User:Falgaia/sandbox

Article 1

Plagiarism: Added citations to the Diet and Description sections, removing one [citation needed].

Cleaned up the grammar and flow of the article, as well as changing verb tenses to be more uniform. Also included a link to the Wiki page for Wildlife Trade in the Threats section, as well as the in text links listed below.

Added the following citations:

Added the following details:

"Gestation periods differ by species, ranging from roughly 70-140 days." (updated from a general statement that listed a blanket 120-150 days)

"[Pangolins ... of bush meat,] while local healers use the pangolin as a source of traditional medicine."

"Some species, such as Manis pentadactyla have become commercially extinct in certain ranges as a result of over hunting."

"Many attempts have been made to reproduce pangolins in captivity, but due to their reliance on wide ranging habitats and very particular diets, these attempts are often unsuccessful. Pangolins are susceptible to diseases such as pneumonia and the development of ulcers in captivity, complications which can lead to an early death. In addition, pangolins rescued from illegal trade often have a higher chance of being infected with parasites such as intestinal worms, further lessening their chance for rehabilitation and reintroduction to the wild."

ARTICLE 2

//citation added below, damage cost listed in sidebar changed to reflect this due to lacking citation.

At least 53 people died in New York as a result of the storm. Thousands of homes and an estimated 250,000 vehicles were destroyed during the storm, and the economic losses in New York City were estimated to be roughly $19 billion with an estimated $32.8 billion required for retoration across the state.

Immediate aftermath

//Consolidation of micro paragraphs into more cohesive arrangements, removal of an uncited statement. Relinked a broken citation to a new source that mentions the public health emergency declaration.

United States Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius declared a public health emergency October 31 for New York. In response, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) sent 30 teams of workers into damaged areas of the New York region.^[32]

During a news conference on November 1, Mayor Bloomberg announced that most parks would reopen on November 3; that Coney Island, the Rockaways, and parts of Staten Island would get temporary centers for the distribution of meals and bottles of water at a time; that AT&T would bring cellphone-charging and cell service-enabled pods to certain areas of New York City; and that 400 members of the National Guard were to go door-to-door to deliver meals and supplies to elderly and home-bound residents.^[29] A relief fund was created for residents of Staten Island. United States Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano toured the island on November 2.^[30] Time Warner Cable donated $500,000 to the Mayor's Fund to Advance New York City, and $50,000 each to the Red Cross of Northeastern New York and the Red Cross of Northern New Jersey. They also sent out vehicles with mobile charging stations and free WiFi access points, and additionally opened all of their WiFi spots in the city.^[31]On November 2, the state of New York created a $100 million fund to help people hit hardest.^[33]

On November 3, the National September 11 Memorial & Museum was being pumped free of floodwater and reopened on the 6th.^[34] Five emergency mobile gas stations were deployed by the military on the same day, offering 10 free gallons per person.^[35]

Thousands of runners who came to the city to run the New York City Marathon met in Central Park on November 4; due to the marathon's being called off, many went to Staten Island to help storm victims.^[36]

On November 5, meteorologists began tracking a coastal nor'easter that threatened cleanup and recovery efforts in the state on November 7 and 8.^[37] NYU Langone Medical Center, evacuated during the storm, began reopening on the same day,^[38] and about 750 workers resumed construction on Ground Zero.^[39]Governor Cuomo signed an executive order saying that displaced New Yorkers could vote in the 2012 United States elections at any polling place in the state.^[40]

On November 7, Governor Cuomo fired Steven Kuhr, the head of the New York Office of Emergency Management, after Cuomo discovered that Kuhr had sent Suffolk County workers to clear a tree in his Long Island driveway as other victims needed help.^[41] A day later, Cuomo said that the estimated storm damage in New York state was $33 billion.^[1] New York City and the counties of Nassau and Suffolk imposed "odd-even" gasoline rationing, as New Jersey had, to ease congestion and frustration at filling stations. The system began on November 9 in the wake of a shortage.^[42] Cuomo also temporarily waived certain taxes and pollution restrictions on fuel deliveries.^[43]

//Sentence deleted due to citation leading to a 404 Error and not being able to find a replacement.

Transportation

//Everything said here gets explained further down. Removed for redundancy.

Ground

The Holland Tunnel opened to buses only on November 2.^[69] HOV restrictions on bridges and Lincoln Tunnel ended on that day. By November 3, 80 percent of subway service was restored.^[70] On November 6, the Queens Midtown Tunnel reopened one lane for buses heading into and out of Manhattan during rush hour.^[71]The Holland Tunnel reopened November 7 at 5 a.m. EST.,^[72] while the Queens-Midtown Tunnel reopened on November 9 at 6 a.m. EST.^[73] The Hugh L. Carey Tunnel opened November 12 to limited rush-hour bus service.^[74]

//Deleted sentence here as a result of not seeing how it related to overall theme of the paragraph.

Events

//Deleted section about events that progressed as planned. The hurricane did not effect these events, so I see no reason for them to be included in an article about the Effects of Hurricane Sandy. Cancelled and Rescheduled events subsections combined due to lacking enough substance to stand alone.

Evacuations and rescues during storm

//Sentence removed due to being information later listed under Fires.

Damage

// Fatalities moved to here.

On November 26, Governor Cuomo said Sandy cost the state $32 billion in damage and loss. Mayor Bloomberg announced earlier in the day that the storm caused $19 billion in losses in New York City, which was included in the estimate Cuomo gave.^[94] At the time of the disaster, a total of 43 civilians were confirmed to have died as a result of the hurricane.

Fires

On October 30, over 190 firefighters fought a six alarm fire that destroyed 111 structures and damaged another 20 in Breezy Point, Queens, as a result of the storm. The area had been under evacuation orders, but some residents rode out the storm. One firefighter and two residents were injured. The rescuers were in chest-deep water and had to use a boat to reach survivors. A transformer explosion is suspected to have caused the fire.^[100] On October 31, Breezy Point residents pledged to rebuild their community.^[101]

//Sentence here was uncited and not relevant to fires. Paragraph below editted to include more information from the source in addition to reading more coherently.

Suffolk county suffered an outbreak of fires in the aftermath of the storm with ten separate instances occurring at once as a result of downed trees collapsing on power lines and exploding transformers. Compounded with the floodwaters, the situation taxed first responders heavily, leading to instances where firefighters became trapped due to rising waters as they were working to save affected residents.^[89]One home in West Babylon and another in Lindenhurst were burning continuously, and both had to be knocked down with payloaders.^[89]

Political

//Unnecessary quote removed and citations added, as well as cleaning up the section regarding the ad campaign to read better. Removed from Events subsection and given its own header.

The hurricane damaged many homes beyond habitability. Governor Cuomo worked closely with President Barack Obama and with Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey, which was even more hard-hit, to come to their aid. Cuomo allowed New York voters, via a specific provision aimed at accommodating those displaced, to cast provisional ballots for the 2012 election anywhere in New York state. He also appointed a commission to examine the responses of New York utilities to damage caused by the storm, and to help lower the energy costs of residents affected by the damage. The Cuomo administration used $140 million of the funds originally allocated to this commission in order to pay for the broadcast of national TV ads encouraging businesses to return to New York after the disaster.^[81][82] Many have been critical of the effort, including former New York governor Eliot Spitzer, who called the ads "fluff" and "a waste of taxpayer money".^[81][82]

Margaret Higgins Feedback

I think your second contribution is great but I'm still a little confused on what you actually contributed. Did you add/change all of these sentences? In your sandbox I would highlight the specific things you changed in each of the paragraphs if you would like to continue arranging it this way. Several times you say that you removed a sentence or cited source. I would try to clarify which sentence was removed and which sources were cited more explicitly. Overall though, I think you made a great contribution to the article.

ARTICLE 3: FORWARD

//Here's an interesting case. On the talk page for the Vajont Dam disaster, I found that another Wikipedia user back in 2015 had created an english translation of the much more in-depth Italian Wikipedia Article of the same page, but the draft they submitted was criticized for being overly long and lacking citations and was declined as a result. As such, I'm going to spend this assignment proofreading and correcting the original draft in the hopes of being able to resubmit the draft and get it approved for use. Onwards!

Note: Everything in Italics is showing the progress I have made in re-writing the article.

Vajont Dam Disaster

The Vajont Dam disaster was the event that occurred on the evening of October 9 1963 at the hydroelectric dam at Vajont, because of the fall of a colossal landslide from the overlying slope Monte Toc in the waters of the underlying and eponymous alpine lake basin. The resulting overflow of the water contained in the reservoir, with the effect of run-off of the shores of the lake, and the overcoming of the newly completed dam across the gorge, caused the flood and led to the complete destruction of several villages of the Veneto valley , including Longarone, as well as the deaths of roughly 2000 people.

The disaster, after many debates, processes and writings, was identified as being due to the neglect of the designers, as well as the companies and organizations that ignored the known geological reports and subsequent studies, in particular the Società Adriatica di Elettricità ("SADE", or "EDIS," English: Adriatic Energy Corporation) and the managing body after nationalization ("ENEL", part of the Ministry for Public Works), which hid the fact that Mount Toc, which held the dam on one side, was unstable and unsuitable for dam construction from the general public.

Description

At 22:39 of October 9, 1963, about 260 million cubic meters of rock slid at a speed of 67 mph (108 km/ h) in the reservoir created by Vajont dam below (which contained about 115 million cubic meters of water at the time of the disaster), causing a tsunami that crested the dam by over 200 meters. Waves additionally went up the opposite slope, destroying all the villages along the banks of the lake in the town of Erto and Casso. Roughly 25-30 million cubic feet of water came rushing into the Piave valley, completely destroying the village of Longarone as well as several others that lay within the flood's path.

The event had a number of causes, including poor management, miscommunication, and refusal of research data. This, combined with abundant rainfall at the time of the disaster, and a lack of understanding as to the geological construction and stability of Mount Toc, led to a wave much larger than anything that had been predicted. Several models had been created to test the ability of the dam to hold water in the event of a landslide, but none could predict the speed or mass at which the landslide would occur.

Harbingers of the project

The shortage of raw fuels such as coal in Italy prompted the country to look for new alternative energy sources. Exploiting the many rivers that flowed through the country, engineers began to create a series of dams to harness hydroelectric power in order to fuel the industrial development of the country. The idea of using the Vajont River valley as the site for a hydroelectric dam was first materialized by hydroelectric company Veneta, which would later absorbed by SADE, particularly before the nationalization of the electricity sector of Italy through the creation of ENEL ("National Agency for Electric Energy"). Despite public outcry to the creation of the dam, the project was accepted by the agency.

In this context, the first case of a preliminary project for the exploitation of the waters of the stream Vajont was drafted by Carlo Semenza in 1926. The dam was scheduled to close the Casso bridge (that once existed east of the industrial area at the foot of the fork to Casso) and included a central Dogna. The choice was the daughter of a recommendation of Prof. Hug that had discouraged the alternative further downstream at the bridge of Colomber (where the artifact was later actually built).

In 1929 was presented with the grant application for the construction of a dam project to bridge Casso (maximum storage quota to 656 m s.l.m. ) with attached a report from Hug 1926. The geological studies on the valley affected by the new reservoir and continued in 1930 Giorgio Dal Piaz presented a report relating to the absence of major landslides along the banks of the basin between the area of Pineda (east) and the bridge of Casso (west).

In 1937 was presented a new project with displacement of the dam further west near the bridge of Colomber up to the point where the road from Longarone to Erto saliva it crossed the gorge on the Vajont stream passing from the left bank to the right of the valley. The maximum storage was expected to share 660 m s.l.m. ; it was attached to a geological report signed Dal Piaz substantially mating with that of 1930, which extended the validity of its claims to the new location of the dam. It should be emphasized, however, that in its previous report of 1928 Dal Piaz had always opposed the damming of the valley near the bridge Casso because he believed the rock sets the dam at that point not suited for which the artifact could not have been more up to fifty meters from the base of the stream.

The project of the "Great Vajont"

The dam, despite the stresses almost 10 times higher than those provided by the project, resisted wave, which destroyed only the shelf of reinforced concrete "stitched" to the dam on which rested the road linking the left bank of the vajont Vajont Dam March 30, 2013 view from the basin of the mountain

The idea of change in the original plan by formulating the hypothesis of a single system integrated with the other surrounding valleys is attributed to Carlo Semenza that formulated the first time in 1929. The project is usually identified with the name "Great Vajont".

The aim of the project was to create in the middle of the mountains Dolomite a water reserve (buffer container pluristagionale) allowing to exploit the gravitational energy (because the dams allow to use water as the working fluid), in the form of water power, to bring electricity to Venice and the whole Triveneto area, even during the dry rivers. The reservoir was created to accumulate the waters of the river Piave after their passage in the dam of Pieve di Cadore, from which he came in the tank Vajont through pipes with minimum altitude and therefore less loss of gravitational energy. To this system were added, through pipelines and bridges-pipe, also lakes Vodo and Valle di Cadore (on stream Boite ),of Pontesei (on stream Mae ) and Val Gallina(Charging Dock Central Soverzene). It was therefore designed a large system of communicating vessels, with small differences between them, worked by small power plants (Pontesei, Colomber for Vajont and Gardona) and all converge in the central main Soverzene (220 MW, at the time the largest Europe). The deep gorge of Vajont, which comes from Pre-Alps carniche and it flows into the river Piave, along the Monte Toc, between the the province of Belluno and the the province of Pordenone, established later (1968), it appeared to be the most suitable place to build the double-arch dam that eventually turned out to be the highest in the world.

The demand for a dam in the Vajont valley high up at an altitude of 667m above sea level and the barrier at the Colomber was introduced in 1940. There was a report attached to the Dal Piaz identical to that of 1937.

At the end of World War II, projects the Vajont was resumed. The final concession was granted by Presidential Decree nr. 729 of 21 March 1948; The initial project was a dam dual arc high 202 m with a reservoir of 58.2 million cubic meters. Also in 1948 he began to develop the idea of raising the dam up to 679 m s.l.m. fully exploiting the geological characteristics of the Vajont Limestone that characterized the engagement point of the dam in the valley sides.

Scientific observation[edit | edit source]

Given that the dynamics of the catastrophe was materialize for a competition of natural elements and important human responsibility, the scientific investigations revealed some elements related to the morphological constitution of the valley.

Site geology[edit | edit source]

The geology of the site was identified, according to research of the first sixties, in the following stratigraphic sequence: Jurassic :

• G1: Levels limestones marl and flint, gray-dark, layered in an intense and subtle, with inserts of calcareous marl. (Lias)
• G2: oolitic limestone, dolomite at the base, compact and stratified chaotic and vaguely ordered. (Dogger-Malm)
• G3: three levels recognized, (Malm):

• Lists with dark gray limestone and chert nodules, thinly laminated with interlayers basal greenish marl and limestone and interbedded with marl and clay;
• Gray limestone, and, gradually, from an average of thinly stratified;
• Limestone and calcareous marl, similar to baseline, but in banks of more than one meter thick.

Spatial structure[edit | edit source]

In the Oligocene, during the Alpine orogeny, (30 million years ago), marl and limestone formations clay were bent, fractured and raised; these, towards the base, have a surface inclined at a tension that has been involved in the enormous slips of Monte Toc.

From the structural point of view in the area can be recognized two folds with both main axis oriented in the direction EW namely:

• The Pelf-Frugna anticline, whose axis runs along the Val Gallina and crosses the valley of Vajont whose core consists of the Main Dolomite;
• The Erto syncline, recognizable in the valley of Erto, with the core training flysch.

The southern flank of the syncline is asymmetric along its axis, set to the Vajont valley, and constitutes the northern flank of Mount Toc from which the landslide arose.

In terms of morphology, the Vajont valley was created by glacial erosion during and following the last Ice Age. To the initial glacial erosion was added the subsequent torrential erosion as glacial waters melted, generating the deep "V" of the valley and an ideal profile for a dam.

Climate[edit | edit source]

The Vajont is located in an area with high rainfall with maximum in spring and in autumn and minimum in winter. The action of freeze-thaw insists on the southern slope of the valley. Moreover, given the exposure of the same to the East-West, it is subjected to a little sun.

In 1962 - 63, the level of rainfall was so low that, to compensate for the possible Water Crisis and continuing with the activities of electricity production, the level of the reservoir was increased despite fears that went with it.

This was, regardless of the reasons, a rather disconcerting decision when it is considered that just to avoid the landslides threatening the basin and the surrounding area it was decided to slowly lower the level itself. This increase in such a sensitive time may have been the precursor of the landslide, so that, although he was a "hydraulic" with a reservoir full, may have originated because of a drought.

Such a decision is partly explained by the nationalization of the hydroelectric industry started in the same year of the disaster ^{[citation needed]}. The manufacturer private SADE had an urgency that was done testing the dam so that it can sell to the state, he was nationalizing the electrical industries. The state of transience in which he was the baby Authority for Electricity perhaps not allowed to check in detail the conditions of all the work that the company was selling it privately SADE.

Studies[edit | edit source]

Notes on the studies carried out before the disaster[edit | edit source]

The construction of the dam began in 1957 : the mountainside above the dam was once kept in check. For this reason, the famous Austrian specialist in mineral exploration Leopold Müller was consulted to evaluate the problems of stability of the rock. However, in this first study of its investigations did not reveal the paleolandslide that then would be seen as a major cause, although the conclusion was that the water supply could cause landslides, and one million cubic meters.

Dal Piaz, however, even a year later, in 1958, did not consider that they were present real risks of dangerous landslides. Only in 1959 the geologist Edoardo Semenza - son of the chief designer Carlo Semenza - found in a survey on field presence, in the left side, the obvious dangers of an area of mylonites cementless, long about 1.5 km ^[8]. This led Edoardo Semenza to assume the presence of a paleolandslide. The geophysical geologist prof. Peter Caloi seemed to indicate instead the next study (November 1959) that the area to the left of the valley was "exceptionally" solid, compact rocks covered by just 10-20 meters of loose debris.

Meanwhile, in 1959 the dam had been completed and had started to fill the reservoir. However, as already seen, Nov. 4 1960, with the lake level to 650 meters above sea level, there was a landslide of medium size (800,000 m³) on the left side; after this event yet Müller studied the territory and proposed several hypotheses to avoid the landslide of the slope, although he did not believe even in the presence of landslides. It was not opposed to the construction of the dam, but he feared the possibility of a landslide uncontrolled, so as to suggest various remedies, the most viable of which was perhaps a drainage tunnel which passes through limestone layers compact, reached from under the landslide masses and it convogliasse the water away. The bell tower of Pirago, village of Blyth, remained standing after the passage of the wave of death. The church at his feet was completely wiped out along with the entire village. Among other possible working hypotheses, none of them seemed really feasible: sbancare the landslide or the cement, the most realistic, were in fact, for the magnitudes involved, solutions deemed too costly and difficult to achieve.

However, the fact remained that the issue should be better understood. Surveys and prospecting continued to be provided, although digging into the layers of debris presented considerable technical difficulties.

In 1960 Caloi geoseismic resumed his studies and, to everyone's surprise, took up to 150 m of fractured rock concludes, even more surprising, that the fracture had to have happened after his first survey of the previous year.

As we saw in 1961, at the behest of Carlo Semenza, a scale model 1: 200 of the Vajont basin was prepared and tested in the center hydraulic models of Nine of Vittorio Veneto, under the guidance of the owner of the Institute of Hydraulics dell ' University of Padua, Augusto Ghetti, assuming the possibility of a landslide with surface movement of 30 ° and 40 ° and times landslide evaluated until the time of a minute (already considered exceptionally fast with the data held at the time). The total was considered enough to not have to fear or breakdown of the dam or flares over the same by the tidal waves generated, not higher than thirty meters, corresponding to 40 million m³ in the worst case. But in reality the landslide was almost 300 million cubic meters (about 8 times the maximum expected value) and moved to three times faster than expected; all this produced a kinetic energy of almost 100 times greater than expected, and the level of the wave passed the 200 m on top of the dam.

In the meantime, however, they were implanted piezometers - albeit with great difficulty (due to the need to reach the layers when there was aquifer ),as well as markers of land to see the movements of the landslide. Despite the difficulties in interpreting the data they provided, they were very helpful in determining how to proceed empirically to reduce the landslide.

The strategy of Müller provided that the landslide in any case out of control, and the tactic recommended after that of 1960 was slow emptying of the basin up to the level of 600 m s.l.m., to realize with multiple maneuvers decrease in the level of 4-5 m in less, each spaced by a pause of several days to give the way and the time the material to adjust and remain stable despite the change of hydraulic condition.

Thus, the movement of the landslide almost stopped in a short time, and probably would not be reactivated without violently over the return portion 700 m s.l.m., if the testing requirements had not "imposed". The area of the landslide, the lower the mass of debris still present.

Subsequent studies[edit | edit source]

After the landslide, they were intensively studied the causes and measures to be used to prevent further cases similar to this. Many jobs study completed. Among them, those of Müller, Trevisan, and Hendron-Patton, the most recent, in 1985.

This study provides definitive confirmation of the presence of two distinct aquifer levels, the upper one, which was affected directly the level of the lake, and the lower, dependent on rainfall.

they were conducted polls and found that the level said Fonzaso with clay was what amounted to the failure surface of the landslide. This layer would also have caused the separation of the two aquifers which proved so important: that the mass of the landslide and that the underlying layers of limestone. Note that the upper level of the aquifer was found, according to three piezometers installed, directly linked to that of the lake.

The aquifer below, however, given the presence positioned in structural geology of a synclinal but also of a limestone layer, is on one side isolated from direct contact with the water contained in the lake and on the other is instead result connected to the rains, also its water remains in the area for a long time and favors phenomena Karst. The change in the level of groundwater is in contrast to what was thought previously, slow and linked to atmospheric phenomena (rains upstream).

That seemed plausible that, actually, the lower pressure of the aquifer was capable, occurred when heavy rainfall, causing landslides, even when there was the artificial lake.

However, the combination of these two factors, lake and rain, triggered this colossal landslide when the combination of heavy rainfall and high lake level proved enough all'innesco.

In summary, the causes preparatory or predisposing to the Vajont disaster were varied, and also variously interpreted, but some seem sufficiently and identified:

• the geological structure (as described above) of the northern slope of Mount Toc.
• deforestation.
• a progressive decay of the mechanical properties of the base of rocks subject to movement.
• and secondly, earthworks and the incisions caused by the construction of roads and canals in the area in question.
• the presence of the artificial lake and in particular the reduction of the weight of water in coincidence of flares.
• heavy rains, which did nothing but worsen the problems of stability of the slope, with the same level of the lake. It is estimated now that the landslide could occur even with rains only above a certain amount (700 mm) in a month, but here we must add also the dam lake.

The background

What the area, despite its geometric qualities of 'reservoir' in terms of volume and positioning, was far from stable, the show of historical documents dating back to Catullo, which speaks of a landslide that fell on the valley floor, damming it.

In the same area, occurred in landslides 1347, 1737, 1814, 1868. it pulled in particular by Mount Antelao, causing casualties and considerable damage.

• In the nearby valley of San Lucano, landslides occurred in 1748, 1908 and 1925.
• But what about the story of Vajont, interest may be credited to the landslide Pontesei (in the neighboring valley Zoldo ),and that of Mount Toc November 4 1960.

The first was related to the presence of a reservoir, one of many of the Belluno, for the production of Electricity. The characteristics of the landslide have been a preview of the Vajont. At 7 am on 22 March 1959 a mass of 3 million m³ broke away from the foot of Mount Castellin and Spiz, on a front of 500 meters and fell into the lake Pontesei 2-3 minutes, or one of the reservoirs. The event provoked the formation of a wave which overcame the dam for at least 7 meters, despite the basin was at a level of 13 meters beneath the rim of the dam. The wave hit the poor Archangel Tiziani, overseer of the dam whose body was never found.

The event had a long face landslide of about 500 meters and its dynamics saw the landslide surface of a considerable thickness of debris moraine.

The landslide of November 4 1960 saw 800,000 m³ instead come off from Mount Toc and fall into the reservoir causing a wave of 10 meters high. Although no damage, this event was a clear warning on the precariousness of slope stability, and this with a level of the surface of the basin that reached a height of only 650 meters. At the same time he opened a huge crack perimeter on the mountain, drawing a M, long slit over 2500 meters on the northern slopes of the Mount Toc between an altitude of 930 and 1360 meters s.l.m.^[9]

At that point he was given orders to flare basin, intensified studies to better understand the structure of the place, and was finally practiced a tunnel bypass to keep connecting the dock even if it had been cut in half by a large landslide, to prevent arbitrary increases the level upstream thereof.

The journalist Unity Tina Merlin, that denounced a series of articles with the danger of landslide of the Monte Toc

The journalist Unity Tina Merlin wrote to about these events:

Already two years before the tragedy, Tina Merlin anticipated what might happen in the valley, with an article in the Unity on February 21 1961, in which the journalist denounced the possibility that the landslide fell into the lake, causing massive damage^[10][11].The same Merlin pleaded an information campaign against the dam for the duration of the construction work, by consulting the inhabitants of the valley below Mount Toc. Unheard by the institutions, the journalist was denounced for "spreading false and misleading information likely to disturb public order" through his articles, tried and acquitted by the Court of Milan.

In 1963, Indro Montanelli and Dino Buzzati took a critical position about the real causes of the tragedy, stating the nature of the natural disaster itself, and accusing of "looting" the activities of some Italian journalists, including in fact Tina Merlin, accusing it of political speculation for his writings^[12].Years after Montanelli clarified its position, arguing that at the time he wanted to avoid an "advance of sentencing based on the items" because in his opinion "at that time was the widely held suspicion that the rumors wanted only benefit the cause of the political party that demanded the nationalization of the electricity industry. " However taken note of the criminal liability established in court and even though it considers to have been misinterpreted, apologized anyway: "With this, I do not mean to defend a mistake. I made him. But I fear that, in similar circumstances, would go back to committing"^[13].

From construction to disaster

The work of the dam

Inside the cabin centralized controls; The technical picture is Ing. Mario Pancini SADE[delete-, who committed suicide in 1968]. The photo is taken from the movie "H MAX 261,6m" Uni Europa Film, wanted by the designer of the work in memory of the work done

After the Second World War, the Vajont project began to take shape.

The geological controls began in 1949 and with them the first acts of protest of the authorities involved in the project: the construction of the dam would have indeed brought the inhabitants of the countries of Casso and Erto the abandonment of homes and productive land.

Despite the protests of the inhabitants of the valley and the strong doubts of the bodies responsible for monitoring the project in the mid- Fifties began the first expropriation land and site preparation: the work on the construction of the dam began in 1956, ^{[citation needed]}.

The project obtained the full ministerial approval on July 17 1957.

After the project was modified: the dam would reach the height of 261.60 m, a useful reservoir of 152 million cubic meters. The reservoir of the dam was in effect larger than ever expected.

The cost of construction of the dam was sustained thanks to a contribution of 45% of the expenditure, provided at the time of the design, by the government.^[8]

In August 1958 began the jets for the construction of the dam. ^[14]

At the end of the redesign, which saw the rise of about 60 m and the capacity of the basin tripled, the Vajont dam had the following characteristics:

• Type: arch dam with double curvature concrete
• Actual start work: 1957
• Manufacturer: Group S.A.D.E. - Adriatic Society of Electricity in Venice
• Completion: 1959.
• Overall height: 264.6 m
• Width at the base: 3.4 m
• Width at the top: 27 m
• level of maximum storage: 722.5 m s.l.m.
• level of maximum flood: 462.0 m s.l.m.
• Maximum: 725.5 m s.l.m.
• Reservoir overall capacity: 168 715 000 cubic meters (150 million net)
• Deaths during the construction of the dam: 15

The triggers audits by the Lake[edit | edit source]

The view from dam Longarone On June 15, 1957 Board of Public Works gave a favorable opinion to the raising of the dam with prescription complete geological surveys

with a decision that further aroused many doubts, in particular on the absence of a rationale in approving a project for which they were required further investigation. If the issue has been largely superseded by modern legislation (which requires tightened preventive controls throughout the basin), this recommendation was the subject of a dispute between the proponents of the different interpretations of the facts of the Vajont, as some surveys had indeed been carried out (e.g. in the village of Erto) and the subject of a report Dal Piaz of June to September 1957. The evidence further demonstrate the incompleteness-inadequacy thereof.

On August 6, 1957 was delivered to SADE a new relationship of geotechnical Müller (the 2nd) in which it showed strong dangers of landslides along the left bank of the reservoir. It was the first report that instilled doubts on the left bank of the basin, although it relates only to the front and shallowest of the great landslide of Toc which was highlighted only years later. In this first study of its investigations did not reveal the landslides that then would be seen as a major cause of problems to the tank, even if his conclusion was that the reservoir could cause landslides, and one million cubic meters.

On 22 March 1959, after which the construction work of the dam Vajont had already begun, a landslide of about 3 million cubic meters of rock poured into the reservoir of the dam in the village Pontesei, which had been completed only two years earlier by the same EDIS and was closely monitored by the local presence of two landslides: that of "Pontesei-Fagarè", origin of the flood and that of "Pontesei shoulder dam". The wave generated killed the worker Archangel Tiziani Company Cargnel, while two technicians SADE managed to escape.

The following events are crucial to analyze the changing attitude of the technicians of the SADE, in particular a letter the next day (March 23):

In another letter of March 27, always relative to Pontesei, Caloi says:

The writings of Caloi are exemplary to highlight it because it changed the attitude of EDIS after the events Pontesei that drove sensibly to deepen studies on the Vajont basin, both to demonstrate an attitude of connivance or at least some of subjection technicians, compared to the work of the same (according to some authors as entered in the "payroll" of the firm).

In this respect, Edoardo Semenza writes:

In this regard, the court ruled that the Eagle was the landslide Pontesei descent in about two minutes.

Despite Dal Piaz in its report related to the construction of the ring road on the left bank of the Vajont October 29, 1959 had considered that there were real risks of dangerous landslides, events Pontesei had convinced SADE to explore the theme. The task of further study of the shores of the Vajont basin was then entrusted to Müller, who as geomechanical was already following the problems of the taxes of the dam.

The checks on the banks identify the landslide on the left side of the pelvis[edit | edit source]

Performed an inspection on site July 21, 1959, Müller commissioned a study plan initially only informally.

This study was entrusted to the geologist Edward Semenza - son of the chief designer Carlo Semenza - who was later assisted by the geologist Franco Judges. Seeds discovered in a survey on field presence, in the left side of the valley of Vajont, to obvious hazards from one area of mylonites uncemented, long about 1.5 km ^[8]. This led Edoardo Semenza to assume the presence of landslides, which covered the entire area in the lower portion of Mount Toc started from the steep walls of the gorge torrent Vajont north ("Castelletto", "Punta del Toc" and "Wall North Toc ") exceeded the flattest part of the slopes of the mountain (" Pian del Toc "and" Pian della Pozza or rest ") going on (southbound) the dorsal more impervious to the" Tower of Punta Vasei "and" Beak of Toc ". And inform the Müller formalized a plan of study based on his very detailed written proposal included in its 6th report of 10 October 1959. The final report Judges-Semenza was then officially handed over at the beginning of June 1960.

The findings were also suggested to carry out a survey geoseismic through the supposed paleolandslide that was entrusted to Prof. Peter Caloi. The results obtained (in November 1959) seemed to indicate instead that the area to the left of the valley was "exceptionally" solid, compact rocks covered by just 10-20 meters of loose debris. The report was delivered Caloi definitively February 4, 1960.

The results of the two studies antipodes imposed an examination of the theme that was favored by subsequent events.

The first test of the rains (filling/flooding) and highlight the great landslide[edit | edit source]

The front of the landslide on the northern side of the Toc, highlighted again with the big "M". In the meantime, the construction of the building were continued and in September 1959 the dam was completed. October 28, 1959 SADE advanced application of experimental (filling/flooding) to a height of 600m above sea level, which was passed to a height of 595m above sea level on Feb. 9, 1960.

In March 1960, when the reservoir Vajont was roughly at an altitude of 590 m above sea level in the northern wall of the Toc overlooking the valley (in the east of the river Massalezza virtually opposite the junction for Casso) there was the collapse of a small portion of "North Wall of Toc" near its western base. It also witnessed the remobilization of "Castelletto Toc" place just west of the river Massalezza and facing the "Punta del Toc".

They continued in the meantime investigations suggested by Müller in May 1960 led to the installation of the first cornerstones for identifying potential landslides Toc through topographic measurements. The measurements, made with the reservoir at an altitude of 595m above sea level, the movement took over the northern part of the Toc, with increasing speed which resulted in the following months.

On 10 May 1960 the SADE sought permission to bring the reservoir at an altitude of 660m above sea level without first proceeding with the flare, and its license was granted on 11 June 1960. During the same period was also delivered the final report Judges of the study-Semenza, in which it was confirmed the supposed presence of large landslide.

On July 9, 1960 was delivered the report Dal Piaz about the slope stability of the entire basin. To the northern side of Toc it essentially denied the existence of the landslide-paleolandslide.

In the meantime, continued checks Semenza relating to his hypothesis of landslides. In particular, he discovered in late July and August 2, 1960 the probable southern edge of landslides (i.e. the mountainous part of it and closer to the top of the Toc) at the point of separation of the stream Massalezza in both Western and Eastern branches converging "Y" in the main course and usually dry. In them you could observe the transition from sound rock outcropping to the south (mountain side), to the crushed or finely ground outcropping north (side valley of Vajont).

Towards the end of October 1960 with the reservoir at about 645m altitude above sea level, while the movements of the landslide reached and exceeded the alarming rate of less than 3 cm per day (which was never previously achieved in ' imminence of posting in 1963), on the slopes of Mount Toc (from an altitude of 1200 down) appeared the crack perimeter mountain side of the moving mass. Its lateral margins were apparent only in part to higher altitudes, while they appeared scarcely perceptible at lower altitudes. This large crack on the mountain was shaped roughly like a large "M" (which can be seen by the side of the Vajont river), wide between 0.5m and 1m, he immersed himself deeply at an angle of approximately 40 °. The two tips of the "M" started from altitude 1200m above sea level and 1400 meters and came up to about 600m above sea level altitude.

On November 4, 1960 there was a warning omen of disaster: about 750,000 cubic meters of earth and rock (the part facing the gorge had already slumping move tens of meters down in the spring of that ' year) they came tumbling into the basin, who was with the water at an altitude of 650m above sea level.

The new proposed studies and attempts to save the facility[edit | edit source]

Carlo Semenza, designer of the dam and creator of the "tunnel or overtaking bypass" on the right side of the valley of Vajont

The movements on the entire side of the mountain, which covered a front of nearly 3 km, with obvious signs of movement-slip on the sides of the big "M" that had grown to form (the index of the mass movement was parallel to that of the lateral line of rupture and was then in a northerly direction i.e. towards the basin), while if not interpreted in a unanimous way (the discrepancies concerned now only the depth of the moving mass, and then the actual volume in cubic meters of the same) They marked a turning point.

The board of SADE interpellarono immediately Müller after several inspections advised them to lower the lake level. It was therefore performed a controlled flare (5m in two days) and gradual (then followed by a rest period of four days with a constant level basin). This allowed immediate slowing of movements and with water at about 600m altitude above sea level, a stop almost final (December 1960).

was immediately performed (December 1960) a new geological survey (conducted again by Caloi) from which it emerged that the rock now had poor mechanical properties. Some authors believe that the earlier investigation of Caloi (in which they had been excluded problems whatsoever to the slopes of Mount Toc) had not been performed or interpreted correctly. The report was officially handed over on Feb. 10, 1961.

Realizing that the fall of a landslide (even in the most optimistic on the volume) would render useless the tank obstructing the "mouth" and putting in danger the rest of the valley (with an uncontrolled increase of the lake water) Carlo Semenza, proposed the construction of a tunnel (known to history as the tunnel overtaking or bypass) that passing under the mountain Jump on the right side of the valley, could exceed the area "unsafe" on the left side of Vajont.

The tunnel was dug between February and September 1961 at the east entrance of Mill Thick to share 617,4m above sea level (you can access it again down the road that leads to the dam from Erto turning left before artificial tunnel rockfall) and outlet near the dam at an altitude of 600,7m above sea level. This imposed to keep the water of the tank below this level for the whole period of the work. They were also made two service windows at the bridge of Casso (613,9m) and the bridge of Colomber (608m).

New study elements: the 15th report Müller[edit | edit source]

The report delivered by Müller February 3, 1961, commonly known as the serial number 15, as it was precisely its 15th report, dealt exclusively with the landslide of the slopes of Mount Toc and has always been one of the points greater contrast between the authors who have dealt with the events of the Vajont.

While not agreeing with Judges-Semenza on the assumption of landslides, the geomechanical Austrian agree with them that there is on the left side of Vajont a large landslide, showing how in his opinion there is no doubt about the deep lay of the plan sliding (thickness of the landslide) and assuming a mass movement of about 200 million cubic meters of material (wandering about a quarter less than what will be then verified later), but providing yet one of the most accurate forecast data then available.

This fairly accurate detection of the moving mass, was in fact the reason for the dispute between the various authors, as the champions of predictability have always used this report to demonstrate that it was possible that the technicians of the SADE before, ENEL-SADE then, they did not clearly in sight of the values of the masses involved. And why in the tests on the hydraulic model (which will be equipped to nine and which will be discussed in the next section) will not have ever been carried out based on his assumption of the volumes on the move.

Indeed, its relationship remains illuminating in many respects, both as regards the identification of the correlation between the level of the lake water and precipitation with respect to movements of the landslide, both for providing a series of measures to be carried out and countermeasures that can be used in order to solve problems that were gripping the tank.

Studies on the hydraulic model of the basin[edit | edit source]

After the discovery of the landslide of the northern slopes of Mount Toc, it was decided to deepen the studies on the following effects: 1) dynamic actions on the dam; 2) Effects of air in the tank and the dangers to the surrounding areas, with particular attention to the village of Erto. 3) Hypothesis of a partial rupture of the dam and subsequent examination of the wave and its propagation route along the last stretch of Vajont and along the Piave, until Soverzene and beyond.

The study was performed at the first point of the ISMES (Institute of Experimental Models and Structures), Bergamo (born in 1951), while for others the Sade decided to build a physical model-hydraulic basin in which to perform experiments on the effects of the fall of a landslide in a reservoir.

The model in scale 1: 200 of the pelvis, which can still be visited, was set up at the hydroelectric power station of Nine (loc. Botteon of Borgo Vittorio Veneto ) of SADE and became the C.I.M. (Center Models Plumbers). The experiments were entrusted to professors and Marzolo Ghetti, university professors of the Institute of Hydraulics and Hydraulic Works of ' University of Padua and were carried out with funding from the Sade and under the control of the research department of the company.

The study aimed to verify the effects on hydraulic dam and reservoir on the banks of the landslide and was then referred to this way rather than to reproduce the natural phenomenon of the landslide. The experiments were conducted in two different series (August-September 1961, and January-April 1962), the first of which served to substantially refine the model.

The first series of experiments[edit | edit source]

The first series of 5 experiments began August 30, 1961 with a sliding surface of the landslide plane inclined by 30 °, consisting of a plank of wood covered by a metal sheet. The crumbling mass was simulated by gravel held by networks of flexible metal, which were initially held in place by ropes then suddenly loosened. In early September they were carried out other 4 trials designed to have for guidance. The first always with a plane inclined at 30 °, the following 3 with an inclined plane of 42 °. Found it impossible to reproduce in the model the natural geological phenomenon of the landslide, the model was developed by modifying the surface movement of the landslide, which was replaced with a brick (their profiles were processed by that E.Semenza to establish them also he took advantage of surveys that had already been made and that they had provided sufficient elements of judgment in this sense) and to enable the change in the rate of fall of the landslide in the tank (made difficult by the new form "in the back" of the surface of movement) and simulate compactness of the material in motion (which in the model remained the gravel) were inserted rigid areas that were towed through the rope pulled by a tractor.

The second series of experiments[edit | edit source]

In these 17 experiments conducted from January 3, 1962 to April 24, 1962, the material "crumbling" was still gravel this time held through networks of hemp and lanyards. Assuming Muller on the different characteristics of the moving mass of the downstream part of the river Massalezza (west) and the upstream part of the same (east), all experiments were performed by bringing down those two hypothetical parts of the landslide separately. In the model, however, the two landslides were made initially off at different times so that their effects were totally separated and subsequently when the wave produced from the first turned back so as to obtain a total superelevation of the lake water also increased.

The final report by Ghetti[edit | edit source]

The total superelevation water tank (measured by special instruments) was broken down into "static superelevation" which had the effect of transient increase in the level of water left in the tank after the landslide result of the dive landslide in the tank (once again achieved the state of quiet) and "dynamic superelevation" due to the temporary wave produced by the collapse. The superelevation static depended on the volume of the landslide which remained immersed in the tank, while the dynamic superelevation depended almost exclusively on the speed of the fall of the landslide (while negligibly bound to the same volume).

On the basis of this exercise (following the disaster in for criticism, as seen by some rough) it was determined that the limit of a height of 700m reservoir not have caused damage above 730m altitude above sea level along the banks of the reservoir, while a minimum amount of water would have passed the edge of the dam (722,5m) by arranging negligible damage downstream thereof.

However, the scale model of the likely landslide turned out later not reliable, negligibly since the model of the landslide was composed of materials other than the original (rather than using a compact mass to simulate the landslide, was used gravel, which produced effects slightly smaller than a mass of the same volume, but more compact) and mainly because the study started from a basic error in the assessment of the fall time of the landslide (determining value in order to calculate the dynamic superelevation). However, at a meeting on March 30, 1962, it was expressed by engineers the belief that the time to one minute for the fall of the landslide experienced by Ghetti was too short. Which probably convinced many that even exceed the target of 700m above sea level would not generate any kind of risk, even in case of fall of the landslide.

The second round of (filling/flooding) tests[edit | edit source]

The second (filling/flooding) tests performed under the name of the engineer. Bellies who decided to pot up to a certain height and then run a quick flare. The purpose of this test was to drop to "spare" the Mount Toc. Everything seemed to work, but there was a landslide on the size suggested. Thus he failed the second (filling/flooding) tests.

The third round of (filling/flooding) tests[edit | edit source]

From 1961 to 1963 were drilled numerous reservoirs and flare to limit as much as possible the possibility of landslides around the dam: September 4 1963 he arrived at an altitude of 710 m. The inhabitants of the area denounced ground movements and earthquakes also were clearly heard explosions coming from the mountain.

The disaster[edit | edit source]

Aerial photos of the reservoir before and after the landslide of October 9, 1963

In late summer 1963, since the sensors revealed disturbing movements of the mountain, it was decided to gradually decrease the height of the reservoir, is to try to prevent the posting of a landslide, it is to prevent a possible landslide could cause a wave climbed over the dam. But at 22.39 on 9 October 1963 broke away from the coast of Monte Toc (which from Friuli, short for "Patoc", meaning "rotten") a landslide long 2 km to over 270 million cubic meters of rock and earth. In about 20 seconds the landslide came downstream, generating a seismic and filling the reservoir.^[15]

Image of the victims of the disaster

The impact with the water generated three waves: one headed up, licked the homes of Casso and falling landslide went on digging the basin pond Massalezza; another headed for the banks of the lake and through action of washing away of themselves destroyed certain locations in the Municipality of Erto e Casso|Erto and Casso and the third (about 50 million cubic meters of water), climbed over the side of the dam, which He remained intact, except for the crowning path from the ring road leading to the left side of Vajont, and rushed into the narrow valley below.

About 25 million cubic meters of water that managed to climb over the work reached the rocky shore of the Piave Valley and carried off considerable debris that flooded the southern sector of Longarone resulting in the almost complete destruction of the town (he saved the town hall and houses at the north of this building) and other neighboring nuclei and death, all in all, about 2,000 people (official figures speak of 1,918 victims, but it is not possible to determine with certainty the number). It was estimated that the shock wave due to the movement of air is intensity equal, if not superior, to that generated by the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. At 5: 30 am on October 10, 1963 the first of the military ' Italian Army arrived on the scene to rescue and recover the dead. Among the participants they were mainly military Alpine[disambiguation needed], some of which belong to ' weapon of Engineers who dug by hand to be able to find the bodies of the missing. These also got some safes, no longer open with normal keys, as much damaged.^[16]Even fire fighters from 46 Provincial Headquarters participated en masse in the rescue effort, with an employment of 850 people, including Nuclei Somozzatori, Earth and helicopter pilots, and a large number of vehicles and equipment. The Divers team of Genoa, with 8 units of personnel, it was used, in particular, in the basin in front of the dam Busche, to search for dredging corpses and fustame of toxic substances (61 drums of cyanide), with subsequent patrolling by immersion and final removal of sludge in the basin drained. Of the approximately 2000 deaths, have been recovered and recomposed summarily only 1,500 corpses, half of which could not be recognized. ^[15]

After the disaster[edit | edit source]

The Ministry of Public Works immediately began an investigation to identify the causes of the catastrophe.

were initiated operations for the safety of the valley. Enel installed a pumping station to maintain the level of residual sector of the lake (the upstream) within safe limits, since being left without emissary could submerge Erto, and were simultaneously launched the restoration and extension over the dam gallery bypass built before the disaster (and still ensures the flow of water over the dam). Despite assurances of geologists, however, it was decided to transfer the population of Erto. Since then a few of the old inhabitants have returned to their homes and have restructured, while others occupy the new neighborhood built higher.

it was carried out a whole series of works of dubious utility, such as waterproofing step Sant'Osvaldo (West tip) with a screen of 80 m deep concrete (removed in 1998) known as the Wall of Shame, or Wailing.

On February 20, 1968 investigating judge of Belluno, Mario Fabbri, deposited the judgment of the criminal proceedings against Alberico Biadene, Mario Pancini, Pietro Frosini, Francesco Sensidoni, Curzio Batini, Francesco Penta, Louis Greek, Almo Violin, Dino Tonini, Roberto and Augusto Marin Ghetti. Two of these, Penta and Greek, in the meantime died, while Pancini committed suicide on November 28 of that year.

The next day he began the process of First Instance, which was held in The Eagle, to 550 kilometers, which ended December 17, 1969. The prosecution requested 21 years for all defendants (except for Violin, for which they were required 9) for culpable disaster landslide and culpable disaster d ' flooding, aggravated by the anticipation of the event and multiple aggravated manslaughter. Biadene, Batini and Violin were sentenced to six years, including two condoned, imprisonment for manslaughter, guilty of failing to warn and not to have set in motion the eviction; acquitted all others. The predictability of the landslide was not recognized.

From 15th to 25th March 1971 to Rome took place the process of the Supreme Court, where ^{[clarification needed]}, but the penalties are reduced to Biadene and Sensidoni: the first is sentenced to five years in prison, the second ten months, but after Biadene be pardoned three years for health problems.

In 1971, to allow displaced persons still without new homes to return to normal, it was built the town of Vajont at Maniago.^[17]

In 1997 the Montedison (which had acquired SADE) was ordered to compensate the municipalities affected by the disaster. The affair ended in 2000 with an agreement for the distribution of the burden of damages between ENEL, the Italian Montedison and 33.3% each.^[18][19][20]

The community recovered quickly to rebuild not only the social fabric destroyed, but also the city. Another call centerNew Ertowas built in Bridge in the Alps (province of Belluno), of which it is a neighborhood. Finally, above the old town of Erto original it was built the village of Erto current.

The term "race to test" as the cause of the disaster. The hypothesis of this race, some motivated by the nationalization of the Electricity Industry in 1963, found no basis for the courts. The decree imposing ENEL indicated as terms of compensation to owners of the Company Electrical payment of shares whose value was determined as "average of the years between 1959 and 1962". A demonstration of how any action taken to the testing of new plants designed to increase the value provided by the State for the nationalization could never lead to the achievement of this goal.

In an attempt to restart the local economy as a result of the tragedy, Italian Parliament passed the Law no. 357/1964 (called "Law Vajont"): it provided that each inhabitant of the municipalities affected it was equipped with a commercial license, trade or industrial applications to 9 October 1963 was provided with a grant of 20% of the value of destroyed, an additional funding of 80% in fixed interest rate for the term of 15 years, and for 10 years was exempted from paying tax on income from movable property. Then, if the beneficiary had not been able or willing to start to act as before, had the right to assign the license to third parties, which enjoyed the same exemptions and benefits provided to operate in an area that initially matched that of disaster but that was later extended to the entire territory of the regions affected in some way (Trentino, Veneto, Friuli - Venezia Giulia). So it was that companies and businesses completely unrelated to each other, buying licenses in question to ridiculously low prices, could enjoy public funding particularly relevant, initially for victims^[21]

Predictability or unpredictability of the event[edit | edit source]

In order to resolve one of the most controversial issues of the case, it should be clarified that, in the light of the above that the present landslide on Mount Toc and then innescatasi the night of October 9 1963 had already been openly identified by ' autumn 1960. In addition, if at least initially technicians had been discussing on its real dimensions (such as cubic meters of material landslide potentially moving), since at least the year 1961 in which they were installed piezometers (about 175m deep), is objectively not credible believe that specialists did not have clear evidence that the landslide was interested in blocking a mass of large thickness (depth) and therefore of enormous volume, as piezometers, except the last meters of the number 4 (according to other sources the two), did not report breakage or deformation ^[14].

The indecision concerned the movement speed (connected to the sliding plane) and possibly the timing of fall of the landslide, because certain doubted on the actual uniqueness of the same, being more likely to divide it into two portions (in the east and west torrent Massalezza), designed to detach at different times. It should be recalled that the decision to build a tunnel or overtaking bypass the landslide on the side of the valley opposite to the "danger" (which had once saved the reservoir and allowed the control of the lake upstream was no emissary in case of fall landslide) was already advanced in November 1960 and the construction of the same began as early as February 1961. It was therefore clear that the landslide was of such magnitude as to be able to cripple the tank completely burying about 2-3 km of the same, and reducing the flow rate by almost half. The surveys on the movements of the landslide through strongholds began in the summer of 1960, while data on water levels in piezometers were collected next summer. ^{[14] [23][24]}.

The objective of the event unpredictability related only to the "exact time" in which the landslide would actually set in motion and, in part, what would be the triggering events. The variables involved were immediately tied up the water in the reservoir and its possible, but almost certain correlation with rainfall.

that in May 1960

Remember, however, that the movements of the cornerstones in the points of detection of landslide installed already since summer 1960 results were absolutely alarming since the beginning of August 1963, in fact going worse throughout the period that led to the posting of the landslide in early October. ^[14] Longarone before and after the disaster of Vajont. One more caution would have to push the technical ENEL-SADE to stop the third round of already (filled/flooded) in August, although they may have been initially misled by the theory-hypothesis "first wetting" formulated by Müller and confirmed by Penta. They also left unfortunately the importance of rainfall well established by Müller in 1961 ^[14] [23]. Finally it should be mentioned that during the morning and afternoon of that tragic October 9, 1963, because of the movements impressive recorded by the tenets than the previous days (30 cm versus 5 cm) it was clear that the fall of the landslide was imminent so much so that many places in the Municipality of Erto were evacuated during the day. It was also decided to suspend the traffic on the road Alemagna, but were not cleared the countries of the valley and all the villages of Erto closer to the shores of the reservoir ^[14] [23].

It is not plausible from the evidence also it found procedural, that the cause of the disaster can be traced back to a hypothesized "race to the test." Proponents of this view the associated need of SADE to charge the system as tested at the time of passage of that ENEL, as is so evident that the law that created the agency included a compensation calculated on the SADE stock-market value of its shares in the period 1959-1961^[25].limitation is that (although they would not be received by SADE, but would be collected by ENEL), remained to be forfeited part of the funds provided by the state as funding the work and were frozen by law to after the test. The testing of the system was thus necessary both to honor all the work already done, it is to unlock these funds, since even the ENEL was obliged to draw up its own budget. It should be remembered that the amount of testing was 722,5m (above sea level) and the landslide was triggered during the third round of (filling/flooding) that was intended to reach only 715m altitude above sea level According to the proponents of the "race to the test" we must not forget that extending the period of non-use of the system still represented a buffer in a time longer than the cost of the work done. Construction costs were too soared because of variations during the work necessary for the reinforcement of the shoulders of the dam and the construction of the tunnel overtaking (dug out of solid rock): all works had not been scheduled and very expensive (is calculated that the only gallery of overtaking has accounted for almost a quarter of all costs incurred). Finally, it is only appropriate to point out, as if it were a natural and absolute interest of SADE, to maintain the confidentiality about the problems they were rising up on possible non-use of the Vajont basin, as if the news had become public knowledge value of its shares would certainly depreciated greatly.

however was the most considered morally unacceptable to have tried to raise the lake over the share of 700m above sea level, which during tests conducted on a physical model dynamic-basin set in Ninehad been designated as safety (and always bearing in mind that the tests had been distorted by an erroneous assessment of the speed of movement of the landslide and time of posting incorrect). The report in fact, even with the theoretical and practical limits already exposed, provided dramatic consequences for the countries in the valley where the landslide had fallen with the reservoir at an altitude higher than 700m above sea level. Especially considering that the data on the movements of the cornerstones were heavily alarming results immediately (with the same movement even more centimeters per day), as soon as the water of the reservoir was able to overcome altitude 700m ^[14].

According to some authors the disaster was fortuitously favored by hydrological crisis resulting in the severe 1962-1963 winter rainfall that led ENEL to promote measures aimed at pushing hard reserves tank, measures that perhaps brought Eng. Biadene to request the advance of the third round of (filling/flooding). If this happened, however, it is false to say that this was done to take advantage of the new power of Colomber, because the same could only work with the largest fill. More properly the water "forfeited" in the tank Vajont was exploited by the central Soverzene ^[14].

One of the biggest problems of this disaster was the fact that it soon turned into a "political case", in line with the thesis of an array, and the other on the opposite side. This was emphasized by the fact that the technicians of the SADE and the Ministry had behaved in a manner substantially conspiratorial than the big Toc to slide, the severity of which was in fact kept hidden from the population and local politicians. And even after the event, no lack of attempts to cover-up, including the non-disclosure of the statement of the tests carried out in Nove, discovered accidentally by an employee of the University of Padua, an act for which he was also charged (and later acquitted). Also one of the few newspapers that had dealt in depth of the story before the tragedy, was Unity. If this sum is a reckless attitude of SADE who had previously reported to the magistrature tested for false alarm, you understand how the arrival of the tragedy immediately brought the parties on opposing sides and not at all conciliatory, which had their moment most emphatically with the drafting of three separate reports by the members of the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry set up to shed light on the case^[26]

The final judgment of the courts decreed however the actual predictability of the event and condemning Biadene Sensidoni for flood (aggravated by the predictability of the same). Despite the sentence for both of five years in prison, they were removed Biadene 2. A year later he was released.

Victims of Vajont[edit | edit source]

The victims were 1,917, but only 1,500 bodies were recovered. 487 children died in the disaster^[27].The youngest victim of the disaster was Claudio Martinelli Erto and Casso (PN), born on 09.18.1963, 21 days earlier^[28], the oldest victim was born on 01/26/1870 Amalia Pancot 93 years Conegliano (TV).^[29]

Common	Victims
Longarone	1.458
Erto and Casso	158
CastellavazzoCodissago	111
Other common	207
TOTAL	1.917

Source: from oggi.it

The wave of Vajont[edit | edit source]

The height of the flood wave reached an estimated height of 150m in the lake, this table shows the estimated maximum height of the wave caused by the landslide of Mount Toc :

Area	Max height
basin Vajont Dam (PN)	150 m
of Pirago Longarone (BL)	25 m
Castle Lavazzo (BL)	about 30 m
Codissago (BL)	about 30 m
Bridge in the Alps (BL)	>12 m
Belluno (BL)	12 m
Segusino (TV)	4,89 m
Battle Ground (TV)	2,33 m

Source: The flood wave that followed the landslide Vajont study of the faculty of engineering University of Naples

Gallery[edit | edit source]

• The landslide Mount Tocwhich caused the Vajont disaster, with the so-called M "Muller".
• The Vajont dam after the disaster.
• The Vajont dam after the disaster.
• Longarone after the disaster.
• Longarone after the disaster.
• The bell tower of the church of Pirago Longarone after the disaster.
• The bell tower of the church of Pirago Longarone today.
• to the Church Vajont dam dedicated to the victims of the disaster.
• Chiesa di longarone 01.JPG The Church of Santa Maria Immacolata to Longarone dedicated to the victims of the disaster.
• Epitaph dedicated to the Vajont disaster in Erto and Casso
• Cross dedicated to the Vajont disaster in Erto and Casso
• Fortogna. The cemetery of the victims of the Vajont, before its restructuring
• Fortogna. The cemetery of the victims of the Vajont, after its renovation
• Church of Longarone. Museum "Pietre Vive" located under the church. Contains the ruins of the old church wiped out in the disaster Vajont.