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The following is an archived discussion of a featured article nomination. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the article's talk page or in Wikipedia talk:Featured article candidates. No further edits should be made to this page.

The article was promoted by Ealdgyth via FACBot (talk) 23 January 2021 [1].

American logistics in the Northern France campaign

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Nominator(s): Hawkeye7 (discuss) 19:49, 30 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]

This article is a sequel to American logistics in the Normandy campaign, but it covers different ground literally and fugitively. This campaign saw a fast-moving pursuit of the German armies back to the German border, which placed the American logistical system under enormous strain. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 19:49, 30 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Support from Gog the Mild

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Recusing as coordinator to have a look at this. I went through it at A class and was impressed.

Nota bene* FAC coordinators have to put "recuse" or "recusing" into an edit comment on the review so the Bot will know. Only one is required, so just add it to your next comment. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Er, "recusing" is the first word after the section header.
Sure, but the MilHistBot would have to grab the page history, download and parse each edit you made, and attempt to find the word in the edit. This way it only needs to look at the page history (one call). Hawkeye7 (discuss) 01:37, 13 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Hawkeye7 Just so I am clear - I can be hard of thinking at times - when you write "edit comment", that is the same as the "Summary" at the bottom of this edit page, yes? So the edit summary of this edit will do the trick? Cheers. Gog the Mild (talk) 14:09, 13 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, the edit summary. You only need to do it once though. It's fine now. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 18:51, 13 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • Bocage and any other non-proper name foreign language words should be in lang templates, not just in italica.
    The dictionary asserts that "bocage" is indeed a mot anglais, albeit an obvious loan word, so I have removed the italics. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • "While the logistical system had facilitated a great victory, these factors would be keenly felt in the fighting in the months to come." Optional: Something like 'While the logistical system had facilitated a great victory in Normandy, these factors would be keenly felt in the fighting in the months that followed" seems a clearer summary.
    Done, but used "Northern France" instead of "Normandy". Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • Any chance of an explanation of what a "measurement ton" is? And how it differs, or doesn't, from other types of ton[ne].
    US customary unit. A measurement ton (sometimes called a shipping ton) is 40 cubic feet (1.1 m3). Linked. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • and seizing the Seine ports of Le Havre and Rouen as an alternative to those in Brittany, neither of which had yet been captured." Does neither refer to Le Havre and Rouen, or the Brittainy ports. if the latter, does "neither of which had yet been captured" imply that the Brittainy ports had? (Yes, these are rhetorical questions.)
    Move the clause forward to remove ambiguity. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • "operational art". Could we unpack this a little? To spare the majority of raders who will assume that you are actually talking about some sort of art.
    Added a definition. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • "Although the planners had estimated that no more than 12 divisions could be maintained beyond the Seine, 16 were by mid-September". Do you mean 'Although the planners had estimated that no more than 12 divisions could be maintained beyond the Seine by mid-September, 16 were"?
    I think the original is better. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • "Colonel Roy W. Growler's Base Section No. 1 had arrived at Utah Beach"; "Brigadier General Leroy P. Collins's Base Section No. 1 moved to Le Mans". Base Section No. 1 x 2?
    Ooops. Corrected. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 21:56, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • "another 40 miles (64 km) further away". One of "another" or "further" is redundant.
    Not sure. Changed as suggested. See if it works.

To MT. More to follow. Gog the Mild (talk) 19:22, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

  • In the lead it states "The difficulties were exacerbated by the poor supply discipline of the American soldier". Could you point me to where that is expanded on in the main article?
    Lost in splitting the article. Restored to the POL section. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 01:37, 13 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Masterful. Gog the Mild (talk) 22:55, 12 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

  • Hawkeye7, as a relatively long, specialist and detailed article this seems less likely than average to pick up drive by reviewers. You may wish to see if any other of the ACR reviewers would be up for reviewing here, or call in some favours, or post a general request at MilHist - once the ACR activity has died down. Gog the Mild (talk) 14:05, 13 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

CommentsSupport by PM

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Great to see another of these loggie articles. Some comments:

Lead
Body

That's me done. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 06:59, 14 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Still a couple of things that need better formulation for clarity. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 20:58, 14 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
OK, supporting. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 10:47, 17 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Support Comments by JennyOz

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Hi Hawkeye, sorry I'm sooo slow but finally finished my comments...

lede
Background
Breakout and pursuit
Base organization
Petrol, oil and lubricants
Railways
Motor transport
Resupply by air
Ports
Outcome
Caption
Senior Allied commanders. Left to right: Bradley, Tedder, Eisenhower, Montgomery and Simpson - is full stop ok?
Added. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 20:15, 17 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

That's it for me I reckon, JennyOz (talk) 12:17, 17 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks for above, Hawkeye. Pls check 3 minor tweaks I just made. I am happy to add my support for promotion. (Non-milhist reviewer) JennyOz (talk) 02:18, 20 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

SandyGeorgia

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I am concerned that one source is cited for this one-sided opinion: it seems that the opinion should be attributed or backed up by other sources, and I wonder if there are alternate opinions. ... Subsequent events demonstrated that Eisenhower's decision was the wrong one; the German army in the West was not destroyed and neither the Ruhr nor the Saar was reached in 1944. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 23:42, 18 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Leaning oppose. Because my background is in Operations research, I am partial to the British strategic and logistics efforts during World War II, and enjoy reviewing these logistics articles. I have not gotten to the prose nitpicking, because this one is sending up red flags, and I have bigger concerns about possible bias/balance. The statement that:

was in the A-class version,[2] followed by an opinion which appears to be based entirely upon Dick:

  • "It is possible that the Ruhr could have been reached had Montgomery's proposal been adopted."

Here is what some other sources say:

  • Keegan, John, ed. (1989). The Times Atlas of the Second World War (1st ed.). Harper & Row. p. 158. ISBN 9780060161781. "The Allies pursued, hampered by shortage of fuel and supplies. Hitler had ordered the ports along the Channel coast to be held as fortresses; of these, Le Havre was besieged until 12 September, and Boulogne and Calais fell on 30 September but Dunkirk held out until the end of the war. This obliged both Montgomery and Patton to draw on shipments landed across the Normandy beaches—necessarily both slowing the Allied advance and limiting the amount of supplies available to them. Each petitioned Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied Commander, to allot him a major share of the supplies available, thus provoking what came to be called the “Broad verus Narrow” dispute over strategy. Montgomery insisted that he could break into Germany via Holland, if given the lion’s share; Patton similarly argued that he might rush the Siegfried Line through Lorraine. Eisenhower diplomatically distributed equal shares, with the result—probably inevitable in view of Hitler’s mustering of reserves—that the Allied advance came to a halt on the approaches to the German frontier in early September."
  • Keegan, John (1994). Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris. Penguin Books. pp. 318–19. ISBN 9780140235425. "And yet at the turn of the year, Hitler’s Germany was no nearer imminent collapse than it had been in the summer. By frantic measures of rearmament and recruitment, a new strategic reserve had been assembled, which endowed Hitler once again with the power to counter-attack and so, locally at least, impose an initiative. … [Followed by a paragraph about the fuel/truck logistics problems. Followed by a paragraph that the Germans had overcome their logistics problems by retreat, but their success was short-lived as the American strategic bomber force took out railroads.] … [R]etrospectively, the six months between the end of the Battles of Normandy and Army Group Centre and the appearance on the Rhine and Oder of the armies which had won them certainly had something miraculous for Germany about them. The Allies' failure to capitalize on their great victories could not be laid at the door of logistic difficulties alone. It had also to do with the continuing ability of German industry to produce, despite every sort of damage to railways, factories and fuel sources which the Allied bombers could inflict, and to the extraordinary resilience of the German army."
  • Summary of Chapter 6 from C.J. Dick: "The British and Canadians ... however, suffered from periodic ammunition shortages and restrictions on usage until well into August. And both armies suffered again from a dearth of munitions in September and October. To a large extent, this was caused by a lack of logistic lift, a problem resulting from conscious trade-offs in the planning process and greatly exacerbated by the discovery that 1,400 newly procured British three-ton trucks suffered from engine defects (which afflicted replacement engines as well). The major failing of each of the Allies was the inadequate provision of infantry replacements. Each army faced a manpower crisis sooner or later. For the British, it was sooner. As a result of drawing faulty lessons from the North African campaign, the War Office seriously underestimated the infantry’s likely casualty rate (by almost half) while simultaneously overestimating that of the other arms."

Yet the opening statement of the article-- indeed the perspective and premise of the article (In the first seven weeks after D-Day, the Allied advance was slower than anticipated because the well-handled and determined German opposition exploited the defensive value of the Normandy bocage country) overlooks this entire argument. (Noting also that the British article, British logistics in the Normandy campaign, downplays the 1,400 defective trucks, with one sentence: "An exception was 1,400 Austin K5 three-ton lorries, along with all their replacement engines, which were found to have faulty pistons and gave trouble", which is sourced to the Army itself rather than the independent source, Dick.)

The overarching political argument made by Robert Blake, Baron Blake on page 297 of The Decline of Power: 1915–1964, Oxford University Press, 1986 is overlooked.

The British logistics failure at Antwerp as covered by William I. Hitchcock on pp. 69–72 (The Bitter Road to Freedom, Simon & Schuster, 2008) is not in either the British article or this article. He argues that the logistics problem was made worse by the failure to clear the approaches to Antwerp for several months after it was captured. "While the Allied armies started to ration their ammunition, the Germans, so bloodied and disorganized after their retreat from France, swiftly resupplied their forces and prepared to defend their homeland."
All of these sources together add up to a picture that it cannot be known if either Montgomery's or Patton (Bradley)'s plan to launch a spear into Germany (from their own sector) would have been successful, because of the ability of the Germans to muster reserves and resupply. This suite of articles seems to advance a British POV, and does not seem to encompass all sources, and seems harsher on Americans than British in blaming logistical failures for delays. It is not knowable if Montgomery's planned spear would have worked; it is known what happened at the Battle of the Bulge (which started within three weeks after Antwerp was cleared), where the Germans attacked with 30 divisions assembled in total secrecy.
I am concerned that a statement that "Eisenhower was wrong" was in the version that passed A-class peer review, yet does not appear to be supported by the source, because when I questioned it, it was deleted. And I've found several other instances that are shaded to a British perspective. Although I don't have the book, the chapter summary from Dick does not appear to take that approach. My suggestion is that this article a) be sent back to A-class for closer scrutiny by our MilHist experts, and b) be subject to a source-to-text integrity spotcheck. I am concerned whether similar is a factor at American logistics in the Normandy campaign or British logistics in the Normandy campaign. @Gog the Mild and Peacemaker67: ... even though this sentence has been deleted, it was a red flag, and I worry that there are similar issues throughout the three articles that warrant a closer look by our esteemed MilHist colleagues.
Leaning oppose, as I suggest that a closer look at a new A-class review is preferable to working through a spotcheck on FAC. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 23:32, 24 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Continued discussion moved to talk. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 18:19, 25 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

First of all the reason for the British logistics in the Normandy campaign using the 21st Army Group history as a source for the 1,400 three-ton lorries with faulty pistons was that I did not have Dick at the time that article was written in 2017. I would have liked to supply more details, but while I found explanation of what had gone wrong, it was not in sources that would pass our RS bar. I was concerned at the time that it might have been downplayed in British sources, which by and large don't mention it. British primary sources do tend to be more downbeat than American ones.

It is important when considering the articles to remember the dates of the campaigns that the US Army has officially laid down. These were used to frame the scope of the articles to prevent them becoming too large. I split the original article in two for that reason, and I think it works out well. The Northern France campaign officially starts with Cobra, and ends at the start of September. The campaign and therefore the article covers the breakout and pursuit. The fighting on the Siegfried Line in Lorraine, and around Antwerp, as well as the ammunition and shipping crises and the problems with winter clothing all belong properly to the subsequent Rhineland campaign.

Here's what Dick has to say:

The actual unfolding of events demonstrated that Eisenhower’s decision in favor of an advance right across the front was mistaken. Each of the armies in his Northern and Central Groups culminated short of its assigned geographic objective, and the German army was vouchsafed enough breathing space to recover its strength and balance in the operational pause that followed. Operational and tactical failings undoubtedly contributed to this disappointing result, but the main cause of the Allied failure was the logistic system’s inability to cope, especially on the part of the Americans.

Hawkeye7 (discuss) 04:33, 26 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  1. Thank you for the (very logical) answer on my concern about the trucks and the British article, which eases my concerns about the other two articles.
  2. And thank you for the quote from Dick. So, his POV is that Eisenhower was wrong, which eases my concern about source-to-text integrity, at the same time it raises a more serious concern. In what is possibly one of the most hotly debated topics of WWII (the broad vs. narrow front controversy), there are many opinions which differ from his, and when we have some equivalent of the Broad vs. narrow front controversy in World War II article, it would presumably cover all points of view, giving due balance to each, including that a spear would not necessarily have worked because of long supply chains being vulnerable and the German capacity to resupply. The outcome is not knowable or provable.
    So, when a statement as obviously POV as "Eisenhower was wrong" makes it through ACR, and three FAC reviewers, then I suggest we still need for everyone to revisit this article carefully to make sure no other unattributed, undue opinion is being stated as fact in Wikivoice. The surprising part to me is that one does not need to be a context expert or a MILHIST editor (as I certainly am not) to have seen this red flag. In any content area, we don't make statements like that without attribution. I would feel much better about removing my lean oppose if the knowledgeable MILHIST editors would comb through this article one more time, before I sit down to my nitpicks (which I didn't write down as I was reading through last time, but are mostly minor-- sorry, but I was sidetracked by what was clear POV to me).
  3. And finally, I am confused about the scope of this article. Hawkeye, you clarify above how you divided the series by date, and yet this article has an Outcome section (as well as statements in the lead) that gets in to what happened after the time period you defined above. The premise of the article seems to go beyond logistics and to strategy. So I really wonder how this article can be written well when we don't even have an overview of the Broad vs. narrow front debate anywhere on Wikipedia, and where you draw the line in this article and what that one would be if it existed. I am concerned that the Outcome section in this article is getting into territory that would belong in the wider controversy article, which had to do not only with strategy and logistics, but the German capacity, and Eisenhower's need to account for the politics because Montgomery (like Patton) was viewed as such an insufferable egotist that he (Eisenhower) would have been severely questioned had he given either of them all the resources at the expense of the other. All of this is for another article, but I am concerned that conclusions are being drawn here that may not be supported by a balance of sources, and hope other knowledgeable MILHIST editors can help sort this (meaning, the boundaries of this article vs. the article not yet written, as well as any possible remaining unattributed opinion) before I start nitpicking the prose. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 20:55, 26 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I also have concerns about the dates of some of the sources used. I realize these sources are specific to logistics (while those I provide on the Broad-front controversy are not focused only on logistics), but logistics and strategy overlap, and some of the sources I cite above are newer. Why so much Ruppenthal? And one of his articles supports the position I am offering based on other, more recent sources. At "Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy", he says, "It also was clear that the maintenance of large-scale operations would remain unsatisfactory until the port of Antwerp and adequate rail lines of communications were made available. The operations of the 21 and 12th Army Groups, consequently, were to be dominated throughout the fall of 1944 by the necessity of developing a new administrative base in closer proximity to the front lines." The British did not get the approaches to Antwerp cleared; his position seems to be that the spear could not have worked without this. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 21:09, 26 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Carlo D'Este article, "A Lingering Controversy: Eisenhower's 'Broad Front' Strategy" may be of interest.
  • The war of words over the choices by which the war might have been won was, in the end, all but irrelevant. Not only was it politically impossible to have permitted the British to win the war by means of the narrow front, there is ample evidence to question if such a drive, if mounted, could have been logistically sustained beyond the Ruhr.
  • Another major point that further muddied the waters was Montgomery’s contention that his offensive encompass forty divisions, a figure wildly beyond the capacity of the logisticians to have supported without the port of Antwerp, which was then still in German hands. The most reasonable figure was a mere twelve divisions. The great argument has focused on whether or not the war would have been shortened had Montgomery’s single thrust strategy prevailed. On this point historians still disagree, as did the logisticians in 1944. Eisenhower questioned, even if given the necessary resources, if Montgomery could have carried out a systematic, aggressive offensive into the Ruhr. He concluded Montgomery could not.
  • Monty’s failure to secure Antwerp in furtherance of the logistical advance into Germany can only be viewed as problematic to his one coordinated thrust into the Rurh strategy. His remarkably flawed Market Garden plan showed that his idea of a single narrow front thrust was going to leave a large portion of the Allied land armies unable to react to any German counteroffensive, which they were very adept at in spite of allied air superiority.The same German reserves used in the Ardennes could very well have cut off Monty’s advanced XXX Corps units and made the losses of Market Garden pale in comparison. Bad planning and wishful thinking isn’t a strategy for victory. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 21:23, 26 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I could write the requested article, but let's concentrate on the one at hand for the moment.

  • The original plan was for US forces to be supported through the Brittany while the British used the Channel ports (ie the situation in World War I) Antwerp did not figure in the plan, because it was not expected to be captured before D plus 300.
  • The German strategy was to deny the Allies access to ports; first by holding in Normandy, and then by holding or destroying the ports.
  • With a shorter line of communications, fewer troops and access to the Channel ports via intact railways (along with better organisation, and more experienced staffs and commanders) the 21st Army Group was in a much better logistic situation than the Americans. This was not a coincidence; they had intended this to be the case from the very beginning.
  • Because Bradley decided to forego the Brittany ports, the 12th Army Group was forced to use ports captured by the 21st Army Group. The importance of Antwerp is clear in retrospect, but the 21st Army Group didn't need it, and the 12th Army Group did not recognise it. It was up to COMZ to press SHAEF for it. I've combed through the records, and there is nothing about it from SHAEF before it was captured.
  • Montgomery did not put Bradley on the short leash he had on Dempsey and Crerar. This was for political reasons: a firm hand from any British general would have been resented, but Monty's prickly and eccentric personality did not help.

Let me ping @Nick-D: for an opinion. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:59, 26 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

  • There are two issues that I can see from the above and looking at what Beevor says about this (I am a bit surprised Beevor hasn't been used). Beevor (p. 891 in my ebook) says

    The First Canadian Army had not yet managed to retake the Channel ports, which were resolutely defended on Hitler’s orders. So Antwerp was the only solution. Yet, although the British Second Army had taken the city and the port virtually undamaged, Montgomery failed to secure the land and islands along the Scheldt estuary from the North Sea. He had ignored Admiral Ramsay’s warnings that mines and German coastal batteries on the islands, particularly Walcheren, would make it unnavigable and therefore render the vital port useless. The fault also lay with Eisenhower and SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) for not having insisted to Montgomery that he should clear the estuary before he attempted to dash on to the Rhine. The Germans had time to reinforce their garrisons on the islands. The result was that long and complex battles, including amphibious landings, were later required by the Canadians to rectify this mistake. They sustained 12,873 casualties in an operation which could have been achieved at little cost if tackled immediately after the capture of Antwerp.

Also, talking about "could have been logistically sustained beyond the Ruhr" (as SG has above) really is out of scope even of the broad front argument. Surely that argument is about who could get to the German industrial heartland first and thereby shorten the war? But I agree that the article probably does stray into longer-term outcomes and could be trimmed to concentrate on the immediate outcomes of the logistics of the Northern France campaign rather than operational strategy, where, whilst it was important, logistics was not the main determining factor, because stiffening German resistance, reserves, and equipment and ammunition production were also clearly major factors. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 00:28, 27 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]
OK, not knowing what to do next, I will formally switch to Oppose in the hopes that will bring resources to getting things sorted by MILHIST editors (as opposed to me becoming increasingly confused as more and more sources emerge).
First, scope: on where this article begins and ends, and what to do about the missing broad vs. narrow front article (which should at least be a red link, but even better, a stub).
Second, whether the entire Outcomes section extends beyond the scope of this article, and includes unrepresented sources or unattributed opinions.
Third, unclear why Hawkeye's response above is about Brittany; the article is critical of the US failure to capture ports in Brittany, but downplays the destruction of those ports by Allied bombardment and German sabotage ... where do we put (which article?) things like:
  1. Montgomery himself acknowledged the necessity of the use of Antwerp. He admitted his error in not giving priority to clearing the Scheldt: "I must admit a bad mistake on my part – I underestimated the difficulties of opening up the approaches to Antwerp so that we could get the free use of that port. I reckoned that the Canadian Army could do it while we were going for the Ruhr. I was wrong." (See Omar Bradley memoirs.)
  2. The Brittany ports were unusable per the reasons discussed at Battle for Brest. Considering that, and their distance from the front, it is understandable why those ports were not used.

On minor things to help the layreader (besides a broad vs. narrow front article):

  1. There is War Department (United Kingdom) and War Department (US); in several places, I lost track of which country was being discussed.
  2. Major General Frank S. Ross seems to warrant a red link (at one point, I lost track while reading of whether Ross was Brit or UK).

I would feel much better about MILHIST editors appraising whether there is any other unattributed or unbalanced opinion or underrepresented sources in the article. Once you all have given the green light, I will do the layperson nitpicking. Regards, SandyGeorgia (Talk) 19:29, 27 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

"War Department" always refers to the United States Department of War. The British equivalent was the War Office and since this article is US-centric, that is always prefixed with "British". Major General Frank S. Ross was an American, the ETO Chief of Transportation. I have red-linked his name, but people keep removing the red links.
I have removed the two paragraphs in the Outcome section about the broad front vs narrow front as out of scope.

Hawkeye7 (discuss) 20:41, 27 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Thanks, Hawkeye7; if you could entice some MILHIST editors to revisit for any other possibility of unrepresented opinion, I will get back to this as soon as I finish up some other pressing matters. Bst, SandyGeorgia (Talk) 20:45, 27 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Continuing; apologies for the delay (real life and Wikipedia work accelerated simultaneously). I am disappointed to see that no other MILHIST editors have engaged (perhaps also the holidays), so I will struggle on with my piecemeal layperson knowledge.

  • Not a sentence ... The tardy delivery of vehicles adversely affected the training of motor transport unit personnel. A misread on my part. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 04:33, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Multiple issues of layperson confusion here. Theater (warfare) refers to an area (I know that much :) But in this article, "As with many other service units, the European Theater of Operations (ETO) was compelled to accept partially trained units", ETO refers to a unit. And in this article, it is referred to as ETO, where in the linked article (European Theater of Operations, United States Army) it is referred to as ETOUSA. Things like this make it hard for me as a non-military person to keep straight who is who, what is what, and which refers to which country. Not sure how to fix this. I would rather see the acronym throughout be ETOUSA, as that provides a reminder about who is who later on. Is there a predominance of one acronym or another in the sources that we can go by ? Laypeople are not accustomed to sorting all the acronyms the military loves to use, and we've got ADSEC, COMZ, ETO ... and so on. Perhaps something along these lines to help readers like me get them sorted early on ...
    The US Army's logistical agency Advance Section (ADSEC) organized the Red Ball Express ... As with many other service units, the Army's European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) command was compelled to accept partially trained units in the hope they would be able to complete their training in the UK. Approval for additional relief drivers was also slow, and racial segregation in the US Armed Forces complicated personnel assignment.
    Reading on further, I do see ETOUSA used ... is this not the same as called ETO in the lead? ... the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA) was ...
  • This is an example where I wish other MILHIST-knowledgeable would chime in: "At critical junctures in the campaign, senior American commanders subordinated logistical imperatives to operational opportunities." Is this a summary/conclusion supported by a multitude of sources, or is it an opinion that needs attribution, and are there other opinions and factors to counterbalance this one? The reason I question this early on is that the very next example given is the ports of Brittany, which some sources agree would not have/could not have been useful, and that the decision was the correct one. And the Outcome section of this article seems to also indicate that there is not broad agreement that Brittany ports could have been useful. (Particularly compared to the need to clear the approaches to Antwerp, a port closer to the action.) That is, the article seems unnecessarily negative about decisions that, best I can tell, many historians agree were the right ones.
    Answered below by Nick-D, but what he states is not coming across (to me) clearly in the article. Wordsmithing ? SandyGeorgia (Talk) 04:44, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  • Here we have a similar opportunity to sort the which is which early on ... "ETOUSA and SOS were combined into a single headquarters, which was increasingly referred to as the Communications Zone (COMZ)". But ETOUSA and SOS were both US, while Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of Allied Forces, and COMZ links to Communications Zone which says it included NATO ... this is not made clear on first occurrence. The combination involved more than ETOUSA and SOS, also NATO forces ? Could we establish the which country and unit and organization is which early on (at first occurrence)?
  • Similar continues here ... "To support Operation Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, COMZ activated two subordinate headquarters, the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone (FECOMZ), under Brigadier General Harry B. Vaughan, with Colonel Frank M. Albrecht as his chief of staff, and the Advance Section (ADSEC), under the command of Colonel Ewart G. Plank." Since at this point I am understanding that COMZ is more than just US forces (unless that is incorrect), and since none of these people have articles or redlinks (which it appears they should), how do I know if we are referring to US personnel, or Brits, or what at this point? If they are all US personnel, can that be stated, but separately, if COMZ was an Allied Forces (NATO?) group, which are the non-US pesonnel involved there? It is this sort of thing that needs sorting at other places in the article, and in particular where there are no links (red or otherwise) to personnel.
  • Separately, you mentioned above that someone is removing WP:RED links. Why is that happening?

I'll stop here for now, as I could be missing something significant. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 16:23, 31 December 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Nick-D
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Comment I tend to agree with the removal of the commentary on the broad front vs narrow thrust debate - this is a huge topic, which is largely outside the scope of this article. My understanding of the current status of this debate is that most modern historians think that Eisenhower's 'broad front' decision was basically right given that a 'narrow thrust' was unfeasible both on logistical and military grounds (e.g. the Allies had outrun their supply lines, and the Germans had recovered enough to clobber any narrow thrusts which were attempted, with the Market-Garden debacle demonstrating this). Modern historians tend to be much more sympathetic to Eisenhower than was the case with their predecessors. Criticisms of his conduct of the campaign end to be focused on losing control over Montgomery during September 1944, leading to the easily foreseeable failure of Market-Garden and the obvious mistake to not secure the approaches to the vital port of Antwerp. Re: "At critical junctures in the campaign, senior American commanders subordinated logistical imperatives to operational opportunities" - my understanding is that this is a very safe consensus view: the Allied plans for the liberation of Western Europe developed before Operation Overlord were based around a slow but steady advance against solid German opposition. When the Germans were outmanoeuvred and then driven into a chaotic retreat, the Allied commanders pushed their forces to the limits logistically to take advantage of this. This led to some of the fastest advances by land forces in the war, facilitated through some pretty dramatic logistical efforts such as 'grounding' entire combat divisions so their trucks could be used to support other units. The end result was that the Allies outran their supply lines, and got bogged down on the German frontier until early 1945, but this was an acceptable trade off for swiftly liberating France and Belgium at a fairly low cost in civilian and military lives. Nick-D (talk) 04:25, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]

You have wonderfully summarized my understanding of the sources I have access to. But the article does not read this way at all. It has improved since the first version I read, but the flavor of what you just stated so well seems to be obscured. Factors that led to some positive outcomes read like net negatives. I can see it, but don’t know how to fix it. SandyGeorgia (Talk) 04:44, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I think that this could be fairly easily addressed with an extra para or two in the 'outcomes' section and some adjustments to the tone of it, as well as corresponding adjustments to the last para of the lead. At present, this material is written a bit from the perspective of logisticians, when it would be helpful to think about the views of French and Belgian civilians who needed to be be rapidly liberated and the Allied leadership who were pleased with the outcomes of the campaign but became over-confident as a result and believed that further successes could be rapidly achieved. The gap between the Allied success in running riot in August-September and the difficulties they experienced beyond that time until the Allied 'tail' caught up is probably the key issue. Hawkeye, from memory Martin van Creveld's book Supplying War might be helpful in this - it includes a description of this campaign where (again from memory) he argues that a great victory was achieved despite the Allied logisticians maintaining that it was impossible to achieve it. There's also a very succinct summary of the logistical constraints affecting the Allies in the introductory chapter of the final volume of the official history of the US Army in the ETO and what it looked like when this was overcome in chapter 15 (including the great quote "as the prospect of unqualified pursuit warfare loomed, there stood behind the awesome power of Allied armies a logistical establishment geared to demands that, had they been made during the pursuit across France the preceding summer, would have been preposterous"). Nick-D (talk) 06:57, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Nick-D, I am striking my oppose, not because the issues have been resolved as yet, but I see that you are on board and know how to fix them, so I leave it in your capable hands. You are better able than I to clearly state that which I believe the sources make clear, and will know how to fix this article so it better reflects those sources. I am striking so I can unwatch; in the New Year, I have decided there are better places to focus my limited reviewing time than at FAC. If there is a FAC that warrants my feedback, a post on my talk page is the way to get my attention, as I am disabling pings. I do hope that efforts to correct the kinds of problems I have found in too many FACs are heeded and addressed, both at FAC and at ACR; that this problem was apparent to a layperson is a concern. All the bst, SandyGeorgia (Talk) 15:29, 1 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks Sandy - Hawkeye, happy to help (including with checking van Creveld if you don't have access to a copy - I think I can remember where mine is!). Nick-D (talk) 00:30, 2 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
My copy is on the shelf in Canberra. I will look it up when I return. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 01:20, 2 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I've found my copy if helpful. Nick-D (talk) 07:29, 5 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Got mine, and have added it to the article. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 20:06, 13 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I have removed the material on the broad front vs narrow front controversy. I will create a new article on the subject in due course. I agree with your assessment that modern historians tend to be much more sympathetic to Eisenhower. This is also true of Montgomery, whose reputation has been burnished in recent years. The article is narrowly focused on logistics. The key point is that logistical failure was foreseen and to some extent accepted. When someone reads that the Allies outran their supply lines, they can turn to this article to find out what that really means, and the answers to the inevitable "Why didn't they?" questions. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 20:06, 13 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Hawkeye7, Nick-D, and Peacemaker67: I popped back in to see if I am still the holdup here, and out of concern that I am, I have re-read the article to see what improvements have been made. I have one outstanding quibble, and would be prepared to support if you MilHist experts could reassure me wrt the Brittany ports. See Operation Chastity, but set aside the overstatement in that article that "the Allies had already seized Antwerp (on 4 September) with its port facilities intact" ... because the approaches to Antwerp had not actually been cleared, and that should be sorted out in that article. This article still seems critical of the decision not to take the Brittany ports, but that was a deliberate one. This article states that "the US Army's logistical difficulties in the pursuit were not a result of inadequate port resources" but that "the problem was the inability to deliver" supplies. The Allies were successful in bringing in supplies via artificial ports and over the beaches, even without the Brittany ports. So I don't understand what seems to be criticism of the deliberate decision to not divert troops and resources to attempt to take ports further away from the front, also considering that shortages at the front were partly the result of long supply lines (and other). What is my solution? Find a way to leave the Brittany question out of this article, or minimize what appears to be criticism, depending on what you experts say. ("The decision to abandon plans to develop the ports of Brittany left only the Normandy beaches and the port of Cherbourg for the maintenance of the American forces.") SandyGeorgia (Talk) 17:15, 17 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
  1. The Allies were successful in bringing in supplies via artificial ports and over the beaches in August and September (the period covered by the article), but this was contingent on the weather, which they knew would deteriorate as winter set in. Things became critical in October when the beach tonnages fell below that required for maintenance of the American armies. I have added an extra paragraph on beach operations.
  2. The port of Antwerp was largely intact, insofar as the quays and the 650 cranes were undamaged. However, the sluice gates had to be repaired. (And of course the Germans had to be removed from the approaches.) The article notes this. The statement you refer to is in the Operation Chastity article, not this one.
I have re-worked the first paragraph of "Outcome" to present both sides of the Brittany argument, and re-worked it to be less critical. Hawkeye7 (discuss) 23:23, 17 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I've read through and fixed a typo, but it looks fine now, and SG's concerns seem to me to be addressed. Peacemaker67 (click to talk to me) 00:05, 18 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
This material also looks good to me. Nick-D (talk) 09:46, 20 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, all, SandyGeorgia (Talk) 11:03, 20 January 2021 (UTC)[reply]
The above discussion is preserved as an archive. Please do not modify it. No further edits should be made to this page.
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