fay. Herwig’s article does not how much Fay received personally, but that is as close as I can get to answering the opposition’s question. More importantly, Fay was in close contact with Major von Wegerer of the Center for the Study of the Causes of the War from 1923 onwards, and contributed to the Center’s journal, Kriesschuldfrage (War Guilt Question). Since the Center of the Study of the Causes of the War was not an independent think-tank, but a secret arm of the German government, it is rather hard to believe that Fay could have been ignorant of what was really going on at the Center. And if he did not that the Center was just a fraud, but had said nothing, then he was nothing more then a pro-German hack poising as a historian. Holger Herwig, who is both one of Canada’s leading historians (through please that he is a German immigrant) and a leading expert on the First World War called Fay’s work a useless pro-German “apologia”. Fay is totally worthless as a historian of the First World War because in associating himself with the like of Wegerer. And please also note that before Wegerer started to work for the Center in 1923, he was very active in the Völkisch movement, which would mean that Wegerer’s views even during the Weimar Republic were basically the same as the Nazis. The fact that Fay didn’t mind working with a man of well-known volkische views might suggest he was of the same mind.

Which brings us to the next question, the opposition’s outrage at my comparison of denying German responsibility with Holocaust denial. First thing, as Deborah Lipstadt puts out in her book, Denying the Holocaust the Holocaust denial movment is a direct outgrowth of the pro-German revisionist historical movement of the 1920s. Indeed with Harry Elmer Barnes, there is a very direct human link between the two. Holocaust denial, denying Germany was an aggressor in 1914 and in 1939, denying the Armenian Genocide, denying Japanese war crimes, denying Soviet crimes-all the manifestations of the same thing, namely negationism. The essence of negationism that denies what happened in history, and say that something did not happened actually did happen. Distorting the historical realities of 1914 in which aggressors become victims of aggression and victims of aggressors become aggressors strikes as very similar to Holocaust denial where the Jewish victims of genocide become swindlers and German criminals become victims of the Jews. Without so much as even bothering to offer an argument, the opposite simply says my statement is “offensive” and “nonsense” without providing any proof at all.

But the opposition’s statement is highly very revealing. Note the opposition’s problem with the G-word, namely Germany. The Holocaust and Hitler occupy an infamous place in history, but not the Germans. Apparently the Holocaust was the work of Hitler alone, and the Germans played no role in whatsoever. Perhaps this slightly off topic, but without the Germans the Holocaust would not have occurred nor would Hitler have amounted to anything. It was the German people who loved Hitler; it was the German people who proclaimed in his ugly hate-filled speeches here was the essence of Deutschtum; it was the German people who provided the manpower to allow Hitler to execute his schemes; it was the German people who built and operated Auschwitz, Treblinka, Sobibor, Belzec, Majdanek and Chlmno,; it was the German people who were the executioners of the Einsatzgruppen; in short, the problem was the German people who loved Hitler and wanted to do his wishes. In the opinion of the German historian Milan Hauner, the German people were so closely identified themselves with Hitler that is right and proper to use the terms Hitler and Germany interchangeably. It is Germans who occupied a "special ignominious place in modern history", it is the Germans who willingly covered themselves with blood of others, so please stop these German apologetics which made it says that Germany is good while only Hitler is bad. Anyhow, John C. G. Röhl, who please note is a British historian and the son of an anti-Nazi German émigré in his book 1914: Delusion or Design? notes that based on the evidence undercoved by Fischer and himself argues that had a Nuremberg type Tribunal existed after 1918 and had the documents that Fischer uncovered in the 1950s had been available comments that there were every grounds for convicting the Second Reich's leadership the same way the Third Reich's leadership was in 1946.

And now I turn to the opposition’s ad hominem attack on me. “Did A.S. Brown delete a foot-noted paragraph under the expand?” Very typical of the opposition’s methods, namely an accusation posing as an question which insinuated much without providing anything concrete. Please show some guts and spell it out what I am guilty of? And since this a forum for discussing improving this page, the question of changes on the Fischer page don’t here.

No, the historiography section should not be deleted. I have strong doubts about the opposition’s motives, but I have in fact tried to make a good faith effort to work with the opposition. The opposition’s reasons for seeking to delete this section are spurious. The opposition had no problem with the section as long as it reflected what the opposition wanted this page to say, and only got interested in deleting material from it when I suddenly to add information the opposition didn’t like. The opposition’s approach is simply to delete, erase and wipe out any information that might suggest that Germany was a less then innocent power in 1914.

Finally, I will close off this debate by exposing that this line against Fischer should be kept out because it is entirely untrue. I was a bit surprised to read the claim on the Fischer page that he “successfully deceived” the public about his loyalty to the Nazi regime, “…which he denied being a follower”, as I seemed to remember reading in Fischer’s obituaries back in 1999 mention that he was a NSDAP Party member. However, the allegation was based on a footnote to a German newspaper article from 2004 (please note that I can not read German), and as I didn’t have any evidence on hand to oppose it, I went along with accepting the claim on Fischer’s page. I have done some research, and the Daily Telegraph's obituary does say he was a Nazi. Likewise, the Independent’s obituary says the same thing.. Since his obituaries mention his Nazi Party membership, and in the case of the Independent that he left the Nazi Party in 1942 (which might suggest some problems with National Socialism), Fischer could not have “successfully deceived” anybody about his Nazi past. Likewise, in 1962, Ritter publicly accused Fischer of being “an old Nazi, who had so quickly managed to convert to democracy after 1945”. Again, if Fischer was “living a lie” and deceived the public about his past Nazi Party membership, how did Ritter know about it in 1962? And since Ritter made the charge very publicly, everybody else in 1962 who was paying attention to the “Fischer Controversy”, which would have involved most West Germans must have know about it as while. Likewise, Ritter publicly accused Fischer of being a close “student of the arch-Nazi Erich Seeberg” and of obtaining his post at Hamburg University through Walter Frank. Ritter seemed to known quite a bit about Fischer’s past, and please note this was 1962 I’ll rather suspect that the misleading information on Fischer’s page, which the opposition based its deductions upon was the result of someone confusing Fischer with another historian, namely Martin Broszat, who did successfully hid his Nazi Party membership right up to the time of his death in 1989. That only come out in 2002, but since Broszat’s work has nothing to do with the First World War, that information is not relevant here. In short, the offending sentence I removed is totally untrue, and therefore should be removed. Now of course, this should be the end of the debate, but knowing the opposition with its unendless pro-German energy, it won't be. As for myself, I am finding this debate to be increasing tiresome, and think that I would rather devote my time to cleaning up this page by removing all of the pro-German apologetics from it.--A.S. Brown (talk) 05:14, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

“The argument that Russian mobilization forced Germany into war only works if one accepts the premise that Germany only mobilized in response to Russian mobilization whereas the German documents all show that Germany was going to mobilize regardless of what Russia did or didn’t do.”

You are basically arguing that pre-emptive war is justified, but that it was the Russians who were pre-empting the Germans. If Germany had such intentions though, wouldn't it have mobilized much sooner? for instance as soon as Russia began doing so, or even before? What did it have to gain nothing from waiting except the hope of avoiding general war?

“Turning to Lugi Albertini, I am probably going to sound somewhat rude here, but given the opposition’s astounding lack of knowledge, I rather have no choice. Albertini s book was published in Milan in two volumes in 1942-43. The opposition may or may not know this, but Italy was ruled by a Fascist dictatorship that had allied itself with Germany. … So of course, Albertini was forced into diluting his views by Fascist censorship.”

Before you wrote that you might have checked his Wikipedia article, Albertini was an ANTI-FASCIST who only had time to work on it during the Mussolini regime because it had forced him to resign and sell his paper. It was also first published AFTER the war (mid-50s) and thus was not affected by Fascist censorship but rather published amidst an anti-fascist atmosphere, I would never have bothered even reading his book if I had not checked this first. Your ability to make snap judgments is impressive. By your reasoning (which always assumes everyone is acting on bias no matter what) he should have been ANTI-German, and should increase his credibility. I prefer not to make such assumptions personally. --Loje (talk) 18:15, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

With all due respect, I will have to register some disagreement here. First thing, as I have already noted, it is against the rule to use a Wikipedia article to support an argument on another page, so your suggestion that I check the Albertini page as a source is very inappropriate. I am certain you meant well by your point, but rules are rules. Please avoid shouting. It you want to disagree with me fine, but there is not need to get all worked up on the subject. Turning to more important matters, Albertini's book was published in English in three volumes in New York between 1952-57; the original as I have already noted was published in Milan in 1942-43. Please see page 162 of The Outbreak of World War I edited by Holger Herwig, Boston: Hounghton Miffline, 1997, which it is stated that the three volumes of Albertini's book were published in Milan in 1942-43. Your statement that the book was first published after the war is quite wrong. Albertini may well have been an anti-fascist, but everything published in Fascist Italy was subjected to censorship regardless of whatever was a Fascist, anti-Fascist or indifferent. Since in 1942 and the first half of 1943, Fascism was still very much in power, the book was affected by Fascist censorship. And the volumes published in 1943 must have been published while Fascism was in power because in September 1943, the Germans occupied Milan, and there is no way that such a book would have been published under the German occupation. Milan wasn't liberated until 1945. Now, perhaps if Albertini had not died in 1941, and was still around in the 1950s, and his book was translated into English saying the same thing that first Italian edition did in 1942-43, then I would agree with you. But as Albertini died in 1941, we will never know how much Albertini had changed his book to get it pass the censors. And let's us remember that since Italy was an ally of Germany in World War II, allowing a a book to be published that directly contradicted the Nazi line on the war's origins would be considered an less then friendly act on the part of an ally.

As for your arguments about pre-emptive war, no you seemed to misunderstood me. I was offering a summary of the situation in 1914, not trying to justify pre-emptive war. I am not certain if I follow you, so please accept my apologies if I had misunderstood you. No, I was not trying to say that Russia was planning a war against Germany. My point merely was Russia could not realistically expect to fight a winning war against Germany until 1917, and as I have already noted, the completion of the Russian Great Military Programme would undermine the basic assumption of the Schlieffen Plan, that because of the shortage of east-west railroads in the Russian Empire the Russians would have great difficulty in mounting offensive operations, and so therefore Germany could remain safety undertake a defensive stance on the Eastern Front while committing their main blow against France. As far I am aware, the Russian government had no plans to attack Germany once the Great Military Programme was completed in 1917, and certainly given the Russians were only two years into the programme in 1914, it would be an utterly insane move to start a war in 1914. As I have already noted, once war did began, the shortage of rail-track going east-west was a major cause of the Russian defeats in the war as the Russians had a great deal of difficulty keeping their troops properly supplied. And as I have alredy noted, the Germans were well aware of this, which is why the German General Staff had kept on insisting right from the moment the Russian Great Military Programme was began in 1912, that Germany launch a "preventive war" before the programme could be completed. Let me further note that at past this article takes no account of this.

The crux of your argument here seems to be if that was the cause then why didn't Germany launch a war in 1912 or 1913. As I have already noted, at the great German War Council on December 8, 1912, initially it was suggested that the "preventive war" against Russia be started in December 1912. It was Admiral Tirpitz who blocked that move, arguing that if Germany launched a war in December 1912, then Britain would probably become involved, and the German Navy was not ready for a war against the Royal Navy quite yet. Tirpitz stated that the Navy needed to complete the U-Boat base on Heligoland and the widening of the Kiel Canal. The completion of the Kiel Canal was not scheduled until the summer of 1914. At that point, it was decided that the war could be put off until the completion of the Kiel Canal was finished (i.e the summer of 1914). If you are talking about the July Crisis, your argument is what did Germany have to gain by "waiting except for a desire to avoid a general war". Well, Germany did have something to gain by waiting, and it was not a desire to avoid a war, namely the German government very much wanted it to look like to both their own people and world opinion they were trying to save the peace, and it was Russian mobilization that forced their hand. Indeed, this gambit has very successful, which is why I am have to waste my time almost 95 years after the event explaining all this today. I don't have the reference hardy right now (through I can provide it), but the fact is that it had decided that even if Russia did not mobilize, then the war was going to be launched at the beginning of August. If you read the German documents from late July 1914, there is a palatable sense of frustration and irritation that the Russians are not mobilizing sooner or only aiming at a partial mobilization. Moltke the Younger in the last days of July was phoning Bethmann-Hollweg on almost hourly basis, urging that a war be launched regardless if Russia was moblizing or not, only to be repeatedly told by the Chancellor that he wanted to see Russia mobilize first so he could present the war to the German people as something forced on them. This was especially the case because the Social Democrats, who were the largest party in the Reichstag at the time were nominally opposed to all war and committed themselves to calling a general strike if Germany went to war, had indicated privately to the Chancellor that they would forego their pacifism and support the Fatherland if they felt Germany was under the verge of a Russian attack. So in other words, Germany did have something to gain by waiting other then a desire to save the peace, and that was to ensure a united home front when the war came. Because of the threat of a general strike, it was considered essential by Bethmann-Hollweg to get the Social Democrats on board in supporting the war effort, and as Bethmann-Hollweg knew, the best way of doing that was to present Germany as a victim of Russian aggression. So again, if Germany waited for Russia to mobilize before going to war, it was not out of the desire to save the peace, but for as way of ensuring stabllity on the home front. And finally, please note if the Russian mobilization in the summer of 1914 imposed a decision on the Germans, who were putting off mobilization to avoid war, then why were the Germans talking about going to war in the summer of 1914 in December 1912? As I have already noted here, the scenario discussed about how to cause a war in 1914 at the Great War Council in 1912 sounds awfully like what did happened in 1914. The Great War Council said that Austria should find an excuse for attacking Serbia, which was expected to cause Russia to mobilize, which would be used as an excuse for Germany to go to war. Now, there are some historians who say that happened at the Great War Council was meaningless and just a lot of hot air, but the similiarites between the Great War Council said how war was going to begin in 1914 is exactly how the war did begin in 1914. Coincidence or what?

Now, finally, that is not my reasoning that everybody acts on their biases no matter what. There seems to be an misunderstanding here. All I said is that all historians are biased, some more then others, and there that the popular idea of a good historian as a totally objective observer is a myth. I did not say that all historians act according to their bias all the time. Rather my point was all historians always have a bias. Having said that much, historians can a measure of objectivity and yes, there can be influenced by the evidence that they see. History is both an art and science. Art is subjective, science is objective. In science, it is a matter of fact that 1+1=2, and not 3. So in science, there are objective conditions which exist independently of the scientist. Art is subjective. Who is the better painter, El Greco or Rembrandt? That is a matter of personal taste because beauty is in the eye of the beholder. There are no objective laws to prove which is the better painter because these are matters of personal taste. History is a such strange discipline as being both a art and a science, there are objective and subjective factors. When did the Norman Conquest of England take place? Answer: 1066. This is where history is objective. Was the Norman Conquest a good thing or bad thing for England. This is where history is subjective. There are lots of historians who say the conquest was a bad thing, lots who say it was a good thing, and lots who say it was something in between. The question of whatever something is a good thing or a bad thing is thus very much subjective. Now, I don't mean to sound patronizing or rude, but I do hope I as a historian have clarified something about how historians work to you. I am not certain if that line "ability to make snap judgments is impressive" is not meant as a compliment (I really don't think it is), and through I wasn't making snap judgments, but still thank you nonetheless. Finally, I hope that I have answered your objections here.--A.S. Brown (talk) 20:26, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

For the purpose of your objections to Albertini, here is [an outside source =http://books.google.com/books?id=dybu5ruF8RUC&pg=PA254&lpg=PA254&dq="luigi+albertini"+anti-fascist&source=bl&ots=tjNJJa7zFn&sig=b4gL2mXXL0lCWcXOVawi1RDBW5A&hl=en&ei=4gT1Sd_1Cd-Mtgfi87jBDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#PPA254,M1] (pages 254 and 256), which, though not especially detailed, should be sufficient.

As for the publication in 1943, I'm looking at the 1951 translator's note to a reprint of the the 1951 edition, and apparantly it isn't a translation of the 1943 edition (both because of censorship and because allied bombing made for a "hurried publication" whatever that means) instead this translator made a further revision of the text based not on published versions but Albertini's "original renderings". Although you're right, I hadn't realized this had been necessary. --Loje (talk) 01:21, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for the information about the history of Albertini's The Origins of the War of 1914. But there is a wider objection to Albertini, which I have already made here earlier, and that is not to knock Albertini or anybody else, but there is a source problem with all books published before the 1950s, and that is the archives of the belligerent powers were not opened to historians in the inter-war period. To take three examples, the German archives were not opened until the 1950s, the British archives were not opened until the late 1960s, and the French archieves until the mid-1970s. Even then, there are some gaps in the archives. Some of the French archives were burned in 1940 to prevent them from falling into the hands of the Germans while there are some major gaps in the German archives because the likes of Major Alfred von Wegerer were given free reign over them in the 1920s-30s. The only good thing from a historical point of view was that Major von Wegerer, formally of the völkische League for German Culture and latterly of the Centre for the Study of the Causes of the War was not allowed access to the documents of the German Army and Navy, or else he would had "edited" them as well to suit his own very peculiar ideas about the war's origins. As I already noted, most of the private papers of Bethmann-Hollweg were destroyed in the 1920s, which is why historians are so reliant upon the diary of Bethmann-Hollweg's aide, Kurt Riezler to try to know what Bethmann-Hollweg was thinking in the summer of 1914. Even then, there are some problems with Rizler's diary because apparently some passages in the diary are post-war forgeries designed to make German foreign policy look less aggressive then what it was. There is a rather lively debate about whatever Karl Dietrich Erdmann, the historian in charge of preparing Riezler's diary for publication forged those passages supporting the "calculated risk" theory of the war's origins or not. The majority opinion is that he did, in which case Riezler's diary is a very problematic source historically speaking. Incidentally, if Erdmann did engage in forgery and the majority opinion is that he did, that would indirectly support Fischer's interpretation because Erdmann was a leading member of the coterie of German historians decided to discrediting Fischer during the "Fischer Controversy", and Riezler's diary was published with the express purpose of rebutting Fischer. Since Erdmann had to forger passages to rebut Fischer, then logically it must stand that the original version of the diary would had supported Fischer.

The fact that there are gaps doesn't mean that historians can't develop a idea of what happened and why, but it must admitted that the total story will never be known, but then all history is like that. Historians never know the total story behind everything. But turning to the matter at hand, there was a great deal that Albertini could not looked at the 1920s-30s, i.e the German Great War Council meeting of December 8, 1912 which it was declared that a war was going to started in the summer of 1914. Any book about the war's origins that does not take into account what was decided on that Sunday morning in Berlin in December 1912 must be regarded as somewhat behind the times. Again this is not to knock Albertini, but there is a great deal buried in the archieves that he simply did not have access to when he was doing his research between 1928-1940. Now of course, one is free to use whatever's sources one wants, but I might urge as a general rule, that one might place more value on books based on research in the archives then books that were not. Through I must express reservations about Albertini's work owing to his lack of access to the archives, but still thank you nonetheless for the information. --A.S. Brown (talk) 02:16, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

“Well, Germany did have something to gain by waiting, and it was not a desire to avoid a war, namely the German government very much wanted it to look like to both their own people and world opinion they were trying to save the peace, and it was Russian mobilization that forced their hand.”

If they only mobilized because Russian mobilization forced their hand, than without Russian mobilization their would have been no German mobilization and no general war.

There are places where you can find Russia and French sources speaking of using mobilization to force Germany to make the first declaration of war for the same propaganda purpose.

“If you read the German documents from late July 1914, there is a palatable sense of frustration and irritation that the Russians are not mobilizing sooner or only aiming at a partial mobilization.”

“ Moltke the Younger in the last days of July was phoning Bethmann-Hollweg on almost hourly basis, urging that a war be launched regardless if Russia was moblizing or not, only to be repeatedly told by the Chancellor that he wanted to see Russia mobilize first so he could present the war to the German people as something forced on them”

The reason for irritation is that the case of partial mobilization is something of a gray are in treaty relations and the proper response is not so clear as it would otherwise be.

Just as the Russian General staff was pushing for General mobilization days before it was implemented (ordered the second time), Moltke was pushing for German mobilization earlier than it was ordered because Russia was mobilizing even if not the entirety of its forces and thus still gaining progressively greater advantage over Germany and Austria (also not mobilizing at this stage), the Kaiser and other authorities did not do as Moltke was advising because they wanted to avoid general war, so mobilization took place only much later. --Loje (talk) 01:42, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

With all due respect, I must express some disagreement with the above remarks. First thing, if Russian moblization did force Germany's hand in the summer of 1914 as you suggest, then why were the Germans talking about starting a war in 1914 in 1912? Please excuse my sarcasm here, but how did Russian mobilization in August 1914 force Germany to decide for war in December 1912? Did those who attend the meeting on December 8, 1912 have a crystal ball and know in advance that Russia was going to mobilize in August 1914, forcing Germany to decide for war two years before it happened? Perhaps this is just me, but I am not going through here about the importance of the meeting of December 8, 1912?

Likewise, I must disagree with your remark about Wilhelm II not wanting a war. The Kaiser didn't know what he wanted and was simply not capable of pursing any sort of consistent line. As you probably already know, Wilhelm's birth was a botched job, which he why he had a withered arm. Because his heart had stopped beating for a good two minutes, which caused his withered arm, it also caused some serious brain damage. It is almost certain that Wilhelm suffered from a severe case of attention-deficit disorder (ADD). If Wilhelm did suffer a ADD, and there is a very good case that he did, it would go a long way to explain his highly erratic behaviour. Wilhelm was probably known as "Wilhelm the Sudden" or "Wilhelm the Impulsive" due to his tendency to suddenly to impulsively throw himself body and soul into a cause, and just as suddenly to abandon it. Just look at Wilhelm's behavior during the July Crisis; at one time, he was a strutting warlord who was looking forward to plunging the world into a bloodbath, and then the next moment he was the man of peace desperate to stop the impeding cataclysm, and then next he was back to being the militarist longing for war, and then the next moment he was the man of peace again. I am sorry, but about your remark about the Kaiser not wanting a war is mistaken because you are assuming that the Kaiser was actually capable of making up his mind and then sticking to it. All of the available evidence suggests otherwise. Wilhelm because of the brain damage that would had ensured that when one's brain is cut off from oxygen for a good two minutes was not capable of deciding anything, or holding to any sort of consistent attitudes. Just like at Wilhelm's views towards the British. At one moment, he was a devoted Anglophile proud of his Britsh mother and wishing for the best in Anglo-German relations, the next he was a raging Anglophobe who cursed the British as the eternal enemies of the Reich, and who wanted nothing less then to destroy the British Empire. Or just look at views towards Islam. At one moment, he was the self-proclaimed "Protector of Islam", the friend and admirer of Islam, which he claimed was spirtually superior to the corrupt, decadent materialist civilization of the West, and then the very next minute Wilhelm would damn all people from Middle East as the racial inferiors of the Germans. Wilhelm was just an arrogant, stupid, exceedingly pompous and totally scattered-brained man who had inherited duties that were far beyond his mental capacities to deal with. To put it bluntly, Wilhelm was too scattered-brained to decide anything.

Which is why I suggest that rather then focusing on Wilhelm, we look at the German leadership in its entirety. All of the evidence that does survive (i.e. the documents that Major von Wegerer and company didn't manage to burn in the 20-30s) indicates that of the key decision makeres like Moltke and Bethmann-Hollweg were favor of a resort to arms, and ultimately because they were capable of making up their minds and then sticking to their decisions, their will proved stronger then that of the addle-brained Wilhelm II, who didn't really know what he wanted to do.

No, the reason for the sense of irritation with Russian partial mobilization was to would be a hard sell to the German people to present this as a threat justifying going to war. Anyhow, if Russian mobilization was such a threat to Germany, the Germans knew that a Austrian attack on Serbia was most likely to result in Russian mobilization, and the Germans wanted to preserve the peace, then why encourge Austria to attack Serbia?

Finally, there seems to have been some misinterpretion here. I wrote that: “Well, Germany did have something to gain by waiting, and it was not a desire to avoid a war, namely the German government very much wanted it to look like to both their own people and world opinion they were trying to save the peace, and it was Russian mobilization that forced their hand.” In response, (talk) wrote "If they only mobilized because Russian mobilization forced their hand, than without Russian mobilization their would have been no German mobilization and no general war.". I didn't say that Russian mobilization forced Germany's hand, what I wrote was that Bethmann-Hollweg wanted to look like Russian mobilization forced Germany's hand, which is an entirely different thing. Finally, if even Russian mobilization did not take place, Germany would still have mobilizated. So even Russia didn't mobilized, Germany still would have gone to war. Give me a day or two, and I will bring in some sources proving that. I would like to say more, but I will as soon as I have some sources to back me up. Thank you Loje for the interesting debate. --A.S. Brown (talk) 03:04, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

The import of the 1912 meeting has been greatly inflated, the claims made about it come mainly the selective quotation of this Diary Entry.

However the entry ends with the comment that "That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results.", it was not percieved as the basis for the next several years of German foreign policy. Also, "The chief of the general staff says: the sooner war comes, the better; however, he hasn’t concluded from this that we should give Russia or France, or even both, an ultimatum that would trigger a war for which they would carry the blame."

It is true that Admiral Tirpitz "called attention to the fact that the navy would gladly see a major war delayed by one and a half years." but Moltke "said that even then the navy would not be ready," and more importantly that "the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to arm themselves more rapidly.", meaning that although the navy was expected to become somewhat more prepared, Moltke was made it abundantly clear that the army would be less so, which is a very important consideration. Since the Schlieffen plan had virtually no role for the navy in theory or in practice, waiting a year and a half would leave the country less able to carry it out rather than more so.--Loje (talk) 21:34, 27 April 2009 (UTC)

It has taken somewhat longer to assemble the necessary books then I thought, but here I go. This debate is very tiresome, and I wish I had never gotten into it, but if nobody is going to fight against the grotesquely pro-German apologist pseudo-history here, I suppose that this thankless task falls to me because nobody else seems interested. So here I go back into this futile and apparently endless debate with the German apologists.

First thing, I would like to express some annoyance with consistently patronizing and condensing treatment I had to endured from Loje. You know, I do know a thing or two about the War Council meeting of December 8th, 1912, so there is no need for you to post a link to let me poor ignorant me know about the War Council really said. This is especially annoying because there is no doubt about the reason why you studiously ignored me about the War Council during our earlier exchanges was because you didn’t know anything about it, and had to do a quick google to find out about it. You know instead of using the Internet as a source, why don’t you try reading a good book on the subject?

Now, I bet you think you have got me with that remark from Admiral von Müller’s diary that: "That was the end of the meeting. There were almost no results”. In fact, it is you who are guility of “selective quotation” here, and if you really knew about Admiral Müeller was talking about, you would see that I am right here. Admiral von Müller was a advocate of lanuching a war in December 1912. That is what he meant by “no results”, i.e. no war in 1912. For him, waiting until 1914 was not unacceptable, and the time to start the war was 1912. So in other words, the German government was divided between one fraction that wanted a war in 1912 and another in 1914. At least, I think that is an important of both German intentions and thinking. By “no results”, Müueller meant that waiting until 1914 was not a good idea, and let's start the war in 1912.

Second, your point about the Navy having “no role” in the Schlieffen plan is rather biazzre. Given that the Schlieffen Plan was a Army plan, I am not surprised that the Navy had little role in it! Really, you are being quite silly here, or at are very confused. You are assuming that the Schlieffen Plan was the overall German war plan, but it was not. There was no overrall war plan for both services, it never existed. I already made the point here, which you Loje have ignored as you have ignored everything else I say, is both the German Army and Navy operated like the other service didn’t exist. There was no equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Second Reich. The closest there was was Wilhelm who was the Supeme Commander in Chief, but given that Wilhelm was really too unstable, too erratic and too stupid to play that role, so in practice, there was no overall war planning on the grand strategic level in Germany. Both the Navy and Army usually made absoutely no effort at co-operation with their war plans. That is where the significance of the War Council comes in. It was one of the very few occasions where German leaders attempted to get together and hash out a common policy, which disproves your rather silly point about the Navy not playing a big role in the Schlieffen plan.

In this regard, it is hugely important that in their get-together in 1912 that they worked out what they felt were the prerequisites for war. Moltke wanted a war right here and now in 1912, but Tirpitz said that in order to deter British intervention, or alternatively if Britain did intervene, then in order to have the German Navy as ready for war as ever would be, the U-boat base at Heligoland and the widening of the Kiel Canal. Once these prerequisites were fulfilled, the Navy was ready for war. And since the German Army already said it was ready, all of the prerequisites would be in place by 1914. And yet, you said that none of this is important to how the war began. And given that the fact that Molke and Wilhelm wanted to see a war launched in 1912, surely must count for something as opposed to nothing as you seeemd to be claiming? The War Council must be understood as an important sign of Germany’s intentions. If were not for Tirpitz’s objections, they were all set to start a war in 1912.

Now, let’s turn to this whopper of a statement: “but Moltke "said that even then the Navy would not be ready," and more importantly that "the army’s situation would continue to worsen, since due to our limited financial resources our opponents are able to arm themselves more rapidly.", meaning that although the navy was expected to become somewhat more prepared, Moltke was made it abundantly clear that the army would be less so, which is a very important consideration”.

You have just proved, albeit inadvertently my point about one of the main, indeed if not the most important cause of the war. According to the minutes of the meeting on December 8th, 1912, Moltke said “I believe a war is unavoidable and the sooner the better”, and that he “wanted to launch an immediate attack” against Russia. Moltke’s reasoning being the longer that the Russian Great Military Programme, which had started in November 1912 had to go, the weaker Germany become, and so the sooner war came the better. That is what when he meant, “that even then the navy would not be ready" in 1914, and thus it was best to have a war right here and now in 1912. How can a statement in favor of starting a war in 1912 as opposed to 1914 can possibly be taken as a sign of Germany’s peaceful intentions is utterly beyond me. Do please explain this to me? If anything, Moltke’s statement proves just how much he wanted a war, because since the Navy probably would notbe ready for war in 1914, so why not have the war right now in 1912. You seemed to be a German apologist, Loje, but really do you actually believe this a statement for about starting a war in 1912 as opposed to 1914 can really be understood as a sign of Germany wanting peace, or do you just hold my intelligence in such total contempt that you are actually think that I am so stupid that I would believe that? Please do answer that.

And if Molkte felt that way about starting a “preventive war” against Russia in December 1912 when the Russian Great Military Programme had only just began, imagine how more he would felt about the issue in 1914? As someone who appears to be a German apologist, Loje, this particular act of imagination might be difficult for you, but I will spare you the trouble.

Let’s consider the following facts:

Throughout May-June 1914, Moltke had engaged in an “almost ultimative” demand for a German “preventive war” against Russia in 1914 (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 31).
At the end of end of May 1914, Moltke had told the Foreign Secretary Gottlieb von Jagow:
“Moltke described to me his opinion of our military situation. The prospects of the future oppressed him heavily. In two or three years Russia would have completed her armaments. The military superiority of our enemies would then be so great that he did not know how he could overcome them. Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near-future” (Röhl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 pages 31-32).
In June 1914 Moltke told Jagow that Germany must start a world war before the Russian Great Military Programme was completed in 1917, strongly approved of the idea of an Austrian attack on Serbia as the best way of bringing about a world war (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 180-181)
At the beginning of July 1914, Moltke told Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister in Berlin that “a moment so favourable from the military point of view might never occur again”(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 60). Moltke argued that what he regarded as superior German weaponry and training together with problems in the French Army due the change from a two-year to a three-year period of service meant that Germany could easily defeat both France and Russia in 1914 (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 60)
In mid July 1914, Moltke argued that Germany should declare war on Russia as soon as Austria declared war on Serbia (Fromkin, David Europe's Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 202)
At the end of July 1914, Moltke was urging that Germany declare war regardless if Russia mobilized or not (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 203)

I think the above proves the following things. A) Moltke felt Germany could never defeat Russia once the Great Military Programme was completed in 1917 B) Germany could defeat Russia in 1914 and so C) now was the best time to have a war. So, how you possibly maintain in light of these facts that Germany was in a too bad of a position to go to war in 1914 is likewise beyond me.

Which brings us to the next of your tedious German apologetics, which is your frankly bizarre statement: "If they only mobilized because Russian mobilization forced their hand, than without Russian mobilization their would have been no German mobilization and no general war." This is your very peculiar mode of historical causation, in which actions that served as the pretext for something already decided become the main causal agent. By your warped pro-German logic and methodology, Poland started World War II in 1939. After all, did not Poland rejected out of hand the German demand that the Free City of Danzig be allowed to rejoin the Reich, and for extra- territorial roads across the Polish Corridor? But of course, these demands were just pretexts, and even if the Poles had said Danzig could rejoin Germany and extra-territorial roads linking East Prussia to Germany, it would not have mattered. Germany would still attacked Poland because these things were just excuses. Of course, the Poles played into German hands by rejecting the ostensible German demands, but it didn’t matter. A case in point is that the German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop would not allow any German-Polish talks to take place out of the fear that the Poles might agree to the ostensible German demands. Likewise, Hitler’s response to an British message of August 30, 1939 that German-Polish negotiations should begin immediately was to move the invasion date to September 1 as opposed to September 2 as previously considered, just to provide one less day for talks (Weinberg, Gerhard The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany Starting World War II pages 645-646). Just in the same way that German demands about Danzig were only just a pretext to do something already decided upon, so were German claims about Russian mobilization forcing war on them in 1914. If you really subscribe to this mode of historical causation in which those who provide the pretexts to do something already decided upon are the prime causal agents, then I suggest Loje that you have the courage of your convictions, and re-edit the origins of World War II to say that Poland caused the war in 1939, and Germany was not responsible.

Which brings us to the next part of your hopelessly German apologetic arguement, which is your statement that: “The reason for irritation is that the case of partial mobilization is something of a gray are in treaty relations and the proper response is not so clear as it would otherwise be. Just as the Russian General staff was pushing for General mobilization days before it was implemented (ordered the second time), Moltke was pushing for German mobilization earlier than it was ordered because Russia was mobilizing even if not the entirety of its forces and thus still gaining progressively greater advantage over Germany and Austria (also not mobilizing at this stage), the Kaiser and other authorities did not do as Moltke was advising because they wanted to avoid general war, so mobilization took place only much later”.

Let’s work this one through. Until July 31st, Russia was only mobilizing against Austria. There were no trains carrying Russian troops to the borders of the Reich until 31st of July, so how Moltke can possibly be pushing for mobilization before the 31st of July due to a non-existent Russian threat is beyond me. Russia was only mobilizing against Austria, which meant that trains carrying Russian troops were going to the Austrian border, so how you can possibly speak of a Russian “advantage” over Germany in regards to mobilization? And how much of a danger was Russian mobilization anyhow? Surely, you must know that the basic premise behind the Schlieffen plan was it would take Russia several weeks to mobilize, hence allowing Germany enough time to send the bulk of her forces against France. Even after the 31st of July, by the own reasoning of the Germans they were not in imminent danger. Given the scarcity of east-west railroads in Russia, the Germans were banking their bid for victory on the slowness of Russian mobilization, so they could not and did not feel they were in danger on July 31st. There was no Russian “advantage” in mobilization, and the Germans knew it. If the Russians really had an “advantage”, the Germans would not have sent the bulk of their Army west in August 1914.

Now, let’s consider your statement that the Germans were angry because partial mobilization is a legal “gray” area. Your basic assumption here is that Germany had such reverence for international law that they did not want to go to war in violation of the precepts of international justice. Correct me if I am wrong, but did not the Schlieffen plan call for Germany to violate the neutrality of Belgium? And was not Germany one of the guarantors of Belgian neutrality? Surely, this should show that Germany could care less about international law. And let’s us consider Wilhelm’s rather hysterical call for German troops being sent to surpass the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 to behave like “Huns” and commit atrocities in China (Incidentally, this is the origin of the “Hun” nickname for Germans). Nor was this empty talk. The Germans did behave like “Huns” in China, and massacred thousands of Chinese civilians. And please also consider the genocide in German South-West Africa in 1904-07. No, I don’t think any reasonable person can say that Germany had any special regard for international law as you are trying to claim here.

Now, returning to Russian mobilization, did the Germans really feel threatened? The answer is a very firm no. Let’s consider the following. The German military attaché in Russia reported to Berlin that “I have the impression that they [the Russians] have mobilized here from a dread of coming events without aggressive intentions and are now frightened at what they have brought about” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 231). More importantly, please consider Bethmann Hollweg’s statement of July 30th to the Prussian State Council that Russian mobilization was a not a source of worry for Germany(Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 232) Bethmann Hollweg told the Prussian State Council that “although the Russian mobilization had been declared, her mobilization measures cannot be compared with those of the West European states…Moreover, Russia does not intend to wage war, but has been forced to take these measures because of Austria” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 232). That’s doesn’t like a man who is threatened, do you agree? And consider also the reaction of the Bavarian military attaché to hearing of Russian mobilization: “I run to the War Ministry. Beaming faces everywhere. Everyone is shaking hands in the corridors: people congratulate one another one for being over the hurdle”(Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 242). They don’t sound scared, now do they? And likewise, consider the fact that before the war, German military experts were all telling their government that Russian mobilization was not a threat because of the problems with the Russian rail roads(Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 231). And you seemed to believe there is a equivalence between Russian mobilization and German mobilization, in which you are totally wrong. In Russian mobilization, Russian troops advance to the frontier and there they stay until they receive an order to commerce hostilities. In German mobilization, German troops as part of their deployment automatically advanced against the Belgian frontier. In other words, for Russia and everybody else, mobilization did not mean war, whereas for Germany it did.

And let’s consider some of Bethmann Hollweg’s remarks. Bethmann Hollweg told the Prussian State Councilors stated on July 30th that his only interest now was for domestic political reasons to “represent Russia as the guilty party” behind the war (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 80) And what about Bethmann Hollweg’s telegram to Austria that same day where he wrote:

"If these efforts of Britain’s meet with success [the British peace plan], while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 81)

Bethmann Hollweg ended his message with the words “It will hardly possible to place the guilt of the outbreak of a European war on Russia’s shoulders” if Austria continued to reject out of hand Grey’s peace plan (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 230) It seems like Bethmann Hollweg was only interested in making it seem like Russian mobilization had forced his hand.

Let’s take this a step farther. If Russian mobilization was really such a threat to Germany, then why did Germany do everything in its power to encourage Austria to attack Serbia, when the Germans knew that Russian mobilization was the most likely result? And the Germans knew that because during an earlier Balkan crisis in 1912, Russia had threatened to mobilize if Austria attacked Serbia, so if thought they could cause a Austro-Serbian war without bringing Russian mobilization, then the all of the Reich's must had been really incrediably stupid. That's at least is the main argument of Andreas Hillgruber with his "“calculated risk" theory, perhaps the most intelligent of Fischer's critics (and I citing this because I wrote most of the entry on Hillgruber). On July 7th, 1914, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza warned the Austrian-Hungarian Crown Council that any attack on Serbia “would, as far as can humanly be foreseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence a world war” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 165). That same day, Bethmann Hollweg said in Berlin that “An action against Serbia can lead to a world war” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 181) On July 8th, Tisza told another meeting of the Crown Council that any attack on Serbia was bound to lead to “intervention by Russia and consequently world war” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 56). If the Germans didn’t want a war and really feared Russian mobilization, they would had been pressuring Austria not to attack Serbia.

But did they do that? Let’s look at the evidence. On July 11th, Count Tschirschky, the German Ambassador to Austria-Hungary reported to Jagrow that he “again took the occasion to discuss with Berchtold what action was to be taken against Serbia, chiefly in order to assure the minister once again, emphatically that speedy action was called for” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 57) On July 12th, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Germany Count Szogyeny reported from Berlin that everyone in the German government wanted to see Austria-Hungary declare war on Serbia at once, and were tired of Austrian indecision about whatever to chose war or peace(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 58) Szogyeny further reported that this “absolute insistence" on war against Serbia was shared by all in the German government (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 58) On July 17th, Count Stolberg of the German Embassy in Vienna reported back to Berlin that he had told Berchtold:

“If Austria really wants to clear up her relationship with Serbia once and for all, which Tisza himself in his recent speech called ‘indispensable’, then it would pass comprehension why such demands were not being made as would make the breach unavoidable. If the action simply peters out, once again, and ends with a so-called diplomatic success, the belief which is already widely held there that the Monarchy is no longer capable of vigorous action will be dangerously strengthened. The consequences, internal and external, which would result from this, inside Austria and abroad, are obvious” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 59).

So, Germany knew the risks, and it took them anyhow. But of course, Russian mobilization was just a pretext for war. The most recent account states quite clearly:

”It often is said that what led to war was Russia’s decision to mobilize. That could have been true in other circumstances. It was not true in the circumstances of the summer of 1914. The German government had determined to go to war before Russia mobilized; therefore the German decision could not have been caused by the Russian decision. And, far from fearing Russian mobilization, the German leaders hoped for and waited for it: it was their excuse and enabled them to obtain the essential support of their own people” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 267)

And let’s consider the following. On 9: 00 PM of July 30th, Bethmann Hollweg told Moltke and Falkenhayn’s that Germany would mobilize at noon the next day regardless of whatever Russia began a general mobilization or not(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 85) It thus simply rubbish to say that Russia forced a war on Germany when Germany would had mobilized if Russia did not mobilize.

And now we turn to other points of your somewhat unique understanding of history. Albertini was an anti-fascist, and therefore should had been anti-German. You are assuming that the foreign policy of Fascist Italy was always pro-German, and in this you are totally wrong. You may or may not know this, but until 1936 Italo-German relations were quite bad. German and Italian newspapers engaged in a vitupative propaganda war against each other. More importantly, when faced with a Nazi putsch against the Italian backed Austrian government in July 1934, Mussolini rallied to the Austrian government and sent troops to the Brenner Pass to deter Germany from invading Austria. Nor were Italo-German relations any better under the Weimar Republic. Mussolini’s Italianisation policies in Alto Adige caused much tension with Germany. And perhaps in the 1920s (at least for most of the time), Mussolini liked to appear as a defender of the Versailles settlement, which of course, everybody in Germany wanted to destroy. So if anything, Albertini’s anti-fascism should had made him pro-German, at least until 1936. Maybe you may want to start checking up on the basic facts of European history before shouting at me in capital letters that because Albertini was an anti-fascist, he should had been anti-German.

And now we turn to the last of your tedious misrepresentations of my statements. You claimed that “You are basically arguing that pre-emptive war is justified, but that it was the Russians who were pre-empting the Germans”. This a bit rich coming from someone who tells me that Germany was forced into war by Russian mobilization, don’t you agree? It is you, Loje who are championing preventive war here, not me. So, please stop confusing me with yourself. I don’t share your views, so don’t falsely attribute them to me.

Now, what I wrote about the Russian Great Military Programme was “…the impetus behind the Great Military Programme as the five year scheme to modernize the Russian Army and build more east-west railroads was purely defensive”. I don’t know we are saying that I was saying that “it was the Russians who were pre-empting the Germans”. Please stop attributing your German apologist views to me. There is not a shed of evidence that Russia ever planned to attack Germany at the end of the Great Military Programeme. None, absoluetly none at all. The Great Military Programme was the Russian reponse to the arms races that the Germans had began. To understand the spirit behind the Great Military Programme, the best quote is si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war for those unfamilar with Latin sayings). The purpose of the Great Military Programme was to deter war by making Russia too strong to be attacked. And to fair, if the programme had been completed, it would had served that purpose.

True, the Germans thought that at the end of the Great Military Programme, they would be attacked, but says more about German hysteria then it does about Russian intentions. I don’t like the word guilt in history because it has legalistic-moralistic connotations that usually do more to hinder then help historical understanding. Personally, let’s banish the word war-guilt from this page. But I think the following analogy is helpful. A man is schizophic, and hears voices in his head telling him that best friend is going to kill him. Fearing that his life is in danger, the schizophic man kills his best friend. Now, if we want to understand the crime, we need to understand the schizophic man believed owning to his mental illness his life was in danger. But that does not mean he was in danger. There is a big difference between trying to explain something and excusing something. The leaders of Germany in 1914 were operating in a state of extreme hysteria, believing they had no other choice, but to fight a “preventive war”. Personally, I don’t believe that we call a war launched to prevent the completion of the Great Military Programme three years later, and despite a total lack of evidence of any Russian plans to attack Germany a “preventive war”. There was no sign was that Russia going to attack Germany in 1917, and anyhow, starting a war to prevent something three years in advance is stretching the term “preventive war”. Even Hillgrueber, who really was a most offensive German apologist with statements like Germany ceasing to be a great power in 1945 was just as sad as the Holocaust, wrote much of the "inflation" as he called it of the term "preventive war" in pre-1914 Germany. But, the Germans believed that they would be attacked, hence the increasing insistent demands that a “preventive war” be launched from December 1912 onwards. I am not saying to excuse anybody, just merely a call for understanding. So, please stop attributing me to me views that I do not hold. I don’t what it is with you, Loje, but you seem to have much trouble understanding me.

Now, this debate is really getting very stale, and I wish it would end because it takes up too much of my time, and nobody listerns to me anyhow. I hoped that I had a convincing demonstration of my views, but of course, this debate will never end. No doubt, by tomorrow, Loje and company will back here, telling him can I am totally wrong about everything. If I sounded slighly abrasive here, please accept my apologies, but these not so thinly veiled snide put-downs of my intellignece and the inability/unwillingness of anyone to listern does leave one slightly annoyed. But for now, goodnight and good wishes to you all. A particular word of thanks to Edward Lovette for all your kind words--A.S. Brown (talk) 02:28, 29 May 2009 (UTC).

-Regarding Muller. By any objective criteria the decision to launch a general war and when to do so qualifies as “a result” for such a meeting. -On Moltke’s position, I wasn’t saying he didn’t want war sooner rather than later, I was pointing out that according those at the meeting Germany was less ready to win a war then than they would be in 1914. - Russia’s program ending in 1917 began in 1914 -By the way if you really think that the canal was so important you may be interested to know that Tirpitz stated the navy would be

“ready” at the same time and for the same reasons in 1909, so you’ll probably want to start saying the war was planned since then.[Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 140.]

-In June, and even July 1914, far from expecting an imminent war, the minister of war and chief of staff were arguing for military increases to take effect in 1915 and 1916. This was considered an alternate way of preserving military superiority since war did not appear to be in the offing. “Moltke’s solution to the dilemma of 1917 was more troops…. which would make Germany ready by 1916/1917 to counter a numerically superior army.” [Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 175, 181.]

“ In mid July 1914, Moltke argued that Germany should declare war on Russia as soon as Austria declared war on Serbia”

-And obviously he was ignored, as usual.

“This is your very peculiar mode of historical causation, in which actions that served as the pretext for something already decided become the main causal agent.” Your problem is that you label causes pretexts, and then feel free to ignore what displeases you.

“Moltke was pushing for German mobilization earlier than it was ordered because Russia was mobilizing even if not the entirety of its forces.”

Yes, and he was consistently unsuccessful in doing so. That should matter if you’re concerned with what the Germans actually did. Moltke’s analysis was that Russia’s partial mobilization would eventually prompt Austrian counter-mobilization (though this didn’t actually happen until after Russian general mobilization) [Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 201-202.]and at that point he judged a clash and declarations of war inevitable that would force Germany to support its ally or abandon the alliance and bring in France as well. Even so the general initially told the Austrians on the morning of the 30th that partial mobilization gave the Germans ‘no reason’ to mobilize and that they would only do so after war broke out between Austria and Russia and advised the Austrians not to ‘declare war on Russia but wait for Russia to attack (he changed his mind later in the afternoon, Falkenhyne wrote in his diary that Moltke’s “changes of mood are hardly explicable, or not at all”). [Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 204, 206-207.] But the generals couldn’t even get the Kaiser to order Kriegszgefahrstand (danger of war) until after Russian general mobilization had been proven.

“Until July 31st, Russia was only mobilizing against Austria.”

General mobilization was ordered on July 30th, and before then there was limited mobilization against Germany as well Austria as ordered on July 25th under the period preparatory to war, though the Germans were willing to tolerate this. Also, under partial mobilization the Baltic fleet was mobilized, that’s against Germany.

"Now, let’s consider your statement that the Germans were angry because partial mobilization is a legal “gray” area. Your basic assumption here is that Germany had such reverence for international law”

I didn’t say anything about international law, I was speaking of Germany’s obligations towards its ally [for instance Moltke’s already cited comment]. Another possible reason partial mobilization didn’t produce German mobilization is that because it didn’t especially enhance Russia’s ability to invade East Prussia, it could not interfere with Germany’s ability to execute its war plan successfully.

“Bethmann Hollweg’s statement of July 30th to the Prussian State Council that Russian mobilization was a not a source of worry for Germany “

-Referring to partial mobilization, and to calm nerves.

“They don’t sound scared, now do they?”

-They were happy that mobilization would be ordered, if the Kaiser had continued to refuse they would have been concerned. Moltke observed about the importance of time that “if we hesitate with mobilization, our situation will worsen day by day and may lead to the most fatal results for us if our opponents are allowed to continue to prepare themselves undisturbed.” [Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 202.]

“German troops as part of their deployment automatically advanced against the Belgian frontier. In other words, for Russia and everybody else, mobilization did not mean war, whereas for Germany it did”

-Yes Sazonov said that “in Russia unlike in Western European states, mobilization is far from being the same as war.” The fact is that it was well understood in St. Petersburg that Germany would take the offensive immediately if they ordered general mobilization, but their military leaders assured the Czar that their partial mobilization meant that they had to either order it pr their mobilization system would be thrown into disarray, forcing an early decision on peace or war. Asked to reorder general mobilization the Czar commented that Sazonov should “Consider that it means sending thousands and thousands of men to their deaths”[ The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914 International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, (Winter, 1990-1991), 128-129.

“It seems like Bethmann Hollweg was only interested in making it seem like Russian mobilization had forced his hand.”

You seem to be arguing that Germany wanted Russia to mobilize as soon as possible so that they could initiate hostilities. But this is the opposite German policy throughout the July Crisis, Russian general mobilization was only cancelled the first time because of the Kaiser for example and it was manifested in diplomacy through the foreign ministry as whole as well.

“why did Germany do everything in its power to encourage Austria to attack Serbia”

-They thought that the faster Austria moved the less likely it was that there would be a general war. That’s the same reason Vienna had a short time limit, kept their plans as secret as possible, and waited until Poincaire left Russia (hoping Russia would not act without consultation).

“in 1912, Russia had threatened to mobilize if Austria attacked Serbia”

It had already called up a lot of troops, it was not thus supportive in 1913 when Austria sent Serbia its ultimatum. Partly that was because France wasn’t offering to go to war in 1913 as in 1912, but Russia was itself exasperated with Serbia at that point.

” as far as can humanly be foreseen, lead to an intervention by Russia and hence a world war”

The minutes of the meeting I’ve read say they don’t include that part of the discussion, I’ll be sure to look them up though. But if that was the general conclusion of the Austrian government I assume you’d have said so and that Austria would have mobilized accordingly.

“Germany knew the risks, and it took them anyhow. “

The risks that Russia would go to a war over it, the Germans were not sure this was the case, the flip side of their assumption that they had a military advantage being that they doubted Russia would challenge it. Russia actually encouraged this view somewhat during the July Crisis, especially when Sazonov told Szapary that Russia would go to war “if Austria swallows Serbia” which led to Austrian and German assurances of Serbia’s territorial integrity that they only learned later were not considered to be of any value. Most scholars accept that Germany pursued a policy of localization at the beginning of the crisis.

“And let’s consider the following. On 9: 00 PM of July 30th, Bethmann Hollweg told Moltke and Falkenhayn’s that Germany would mobilize at noon the next day ”

Technically Bethmann only agreed that a decision would be made over it by then. The generals and the Kaiser were actually waiting for news of confirmation of Russia’s mobilization, and Falkenhayn's diary also notes that as the deadline approached Moltke appeared ‘unfortunately very nervous’ and that of Moltke’s adjutant has similar comments, he was not sure exactly what the decision would be. [Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 206-207.]

“until 1936 Italo-German relations were quite bad.”

He’d still have had 5 years to alter the tone of his book, I don’t think and never said he was motivated by bias though, and he’s also not especially “pro-German”.--Loje (talk) 04:19, 31 May 2009 (UTC)

I was wrong about the time (it took three days, instead of one) to reply, but I was right about the expected 100% disagreement. Since I have not read Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, I shall reply in full when I get chance. Good day.----A.S. Brown (talk) 21:43, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Pardon me for poking my bugle in but why is Germany's war guilt causing such grief? It's customary these days to call war a Bad Thing but surely this is anachronism for 1914? Clearly the use of force then was of far less significance because so much of it was against those who had small ability to retaliate. Europe's boss class seems to me to have formed accurate conclusions about the likely course of a great European war (along the lines that Molke's thought ran after the Franco-Prussian War) but we're the ones with certainty. Is it so bad that there was a war party among Germany's rulers, when at the time it looked as though the winners of such a war would remake Europe and the world for their benefit for the next century, when the consequences of not doing it were exemplified by the fate of the likes of the Ottoman Empire and China? Germany's guilt (in that sense) lies in losing the war, not starting it.Keith-264 (talk) 20:06, 9 June 2009 (UTC)

Concerning the opposition’s latest assertions, I had a chance to read Helmuth von Moltke and The Origins of the First World War. Before venturing further, the opposition is very much worse then Werchovsky who judging from his statements appears to believe that the war was a result of a Franco-Russian conspiracy to destroy Germany. Before going any further, I would like just like to remark how this is utterly unacceptable. As early as 1973, it had been observed that no historian today advocate the view that the Entente planned to attack Germany, or that the war could in any way be understood as a case of Entente aggression (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 28), so which makes me wonder why nobody noticed that there was a on-going problem with this page over the last two years. Take this a typical example of the problems with this page:

“Kaiser Wilhelm II wrote a lengthy commentary containing the startling observations:
"For I no longer have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed among themselves—knowing that our treaty obligations compel us to support Austria-Hungary—to use the Austro-Serb conflict as a pretext for waging a war of annihilation against us. ... Our dilemma over keeping faith with the old and honorable Emperor has been exploited to create a situation which gives England the excuse she has been seeking to annihilate us with a spurious appearance of justice on the pretext that she is helping France and maintaining the well-known Balance of Power in Europe, i.e. playing off all European States for her own benefit against us."”

"

The problem here lies with the phrase “startling observations”. According to my dictionary, observation means “an act or instance of noticing or perceiving”. So in other words, observation implies that there is some sort of objective reality here as one can not notice or perceive something that does not exist. So to take an example, “He observed the stars” means somebody went and looked up at the sky, and saw the heavens contained. I have no objection to someone quoting Wilhelm’s commentary, but to present his own POV as his “startling observations” is to imply that he is correct here, that Germany was the victim of a British engineered war of aggression in 1914. By the same technique, one could present Hitler’s “startling observations” that the Jews started World War II. The phrase “startling observations” implies that Wilhelm is only not describing the situation of 1914, but doing it well. That’s quite of lot of this sort of things, subtle expressions that quietly distort history on this page, and I appear to be the only one here who finds this all rather objectionable?

But the opposition here, and I am going to presume that he has read Mombauer’s book that he cites so liberally, must know better then to accept the sort of nonsense I mentioned above, so makes these attacks upon me in this entirely unwanted debate so egregious. If I known that removing one POV sentence about Fischer, which implies that he guilty of some sort of academic misconduct back in February would cause me so trouble, I would not have bothered as I much prefer the peace and quiet of the offbeat topics that I work on that’s nobody else cares about, but since I have been engaged, against my better judgement and wishes in this terrible debate, so in for a penny, in for a pound. Apparently seems to be an unwritten rule around here that anybody who says anything critical of Germany must attacked. This is the third time this happened to me over the last two years that I have been subjected to these sort of venomous attacks for innocuous edits. And why the opposition had to barged in into my debate with Werchovsky back in April is a question that only the opposition can answer, through personally I find the opposition’s tactics typical of the worse sort of intellectual bully. I had no desire or interest to talk to the opposition back in April, and the only reason why it appears the opposition started this conversation was to bully me into changing views the opposition clearly dislikes. I was finishing off my involvement on this page (at least for while) in April, when suddenly I was subjected to this unprovoked aggression here. But since as a results of these vicious attacks, I have been forced to make the long and dangerous journey to the library several times to acquire the necessary books to defend myself, why not make use of them to improve this page?

Now turning to the matter at hand:

“-Regarding Muller. By any objective criteria the decision to launch a general war and when to do so qualifies as “a result” for such a meeting.”

But that does not change the fact that the lack of “results” he writing of was the decision to wait until 1914 for war, and it is malicious otherwise to distort what he writing of. All I was merely pointing out was Admiral Müller’s “no results” remark was a reference to his disappointment that there would be no war in 1912, as opposed to the opposition’s claim that the meeting amounted to nothing. At very least, the War Council meeting of 1912 can regarded as a sign of German intentions, which makes it historically important as opposed to the opposition’s claims of nil importance. More about that in a moment. And moreover, if the War Council had been had in Britain, France or Russia, no doubt the opposition would be proudly trumping it as proof that Germany didn’t a war, and it was (insert name of the Allied country) that did. And to be fair, if there was a British, French or Russian War Council in 1912 that said we will go to war in 1914, I would not dismiss it as a something totally unimportant.

“-On Moltke’s position, I wasn’t saying he didn’t want war sooner rather than later, I was pointing out that according those at the meeting Germany was less ready to win a war then than they would be in 1914.”

Which would mean presumably mean that Moltke was more anxious for a war in 1914 as events were moving closer to his self-imposed 1917 deadline as I have noted. More importantly, Moltke told the German Foreign Secretary von Jagow in May 1914 “Today we would still be a match for them. In his opinion there was no alternative to making preventive war in order to defeat the enemy while we still had a chance of victory. The Chief of the General Staff therefore proposed that I should conduct a policy with the aim of provoking a war in the near-future” (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 pages 31-32). At the beginning of July 1914, Moltke told Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian Minister in Berlin that “a moment so favourable from the military point of view might never occur again”, and that he felt Germany could defeat both France and Russia together in 1914 (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 60). So given Moltke’s assessment of the military situation in July 1914 as being highly favourable to Germany, I would suggest that the opposition’s point that Moltke said in 1912 that Germany would have less of a lead in defence compared with 1914 is largely redundant.

“- Russia’s program ending in 1917 began in 1914”

My mistake in saying the Great Russian Military Programme began in 1912, but the opposition in saying 1914. It started on November 4, 1913, through it had talked about since late 1912. At least unlike some other people, I gladly confess to any errors on my part, but my overall point stands, the ideas behind the Great Russian Military Programme had been discussed since 1912 in the Duma and the Russian press, and was thus German decision-makers would had been operating on a worse case scenario that the Russians would go ahead with the programme. I haven’t done any serious work on this subject since November 2000, so I must confess to being a bit rusty in certain details.

“-By the way if you really think that the canal was so important you may be interested to know that Tirpitz stated the navy would be “ready” at the same time and for the same reasons in 1909, so you’ll probably want to start saying the war was planned since then.[Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, 140.]”.

The opposition’s sarcasm aside, that is not the way I operate. I go on what the evidence allows, and nothing else. I am not aware of any War Council in 1909 saying that a war will begin in 1914, and I will make no such claims. And since the opposition treats Mombauer as almost a Bible, surely the oppositon will be aware the next page of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, namely page 141, it was stated that the German government started as one of the decisions at the War Council a press campaign to get German people to accept a preventive war against Russia. An ineffective press campaign, to be sure but this directly contradicts the opposition’s claims based on one remark from Admiral Müller’s diary of “no results” from the War Council. Indeed, I can’t but help wonder if “pretty much zero results” remark from Admiral Müller’s diary about the ineffectiveness of the press campaign for a war against Russia is the same “no results” remark translated from the German differently by Mombaurer. If that is the case, and if the unsuccessful press campaign that he is talking about, that would mean the opposition is being highly disingenuous at best in using that remark by Admiral Müller to say that War Council is not historically important. Even if that is not the case, the fact that a press campaign, albeit highly a fruitless one (and that is really besides the point, it is the intentions behind the press campaign, and not the results that matter here) was launched to justify a coming war with Russia in late 1912, proves that German leaders had intentions for a war with Russia sooner rather then later from late 1912.

Now, the fact that Moltke and the rest of the German generals kept on pressing the Government all through 1913-14 would support the interpretation that the War Council was not a binding decision for a war, and please note the use of my words intentions rather then plans. After all, it was a binding decision, than presumably all this pressure to keep on starting a war “sooner rather then later” was all rather unnecessary. Which, is why I placed the War Council meeting in the “Run-up to War’ section rather the “Decisions for War” section. But I do find the War Council historically important because it reveals the thinking of Germany’s leadership, and clearly shows their intentions to have a war in the very near-future. If there appears to be contradiction here between what I am saying here and my earlier statements in April, it is because I take a critical approach to all the sources I use, and have revised my views after further reflection, which is my right (and please note that this process was entirely internal as I don’t find anything the opposition says in the slightest thought-provoking). Yet still, the fact that a war began at the same time and in the same way as described in the War Council of 1912 always me with a nagging feeling that there this is not a just a coincidence, but that is just a gut feeling on my part. And finally, the purpose here is reflect consensus, and as the opposition itself noted in an edit in the Historiography section back in May, there is no historical consensus on the importance of the War Council, so therefore this page should summarize both sides of the debate, as opposed to the opposition’s attempts to have mention of the War Council banished from this page all because of one sentence in a German admiral’s diary. The War Council, through its precise importance historians will never come to agreement about, at very least merits a mention in this article as opposed to totally ignoring it has been the case so far.

Moving to late 1913, both Wilhelm and Moltke told the visiting King Albert of Belgium in November 1913 that Germany expected to have a war with France in the very near future, and wanted transit rights for German troops to cross over Belgium (“Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War” page 166). And once Moltke repeated the same message to the Belgian military attaché, using as Mombaurer points out, the exactly same words he used at the War Council of 1912 that the opposition finds so unimportant, “The sooner, the better” ( Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 166). I will be discussing this more in greater detail below, but at very least, I don’t think Wilhelm regarded the War Council as a binding decision. I have already stated this before, but it bears repeating that Wilhelm almost certainly suffered from attention-deficit disorder owing to his botched birth, and regardless if he suffered from ADD or not, he had a marked tendency to change his mind once every five minutes or so. So that through Wilhelm said at the time that he regarded the War Council as binding in 1912, and based on his remarks to King Albert in 1913 about a war “inevitable and near”, seems to have felt the same way a year later, is almost certain that Wilhelm changed his mind about the issue a half dozen times or more between 1912-14. So now, I would not argue that Wilhelm went into 1914 based on the War Council meeting of 1912 determined to have a war, and indeed I never stated that.

But I would argue that Moltke and the rest of the German military leadership certainly had intentions from late 1912 to have a war in 1914. Indeed, Mombaurer writes that it was not a “coincidence” that Moltke was repeating the phrase “The sooner, the better” from the War Council to the Belgian military attaché in November 1913 (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 166). At very least, the German requests of Belgium in November 1913 for transit rights for a war that was “inevitable and near” seems to qualify as a “result” of the War Council of 1912. And don’t bother with the quote from Beyens about the “peace-loving” Kaiser being pressured by his generals that can be found on pages 166-167. It just confirms what I have been saying all the long that Wilhelm was a man, and I mean this with only slight exaggeration, who changed his mind once every five minutes or so. The only things Wilhelm was ever consist about were German nationalism, anti-Semitism and navalism-with everything else, he was constantly oscillating and flip-flopping from one position to another on almost daily basis.

By contrast, Beyens’s statement supports what I have been saying all long, the Army had made it its mind in 1912 to have a war in the very near-future. And I as I will show below, when push come to shove, it was the military and not the Emperor who mattered. And finally coming from someone who relies so heavily from Mombaurer, I find the remark disparaging me for stressing the importance of the opening of the widened Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in June 1914 particularly incomprehensible. After all, Mombaurer herself says that opening of widened canal was one of the reasons why Germany’s leaders regarded the summer of 1914 as providing a “good opportunity” for war (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 187). Since the opposition wants to cite Mombaurer against me, perhaps should the opposition should be paying more attention to what Mombaurer says.

“-In June, and even July 1914, far from expecting an imminent war, the minister of war and chief of staff were arguing for military increases to take effect in 1915 and 1916. This was considered an alternate way of preserving military superiority since war did not appear to be in the offing. “Moltke’s solution to the dilemma of 1917 was more troops…. which would make Germany ready by 1916/1917 to counter a numerically superior army.” [“Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War”, 175, 181.]”.

Yes, the quote is correct, but is taken out of context as the opposition must know. Mombaurer says on page 180 that the German Army regarded the summer of 1914 as the best time for a war, and was pressing hard for such for a war, which is hardly the sign of the pacific intentions credited to the German Army by the opposition. What Mombaurer actually says on page 181 is the German generals did not trust the civilian leadership to go through with a war in 1914, and were afraid of another diplomatic compromise like those which ended the two Moroccan crises, hence the battles over the size of the Army increases planned for 1915-16. Since we are at page 181 of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, let us also know that it confirms what I already stated here several times, that the German military feared that they would be unable to defeat Russia once the Great Military Programme was completed in 1917, so they felt 1914 was the best time for a so-called “preventive war”. And let’s also further note, since I already see the opposition’s objection that the concerns of the military are not the same as the rest of the Government, that Mombaurer says twice on page 181, and in more considerably more detail on 188 that Bethmann-Hollweg had been convinced by these constant appeals by Moltke to start a “preventive war”. However, Moltke and the rest of the Army were not aware of the extent to which they convinced Bethmann-Hollweg of the desirability of a “preventive war” in 1914, and did not realize that he would go as far as he would to start the desired war in July 1914 (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 191) So, the opposition’s claims about the military increases for 1915-16 proving the pacific intentions of German policy are spurious, but then the opposition already knew that.

““ In mid July 1914, Moltke argued that Germany should declare war on Russia as soon as Austria declared war on Serbia”

-And obviously he was ignored, as usual”.

Yes, in this particular case. But the opposition is ignoring the point I was making here that Moltke’s insistence upon starting a war predated anything Russia had done. Through in this particular case, he may been ignored, but returning to the above, in a general sense, Bethmann-Hollweg had been convinced by Moltke that the summer of 1914 was the best time to start a “preventive war” (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 188-189). So in this particular case, Moltke was ignored, but I think the wholesale deprecation of Moltke’s influence on the German decision-making process as implied by the “And obviously he was ignored, as usual” is entirely unwarranted by the evidence.

“Your problem is that you label causes pretexts, and then feel free to ignore what displeases you”.

I might say the opposite that the opposition labels pretexts causes, but rather then waste my breath, how about proving that? No, if I felt free to “ignore” what allegedly “displeases” me, then I have am writing this rebuttal? The very fact that I am writing this rebuttal and took the time to read Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War shows I take the ideas of the opposition seriously. If I find the ideas of the opposition wanting, it is because the evidence does not support them. And at very least, I do not read books, and then selectively quote certain passages out of context that are contrary to the book says.

I take the view that true class speaks for itself, so I fear no need to boost about anything, but this particular attack on my operating methods requires some rebuttal. I take the view that all sources need to handled carefully and critically, and I do not go beyond the evidence allows. To take one example, I noticed the talk between the German reporter Victor Neumann and Count Alexander Hoyos on July 1st, 1914, where Neumann indicated that he was speaking on behalf of the German Army, and told Hoyos that Austria should attack Serbia because it would trigger a war with Russia that the German Army was looking forward to having that year. Fischer wrote Neumann was speaking on behalf of the Army, whereas Ritter contended that Neumann was speaking as a private individual. So who’s right? We never know for sure because the evidence isn’t conclusive enough. But having said that, there is a circumstantial case in favour of Fischer. In those days, it was common for journalists to be used as unofficial diplomats to carry on messages while at the same time providing to use the modern term “plausible deniability”. Neumann had very nationalistic-militaristic views, and was known to be close to the German Army and Foreign Office, who often leaked information to him. And before just he left for his trip to Vienna, he had met with the hardliner diplomat Wilhelm von Stumm in Berlin, who may had wanted to bypass the German Ambassador Prince Tschirschky, who at time was urging restraint on the Austrian government. And certainly, during his talk with Count Hoyos, Neumann seemed to make out that he was speaking for the German government. But of course, Ritter may have been right. We have no record of Neumann’s meeting with Stumm, and for all we know, they may had discussed dog-racing instead of asking Neumann to take a message to Vienna. And maybe, Neumann was not being honest when made out he was speaking on behalf of Germany, and was just expressing his own views here. We never know for sure, and I made a point when I including all this in the mention of the Neumann-Hoyos meeting in the text. Now, if I wanted to, I could have just presented Fischer’s interpretation of the Neumann-Hoyos meeting, and left it at that, but not is the way I operated. But at the same time, there is as I have noted, a circumstantial case (and no more) for Fischer’s interpretation, which why I have included it also. And I have also included, what is the most consequence of the Neumann-Hoyos meeting that the Austrians believed Neumann was speaking for Germany. And again, if had wanted to, I could have used this link to support my arguments [1], but I didn’t because I don't think that arguments over something which does not in fact exist in the archives is a productive one.

“Yes, and he was consistently unsuccessful in doing so. That should matter if you’re concerned with what the Germans actually did”.

Again, my point here was Moltke’s determination to mobilize was not influenced by anything the Russians did or did not, but rather reflected a priori decision taken beforehand. Now, I have said this before, and thus starting to find repeating it a little bit tiresome, the reasons why Moltke’s requests to mobilize were turned down was because Bethmann Hollweg two political preconditions for a war were 1) British neutrality and 2) ensure that SPD support the war effort, so it was best to make it appear that Russian mobilization had forced a war on Germany (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 pages 75 & 80) . This makes this attack on me for my supposed non-concern about German actions particularly baffling. I already made this point way about too many times Bethmann Hollweg’s political preconditions as a factor in German policy, so I can find it being accused about not being concerned about “what the Germans actually did” rather mystifying. And I did write up a very detailed account of the July Crisis for this page (through unfortunately it looks somebody deleted it, but I am certain the opposition can look it up), with hundreds of footnotes and extensive quotations from various politicians, generals and politicians (and not just German ones), so this criticism that I am not concerned with “what the Germans actually did” particularly unfair and vicious. After all, there is below complaints what I was too detailed and too long (fair enough, but given the contentious nature of the subject, I had no choice).

The summary of Moltke’s memo “Assessment of the Political Situation” of July 28th is correct, but the opposition appears to have missed Mombaurer’s remark the purpose of the memo was to influence the politicians not to seek a peaceful solution as Moltke feared they would now that the moment of crisis was upon them by providing a set of supposed military necessities for mobilization (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 198-199 & especially 201) Now, it would be churlish to deny that the prospect of Russian mobilization did not cause Moltke some concern, but I as it has must be amply established by now, Moltke had been an advocate of war long before July 1914, and now that he saw his chance to get the war he been seeking for so long, of course he was going to come up with a list of supposed categorical military necessities for war for the benefit of the politicians. At very least, I would treat Moltke’s memo with more then a grain of salt, as opposed to accepting it at face value, as the opposition is doing here. And since we talking of military necessities here, I noticed that the opposition has somehow completely ignored the military concern that most motivated Moltke’s actions (one I have already touched upon in the text, through it appears that somebody has deleted it), namely the need to storm the Liége fortress by surprise to ensure the success of the Schlieffen Plan, which required that Germany mobilize as soon as possible before the Belgians mobilized (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 203). And since Moltke did not want to tell the politicians about the need to storm Liége at once, of course, he was going to come up with these various reasons why Germany had to mobilize at once (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 203). Through the book does not say this, but the impression I got was Moltke wanted to keep the need to storm Liége secret from the politicians because to admit it would be admitting that Germany’s fate hung on to great deal of chance (i.e. the need to have the element of surprise to take Liége), and that would make him look incompetent in leaving such an important to the vagaries of chance. It was the actions of the Belgians far more then the actions of the Russians, which influenced Moltke in the last days of July; the book says the news about the Belgians calling up troops was “more worrying” to Moltke then the news from Russia (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 203). Yes, Moltke was often hesitant. As Mombaurer says, that was the supreme challenge for he had been prepared all of his professional life, so that the strain should show is not surprising. But when push came to shove, despite all of his hesitations he always came back to deciding for war, and that is what matters in the end. Anyhow, at the risk of sounding repetitive, may I further note that the major cause of Moltke’s stress and strain was his fear that if Germany did not mobilize at once, then the Belgians would time to prepare, and Liége fortress could not be stormed, dooming the Schlieffen Plan to failure (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 206-207) I think Mombaurer makes it clear that Moltke’s repeated demands for German mobilization at once were more much influenced by Belgium then Russia, which disqualifies the opposition’s whole point about Russian mobilization forcing a war on Germany. If anything, it was Belgian mobilization that forced a decision, but not a war on Germany. Anyhow, Falkenhayn was even more of a hawk then Moltke and was personally hostile towards the Chief of the General Staff, regarding him as something of a wimp, so his diary needs to be used with some caution when he starts to blast Moltke for not doing enough to start a war (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 200). And the passage criticizing Moltke for his “changes of mood that hardly explicable” refers to Moltke’s decision to abandon Bethmann Hollweg’s political preconditions of waiting for Russia to mobilize first, and to press on with immediate German mobilization (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 205). The preceding sentence, which the opposition failed to quote was Moltke had been supporting Bethmann Hollweg about waiting for Russian mobilization, and now “Moltke declares himself decidedly in favor of war sans phrase” (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 205).

“But the generals couldn’t even get the Kaiser to order Kriegszgefahrstand (danger of war) until after Russian general mobilization had been proven”

I’ll come to point in a moment, but since we are here, let’s consider Moltke’s actions on July 30th when in a direct and unconstitutional move into diplomacy, Moltke worked to sabotage Bethmann Hollweg’s peace proposal by appealing to the Austrian General Staff to launch a general mobilization Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 205). I think this supports my case that at times the German Army was a law unto itself that did as it pleased with no regard for the politicians, and that the German Army was working actively to bring about a war. . “Also, under partial mobilization the Baltic fleet was mobilized, that’s against Germany”. Given the huge disparities in size, quality of ships and crew training of the German High Seas Fleet and the Russian Baltic Fleet, I don’t think any reasonable historian would conclude that the Baltic Fleet presented much danger to Germany, and more importantly, I find any sign that any of Germany’s admirals were alarmed by this. Indeed, I can’t find any mention of this in any of the books I have consulted, through this reflected the fact that perhaps I have not looked hard enough. I note here that all of the plentiful quotes with the page #’s from various books the opposition uses are not to be seen.

“I didn’t say anything about international law”. Fair enough, but the opposition should have been clearer it was referring to the Dual Alliance of 1879 rather international law.

“Referring to partial mobilization, and to calm nerves”. No, that is not Fromkin says. Fromkin makes it clear that Bethmann Hollweg was talking about full mobilization here, not partial mobilization (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 232). Fromkin got that quote from Volker Berghahn’s Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, which I examine to see if refers to partial or full mobilization. But given that Berghahn is a member of what is called in Germany the “Fischer School” (his 1966 monograph The Tirpitz Plan is a classic of the “primacy of domestic politics” school of history if one likes that sort of thing), so if I am forced to make the long and dangerous journey to the library take Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 out, then I will most certainly back in material from Berghahn’s book to this page. But I note that this is no reference here from any book to support this assertion. Coming from someone who accuses me of “ignoring” what evidence I don’t like, I’ll notice that the opposition’s silence about the last part of Bethmann Hollweg’s remark, namely “Moreover, Russia does not intend to wage war, but only been forced to take these measures because of Austria” is quite deafening. True, that could be an effort to project “calm nerves”, but I can’t seem to find any evidence in any of the books that I have consulted that Bethmann Hollweg regarded Russian mobilization as a threat, and plenty of evidence that he regarded it as an opportunity. More about that in a moment.

“They were happy that mobilization would be ordered, if the Kaiser had continued to refuse they would have been concerned. Moltke observed about the importance of time that “if we hesitate with mobilization, our situation will worsen day by day and may lead to the most fatal results for us if our opponents are allowed to continue to prepare themselves undisturbed.”

The opposition credits this quote from page 202 of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, but I can’t find it, through to be fair, there are similar statements in the first paragraph on that page. Now again, it would be take a totally truculent attitude to deny that the German General Staff did not some concerns about Russian mobilization, but as a causal agent, these concerns were entirely secondary. First thing, before any further, my contention, which I think I had already established based on the earlier sources that I had used that Germany would had been mobilized regardless if Russia mobilized or not is further supported by Mombaurer who says exactly I have been saying all the long that Germany would had mobilized on noon of July 31st, 1914 regardless of whatever Russia mobilized or not (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 205-206). And again, it was need to storm Liége before Belgian mobilization was completed, and not fears of Russian mobilization that was the primary factor that drove Moltke to urge this course (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 204 & 207) And again, if we to take the time to read page 242 of Europe’s Last Summer as opposed to just offering your own theories, you would see that what he is referring to is the jubilant mood by the German Army that they are going to have the war that they had so desperate for. And in turn, Fromkin got that quote from The Coming of the First World War, which is edited by Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Richard J. Evans. And since both Evans and Strandmann follow Fischer’s analysis of 1914 (Strandmann was a student of Fischer’s and Evans calls Fischer the man who inspired to get involved in German history back in the 60s), so if I am forced to make the journey to the library to get The Coming of the First World War out, then again I will bring the material from that book into the page. Personally, I’ll rather suspect that if I do check the source, it is going to say what I have been saying all long, that is was a war that was designed to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war. And if you really want to be obdurate about this, and make me go back to the source, please remember that whatever I find is going to end up in the article.

And anyhow, Russian mobilization could only be a real threat if accompanied by French mobilization as the German General Staff itself often noted. The German Army always make it clear in the pre-1914 period that they felt they could defeat both Russia and France on their own, and it was only the combination of the two that posed problems for them. On July 30th, the French government ordered French troops back six miles from the German frontier as a sign of its good faith and on July 31st, the French government refused Marshal Joffre’s request for mobilization (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 233 & 236). France only mobilized on August 1st, at which time it quite clear that Germany was going to invade. At the same time, through I admit that Moltke did have some concerns about Russian mobilization, I already indicated that there were only a secondary factor. I think we should get consider all those remarks that I have quoted earlier from Moltke about how he regarded Russia as very unprepared for war in 1914 in considering his actions. But just to jog the opposition’s memory, on July 27th, Moltke submitted a memo that called 1914 a “singularly favourable situation” for Germany to go to war as both Russia and France were unprepared for war while Germany was (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 218). Furthermore, Fromkin notes that Moltke did not really fear Russian mobilization, and ardently wished for it (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 202-203). It is a matter of fact that when the Schlieffen Plan was adopted, that Russia had only the rail capacity to move 200 trains/day of troops, supplies, etc to the front, and would need the capacity to move 500-600 trains/day in order to impose a real danger to Germany (Stone, Norman The Eastern Front, London: Penguin, 1997 pages 40-41). By contrast at the same time, Germany had the rail capacity to move 650 trains/day in western Germany alone(Ibid). In 1914, Russia had the rail capacity for 360 trains/day, and by 1917 once the Great Military Programme was completed, would have the capacity for 560 trains/day (Stone, Norman The Eastern Front, London: Penguin, 1997 page 41). The Germans might not had known the precise details of all this, but the fact that Moltke repeated requests for a “preventive war” before 1917 shows that he was in general aware that the existing Russian rail network was not sufficient to properly support Russian armies in the field, and that after 1917, it would be. The Schlieffen Plan was based on the assumption that if would Russia at minimum, several weeks to mobilize, so all these claims that how Russian mobilization was an immediate and direct threat requiring German mobilization are simply wrong-since the Germans expected Russian mobilization to take several weeks, there were still lots of time to talk had the will been there. And anyhow, Moltke had the information in late July 1914 that Russian mobilization steps were on far smaller scale then the Germans expected (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 203) And as Fromkin says, Moltke at first felt so little threatened by Russian mobilization that he felt he could sacrificed a few days to let Russian mobilization gather stream (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 203) It was only later in the week that his concerns about Liége and Belgian mobilization changed his mind about the issue, and led him to demand that Germany mobilize now (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 204)

“You seem to be arguing that Germany wanted Russia to mobilize as soon as possible so that they could initiate hostilities. But this is the opposite German policy throughout the July Crisis, Russian general mobilization was only cancelled the first time because of the Kaiser for example and it was manifested in diplomacy through the foreign ministry as whole as well.”

Well, isn’t that what happened? Since the opposition wants to cite Mombarer against me, please note that she exactly what I am been saying about Russian mobilization as a pretext for war (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages188-189, 200, 204, 207-208). Since the opposition puts so great store by Admiral Muller’s “no results” comment in his diary about the War Council, I trust this indicates that the opposition considers Admiral Muller to be a reliable source. So, what about Admiral Muller’s diary entry of July 31st: “Brilliant mood. The government has succeeded very well in making us appear as the attacked” (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 207). And finally let’s consider Bethmann Hollweg’s remark in 1917, which confirms what I have been saying all the long that the Germans started a so-called “preventive war” before the Russian Great Military Programme could be completed in 1917. Bethmann Hollweg said after the military had dismissed him as a Chancellor:

“Yes, by God, in a way it was a preventive war. But if war was in any case hovering above us; it would have come in two years’ time, but even more dangerously, and even more unavoidably, and if the military leaders that then it was still possible without being defeated, in two years time no longer! Yes, the military!”

(Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 189). Please note, if isn’t all ready oblivious that Bethmann Hollweg is not saying anytime about Russian mobilization forcing a war upon him, but is saying what I have been saying here all long. I’m curious about what sophistic argument that the opposition is going to be deployed here to explain why Bethmann Hollweg’s remark here should be dismissed and ought not to consider. I think the opposition is just going to say that Bethmann Hollweg had a case of sour grapes against the military for dismissing him, so he made that up. But if Russia really did force a war on Germany in 1914 by mobilizing, then by rights Bethmann Hollweg should not have saying something like that.

I have already warned the opposition about this tendency to take Wilhelm’s claims of “personal government” too seriously, but now let’s rehash the point again. Wilhelm had very broad powers under the German constitution, and yes, at times he did exercised them effectively. But Wilhelm was simply not capable whatever because he had ADD or just incompetent of applying himself consistently to anything. So, most of the time, he did not governed Germany despite all sorts of bombastic claims on his part to the contrary. Most of the time, he reigned, but did not rule. So, the system that emerged was highly fractious government that often managed to operate against itself. The Reich under Wilhelm was an example of German inefficiency rather then efficiency. Once we accept the idea that the German government was a collection of fractions not always working in tandem, than we can solve the puzzle of the apparently contradictory actions by various German leaders in July 1914.

First off, I will concede the point (which I never denied in the first place) that during the last days during the last days of July, Wilhelm was for most of the time working for peace. As the opposition points out, Wilhelm did appeal for Russian demobilization during the Willy-Nicky telegrams. But having said that much, to treat Wilhelm and the German government as being one and the same thing is to commit a historical travesty of the highest order. Essentially, what happened when Wilhelm started to work for peace, he was pushed aside by other fractions in the German government. As Fischer noted as early as 1961, Wilhelm’s sudden change of mind about war and peace enraged Bethmann Hollweg, the military and the diplomatic service who acting on concord proceeded to sabotage Wilhelm’s offer (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 72). Writing of Wilhelm’s letter to Jagrow telling him to work for peace, one of Wilhelm’s biographers, “Perhaps the most striking thing about this letter to Jagow of 28 July is that it was not acted upon…His instructions to Jagow had no influence on Berlin’s representations to Vienna. Bethmann Hollweg did cable Vienna, repeating some of Wilhelm’s views, but omitting the most important one: that Austria should stop, not go to war…” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 219) In his message, Bethmann Hollweg sabotaged Wilhelm’s proposal by informing Prince Tschirschky: “You must most carefully avoid giving any impression that we want to hold Austria back", which is directly counter to what he had been ordered to say (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 72) Earlier, the German Foreign Office suggested that Wilhelm stay on his North Sea cruise because “…everything must be done to ensure that he [Wilhelm] does not interfere in things with his pacifist ideas” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 197), which I supports my earlier point about the German bureaucracy having a mind of its own when it come to these things.

Through this is not relevant here, but the fact in 1916 that Wilhelm was to all intents and purposes reduced to a figurehead monarch with no power at all by the military under the grounds that he was simply too incompetent to run a modern war shows it was the military that was the greater power in the land. And again, one might consider the way that when the Allies stated in 1918 that that they would not sign a armistice with Wilhelm, the way the military forced very unwilling Emperor to abdicate for their own good of getting the country out of a losing war. Now, I’m not advocating that Wilhelm didn’t have real power before 1914, or that the military secretly ran things from behind the scenes, but rather the military functioned as a power bloc that while nominally subordinate was prepared and capable of asserting its own interests, against even the Emperor himself if necessary. In this respect, one might want to consider the remarks of President Wilson’s peace envoy, Colonel House in May 1914 that he had heard from informed sources in Berlin that the military felt that the country needed a much better Emperor then the one it had, and were considering deposing Wilhelm (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 219).

And the opposition may want to consider Falkenhayn’s remark to Wilhelm of July 27th recorded in his diary “I remind him that he is no longer in control of these matters” (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 199) And finally, let us consider the ways in which Moltke sabotaged Wilhelm’s “Turn East” order of August 1st (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 220-222)

Turning to the general rather then the particular can be stated that the German government was divided into three fractions. One was Wilhelm who seemed to have thought of only a localized war in the Balkans, through prepared at times to run the risk of a general war. Another was Bethmann Hollweg, who regarded the Balkan situation as a win-win, feeling that a localized war would realign the diplomatic balance in Germany’s favour or allow a general war that Germany would win. This is the substance of Bethmann Hollweg’s remarks to Count Rodern, the State Secretary for Alsace-Lorraine on July 16th (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 60) See also Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War on page 190 for more support for this. And finally, there was a military fraction that wanted a war no matter what. Mombarer writes of Falkenhayn of wanting war for the sake of war (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 208). As Mombarer herself notes, at differing times, both civilian and military leaders took the decisions that led to war, and not always in co-ordination with each other (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 185).

To keep this already way too long post from getting any longer then already is, what happened in 1914 was first the civilian leadership took the plunge for war, and then when they got cold feet, essentially the military took and pressed onto war (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 271 & Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 205-208). See especially page 208 of the latter book which tells us that the military saw the July crisis as chance to have a war they had been desperate for quite some time (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 208). The key to this apparent mystery is the differing attitudes about the prospect of a war with Britain. Bethmann Hollweg was all for a war with Russia and France, but not with Britain whereas as the generals were all for a war with Russia, France and if necessary Britain (“Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War” pages 208-210). On his meeting with the British Ambassador, Sir William Goshen on July 29th (a good two days before Russian mobilization), Bethmann Hollweg was quite blunt that Germany was going to war with France and Russia, all but said that Belgian neutrality was going to be violated and trying to induce Britain to agree to being neutral in the coming war by promising the British Ambassador that no French territory would be annexed after Germany defeated that nation (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 77) Just as a aside here, note the way Bethmann Hollweg just assumed in his talk with Goshen that Germany was going to defeat France, which does not support the view that Bethmann Hollweg feared France. Once Bethmann Hollweg received firm information from his ambassador in London Prince Lichnowsky that if Britain would enter the war, then and only then did Bethmann Hollweg started making his first moves to try the war (Fischer, Fritz ‘‘Germany’s Aims In the First World’’, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 79)

Turning to the opposition’s claims that “But this is the opposite German policy throughout the July Crisis, Russian general mobilization was only cancelled the first time because of the Kaiser for example and it was manifested in diplomacy through the foreign ministry as whole as well”, all has to do is look at German efforts to undermine the various British peace plans prior to July 29th. After all, if the desire for peace was “manifested in diplomacy”, then they should had been working for the success of Sir Edward Grey’s peace plans.

On July 23rd, the German Foreign Secretary Jagrow ordered Lichnowsky to sabotage Grey’s offer of mediation by instructing him to tell Grey of the supposed German ignorance of the Austrian note, and that Germany regarded Austro-Serbian relations as “…an internal affair of Austria-Hungary, in which we had no standing to intervene” (Fischer, Fritz ‘‘Germany’s Aims In the First World’’, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 65)

On July 24th when the Austrian Foreign Minister Count Berchtold met with the Russian charge d’affairs, this prompted furious complaints from Berlin who warned that Austria should not engage in any sort of talks with any of the other powers in case a compromise might be worked out (Fischer, Fritz ‘‘Germany’s Aims In the First World’’ , New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 65)

Also on the 24th Jagow sabotaged Grey’s mediation offer by waiting until after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had expired before passing on the British offer (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 65)

On July 25th Jagow passed another of Grey’s mediation offers to Vienna without comment, which in the parlance of diplomacy is an unofficial way of advising rejection (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 66)

Now, Jagow accepted a Franco-Russian offer of direct Austro-Serbian talks on July 25th , but as he said in private, this was only because it offered the best chance to sever Britain from France and Russia (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 66). Again, this back up my earlier point about a civilian leadership working for a war with France and Russia, but not Britain.

On July 26th, Bethmann Hollweg send out a message to the German Ambassadors in London, Paris and St. Petersburg stated the principle aim of German foreign policy now was to make it appear that Russia had forced Germany into a war, in order to keep Britain neutral and ensure that German public opinion would back the war effort (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 pages 72-73)

And one might want to consider how Bethmann Hollweg told the German Ambassador in Vienna, Prince Tschirschky not present Wilhelm’s “Stop In Belgrade” proposal until noon, a good hour after Austria declared war on Serbia (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 73)

On July 27th, Jagow send a message to Vienna telling the Austrians they must attack Serbia at once because otherwise the British peace plan might be accepted (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 219)

And finally, let also consider that on the 27th of July, Jagow told the Austrian Ambassador Count Szögyény that he was only going through the pretence of taking up the British offers of mediation in order to ensure British neutrality, but had no intention of stopping the Austro-Serbian war (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 70) Szögyény reported :

“in order to avoid a misunderstanding” that Jagow had promised him that: “the German government assured Austria in the most binding fashion that it in no way identifies itself with the proposal [Grey’s mediation offer] which may very shortly be brought to Your Excellency’s [Bercthold] notice by the German government: it is, on the contrary decidedly opposed to consideration of them, and is only passing them on out of deference to the British request”

" (emphasis in the original) (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 70) Jagow’ reasoning for his actions was “The German government point of view was that it was at the moment of the highest importance to prevent Britain from making common cause with Russia and France. We must therefore avoid any action which might cut the line, which has so far worked so well, between Germany and Britain” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 70) Jagow ended his telegram that “If Germany candidly tells Sir E. Grey that it refused to communicate England’s peace plan, that objective [ensuring British neutrality in the coming war] might not be achieved” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 214) Bethmann Hollweg in a message to his Ambassador in Vienna, Prince Tschirschky wrote on the 27th of July:

“As we have already rejected one British proposal for a conference, it is not possible for us to refuse this suggestion also a limine. If we rejected every attempt at mediation the whole world would hold us responsible for the conflagration and represent us as the real war-mongers. That would also make our position impossible here in Germany, where we have got to appear through the war had been forced on us. Our position is the more difficult because Serbia seems to have given way very extensively. We cannot therefore reject the role of mediator; we have to pass on the British proposal to Vienna for consideration, especially since London and Paris are continuously using their influence on St. Petersburg”

" (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 70). In passing on Grey’s message, Bethmann Hollweg deleted the last line which read :

”Also, the whole world here is convinced, and I hear from my colleagues that the key to the situation lies in Berlin, and that if Berlin seriously wants peace, it will prevent Vienna from following a foolhardy policy”

(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 71) In reply to Grey’s offer, Bethmann Hollweg sent the message to London containing the false claim that :“We have immediately initiated mediation in Vienna in the sense desired by Sir Edward Grey” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 71) Jagow sent Grey’s offer to his ambassador in Vienna, but ordered him to not show it to any Austrian official in case they might accept it (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 214) And on the 28th of July, Bethmann Hollweg rejected another British mediation offer because Germany “could not bring Austria’s dealings with Serbia before a European tribunal” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 67). And on July 30th (that is after Bethmann Hollweg learned that Britain would not be neutral if a war broke out), Bethmann Hollweg send the following message to Austria:

“If Vienna…refuses…to give way at all, it will hardly be possible to place the blame on Russia for the outbreak of the European conflagration. H.M. has, on the request of the Tsar, undertaken to intervene in Vienna because he could not refuse without awakening an irrefutable suspicion that we wanted war…If these efforts of Britain’s meet with success, while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only urgently recommend Vienna to accept Grey’s proposal, which safeguards its position in every way”

(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 81) Late that same night, upon hearing of Prince Henry of Prussia’s assurances that George V had promised him that Britain would remain neutral, Bethmann Hollweg send out a second telegram cancelling his first telegram earlier that night, and urged Austria to reject Grey’s offer (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 81) And finally let’s consider the statement of a German diplomat himself. That Luigi Albertini should have been anti-German because he was an anti-fascist is something that has been flaunted to me several times. May I now return the coin, and point out that Prince Karl Max Lichnowsky, who was a German diplomat in his 1915 memo Delusion or Design? blamed his country for the war. And least, I have to endure the familiar objection that Prince Lichnowsky was an Anglophile, may I point out that Lichnowsky was appointed German Ambassador to the Court of St. James in 1912 because he was considered to be anti-British (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 41). In a passage of Lichnowsky’s memo that was surpassed by the German censors in 1915, he wrote:

“We actually urged Count Berchtold to crush Serbia; we rejected all proposals for mediation although Russia was already mobilizing; we declared war before Austria, although we had no obligations as long as Russia did not attack Austria; we showed an excess of zeal in a matter which concerned us only indirectly-and now we cannot understand why we seen as disturbers of the peace!”

" (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 113) Since Lichnowsky was as a German ambassador in London was holding one of the more important diplomatic posts in the German Foreign Office, and if German diplomacy was working so hard to avoid a war, then did a German diplomat who is in a position to see a great deal first hand in the middle of the war write a memo blaming his own country for the war? Since Lichnowsky was a German, I think we can all assume his first loyalty was to Germany, and moreover, one could get into trouble for writing a document like that in wartime (as he did). Since both of these reasons, there is a strong case for paying particular attention to Lichnowsky’s statements in Delusion or Design? that his government together with Austria were responsible for the war.

Now, I realize this all makes for tedious reading, but it is simply not true that German diplomacy was working, or at least consistently working to try to avoid a war.

“They thought that the faster Austria moved the less likely it was that there would be a general war. That’s the same reason Vienna had a short time limit, kept their plans as secret as possible, and waited until Poincaire left Russia (hoping Russia would not act without consultation). It had already called up a lot of troops, it was not thus supportive in 1913 when Austria sent Serbia its ultimatum. Partly that was because France wasn’t offering to go to war in 1913 as in 1912, but Russia was itself exasperated with Serbia at that point. The risks that Russia would go to a war over it, the Germans were not sure this was the case, the flip side of their assumption that they had a military advantage being that they doubted Russia would challenge it. Russia actually encouraged this view somewhat during the July Crisis, especially when Sazonov told Szapary that Russia would go to war “if Austria swallows Serbia” which led to Austrian and German assurances of Serbia’s territorial integrity that they only learned later were not considered to be of any value.”

Finally, something I can agree with the opposition. So, I am not only the one here who thinks Serbia was not a Russian province in 1914, which judging from the way Werchovsky talks about it, you would think it was. But that still begs the question of your silence both here were Werchovsky kept on asserting Serbia was some way of a Russian protectorate, which is offering up a grotesquely distorted account of Russo-Serbian relations to support his conspiracy theories about Russia seeking a war to destroy Germany in 1914. Just as aside here, Pan-Slavism and talk of Orthodox amity was and is just a lot of vacuous hot air, and the Serbs and Russians have only ever been close when one or the other power has been in some sort of international trouble. Otherwise, successive Serb and Russian leaders have always put their own interests first with little regard for each other. Leaving that aside the problems with the negationist here, there still there was the precedent of 1912 to consider. Judging by the opposition’s statement about Sazonov’s remark to the Austrian Ambassador, the opposition appears to be accepting the view that the evidence that all of the evidence from the Austrian and German archives indicates, that Austria was seeking a war against Serbia. The statements that were formerly on this page that I rather suspect were Werchovsky s work about Austria having hopes that the ultimatum might be accepted are really wrong. But again, note the vehemence and ferocity of the attacks against me by an user whom I did not initiated contact with appeared to the total silence to the various information that is simply wrong on this page. This perverse double standard in favour of the conspiracy theorist and against me is most unfair, indicating the general biases of the opposition. Like the statement in French domestic politics section about the almost entire French press being on the Russian payroll to whip up war fever against Germany. I am not familiar with the book from which this misinformation comes from, but the title The Russian Imperial Conspiracy gives away its thesis quite well. The book is from 1927, and its sounds like something written by someone under the influence of Major von Wegerer and his Centre for the Study of the Causes of the War. Now, its true that the there was a Russian slush fund for bribing French newspaper editors, but that related to the desire of the Russian government to keep French investors from pulling their money out of Russia. France was by far the largest investor in Russia, and after the political turmoil caused by the Revolution of 1905, a great many French investors in Russia got jittery and nervous. The purpose of the slush fund was to calm the nerves of French investors, not cause a war. Indeed, until I came to this page, I had not heard of this interpretation of the Russian slush fund, but since it is from a book from 1927, that is not surprising. It is simply not true that Russian money went to whipping war fever in France, nor was the entire French press on the Russian payroll; only editors of newspapers with large business readerships received the bribes. Yet, I noticed that nobody except for myself has a problem with that statement. And since I’m on the subject, we really shouldn’t be using books published in the interwar period as sources. Besides for the problems posed by the persistent Major von Wegerer, the various archives were not open at the period. And so with France, we really should only be using books written after the mid-1970s, when the French archives were opened. Give me some time, and I will remedy this problem, which currently disfigures this page.

But back to the main topic, the very fact that the Austrians sought the (in)famous “blank cheque” of German support in early July proves both Vienna and Berlin were aware of the possibility that Russia might not just step aside, so through the information from the opposition is not false, it is somewhat misleading in its suggestions that it reasonable to expect no Russian reaction from an attack on Serbia. And if the idea was “localization” only (more about that below), then by all rights German diplomacy should have changed track when faced with Sazonov’s very angry reaction to the Austrian ultimatum when he told the Austrian Ambassador “I know what it is. You mean to make war on Serbia…You are settling fire to Europe…Why was Serbia given no chance to speak and why the form of an ultimatum?…The fact is you mean war and you have burnt your bridges…One sees how peace-loving you are” (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 190). But that is not what happened. Instead, the Germans applied pressure on the Austrians not to back down, blocked Grey’s mediation efforts, and did their utmost to bring about an Austro-Serbian war. Jagow told the British that the Germans could do nothing to extent the deadline of the Austrian ultimatum because his country supposedly knew nothing of the contents of the Austrian note, and the Reich regarded Austro-Serbian relations as “…an internal affair of Austria-Hungary, in which we had no standing to intervene” (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 65). Until Bethmann Hollweg learned that he going to have to take on Britain on July 29th, he did nothing to stop Austria’s war with Serbia and everything to encourage it, even through increasing clear in the last days prior to the 29th that “localization” was not working. When Bethmann Hollweg finally did start to apply pressure on Austria for a peaceful solution after his meeting with Sir William Goshen on July 29th, by all accounts the Austrians were stunned and very confused by his U-turn (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 205).

And one might consider the remarks the remarks Bethmann Hollweg apparently made to Kurt Riezler at the beginning of July 1914: “An action against Serbia can lead to a world war” and that Germany had taken a “leap in the dark” with the “blank cheque” to Austria (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 page 181). Now, I perfectly well aware that the Riezler diaries are a highly problematic source, as I was the first here who sounded the alarm about the high probability that some of the passages are post-war forgeries. Not only that, but far as I can tell I am the first here who brought the Riezler diaries into this page, period. But when there is a lack of information as there is with Bethmann Hollweg since the German government destroyed almost all of his papers in the 1920s (almost certainly a sign that there was something they didn’t the world to see in those papers-if Bethmann Hollweg was working so hard for peace as they were claiming in the 1920s, why not make the papers public to rebut the “war guilt lie”?), so the Riezler diaries are with all of their flaws are one of main sources that are around. Historians have to use the sources that they have, no matter how problematic, and if we were to exclude Riezler diaries entirely because of forged passages, then medievalists would be out of business because a great deal of medieval manuscripts have various forgeries inserted into them. Now, of course, all sources should used with care, and in the case of the Riezler diaries, special care is called for. Now, it seems to me that if someone was forging passages in the Riezler diaries in Germany’s favour, then the frequently bellicose remarks that Riezler has Bethmann Hollweg making about Russia in early July ought not to be there. At very least, the majority opinion with historians is that some of the passages in the Riezler diaries, especially the ones from late July don’t seem to match up with what is known about Bethmann Hollweg’s movements (i.e. Riezler has Bethmann Hollweg talking to him at times when we he was at a meeting), and were probably written after the war. But having said that much, some of the passages from early July were if perhaps re-written after the war, nonetheless incorporated some genuine materials from the time. So is especially the case because the views that Riezler gives to Bethmann Hollweg about Russia match up with what Bethmann Hollweg was saying to other people at the same time. And moreover, Riezler has Bethmann Hollweg saying he got all this about the need for a preventive war against Russia from Moltke, which again ties in with the known facts. Now admittedly not at such length and vehemence, but then Bethmann Hollweg was a reticent man and Riezler was one of the few people that Bethmann Hollweg trusted. So perhaps Bethmann Hollweg was expressing more himself more openly to Riezler, with whom he had almost a father-son relationship. It seems to have that if somebody was forging the diaries to present Germany in the best light, then those passages are should not be there. Certainly, passages like an Austro-Serbian war would probably cause a world war, “…which would lead to an overthrow of the existing order”, but since the “existing order was lifeless and void of ideas”, such a war could only be welcomed as a blessing to Germany (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 24) does not sound like something that a pro-German forger would write. Now, of course, not all of the passages are so bellicose since Riezler also has Bethmann Hollweg saying “If the war comes from the East, so that we are marching to Austria-Hungary’s aid instead of Austria-Hungary to ours, then we have a chance of winning it. If war does not come, if the Czar does not want it or France dismayed, counsels peace, then we still [sic!] have a chance of manoeuvring the Entente apart over this action” (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 26), a statement and others like them that Andreas Hillgruber used to support his “calculated risk” theory. Personally, that I think that Bethmann Hollweg at least until the late of July had a double policy of either trying to break apart the Entente or failing that, fighting a world war. Bethmann Hollweg’s statement to Count Rodern which I have already referred to, and which there is no doubt about its authenticity would strongly support such an interpretation. But regardless, if historians sympathetic towards Germany and who argue the “calculated risk” theory concede that Bethmann Hollweg in seeking a Austro-Serbian war was presenting an “enormous challenge” to Russia (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 26).

And we make also want to consider Count Szogyeny’s report of July 12th after talking to various German officials this:

“’absolute’ insistence on war against Serbia was based on the two considerations already mentioned; firstly that Russia and France were ‘not yet ready’ and secondly that Britain will not at this juncture intervene in a war which breaks out over a Balkan state, even if this should lead to a conflict with Russia, possibly also France… Not only have Anglo-German relations so improved that Germany feels that she need no longer feel far a directly hostile attitude by Britain, but above all, Britain at this moment is anything but anxious for war, and has no wish whatever to pull chestnuts out of the fire for Serbia, or in the last instance, Russia…In general, then, it appears from all this that the political constellation is as favourable for us as it could possibly be”

(Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 58). Again, I think that any reasonable observer would agree that what Count Szogyeny reported ties in well with I have already suggested about Bethmann Hollweg’s feeling that this was a win-win situation with either the Entente breaking up over the crisis in the Balkans or Germany fighting a victorious war, through I’ll rather suspect it was the latter outcome that Bethmann Hollweg much preferred. John Rohl, who has been through all of the German archives and indeed has discovered quite a few new documents buried in various German castles says that most of the evidence through indicating that Bethmann Hollweg had some hopes for a diplomatic realignment, greatly preferred a war, presumably if Russia were destroyed that would end any future danger permanently (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 24). But regardless of what Bethmann Hollweg’s true policy was, it clear to any reasonable observer that that a great deal of risk involved in encouraging Austria to attack Serbia. Please note Szogyeny spoke of the possibility of a conflict with Russia, and the emphasis given here on British neutrality almost certainly reflects talking to Bethmann Hollweg. The opposition has not made any references to Hillgruber, and I rather suspect the opposition’s politics are miles away from Hillgruber’s (which is a good thing because Hillgruber at times had some very sinister things to say), but the thesis that the opposition seems to be asserting here is a variant of the “calculated risk” theory minus the noun.

Given the very intense Austro-Russian rivalry for spheres of influence in the Balkans, the idea that Serbia at a minimum could be removed from the Russian sphere back to the Austrian sphere of influence without generating any sort of Russian reaction, through sincerely held by the Austrians and apparently by Wilhelm reflects more wishful thinking then any rational assessment. Prince Lichnowsky wrote “On this question the Russian statesmen have never allowed any doubt to arise; they considered an attack on Serbia as a casus belli, “une question de vie et de mort” as Mr. Sazonov called it…” (Rohl, John 1914: Delusion or Design, Elek: London, 1973 page 83). And the way that leaders like Sir Edward Grey started working to try to get the Austrians to soften their ultimatum once it was delivered shows that he was aware of the possible wider results of an Austro-Serbian war. And Fischer indicates quite clearly that Germany’s leaders were aware of the risks they were running when they take the plunge (Fischer, Fritz Germany’s Aims In the First World War, New York: W.W. Norton, 1967 page 63) Finally, the rather apocalyptic terms in which Bethmann Hollweg painted the results of the Russian Great Military Programme for Germany (see Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 188-189 for examples of this) makes one wonder did Bethmann Hollweg really believed that all this could be prevented just by putting the Obrenović back on the Serbian throne or having Serbia partitioned. And for what it is worth, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War says quite clearly on the bottom of page 188 that Bethmann Hollweg was working for a “preventive war” to destroy Russia in 1914 (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 188). So maybe, the advocates of the “calculated risk” theory have something in that the diplomatic realignment that they credit Bethmann Hollweg with was considered a possible outcome, but the evidence also shows that a war with Russia and France was considered as just as likely, and even more desirable outcome.

“The minutes of the meeting I’ve read say they don’t include that part of the discussion, I’ll be sure to look them up though. But if that was the general conclusion of the Austrian government I assume you’d have said so and that Austria would have mobilized accordingly.” Irrelevance being used to score rhetorical points here. Of course, I would had said that, and as have already noted, the Austrians activated War B, not War Plan R. But if your interested, Fromkin’s source for that is Volker Berghahn’s Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 on page 204.

“Technically Bethmann only agreed that a decision would be made over it by then. The generals and the Kaiser were actually waiting for news of confirmation of Russia’s mobilization, and Falkenhayn's diary also notes that as the deadline approached Moltke appeared ‘unfortunately very nervous’ and that of Moltke’s adjutant has similar comments, he was not sure exactly what the decision would be. [“Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War”, 206-207.]”

Once again, the opposition’s tendentious tendencies, has come to the fore. What Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War says that on 12: 00 PM on July 31, 1914, a “state of imminent danger of war” was to be declared regardless if Russia had mobilized or not (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 206). The next paragraph has Moltke telling his adjutant Hans von Haeften on the night of 30th-31st to start drafting Wilhelm’s declaration justifying mobilization to be issued the next day, so I think we can assume that Moltke had good reasons to expect that mobilization would go through the next day (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 206). The references to Moltke’s nervous conditions are about his concern about whatever the Germans could still take Liége, and about the possible consequences of the war that Moltke was helping to unleash (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 206-207). It is almost certain that Moltke was really afraid that Belgian mobilization had gone too far, and that the German Army would be unable to take the Liége fortresses, thereby dooming Germany to defeat. So in other words, at this moment in time, Moltke was not so sure of victory as he been a few weeks earlier, which would make any general on the verge of war nervous. Haeften thought Moltke was nervous because of having to urge mobilization against the politicians, and Falkenhayn thought Moltke’s nerves were on edge because they had received a report about possible Russian mobilization, and were waiting to see if was correct (and it was) (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 206-207) And finally, the book states quite clearly on the night of 30th-31st that Moltke had no news about whatever Russia was mobilizing or not at the time he ordered Haeften to start drafting the necessary documents (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War page 206). Finally on the bottom of page 207 and in the next paragraph of the top of page 208 the book tells us that it had been Bethmann Hollweg’s intention “all along” for Russia to mobilize first, and to thus Germany with a pretext to do something that already been decided upon (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 207-208). And all of this from someone who accuses me of having the alleged “problem” of ignoring evidence I don’t like!

“He’d still have had 5 years to alter the tone of his book, I don’t think and never said he was motivated by bias though, and he’s also not especially “pro-German””.

Albertini finished his research in 1940, so that’s four years. I’m not interested in Albertini’s biases, indeed I am not interested in Albertini period (there is really not need or excuse to treat a book published in 1942-43 as the final word on the subject), my point was that the opposition was being highly misleading as usual in implying that Italo-German relations were always good in the interwar period, so Albertini should have been “anti-German”. "Before you wrote that you might have checked his Wikipedia article, Albertini was an ANTI-FASCIST who only had time to work on it during the Mussolini regime because it had forced him to resign and sell his paper. It was also first published AFTER the war (mid-50s) and thus was not affected by Fascist censorship but rather published amidst an anti-fascist atmosphere, I would never have bothered even reading his book if I had not checked this first. Your ability to make snap judgments is impressive. By your reasoning (which always assumes everyone is acting on bias no matter what) he should have been ANTI-German, and should increase his credibility"

Anybody can see what is being implied here, and the claim of that Italian foreign policy in the Fascist period always pro-German implied here is really quite false.

Before going any further, I must say that this must all be old news to the opposition who has already read Mombaurer’s book, but really, this all quite disgusting the way I am being attacked by someone who knows I was saying was the truth all long, or failing that, has read Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War in an incredibly selective manner. Since Fromkin has also read the same book, and come to exactly the same conclusions that I have, at the risk of sounding presumptuous, might I take this as a sign that I have understood the book correctly. You know, I have a theory that true class speaks for itself and that whatever people lack the most is what they talk about the most. So it is always the most stupid who tell you how smart they are, the most laziest who tell you how hard they work, and the most dishonest who tell you how honest they are. I’ll let the reader draw their own conclusions about the significance of these incessant and vicious attacks on me for my supposed defective methods of research and analysis. At very least, I will credit the opposition with good taste in books. Since the opposition itself has noted itself that “Annika Mombauer's book on Moltke the Younger, and Sam Williamson's book on Austria-Hungary and the origins of the war are particularly good” Do you still stand by these judgements? Mombauer simply confirms what I have been saying all long, through apparently nobody is listerning, but then what else is new? Mombauer’s biography presents the conclusions that German military had long wanted a war before 1914, and saw in the July Crisis a chance to have the war they had been looking for (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 286-287). In part of my humble contributions to this page (which unfortunately been deleted-how perverse that factual information gets deleted in a matter of weeks whereas nonsense is allowed on this page for years), I wrote statements to the effect that Germany’s leaders believed 1914 was the best time to have a war, that the prime driving force was concerns about Russian Great Military Programme, which were further enhanced by their Social Darwinist beliefs in a inevitable “race war” between Germany and Russia. And on pages 285 to 287, Mombauer says precisely the same things I have been saying Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 285-287). Through I indicated that I dislikes this word been used in a historical sense, Mombauer writes of Moltke’s “guilt” for the war (Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War pages 212-213). Given the opposition’s pro-Germanism, no wonder it has made little use of Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War on this page. I have no such inhibitions, and after all this vile abuse and aggression I have to endure in an exceedingly unpleasant and entirely unwanted battle, I am looking forward to wielding this sword without mercy.

Earlier the opposition tried to bully me by telling me “That I just don’t see it” about German responsibility for the war. Besides for the fact that an assertion from a complete stranger with no supporting evidence telling me that I am all wrong strikes me as bullying (besides for being a very poor way of coming to judgements!), I felt like replying that I do see it, and further of inquiring if the opposition was just blind or closing its eyes, but instead I tried to engage in a rational debate, which is what I am continuing to endeavour to do. The very fact that I have taken the time to type up this post, which comprises a good 23 pages on my Word document with very detailed evidence can be taken as a sign of my commitment to rational debate as opposed to mere assertions. Well, at least it can be shown what the correct answer is to my question. This methodology, so strikingly reminiscent of the terrible events of former times is utterly appalling, and has made a very unpleasant discussion for me a thousand times worse

Thank you, for the thoughtful remarks, Keith. I am regretting getting involved in this hateful debate, but I let myself get dragged in. Yes, I would agree that your point that in those days, the use of force to achieve one’s ends in many ways was considered acceptable. Fromkin in his book makes the same point, that by the standard of the times and certainly by own moral standards that the leaders of Germany and Austria felt they were acting properly. Again, I would agree with you that Germany’s leaders would had felt that they would more to gain then to lose by war. From a moral standpoint (which is of course subjective), I might argue that given what they caused, the existence of a war party in Germany is a bad thing, but from an objective point of view, I will register no disagreement. From a purely objective position, a war party existed, which bears a huge degree of the responsibility for the war, and that is there is to it. I would like to have this article rewritten in a cool, neutral style which simply records the facts. All very good points. --A.S. Brown (talk) 05:11, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

'Germany has lost 35% of it's pre-1914 territory.' True but Britain lost about 22% of its after the civil war of 1919-1922. Germany got out of WWI pretty lightly all things considered.Keith-264 (talk) 07:48, 23 June 2009 (UTC) 'through apparently nobody is listerning' I am and very good stuff it is. Having read some of the opposing comments I do have the feeling that the ghost of Barmy Irving's credibility has been stalking this page. I'm still a bit nonplussed that German war guilt is being questioned given that it seems so anachronistic. .I suspect that much of your analysis and references will end up plagiarised in several thousand undergrad essays. You should sell tickets :o)Keith-264 (talk) 09:45, 23 June 2009 (UTC)

Thank you, Keith for the sensible and thoughtful commentray. And one might add that there several plebiscites to determine whatever an area wanted to stay with Germany or not. Now admittedly to be fair, some areas that Germany lost like Danzig would voted to stay with Germany if they had the chance, and Germany would probably gained territory under the principle of self-determination in the form of Austria and Sudetenland, so the German complaint about a selective application of the principle of self-determination does have some weight. But then, the Germans themselves applied the principle of self-determination selectively, claiming that Austria under the grounds that the people there spoke German and wanted to join Germany, but at the same time, claiming under the grounds of geographic and/or economic necessities ethnically Polish districts in the Polish Corridor and Silesia that wanted to join Poland. So, the German case seems to be that if area was ethnically German, then area should stay or become part of Germany, and if the area was Polish, then the interests of German geographic unity and economic needs overrode the Polish right to self-determination. The Allies at the same time, for the most part, applied this principle in reversal (as I have already noted, there were a number of plebiscites to determine whatever an area wanted to stay with the Reich or not, so it is not true that Allies always displayed no consideration to the interests of the local people when territory was detached from Germany). One could say that both sides were hypocrites about when to apply or not apply self-determination, through the Germans more so because at least some of the time, the Allies took the pains of asking the local people what country they wanted to belong to. Likewise, when it comes to reparations, the German claim of an impossibly large sums to pay simply dissolves. Supposedly, Germany was to pay 132 billion gold marks (that’s in 1921 money and not inflation-adjusted), which was divided into three classes of bonds labelled A, B, and C. The bulk of the 132 billion was assigned to the C bonds, which the Allies never intended to collect, and only there to maintain the fiction to French public opinion that vast sums of reparations were going to be collected (Marks, Sally “The Myths of Reparations” from Central European History, Volume 11, #3 Sept 1978 page 237). Sally Marks calls the C Bonds a “chimerical” device designed to disguise the fact that Allies were not expecting the Germans to pay that much (Marks, Sally “The Myths of Reparations” page 237). The A and B bonds, which were the ones the Allies actually expected the Germans to pay totalled 50 billion gold marks, which was an amount smaller then the German had recently estimated they could pay (Marks, Sally “The Myths of Reparations” page 237). The only problem was not that the Germans couldn’t pay because even going by their own estimates they were perfectly capable of paying 50 billion, it’s just that they didn’t want to pay, so they made inordinate difficulties about the issue as a way of undermining Versailles, and creating a precedent for doing away with other sections of Versailles. Thanks for bringing up, I had forgotten claim made here that France had “dismembered” Germany in 1919 with an allegedly harsh and vindictive Versailles treaty, which if anything served instead to prevent war by keeping Germany disarmed.

Thank so much, at least somebody is listening! For a long time, I felt I was arguing with a brick wall here. I should have stayed away from this debate because it had brought back memories of things best forgotten. I must say that of the tactics do strike me at times as reminiscent of Mr. Irving’s methods. Personally, I was somewhat surprised and offended when I saw just how the pro-German this page had become back in February. Partly, I think it perhaps some of the contributors here have a vested and very strong pro-German tendencies, and in part, I think it can be explained by the cultural memory of the Great War. Everybody thinks of the Great War as slaughter without purpose. At least, I think it is interesting whenever an anti-war movie is made, it usually set in WWI, and whenever a pro-war movie is made, it is usually set in WWII. I think that for public opinion, WWI is the great anti-war war, the proverbial "bad war", and WWII is the proverbial “good war” that was worth it. So because of the cultural memory of WWI, I think that the idea that the war was nobody’s fault, or alternatively was everybody’s fault finds much resonance with public opinion. Personally, I think it would have better if WWI had been avoided, but that is not what happened. But at the same time, the idea that the war was everybody’s fault, an idea first promoted by the German Foreign Ministry in the 1920s as a part of its campaign to undermine Versailles is simply not acceptable. William Keylor has noted that the idea of that Germany and Austria caused the war has simply never caught with the general public, in large part because it serves to contradict the popular idea that the war was about nothing. Please see the link here [2] about how popular memory of WWI differs from what historians have been writing since the 1960s on the topic. In this respect, I would like to quote the following by John Grigg on November 8, 1998 in the Independent :

"Ask anybody for an opinion on the relative merits of the two world wars and the answer is likely to be overwhelmingly adverse to the first. Most people still appear to believe that in 1914 Britain got involved in an unnecessary war - the product of "power politics" without any moral content - whereas in 1939 the country embarked upon a crusade for freedom and democracy. This conventional wisdom is at last coming under challenge, but it remains absurdly dominant. Historians who should know better continue to subscribe to it. As we prepare to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of the First World War, the idea that it was a futile bloodbath is still being aired.
The truth is that on both occasions Britain went to war in defence of its vital interests. Self-preservation was the primary motive for our involvement in both wars; both were equally struggles for national survival. There was also a strong element of idealism in both wars: stronger, actually, in the first than in the second. Since Britain and France (the principal Western allies in the first war) were countries with genuinely free institutions, their fight for survival in the first war can be regarded as a fight for the general cause of freedom. And the same is true of the Commonwealth and the US in the second war.
Part of the reigning mythology is that the second war, unlike the first, was a "people's war". The suggestion is that in 1914 the British people were committed to war by their rulers and then roused by propaganda to a state of mindless patriotism, whereas in 1939 they acted spontaneously and wholeheartedly to oppose the spread of Nazism. In reality, the decision to enter both wars was taken by the British government and parliament of the day, without any formal reference to the British people. In 1914, however, there was profound popular feeling in support of Belgium, whose territory had been invaded and which was putting up brave resistance. Most members of the Liberal government at the time knew that Britain ought to intervene to prevent the defeat of France, which was Germany's immediate objective, since it was evident that this would be followed by a German hegemony over the European continent - indeed, if Russia were also defeated, over the whole Eurasian land- mass. But there was some division within the government, which the strength of popular indignation about Belgium helped to resolve. In a sense the people did play a part in the decision to go to war in 1914, and neither their patriotism nor their idealism was mindless. In September 1939 Britain was faced with a German invasion of Poland, a more distant country to which the British government had given a guarantee earlier in the year. As a result, an ultimatum was sent and war with Germany followed, with public acceptance though with markedly less public commitment than in 1914. There was sympathy for the Poles, certainly, though far less intense than the sympathy felt for the Belgians a generation earlier. And, of course, it is a discreditable fact that, whereas the restoration of Belgian independence remained a British war aim and was duly achieved in 1918, in 1945 Polish independence was sacrificed to inter-allied expediency. When the Second World War ended, Poland had to exchange one form of alien tyranny for another. Only the eventual collapse of Soviet power liberated the Poles. In the first war the army was based on voluntary recruitment until 1916. Next time there was conscription from the word go. It is true, of course, that Hitler was a more terrible human being than Kaiser Wilhelm II, and the Nazi regime a worse threat to civilisation than Imperial Germany. But it must be remembered that German unity under the Hohenzollerns had been achieved by Bismarck by "blood and iron", in three wars cynically provoked; and that his successors inherited his brutal approach to politics while abandoning his realistically limited aims. The Germany of 1914 may have been less unpleasant than that of 1939, but it was unpleasant enough, not least in its anti-Semitism. (Those who cherish the illusion that Imperial Germany was different in kind, rather than in degree, from Hitler's Germany, should read the work of two German historians, Fritz Fischer and John Rohl.) Britain in particular was even more threatened by the Kaiser's Germany than by Hitler's, because the former had built a huge fleet deliberately to challenge the sea power upon which our freedom depended. Hitler's fleet was never remotely a match for the Royal Navy in surface strength, even before the crippling losses it suffered in the Norwegian campaign (the only benefit to us from that otherwise deplorable episode). In the supreme crisis of 1940, Britain was acutely threatened from the air, but - even if the Battle of Britain had not been won by the RAF - perhaps not mortally, granted the country's continuing superiority at sea. Much is made of the horrifying human cost of the first war, and indeed it was horrifying. But the total human cost of the second war was on a vastly larger scale - an estimated 60 million dead compared with about 10 million. British losses on land were admittedly much lower (between a third and a half of the earlier figure), but mainly for the reason that in the second war the British Army was far less heavily engaged. In 1914-18 Britain and France together carried the heaviest burden, and together won the decisive military victory. In the second war the decisive contribution on land was made by the Red Army, before the British (anyway outnumbered by the Americans) re- established a major front in western Europe. Incidentally, AJP Taylor makes the telling point that at Alamein "the proportion of casualties among men actually engaged was as heavy as on the Somme". But, of course, far fewer men were engaged: the desert war was a side-show compared with the Western front in 1916. The human cost of the second war was not only far larger; it also involved civilians at least as much as combatants. Nightmarish as the first war was, it was essentially a conflict between fighting men. In the second, civilians were treated as legitimate targets. For two years, for instance, the British war machine was principally directed not against the armed forces of the enemy, but against unarmed civilians. In February 1942 a directive was sent to RAF Bomber Command to the effect that bombing should in future be focused "on the morale of the enemy civil population". Which was the nobler, more idealistic war, so far as Britain was concerned? The historian Niall Ferguson argues that Britain could safely have stood aside in 1914. The British Empire (he thinks) could have survived, while continental Europe would merely have experienced earlier the sort of unification to which it is now being subjected. This seems to me a doubly perverse and fallacious argument. In one crucial sense the British Empire was not weakened, but rather strengthened, by the First World War. The self-governing dominions played a vital part in it, and came to maturity as a result of it. Yet their effective independence did not lead to disintegration of the British system. The Commonwealth of Nations (apart from Eire) demonstrated its solidarity in 1939. If India had been given dominion status after the first war, as it should have been, I believe that a free India would also freely have entered the war against Nazi Germany. As for continental Europe, it is grotesque to compare the European Union that has evolved since the last war with the union that would have resulted from a German victory in 1914. The EU that we know is a free association, based upon democracy. The Kaiser's European union would have been imposed by a militaristic power and organised to suit its interests. The Second World War could have been avoided if the victorious allies had stuck together and resisted the revival of German power. Grave mistakes were made after the victory, but the victory itself should be remembered with gratitude. Britain's perception of the threat that Germany posed, and resolute stand against it, should not be dismissed now as an aberration. The performance of our country in the First World War was magnificent, and deserves eternal honour".

Thank you again for your kind words. After this work, it is so heartening that at least somebody is listerning.--A.S. Brown (talk) 22:02, 23 June 2009 (UTC) Consider as well that Germany paid a far higher price in reparations after the Second World War! The plebiscites after WWI weren't perfect as some places were disposed of on other criteria than self-determination but the Entente did respect the ones that were held particularly those in Silesia. Would a victorious Germany, the germany of Brest-Litovsk have done this? I doubt it.Keith-264 (talk) 07:20, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

There was much with Versailles that was flawed and can be legitimately criticized, but at least the Allies in a muddled sort of way, did genuinely and sincerely attempt to build a better world. Based on Brest-Litovsk, if the positions had at Versailles had been reversed with the Germans as the victors, the world would had moved in a much darker direction.--A.S. Brown (talk) 20:24, 24 June 2009 (UTC)

Belated reply,

why not make use of them to improve this page? I’ve tried, but only in modest ways. You see some people try to carefully research and edit and others rewrite entire pages based on narrow resource bases, sometimes even dividing their edits into small pieces to make them very difficult to reverse or labeling them inaccurately as “minor” to escape notice. You should remember that how loudly one trumpets their views is not a measure of their veracity even if I am unwilling or unable to compete with you in that department.

claim that the meeting amounted to nothing -That’s actually how many writers translate the phrase, that the results were almost zero. He said the results “amounted to almost zero” not that there were major consequences just not quite the ones he wanted. I don’t know how you can consider so momentous a decision as you suggest (determination to bring about the war) compatible with this.

And moreover, if the War Council had been had in Britain, France or Russia, no doubt the opposition would be proudly trumping it as proof that Germany didn’t a war, and it was (insert name of the Allied country) that did. And to be fair, if there was a British, French or Russian War Council in 1912 that said we will go to war in 1914, I would not dismiss it as a something totally unimportant -Interesting idea. If hypothetically, I could present you with proof of such a country’s military leadership decided and advocated that it was a uniquely favorable moment for war and it should not be long delayed, and ideally occur in 1914 how precisely would you change your view (I’d prefer a statement in advance).

I would suggest that the opposition’s point that Moltke said in 1912 that Germany would have less of a lead in defence compared with 1914 is largely redundant. -I only mentioned it as it should affect how you view the war council, since I don’t think highly of the former’s significance so for the purpose of the outbreak of war I of course I think its largely irrelevant except as further evidence of Moltke’s preference for preventive war.

I am not aware of any War Council in 1909 saying that a war will begin in 1914, and I will make no such claims -Neither does the “war council” of 1912, it at most says war should be avoided until the navy is ready circa 1914, which is what Tirpitz said in 1909 (there are also quotes from the army at the time along the lines of missing an opportunity that will not soon recur dating from this time)

it was stated that the German government started as one of the decisions at the War Council a press campaign to get German people to accept a preventive war against Russia…..was launched to justify a coming war with Russia in late 1912, proves that German leaders had intentions for a war with Russia sooner rather then later from late 1912. -I’m fairly sure you inserted the word “preventive”. At any rate, though a press campaign was decided to be desirable, afterwards “there was no national propaganda campaign.” [Clark, Christopher, Wilhelm II, Profiles in Power Series Keith Robbins ed. (2000) page 196]

the fact that a war began at the same time and in the same way as described in the War Council of 1912 always me with a nagging feeling that there this is not a just a coincidence -The “same way” is not very impressive considering that the 1909 crisis, the current crisis, (in 1912), and the 1913 and July 1914 crises all threatened the outbreak of war in the same way (Austria vs Serbia, Russian intervention followed by German and French w/ possible English). They were talking about a present situation not a future one. Also, the Kiel Canal wasn’t tested until July twenty something (I think 24th) and then ahead of schedule for heavy ships, which makes it perplexing why the German government was pushing Vienna to act much earlier in the month if they were waiting for it. Also of course, the army never thought this was important at all, and (I may be wrong about this) but Tirpitz isn’t usually portrayed as one of the more outspoken proponents of war in 1914 is he?

"as opposed to the opposition’s attempts to have mention of the War Council banished from this page all because of one sentence in a German admiral’s diary." -If the sentence is his summing up of his entire account as he sees it that sentence is one of the most important parts.

both Wilhelm and Moltke told the visiting King Albert of Belgium in November 1913 that Germany expected to have a war with France in the very near future….seems to qualify as a “result” of the War Council of 1912 -One of Wilhelms many clumsy attempts to form alliances, in this case there was really nothing other than a Franco-German war which would make such an alliance relevant, and it could only be portrayed as pressing that they sign the alliance when this might happen in the near future. The Kaiser said that “the provocations of France must ‘inevitably’ lead to war”, not that Germany intended to force one. [Jean Stengers, Decisions for War: Belgium] Moltke expressed only his usual view. Inevitable and near was an increasingly popular view in much of Europe, especially immediately following a major international crisis. I think waiting almost an entire year and living through several further Balkan crises makes it unlikely that it the war council prompted it, was the idea even mentioned there?

But I would argue that Moltke and the rest of the German military leadership certainly had intentions from late 1912 to have a war in 1914. -As has probably been mentioned before, the army both wanted war long before 1912 and never wanted to wait until 1914 (“the sooner the better” is itself proof that they not only did not prefer to wait until 1914 but believed it to be unwise to do so)

What Mombaurer actually says on page 181 is the German generals did not trust the civilian leadership to go through with a war in 1914 -I never credited the army with pacific intentions. What Mombauer argues and this shows is that the army hoped for war but did not expect it, see [Page 181] “until the last days of the crisis military decision-makers did not believe the crisis wouldn’t be resolved peacefully by the civilians.” Those favoring preventive war did not control policy and could not bring it about and seem to have been largely resigned to this state of affairs.

the German military feared that they would be unable to defeat Russia once the Great Military Programme was completed in 1917, -Which is why they were lobbying competing plans to avoid this, plans which would not begin for until 1915-1916 and whose existence represented an acceptance that, rhetoric aside, war might not be at all “imminent and unavoidable”

Yes, in this particular case. But the opposition is ignoring the point I was making here that Moltke’s insistence upon starting a war predated anything Russia had done. -But he could not convince Bethmann or the Kaiser to do much until it had done something to justify it, not even to keep pace with Russian and French preparations.

Bethmann-Hollweg had been convinced by Moltke that the summer of 1914 was the best time to start a “preventive war” -Some sources certainly suggest he was somewhat influenced by it, but during the July Crisis he did not support that position and whether this was cold feet or his view all along doesn’t make much difference.

I think the wholesale deprecation of Moltke’s influence on the German decision-making process as implied by the “And obviously he was ignored, as usual” is entirely unwarranted by the evidence. -I was referring to his regular statement of “ better sooner than later” his requests for the ordering of Kriegsgefahrzustand, and was accurate.

what is the most consequence of the Neumann-Hoyos meeting that the Austrians believed Neumann was speaking for Germany -It seems of no consequence actually insofar as the Austrians still felt the need for German support from an official source, hence the Hoyos mission to obtain it which superseded any assurances via journalist.

Again, my point here was Moltke’s determination to mobilize was not influenced by anything the Russians did or did not, but rather reflected a priori decision taken beforehand. -But the decision to mobilize was in the hands of people who did not share this view

were turned down was because Bethmann Hollweg two political preconditions for a war were 1) British neutrality and 2) ensure that SPD support the war effort, so it was best to make it appear that Russian mobilization had forced a war on Germany -But by the time Russia ordered general mobilization wasn’t condition one considered unobtainable? My understanding was that Fischer contended that Bethmann’s belief in British neutrality was broken by the 29th

but the impression I got was Moltke wanted to keep the need to storm Liége secret from the politicians because to admit it would be admitting that Germany’s fate hung on to great deal of chance (i.e. the need to have the element of surprise to take Liége), -I think you took your information rather out of context. She says that Moltke could have been panicked by the declaration of war, news that Russian preparations were further advanced than he thought or about Belgian preparations”. (page 203), the initial reports from German intelligence on the 28th mentioned the mobilization of Russian forces in the four districts AND reports of it in Warsaw that had not yet been confirmed [Trumpener, Ulrich “War Premeditated? German Intelligence Operation in July 1914” Central European History, Vol. IX, 1 (March 1976) 58-85] I think for his memo of the 28th Belgian preparations may have motivated him somewhat, however it would be misreprentating the book or reality to pretend it to have been the sole concern

If anything, it was Belgian mobilization that forced a decision, but not a war on Germany. -If Belgian mobilization “forced a decision” than there would have been no option, as you claim, to wait for Russia’s

And the passage criticizing Moltke for his “changes of mood that hardly explicable” refers to Moltke’s decision to abandon Bethmann Hollweg’s political preconditions of waiting for Russia to mobilize first -I assume your citation must be of the quote, not your claim, which makes no sense. The comment was made at a meeting on the evening of the 30th, two days after Moltke’s memo which was in contradiction to those preconditions, also Falkenhayn also favored mobilizing, or at least Kriegsgefahrzustand, before Russia mobilized. The reason Falkenhayn couldn’t understand Moltke is that the latter was rapidly receiving information from military intelligence, with which Falkenhayn and Bethmann were less in touch or not at all.

Moltke worked to sabotage Bethmann Hollweg’s peace proposal by appealing to the Austrian General Staff to launch a general mobilization -He was not advising it as the best way to sabotage a peace proposal, but rather was reacting to learning (inexcusably for the first time) that Conrad planned in the event of war to remain on the defensive against Russia (p. 214) which was not useful for the Shlieffen plan and in fact jepordized it. Austrian general mobilization would not have meant war of course, and was not in contradiction with his other advice that Austria not under any circumstance declare war on Russia.

Fromkin makes it clear that Bethmann Hollweg was talking about full mobilization here, not partial mobilization (Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 232). -I’ve read that minutes of that meeting, in the part where Bethmann catalogues Russia’s military preparations to date (as he knew them) he listed A. Russias period preparatory to war B. Russian partial mobilization against Austria, and C. Russia’s recent assurance that there had been no mobilization measures against Germany (and portraying the first two from substantiating this statement). There is not the slightest reference to general mobilization or substantial Russian mobilization against Germany, which makes sense since the meeting took place before it was known of in Berlin. In fact you've already tried to claim that nothing was known of it even at 11 PM.

is quite deafening -less so for one who only knows of Russian partial mobilization. Also, his purpose in the meeting was to defend his view that Kriegsgefahrzustand need not be ordered and that a settlement could be achieved based on the Serbian reply (whose essentially acceptable nature was one of the official topics of the meeting. [translation of the Kautsky Documents, No. 456 (p.308-383 in that edition) you’ll like Kautsky, his post-war archival document collection aimed to blame the war on Wilhelm]

this quote from page 202 -My notes say 202-203, it may be at the bottom or mostly on 203

Mombaurer who says exactly I have been saying -That is her opinion, but there is plenty of evidence, despite Bethmann’s claims to the contrary, that Kriegsgefahrzustand did not mean war or necessitate mobilization. [for instance Trachtenberg, Marc, History and Stategy, 88]. If it was it would be hard to understand why afterwards Moltke kept insisting that “more proof was needed to "obtain the promulgation of a [German] mobilization order,"” and demanding more detailed intelligence. [Trumpner 82]

if we to take the time to read page 242 of Europe’s Last Summer as opposed to just offering your own theories, you would see that what he is referring to is the jubilant mood by the German Army that they are going to have the war that they had so desperate for. -This concern’s August 1st, considering he puts the date at the tops of the pages of this part of the book and the opposite page says “August second” as the next day in large letters I can’t believe you did not notice that.

Russian mobilization could only be a real threat if accompanied by French mobilization as the German General Staff itself often noted. -Not at all true, France (and Belgium by extension) had to be defeated in a window of time defined by how soon Russia could move against Germany in force (as opposed to a handful of divisions in East Prussia), Russian general mobilization, and to a much lesser extent the period preparatory to war could jepordize their plan by altering how long they had just as Belgian preparations could altered how long they would need, either would squeeze their schedule, but if Germany and France began mobilizing at the same time but Russian mobilization was already completed, the Germans could not have left the east so weakened as was required by the Schlieffen plan and it could not have been implemented.

On July 30th, the French government ordered French troops back six miles from the German frontier as a sign of its good faith -It wasn’t measure of “good faith”, in British diplomatic documents Grey records that Paul Cambon “said that, for the sake of public opinion in England, France had drawn her forces back from her German frontier”, it should be understood as a measure to help sway the British towards intervention, (not that there’s anything wrong with that under the circumstances). In addition to avoiding giving pretexts for war this was also explicitly discussed as a reason for doing so in the French cabinet as well as the fact that it would have a positive effect on domestic opinion. Keiger notes also that “the immediacy with which the British government was informed of the measures and the degree of sacrifice involved merely confirm the extent to which French decision-making was conditioned by Britain.”[Keiger, Decisions for war: France, 133]

on July 31st, the French government refused Marshal Joffre’s request for mobilization -Usually when a general is offering mobilization well before there is a reason to do so you call the reason "a pretext" when it occurs, why not in this case?

Fromkin notes that Moltke did not really fear Russian mobilization, and ardently wished for it -To say he wished for it is not to say that its prior occurance would not jeopardize his war plan (Fromkin says nothing of the sort), saying that Moltke wanted a pretext and nigh irrefutable argument for war is not different than stating that he wanted war at all. Hardly a debatable point.

The Eastern Front -I’m sorry, I haven’t read Stone in a while, what sort of danger did he mean? That it couldn’t field an army at all (in which case the entente was incapable of a two front war, which would be surprising) or that it would at that point be able to mobilize so fast that Germany’s “window” of time to operate in the west would be closed.

The Schlieffen Plan was based on the assumption that if would Russia at minimum, several weeks to mobilize, so all these claims that how Russian mobilization was an immediate and direct threat requiring German mobilization are simply wrong-since the Germans expected Russian mobilization to take several weeks, there were still lots of time to talk had the will been there. -You’re forgetting that Germany needed those weeks, it takes a while to overrun Belgium and Northern France and crush the French army. You must know that much.

And anyhow, Moltke had the information in late July 1914 that Russian mobilization steps were on far smaller scale then the Germans expected -This is probably relating to what I mentioned before from Trumpner, they were not smaller than expected, they were smaller than originally reported.. Initially partial mob. Was reported as possibly including Warsaw (and as Fromkin notes there, Moltke was a pessimist), and this was then discovered to be incorrect, I.E. Russian mobilization less threatening than first thought. Intelligence is tricky during the JulyCrisis, leaders of different countries are often found to have (probably unknowingly) endorsed inaccurate reports, particularly supported a view already held.

And as Fromkin says, Moltke at first felt so little threatened by Russian mobilization that he felt he could sacrificed a few days to let Russian mobilization gather stream -Read the next sentence, even Fromkin links Moltke’s shift in late July to this downgrading of intelligence reports. His fears of Russia were linked to its preparations.

let’s consider Bethmann Hollweg’s remark in 1917, which confirms what I have been saying all the long -Well, I could dwell on the relevance of the qualifier “in a way”, but I’d rather put it in context. The interview (actually in February 1918) has Bethmann stating that “"all nations are guilty; Germany, too, bears a large part of the blame."” He also consistently laid some of the blame on Austria, in that interview, he stated soon after your quote that “after we had decided for a [common] policy with Austria, we could not desert her in such danger.”, In the talks recorded in the diary of Theodore Wolff [1915, but in private] he repeated this perspective claiming that it was completely untrue that Germany had encouraged Vienna to attack Serbia or even was involved in wording the ultimatum. Getting back to the Generals, sour grapes is putting it mildly. After years of bitter fighting for control and precedence Ludendorff and Hindenburg forced him out, perhaps worse, in early 1915 his son was killed (also the fault of the generals and their forcasts of wars over by Christmas). those two had neglible roles in policy-making in 1914, yet instead of criticizing Moltke or Falkenhayn he fulminated against “the generals”, it is fairly clear who he was actually angry at. If you look at what you quoted, you’ll note that his putting even the slightest bit of blame on the military for the by then disastrous war required that it be at least in part preventive, otherwise he would have no argument, hence he made vague reference to it, not as a confession of his responsibility but rather as an indictment of others. Also note that he did not blame the military for usurping his control of policy as you claim occurred during the crisis. As for why he did not go on at length about Russia, that’s simple enough, German propaganda tended to blame Britain, not Russia. Such nauseating “arguments” portrayed Britain as the nefarious architect of Germany’s hostile encirclement, a bitter and jealous commercial rival, the fading power of the old world envious of the rising power of the new etc. (as I said, propaganda), and tended to cite the claim that as the other entente powers would never of gone to war without English support and that therefore by greenlighting war England was responsible (I’m not endorsing this). Bethmann in his conversations with Wolff stuck to the line that Germany had at most partial responsibility for the war, that “Neither France nor Russia would have risked the conflict had they not been sure of British support.” and “ I am still convinced that Grey could have pre-vented the war, if he had declared from the beginning that England would not go along." Not that the British Foreign Secretary had wanted to fight, but "the Triple Entente was more important to him than peace." Bethmann towed this line, even in his work published immediately after the war “Reflections on World War”. Not that I wouldn’t be interested to read the interview in its entirety, his claim that “"all nations are guilty” even if Germany bears partial, or even “a large part” of the blame does not support your claims of preplanned or preventive war. [the quotes are from Konrad Jaurusch’s articles in Central European History “The Illusion of Limited War” (1969) and “Revising German History: Bethmann revisited” (1988)]

Wilhelm did appeal for Russian demobilization during the Willy-Nicky telegrams. -On Bethmann’s advice

one of Wilhelm’s biographers, “Perhaps the most striking thing about this letter to Jagow of 28 July is that it was not acted upon -I’ve actually read Clark (who Fromkin is quoting here), and either you or him are grossly misrepresenting what Clark writes there. He goes on to say of Bethmann’s actions later in the same paragraph that “The view that he had already begun to harness his diplomacy to a policy of preventive war cannot be supported from the documents.” Clark describes Bethmann “commited to the alternative strategy” of persuading Russia not to intervene. That shouldn’t surprise, since without Russian partial mobilization or a firm British stance there was not much reason for him to conclude that localization had failed.

You must most carefully avoid giving any impression that we want to hold Austria back -That doesn’t forbid restraining Vienna, only giving the impression that such pressure was being applied. During the crisis is was common for attempts at restraint to be prefaced with declarations of support, using no more pressure than necessary would minimize damage to alliances (at the risk of being less effective), see for instance Vivani’s July 30th telegram to St. Petersburg. Note also that Jagow's urging for a declaration of war was in a way supported of the Kaiser's plan, since it called for a partial occupation of Serbia as a pledge and Serbia would not have willingly submitted to this. A halt in Belgrade requires a march on Belgrade.

which I supports my earlier point about the German bureaucracy having a mind of its own when it come to these things. -It supports your view that they prefer to act without his dislike of war (a localized one of which was considered optimal), since they did not think initially that the crisis would necessitate significant German military preparations the Kaiser was not expected to have a very important role. However it strongly contradicts your view that he was unable to significantly influence policy, since if that were the case there would be no such concern.

the fact in 1916 that Wilhelm was to all intents and purposes reduced to a figurehead monarch with no power at all by the military under the grounds that he was simply too incompetent to run a modern war shows it was the military that was the greater power in the land. -Throughout the course of World War I in every country involved in it to any degree there was increasing military influence over government policy and of government influence over society as a whole. To suggest that military control of the government in 1916 was no greater than in 1914 is indeed preposterous.

Colonel House in May 1914 that he had heard from informed sources in Berlin that the military felt that the country needed a much better Emperor then the one it had, and were considering deposing Wilhelm -Fromkin himself also says that “House may have exaggerated” and of course, that Wilhelm’s situation had been precarious since 1908. That was not as a result of growing military assertiveness but of outrage by the public and political parties of the embarrassment he had caused.

And the opposition may want to consider Falkenhayn’s remark to Wilhelm of July 27th recorded in his diary “I remind him that he is no longer in control of these matters” -Seems to have been a reaction to the Kaiser's suggestion that Germany should avoid war even at the cost of abandoning Austria, I'm not sure if that's so much a claim that the military supersedes the civilians as of the Kaiser having a less than absolute control over policy relative to the cabinet (also a civilian organ), that's certainly the easiest way to may it compatible with his other diary entries, that of the 29th about Bethmann’s resistance to ordering Kriegesgefahrzustand asserts that “it is his [Bethmann’s] task to determine policy, and he is not to be disturbed in this by military advisors.” [Hewitson, Mark, Germany and the Causes of the First World War, 202]

let us consider the ways in which Moltke sabotaged Wilhelm’s “Turn East” order of August 1st -Unsuccessfully?, the orders, even though circumventing Moltke had already begun to be carried out when they were cancelled.

Bethmann Hollweg was quite blunt that Germany was going to war with France and Russia, -Not at all, Goshen’s telegram reported that Bethmann “said he was continuing his efforts to maintain peace” and was enquiring about Britain’s position in the event of “a Russian attack on Austria” which might “to his great regret, render a European conflagration inevitable”. [BD no.293] not as blunt as you pretend.

then they should had been working for the success of Sir Edward Grey’s peace plans. -Both Russia and Germany chose direct talks over mediation, although the former only on the 27th, when informed by Pasic that Serbia would neither request nor accept mediation

‘If these efforts of Britain’s meet with success, while Vienna refuses everything, Vienna will prove that it is set on having a war, into which we are dragged, while Russia remains free of guilt. This puts us in a quite impossible position in the eyes of our own people. We can therefore only urgently recommend Vienna to accept Grey’s proposal, which safeguards its position in every way’ -If Austria had rejected Germany’s mediation attempts on the halt in Belgrade proposal exactly such a situation would have arisen, and as such this statement should be considered evidence that Bethmann would not have accepted its rejection, if there had been time.

Late that same night, upon hearing of Prince Henry of Prussia’s assurances that George V had promised him that Britain would remain neutral, Bethmann Hollweg send out a second telegram cancelling his first telegram earlier that night, and urged Austria to reject Grey’s offer -Bethmann’s instruction that mediation be stopped was sent at 11:00PM, “as soon as news of Russian general mobilization began to arrive in Berlin” [Hewitson 202]

Finally, something I can agree with the opposition. -I’ve generally felt Werchevsky went a bit far.

proves both Vienna and Berlin were aware of the possibility that Russia might not just step aside, -even if Russia was thought unlikely to risk war with Germany, there would have been no chance at all that Russia would stand aside in the absence of German support, since Serbia and Russia could have beaten Austria without French or British help, hence Austria needed German diplomatic support regardless.

when faced with Sazonov’s very angry reaction to the Austrian ultimatum -That Sazonov starting on the 24th stated that Russia would only go to war if Serbia was “swallowed”, which was reported triumphantly to Berlin and Vienna made a much greater impression, inaccurate or not, that Russian intervention could be prevented by moderate peace terms for Serbia, it took quite some time for this to be clarified.

says that on 12: 00 PM on July 31, 1914, a “state of imminent danger of war” was to be declared regardless if Russia had mobilized or not -That part is her analysis, which wasn’t what I was quoting, and to which I do not subscribe,

The next paragraph has Moltke telling his adjutant Hans von Haeften on the night of 30th-31st to start drafting Wilhelm’s declaration justifying mobilization to be issued the next day, so I think we can assume that Moltke had good reasons to expect that mobilization would go through the next day -That argument doesn’t make sense, after all, Moltke was drafting the ultimatum to Belgium on the 26th, [page 197], so he can hardly be viewed as only doing such drafting after obtaining a green light. Also, Moltke told Haefton at the same time that “reliable news had been received about Russia’s general mobilization”, therefore he would have had a basis for believing that mobilization would be ordered eventually even without it having been agreed to previously.

Moltke had no news about whatever Russia was mobilizing or not -This is extremely dishonest on your part. She says that he was wrong in claiming that “reliable” news of it had been received, the two reports received on the evening of the 30th did not represent confirmation, however they were suggestive and seem to have convinced Motlke. The general staff had considered these reports ““not sufficiently ‘conclusive’ “ [Trumpner 80-81] To ignore that Russian mobilization had been reported in Berlin on the evening of the 30th requires ignorance of what you just read and of the historiography and evidence in general of the highest order. Fischer can say that the information from the archives of military intelligence were not available in the 60s, but you have no such excuse.--Loje (talk) 21:37, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

Corporate Profits=

Information on Corporate Profits I have provided information on how American corporations benefited from this war. It would be helpful if others provided information on how much British, German, Austrian, Russian, French, or other corporations benefited from increased profits during World War I. —Preceding unsigned comment added by H8erade (talk • contribs) 09:32, 14 January 2009 (UTC)

I set this in its own section as it seems to be a different topic than Fritz Fischer. I have read your H8erade's edits to the article. The article must remain within its scope and be factual. American entry into the war is outside the scope of the article. Much of the rest of the edits by H8erade is opinion rather than fact and doesn't seem to have the proper specific context. At what points were the actions of the key statesmen and generals influenced by corporations? To take an extreme example, if, during the July crisis, Lord Grey gave his guarantee to protect France with Britain's navy only after receiving a corporate bribe, this would be a good context to introduce corporate profits and bribery to the article. The edits, as they stand, have to go, but, this is not to say that weapons manufacturers lacked some degree of influence over Statesmen.Werchovsky (talk) 19:40, 14 January 2009 (UTC)

Under the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the sale of weapons and ammunition by neutrals to beligerants was completely legal. Germany benefited from the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese war by selling weapons and ammunition to the Boers and to the Russians. So my question would be why 'how much' each country benefited would be at all relevant? The hague Conventions never stipulated any 'limits' to profiteering. Profiteering has ALWAYS been associated with wars. Look at the American Civil War and the blockade runners. They were profiteers. Look at the Napoleonic wars and all the smuggling that was done to thwart Napoleon's 'Continental System'. You also have to consider that America gained in trade with Britain and France, but America also lost most of its trade with Germany and Austria-Hungary.76.94.18.217 (talk) 02:01, 18 January 2009 (UTC)

Considering that the stated theme of this article is origins (or "causes") and the profitting is an outcome, I'd suggest that this sort of material be collected into a separate article. Askari Mark (Talk) 02:03, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the move request was move to Causes of World War I Aervanath (talk) 12:11, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

I think we should move this article to "Causes of World War I". This article isn't about the origins, it's about the causes. The "origin" is where something starts, the "causes" are why somethign starts For example, when I think of the origins of a river I think if the point where it starts. When I think of the causes of the river I think about rain or melting ice. The origin would be the Sarajevo or Austria-Hungary. The causes were the shooting of Franz Ferdinand etc. Using "origins" in this instance is just bad English. I read the previous discussion and no, "Origins" isn't more common in published works. Here are a list of books that use "causes":

Causes of World War I by John Ziff 2005
The Causes and Consequences of World War One by Bullitt Lowry 1996
Germany and the causes of the First World War‎ by Mark Hewitson 2004
The Causes of World War I by Tony Allan 2002
Causes and consequences of World War I by John Milton Cooper 1972
The Causes of World War I Stewart Ross 2003
Causes and Consequences of the First World War by Stewart Ross 1997

Additionally, "causes" is twice as common as "origins" in google searches.

23,600,000 results for "origins world war i"
43,800,000 results for "causes world war i"

I'd like to hear what others think.--Patton^t/c 22:38, 22 March 2009 (UTC)

Strongly oppose. Origins of the First World War is the title of the classic work on the subject, by Sidney Bradshaw Fay - I do not speak for Fay's conclusions, which are one-sided, but it should surely settle the point of usage. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 23:46, 22 March 2009 (UTC)

That's a single very old book, and using "origins" is bad English. It's like saying "I move my car" rather than "I drive my car".--Patton^t/c 19:41, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

Either you or Fay, then, does not know what good English is. I'll go with the Ivy League professor on this point of usage, thanks. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 22:29, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

False dichotomy; false appeal to authority. A man who was born in 1876 spoke a different form of English from that in common use today. They could easily both be correct in their own time. -GTBacchus^(talk) 03:52, 28 March 2009 (UTC)

You are strongly opposig this move because there is one book that uses "origins" yet I've shown you 7 that don't, and shown that "causes" is twice as common? That's madness. Naming conventions require us to use the most common name.--Patton^t/c 23:00, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

No, I am strongly opposing this move because the argument against the present title depends on a premise which is clearly false, so there is no reason to move.Septentrionalis PMAnderson 02:24, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

What premise is clearly false? There were three arguments for the move above: (1) "causes" is a much more accurate word to describe what this article than "origins", (2) "causes" is more common in relaible sources than "origins" and (3) "causes" is more common everywhere else than "origins". I don'#t see which of these are false.--Patton^t/c 16:40, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

Agree with Causes... The content of the page would justify the move to the broader title. Macdonald-ross (talk) 11:35, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

Comment re Google searches:

The queries submitted as evidence by Patton are poorly formed. Here are some more accurate results:

origins "world war I" -wikipedia, which gives 2,370,000 hits
origins "First World War" -wikipedia, which gives 1,090,000 hits
causes "world war I" -wikipedia, which gives 3,680,000 hits.
causes "First World War" -wikipedia, which gives 1,350,000 hits.

By no means is that the "end all, be all", it's just a more accurate representation of Ghits. Parsecboy (talk) 23:17, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

I think it's worth noting that the parallel article for World War II is at "Causes." Personally, I'm not too bothered on way or the other, as I think both are easily understood. However, "causes" is perhaps slighty drier, and more "encyclopedic" than "origins" which has a more romantic ring to it. Peregrine981 (talk) 19:12, 24 March 2009 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

"Start" Quality??

Having very little knowledge about the causes of World War I, and no knowledge of all about the cascading breakdowns in diplomacy and alliances that led up to the war, I must say that I found this article a fascinating read. At least some editors have clearly put a lot of time into this. That said, I was stunned to see this article rated "Start"-quality; I've read several "B"-quality articles that are nowhere near this thorough. Quite frankly, before seeing this, I had wondered if it had ever been nominated for Featured-Article status.

Looking at the two allegedly missing criteria--it definitely appears to be at least reasonably referenced, and I don't know what on earth it could further include. Again, I'm no expert on either WWI or wikipedia policies. But without accidentally stepping on someone's toes, I think you guys are really shortchanging yourselves by leaving this article's rating at the "Start" quality. toll_booth (talk) 02:31, 9 April 2009 (UTC)

OK everyone, I'm going to give this article a shot for GA-status. In the meantime, I've reclassified it as B-class. toll_booth (talk) 02:51, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

A point to realise is that an article's quality is not always congruent with its assessment due to the fact that the assessment might have been made before considerable changes have been made to an article. Despite the tag system, changes to articles are not necessarily very visible to people who are willing to spend the time assessing them. As such it could be a long time between assessments and in between these periods, the article could be greatly improved. If you find an article that you believe deserves a higher rating, please re-assess it (also same goes if you feel an article is rated higher than it should be, but I would stress caution in these instances). Any registered user is allowed to do this and can assess up to and including B class. Beyond that there are review processes, but any registered user can be involved in these also. Also, if you do not feel able to assess an article, you may request someone else do it. For military history articles, this can be done by going to WP:MHA and adding the name to the list of requests for asssessment. — AustralianRupert (talk) 04:14, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

Quick Review

I notice that this article has been nominated as a good article. I do not have time to review the article (given its size), however, I will make a couple of quick points. I don't believe that this article will pass the review unless a few issues are fixed up:

Referencing: this is a major hurdle. There are a number of citation needed tags, plus large sections with no citations at all. A general rule of thumb for B class is that every paragraph or block of information (e.g. list) has at least one citation (more if multiple sources are used). For GA it would be a higher requirement, that is one citation per assertion made (hence many GA articles frequently have hundreds of notes);
Citations: a number of the citations could be consolidated using WP:NAMEDREFS;
Endashes and Emdashes: date ranges and page ranges r endashs and emdashes should be used also for aside points made within sentences as per WP:MOS;
Reference list/further reading: there appear to be a couple of different styles of listing sources. The style needs to be consistent, e.g. some years have brackets, others do not.

They are just a couple of things that I can see need fixing. I would probably suggest putting the article up for peer review by going to WP:MHPR, as this would provide some pointers on what improvements could be made. Also the GA review can take a while to get done because of the large backlog. — AustralianRupert (talk) 04:43, 30 April 2009 (UTC)

causes

The article is problematic. Its title is "causes of world war one" but by far the biggest part of the article is dedicated to the events of the few weeks preceding the war. However, by far the biggest part of the causes go back decades...90.11.65.180 (talk) 09:02, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

The article is now also twice the recommended length for a wikipedia article. Perhaps we should consider splitting the detailed discussion of the events of the summer of 1914 into their own article? Objections? Peregrine981 (talk) 21:01, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

shouldn't the July crisis section be trimmed down, and trimmed information put into July crisis article. Since this article currently is around 250k. Gman124^talk 21:31, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Seeing as there are no objections, I think we should move the information shortly. However, the "July Crisis" article is now the "July Ultimatum." How easy is it to move it back, as it would certainly be better suited to July Crisis with all of the new content.Peregrine981 (talk) 16:16, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

"German apologists"

A new passage has been inserted which is blatantly POV.

"Shortly after the War Council met on December 8th, 1912 Wilhelm told the Swiss Ambassador that the “German race” and the “Slavic race” would engage in an apocalyptic race war that “will probably place in one or two years” [22]. Apologists for Germany often attempt to discuss the importance of the War Council by citing the passage from Admiral Muller’s diary, which states: “That was the end of the conference. The result amounted to nothing” ”[23] As the historian John Röhl notes, the German apologists are guilty of deliberate misquotation because Admiral Mueller was an advocate of launching a war in December 1912, and his reference to “nothing” being decided is his way of describing putting off the war until 1914[24] Moreover as Röhl has argued against the apologists for German aggression, even if the War Council was a not binding decision, it was nonetheless a clear sign of the German intentions[25]. It was clearly established that the German Army wanted a war, and the sooner the better[26] More importantly, a clear deadline had set for when the war was to begin, namely the summer of 1914[27]"

I am not familiar with the sources cited, so I am not completely comfortable with re-writing the passage. However, it is clearly in breach of POV guidelines as it stands. Calling one side of the argument "apologists for German aggression" is not likely how they would present themselves. This passage clearly presents Röhl as "correct." Peregrine981 (talk) 11:06, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Further to my previous comment, I now see that there is now a generally "anti-German" slant to much of the early parts of the article. I notice that Fischer, Röhl, and Fromkin are now cited literally hundreds of times. While it is good to cite sources, this cannot help but skew the article. This should be an overview article, not an essay pushing a POV, which it cannot help but do with such a concentration of sources. I am not exactly sure what to do about this situation, but I would like to flag it, and I would encourage editors to try to balance the situation. Peregrine981 (talk) 11:21, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

That matter has been corrected, and the offending passages removed and rephrased. I am just getting started, and will bring in a greater overview.--A.S. Brown (talk) 20:16, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

Refernecs

The references of this page really need to be combined together. for example reference 329-332 have following refs.

^ Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 215
^ Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 215
^ Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 215
^ Fromkin, David Europe’s Last Summer, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2004 pages 215

so can't references that have same book and page number be comibed together? Gman124^talk 18:06, 2 June 2009 (UTC)

I agree, as it is a real dog's breakfast right now. Does anyone know if it is possible to make a central reference, that can be referred to multiple times, but with different page numbers attached? I haven't been able to come across that, but given the repetition of sources with slightly different page numbers, it seems as though it would be very useful here. Peregrine981 (talk) 16:19, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Is this any help?

For Wikipedia references, please do not use "op. cit." or similar shorthand. See this style guide for help citing a footnote more than once on Wikipedia.

Op. cit. (Latin, short for "opus citatum"/"opere citato", meaning "the work cited/from the cited work") is the term used to provide an endnote or footnote citation to refer the reader to an earlier citation. To find the Op. cit. source, one has to look at the previous footnotes or general references section to find the relevant author.

In legal citation, the phrase refers to the cited source immediately previous to the last cited source.

Contrast: Ibid, referring to the last cited source, and supra, meaning cited (with details of the source) above. Also loc. cit. ("in the place cited"), now rarely used.Keith-264 (talk) 16:34, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

well, thanks for the effort, but since we can't use "op. cit." it doesn't really get us any further. SUrely there must be some technical wizardry available to avoid multiple citations. I'll look into it. Peregrine981 (talk) 19:52, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

As far as I can tell there's no technical work-around for this problem. The best I could do was to use [3] to create a citation from the ISBN #, and then group the pages into reasonable sections. I've done a few already, but there's still quite a bit of tedious work to do. Might I suggest that the original author should try to pitch in and tame some of the forest of citations. Thank you for the contribution, but I think it is reasonable to help with some of the maintenance work required to format it correctly. Peregrine981 (talk) 21:05, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

The Riezler Diaries

These are currently mentioned in 8 or 9 places in the article, often with direct quotes. I'm not sure what to do about it but it should be known that their validity is considered somewhat controversial, since the pages from the period of the July crisis are different from those of the rest of the diary, and according to some are a type of paper not available in 1914. Essentially all entries from July 7th-August 14th consist of summaries, and Fischer and others argue that the relevant pages were torn out and rewritten to show Germany in a better light (whatever the forger conceived that to be), if it wasn't fabricated from whole cloth. It is all the more problematic in that it may not even have been Riezler himself who did it (it passed through many hands over many years before it was prepared for publication) and there is debate about the extent to which it was modified and to which the text is reliable. I'm getting this from only tertiary sources though,(I can't read German), so maybe someone else has more precise information.--Loje (talk) 21:30, 10 June 2009 (UTC)

Historigraphy

No mention of Luigi Albertini (does anyone know how to do a link to his Wiki page?)? No mention of Annika Mombauer's historiographical survey 'The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus' (2002)?

By all means, please include them. Mombauer and Albertini are cited in the article though. Peregrine981 (talk) 12:05, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

EythenkewKeith-264 (talk) 12:31, 16 June 2009 (UTC)

Revelations made in Kaiser's Memoirs

A scanned copy of the Kaiser's My Memoirs: 1878-1918, Cassell and Company (1922) is available at

http://books.google.com/books?id=ywZoAAAAMAAJ&dq=kaiser+%22My+Memoirs

and contains the following truly startling revelations about various schemes that were being concocted by the other powers.

1. The British-American-French agreement of 1897

On pp. 69-70, the Kaiser wrote the following.

Professor Usher, in his book published in 1913, made known for the first time the existence and contents of an 'agreement' or 'secret treaty' between England, America and France, dating from the spring of 1897. In this it was agreed that, in case Germany or Austria, or both of them, should begin a war for the sake of 'Pan-Germanism,' the United States should at once declare in favour of England and France and go to the support of these Powers with all its resources. Professor Usher cites at length all the reasons, including those of a colonial character [conquest of the Spanish dependencies, control over Mexico and Central America, the opening up of China and the annexation of coaling stations], which inevitably imposed upon the United States the necessity of taking part, on the side of England and France, in a war against Germany, which Professor Usher, in 1913, prophesied as imminent!

Roland Greene Usher was a professor of political science at Washington University, in St. Louis. His book Pan-Germanism was published in February 1913. The various scanned chapters are at

http://books.google.com/books?id=YFwMAAAAYAAJ

Chapter X discusses the secret agreement of 1897.

2. The Russo-French proposal for war against England in 1900

On pages 79-84, the Kaiser discusses how the Kruger telegram was composed by Marshall and the controversy that it created. The Kaiser also makes the following revelation.

In February, 1900, [...] I received news by telegraph [...] that Russia and France had proposed to Germany to make a joint attack on England, now that she was involved elsewhere [in the Boer War], and to cripple her sea traffic. I objected and ordered that the proposal should be declined.

Since I assumed that Paris and St. Petersburg would present the matter at London in such a way as to make it appear that Berlin had made this proposal to both of them, I immediately telegraphed from Heligoland to Queen Victoria and to the Prince of Wales (Edward) the facts of the Russo-French proposal, and its refusal by me. The Queen answered expressing her hearty thanks, the Prince of Wales with an expression of astonishment.

3. Joseph Chamberlain’s proposal for war against Russia in 1901

On pp. 101-103, the Kaiser makes some startling revelations about Joseph Chamberlain's proposal, made in the spring of 1901, for an alliance between Britain and Germany. According to the Kaiser:

I immediately asked: 'Against whom?'--for it was evident that if England so suddenly offered to make an alliance in the midst of peace, she needed the German army, which made it worth while to find out against whom the army was needed and for what reason German troops were to fight, at England's behest, by her side. Thereupon the answer came from London that they were needed against Russia, for Russia was a menace both to India and to Constantinople.

The first thing I did was to call London's attention to the old traditional brotherhood-in-arms between the German and Russian armies, and the close family ties between the reigning dynasties of the two countries; in addition I pointed out the dangers of a war on two fronts, in the event of France coming in on the side of Russia, [. . .] and that there was no reason to unloose a conflict with Russia at this time, when we were in the midst of peace;

The Kaiser also realized that:

in case of our making common cause against Russia, Germany would be the only one who would be in great danger [. . .] and Chamberlain's 'plan' therefore came to nothing. Soon afterwards England concluded her alliance with Japan (Hayashi). The Russo-Japanese War broke out, in which Japan--owing to the fact that it fitted in with her schemes--played the role of pawn in England’s interests, which role had originally been reserved for Germany. By this war, Russia was thrown from the East back to the West, where she might concern herself again with the Balkans, Constantinople and India--a result clearly to Japan’s advantage--leaving Japan with a free hand in Korea and China.

4. The role of the "Grand Orient Lodge" in the outbreak of the war

Chapter 10 is entitled "The Outbreak of War." In pp. 245-252, the Kaiser lists 12 "proofs," from the more extensive "Comparative Historical Tables" that he had compiled, which demonstrate the preparations for war by the Entente Powers made in the spring and summer of 1914. Page 246 contains the following.

(5) According to the memoirs of the then French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, M. Paléologue, published in 1921 in the Revue des Deux Mondes, The Grand Duchesses Anastasia and Militza told him, on July 22, 1914, at Tsarskoe Selo, that their father, the King of Montenegro, had informed them in a cipher telegram, "we shall have war before the end of the month [that is, before the 13th of August, Russian style] . . . nothing will be left of Austria. . . . You will take Alsace-Lorraine. . . . Our armies will meet at Berlin. . . . Germany will be annihilated."

On pp. 253-54, the Kaiser makes the following startling revelation concerning the information given to the Kaiser by a German Freemason about the role played in the preparation of the war by the "Grand Orient Lodge."

He said that, in 1917, an international meeting of the "Grand Orient" was held, after which there was a subsequent conference in Switzerland. There the following programme was adopted: dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, elimination of the House of Habsburg, abdication of the German Emperor, . . . restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France, union of Galicia with Poland, elimination of the Pope and the Catholic Church, elimination of every State Church in Europe. Italus (talk) 02:18, 2 September 2009 (UTC)

Has any of this been corroborated since then? The self-serving statements of an embittered monarch in his memoirs from that long ago is not credible without it.--Loje (talk) 02:11, 4 September 2009 (UTC)

The revelations that I listed cannot be conveniently dismissed as "the self-serving statements of an embittered monarch." The claim about the "Grand Orient Lodge" is the only one that is questionable. Presumably, the telegrams about the Russo-French proposal for war against England are in the archives. Joseph Chamberlain's Anglo-German treaty negotiations are documented, as are Usher's book and Paléologue's memoirs. Italus (talk) 00:04, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

The Kaiser's memoirs are not a reliable source for anything other than the Kaiser's retrospective opinions. This article ought to be based on reliable secondary sources, like Albertini, Joll, and so forth. john k (talk) 03:13, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Item (5) above was indeed written in Maurice Paléologue’s memoirs at: http://www.gwpda.org/memoir/FrAmbRus/palTC.htm . The following is under Wednesday, July 22, 1914 at: http://www.gwpda.org/memoir/FrAmbRus/pal1-01.htm

I was one of the first to arrive. The Grand Duchess Anastasia and her sister, the Grand Duchess Militza, gave me a boisterous welcome. The two Montenegrins burst out, talking both at once:

"Do you realize that we're passing through historic days, fateful days! ... At the review to-morrow the bands will play nothing but the Marche Lorraine and Sambre et Meuse. I've had a telegram (in pre-arranged code) from my father to-day. He tells me we shall have war before the end of the month.... What a hero my father is! ... He's worthy of the Iliad! Just look at this little box I always take about with me. It's got some Lorraine soil in it, real Lorraine soil I picked up over the frontier when I was in France with my husband two years ago. Look there, at the table of honour: it's covered with thistles. I didn't want to have any other flowers there. They're Lorraine thistles, don't you see! I gathered several plants on the annexed territory, brought them here and had the seeds sown in my garden ... Militza, go on talking to the ambassador. Tell him all to-day means to us while I go and receive the Tsar ..."

At dinner I was on the left of the Grand Duchess Anastasia and the rhapsody continued, interspersed with prophecies . "There's going to be war ... There'll be nothing left of Austria .... You're going to get back Alsace and Lorraine .... Our armies will meet in Berlin ... Germany will be destroyed ... ." Then suddenly:

"I must restrain myself. The Emperor has his eye on me."

Under the Tsar's stern gaze the Montenegrin sybil suddenly lapsed into silence.

Does anyone have more information about this telegram sent by the King of Montenegro to his daughters? Italus (talk) 20:33, 15 September 2009 (UTC)

'The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation' by Avner Offer would be a better place to look for British planning for a possible war against Germany.Keith-264 (talk) 14:09, 10 September 2009 (UTC)

Serbian concordat

An interesting an often overlooked aspect of Eugenio Pacelli's diplomatic career is the political role that he played in Austria-Hungary in the years that preceded World War I. He contributed to signing the Serbian concordat, which enraged the Hapsburg aristocracy because it indicated that the Church recognized the political autonomy of the Serbian region. Incidentally, this occured only a few months before the assassination of the archduke of the Balkans by radical nationalists in the area. [4] ADM (talk) 02:27, 6 September 2009 (UTC)

Bosnian/Serbian Gavrilo Princip

I'm sure it is an issue that has come up before but I can't find an answer. Princip was born in 1894 ethnically Serbian but born in Bosnia (then controlled by Austria-Hungary). Therefore what should his nationality be described as? a) Serbian b) Bosnian c) Bosnian-Serb Francium12 19:59, 4 November 2009 (UTC) I think that esteban aLVA live in ATE is a fuckin shit

New stub

A new stub has been created that some on this page may be interested in developing: World War I naval arms race. --rannṗáirtí anaiṫnid (coṁrá) 22:08, 7 November 2009 (UTC)

Section about economy and Industry

Please write about the Second Industrial Revolution and the changes of economic powers.

Germany and the United States The German Empire came to rival or replace the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland as Europe's primary industrial nation during this period. This occurred as a result of several factors. Germany, having industrialized after Britain, was able to model its factories after those of Britain thus saving a substantial amount of capital, effort, and time. While Germany made use of the latest technological concepts, the British continued to use expensive and outdated technology and therefore were unable (or unwilling) to afford the fruits of their own scientific progress. In the development of science and pure research, the Germans invested more heavily than the British, especially in the chemical industry. The German cartel system (known as Konzerne), being significantly concentrated, was able to make more efficient use of fluid capital. Some believe the reparation payments exacted from France after that country's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71 had provided the needed capital to allow massive public investments in infrastructure like railways. This provided a large market for innovative steel products and facilitated transportation once installed. Following Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, a number of large factories were also taken over. In the United States of America the Second Industrial Revolution is commonly associated with electrification as pioneered by Nikola Tesla, Thomas Alva Edison and George Westinghouse and by scientific management as applied by Frederick Winslow Taylor. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.44.3.61 (talk) 10:46, 11 January 2010 (UTC)

It was Germany's liberation of Alsace-Lorraine not it's annexation because the people there aren't french but german! --89.50.29.214 (talk) 09:24, 16 March 2010 (UTC)

American Army in WW1 and the British war propaganda

A film about how Americans were decoyed in to the war. Leading American academic historians and experts of the era about president W.Wilson and untrue British War propaganda.

Secrets of World War I (1 of 5) It contained five parts.

starting part1 here: [5] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 84.0.143.148 (talk) 12:21, 28 January 2010 (UTC)

causes of world war 1

there were many differences between countries! —Preceding unsigned comment added by Yahnellie (talk • contribs) 16:07, 23 February 2010 (UTC)

Well Written

I just wanted to say that this is a superbly written article, possibly the best I have read on Wikipedia thus far. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 98.229.99.76 (talk) 20:23, 23 March 2010 (UTC)

PANSLAVISM & PANSLAV nationalism

The most important nationalism in the topic is the panslavism. Panslavism had the direct interest to ruin the status quo of Europe. But it is not mentioned in this article. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 81.182.75.7 (talk) 17:03, 15 April 2010 (UTC)

The role of panslav factor

Panslavism

The world's first race-based identity and ideology was the panslavism. Slavic nations believed that they are descendants of common forefathers, they believed that they are racialy clears. Thus the race-based identities and societies were exclusionary. See: Genocides Ethnic cleanisings and forced deportations against Hungarian and German speaking populations after ww1 and ww2. However the romantic naive panslav beliefs and myths collapsed in scientific levels (remember : population genetics of 1990s and 2000s). However these false nationalist beliefs survived in lesser educated common people.

The Black Hand society was a state-supported terror organization of the Serbian government. Panslavism and slavic nationalism had a key-role in the extension of a local conflict to a real World War. The supporter of panslavism, Tzar of Russia Nicholas II would had been the first Hitler, he started progroms genocides against Jews before ww1. It's awfull to imagine what would happend with non-slavic nations if he had won the war. However Tzarism couldn't survive the ww1. The new Soviet regime was strongly internationalist. After the WW1, the collapse and lack of a great slavic nationalist Empire (Russian Empire) prevented a large-scale new tragedy in the European continent. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.111.183.192 (talk) 14:36, 12 October 2010 (UTC)

this is outrageous neo-Nazi talk as no pogroms occurred in Russia proper. They took place in the Russian empire - in Bessarabia for example. Disturbances in India don't make Queen Victoria a Hitler. Secondly pogroms counted dozens of victims, hardly a genocide, while Hitler exterminated millions. Furthermore Slavic ethnic groups faced continuous persecution coming close to genocide in the territories of Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. There were no Russian or Czarist deportations of German-speaking or Hungarian populations from and to anywhere. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 83.187.148.52 (talk) 11:33, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

Please name an ethnic cleanizing/genocide of the Habsburgs or pre ww1 Germany. You can't. There weren't Hungarians in the Russian Empire. However ethnic celanizing/transportation was frequent in Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union and Serbia. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Longlongway (talk • contribs) 07:17, 21 February 2011‎ (UTC)

POV paragraph

In my opinion the paragraph including the following:

"Röhl is on safer ground when he argues that even if this War Council did not reach a binding decision - which it clearly was not" has an unnecessarily POV tone. I think the larger argument expressed here is sufficient neutral, but the tone it is presented in is conversational and assumes an irreverent air of superiority. My computer said love (talk) 00:22, 28 April 2010 (UTC)

It is strange that the article takes Röhl's opinion as typical, although among contemporary historians he is alone in taking this position. --Loje (talk) 15:55, 28 April 2010 (UTC)

poincaré, giolitti

French Président Poincaré is the subject of two paragraphs that are completly opposite:

1/ "The new French President Raymond Poincaré, who took office in 1913, was favourable to improving relations with Germany.[7] In January 1914 Poincaré became the first French President to dine at the German Embassy in Paris.[7] Poincaré was more interested in the idea of French expansion in the Middle East than a war of revenge to regain Alsace-Lorraine. Had the Reich been interested in improved relations with France before August 1914, the opportunity was available, but the leadership of the Reich lacked such interests, and preferred a policy of war to destroy France. Because of France’s smaller economy and population, by 1913 French leaders had largely accepted that France by itself could never defeat Germany.[8]"

2/ "For example, on July 29, after he had returned from the summit in St. Petersburg, President Poincaré was asked if war could be avoided. He is reported to have replied: "It would be a great pity. We should never again find conditions better."[17]"... Prime Minister and then President Poincaré was a strong hawk. In 1913 Poincaré predicted war for 1914.[19] In 1920 at the University of Paris, thinking back to his own student days, Poincaré remarked "I have not been able to see any reason for my generation living, except the hope of recovering our lost provinces (Alsace-Lorraine; Poincaré was born in Lorraine)." [20] Prime Minister and then President Poincaré was a strong hawk. In 1913 Poincaré predicted war for 1914.[19] In 1920 at the University of Paris, thinking back to his own student days, Poincaré remarked "I have not been able to see any reason for my generation living, except the hope of recovering our lost provinces (Alsace-Lorraine; Poincaré was born in Lorraine)." [20]"

I think that the fact that Poincaré accepted to dine at the German ambassy is the only point to advocate the fact that he was against war, ant it is a very weak one... But anyway theese two paragraphs need some editing.

Regarding Giolitti, Italian prime-minister on the onset of war, he is the only european leader to have refused to go to war, despite the 1882 treaty, and this sould aty least desserve some attention! — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jsoufron (talk • contribs) 08:05, 11 December 2011 (UTC)

July 29: Nicholas II sent the telegram to Wilhelm II to submit the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague Conference

Moxy, you undid my text:

* July 29: Nicholas II sent the telegram to Wilhelm II, with the suggestion to submit the Austro-Servian problem to the Hague Conference (in Hague tribunal) – Wilhelm II did not respond to this telegram [1-12]

Meanwhile, for comparison, we read in the same place:

July 29: Sir Edward Grey appeals to Germany to intervene to maintain peace.

Why do you think that this appeal of Sir Edvard Grey deserves a mention in the article and the appeal (telegram) of Nicholas II is not worth mentioning? Moxy, you're using the "double standards"? - I ask you to restore my text. Борис Романов (talk) 19:27, 9 January 2012 (UTC) Boris Romanov

Moxy, you still have not answered my question. Борис Романов (talk) 15:29, 9 March 2012 (UTC) Boris Romanov

we've been over and over this. The RS do not consider it important--and the czar never even told his foreign minister what he did. the Czar himself did not submit the case to the Hague. If he had done so that would be of interest--but he suggested his cousin do it, for no clear reason. the Kaiser ignore it. the czar forgot about it. the ambassadors learned about it weeks later when the war had begun. Rjensen (talk) 20:30, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

And ambassadors considered it important. And more than 10 RS consider it important through al XX c. and till now - see Talk:World War I. The informal (confidential) correspondence between the leaders of countries is no less important than formal appeals of their ministers. Борис Романов (talk) 20:54, 9 January 2012 (UTC) Boris Romanov

the point is the Czar did nothing -- he told his cousin to do something and never followed that up. Within an hour the czar forgot the telegram & forgot to mention it to his foreign minister, so it was not discovered till weeks later. Rjensen (talk) 21:05, 9 January 2012 (UTC)

Obviously, you believe that Nicholas II was an idiot - but it's your personal view and that is your problem. Борис Романов (talk) 21:28, 9 January 2012 (UTC) Boris Romanov

We've been over this ad nauseum, Boris. Your repeated assertion that something is a RS does not make it so. The act of an ambassador or lawyer or politician writing something in his diary doesn't make it reliable, in fact that is the very essence of a Primary Source, not to mention being wp:POV. Subsequent republication of that primary source in toto in no way adds to its reliability. Show us credible modern independent academics who say in their own words that this was a cause of the war and we'll treat those as reliable. LeadSongDog come howl! 16:06, 9 March 2012 (UTC)