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Eduard Shevardnadze

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Career

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Soviet Union

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First Secretaryship

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Corruption campaigns
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Shevardnadze's rapid rise in the Soviet Georgia's political hierarchy was the result of his campaign against corruption. By the time Shevardnadze had become leader Georgia had become the most corrupt-infested republic in the Soviet Union. The reign of Vasil Mzhavanadze, Shevardnadze's predecessor in office, had been characterised by weak leadership, nepotism, despotism, bribery and corruption at the upper echelons of power.[1] Throughout most of his leadership, anti-corruption campaigns were central to his authority and policy. In Georgia corruption had been allowed to grow nearly freely. This had led to serious deformations in the system, an example being that only 68 of Georgian goods were exported legally, while goods exported legally from other Soviet Republics amounted close to 100 percent. Shevardnadze rallied up support for his corruption campaigns by establishing the Study of Public Opinion.[2] To combat corruption he indulged himself in subterfuge after halting all external export by dressing up as a peasant, and driving a car filled with tomatoes through the border.[3] After his personal subterfuge the entire Georgian border police was purged. While never proven, it is said that Shevardnadze after taking office, asked all leading officials to show their left hands; he then ordered those who used Western produced watches to replace them with Soviet ones. This story portrayed Shevardnadzes as an active battler against corruption.[4] His campaign against corruption was largely unsuccessful and when he returned to Georgia in 1992, corruption was still an epidemic problem.[5]

Economic policy
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Under Shevardnadze's rule Georgia was one of only a handful of Soviet Republics who did not experience economic stagnation, quite to the contrary Georgia experienced rapid economic growth. By 1974 industrial output had increased by 9.6 percent while agricultural output had increased by 18 percent. The shortage economy which had evolved into a prevalent problem in other parts of the Soviet Union had in Georgia nearly disappeared. This positive trend can be proven by the fact that the long Food queues in Tblisi had been shortened while in Moscow been lengthened. Some of Shevardnadze's economic policies were adopted by the Soviet government on a national level.[6]

In 1973 Shevardnadze launched an agricultural reform in Abasha, popularly refered to as the "Abasha experiment". This reform was inspired by János Kádár's agricultural policy in the People's Republic of Hungary which returned the agricultural decision-making to the local level of governance. Shevardnadze merged all Abasha agricultural institutions in one single entity and established a new remuneration system. If a farmer fulfilled the five-year plan early he would be awarded a share of the crops. The policy had a positive effect on the Georgian economy, and because of the large increase of agricultural output in Abasha, the reform was introduced elsewhere in the republic. The agricultural reform in Georgia became the model of the nationwide Agricultural-Industrial Organisations established by a decree in 1982.[7]

Shevardnadze has taken much of the credit for Georgia's economic performance under his rule. Seven months before his promotion to the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministership Shevardnadze claimed that there were thirty, or more, economic experiments operating in Georgia which he claimed would further democratise the economic management.[8]

Political experimentation and nationalism
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Shevardnadze was a strong supporter of political reform in Georgia. Under his rule he created agencies attached to the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party who's main task was studying, analysing and molding public opinion. These agencies worked closely with Georgia's communications network's, such as television, and government ministers and Shevardnadze himself were regularly interviewed live on television.[4] Shevardnadze criticised flattery in Georgia, and felt that he along with his government's activities, needed to get criticised more often, especially during party congresses.[9] He also proved himself, even before Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to power, to be a firm supporter of people's democracy (e.g. power from below).[10]

The previous Soviet Georgian rulers had given away to nationalist favoratism to the Georgians, Shevardnadze was however, against this policy of favoratism. Therefore his nationalistic policy is seen as highly controversial in today's Georgia.[11] At the 25th Congress of the Georgian Communist Party Shevardnadze told the congress; "for Georgians, the sun rises not in the east, but in the north—in Russia".[12] Shevardnadze saw "extreme nationalism", coupled with corruption and inefficiencies within the system, as one of the main obstacles to economic growth. During his rule he condemned what he saw as "national narrow-mindedness and isolation" and writers who published works with nationalistic overtones. The 1970s saw an increase in nationalistic tendencies in Georgian society. When the 1978 Georgian demonstrations were sparked when the Soviet government decided to amend the Georgian constitution and removing the Georgian language as the sole state languge in the republic. While at first standing at the same side as the Soviet government Shevardnadze quickly reiterated his position and was able to make a compromise with the Soviet government and the demonstrators. The Georgian language was kept as the sole official language of the republic, however, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union passed a legislation which called for an increasing the level of Russian language training in the non-Russian republics.[13]

There was another problem facing Shevardnadze during the 1978 demonstrations, some leading Abkhaz intellectuals were writing to Leonid Brezhnev in the hope that he would let the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic secede from Georgia and merge into the Russian SFSR. To halt this development the Georgian government gave away to concessions made by the secessionists. These concessions includes establishing a Abhkaz university, the expansion of Abkhaz publications and creating an Abkhaz television station. Shevardnadze would prove however to be an active supporter of defending minority interest.[14]

Repression
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Independent Georgia

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  1. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 11.
  2. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 19.
  3. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, pp. 19–20.
  4. ^ a b Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 20.
  5. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 26.
  6. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 17.
  7. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 18.
  8. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, pp. 18–19.
  9. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 20–21.
  10. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 21.
  11. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 22.
  12. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, pp. 22–23.
  13. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 23.
  14. ^ Ekedahl and Goodman 2001, p. 24.