Talk:Soviet Union/Archive 9

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2nd largest

I'm just going to split this off here. I think I've outlined my reasons for why I think it should NOT be included and I'll leave it up to others to decide.radek (talk) 06:39, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Well, I also have presented my arguments... just to fix some positive achievements of the discussion: are you OK with the present form of my version without its last sentence, that is without mentioning the GDP? Greyhood (talk) 07:00, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

(i) This is not certain, as we don't know at what point Japan surpassed the (former) Soviet Union.

(ii) This fact, even if true, is not particularly informative and is of virtually no consequence. A "who has the biggest penis" contest, roghly.

That is, it is rather meaningless. If not for the shortage of space in this article, it could be ok with me. With the lowest priority. But not now. Colchicum (talk) 13:34, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I am also not a proponent of "second largest", because different estimates exist (e.g. off the top of my head, according to one source, the USSR economy was not greater than that of Belgium), and, more importantly, all these estimates are based on some assumptions, each of which can be contested. Nevertheless, I think the sentence that gives a reader an impression of the size of Soviet economy is needed, so I propose to replace "second largest" (that is questionable) with "one of the largest" (that was absolutely correct).--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:01, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Well, I agree with Radeksz in that if we are going to include this at all, it is important to point out that the Soviet GDP lagged very far behind the first place. "One of the largest" doesn't convey this information. Colchicum (talk) 14:16, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Actually I just looked in the cited CIA factbook and even there I don't see an explicit claim that it was "2nd largest", just a GDP number based on Soviet statistics and a warning about greater than usual uncertainty about its accuracy. Still, when you consider the number of countries in the world I guess saying "one of the largest" isn't too far of the mark. And like I said, what matters is income per capita. So how about something like "Due to its large population, the Soviet Union had one of the largest economies in the world as measured by aggregate real GDP. In terms of real income per person it ranked at xx in 1970, xy in 1980 and xz in 1990" (or just do 1990 if the other years are too uncertain).radek (talk) 19:29, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

BTW, Radeksz, what do you think of this chart? Should it be removed? It looks entirely wrong to me and contradicts numerous sources. Colchicum (talk) 14:16, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Oh wow I didn't even notice that before, having focused on the text. Yes, that chart needs to go. It is the quintessence of the kind of SYNTHESIS and OR that is prohibited by Wikipedia guidelines. For starters, I don't see "USSR" in the United Nations statistics that the image links to. Of course it could've come from an older edition of a statistical yearbook but that presents problems of its own. Second, the image doesn't specify whether this is nominal gdp or real gdp (eyeballing it, I'd say the USSR series at least is most likely nominal). If it is nominal then this is meaningless since it includes inflation and any kind of currency reforms that happened in the former Soviet states at this time. If it is real, the chart doesn't specify what the base year or the chaining method is and in fact, whether, both series use the same base year/chaining method. Also, for the post-Soviet period how has the conversion between different countries gdp's been made? Using exchange rates? PPP adjustments? A big give away that this just splices two completely different series, denominated in different units is the large break between them - it's true that most of the Soviet states took a big hit to GDP in the early 90's (also true that real GDP was probably already falling in late 80's) but that would show up differently (in a manner similar to the 97-98 drop).

Of course if a chart of this nature, which compares pre and post gdps can be found in an actual reliable source, and if the data underlying the chart in the source can be recovered, then I believe remaking such a chart using a spreadsheet, uploading it to Commons and including it in the article is allowed (under both Wikipedia rules and copyright laws) - but it needs to come from a reliable source.radek (talk) 16:55, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I cannot tell for sure if the FSU part of the graph is correct, however, the USSR part (which is relevant to this article) seems quite correct. Mark Harrison (Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the Soviet Command Economy. The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 55, No. 3 (Aug., 2002), pp. 397-433) provides the graph that shows an almost linear growth from 1928 till circa 1985 (which interrupts during WWII) in seli-logarithmic coordinates, which mean almost exponential growth, so both graphs qualitatively coincide. Under qualitatively I mean that Harrison gives much greater numbers, from ~1,500 billion in 1928 to ~8,000 billion in 1985. I can prepare a new chart (for the USSR only) if you see problems with this one.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:38, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Heh, yeah, up to 1985 the chart looks reasonable and resembles that of Harrison. For the pre-1985 period it's possible (though there is no way of knowing) that the difference between Harrison's chart and this chart is that Harrison uses 1990 prices while whoever made the graph used data which used whatever other base year prices.

BUT, note also how drastically Harrison's chart differs from this one for the post 1985 period. Harrison has a big drop in real GDP while this chart has a (very unrealistic) huge upswing. I wouldn't be surprised if the author of this graph not only spliced different post and pre SU series but also spliced completely different series for the pre 1985 and post 1985 period.

I'll try to get the underlying data Harrison used (it should be available somewhere or perhaps an email will work).radek (talk) 23:19, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Oh, it's Maddison's data, most of which was available online until recently. Unfortunately Angus Maddison passed away quite recently and it appears his old website is not working anymore.radek (talk) 23:23, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Here's a little flash dynamic graph based on Maddison's data which compares both per capita and aggregate GDP for US, China, USSR and Western Europe. It shows that China also surpassed the Soviet Union as the "2nd largest" (NOT counting "Western Europe" as a single economy) sometime in the 1980's. I still want the actual numbers though cuz this kind of 'eyeballing' is kind of sketchy. Note also that some of Maddison's estimates have been criticized quite heavily though in different context (basically, his estimates for pre-industrial revolution incomes - don't know if same criticisms apply to the Soviet estimates)radek (talk) 23:30, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

According to the chart the growth of the Soviet GDP from 1985 to 1990 was (1533/914)^0.2= approximately 11% per year on average, which is sheer nonsense, unless it is nominal. Colchicum (talk) 22:55, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

AFAIK Harrison used data from Maddison's Monitoring the world economy, 1820-1992 there. And Maddison gives us 231,886 million 1990 G-K USD for 1928, 420,091 million for 1940, 333,656 million for 1945, 1,351,818 million for 1970 and 2,037,253 million for 1989, very far from what this chart shows. Colchicum (talk) 23:38, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

So that's a growth rate of about 3.6% per year which is reasonable for aggregate GDP, at about the world average for the period. BTW, the Easterly and Fischer paper I mentioned before can be found here; [1] and the data from it can be downloaded here: [2] Note the abstract - the point of the paper is that Soviet growth was at about the world average BUT given the amount of investment that the Soviet economy made, the relatively high level of education (human capital), the low population growth rate and the low level of initial income, the performance of the economy was very very weak ("worst in the world"); it SHOULD HAVE grown faster. Note that this refers to per capita GDP.radek (talk) 00:12, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

As a general comment, one can't compare real GDP series which use different base years or different chaining methods, unless one knows the methodology which will enable one to convert from one series to another - but then you can only compare AFTER the conversion is carried out. So it doesn't make much sense to say "this chart says 8 billion but this data says 2 billion" - they could both be correct but just be expressed in different units (like kilograms vs. pounds). Since the chart doesn't say what the units are, we can't use it. We can however, replicate the chart either from Harrison or Easterly & Fisher and include it here, with appropriate labeling of units and description.radek (talk) 00:12, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

I just tried to replicate the chart from the UN data for the post-Soviet part. It is the "GDP, at current prices - US Dollars" series: [3] - which means that this is Nominal GDP ("current prices" - not adjusted for inflation. "constant prices" - calculated on a basis of constant base year prices). The "constant prices" series looks quite different (though of course there's still the early 90's dip). If I have a bit of time later on I might make the proper chart and update that image.radek (talk) 00:23, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

The author of the graph has clarified that both series are in nominal terms (hence the post 1985 run up in the graph is basically inflation. Since before 1980's inflation in Soviet Union was low it makes sense that for the pre-1985 period the nominal and real gdp would move together and the chart would correspond to that of Harrison). I still see no reason for putting them together (and that is Synth).radek (talk) 19:34, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

This source from the Russian State Statistics department compares Russian GDP in 1996 with that of other countries. The data presented there is consistent with the subsequent statistics of Russian GDP up to the present moment, which in turn is consistent with estimates by World Bank, IMF and CIA.

• Look up at the first graph. It shows how Russian GDP changed from 1990 to 1996 (including Russian SFSR, which was 2/3 of the total Soviet economy). The pink seems to correspond to the problematic graph that have been discussed above. Indeed, in 1991 inflation soared up in the Soviet Union while the currency exchange rate was artificially fixed, so the Soviet GDP nominated in foreign currency soared up, while in real terms it was stable or decreasing (blue line - PPP, green line - national currency adjusted for inflation).
• The graph shows that between 1990-96 Russian GDP (PPP) dropped more than 30% below its 1990 level. The table below estimates Russian GDP (PPP) as 996,4 billion $ in 1996. If we add here the GDP (PPP) estimates for the former Soviet republics in Europe from the same table, we get 1270 billion $. There is no information for the Caucasian and Central Asian Republics, but the addition of their GDP (PPP) should make the total post-Soviet GDP (PPP) in 1996 more than 1500 billion $. So if we take into account that the post-Soviet GDP (PPP) in 1996 was less than 70% of its 1990 level (the other Soviet Republics performed just as bad as Russia, if not worse) than we get the figure of over 2200 billion for the Soviet GDP (PPP) in 1990. Which means the claims that the Soviet GDP was lower than China's at that time are quite wrong (see IMF PPP figures for China here - Historical GDP of the People's Republic of China), unless by some reason Chinese GDP was underestimated more than two times. The same with other countries, except Japan - they all obviously had much smaller GDPs than the Soviet Union in 1989-90. And it is consistent with 1996 and current statistics, even though that 2200 billion $ GDP (PPP) is smaller than 2,659 billion $ GNP that this CIA-based source gives. So indeed, it seems that CIA figures for 1989 or 1990 Soviet Union GDP might be exaggerated, but not very significantly.
• The only contender for the second place in the late 1990s (except the USSR) was Japan. The same Russian source estimates Japanese GDP (PPP) in 1996 as 3019 billion $. Even given the fact that Japanese GDP (PPP) grew a total of about 10% from 1990 to 1996 (the Japanese growth was very slow after 1990), the 1990 Japanese GDP (PPP) according to such analysis would be about 2700 billion $, which is bigger than the Soviet GDP (PPP) (2200 billion $, even if we presume that it is slightly lowered estimate). This seems not consistent with the CIA data, according to which Japanese GNP was lower than the Soviet. Perhaps to certaint extent the problem is in the difference between GDP and GNP (GNP is product produced by enterprises owned by a country's citizens; no foreign ownership in USSR and some in Japan). So the question of the USSR and Japan GDP ranking in 1989-1990 is quite complicated. The Japan likely had surpassed the USSR in GDP in the late 1980s, but perhaps was behind in GNP. More sources are needed to establish the facts regarding the ranks in 1989-1990.

That's why now I agree that we should avoid giving the international ranking of the USSR economy for the specific year in the late 1980s or early 1990s, since it is unclear when exactly Japan surpassed USSR. But still I believe that we may do the following things:

• 1) use the CIA source for GDP or GNP per capita.
• 2) mention that the Soviet Union had the world's second largest economy for the most of the period between World War II and its collapse, like the information from this article suggests. Greyhood (talk) 22:34, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Per Pauls's suggestion above I'd go with "one of the largest for most of the period between World War II and its collapse" though the statement needs to be coupled with another, about per capita GDP to avoid misleading the reader. Just to note China also might have surpassed USSR in terms of GDP sometime in the 80's.

As to the sources for the numbers, I'd prefer something other than the CIA but it will do. Again, it doesn't make much sense to include a number which is non-comparable to other numbers, so optimally we would like to have USSR's GDP in 2010 international PPP adjusted dollars (which is what GDP is given in for most countries on Wikipedia) - but it might be quite difficult to find such a number.radek (talk) 17:30, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

China couldn't have surpassed USSR in terms of GDP sometime in the 80's, because by typical estimates Chinese GDP in 1980s was even less than Russia's in 1996 (near the peak of its post-Soviet collapse), not to say about the combined (and still not collapsed) Soviet GDP in 1980s. Unless, of course, the Chinese GDP was understimated more than 2.5 times, which is unlikely and which is a different story here. Anyway nothing prevents us from stating that "Soviet Union had the world's second largest economy for the most of the period between World War II and its collapse", since the most part of the period comprises 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, when the Soviet industry and GDP (PPP) quite obviously were the second. Greyhood (talk) 17:50, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

No, in 1996 China had a pop of about 1227.77 million and Russia a pop of about 148.31 million. At that time Russian per capita GDP was a little more than twice that of China (Penn World Tables estimates [4] give 3224-3231 real per capita GDP for China and 7607-7611 for Russia). So a 8x advantage in population for China and a 2.5x (being generous) advantage in per capita GDP for Russia implies that China's economy was more than 3x larger than Russia's in 1996 (320%). Even with alternative numbers for per capita GDP, given that population figures are about as reliable as they come, it would be very hard to erase that 320% difference.

For the earlier part, it is probably true that in the early 80's Soviet Union had the larger economy. The opposite was true by later 80's (pre Soviet collapse though) as China really grew like crazy during this time.radek (talk) 18:17, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

No, you've missed what I compare with what. The comparison was between 1996 Russian GDP and 1980s Chinese GDP, not between Russia and China in 1996. Between 1989 and 1996 Chinese GDP grew about 2.5 times, while Russian GDP dropped 1.5 times, that's how we came to the figures in 1996. But in the late 1980s the combined and still growing or stable Soviet GDP was obviously bigger than Chinese. Regarding the ranking in the early or late 1980s - it doesn't matter, since the phrase that the "Soviet Union had the world's second largest economy for the most of the period between World War II and its collapse" is true enough because it is true for 1950s, 1960s and 1970s (about 75% of the period). Greyhood (talk) 18:50, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Oops good point. However it doesn't change the basic fact that China probably surpassed USSR in aggregate GDP sometime in the 80's. From the same source, take Chinese per capita GDP for 1985 (the mid point of the 80's) - 1410, and population, about 1.06 billion. That still makes the 1985 Chinese GDP larger by about 366 billion (or more than a third of a trillion) than that of Russia in 1996, or about 35%. Ok, so if we assume that Russia was 3/4 of Soviet economy and assume that this proportion roughly held among post-Soviet states then China's and Russia's GDPs are probably similar (the diff between them being on order of 9 million which in a context such as this is margin of error). If you go forward to 1987, with Chinese per capita GDP rising to 1616 and its population gaining another 4 million, then I'm pretty sure China is clearly larger. (This of course also neglects any kind of purchasing power adjustments which should always be done in international comparisons of income).radek (talk) 22:45, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Radek, Russia was 2/3 of the Soviet economy, not 3/4, and've already shown that Soviet GDP (PPP) in the late 1980s was over 2 000 billions $, while the estimates for Historical GDP of the People's Republic of China in the late 1980s doesn't surpasss even 1000 billion $. But these questions are not relevant to the last wording I've proposed, so I hope that the problem about 2ndBE is fixed. Greyhood (talk) 22:59, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Quite honestly, I'm spending more time on this point then I'd like, since as I said I don't think aggregate GDP is a very informative statistic and the focus should be on per capita GDP. So perhaps a suggestion on how to include information on the size of per capita income over time in the text would be more helpful. If that part is done adequately I'm willing to accept the 2nd largest thing.radek (talk) 22:57, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Look, this is the wording that fixes the problem: For the most of the period after World War II and up to its collapse, the Soviet economy was the second largest in the world by GDP (PPP), though in per capita terms the Soviet GDP was behind that of the First World countries. Greyhood (talk) 23:01, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Section break 2

Greyhood, I have an issue with your "including petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, heavy industries, electronics, food processing, lumber, mining and defense". The cited source (1991 CIA factbook) doesn't support this information.

Ok, I have tried to introduce non-controversial and verifiable points from Greyhood's text. Here is the result; Colchicum (talk) 14:16, 23 June 2010 (UTC) :

Main article: Economy of the Soviet Union

Further information: Eastern Bloc economies

The Soviet Union became the first country that adopted planned economy, whereby production and distrubution of goods were to be centralized and directed by the government rather than driven by demands of the market. In conformity with its official Marxist-Leninist stance, all means of production were to be owned by the state.

The first Bolshevik experiment with planned economy was War Communism, involving nationalization of all private enterprises and land, criminalization of free trade, centralized distribution of output, coercive requisition of agricultural production, and attempts to eliminate money circulation. As it had caused a severe economic collapse, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP), legalizing free trade and private ownership of smaller businesses. The economy subsequently recovered fairly quickly.

Following a lengthy debate in the Politburo over the course of economic development, by 1928-1929, upon gaining the upper hand in the power struggle, Joseph Stalin had abandoned the NEP and pushed for full central planning, starting forced collectivization of agriculture and enacting draconian labor legislation. The resources were mobilized for rapid industrialization, which greatly expanded Soviet capacity in heavy industry during the 1930s. As a result, the USSR was transformed from a largely agrarian economy into a great industrial power, and the basis was provided for its emergence as a superpower after recovering from the World War II.

Since the 1930s and until its collapse in the late 1980s, the way the Soviet economy operated had remained essentially unchanged. Officially it was emphasized that the economy was directed by scientific central planning, carried out by Gosplan and organized into five-year plans. In reality, however, the role of Gosplan was fairly limited, and the plans were highly aggregated and provisional, subject to ad hoc intervention by any superior. Resources were allocated mostly by intervention rather than by plan.

All key economic decisions were taken by the political leadership. The decisions deemed minor were delegated from top to bottom through ministries (or, for some time during Khrushchev's rule, regional economic councils), but subordinates routinely funneled them back upwards to limit their own responsibility. The administrative burdens on the top decision-makers thus became tremendously heavy. Information available to them to make rational economic decisions was unreliable, as production managers had incentives to distort their reports. This led to huge investment blunders, evident in a large number of unfinished construction projects throughout the country. Successful decisions, mostly concerning the technologies of defense and heavy industry, were usually informed by the monitoring of progress abroad.

Unlike War Communism, the later Soviet economic system relied on money. Allocated resources and plan targets were normally denominated in rubles rather than in physical goods. Credits were discouraged, but widespread. As plans were too aggregated, final allocation of output was achieved through relatively decentralized, unplanned contracting. Although in theory prices were legally set from above, in practice this was the case only partially, as actual prices were often negotiated at this point. Informal horizontal links were pervasive. A massive unplanned second economy existed alongside the planned one at low levels of the structure, providing some of the goods and services that the planners could not. Legalization of some elements of the decentralized economy was attempted with the reform of 1965.

A number of basic services were state-funded, such as education and healthcare. Consumer goods, in particular outside large cities, were often in short supply, of poor quality and limited choice, as under command economy consumers' preferences wielded almost no influence over production, changing demands of the population with growing money incomes couldn't be matched by supplies at rigidly fixed prices, and heavy industry and defense were assigned higher priority than consumer goods production.

Foreign trade in the Soviet Union was a state monopoly. By the early 1940s, the Soviet economy had become relatively autarkic, although since the 1930s the Soviet economy had relied on import of high-technology equipment. Bauxite, phosphate rock and grain eventually became other important import articles.

During the arms race of the Cold War the Soviet economy became increasingly burdened by military expenditures, heavily lobbied by the powerful bureaucracy dependent on the arms industry and estimated as 12-17% of the GDP in the mid-1980s. At the same time the Soviet Union became the largest arms exporter to the Third World. After the creation of the Comecon, external trade rose rapidly. Allies and satellite states received large amounts of Soviet aid.

In the 1970s-1980s, the Soviet Union heavily relied on fossil fuel exports to earn hard currency. At the peak level in 1988, it was the largest producer and second largest exporter of crude oil, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia.

During the war the Soviet economy and infrastructure suffered massive devastation and subsequently required extensive reconstruction. Although statistics of the Soviet economy is notoriously unreliable and its growth is difficult to estimate, by most accounts it continued to have a positive rate of economic growth until 1989-1990. During 1950s and 1960s the Soviet economy was catching up with the West. However, after 1970 the Soviet growth rate, while still positive, steadily declined, much more quickly and consistently than in other countries, despite rapid increase in the capital stock, surpassed only by that in Japan.

In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev pushed to reform the economy with his program of Perestroika in an attempt to revitalize it. His policies relaxed state control over enterprises, but hadn't yet allowed it to be replaced with market incentives, ultimately resulting in a sharp decline in production output. The economy, already suffering from reduced petroleum export revenues, started to collapse. Prices were still fixed, property was still largely state-owned until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Just prior to its collapse, <A SOURCED LIST OF PRODUCTS GOES HERE>. Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a variety of manufactured goods were exported from the country.

Ok, Greyhood, point by point, what is wrong here, if anything? Then let's see whether Radeksz agrees or you manage to provide sources to substantiate your claims. Colchicum (talk) 14:31, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

>I have an issue with your "including petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, heavy industries, electronics, food processing, lumber, mining and defense". The cited source (1991 CIA factbook) doesn't support this information.

OK, lets by now stick to what the source says (petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods and arms)).

1) directed by the government rather than driven by demands of the market. >rather than driven by demands of the market is excessive here. Market also exists in the planned economy, but its demands are estimated by planning and subsequently supplied by state direction of resources. There was a notion of socialist market in the USSR (not to be confused with the Chinese case).

2) In conformity with its official Marxist-Leninist stance, all means of production were to be owned by the state. >Yes, were to be owned. De facto private household plots were owned by peasants and dachniks throughout the whole of Soviet period. The same with small businesses during NEP and the very last years of Soviet Union. All this should be clarified, or better the phrase should be dropped.

3) The first Bolshevik experiment with planned economy was War Communism >There is a consensus that War Communism was command economy, but not so about planned economy. Gosplan was founded only in 1921. And there is no consensus that it was purely experiment and not a measure forced by war. So Bolshevik experiment is POV.

4)involving nationalization of all private enterprises and land, criminalization of free trade, centralized distribution of output, coercive requisition of agricultural production, and attempts to eliminate money circulation. >As Paul Siebert suggests, we should avoid paying too much attention to war communism, since it was before the formation of the Soviet Union. Nationalization of land and private enterprises is dubious, since de facto Bolsheviks couldn't control at that time all peasants and all small businesses. Bolsheviks often encouraged peasants to take their lords' land by force during the Civil War, turning it into peasants' own de facto posession. Bolsheviks were really successful only in the nationalization of [big] industry. Small businesses and free trade existed in the black market, so we can speek only about attempts to eliminate them.

More accurate wording: involving nationalization of industry, centralized distribution of output, coercive requisition of agricultural production, and attempts to eliminate money circulation, as well as private enterprises and free trade.

5)As it had caused a severe economic collapse, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP)

Oversimplification. Military communism aggravated the collapse already caused by the Civil War.

6)Following a lengthy debate in the Politburo over the course of economic development

It is necessary to mention that [leading] Soviet economists participated in that debate,

7)Your version lacks the source about the war devastation, and you misplaced that line.

8)Your version lacks the mention of Soviet industries created during industrialization.

9)Your version lacks the good illustrative point of the Soviet Union being the world's leader in industrial output of certain goods.

10)Resources were allocated mostly by intervention rather than by plan.

Very controversial statement, clearly POV. Most sources that I've read don't go so fringe. Superior officials intervened in making plans (and they had a full right to do so). When a plan was completly made, it obviously limited the scope of further possible intervention (otherwise the economy would became utterly chaotic, which was not the case). The only exception is World War II, when again there was command economy rather then planned, and decisions were directed by military needs.

11)The decisions deemed minor were delegated from top to bottom through ministries (or, for some time during Khrushchev's rule, regional economic councils), but subordinates routinely funneled them back upwards to limit their own responsibility. The administrative burdens on the top decision-makers thus became tremendously heavy. Information available to them to make rational economic decisions was unreliable, as production managers had incentives to distort their reports.

Not shown why these problems were of particular importance in the case of the Soviet Union (though I agree they were). If you have ever worked in a corporation, big company or organisation, then you should know that these problems are typical.

12)This led to huge investment blunders, evident in a large number of unfinished construction projects throughout the country.

Very controversial conclusion. Contains a logical fallacy - only finished, but ineffective projects, can be truly estimated as investment blunders. In too much cases of major unfinished projects there were very special reasons for their cancellation - Great Depression, World War II, de-stalinization, Soviet collapse. Without mentioning this, the line is POV. Anyway, too much faults in this line to keep it.

13) Successful decisions, mostly concerning the technologies of defense and heavy industry, were usually informed by the monitoring of progress abroad.

Clear POV, because it was typical for all countries.

14)By the early 1940s, the Soviet economy had become relatively autarkic, although since the 1930s the Soviet economy had relied on import of high-technology equipment.

Overgeneralization. It was mostly factory and construction machinery, machine tools (for industrialization needs - better specify it). The vast majority of the other high technology equipment, such as vehicles and electronics, were produced inside the Soviet Union. And by the way, reliance on machinery imports dropped in the end of 1940s and after the war it was for a time replaced to a great extent with machine tools from defeated Germany and its allies. Then the imports of machinery from East Germany were driven by the need to give East Germany a proper place in the market of Comecon.

15)Bauxite, phosphate rock and grain eventually became other important import articles.

Bauxite and phosphate rock needs direct sourcing. Consumer manufactures as this suggests are very important to mention.

16)During the arms race of the Cold War the Soviet economy became increasingly burdened by military expenditures, heavily lobbied by the powerful bureaucracy dependent on the arms industry and estimated as 12-17% of the GDP in the mid-1980s.

Needs direct sourcing by the way. And If we don't include the general GDP figures on the basis of their unreliability, than likely we don't include these figures too, since they'd be considered secondary to GDP and even more unreliable. There is no consensus, and these particular figures are somewhat high - 10% is what I've seen usually.

17)Just prior to its collapse, <A SOURCED LIST OF PRODUCTS GOES HERE>. Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a variety of manufactured goods were exported from the country.

Bad structuring of the text. Exports definitely should go beside imports and close to the production.

18)Science and technology is not mentioned in your version. Serious omission. Greyhood (talk) 16:51, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Re: " As it had caused a severe economic collapse " I doubt majority sources agree that the collapse was caused by war communism alone, not by preceding WWI and concurrent Civil war. In addition, you repeatedly ignore the obvious fact that War Communism ended before the USSR was formed, so it should be just briefly mentioned. The Greyhood's version of this para is much more neutral and correct.

Re: "Following a lengthy debate in the Politburo over the course of economic development" This is misleading and hardly relevant. These debates had only minor effect on future economic policy: the policy had changed simply by physical elimination of the advocates of NEP.

Re: "Unlike War Communism, the later Soviet economic system relied on money" No need to mention War Communism. The USSR was a socialist state and, although the declared goal was to build a communist society, noone questioned a need of money during this transition. The sentence is no more informative then, e.g., "the later Roman economic system relied on money"

I'll try to compare both versions more carefully in close future, but I think the Colchicum version (if we take it as the base) needs a considerable work. The Greyhood's criticism seems reasonable except #12, because a huge number of unfinished project per se is a demonstration of blunders.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:25, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

>the policy had changed simply by physical elimination of the advocates of NEP.

Can't agree with you on that, Paul. Bukharin was eliminated in 1938, while NEP was cancelled 10 years before.

>a huge number of unfinished project per se is a demonstration of blunders.

Well, it is demonstration of blunders, but not at all those connected to planning and investment, but rather the blunders in provision of such events as Great Depression, World War II etc.Greyhood (talk) 17:35, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

I meant "dismissal with subsequent physical elimination". Although Bukharin was executed in late 1930s, he lost his power in 1929.

Many giant constructions were not connected with WWII or Great depression, e.g. Stalin's polar railroads, huge melioration projects, etc. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:05, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

>I meant "dismissal with subsequent physical elimination". Although Bukharin was executed in late 1930s, he lost his power in 1929.

The dismissal was connected to their losing in the discussion, as I understand. Really, Paul, don't oversimplify the matter like it was just a personal strife between Stalin&Co and all others, and then Stalin just forced his own point of view. Remember that he significantly changed his opinion on industrialization in the course of discussion, so it was important anyway.

>Many giant constructions were not connected with WWII or Great depression, e.g. Stalin's polar railroads, huge melioration projects, etc.

Stalin polar railroads were unfinished because of his sudden death and amnesty and reforming of GULAG, which built that roads. The problem wasn't in the planning from the very beginning. One of the Stalin railways was a military project and was scrapped also because they cancelled the building of naval base in the East of the Kola Peninsula. Nearly at the same time Khruschev scrapped a large part of the program of building the new ships for the Soviet Navy (the causes of that decision are not clear and they are considered voluntaristic). The other of the Stalin polar railroads was completed in parts, and now is a patrt of Northern Railroad in Russia. It is situated in the main region of Russian oil and gas industry, and is scheduled to be completed in future years, just as a Stalin's Sakhalin Tunnel (also scrapped in 1953 on the ground of GULAG amnesty). Main Turkmen Canal was also scrapped in 1953, but the finished part still is very imortant for the modern Turkmenistan and certainly is not an investment failure. Northern river reversal was scrapped because of the Soviet collapse and the rise of the Green movement in that time, but now the debate continues whether Russia and Kazakhstan should realise the project. So, scrapping of all these projects is a more complex story than bad planning and investment failure. In case of railroads, the only real failure was GULAG and its effectiveness, not the specific projects themselves. Greyhood (talk) 18:43, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Hopefully we are not in the Politburo, comrades, what matters here is sourcing.

1. There is a difference between were to be directed and were directed. Sure thing, market exists in the planned economy, a standalone planned economy is just a utopia that is impossible to create.

2. The state ownership is essential to the understanding of the Soviet economy. Were to be owned as opposed to were owned is sufficient to account for the minor deviations (which were a far cry from private property anyway). What wording would you propose?

3 There is a consensus that War Communism was command economy, but not so about planned economy.

Planned economy and command economy are synonyms. It doesn't take a dedicated planning agency to operate a planned economy, when Gosplan was established is irrelevant here. Well, let Radeksz decide, he is obviously more familiar with the terms.

And there is no consensus that it was purely experiment and not a measure forced by war.

The word experiment doesn't imply anything of this sort, it is neutral, an experiment could be very well forced by war or not. Ok, to appease you, let's have "the first Bolshevik experience in command economy" here instead.

4. As Paul Siebert suggests, we should avoid paying too much attention to war communism. Sure, but we should briefly explain what it was. My version is shorter than yours anyway, and the words "war communism" alone are not something an average reader would be able to understand. War communism wasn't and couldn't be implemented to the end, but it is still indisputable that they tried this. Though involving is probably not the word we need here.

5. Sorry, sources say otherwise. I'd go with the sources rather than your opinion.

6. Not a big deal, but it is not in the source that supports this paragraph. Ok, who are the economists, what are your sources?

7. Ok, I'll bring my sources. The sentence about the war devastation and recovery obviously has more to do with the paragraph about the growth and is better placed there, I think.

8. It is unsourced in your version, and the list is obviously not comprehensive. Provide your source, and we'll talk.

9. Which goods? What are your source for this claim?

10. It is a point from Gregory 2004 and Gregory & Harrison 2005, which are among the best sources at hand, by no means fringe (from Gregory & Harrison 2005):

A surprising feature of the working archives of ministries and enterprises is the near total absence of final "approved" plans. All plans were labeled "draft" or "preliminary." The draft plan was no more than an informal agreement which could be changed subsequently by virtually any superior. The "correcting" and "finalizing" of plans was a never-ending process; the "final" plan remained always on the horizon. Searches in the ministerial archives have located only one finalized annual plan, that for light industry in 1939.

The archives provide thousands of cases of plan revisions. Ministers ordered last minute changes; factories were shuffled from one authority to another; one factory was ordered to increase its production post haste to make up for production shortfalls in another factory. Even Politburo commission decisions could be changed at the last minute: Although the first-quarter 1933 vehicle distribution plan had been approved by its own transport committee, the Politburo threw the plan out the window by tripling the Kazak party committee’s allocation and dedicating 90 percent of the vehicles to "organs of control over agricultural producers"

Now, a wikidissenter doesn't make a case for a controversy. It would be controversial if you put up a reliable source that actually contradicts this claim.

11. The sources (both specifically on the Soviet economy and general theoretical works) say they were important. And no, you are wrong about corporations, big companies and organizations in general, but it is irrelevant here, we report what sources say.

12. Again, this is what sources say. And no, there is no logical fallacy. only finished, but ineffective projects, can be truly estimated as investment blunders – this is fairly fringe OR, AFAIK.

13. So is this a POV or something typical for all counties, hehe? I have a feeling that it can't be both ways. The source considers it important, anyway, so it stays.

14. So what do you propose here and what are your sources for this?

15. Ok, I'll bring my sources. The source you are referring to only describes the Soviet economy during Perestroika, which is not characteristic of other years and hence is not appropriate in this paragraph.

16. Ok, I'll bring my sources. What are the sources where you have seen 10%, btw?

17. This is about 1989 (or even 1991) only. Thus it shouldn't go before Perestroika. You placed the text between WWII and the 1970s, which is clearly misleading. It is unsourced (and, incidentally, wrong) for the 1950s-1960s.

18. See Radeksz' comment. As a side note, what are your sources for this? Concerning Sputink and Gagarin, they are only tangentially relevant to the economy and are discussed in the history section (Soviet_Union#Post-Stalin_period). There is no need to duplicate it here. Colchicum (talk) 18:21, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Reply to Colchicum: 1) 2) 3) 4)- in fact these points are rather minor for me. And I suspect that for you too, so lets see what others say. Regarding p. 1) - if you can read Russian, than I recommend this Stalin's article for you ("The economic problems of socialism in USSR") where he argues that market can and should exist in socialist system. This, as well as Lenin's turn to the NEP, shows that it is wrong to say that Bolsheviks were disrespecting the market. Rgarding p. 2 - something like this: "According to Marxist-Lenist principles, the means of production in the Soviet Union were largely owned by state".

5). Sorry, sources say otherwise. I'd go with the sources rather than your opinion.

Both Paul Siebert and me have already presented sources that present the other point of view. You ignored them or dismissed without a good ground.

6). Not a big deal, but it is not in the source that supports this paragraph. Ok, who are the economists, what are your sources?

Yes, the point is minor. Economists include Yevgeni Preobrazhensky, Nikolai Kondratiev, Gleb Krzhizhanovsky, Stanislav Gustavovich Strumilin. This source in Russian, but written by an Anglophone scholar Alec Nove discuss Preobrazhensky and mentiones Kondratiev.

7). The sentence about the war devastation and recovery obviously has more to do with the paragraph about the growth and is better placed there, I think.

Hm, in some cases you are very careful about the chronology and timing, while in others not.

8. It is unsourced in your version, and the list is obviously not comprehensive. Provide your source, and we'll talk.

OK, I'll try to compose a better list and provide a good source, but so far nobody except you questions its credibility.

9. Which goods? What are your source for this claim?

Service source about tractors, steel, pig-iron etc.

10. Your quote support only the statement that intervention in the planning and allocating of resources was very strong, which I agree with and reflect in my version. The quote, however doesn't support the statement that resources were allocated mostly by intervention than by plan. Thousands of cases and one particular example may be not very much in comparison to the general volume of planning. Provide other quotes, so far it is unconvincing in support for your interpretation of the source.

11. The sources (both specifically on the Soviet economy and general theoretical works) say they were important.

You miss my point. While I agree that they were important, I disagree with inserting it here without explanation why they were particularly important in the Soviet case. Radek so far seems too agree that this para at least needs much rewording.

12. Again, this is what sources say. And no, there is no logical fallacy. only finished, but ineffective projects, can be truly estimated as investment blunders – this is fairly fringe OR, AFAIK.

Can you provide a direct quote that supports your interpretation of the source, the significance of the point within the source and the factual material on which that conclusion was based? Sorry to bother you, but this was driven by your quoting in #10.

13. It is typical to all countries, so making an especial attention to it in the case of the Soviet Union is POVish. Well, if you are so inclined to insert everything you like from the sources you like, so perhaps I should reconsider the point about the golden age of communism, even though I don't like that very much.

14. So what do you propose here and what are your sources for this?

See the relevant place in my version. The source seems to be already there.

15. The source you are referring to only describes the Soviet economy during Perestroika, which is not characteristic of other years and hence is not appropriate in this paragraph.

The structure of the Soviet economy didn't change very much from 1960s, it is a well known fact, so no problem with this source here.

16. What are the sources where you have seen 10%, btw?

If I find them, I'll bring them on. Likely it was in the Soviet statistics, which you seems to disapprove, even though all the modern reestimates are inadvertantly based on some reinterpretations of the old statistics.

17. This is about 1989 (or even 1991) only. Thus it shouldn't go before Perestroika. You placed the text between WWII and the 1970s, which is clearly misleading. It is unsourced (and, incidentally, wrong) for the 1950s-1960s.

First, the placement and the wording points to the period after WWII, not in particular to the period of 1950s or 1960s. Really no worse a wording than your passage about bauxites that eventually become one of the main exports. Then, it seems that I am not very much wrong about 1950s-1960s. The structure of imports/exports/production generally formed very soon after the formation of Comecon.

18. See Radeksz' comment. As a side note, what are your sources for this? Concerning Sputink and Gagarin, they are only tangentially relevant to the economy and are discussed in the history section

I've already answered this your question above. The source is given, though it may be nice to provide more and better sources. Industrialization and many other information also is doubled in this article, not a problem. Greyhood (talk) 21:17, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

1. o_0. Thanks anyway.

5. Hmm. What sources? I must have missed them. Lenin and Trotsky themselves admitted that the NEP was caused by the failure of WC (no pun intended), let alone modern scholars.

9. Have you read it yourself or borrowed it directly from the Economy of the Soviet Union? If so, as I have already said, "you know how it happens, someone writes a referenced text and then over the course of months with further revisions it gets eroded and is not really what the sources meant anymore." I'll check it later anyway.

10. Well, if this is not enough, there are other points to that effect in the sources. I assure you that it is an accurate summary. Ask Radeksz.

11. Well, let's wait for his proposal then. It is ok with me.

13. These are not sources I like, these are the most recent and authoritative studies on the subject. And I don't insert everything I like there, I summarize what they have to say proportionally to the attention devoted to the issues.

14. There is no inline reference. The next reference is fairly far away and on an unrelated issue. Which source do you mean? Have you actually read it or borrowed it from the subarticle? See #9 then.

15. No, this is completely wrong, especially regarding consumer goods, petroleum and natural gas, so there are some problems.

17. Again, significant oil and especially natural gas exports developed much later than the Comecon was formed, and there were major changes in this throughout 1970s-1980s.

18. Industrialization is directly relevant and very important here, whereas the space industry was hardly even in the cradle. Now, the source you borrowed from the Economy of the Soviet Union, Davies 1998, p. 72, reads: it launched the first Sputnik in 1957 and the first manned spacecraft in 1961. But could the researches in space research and military technology be generalised? Could advanced technology be widely diffused throughout the economy? We know the answer now; but in 1965 the Soviet Union faced the future with confidence, observed by the capitalist powers with considerable alarm. That is, there was pretty much no such thing as the "space industry" of any macroeconomic significance. Your sentence doesn't summarize the source accurately and gives undue weight to a single fact, disproportional to the attention paid to it in the literature (one short and fairly derisive paragraph). Colchicum (talk) 22:31, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

1. o_0. Thanks anyway.

5. Hmm. What sources? I must have missed them. Lenin and Trotsky themselves admitted that the NEP was caused by the failure of WC (no pun intended), let alone modern scholars.

9. Have you read it yourself or borrowed it directly from the Economy of the Soviet Union? If so, as I have already said, "you know how it happens, someone writes a referenced text and then over the course of months with further revisions it gets eroded and is not really what the sources meant anymore." I'll check it later anyway.

10. Well, if this is not enough, there are other points to that effect in the sources. I assure you that it is an accurate summary. Ask Radeksz.

11. Well, let's wait for his proposal then. It is ok with me.

13. These are not sources I like, these are the most recent and authoritative studies on the subject. And I don't insert everything I like there, I summarize what they have to say proportionally to the attention devoted to the issues.

14. There is no inline reference. The next reference is fairly far away and on an unrelated issue. Which source do you mean? Have you actually read it or borrowed it from the subarticle? See #9 then.

15. No, this is completely wrong, especially regarding consumer goods, petroleum and natural gas, so there are some problems.

17. Again, significant oil and especially natural gas exports developed much later than the Comecon was formed, and there were major changes in this throughout 1970s-1980s.

18. Industrialization is directly relevant and very important here, whereas the space industry was hardly even in the cradle. Now, the source you borrowed from the Economy of the Soviet Union, Davies 1998, p. 72, reads: it launched the first Sputnik in 1957 and the first manned spacecraft in 1961. But could the researches in space research and military technology be generalised? Could advanced technology be widely diffused throughout the economy? We know the answer now; but in 1965 the Soviet Union faced the future with confidence, observed by the capitalist powers with considerable alarm. That is, there was pretty much no such thing as the "space industry" of any macroeconomic significance. Your sentence doesn't summarize the source accurately and gives undue weight to a single fact, disproportional to the attention paid to it in the literature (one short and fairly derisive paragraph). Colchicum (talk) 22:31, 23 June 2010 (UTC)

Reply to Colchicum:

p 5) see the section with Paul's sources and discussion on #5.

9) I've brought another on-line source that gives the same estimates for 1980. See the changes in my version.

10) Gregory may endlessly write about different interventions into the planning, but to make a conclusion that Resources were allocated mostly by intervention rather than by plan one should compare the entire volume of cases when plan worked and the volume of cases when plan didn't worked. I doubt that Gregory or anyone else is able to perform such a task. Even if you present the direct quotation where he probably makes the discussed conclusion, it still will be very controversial. But so far I see only your personal interpretation of the source, and until you or Radek or anyone else show me that Gregory indeed made such a controversial statement, there is really nothing to discuss on this point, sorry.

13)I summarize what they have to say proportionally to the attention devoted to the issues. Sorry, but so far at least in one case it seems that you have gone too categoric in your summary. And even if the sources you've read pay especially significant attention to some aspects of the Soviet economy, it means just that the specific author's intention was to study that aspects more thoroughly than the others. It means nothing about the real wheight of that aspects. Anyway, for making such categoric statements as Successful decisions, mostly concerning the technologies of defense and heavy industry, were usually informed by the monitoring of progress abroad you should better provide a direct quotation and a reference to a specific page where the source comes to such a conclusion. Otherwise it is just your personal interpretation, like in #10.

14)I have added another and better source on this point.

15) 17) I have added another source that describes the Soviet economy and trade in general, not only during perestroika. And there is no any need to go into details and giving the exports/imports structure separately for 1950s/1960s and 1970s/1980s. While indeed the role of oil and gas exports grew in 1970s (and it is specially mentioned in the text), that doesn't mean that there was no any energy exports in 1950s and 1960s.

18) I've provided a better source. Greyhood (talk) 17:32, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

#5

The discussion is multi faceted and quite involved and honestly, I'm getting lost in some portions of it. So I'm going to split off some of the particular issues (like with the "2nd largest" above) into their own section (hopefully this won't be necessary for all 18 or 20 points). So in regard to "#5":

(there may be precedents in the discussion)

Greyhood says

"5)As it had caused a severe economic collapse, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP)" Oversimplification. Military communism aggravated the collapse already caused by the Civil War.

Colchicum says

5. Sorry, sources say otherwise. I'd go with the sources rather than your opinion.

Greyhood says

Both Paul Siebert and me have already presented sources that present the other point of view. You ignored them or dismissed without a good ground.

Colchicum says

5. Hmm. What sources? I must have missed them. Lenin and Trotsky themselves admitted that the NEP was caused by the failure of WC (no pun intended), let alone modern scholars.

Paul cites (omitting full quotes) following sources in response:

The grain monopoly had already been decreed by the Provisional Government in March 1917, and even this decree was only a step beyond the stage the tsarist government had reached by September 1916 when a fixed price had been made mandatory for all grain sales and when state officials were given de facto control over all grain transport.

The growing claims of the state over disposition of the nation's grain supply was of course a practical response to the intensifying food-supply crisis

the grain monopoly in particular was a measure that had already been adopted by such advanced capitalist states as Germany but could be enforced in Russia only over the vociferous opposition of the "uncultured" petty capitalists and other assorted "disorganizers" of town and country. (assuming this is the relevant portion of the quote)

the Provisional Government's Ministry of Food Supply was moving toward much tougher methods in the fall of 1917

then Paul evaluates the quotes:

War Communism was dictated by military needs.

---

Looking over the disagreement it seems that both statements could be correct: War Communism WAS dictated (to some extent) by military needs AND War Communism caused an economic collapse (or aggravated an existing economic problem which arose due to war conditions). Paul's point that the development of Bolshevik grain policy had precedents in both Tsarist and Kerensky's policies is actually unsurprising (actually the Bolsheviks took over and preserved quite a number of Tsarist practices and institutions, adopting them to their own needs; for example the Cheka was staffed to a large extent by former members of the Ochrana) and also a bit of a red herring in the discussion(*). So how about just "As it had aggravated a severe economic collapse" rather than "caused" as a compromise solution. This phrasing also leaves the judgement call out, as it is not uncommon for states in conditions of war to adopt economic policies out of necessity and desperation which in normal times would be deemed absurd. The important point I think is that these policies resumed (AFTER the NEP), despite the fact that the war time conditions have passed.

(*)The (very) simplified hierarchy of grain policy control, which is a matter of degree, here is something like:

Tsarist (and some, e.g. Prussian) grain policy: if you're going to sell your grain, the government sets the price (i.e. all sales not at the set price are black market)

Provisional Government: not only do you have to sell at a price we set, but you have to sell at least a given share of your output (insert an economic theorem that for price controls to be effective they have to be coupled with quantity controls, here)

Bolshevik War Communism: not only do you have to sell at a price we set but you also have to grow as much as we tell you and if you don't supply the amount that we tell you it means you're "hoarding" your grain somewhere or you're a reactionary saboteur and therefore a class enemy.

Degrees do matter. radek (talk) 04:43, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Firstly, this is only one of the sources I quoted;

Secondly, my conclusion was quoted incorrectly: my major point was that it is incorrect to discuss WC separately from the WWI and Civil war;

Re grain policy control. Remember that you compare a policy of Provisional government plans in a situation when there was no civil war in the country with Bolsheviks' real actions during one of the most brutal civil wars in history. Obviously, many of Bolsheviks expected initially that their temporary measures would be supported by peasantry because all land was nationalised by Bolsheviks and transferred to peasantry without compensation. Note, that neither Tzarist nor Provisional government were going to make such a revolutionary step.

Finally, could anybody explain me why such an undue attention is paid to the policy that was abandoned one year before the USSR was formed.?--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:00, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

(Gregory 2004, 1-2):

Their first experiment, called War Communism, was motivated by ideology but later blamed on wartime emergency; it caused a severe economic collapse, and a retreat was sounded to the mixed economy of the New Economic Policy (NEP)

The same position has been taken by Paul Craig Roberts, Peter Boettke, Thomas F. Remington, and at least in part by many other scholars. It is one of the major viewpoints that War Communism was motivated by ideology, and it shouldn't be contradicted by whatever text we agree on, and then I am fine with it. And it is simply a consensus position in the literature that the NEP emerged because War Communism was a failure, there is no need to downplay it (Which Greyhood's version does, moreover, failure is value-neutral, whereas harsh policy is in the eye of the beholder). Cf.

• The first Bolshevik experience with command economy was War Communism, (HERE GOES A SHORT EXPLANATION OF WHAT IT MEANS). As it had caused a severe economic collapse, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP), legalizing free trade and private ownership of smaller businesses.
• State Planning Committee was formed in 1921, the same year when the previous harsh policy of military communism was replaced with the New Economic Policy (NEP), legalizing free trade and private ownership of smaller businesses.

The petty formality of when Gosplan was founded (also before the USSR was officially formed) is a minor detail of little consequence, relatively unimprortant, judging from the sources, yet the fact is given utmost prominence in Greyhood's text at the expense of the matters featured in the sources much more prominently. Btw, the common English name of this policy is War Communism, not military communism.

Finally, could anybody explain me why such an undue attention is paid to the policy that was abandoned one year before the USSR was formed"

The attention is not undue. WC is featured prominently in most sources on the economic history of the Soviet Union.

That's all. Thank you very much. Colchicum (talk) 11:58, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

You are welcome. Obviously, I provided no sources that state that WC was motivated by ideology. Indeed, that was the case. Moreover, it would be even more correct to say that that was an experiment, because Marxist theory dealt mostly with capitalism, leaving all details of future Socialist and Communist economical system beyond the scope. So WC was also an improvisation of Bolsheviks, who came to power absolutely unexpectedly (even in late 1916 Lenin expressed an opinion that he himself would not be a witness of proletarian revolution).

However, it is absolutely necessary to remember that WC was established in a situation when Russian economy (especially agriculture) was on the brink of catastrophe, and that that experiment was not a "clean experiment" because of ongoing Civil War. In particular, one has to remember that part of Bolsheviks' policy (food requisitions) was not their invention but was inherited from the previous regimes.

Although I don't think we can afford a luxury to discuss WC in details in such a summary style article, however I see no problem to discuss it here if you want, provided that it is being done in a context of the devastating effect WWI had on Russia and in a context of ongoing Civil War. In addition if we discuss WC, it should be clearly stated that WC was not an implementation of the Marxist theory (because no theory of socialist and communist economy existed by that moment), but an experiment, when new Bolshevik authorities had to improvise. --Paul Siebert (talk) 18:31, 24 June 2010 (UTC)

Seems that we have only two variants here:

• not going into the details about the War Communism at all and making just a brief mention of it in one or two phrases
• presenting all the relevant points of view on the causes of the policy and the causes of subsequent economic collapse

Currently I've followed the second variant in my version. Greyhood (talk) 16:48, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

On one hand... on the other hand is wrong. These are not two sides of the same viewpoint, these are two different viewpoints (while there is an intermediate viewpoint, it is just another point of view and not a consensus position). I'd suggest to omit this discussion. And there is no consensus (to put it mildly) re Bolsheviks being able to gain enough resources for winning the Civil War thanks to (vs. despite) WC, therefore While Bolsheviks were able to gain enough resources for winning the Civil War has to go. If the sentence isn't meant to imply that this was due to WC, it is trivial (the Bolsheviks were still around after the war, quite obviously they had been able to gain something to win it) and a waste of space, but if it does, which is a more natural interpretation, it is a POV. [C]atastrophically aggravated the hardships experienced by the population is not very useful here, a waste of space, omit this too. In 1921 War communism was replaced with the New Economic Policy (NEP) – there is no need to present it out of the blue and downplay the fact that it was replaced because of the collapse. I am ok with the replacement of "caused" with "contributed to" and addition of "during the Civil War", though:

• The first Bolshevik experience with command economy was War Communism, (HERE GOES A SHORT EXPLANATION OF WHAT IT MEANT, TBD) during the Civil War. As it had contributed to a severe economic collapse, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP), legalizing free trade and private ownership of smaller businesses. Colchicum (talk) 17:43, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

OK, this seems nice, I'll follow this your proposal. For now I'll exchange the SHORT EXPLANATION for your line on WC policies with my corrections. Greyhood (talk) 17:55, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

In actuality, the country was on the brink of catastrophe even before Communists/Socialists took power, so the Radek's "aggravated" is more adequate than "contributed".--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:00, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

OK, fixed. Greyhood (talk) 19:04, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Short review

Since the last time I looked through the article three years ago or so, the article became much more biased, while topics and information, absent in that time remain absent until now. Far from neutrality then, now it became a sort of drive against the Soviet Union, POV accusing and judging passages are present in each paragraph.

Information on science is highly suppressed, a sole sentence on it is lost in the middle of the article. Such topics as Soviet exploration of the Arctic in the 1930s and Soviet exploration of Antarctica and the Arctic in general is absent. No even a word on sports. Suppressed information on education, that was free of charge on all levels. Suppressed information on culture.

All this makes the article not interesting at all to read. I looked through the whole article only because I wanted to write this review. Otherwise I should switch to reading much more interesting articles almost immediately, because this article became extremely boring for me while I was reading the lead section. Cmapm (talk) 09:17, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Good points you make, Cmapm. We definitely should insert the subsections on culture here, as well as on science and technology, education and transportation (Arctic exploration and the Northern Sea Route may go into transportation). You may help with writing these subsections. Here is a good and comprehensive source on the different aspects of the Soviet Union that we may use to write the mentioned subsections. Greyhood (talk) 18:09, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Yeah this could be done, just take care not to mix up the sections - for example, don't make the economics section be about science and culture. I'm also wary of the usage of the term "suppressed" by Cmapm - I don't see anything of the sort.radek (talk) 22:54, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

OK, we can make science and technology a separate section, that's a good idea. Greyhood (talk) 23:04, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Adding of Ethnic groups and national policy and Economy into the article

We've been discussing these sections for quite a time now and we have made a great deal of work. I think we should finally add these sections into the article, and resolve few unresolved problems later, if need.

• Ethnic groups and national policy: There is a consensus on the text presented by Paul Siebert. We may add it into the article right now (with sources, of course). There is one missing paragraph, which Paul asked Colchicum to readd. It may be added into the article later, or even right now, since apparently there is a consensus on that paragraph too.

• Economy: In my version (initially based on Colchicum's) I've tried to take into account all remarks by Paul Siebert and Colchicum. I've either removed or referenced all my additions that raised questions. Regarding 2ndBE and the account of War Communism it seems that we've reached some understanding and good enough wording. So I ask you all, guys, to check my version once more and, if there are no serious problems regarding what is already there, insert it into the article immediately. Again, there is a question about what is not there: one paragraph and few points from the initial Colchicum's text ("more by intervention than by plan", Soviet bureaucracy, unfinished projects and monitoring the foreign technology). We may discuss these points one by one, like we did with 2ndBE and War Communism, and in case we reach a consensus add them into the article later.

This talk page have become really huge and discussion too multi faceted and complicated, so I believe we should fix some consensus points by adding the relevant section versions into the article, and discuss few serious non-consensus points later. Greyhood (talk) 22:44, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Since Colchicum expressed no interest to the Ethnic .. section, he seems to be satisfied with it. Other editors also seem to have no objections. Try to add it into the article, and let's see. The sources, that Colchicum promissed to add, can be added later. With regard to Economy, I am a little bit lost. Could you please re-post the final version below?--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:19, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

OK, here it is:

Economy 2

The Soviet Union became the first country that adopted a planned economy, whereby production and distrubution of goods were to be centralized and directed by the government. The first Bolshevik experience with command economy was the policy of War Communism, involving nationalization of industry, centralized distribution of output, coercive requisition of agricultural production, and attempts to eliminate money circulation, as well as private enterprises and free trade. As it had aggravated a severe economic collapse caused by the war, in 1921 Lenin replaced War Communism with the New Economic Policy (NEP), legalizing free trade and private ownership of smaller businesses. The economy subsequently recovered fairly quickly.

Following a lengthy debate among the members of Politburo over the course of economic development, by 1928-1929, upon gaining the upper hand in the power struggle, Joseph Stalin had abandoned the NEP and pushed for full central planning, starting forced collectivization of agriculture and enacting draconian labor legislation. The resources were mobilized for rapid industrialization, which greatly expanded Soviet capacity in heavy industry and capital goods during the 1930s. Preparation for war was one of the main driving forces behind industrialization, mostly due to distrust of the outside capitalistic world. As a result, the USSR was transformed from a largely agrarian economy into a great industrial power, and the basis was provided for its emergence as a superpower after recovering from the World War II. During the war the Soviet economy and infrastructure suffered massive devastation and subsequently required extensive reconstruction.

A wide range of industries constituted the Soviet industrial sector in the later decades, including machine-building and metal-working, metallurgy, chemicals, petroleum and natural gas, coal mining, forestry, defense industry, textiles, food processing, and construction. By 1980, the Soviet Union had the world's second largest industrial capacity with 20 percent of total world industrial output, leading the world in producing oil, cast iron, steel, coke, mineral fertilizers, locomotives, tractors, and cement.

By the early 1940s, the Soviet economy had become relatively autarkic; for most of the period up until the creation of Comecon, only a very small share of domestic products were traded internationally. After the creation of the Eastern Bloc, external trade rose rapidly. Still the influence of the world economy on the USSR was limited by fixed domestic prices and state monopoly on the foreign trade. Grain and sophisticated consumer manufactures became major import articles from around 1960s. Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a variety of manufactured goods, primarily machinery, arms and military equipment, were exported from the country. In the 1970s-1980s, the Soviet Union heavily relied on fossil fuel exports to earn hard currency. At the peak level in 1988, it was the largest producer and second largest exporter of crude oil, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia.

The Soviet Union placed great emphasis on science and technology within its economy, however the most remarkable Soviet successes in technology, such as producing the world's first space satellite, typically were the military responsibility. During the arms race of the Cold War the Soviet economy was burdened by military expenditures, heavily lobbied by the powerful bureaucracy dependent on the arms industry. At the same time the Soviet Union became the largest arms exporter to the Third World. Significant amounts of the Soviet resources during the Cold War were allocated in aid to the other communist countries.

Since the 1930s and until its collapse in the late 1980s, the way the Soviet economy operated had remained essentially unchanged. The economy was formally directed by central planning, carried out by Gosplan and organized into five-year plans. In practice, however, the plans were highly aggregated and provisional, subject to ad hoc intervention by superiors. All key economic decisions were taken by the political leadership. Allocated resources and plan targets were normally denominated in rubles rather than in physical goods. Credits were discouraged, but widespread. Final allocation of output was achieved through relatively decentralized, unplanned contracting. Although in theory prices were legally set from above, in practice the actual prices were often negotiated, and informal horizontal links were widespread.

A number of basic services were state-funded, such as education and healthcare. In the manufacturing sector, heavy industry and defense were assigned higher priority than consumer goods production. Consumer goods, in particular outside large cities, were often in short supply, of poor quality and limited choice, as under command economy consumers' preferences wielded almost no influence over production, changing demands of the population with growing money incomes couldn't be matched by supplies at rigidly fixed prices.A massive unplanned second economy existed alongside the planned one at low levels, providing some of the goods and services that the planners could not. Legalization of some elements of the decentralized economy was attempted with the reform of 1965.

Although statistics of the Soviet economy is notoriously unreliable and its growth is difficult to estimate precisely, by most accounts it continued to expand positively until 1989-1990. During 1950s and 1960s the Soviet economy performed with comparatively high growth rates and was catching up with the West. However, after 1970 the growth, while still positive, steadily declined, much more quickly and consistently than in other countries, despite rapid increase in the capital stock, surpassed only by that in Japan. In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev pushed to reform the economy with his program of Perestroika in an attempt to revitalize it. His policies relaxed state control over enterprises, but hadn't yet allowed it to be replaced with market incentives, ultimately resulting in a sharp decline in production output. The economy, already suffering from reduced petroleum export revenues, started to collapse. Prices were still fixed, property was still largely state-owned until after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. For the most of the period after World War II and up to its collapse, the Soviet economy was the second largest in the world by GDP (PPP), though in per capita terms the Soviet GDP was behind that of the First World countries.

Greyhood (talk) 23:23, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

Feel free to do minor wording improvements. Regarding the ethnic groups I'd prefer to wait for Colchicum's answer before inserting anything into the article, if Colchicum still has an interest in that section. Greyhood (talk) 23:30, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

The ethnic groups section as it is is not ready, I thought I made it clear. There are mistakes in it. I'll correct them when I am back from a short wikibreak. Meanwhile, Paul Siebert hasn't yet sourced his additions concerning the Jewish issues, which I asked him to do long ago, still something to work on (some of them, unless carefully sourced, are dubious and really don't belong there).

Economy. Same here. No need to hurry. Try to take the points from my initial text into account. Well, it is up to me to reformulate them, I think, because it is impossible for you to summarize sources you haven't read. But you may at least discuss them with Radeksz for the time being, I think he knows what is needed and why. Perhaps there are some minor issues, I'll have to look into your last version more carefully a bit later. And the science & technology point doesn't really belong there in its present form (it goes to Culture, History, but not there). It is not in the sources you have added, so it is still not referenced. Please show me a source which makes a claim that can be reasonably construed as science and technology in the Soviet Union played an important role in the economic development and try to reformulate important role less evasively (because in a sense it is trivial). Again, Radeksz can explain it better. But I think you are reasonable enough yourself to understand that it (or, rather, something of the The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis on science and technology sort, which is not the same thing) should be in the Culture section, not here. A link to Gagarin? Seriously, it is out of the scope of the economy section. Btw, re Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a wide variety of manufactured goods were exported from the country, your source says manufactured goods, primarily machinery, arms, and military equipment, not a wide variety of manufactured goods. It would make more sense ("wide variety" is evasively worded and unsourced). And bauxite import was very important, as much as I hated aluminium kitchenware. It's aluminium ore, you know, and the Soviet Union imported about half of it from abroad, which is an unusually large share. Colchicum (talk) 23:55, 25 June 2010 (UTC)

And please, don't use sources you haven't checked, absolutely make sure that the sources you borrowed from the Economy of the Soviet Union really support the claims you think they support. The placement of inline references sometimes produce ambiguities, and articles tend to change over time regardless of the sources, so we should be extra careful here. Colchicum (talk) 00:01, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

Several points from your initial version need additional discussion, we may add them later if there is a consensus. I've provided a source for science and technology (in the context of economy), but OK, I'll reformulate the line a bit. OK I'll remove Gagarin even though it was as an important step in development of the space industry, and the issue is minor. The information from a pair of unchecked sources from Economy of the Soviet Union is supported also by the country study from the Library of Congress; you may check the old sources yourself, if you want, it is not crucial anymore. You may add bauxite later with a direct reference (since bauxites were mined in the Soviet Union too, I'm not sure about their significance as imports). Wide variety is in the CIA source, but OK I'll remove wide. So that's it. If there are no more remarks from anyone, I'll add the section soon. Greyhood (talk) 00:35, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

I believe you haven't yet addressed all comments made by me and Radeksz. It is a bit premature to add this. As long as some points need additional discussion, there is no need to hurry with the rest of them.

Please remove all the sources you have borrowed from other articles and haven't read yourself. This is not a legitimate use of sources. It is better to have an unsourced statement than a statement "sourced" this way.

From the CIA factbook: wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods and arms), roughly the same as manufactured goods, primarily machinery, arms, and military equipment, no need to be too vague, unqualified manufactured goods are much wider than that. Colchicum (talk) 00:55, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

I've removed two sources that I've borrowed from the economy of the Soviet Union. But otherwise I have addressed all or most of the comments from you and Radek, and more to say, I've tried to address them quickly and without too much argument. If there is something else, remind me or make further comments. But sorry, I have no time to discuss all this for days and days, especially minor points and issues. I'm also planning some wikibreaks and want to see some productive results of the discussion fixed at the current point. Now I'll wait for some time for Paul's or Radek's comments, or for new major remarks from you, but I'm not intending to let the matter go excessively long time. Greyhood (talk) 09:55, 26 June 2010 (UTC)

It's mostly pretty good. There is some, essentially stylistic issues, here:

A wide range of developed industries constituted the Soviet industrial sector in the later decades, including machine-building and metal-working, metallurgy, chemicals, petroleum and natural gas, coal mining, forestry, defense industry, textiles, food processing, and construction.[10][11] By 1980, the Soviet Union had the world's second largest industrial capacity with 20 percent of total world industrial output, leading the world in producing oil, cast iron, steel, coke, mineral fertilizers, locomotives, tractors, and cement. [12]

By the early 1940s, the Soviet economy had become relatively autarkic; for most of the period up until the creation of Comecon, only a very small share of domestic products were traded internationally.[13] After the creation of the Eastern Bloc, external trade rose rapidly. Still the influence of the world economy on the USSR was limited by fixed domestic prices and state monopoly on the foreign trade.[14] Grain and sophisticated consumer manufactures eventually became other important import articles.[13] Petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a variety of manufactured goods, primarily machinery, arms and military equipment, were exported from the country.[13][11] In the 1970s-1980s, the Soviet Union heavily relied on fossil fuel exports to earn hard currency.[13] At the peak level in 1988, it was the largest producer and second largest exporter of crude oil, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia.

The Soviet Union has placed great emphasis on science and technology in the context of economy,[15] however the most remarkable Soviet successes in technology, such as producing the world's first space satellite, typically were the military responsibility.[10] During the arms race of the Cold War the Soviet economy was burdened by military expenditures, heavily lobbied by the powerful bureaucracy dependent on the arms industry. At the same time the Soviet Union became the largest arms exporter to the Third World. Significant amounts of the Soviet resources during the Cold War were allocated in aid to the other communist countries.[13]

I would drop "developed" in the first sentence of the 1st paragraph since that's a judgement call (in this day and age metallurgy may not be seen as a "developed industry"). In the 2nd paragraph in the 2nd sentence it needs to be clarified that the "external trade" was with Soviet satellites, not with ... I dunno, Canada. "import articles" --> "imported articles".

In the last paragraph "in the context of economy" - I know what you're trying to say but the wording is awkward. The whole paragraph suffers from this kind of awkwardness.

Finally, the significant drawback I see is not what's in there, but rather the omission of the fact that relative to its rates of investment, the Soviet economy had some of the lowest growth rates in the world (the Easterly and Fischer work I keep referring to).radek (talk) 02:37, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

"developed" dropped, "in the context of economy" changed to "within its economy" ("played an important role" really is better and corresponds to the source, but it has raised too much questions from Colchicum). Regarding investment and growth rates, I wouldn't mind if you bring it into the article with a reference.

Now I'll insert the section into the article, since I believe the major questions have long been discussed, while the minor stylistic issues are better to fix right on the article's page, with more users participating. I won't remove the old CIA-based table myself since I believe CIA data is not so far from reality (though a bit inflated), but I won't mind if somebody else will remove it. Greyhood (talk) 08:45, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Alright, I'll add the text in once you put it in there.radek (talk) 20:52, 28 June 2010 (UTC)

Well, it is all very nice. As you don't wait for others, others won't wait for you from now on. Furthermore, though not a big deal for me, please be careful not to violate the CC-BY-SA 3.0/GFDL in the future. And you haven't read your sources, otherwise you would have noticed that Davies 1998 links to another Google book. Colchicum (talk) 11:51, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

I've checked the sources, that's why there is no Davies 1998 in the last variant of my text. Regarding waiting, well, sorry. First, I didn't know how long should I wait, and second, I won't be able to perform much discussion and editing in the next several weaks, since I'll be myself in the stance of wikibreak or semi-wikibreak. That's why I've followed WP:BOLD to make some positive result of our work on that section fixed. And above all, I don't like the old wikitactic of endless chatting about some minor issues on the talk page. By this moment we have already constructively discussed the major points related to what already is in my text, and I've tried to quickly remove, or source, or reword the lines you haven't liked. Others haven't objected to insertion of the new text into the article, and it was a definite improvement - a new, more comprehensive, better sourced version. Now, unless you have some completely new big issues to name, there is perhaps nothing more than minor style questions in the added version left unamended. I'm still open for the further discussion, especially regarding the points from your initial text that I haven't included, but please let's not waste too much time on things that don't deserve it. Greyhood (talk) 19:34, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

Well, isn't it amazing that you guys were chatting endlessly and insisted that I should wait for your objections and now all of a sudden this doesn't apply to you? Ok then, but I won't make the same mistake again. Next, this is not your text, it should be properly attributed. And I am afraid I am not open for any further discussion as I see no point in it anymore. BRD, ok, so be it. Cheers. Colchicum (talk) 19:54, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

I mean my edition or version of the text as opposed to your initial or not so much changed variant, you know this. And I don't remember when you had to wait too long for our objections (mine, at least). Well, perhaps for the objections to objections to objections or so. Anyway, it would not be good if the only our achievement here was the setting of this talk page to archive not after 3 months but after 3 weeks, without adding nothing to the article. We all've made mistakes here - no need to publish the proposed versions for several times, no need to discuss minor wording problems on the talk page when they could be easily amended while in the article, no need in too long lists of issues and an excessively multifaceted complicated discussion. We should be quick in publishing the parts we have a consensus on, discuss only the really important points on the talk page and fix the minor wording right in the article, that's it. Yes, perhaps BRD would be better, or long-term editing with small gradual additions and removals of material, or consequtive discussing and publishing of small chunks of text, not the entire big sections. Greyhood (talk) 21:02, 30 June 2010 (UTC)

The Davies source is accurate, when i re-wrote the economy article i must have messed up the links sorry. My apologies. All the information in the economy comes from third party sources, if not other wise stated/or not sourced. --TIAYN (talk) 21:41, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

Oh, just as I suspected - the link in question was messed (at least the page was given wrong). Anyway, TIAYN, thank you for your work on the Economy of the Soviet Union, some of the references and ideas from that article were very helpful. Greyhood (talk) 12:37, 7 July 2010 (UTC)