Operation Red Wings

For the 1956 series of U.S. nuclear tests, see Operation Redwing.

Operation Red Wings
Part of the War in Afghanistan (2001–present)
Date June 27, 2005 through July, 2005 (Red Wings II) Location Kunar Province, Afghanistan Result Temporary Partial Disruption of Anti-Coalition Militia Activity (Stated intent of Red Wings was disruption of Anti-Coalition Militia Activity)
Belligerents
United States	Local (Kunar Province of Afghanistan) Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM)
Commanders and leaders
Lieutenant Colonel Andrew MacMannis (USMC) LCDR Erik S. Kristensen † LT Michael P. Murphy †	Ahmad Shah
Strength
12 Navy SEALs 8 Night Stalkers additional helicopter crews 2 MH-47 Chinook 2 UH-60 Black Hawk 2 AH-64D Apache helicopters	8–10 insurgents
Casualties and losses
19 killed, 1 wounded, 1 Chinook helicopter shot down	Unknown

Operation Red Wings (often incorrectly referred to as Operation Redwing and/or Operation Red Wing) was a combined / joint military operation that took place in the Pech District of Afghanistan's Kunar Province, on the slopes of a mountain named Sawtalo Sar, approximately 20 miles west of Kunar's provincial capital of Asadabad, in Late June through July of 2005. The goal of Operation Red Wings was the disruption of Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM) activity in the region in order to further aid the stabilization efforts of the region for the important upcoming September 18, 2005 Afghan National Parliamentary Elections. Anti-Coalition Militia activity in the region was carried out at the time most notably by a small group led by a local man (from Nangarhar Province) who had aspirations of regional Islamic fundamentalist prominence named Ahmad Shah, hence he and his small group would be one of the primary targets of the operation. Operation Red Wings, conceived by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) of the U.S. Marine Corps (Red Wings was based on an operational model developed by 2/3's sister battalion, the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), who preceded the 2nd Battalion in their combat deployment to Afghanistan), utilized special operations forces (SOF) units and assets, including members of the U.S. Navy SEALs and the U.S. Army Special Operations Command's 160th Special Operation's Aviation Regiment (Airborne) (SOAR(A)), for the opening phase of the operation. A team of four Navy SEALs, tasked for surveillance and reconnaissance of a group of structures known to be used by Ahmad Shah and his men, fell into an ambush by Shah and his group just hours after inserting by fastrope from an MH-47 helicopter in the area. Three of the four SEALs were killed in the ambush; a quick reaction force helicopter sent in for their aid was subsequently shot down with an RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade by one of Shah's men, killing all on board, which consisted of 8 Navy SEALs and 8 U.S. Army Special Operations aviators. The operation then became known as Red Wings II and lasted approximately three more weeks, during which time bodies of the deceased SEALs and Army Special Operations aviators were recovered and the only surviving member of the initial four-man surveillance and reconnaissance team, Marcus Luttrell, was rescued. While the goal of the operation, the disruption of Anticoalition Militia activity, was achieved in part, Ahmad Shah regrouped in Pakistan, and returned with yet more men and armament to the area due to the notoriety he gained from the Red Wings ambush and helicopter shootdown. Operationally, Red Wings achieved its stated goal, although temporarily.

Background of Development of Operation Red Wings

After the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, U.S. Military and coalition partner operations shifted from "kinetic" operations to those of counterinsurgency (COIN) in nature. One of the primary goals of the coalition by 2004 in Afghanistan was nation building, that is, providing a security environment engendering a democratically elected government, as well as infrastructure support. A key milestone in this campaign would be the September 18, 2005 Afghan National Parliamentary Elections. While many of Afghanistan's provinces at this time had stable security environments, one of the most restive continued to be the Kunar Province, which lies in eastern Afghanistan, on the border with Pakistan. In order for election results to be seen by the citizens of Afghanistan and the world at large as legitimate, all elections throughout the country would need to proceed unencumbered, including those in Kunar. Insurgent activity in the Kunar Province during this time came from 22 identified groups, from those with tenuous ties to the Taliban and al Qaeda, to the majority who were little more than local criminals. These groups were collectively known as Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM), and all saw the unification of the country and the increasing presence of national government entities in the Kunar as a threat to their activities. With the goal of successful elections in Kunar, military operations in the area focused primarily on the disruption of ACM activity, and these military operations utilized a number of different units and operational constructs to achieve this goal. 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (3/3), which deployed to Regional Command (East) (RC(E)) (which included the Kunar Province) in late 2004, identified a number of operational barriers due to Special Operations Command doctrine for the battalion's counterinsurgency work in the area. These barriers included non-sharing of intelligence with the battalion and non-disclosure of impending raids by special operations units in the area. To mitigate these problems, 3/3's staff developed an operational model which integrated special operations forces units into their operations, allowing the sharing of intelligence between the battalion and special operations forces as well as maintaining solid operational control of operations with integrated special operations assets and units by the battalion. Operations that 3/3 conducted based off of this model proved successful in disrupting ACM activity. The first of these, Operation Spurs (named after the San Antonio Spurs basketball team), conducted in February of 2005, took place in the Korangal Valley, in the Kunar Province's Pech District. Spurs utilized Navy SEALs for the opening two phases of this five phase operation. Similar operations that followed included Operation Mavericks (named after the Dallas Mavericks basketball team), in April, 2005, and Operation Celtics (named after the Boston Celtics basketball team) in May of 2005. These operations, all of which included Navy SEALs, were conceived and planned by the battalion, with the specifics of those phases involving Navy SEALs being planned by the SEALs. Each lasted between three and four weeks. 3/3 planned and executed approximately one of these operations per month, maintaining a regular operational tempo. The culmination of 3/3's efforts was the forced surrender of a regional and national high value target, an ACM commander known as Najmudeen, who based his operations out of the Korangal Valley, in April, 2005. With the surrender of Najmudeen, ACM activity in the region dropped significantly. Najmudeen's surrender, however, left a power vacuum in the region. 3/3 began tracking a number of ACM groups possibly seeking to fill the power void in the region. The battalion began planning a new operation, tentatively called Operation Stars (named after the Dallas Stars professional hockey team - 3/3's battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Norman Cooling, hailed from Texas, hence most operations being named after Texas sports teams). Stars, like the other operations before it, focused on disrupting ACM activity, although due to Najmudeen's surrender, this activity had dropped and specific groups were difficult to pinpoint. In May of 2005, the Advanced Party of 3/3's sister battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) arrived in RC(E). 2/3's intelligence officer and his assistants had been tracking a small cell led by a man named Ahmad Shah, who was from a region in Nangarhar Province, which borders the Kunar Province. Shah, they determined, was responsible for approximately 11 incidents against coalition forces and Government of Afghanistan entities, including small arms ambushes and improvised explosive device attacks. By June, 2005, 2/3 had relieved 3/3, and had taken the Stars concept and developed a comprehensive operation, an operation they called Operation Red Wings, with the goal of disrupting Anti-Coalition Militia Activity, with an emphasis on disrupting Ahmad Shah's activities, which were based near the summit of Sawtalo Sar.

Naming of Operation Red Wings

The initial naming convention by which Red Wings was named, that of naming operations after sports teams, began with the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Marines (3/3) which named operations primarily after Texas sports teams, at first, Texas basketball teams (San Antonio Spurs and the Dallas Mavericks). The operational shell that would become Red Wings, which was developed by 3/3, was named Stars, after the Dallas Stars hockey team. The focus on Texas teams was due to 3/3's battalion commander being from Texas. When the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Marine Regiment (2/3) took the Stars model and developed the specifics of it, 2/3's operations officer, Major Thomas Wood, instructed an assistant operations officer, 1st Lieutenant Lance Seiffert, to compose a list of hockey team names. They would continue the use of sports team names, but not ones from Texas. The list included a number of teams, including the New York Rangers, the Philadelphia Flyers, and the Detroit Red Wings. The battalion settled on the name Red Wings. 2/3 would eventually abandon the convention of naming operations after American sports teams out of sensitivity to the local population, instead opting for using Dari names for animals, including pil (elephant) and Sorkh Khar (red donkey). The name has been widely mis-stated as "Operation Redwing" and sometimes "Operation Red Wing."

Initial Operation

The map given to the Navy SEALs detailing their mission.

On June 28, 2005, a four-man SEAL element led by LT Michael P. Murphy and consisting of petty officers Matthew Axelson, Danny Dietz and Marcus Luttrell, were on a reconnaissance mission to locate Ahmad Shah, a Taliban leader who commanded a group of insurgents known as the "Mountain Tigers" west of Asadabad.

The team was inserted at night via MH-47 Chinook helicopter several miles from the village where Ahmad Shah was suspected to be operating. The team had been tracking Shah for several months and had actually called off Operation Red Wing twice before when it was discovered Shah had moved locations at the last minute. Reviewing the pre-mission maps and photographs of the area, Luttrell stated that the team was very concerned about the lack of adequate cover in the area surrounding the village. This would make it difficult for the team to stay concealed. Their mission would be to surveil the village, make a positive identification of Shah, and then capture or kill him. If the enemy force was too great, they were prepared to call in a direct action force to assault the village.

The team, under cover of darkness and pouring rain, immediately moved to a preplanned observation point above the village to wait for daylight. Once dawn arrived, they realized their observation point was less than ideal due to a bad angle on the village and a fog bank obscuring their view. LT Murphy and Petty Officer Axelson scouted a new position and moved the team there just after daylight. This new observation post offered a better view of the village, but only one possible escape route, should they be discovered.

As the morning wore on, a local goat herder and his son stumbled upon the SEALs' hiding place. Unable to verify any hostile intent from the herders, Dietz attempted to contact HQ via radio, but was unable to get an answer from anyone. Absent any higher-level guidance, LT Murphy put the decision as to what should be done with them up for a vote: Axelson voted to murder the Afghans, stating, "The military decision is obvious", in reference to the near certainty that the herders would alert the Taliban. Dietz abstained, and Murphy allowed Luttrell the deciding vote, but warned him the murders would have to be reported. Luttrell voted to release the herders. He would later state, "It was the stupidest, most southern-fried, lame brained decision I ever made in my life. I must have been out of my mind. I had actually cast a vote which I knew could sign our death warrant. I'd turned into a f—ing liberal, a half-assed, no-logic nitwit, all heart, no brain, and the judgment of a jackrabbit."

In discussing the option of tying them up and leaving them, Luttrell stated that the team had no rope or other means of securing them and that the presence of the herders' goats was threatening to give away their position. Taking the herders with them to a pick up point was also untenable given their need to move with stealth in that area, made worse by the fact that the goats followed the herders wherever they went. This would certainly expose their presence in the area and possibly lead to a Taliban attack.

The firefight

After letting the goatherds go, the team moved to their first observation point so as to throw off anyone attempting to intercept them at their old location. Dietz continued attempts to reach HQ via radio for immediate extraction, but was continually unsuccessful. Approximately an hour after the goatherds disappeared over the mountain ridge, the SEALs were confronted by a force of Afghan fighters, which Murphy and Luttrell both estimated at 140 strong, causing Luttrell to believe the released herders had given away their position. The team had been told that as many as 200 fighters could be protecting Shah, and according to Luttrell, the SEALs killed a significant number of enemy fighters during the subsequent engagement, however their numbers never seemed to diminish. Luttrell believed they were receiving almost constant reinforcements.

The insurgents set up a "well organized, three-sided attack", which forced the SEALs to begin running down the slope of the mountain, all of them receiving injuries during the descent, either by gunfire, fragmentation, and/or the fall. Even before reaching a new defensive position behind some felled logs, Murphy had already been shot in the abdomen, Luttrell had received a spinal injury, Axelson had taken a head wound, and Dietz's thumb had been blown off. Nevertheless, they all continued fighting, attempting to attrite the Taliban forces enough to cause them to retreat. After 45 minutes of fighting, Murphy moved into the open, after noting the team's radio transmitters weren't functioning properly in the mountains, and placed the emergency call for support from his cell phone. He was shot in the back during the conversation. Nevertheless he returned to his cover after the call and continued to battle.

After two hours of fighting, only Luttrell remained alive, the other members of his team succumbing to multiple gunshot wounds. Eventually he was blown off the mountain ridge by a rocket-propelled grenade, knocking him unconscious.

Failed rescue

Matthew G. Axelson, Daniel R. Healy, James Suh, Marcus Luttrell, Shane E. Patton, and Michael P. Murphy prior to the battle.

File:Kunar-booty-from-Op Red Wing.OGG

Taliban video of captured American equipment being examined after the battle

Two MH-47D helicopters, four UH-60 Black Hawk and two AH-64D Longbows attempted to come to their rescue to provide extraction in the mountains of Kunar. One of the MH-47 helicopters, carrying eight Navy SEALs and eight 160th Night Stalkers, was shot down by a rocket propelled grenade shot through the open rear ramp, causing the pilot to lose control of the craft. It hit a mountain ledge, and then fell to the bottom of a ravine, killing all sixteen on board.

It was the deadliest day for the U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command until the August 6, 2011 helicopter crash that killed 30 American soldiers, 17 of which were Navy SEALs and 5 of which were Naval Special Warfare Command support personnel.

Shah, the original target of the SEAL team, later gave an interview where he claimed that his forces had set a trap for the American forces, "We certainly know that when the American army comes under pressure and they get hit, they will try to help their friends. It is the law of the battlefield."

Search and rescue

The only survivor of the attack, Luttrell tried to hide himself as he waited for rescue from the search helicopters flying overhead. He stayed well hidden in a cleft of rock while the Taliban continued searching for him throughout the remainder of the day. He could hear enemy fighters close by, firing aimlessly into the underbrush, trying to drive him out, but they were never able to discover his location. AH-64 Apache and UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters were flying through the valley almost all afternoon, and Luttrell attempted contact via his rescue radio. Due to dehydration and his mouth being filled with dust, he was unable to speak. He activated his emergency locator beacon, but without verbal confirmation of his identity, the pilots assumed the Taliban had captured a radio and were attempting to lure another helicopter in order to shoot it down. Before night fell, Luttrell killed three Taliban lookouts, with his suppressed Mk 12 Special Purpose Rifle, that were searching an adjacent ridge approximately 150 yards away.

As night approached, driven by thirst, shot in the leg and with three cracked vertabrae, Luttrell traversed 7 miles over the remainder of the night and following day. He remained unnoticed until, falling from a ledge, he was discovered by an Afghan shepherd named Gulab, who summoned his companions to help carry the wounded Luttrell to the village of Sabray-Minah. The villagers took care of Luttrell, providing food and medical attention, and protecting him from the Taliban that came to the village demanding that he be turned over to them. The Taliban offered bounties for turning him over and threatened the villages inhabitants with violence if they did not comply. According to Pashtun custom, the villagers were honor-bound to protect someone they had taken in, and the entire village participated in guarding him. He was moved between houses several times and received medical attention from the village's physician.

Meanwhile, nearly two days after the initial confrontation, the military had 300 men searching for the team, and had located the downed helicopter and verified that all 16 aboard had been killed. A spokesman for the Taliban, Mofti Latifollah Hakimi, confirmed that the helicopter had been shot down by insurgent fire, and promised to deliver the video made during the assault to media outlets.

Despite multiple attempts, the search helicopters were unable to locate the wounded Navy SEAL. On July 2, the village elder, carrying a note from Luttrell, went down to seek help from Camp Blessing, a Marine outpost several miles away, and approached First Lieutenant Matt Bartels with his information.

With this news, the U.S. forces drew up extraction plans which according to Lt. Col. Steve Butow were "one of the largest combat search-and-rescue operations since Vietnam". As the rescue teams closed in upon the village they ran into Luttrell and some of the villagers who were moving him from one hiding place to another.

Six days after the operation, an American search team located the bodies of Murphy and Dietz. For the next four days, they held out hopes that Axelson might be found alive.

American casualties

LT Michael P. Murphy, Medal of Honor Recipient.

Name	Age	Action	Hometown
SEALs
LT Michael P. Murphy	29	Part of 4-Man SEAL team, killed in an ambush	Patchogue, New York
STG2 (SEAL) Matthew Axelson	29	Part of 4-Man SEAL team, killed in an ambush	Cupertino, California
GM2 (SEAL) Danny Dietz	25	Part of 4-Man SEAL team, killed in an ambush	Littleton, Colorado
FCC (SEAL/SW) Jacques J. Fontan	36	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	New Orleans, Louisiana
ITCS (SEAL) Daniel R. Healy	36	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Exeter, New Hampshire
LCDR Erik S. Kristensen	33	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	San Diego, California
ET1 (SEAL) Jeffery A. Lucas	33	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Corbett, Oregon
LT Michael M. McGreevy, Jr.	30	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Portville, New York
QM2 (SEAL) James E. Suh	28	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Deerfield Beach, Florida
HM1 (SEAL) Jeffrey S. Taylor	30	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Midway, West Virginia
MM2 (SEAL) Shane E. Patton	22	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Boulder City, Nevada
160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment
SSG Shamus O. Goare	29	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Danville, Ohio
CWO3 Corey J. Goodnature	35	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Clarks Grove, Minnesota.
SGT Kip A. Jacoby	21	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Pompano Beach, Florida
SFC Marcus V. Muralles	33	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Shelbyville, Indiana
MSG James W. Ponder III	36	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Franklin, Tennessee
MAJ Stephen C. Reich	34	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Washington Depot, Connecticut.
SFC Michael L. Russell	31	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Stafford, Virginia
CWO4 Chris J. Scherkenbach	40	Killed aboard the helicopter when it was shot down	Jacksonville, Florida

Army plaque in memory of the fallen Night Stalkers

Aftermath

On September 14, 2006, Dietz and Axelson were posthumously awarded the Navy Cross for "undaunted courage" and heroism. Luttrell was also awarded the Navy Cross in a ceremony at the White House. In 2007, Murphy was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions during the battle.

In April 2008, Ahmad Shah, who was the target of Operation Red Wing, was killed during a shootout with Pakistani police in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa.

On June 28, 2008, Luttrell and the family members of soldiers killed overseas were honored at a San Diego Padres game. In addition, the United States Navy Parachute Team, the Leap Frogs, brought in the American flag, the POW/MIA flag and the San Diego Padres flag. The attendees were given a standing ovation by the more than 25,000 there to watch the game.

A statue entitled The Guardians stands in the Cupertino Veterans Memorial Park, in Cupertino, California. The statue depicts both Matthew Axelson and James Suh, natives of the region, standing back-to-back.

Afghans who aided Luttrell

In the years following Operation Red Wings more details emerged about the circumstances surrounding Luttrell being given sanctuary by local villagers and the aftermath. Many of the details regarding the Afghans who aided Luttrell were reported incorrectly in the American press during the days after the events occurred.

The SEALs firefight with Ahmad Shah's Taliban forces began along a high-elevation ridgeline called Sawtalo Sar. (The highest peak of this ridgeline is 2830 meters (9,282 feet). A descent down the west side of the ridgeline leads into the Shuryek valley. The northeastern gulch in which the SEALs became trapped was in this direction, above the village of Salar Ban. To the east of the Sawtalo Sar ridgeline is the Korangal valley. As the wounded Luttrell descended down the gulch, he encountered a Pashtun named Mohammad Gulab Khan from the mountain village of Salar Ban. Known simply as Gulab, he took Luttrell into his home that first day and evoked the assistance of others from his village to protect Luttrell until American forces could be contacted.

It is likely Luttrell would have been turned over to the Taliban had he descended into the Korangal instead of Shuryek. While the villagers of the Shuryek valley weren't considered overly friendly to American forces they were nonetheless less hostile than villagers in the nearby mountainous Chichal (part of neighboring Korangal), with whom the Shuryek villagers have been traditionally been at odds over grazing-land boundaries.

Not long before Operation Red Wings had occurred, relations with the Americans had improved in the Shuryek Valley and the greater Pech river region because of humanitarian work that had been occurring. Medical services had been extended, and a girls school was built at Nangalam. Gulab was aware of these developments and had introduced himself to the Marine commander at Nangalam, Matt Bartels, when he was visiting Matin. It was within this context that Gulab stumbled upon Luttrell and gave him sanctuary. The Taliban leader, Ahmad Shah, knew that the wounded soldier that he was tracking had to pass through the village of Salar Ban as he contoured downhill. Through intimidation Shah was able to ascertain which house sheltered the wounded soldier and demanded that he be turned over. But Shah couldn't risk a fight at that moment because he was outnumbered and other relatives and villagers would come to Gulab's aid. Luttrell was subsequently moved to different places until forces could arrive to extract him.

Luttrell wrote a note and asked that it be taken to the American base at Asadabad. Because Gulab had previously met the Marine commander based at Nangalam, he asked an older man named Shina, of another part of the village of Salar Ban, to make the trek with the note to that base instead. This required a longer journey down the trails of the Shuryek valley to Matin, where he then hired a cab to drive the Pech road to Nangalam. Gulab gave Shina 1000 afghanis (about twenty U.S. dollars). When Shina reached the base in Nangalam in the middle of the night he met with the commander and related the story about a wounded American soldier in their village. He then gave him the note that Luttrell had written.

In the weeks after Luttrell was rescued, Gulab and his family received threats from the Taliban and they were relocated to Asadabad.

Controversy

There exists some conflict over the exact numbers of Taliban forces involved in the engagement. In Luttrell's own official after-action report filed with his superiors after his rescue, he estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20–35. Official media reports from the military estimated the size of the Taliban force to be around 20 as well, while in the Medal of Honor citation for LT Michael P. Murphy, the Navy cited 30–40 enemies. In the Summary of Action related to the same MOH, the Navy cites an "enemy force of more than 50 anti-coalition militia". In his book, Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers – the Marine Corps' Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan, military journalist Ed Darack estimates the strength of the Taliban force at only 8–10, compared to the more than 200 claimed by Luttrell in his book. Darack's estimate is based on research sourced from intelligence reports, including aerial and eye-witness studies of the battlefield after the fact, including the men sent in to rescue Luttrell, as well as HUMINT from Afghan intelligence.

Bibliography

• Darack, Ed (2009). Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers – the Marine Corps' Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan. Berkley Hardcover. ISBN 0425226190.
• Luttrell, Marcus (2007). Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10. Back Bay Books. ISBN 0316067598. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
• Williams, Gary (2010). Seal of Honor: Operation Redwing and the Life of LT. Michael P. Murphy, USN. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1591149576.