User talk:MarkusSchulze/Archive 1

This is an archive of past discussions. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.

Archive 1

Hi

hi Markus, wage ja kaum hier etwas reinzuschreiben, nachdem Du offensichtlich alles vor kurzem gelöscht hast. Ich wollte Dir nur meine Anerkennung aussprechen, dass - so mein Eindruck - aufgrund Deiner Arbeit 'Demokratie' Fortschritte macht. Ich bin recht baff, dass sich die konkreten Entscheidungs-Algorithmen dazu noch in Bewegung befinden. Hätte ich nicht vermutet. Dazu finde ich es symphatisch, dass Du von der TU kommst und dann wohl auch aus einem Gebiet, das so auf den ersten Blick nichts mit Demokratie zu tun haben mag. Tourenplanung??? Wünsche Dir weiterhin viel Spass und Erfolg.

Ende Juli / Anfang August 2009 finden erneut Wahlen zu Wikimedias Kuratorium nach der Schulze-Methode statt. Ich hoffe, daß diese Wahlen der Schulze-Methode zum entscheidenden Durchbruch verhelfen werden. Markus Schulze 17:20, 28 June 2009 (UTC)

New (?) Voting Criteria: Cloaked Participation

Hallo Markus, a few years ago I read an argument you made on the electorama mailing list regarding a method that fails the Participation Criterion (I guess it was your method). If I remember correctly it was basically this: Anybody who votes in the style of Approval Voting does not have any risk of being the victim of a No-Show Paradox, so failing that criterion isn't such a convincing argument to actually use Approval Voting instead.

I read an argument that was superficially similar to me by an IRV advocate: IRV satisfies Mono-Add-Top and you can vote like in Plurality, so you can dodge the risk of Participation Criterion failure. There was something off in that argument. I came up with these 2 criteria, neither one satisfied by IRV or QLTD-Bucklin, despite these methods satisfying Mono-Add-Plumb:

The Plurality-Cloaked Participation Criterion states that adding a ballot that bullet-votes for only X should neither decrease the winning probability of X, nor change the winning probabilities among the other candidates relative to each other. A method that does not allow bullet-voting for only one candidate is considered failing the criterion.

The Approval-Cloaked Participation Criterion states that adding a ballot that votes a set S of candidates equally top and all candidates outside that set equally bottom should neither decrease the winning probability of any candidate in S, nor change the winning probabilites among the candidates in set S relative to each other, nor change the winning probabilities among the candidates outside of S relative to each other. A method that does not allow voting by putting one or several candidates in the first rank and all other candidates in the last rank is considered failing the criterion.

I show you this because I want to know

whether you know these Criteria already under a different name
whether the definitions are fuzzy (ich bin kein Mathe-Crack)
whether your method satisfies them

before I put them on the Electorama wiki. --R.H. (talk) 09:19, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

I don't know those criteria under a different name.
The criteria are well defined.
The Schulze method doesn't satisfy them.

Markus Schulze 15:42, 13 August 2009 (UTC)

Voting System FAR

I have nominated Voting system for a featured article review here. Please join the discussion on whether this article meets featured article criteria. Articles are typically reviewed for two weeks. If substantial concerns are not addressed during the review period, the article will be moved to the Featured Article Removal Candidates list for a further period, where editors may declare "Keep" or "Remove" the article's featured status. The instructions for the review process are here.) Feinoha ^{Talk, My master} 06:42, 6 October 2009 (UTC)

Invitation to participate in SecurePoll feedback and workshop

As you participated in the recent Audit Subcommittee election, or in one of two requests for comment that relate to the use of SecurePoll for elections on this project, you are invited to participate in the SecurePoll feedback and workshop. Your comments, suggestions and observations are welcome.

For the Arbitration Committee,
Risker (talk) 08:27, 12 November 2009 (UTC)

Non-monotonic elective systems

I was curious when I saw that run-off systems were under non-monotonic. It seems to me that not all (in fact few) run-off systems result in a non-montonic system... simple majority rule for instance. My impression is that a run-off helps to preserve monotonicity. Is there something I am missing? Greg Bard 22:30, 30 April 2010 (UTC)

Most two-round systems violate monotonicity. Markus Schulze 08:10, 1 May 2010 (UTC)

Your recent edits to the Voting System table

See talk over there. Homunq (talk) 19:57, 15 May 2010 (UTC)

I asked you to please explain your edits, and you responded for one of the 3 edits. However, soon after you continued, making another unexplained edit on a matter that was under discussion in talk. This time, you removed sourced material.

You are by no means obligated to get caught in a back-and-forth discussion. However, if you remove sourced material and are not willing to at least post a one-time defense of your position on Talk:Voting system or in the edit comment, there's not a whole lot to do in response besides just reverting you. I can't seek a neutral compromise if I don't know your motivation. Homunq (talk) 09:38, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

You just violated WP:3RR. Please revert your latest edit and participate in the discussion on the talk page. I believe this can be resolved to everyone's satisfaction, but I don't think you're being helpful right now in that regard. Homunq (talk) 11:23, 16 May 2010 (UTC)

I just reported you for your earlier 3RR violation. All I'm asking is for you to participate in the discussion on talk, instead of edit warring. If, as you say, you find participating on talk too "boring", perhaps you might prefer to take a break from Wikipedia. Peace, Homunq (talk) 16:36, 18 May 2010 (UTC) You currently appear to be engaged in an edit war. Note that the three-revert rule prohibits making more than three reversions on a single page within a 24-hour period. Additionally, users who perform several reversions in content disputes may be blocked for edit warring even if they do not technically violate the three-revert rule. When in dispute with another editor you should first try to discuss controversial changes to work towards wording and content that gains a consensus among editors. Should that prove unsuccessful, you are encouraged to seek dispute resolution, and in some cases it may be appropriate to request page protection. If the edit warring continues, you may be blocked from editing without further notice.

This is getting ridiculous. STOP EDIT WARRING AND JOIN THE DISCUSSION ON TALK. Your most recent pair of edits, in which you revert me, are wrong about substance, wrong ABOUT wikipedia policy, and wrong BY wikipedia policy. I explain why on Talk:Voting system, in this edit. I've also reported your latest behavior in the same thread referenced above ("reported you"). Homunq (talk) 17:33, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

Markus, here's a peace offering: can we post a notice of this dispute on the EM list? There are a lot of smart people there, and some of them would certainly be sympathetic to your view of Arrow's Theorem. An informed third party would help us return to productive debate and end the edit warring. If you agree, I'd be happy to let you make the posting, and make it as biased as you like (though of course I'd prefer a neutral statement of the two issues: Bucklin criteria compliance and whether the LNH criterion is uniquely contentious or simply as contentious as other criteria). I would even promise not to respond to your posting, except to identify myself if you desired, no matter how biased I felt your presentation was. Note: If I do reveal my real name over there, which I suspect you could guess anyway, I'd ask you to promise not to post my real name here or my wiki username on the list. Homunq (talk) 20:25, 18 May 2010 (UTC)

I did notice your latest edit. Thank you, the gesture is much appreciated. Homunq (talk) 15:43, 19 May 2010 (UTC)

Edit warring at Bucklin voting

Recently, an editor complained about your edits at the 3RR noticeboard. This complaint was closed with protection of Voting system. Now it seems a related dispute has broken out at Bucklin voting. I doubt that good faith will allow admins to protect two articles in succession. I think that one or more blocks are imminent if you are not willing to make an effort to get consensus for your changes. The steps of WP:Dispute resolution are open to you, for example a WP:Request for comment, or a posting at a related Wikiproject. If you continue to revert on the subject of voting before agreement is reached, bad consequences may follow. EdJohnston (talk) 23:51, 19 May 2010 (UTC)

It appears that both of you have broken WP:3RR at Bucklin voting. If you continue to revert on that article, or any other voting article, without getting consensus first, you may be blocked. See also the update to the report at WP:AN3. EdJohnston (talk) 11:42, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

EdJohnston is correct, Markus, please be careful. I was asked to look at the situation at Bucklin voting, and there are some problems that I believe the knowledgeable editors can work out without major fuss, it just takes time, and I'm urging him to be patient. As to this, Markus, Homunq is correct. A fact tag merely means that a fact is not referenced, and a Wikipedia article cannot be a reference in itself. Please be patient with the other editor, and, when a controversy has appeared, please discuss proposed reverts on the Talk, don't just go ahead and do it, especially over something so relatively trivial as a fact tag. I've commented on Talk:Bucklin voting, starting to help address some of the issues. --Abd (talk) 18:38, 20 May 2010 (UTC)

Can you please join in on Talk:Bucklin voting? I've separated out 3 different issues, and I'm sure we can find consensus on at least some of them. Honestly, from your brief comments so far, it's impossible to even tell what you really think - for instance, do you think that Majority Choice Approval meets IIAC, ICC, and/or MC? If you're interested enough to stand in the way of my edits, you are certainly interested enough to express your thoughts clearly in a search for consensus. Homunq (talk) 17:00, 21 May 2010 (UTC)

I'm sure you can understand how frustrating it is that you haven't elucidated your obviously-strong opinions on the talk page. As I said in one of my very first edits in this incident, I don't expect you to get caught up in an interminable back-and-forth on the talk page, where each side simply repeats the same arguments ad infinitum. I do, however, want you to fully explain your point of view once on the talk page, clearly. If you don't, I really don't see what the rest of us can do aside from interpreting your silence as consent. More baffled than annoyed, Homunq (talk) 12:39, 23 May 2010 (UTC)

Pamela Geller

Hi Markus. Thanks for your input on Pamela Geller. I'd like to wrap it up. Would you take a moment to read my response and let me know what you think? When we settle that last issue, I (or someone) can post something to the article. Much appreciated. guanxi (talk) 14:20, 26 October 2010 (UTC)

DYK nomination for Schulze method

I've reviewed your nomination for the above page, as far as I can tell there has not been the required expansion within the last 5 days. If I've missed something or have otherwise messed up then please leave a comment at my review on the suggestions page - Basement12 (T.C) 13:14, 28 April 2011 (UTC)

5g Washer System

Hi Markus,

If you have the time, I wonder if you would comment on the voting method we (currently - we've tried lots!) use in our annual story-telling contest The Pint Pot of Fire. I'd be interested to know if there is a formal name for it and how it shapes up against other methods. There are seven or eight contestants and each audience member is given 6 x 5g washers. Each contestant has a separate collecting pot and the voters put as many washers as they want in as many pots as they want. The winner is the contestant whose pot weighs the most.

Reading some of the background material to voting systems makes me wonder if, technically (if not very practically), we should be giving each voter enough washers to rank every contestant i.e. n(n-1)/2 or 21 for 7 contestants, 28 for 8 contestants. Tesspub (talk) 10:31, 5 May 2011 (UTC)

Using Schulze method for proportional representation.

I have a question i would like to ask Markus Schulze.

Assuming an election system which allows variation of voting powers for different seats according to votes received in a multi-member constituency, E.g.: In a two member constituency of total 100 votes, if A received 70 votes, A will have 70% voting power and if B received 30 votes, B will have 30% voting power.

So the question is, will it be fair to make use of Schulze method to allocate the voting power among the seats/candidates?

I shall make a reference below, based on your article on the short version schulze method (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User:MarkusSchulze/Short_version_of_the_Schulze_method):

In this case however, this election is held in a 4 member constituency

Total 21 voters and 4 options 8 ACDB 2 BADC 4 CDBA 4 DBAC 3 DCBA

	p[*,A]	p[*,B]	p[*,C]	p[*,D]
p[A,*]		14	14	12
p[B,*]	13		13	12
p[C,*]	13	15		12
p[D,*]	13	19	13

Since the schulze ranking is D>A>C>B,

D > A = 1 A > C = 2 C > B = 2

If i work out the voting powers of each candidate,

(B) + (C) + (A) + (D) = (B) + (B+2) + (B+2+2) + (B+2+2+1) = 45

B = 2.5 votes = 12% C = 4.5 votes = 21% A = 6.5 votes = 31% D = 7.5 votes = 36%

Total 21 votes

When contrasted with votes allocation based only on first preferences: B = 2 votes = 9.5% C = 4 votes = 19.1% A = 8 votes = 38.1% D = 7 votes = 33.3%

I hope Mr Schulze can reply on this. Thank you — Preceding unsigned comment added by Isachn (talk • contribs) 10:14, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Because of the problems of the Banzhaf power index and the Shapley–Shubik power index, I don't think that it is a good idea to give the different candidates different voting powers. Markus Schulze 12:52, 14 June 2011 (UTC)

Hi Markus,

Thanks for replying. I have read about Banzhaf power index and Shapley–Shubik power index and found it interesting. I shall study them more in depth at a later date.

I was studying a system where a country is split to many many constituencies. And in each multi-member (lets say 4) constituency, voters delegate the voting powers to their representative and wanted to try using a method based on Schulze ranking to distribute voting powers among candidates instead of distributing voting powers based on first preference votes.

I had two questions which i have not figured out the right answer for a long time, i would appreciate your help:

1) Is it better to distribute voting powers based on first preferences or based on Schulze Ranking?

2) If it is better to distribute voting powers based on Schulze Ranking, how will you distribute the voting powers.

Thanks

Isachn (talk) 04:12, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Each representative should have the same voting power.

Example: A has 37 votes, B has 30 votes, C has 21 votes, D has 12 votes. Then A, B, and C have the same Banzhaf, because every proposal needs the approval of only two of them. D has no Banzhaf. In my opinion, it is in the interest of the voters that those votes, that lead to an increase of the nominal voting power, but don't lead to an increase of the Banzhaf, are transferred. Markus Schulze 09:26, 22 June 2011 (UTC)

Schulze promotes Schulze

hi markus, it would be really nice and much appreciated, if you could actively give credit to other people but you as well. this would be valid for references to other persons in articles about the schulze method (giving credit to tideman and others), or references to other voting systems in articles, be it ranked pairs or others. currently the comparison and theoretical background are not yet well written imo, e.g. the major difference between schulze and ranked pairs. --ThurnerRupert (talk) 13:06, 25 June 2011 (UTC)

Nicolaus Tideman has proposed ranked pairs, CPO-STV, and independence of clones. Each of these articles gives credit to Nicolaus Tideman. Markus Schulze 14:21, 25 June 2011 (UTC)

in the german article for the schulze method you removed a reference to tideman which was there because it looked like independence of clones was _the_ most important property while creating the schulze method. also in the english article tidemans influence is not even mentioned nor referenced. the only name you would tolerate is "schulze". somebody with the user name markus schulze inserting his own name into wikipedia, and removing tideman or other names for the schulze method gives the impression of not having a NPOV. debian until today does not use the name schulze method, and it is not be wikipedias task to take a position - wikipedia might only describe the differing opionions, supported by references. --ThurnerRupert (talk) 20:17, 25 June 2011 (UTC)

The Schulze method has been proposed by Markus Schulze. See e.g. reference1, reference2, reference3.

Even Mike Ossipoff (reference4) and Tideman ("Collective Decisions and Voting", 2006) say that the Schulze method has been proposed by Markus Schulze.

Whether independence of clones is the most important property of the Schulze method, is a matter of opinion. I would say that also monotonicity, reversal symmetry, and the Condorcet criterion are important. Markus Schulze 20:34, 25 June 2011 (UTC)

you are saying the schulze method is a greenfield approach, without considering other research? --ThurnerRupert (talk) 09:06, 26 June 2011 (UTC)

Nicolaus Tideman has proposed independence of clones as a criterion for single-winner voting systems. Nicolaus Tideman has proposed the ranked pairs method as a concrete single-winner voting system that satisfies independence of clones. Both articles, the independence of clones article and the ranked pairs article, give credit to Nicolaus Tideman.

Also the Schulze method satisfies independence of clones. However, this doesn't make Nicolaus Tideman a co-inventor of the Schulze method. Even Nicolaus Tideman himself doesn't claim to be a co-inventor of the Schulze method. Markus Schulze 11:39, 27 June 2011 (UTC)

why are you not happy with this text you wrote above within the schulze method article? --ThurnerRupert (talk) 19:38, 19 July 2011 (UTC)

Approval & IIA

Hi,

You made this revision to Voting system, saying, "When it is ambiguous, whether approval voting satisfies majority, then it must also be ambiguous, whether approval voting satisfies IIA." Can you provide a citation for this?

thanks, -Carl beefman (talk) 21:21, 7 August 2011 (UTC)

RfC on ACE2011

Hi, one of the impediments to getting people to seriously consider adopting the Schulze method is the lack of a simple explanation ... say, a shortish paragraph that summarises the mechanics and the effects. Does such an explanation exist? The RfC is bumbling towards a consideration of what method to use, although I suspect it won't change the problematic S/S+O system that has been in use for years.

One discussion thread

The RfC page

$Tony (talk)$ 02:32, 1 October 2011 (UTC)

Split Counting with Schulze

One of my background tasks is finding something to replace First Past The Post counting for public plebescites... and the question that has just occurred to me in rereading the piece about your method, Markus -- which is my favorite so far of all the ones I've seen -- is this:

If one tried to use it for a wide area election -- a governorship, presidency, or any other election where the votes were going to be counted in more than one elections supervisor's office -- would the fact of splitting up the vote counting affect in any way the results the counting would produce?
--Baylink (talk) 16:46, 10 October 2012 (UTC)

It makes no difference whether the ballots are counted in a central office or in a large number of local offices as long as these offices send the whole pairwise matrix to the central bureau. Markus Schulze 11:26, 11 October 2012 (UTC)

Your revert in Schulze method.

I left a question at the talk page about your revert. Please explain your revert there.--Müdigkeit (talk) 09:14, 17 October 2012 (UTC)

Positional Voting Systems

Hallo Professor Schulze. I recently edited the unreferenced stub on the above topic into a reasonable length article and added relevant references. I am puzzled as to why it was removed in its entirety and the original stub re-established. Apart from the Borda Count (BC), the stub only names five voting systems and none of these are positional voting systems (PVSs); although they may be analysed as such. All non-BC PVSs seem to be categorised as ‘variants’ of BC and then described on the BC webpage. So what specific PVSs would then be appropriate for inclusion with BC on this PVS webpage?

As elaborated by Professor Saari (see my references to his published work), my article contained the straightforward criteria that must be met for any voting system to be a valid positional one. As these criteria are fundamental to any understanding of what constitutes a PVS, would you kindly explain why they have been removed? Thanks. Mencor (talk) 09:33, 8 February 2013 (UTC)

Dear Mencor, the "consecutively halved positional voting" (CHPV) method is original research. Markus Schulze 10:25, 8 February 2013 (UTC)

Markus, you're right that CHPV is WP:OR, but you should simply have removed references to that, and left the rest of the article; though its referencing is somewhat weak, it's a clear improvement over the stub. Homunq (࿓) 12:00, 8 February 2013 (UTC)

Lieber Professor Schulze. Thanks for responding but neither of my two questions (above) was addressed. In particular, if not CHPV, then what specific PVSs would be appropriate for inclusion with BC on the PVS webpage? Mencor (talk) 10:23, 9 February 2013 (UTC)

Sorry.

It appears I may have been mistaken in my previous edit here (the one you deleted). However, I don't believe it contained any personal attacks. Homunq (࿓) 16:05, 11 April 2014 (UTC)

Favorite betrayal criterion

You may be interested in Wikipedia:Deletion_review/Log/2014_March_19#Favorite_betrayal_criterion, as you have commented in prior deletion discussions related to this article. Homunq (࿓) 02:06, 19 March 2014 (UTC)

Hi Markus. I have half-followed the many recurrences of Favorite betrayal criterion in deletion discussions. I think it is clear that it does not meet the minimum sourcing standard for a stand alone article. However, this failure of Wikipedia-notability does not mean that there should be no mention/coverage of it all. Why does the word pair "favorite betrayal" not appear in any article? Is this concept of no relevance to any serious treatment of election methods? Is there something personal between you and Ossipoff? Has Ossipoff never reliably published? Has he, nor his voting method stuff never been referred to in a reliable publication? --SmokeyJoe (talk) 02:38, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

As suggested by a couple of admins in the DRV, I've started an RfC on SmokeyJoe's question at Talk:voting system. Homunq (࿓) 14:23, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

RfC on talk:voting system

I've made a commitment to respect the outcome of this RfC (assuming that there is one, and not just "no consensus") until further sources appear. It would be great if you could make a similar promise. If you want to put conditions or a time limit on your promise, that's fine.

If you're not willing to make such a commitment, this may need something more than just the RfC. I'd be amenable to taking this discussion to WP:DRN. This isn't meant to be a threat. Since in my opinion we've both been civil and adhered to policy here, I don't think either of us merit anything drastic like a topicban. But I do feel that there needs to be some stable resolution here, and as far as I can see, that will require attention from third parties. Homunq (࿓) 12:56, 23 April 2014 (UTC)

Hello! There is a DR/N request you may have interest in.

This message is being sent to let you know of a discussion at the Wikipedia:Dispute resolution noticeboard regarding a content dispute discussion you may have participated in. Content disputes can hold up article development and make editing difficult for editors. You are not required to participate, but you are both invited and encouraged to help find a resolution. The thread is "Voting system". Please join us to help form a consensus. Thank you! EarwigBot ^{operator / talk} 11:51, 24 April 2014 (UTC)

Hello! There is a DR/N request you may have interest in.

This message is being sent to let you know of a discussion at the Wikipedia:Dispute resolution noticeboard regarding a content dispute discussion you may have participated in. Content disputes can hold up article development and make editing difficult for editors. You are not required to participate, but you are both invited and encouraged to help find a resolution. The thread is "Voting system". Please join us to help form a consensus. Thank you! —Theodore! (talk) (contribs) 02:35, 27 April 2014 (UTC)

Voting AfDs

FYI WP:AFD and WP:CSD are different deletion processes. Their justifications and processes aren't, typically speaking, interchangeable. So WP:G4 is cause to tag a page for speedy deletion and not a valid AfD rationale, inevitably leading to a speedy keep. I'd suggest withdrawing Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Proportional approval voting (3rd nomination) and Wikipedia:Articles for deletion/Sequential proportional approval voting (2nd nomination) and either tagging the articles for CSD (though it doesn't look like G4 applies) or renominate them with a different justification. — Rhododendrites ^talk \\ 19:55, 21 June 2015 (UTC)

ArbCom elections are now open!

Hi,
You appear to be eligible to vote in the current Arbitration Committee election. The Arbitration Committee is the panel of editors responsible for conducting the Wikipedia arbitration process. It has the authority to enact binding solutions for disputes between editors, primarily related to serious behavioural issues that the community has been unable to resolve. This includes the ability to impose site bans, topic bans, editing restrictions, and other measures needed to maintain our editing environment. The arbitration policy describes the Committee's roles and responsibilities in greater detail. If you wish to participate, you are welcome to review the candidates' statements and submit your choices on the voting page. For the Election committee, MediaWiki message delivery (talk) 22:17, 30 November 2015 (UTC)

ArbCom Elections 2016: Voting now open!

Hello, MarkusSchulze. Voting in the 2016 Arbitration Committee elections is open from Monday, 00:00, 21 November through Sunday, 23:59, 4 December to all unblocked users who have registered an account before Wednesday, 00:00, 28 October 2016 and have made at least 150 mainspace edits before Sunday, 00:00, 1 November 2016.

The Arbitration Committee is the panel of editors responsible for conducting the Wikipedia arbitration process. It has the authority to impose binding solutions to disputes between editors, primarily for serious conduct disputes the community has been unable to resolve. This includes the authority to impose site bans, topic bans, editing restrictions, and other measures needed to maintain our editing environment. The arbitration policy describes the Committee's roles and responsibilities in greater detail.

If you wish to participate in the 2016 election, please review the candidates' statements and submit your choices on the voting page. Mdann52 (talk) 22:08, 21 November 2016 (UTC)

Page move

Hallo,

There is a requested move discussion open at Talk:Voting system#Requested move 11 February 2017, which may be of interest to you. Homunq (࿓) 15:13, 20 February 2017 (UTC)

Too uninteresting and too unimportant. Markus Schulze 18:45, 20 February 2017 (UTC)