United Nations Operation in the Congo
Opération des Nations unies au Congo, abbreviated ONUC (English: The United Nations Organization in the Congo), was a United Nations peacekeeping force in Congo that was established after United Nations Security Council Resolution 143 of July 14, 1960. From 1963 the name changed to Opération des Nations Unies au Congo, keeping the same abbreviation. To generalise, the mission was a response to the Congo Crisis. ONUC was the UN's first peacekeeping mission with muscle, yet ONUC has been described as a "pyrrhic victory at best."
Congo became independent in 30 June 1960, but the Belgian commander, Lieutenant General Émile Janssens, refused to "Africanize" the officers' corps of the Force Publique (the army) resulting in disorder and mutinies. While the President and the Prime Minister were trying to negotiate with the mutineers, the Belgian government decided to intervene to protect Belgians that remained in the country at the request of Moïse Tshombé, who advocated independence for Katanga, one of the richest provinces in the country due to an abundance of minerals.
On July 10, Belgian troops were sent to Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, to control the situation and protect Belgian civilians. With the help of the Belgians, Tshombé proclaimed the independence of the province. On 12 July, the President and the Prime Minister asked for help of the UN. The Secretary-General addressed the Security Council at a night meeting on 13 July and asked the Council to act "with utmost speed" on the request.
At the same meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution 143 (1960), by which it called upon the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Congo. The resolution authorized the United Nations Secretary-General to facilitate the withdrawal of Belgian troops, maintain law and order, and help to establish and legitimize the post-colonial government. This mandate was extended to maintain the territorial integrity of Congo, through particularly the removal of the foreign mercenaries supporting the secession of Katanga. ONUC's intention was an unprecedented role for a UN peacekeeping force, as it was not self-evidently peacekeeping in nature.
Following Security Council actions, the United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC) was established. To carry out these tasks, the Secretary-General set up a United Nations Force, which at its peak strength numbered nearly 20,000. The UN Force stayed in the Congo between 1960 and 1964, and underwent a transition from a peacekeeping presence to a military force.
ONUC's main goals stayed consistent from the first to fifth resolution. It featured the double purpose of withdrawing Belgian military personnel (later expanding to mercenaries) and providing military assistance to ensure internal stability. The successive Security Council resolutions added to and elaborated on the initial mandate but did not fundamentally change the operation's objectives. These were especially significant because Belgium's invasion violated the norm of sovereignty, and the second objective was set to prevent the country from becoming a Cold War proxy state.
The first troops reached Congo on 15 July, many airlifted in by the United States Air Force.
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, dissatisfied with Dag Hammarskjöld's refusal to use UN troops to subdue the insurrection in Katanga, decided to attempt an invasion of Katanga on his own and turned to the Soviet Union for help. The invasion attempt never reached Katanga but led to dissension within the Central Government, the collapse of the Central Government, and eventually to Patrice Lumumba's arrest in December.
In February 1961, the legally elected Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba was killed, and only then did the United Nations Security Council explicitly authorize the use of force for purposes beyond self-defense.
In September the most obvious example of the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement occurred when the local ONUC leadership launched "Operation Morthor", which led to a serious eight-day military engagement between ONUC and the Katangese forces. Seven UN troops were killed, as well as 200 Katangese civilians and troops. Operation Morthor was executed without full approval by several member countries of the UN, particularly the UK, France, and US. Also, the USSR at this time was angrily accusing the US of supporting the assassination of Lumumba, as he was a Soviet ally, and installing the American ally Mobutu as president. The Soviet state interpreted ONUC to now be acting as a proxy for the US rather than supporting the interests of the entire Security Council.
Operation Morthor illustrated a disconnect between decision-making in the field and decision-making from UN headquarters due to poor communication during a series of crises, which occurred again in the tragic intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s. The incident of Operation Morthor undermined both the credibility and impartiality of the entire ONUC operation.
After the withdrawal of the Belgians, the troops remained until 1964, to help the government to maintain the peace and consolidate the independence of the country. In the end, Katanga was reintegrated back into the Congo.
By autumn 1963 plans were underway to remove the United Nations force from the Congo after the reincorporation of Katanga. At that time six battalions of UN troops were stationed in Katanga, one battalion was at Luluabourg, one at Force Headquarters, and administration personnel were at Leopoldville. In May 1964 troops began to withdraw, beginning with the Irish unit in Kolwezi on May 11, and ending with units in Leopoldville in June.
Swedish Army Involvement
Sweden had an active role in the UN forces during the crisis. When Dag Hammarskjold established UN Mission ONUC he organized it into two parts: one military and one civilian. The Swedish Major General Carl von Horn became the head of the military part and the Swedish diplomat Sture Linner was responsible for the civilians. Both of them were subject to American Ralph Bunche, who was appointed head of the whole operation.
During the years 1960-1964, Sweden sent a total of nine battalions to Congo . In the initial stage of the crisis, when whites in the Congo became targets during the riots, Dag Hammarskjöld assesed that it was important that there were white UN troops in the country. He therefore requested that Sweden and Ireland would send a battalion each, with the ulterior motive that these would be easier to win the confidence of the whites than soldiers from African states.The first Swedish battalion arrived in Congo directly from the Gaza 22 July 1960. the first days the Swedes were patrolling in Leopoldville and guarded Kinshasa airport in the city.
Swedes, like other UN troops, time in the Congo came to be characterized by the fact that it was often very unclear who really were friends and who were enemies and that fighting and killing was not always apparent rational reason. In August, the Swedes moved to Elizabethville in Katanga, where they ended up in their first combat situation and suffered their first loss in connection with the escort of a rail road transport. The trains were attacked by Katangans from the baluba community, who supported the central government against the break out government. In practice, the Swedes fought, at this stage, on the same as the Katangan gendarmerie, who would later on become UN's worst enemy.
One of the most difficult tasks the Swedes had in the Congo was to keep order in a huge camp with approximately 40,000  refugees, which hastily grew up in just two weeks during August and September 1961- The camp mainly evolved because the severe persecutions of the baluba people in the Kasai area. Conditions in the camp were appalling: desperate refugees could murder each other in the crush around food distributions, and there was even cannibalism. A group of about a thousand young men of uncertain origin, called baluba jeunesse put fear in the camp, committed murder and rioted. The Swedes came to be in open conflict with the baluba jeunesse and on a number of occasions, the situation developed until they shot straight into the angry crowds, killing several people. No legal investigation has been made of these shootings.
In December 1961, the Swedes, along with UN troops from Ireland, India, and Ethiopia, were involved in heavy fighting for Katanga's capital, Elizabethville. UN forces eventually managed to defeat the Katangan gendarmes in the city and took Elizabethville. During the fighting, eleven Swedish soldiers were taken prisoners, they were released in January 15, 1962 in exchange for Katangan gendarmes.
In 1962, the Swedes moved to the Kamina base, near the town of Kamina who was a Katangan stronghold. On New Year's Eve 1962, the UN troops advanced towards Kamina, cleared all the gendarmes roadblocks and managed to knock down the organized resistance.
Congo crisis became by far the most serious international task the Swedish armed forces faced during the Cold War, and it was the first time in 147 years that Swedish forces were forced into battle. During the years in Congo, 40 Swedish soldiers were injured and 19 were killed. As late as 2004, it was revealed that the corpses of two killed Swedes were eaten by locals, cannibalism was believed to be a way to assimilate the victim's strength. The event was considered very sensitive to the UN and the Congolese government and the incident was covered up.
A number of total 6,334 Swedes served in the Congo during the years 1960-64, 19 died and many wounded. . A total of 11 soldiers were awarded the Swedish Vasa medal for "[...] extraordinary courage and commendable action to save human lives [...]". Two soldiers who received this medal were Stig von Bayer and Torsten Stålnacke.
The Swedish Air Force was also part of the intervention in the Congo, in the form of air force unit, F 22. Katanga region had an air force consisting of about 10 propeller aircraft and three two-seat jet trainers, and this was perceived as a threat of ground troops. Following a request from the United Nations the Swedish government decided 4 October 1961 that a group of five J 29 "Flying Barrels" would be to the disposal of the UN and after just six days later the Swedish planes landed in Congo.
The Swedish unit's main objective was to protect the UN air transportation, but fighters also came to be used in direct combat. The most serious took place during the Battle of Elizabethville in December 1961, and in short time they managed to establish air superiority, which helped to end the fighting.
In November 1962 came an order from the United Nations that the Swedes would shoot down all katangan flights. The Swedish officers in place, however, refused to obey the orders because they felt that it was effectively an order to commit murder. The insubordination led to a diplomatic entanglement between the UN and Sweden.
The Swedish flight operations grew later in scope when the regiment was reinforced with several J 22 aircrafts. Even helicopters and light transport aircrafts were flown by the Swedish UN troops during this period.
Irish Army Involvement
The Irish Army's first large deployment to the Congo was in 1960. The 32nd Infantry Battalion was the first deployment of Irish troops overseas and they were woefully ill-equipped. The standard uniform was a heavy bullswool tunic and trousers and the service rifle was the .303 Lee-Enfield. Issues with kit were eventually solved, new lightweight uniforms were issued and the FN FAL rifle replaced the Lee Enfield. The Irish Battalions had a huge area to patrol and not much transport to patrol it with. Most patrols consisted of a couple of Land Rovers or Willys CJ3As, carrying soldiers armed with rifles, Gustav M45 submachineguns and Bren Guns. One such patrol was ambushed at Niemba on 8 November 1960 by Baluba tribesmen. Of the 11 Irish soldiers, 9 were killed and only 2 escaped, while 25 Baluba were also killed in the battle. Trooper Anthony Browne was posthumously awarded the Military Medal for Gallantry (the highest Irish military award) for giving his life to save his comrade. It is the only time this medal has been awarded. As a result of the ambush, the army equipped its contingent with 8 Ford armoured cars. These had been constructed in Ireland during the Second World War as a stop-gap armoured vehicle. Armament consisted of a single turret-mounted Vickers HMG. Modifications included extra ammunition storage, a searchlight and a cooling fan.
The most famous Irish action of the operation was the Siege of Jadotville where 150 Irish troops held out against a much larger force of Katanganese. The Irish fought until their ammunition ran out, inflicting hundreds of casualties on their opponents while suffering only several wounded. However, an attempt by Irish and Swedish reinforcements to relieve them failed, and in the end, the besieged Irish troops were forced to surrender.
A total of 6,000 Irish soldiers served in the Congo from 1960 until 1964, taking 26 casualties in that time. The Congo deployment resulted in greater investment by the government in personal kit and eventually, armoured personnel carriers.
Canadian Army Involvement
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Canadian soldiers had been a part of every UN Peacekeeping mission from its founding to 1989. The Congo Crisis was one of the earliest and most important UN missions ever. In many ways the UN mission to the Congo would set a precedent for all subsequent UN peacekeeping missions. When violence erupted in the Congo so too did support for a United Nations mission to the Congo among the Canadian public. On 12 July, the Globe asked "where are the UN Police?" in an editorial that called for the dispatch of a UN armed force. In July 1960 Canadians were asked in a poll "of all the trouble spots in the world — Russia, China, Cuba or the Congo, which do you think is most critical?" After Russia the Congo was identified as the next most critical trouble spot. Support for a UN mission was not only strong among the Canadian public but was also strong in Parliament. In the House of Commons, Liberal critic Paul Martin asked the Progressive Conservative of John Diefenbaker "to inform the secretary General of the United Nations that if United Nations police forces are required and requested for the preservation of order in the new Congo state, a Canadian contingent is ready, trained and available to be moved by air transport immediately." At the time Canada had set aside an infantry brigade especially for the use of the United Nations. JW MacNaughton, the Director of Military Operations and Plans, stated that "he considered it unlikely that peacekeepers would get used in any combat capacity, so he expected the UN would ask for military advisers and not the standby battalion Canada had readily available for UN service." When Dag Hammarskjold received the offer to send the Canadian Brigade to the Congo he refused stating that "If outside help was required to resolve the developing crisis, they preferred non-African states to be used as a last resort." The United Nations did not wish to turn the Congo Crisis into a Cold War proxy war and so tried to pick peacekeepers from neutral countries. Hammarskjold hoped that if a military force was necessary "the force would consist of three or four fully equipped units, which he hoped to obtain from several neutral African and Asian countries and from a trans-Atlantic French-speaking country." This trans-Atlantic French–speaking country would be Canada, even though as Dr. Spooner put it "Canada: [was] Just West of Neutral." Canadian forces were perfectly suited for a peacekeeping mission in the Congo because they were bilingual, this allowed them to communicate with the mostly English speaking UN troops as well as the French-speaking Belgian and Congolese forces. They could also communicate with the Congolese people.
All of this occurred prior to there being an official request for assistance from the Congo. The first request for assistance from the Congo requested that the United Nations send technical assistance to support the Force Publique, the armed forces of the Congo. In response, "the secretary general suggested the dispatch of UN technical personnel to the Congo to assist in restoring order and discipline within the armed forces." Canadian National Defence assumed that the United Nations would ask for French-speaking military advisers, the army maintained a standby list of one hundred officers, including many who were bilingual and could be posted abroad on short notice." Before Hammarskjold could put his plan into action, however, a second Congolese request arrived, sent directly to the secretary general from President Joseph Kasavubu and Prime Minister Joseph Lumumba, "the Congolese leaders asked for UN military forces to counter the violent Belgian intervention." Again Canada offered combat troops stating that if the need arose for Canadian military intervention in the Congo Canada could also "deploy one of three French speaking battalions made ready for UN Service." The offer for combat troops was again refused, though Hammarskjold officially accepted the Canadian French-speaking officers.
It was during this time that the first formal request for troops in the support of the UN mission was given to Canada, the request included Canadian signals and logistics personnel be sent to the Congo. From Canada the UN needed specifically signals personnel as well as quartermaster and maintenance personnel. "Once cabinet decided to send signallers, the army moved quickly to complete the necessary arrangements for their departure. Two units were formed: Canadian HQ, ONUC and no. 57 Signals Squadron." To supply these Canada approved "the purchase of thirteen tropicalized AN/GRC-26D heavy wireless sets from the United States." The Canadian Signallers were to be used to send communication from the front to the headquarters and vice-versa. They were stationed both at ONUC HQ as well as in 10 static signals stations spread throughout the country. Canada also sent a Provost Unit which attempted to promote law and order in the capital. "At any one time there were more Canadians serving at ONUC HQ than of any other nationality." In addition to the Signals Squadron, Canada also sent an advanced reconnaissance party consisting of six officers from the United Nations Military Observer Group in India. "These men were instructed to determine personnel and equipment requirements, as well as the organization requirements at HQ." The reconnaissance party found that "ONUC HQ personnel did not carry weapons and were able to move about freely without any trouble." The Canadian government, however, was scared that their French-speaking peacekeepers could get mistaken for Belgian paratroops, and so "peacekeepers were given small arms training... depending on rank the troops were issued either Browning automatic pistols or C1 submachine guns, weapons the non-combatant peacekeepers carried for personal defence only."
It soon became clear that these fears were not unwarranted, Canadian peacekeepers were attacked by Congolese troops on several occasions. "The first incident of serious violence that occurred between Congolese and Canadians occurred at N'Djili airport, and demonstrated how vulnerable the Canadians could be. Two groups of peacekeepers were waiting to depart on reconnaissance missions, when those destined for Luluabourg were delayed on the tarmac. A patrol of about ten to twelve Congolese soldiers suddenly rushed them... the Congolese forced them facedown onto the tarmac, arms extended and then they kicked them." The commanding officer was then knocked out and the remaining Canadian soldiers were herded onto a truck. After about ten minutes the Canadians were rescued by a Danish officer and Ghanain troops. The UN as well as Canada reacted in outrage to this senseless attack against Canadian troops. In turn they praised the Canadian officer for not escalating the situation and responding in due discretion. It was recognized by all parties that the Canadian soldiers were capable of firing on the Congolese troops in self-defence but they did not.
Even though Canada wasn't in the Congo in a combat capacity their involvement came under scrutiny from the USSR. The Soviets began to attack Canadian involvement directly, "they objected to the use of Canadian peacekeepers because Canada was one of Belgium's NATO allies." The Soviets even went so far as to demand "the withdrawal of armed groups from Canada". According to Scarnecchia, the Soviets "accused the RCAF of supplying weapons and armoured steel to Tshombe's forces in secessionist Katanga, they believed that this RCAF support was in line with Western Interests." Although these allegations were never proven, in response, the Secretary-General of the UN transferred the RCAF contingent from performing airlift duties in support of the UN mission to a Pisa-Leopoldville airlift of food and aid. This transfer served to somewhat satisfy the Russians and any further scrutiny was mild in comparison. Instead of arguing against UN involvement in the Congo, the Soviets began to provide aid to Prime Minister Lumumba in Leopoldville. Along with the assassination of Lumumba and the death of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, this then led to the use of force by UN troops in the Congo being allowed by the UN. In 1961, UN troops under aggressive commanders pushed into Katanga, and began routing Tshombe's armed forces. As "clashes between Tshombe and UN forces grew more frequent, the UN moved even more aggressively, and eventually took control of key parts of the province."
One of the most famous Canadian peacekeepers that served in the Congo was General Jacques Dextraze. Dextraze was sent to the Congo in 1963, to serve as Chief of Staff of the UN force, effectively making him second in command of the entire mission. Dextraze was a daring leader, he made a name for himself by "undertaking a number of risky rescues, he once landed his personal helicopter to pick up four missionaries and was forced to keep the rebels at bay until escape was possible. General Dextraze went on to become the Chief of Defence Staff in Canada." Canadians would play an important role in nearly every aspect of the UN mission in the Congo. From their detachment at Command HQ to the RCAF Pisa-Leopoldville Airlift on to the Signals Personnel stationed throughout the Congo, each level of Canadian involvement would play a crucial role in the mission. Though Canadian involvement came under Soviet attack the Canadian commitment to the mission did not waver and Canadian soldiers stayed in the Congo until the end of the mission in 1964. Canadian forces proved themselves admirably in tough situations when they were attacked by Congolese forces and responded with discipline and tact by not firing on their
The greatest strength which the Canadian Contingent in the Congo reached was 461, though 1,900 Canadian soldiers would serve there from 1960–64. There were no casualties except the bruises and cuts given to the Canadian Forces by Congolese troops at N'Djili Airport.
During the ensuing Congo Crisis, about 1,800 Canadians from 1960 to 1964 served among the 93,000 predominantly African peacekeepers with the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), working chiefly as communications signallers and delivering via the Royal Canadian Air Force humanitarian food shipments and logistical support. The Canadian participation stemmed more from overwhelming public opinion, and not decisive action on the part of the Diefenbaker government, according to historians Norman Hillmer and Jack Granatstein. However, Diefenbaker reportedly refused to comply with numerous public calls for Canada to provide humanitarian relief to 230,000 Congolese famine victims in South Kasai in 1961 ostensibly because "surplus foodstuffs should be distributed to unemployed persons in Canada" as a first priority. Two Canadians died from non-conflict-related causes, and, out of the 33 Canadians injured in the conflict, twelve received "severe beatings" by the Congolese forces. Although Patrice Lumumba dismissed the first incidences of these beatings, on August 18, 1960, as "unimportant" and "blown out of all proportion" in order for the UN to "influence public opinion", he attributed them a day later to the Armée Nationale Congolaise's "excess of zeal". Historians have described these incidents as cases of mistaken identity under chaotic circumstances, in which Canadian personnel were confused by Congolese soldiers with Belgian paratroopers, or mercenaries working for the Katanga secession. Only a quarter of Canada's signallers extended their six-month tours of duty to a full year, and Canadian forces reportedly found the Congolese to be "illiterate, very volatile, superstitious and easily influenced", including an instance where a Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel successfully persuaded Kivu Province's Prime Minister to accept a relief contingent from Malaysia by explaining to him that the Malaysians were capable of diverting bullets in flight away from their intended path. A recent study concluded that while the Canadian government "demonstrated a greater willingness to accommodate the Congolese prime minister Patrice Lumumba than other Western nations" and publicly did not side with either faction, it "[p]rivately [...] favoured the more Western oriented [President] Kasavubu". however financial assistance was turned down by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Canada's troops earned the trust of Joseph Mobutu, the latter visiting Canada in 1964 as President of Zaire, during which he acknowledged Canada's support in maintaining his country's territorial integrity.
The UN force was ineffectual in alleviating the dispute, and Member States were divided on how the operation ought to be executed, and what level of force should be used to carry out the mandate. Several peacekeeping contingents suffered casualties during the mission, and the debt incurred from operations nearly bankrupted the UN. Once ONUC had departed, fighting resumed again. Until the end of the Cold War, the memories of the Congo haunted the UN as well as convinced the international organization that peacekeeping should remain consensual and non-threatening in nature, an attitude it maintained for almost three decades.
Force commanders of the ONUC
- General Carl Carlsson von Horn, Sweden, July 1960 – December 1960 (transferred from UNTSO)
- Lieutenant-General Sean MacEoin, Ireland, January 1961 – March 1962
- Lieutenant-General Kebbede Guebre, Ethiopia, April 1962 – July 1963
- Major-General Christian Roy Kaldager, Norway, August 1963 – December 1963
- Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, Nigeria, January 1964 – June 1964
- Morrison, Alex, James Kiras, and Douglas A. Fraser. Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution. Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping, 1997, ix.
- Morrison, Alex, James Kiras, and Douglas A. Fraser. Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution. Clementsport, N.S.: Canadian Peacekeeping, 1997, 60.
- "ONUC", DPKO, UN
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- Thomas Nilsson, Jimmy Persson, 2006, "Kongokrisen - FN-insatsen 1960-64 i analys" , Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, Lunds universitet,B-uppsats
- [ArmeExhibitionPage____2109.aspx?epslanguage=EN] "Svensk FN-trupp i Kongo år 1960-64" 16 november 2008, Nina Lakia 18 juni 2008 sfhm.se Armémuseum
-  Svensk militär fredsbevarande utlandstjänst under Förenta Nationernas tidevarv, 2009 Statens försvarshistoriska museer
-  Svensk FN-trupp i Kongo år 1960-64 2008 Nina Lakia www.sfhm.se Armémuseum
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-  P3 Dokumentär: Kongokrisen Fredrik Johnsson 2007 |verk=sr.se Sveriges Radio P3 Dokumentär
-  "Svenska soldater åts upp i Kongo" Ingvar Hedlund 27 October 2004 Expressen
-  Glöm bort konstbråket – nu gäller det folkmord Pierre Schori 21 January 2004 Aftonbladet
SHwas invoked but never defined (see the help page).
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- Gaffen, Fred. 1987. In the Eye of the Storm: A history of Canadian peackeeping, Toronto: Deneau & Wayne, pp. 217–239.
- Hillmer, Norman; Granatstein, J.L. 1994. Empire to umpire: Canada and the world to the 1990s, Toronto : Copp Clark Longman, pp. 255–256.
- Spooner, Kevin A. 2009. "Canada, the Congo crisis, and UN peacekeeping, 1960–64", Vancouver, UBC Press, pp. 13–16, 128–130, 224 n.13.
- McCullough, Colin. 2011. "Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64. Kevin Spooner", review, The Canadian Historical Review, 92(1) (March 2011): 210–212.
- Granatstein, J.L. 1968. "Canada: Peacekeeper. A survey of Canada's participation in peacekeeping operations", in: Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Response, [Toronto]: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, p. 161.
- Spooner, Kevin A. 2009. "Just West of Neutral: Canadian "Objectivity" and Peacekeeping during the Congo Crisis, 1960–61", Canadian Journal of African Studies, 43(2):303–336.
- To Katanga and Back.
- Abi-Saab, Georges (1978), "The Initial Decision to Undertake a Peace-Keeping Operation in the Congo (July 1960)", The United Nations Operation in the Congo, 1960–1964, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–20.
- Beauregard, JPRE (Summer 1989), "UN Operations in the Congo, 1960–1964", Canadian Defence Quarterly 19: 27.
- Bloomfield, Lincoln P (Spring 1963), "Headquarters-Field Relations: Some Notes on the Beginning and End of ONUC", International Organization 17: 377–89, doi:10.1017/s0020818300033804.
- Chakravorty, B (1976), Prasad, SN, ed., The Congo Operation, 1960–63, Delhi: Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, Govt. of India. Controller of Publications, PDD.37(N)/500.
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- "The Biggest Single Effort Under United Nations Colors", United Nations Review 7, August 1960: 6–7, 45–50.
Non utilised sources
- Scarnacchia, Timothy, "The Congo, Crisis, The United Nations, and Zimbabwean Nationalism: 1960–63", Journal of African Studies 4.
- Spooner, Kevin A (2009a), Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960–64, Vancouver, BC, CA: UBC Press.
- Spooner, Kevin A (2009b), "Canada: Just West of Neutral", Journal of Modern Africa.
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