Talk:Ford Pinto

Sectioning Compromise?

Having read a little more into the analysis performed on the Pinto's safety, it seems there's clearly a reasonable amount of RS arguing that the Pinto was not as dangerous as the public perceived it to be. After some reflection, I think that's a good, WP:DUE and fair piece of information to have in the article. I think the disagreement here has been caused not by the point User:Greglocock and User:842U trying to make, but by the way they're trying to make it. Here's a solution I think we might all find palatable.

Let's create two subsections. The first subsection will cover the public controversy generated by the Ford memo revelations. The second subsection will discuss the more technical and statistical analysis of the danger issue. In that second subsection we can mention the fact that there were analyses done suggesting the Pinto wasn't really all that dangerous (I would still prefer we simply cite Schwartz rather than name him here). That subsection can also include the NHTSA head testimony.

There are really two stories here. 1) The controversy created by the Ford report. 2) The subsequent research suggesting the controversy may have been overblown. If we divide those two stories into two subsections I think it's going to be clearer for the reader. I also think this solution is going to let everyone insert the information they want in there.

Does this sound fair? NickCT (talk) 07:34, 13 February 2016 (UTC)

That's an interesting idea. There is no doubt the controversy exists, and hence should be documented, and I'd argue there is little doubt the attack part of the controversy was overblown, and the exaggerations in the MJ article and subsequent tag-ons should be examined and refuted via RS. Greglocock (talk) 11:52, 13 February 2016 (UTC)

It's possible this could work. The proof is in the pudding. In the meantime: there are not two but at least four stories to the fuel tank conversy: the initial media firestorm, subsequent litigation, the vehicle recall and the later Schwartz Study (five if you count the business ethics case study aspect). While there is an attempt to call references to the Schwartz Study "cherry-picking," the cherry picking seems to be occurring right now, in the article. As it stands, there has been an effort to expunge the topic from the article. And as it stands, the article has zero mention of the Schwartz paper in the article. Clearly there editors completely content with that: ergo a highly dubious effort to lean the article in away from ONE counterpoint (Schwartz Study) while including THREE/FOUR points against the car. It is highly advisable that editors "against inclusion" of the Schwartz study at least revise the article in the interim -- make some mention of it, to show good faith. Otherwise there is a willful disregard for telling the whole story. 842U (talk) 14:53, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

I would support this idea as well. The public perception and the misinformation that was out there is VERY important because it not only guided people's understanding of the car but became the basis for many discussions on corporate ethics. Ford has yet to live down the false accusation that they calculated that it was cheaper to pay off families vs install a cheap part (The Danley paper I mention is particularly significant in this regard). I would add that I think we need to start off the public perception part with some sort of note that many of the facts and understanding initially reported were later found to be incorrect. Basically we should warn the reader that the section is telling what was told and what the public understood, not what was later found to be true under careful and impassioned analysis. Springee (talk) 03:56, 15 February 2016 (UTC)

• Suggestion Propose rolling the article back to the version with the Schwartz paper specifically mentioned until the better version that NickTC is created. Even though I agree with some of the concerns regarding how the article was a few weeks back, I think it's much better with that information vs without. Given the clear evidence that the Ford design was not out of historic norms and that most of the MJ claims about the safety issues and corporate thinking were clearly wrong I think it's a disservice to leave the material out. Springee (talk) 21:47, 15 February 2016 (UTC)

• @Springee: - Appreciate your input. Give me 48 hr to give the "two subsection" resolution a stab. I think I can do this in a way that will make everyone happy. NickCT (talk) 16:06, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

• Sounds good. If you can get access to it I would really suggest reading these references as well: Danley, "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk" Business Ethics Quarterly and Lee and Ermann, "Madness as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational Network Analysis", Social Problems. They are long reads so perhaps just some skimming but they both support the general views of Schwartz with regards to the facts as well as discuss why much of the moral outrage was misguided. To keep things more focused on the car and the controversy I would probably pick several of the key issues raised by MJ (tank location, value of life calculation, previous, "secret" Ford rear impact tests, projected number of deaths, law suits, others?) These items could be described is a bit of detail. The next section could be used to describe the same points as seen by the more recent scholarly work (Schwartz and others). Springee (talk) 17:23, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - I took a stab. Would appreciate review.

re "suggest reading these references as well" - Ok. I will take a look if I get a chance. Please be WP:BOLD if you want to add the material yourself. You'll notice there's now a Ford_Pinto#Subsequent_investigation_and_analysis subsection where I think indepth analysis of the safety issue ought to go.

re "pick several of the key issues raised by MJ (tank location, value of life calculation.....described is a bit of detail." - Yes. In reading over this, I've seen a lot of coverage on the Pinto Memo and the value of life calculation. I was half considering another subsection call The Pinto memo. That subsection could detail the value of life calculation. Again, I can take a stab at this, but if you're feeling up to it, you should be WP:BOLD. NickCT (talk) 17:30, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Thanks Nick, perhaps tonight I can do some edits. The hard part is I read the articles a while back so I have to re-read them just to know what I think should be put in! Anyway, thanks for starting this off. Springee (talk) 18:45, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

This is looking ok, but is there some reason there is no mention of Schwartz? 842U (talk) 18:49, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

@842U: - See my comment above re "I would still prefer we simply cite Schwartz rather than name him here". I've already cited him. I'm not sure what the rationale would be for calling him out by name. I'm guessing Shwartz analysis is probably pretty similar to Danley's as Springee suggested. We should summarize all of their work, but I'm not sure we should name any of them. NickCT (talk) 18:53, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

For the same rational of not citing Schwartz, let's also not look at citing the details and names of a lawsuit. Let's cite summary lawsuit information from any of the numerous citations and business case studies.842U (talk) 19:32, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

re "let's also not look at citing the details and names of a lawsuit" - Agree that we definitely don't want a long list of lawsuits and details. It might be worth naming one or two of the most prominent ones though. NickCT (talk) 20:00, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - No.... Thank you! You've provided good third party opinion, commentary and insight on this topic. NickCT (talk) 18:55, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Please take a look at the intro changes I've just made. I think the paragraph has more do with legacy than anything else, and need summarize rather than detail the specific allegations, exonerations etc. 842U (talk) 19:04, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

@842U: Ok. I've taken a look. I like most of what you've done, but there are two or three edits I think are a little questionable. I'm going to WP:BRD those edits and give detailed explanations below. NickCT (talk) 20:06, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

1 - Undid lead changes because 1) Your use of punctuation seems a little unorthodox. Are you using all those semi-colons for a reason? 2) The fuel tank controversy is probably a lot more notable than the rebagded variant. We should keep the controversy lede summary higher in the lead. NickCT (talk) 20:10, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

2 - Partially undid changes to the "Emergence.." subsection b/c 1) changing "saying that" -> "allegedly". I'm a bit confused why we'd use the word "allegedly". Everyone agrees that the Ford did know about the issue and had done a cost-benefit analysis, right? Is there anything in doubt there? 2) Regarding the line starting "and was subsequently revealed to per...."; this really confused me. This statement seems out of line with all the sources on this topic. Could you quote the specific line in Shwartz you are getting this info from? NickCT (talk) 20:22, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Thinking a little more about the "and was subsequently revealed to per..."; I think you're getting this from the Walter Olson piece? I took a look at that reference. I think it's probably an Op-ed. While the WSJ is a RS, commentary in their Op-ed section should not be used for factual information. NickCT (talk) 20:47, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

The lede semi-colons have been changed to commas and the order has been changed to reflect your request. The paragraph has been modified to remove all colored language. Re: allegations: at the time Mother Jones published its article, it was making allegations. Yes, we know more now than we did then, but that goes both ways, e.g., the memo.842U (talk) 21:14, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

This thread was a significant milestone in the editorial progress of this article. 13-14 February 2016 a consensus was reached on what is really a very straight-forward non-controversial re-affirmation of fundamental principles of Wikipedia editing: we endeavor to keep facts and events separate from opinions and interpretation, and present facts and events to our readers before opinions and interpretation. A consensus was reached to treat retrospective opinions in a "Subsequent analysis" subsection, and, on behalf of the consensus, a "Subsequent analysis" subsection was established for this very purpose. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 23:03, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

Expand Ford_Pinto#Lawsuits? - Judy Ulrich

It seems there's a significant amount of coverage regarding the death Judy Ulrich and subsequent trial. Might be worth adding something about that to Ford_Pinto#Lawsuits. (ref) NickCT (talk) 17:45, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

 Done section Ford Pinto#Indiana v. Ford. Thanks! Hugh (talk) 22:52, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

memo confusion

HughD has removed many referneces in this article, specifically ones demonstrating that the design was not unusual and that the memo DID NOT APPLY TO PINTO or even rear end collisions. if he chooses to disagree with those revisions and has any integrity then he can should put the cites back in, because he removed them in the first place. Greglocock (talk) 09:58, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

No references were removed. Hugh (talk) 15:01, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

That isn't exactly true. No references were removed from the article. You have removed a number of important specific facts from the article. For example, you significantly altered the already too limited retrospective review. Last month it contained this sentence, "A comprehensive analysis looking at road fatalities between 1976 and 1977 showed that accidents in the Pinto were more likely to cause fire deaths, but that the overall number of fatalities in the Pinto was comparable to or lower than similar cars in its class." You removed the part that showed the Pinto wasn't less safe, "but that the overall number of fatalities in the Pinto was comparable to or lower than similar cars in its class." The way you have described the memo in the article is simply wrong with respect to the most reliable sources on the subject (Schwart and Lee and Ermann in particular). Springee (talk) 15:52, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

• With respect to sources, any source that states as fact that the Pinto was uniquely unsafe or prone to fire should be considered an unreliable source or questionable source of fact. Both the NHTSA data and scholarly review have shown that the car's overall safety record and safety record with respect to fires was typical for the time. To quote Schwartz:

Moreover, when all vehicle fire fatalities are considered, the Pinto turns out to have been less dangerous than the average subcompact and only slightly more dangerous than the average car. Indeed when occupant fatalities from all highway causes are considered, the Pinto performed respectably.

The above is given further context by several authors who note that designers have to balance all aspects of design safety during the engineering process. During the late 60s it was not obvious that placing the gas tank behind the rear axle was inherently problematic. In fact it was cited as a better location in terms of side impact protection and because it kept the tank further from the passenger compartment. Isolating the car's performance in one aspect of a rare set of crash circumstances (rear impact --> fire --> fatality) is seen by most of the authors as a questionable way to judge the quality of the safety engineering of a car. Lee and Ermann discuss this in some detail when they explain why it wasn't obvious to either the NHTSA nor Ford that there was a problem with the Pinto. Basically the stats that made the car look bad were a needle in a haystack. One of the big issue with Pinto sources, again noted by several authors including Becker et al, is that the incorrect information is so widely "known" that it is often used without question. Hence Time says the car was a firetrap or deathtrap when the actual record does not support this claim. Furthermore, the exculpatory evidence was available to Time when they wrote their "worst" article but why look up what is "known"? Springee (talk) 15:52, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Yes, there is at leat one ref that has been removed (the memo itself), and all discussion of the fact that the memo did not apply to Pinto or rear enders, including refs and excerpts. Greglocock (talk) 18:00, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Do you mean the so-called "Pinto memo"? It is currently ref #42:

• Grush, E.S.; Saundy, C.S. Fatalities Associated With Crash Induced Fuel Leakage and Fires (PDF) (Report). Ford Environmental and Safety Engineering. Retrieved March 2, 2016.

Thank you. Hugh (talk) 18:17, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Yes you are right, that ref is still there, sorryGreglocock (talk) 18:22, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Yes, some of the older references are easy to lose since they were added before people used more formal citations. However, a number of key facts have been removed in the flurry of edits (almost 190 in 5 days!).Springee (talk) 20:02, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

No key facts have been removed. Hugh (talk) 21:41, 7 March 2016 (UTC)

Who removed, referring to the memo paper trail quote ", ignoring the fact that it was not about rear end collisions or the Pinto." and "former head of the N.H.T.S.A. testified on Ford’s behalf, stating that in his opinion the Pinto’s design was no more or less safe than that of any other car in its class"? Space aliens? Both ar key pointsGreglocock (talk) 07:00, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Your comment in article space "...ignoring the fact that it was not about rear end collisions or the Pinto." was unsourced and removed as original research. Do you have a source? If it is a key point it will be in multiple reliable sources. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 07:31, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Sure, Gladwell, Schwartz, both make the same point (not surprisingly, if you actually read the memo itself). http://www.pdhengineer.com/catalog/index.php?route=product/product&product_id=2283 is another, whether it is a RS I don't know but it is an engineer's ethics course. http://www.ridgepoinths.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Pinto-Case1.pdf discusses the memo at great lengthGreglocock (talk) 19:57, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

The former NHTSA administration head testimony is in the Indiana trial section. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 07:31, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

They aren't reffed because YOU removed the refs. Greglocock (talk) 09:59, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

No references were removed. I did not remove any sources to my knowledge. Please provide a diff. Your editorial comment in article space "...ignoring the fact that it was not about rear end collisions or the Pinto" was unsourced and removed as original research, please see WP:OR. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 14:50, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

No, I can't be bothered to do diffs. You are wasting my time. I had put in quotes in particular places in the article, to balance statements that were made. Putting those refs elsewhere diffuses the argument and allows for selective reading.Greglocock (talk) 19:57, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Greglocock, providing diffs at article talk is a fundamental collaboration tool on Wikipedia, I'm sorry to hear you feel it is not helpful. Anyway, may I summarize your point, to see if I understand it? Thanks. You feel the testimony of a former head of the NHTSA, testifying in defense of Ford, in a criminal trail in Indiana in 1980, regarding a general statement about the overall safety of the Ford Pinto compared to other cars, is such an important key fact, that its inclusion in the subsection on the Indiana trial is not sufficient weight in our article, that it should be repeated elsewhere, if anything impugning the safety of the Ford Pinto comes up, even to subsections covering earlier events? Have I got that about right? Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 20:34, 8 March 2016 (UTC) Greglocock, could you please reply to this? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 23:18, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, please stop dancing around legitimate concerns. Perhaps a way for you to show good faith would be to voluntarily pull back from the article for a week and give others adequate time to respond to the edits you have made. When that time is over they we can discuss editorial direction. You have changed so much in the a crucial part of the article in a very short time. Congrats on the Bold part of the BRD cycle. Now please allow others a chance to review and respond to your work. Springee (talk) 21:12, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

By now, I am very sure everyone on the project knows you wish I would go away, you need not repeat yourself. I have done nothing to prevent anyone from "reviewing and responding." I'm sorry I did not better respect your expertise and strong feelings of ownership of this article. Do you figure it will take you about a week to recast the article to conform to your preferred Schwartz/Lee/Erdman-based narrative? The talk page is open, why not start now, propose some improvements? Hugh (talk) 22:19, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Perhaps a better question to ask would be is it correct to use WP to propagate material that has been shown to be false? Do you agree the "Pinto Memo" was not about the Pinto and did not discuss the cost of settling lawsuits against Ford (or any car company) vs the cost of production changes? Springee (talk) 15:21, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

This thread lacks focus. I am reluctant to enable a wall of text, especially in a thread that is mostly personal attacks. Focusing on content if we can, our article has three sentences about the Grush & Saundy cost-benefit analysis memo in the subsection "Fuel system design". The content is well-sourced to multiple reliable sources. Those 3 sentences are a reasonable summarization of the sources. Our article makes no claim regarding Grush & Saundy's intentions in writing the memo. Regardless of the original intention of the Grush & Saundy, we have a sentence in the next paragraph clearly states how Mother Jones (magazine) interpreted the memo. With that, I think it would be due weight to add that the memo was originally intended as a regulatory response, if we bring in the context of Ford's and other automaker's multi-year ongoing effort to stall more stringent fuel system standards, and if we make more clear that the Pinto team affirmatively rejected design changes. Regardless of the primary intent of the Grush & Saundy memo, as a secondary purpose it helped the project team reject fixes. We have multiple reliable sources that document that the Pinto project team management met and considered and decided not to add any fix or fixes to Pintos in production. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:59, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

I would like to add much of what you are suggesting. Perhaps if you gave others a chance to review your work and make their own changes we can address the concerns of you and others. In the mean time I would suggest you read Schwartz's article. You have read it right?

I will repeat my earlier question, please provide a yes or no answer. Do you agree the "Pinto Memo" was not about the Pinto and did not discuss the cost of settling lawsuits against Ford (or any car company) vs the cost of production changes? Springee (talk) 16:17, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

From your question, I take it your preference would be for our article to state in Wikipedia voice that the Grush & Saundy cost-benefit analysis memo was "not about the Pinto," without any context, without any explanation of what it was about, that is, just one volley between Ford and NHTSA in Ford's well-documented multi-year campaign to stall more stringent federal regulation of fuel systems? Hugh (talk) 17:18, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

You are avoiding my question and replying with more red herrings. Springee (talk) 21:12, 8 March 2016 (UTC)

Irrelevant detail of test conditions in NHTSA investigation section

Contented content:

According to Matthew T. Lee, at the time a graduate student at the University of Delaware, and M. David Ermann, professor of sociology and criminal justice at the University, writing in a sociology journal in 1999, in testing to determine in the Pinto tank design warranted a recall, the NHTSA for forewent the 1977 rear impact crash test standard and created a "worst-case" test. A large "bullet car" was used instead of a standard moving barrier. Weights were placed in the nose of the car to help it slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. The vehicle headlights were turned on to provide a possible ignition source. The fuel tank was completely filled with gasoline rather than partially filled with non-flammable Stoddard fluid as was the normal test procedure. In a later interview the NHTSA engineer was asked why the NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing a 35 mph test given that most small cars of the time would not have passed. "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."

• Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)

The detail of the test conditions used by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration is irrelevant and non-neutral. The NHTSA was perfectly within their mandate to do whatever they had to do to duplicate a reported public safety issue. Yes, in trying to duplicate the fire safety issue under test conditions, the NHTSA put actual gasoline in the gas tank. This excessive detail can only be read as an crass attempt to impune the motives of the NHTSA. For us to imply in Wikipedia voice that the NHTSA was not acting in good faith is unconscionable. Implying through summarization of selected sources that the NHTSA was not acting in good faith is an extraordinary claim that requires a broad consensus of multiple, extraordinary reliable sources. One or a few academic articles is far from sufficient. This is at best a minority view, clearly inappropriate weight in this context, which is a neutral telling of the facts and events. The incontrovertible, widely reported fact is the NHTSA found defect. We have policy and guideline regarding treatment of minority views and this sections is not complaint. Kindly self-revert. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:42, 11 March 2016 (UTC)

Testing to determine a defect is independent from testing to pass a standard. It is not at all interesting or surprising that the NHTSA, in investigating reports of a fire safety vulnerability, devised specific tests. Of course they did not merely repeat the standard test and grade it pass/fail. If all the NHTSA administration did was repeat the standard test we would think them quite incompetent. Of course it is standard operating procedure in engineering that in pursuing a specific problem in order to develop a remedy, an engineer might have to manipulate conditions. Some problems are very high impact but intermittent. Whether the car passed the standard test is not the issue, they were investigating a fire vulnerability. No one is saying the NHTSA's finding of defect is a farce because the car passed the standard test. Only a lawyer or other non-engineer would bother to make such an insipid point. This is a minority view, undue weight in our encyclopedia, and a grossly non-neutral misrepresentation of events. Please revert this addition. Hugh (talk) 02:28, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

• HughD, I thought you said you had read Lee and Ermann. That would at least imply you have a copy. I previously asked you questions about the text because I don't believe you have read it. Today you removed the statement "worst-case" from the article with a claim of OR [1]. Perhaps you should have consulted with your copy of the text.

Relevant Lee and Ermann text

By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 19 70s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 198081:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too."

Springee (talk) 05:07, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

Though verifiable, the paragraph in our article on the details of the NHTSA testing is obviously undue, not to mention pointed in the direction of a vast anti-Pinto conspiracy involving the US government. Of course in investigating a specific reports of a specific safety issue with a specific model of car, NHTSA did testing specific to that problem and that model; that's their job. Lee & Ermann, the sociologist and his graduate student, interviewed the government employee NHTSA engineer who was in charge of NHTSA testing, and he told the citizens exactly what he did. Later, the Mulders & Scullys of the world fans of Pinto latch on to the interview, drawing conclusions far beyond anything in Lee & Ermann (1999): aha! the tests were rigged! the smoking gun that exonerates the Pinto! Oh my god, NHTSA wanted the Pintos to explode! NHTSA put gas in the tank, actual gas!! This is an example of a minority view. Hugh (talk) 16:07, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

To further illustrate the absurdly obvious and pointed undue weight of this paragraph, compare and contrast the level of detail with our article's coverage of Ford's crash testing:

Ford's routine internal crash testing showed that in a low-speed crash, the filler neck could tear away from the tank, spilling fuel beneath the car, and the tank itself could also be punctured by the bolts protruding from the differential.

• Schwartz, Gary T. (1990). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068. The Pinto performed badly in these initial crash tests.
• Wojdyla, Ben (May 20, 2011). "The Top Automotive Engineering Failures: The Ford Pinto Fuel Tanks". Popular Mechanics. Retrieved February 28, 2015. deep into the development cycle, a problem was discovered in the fuel tank design. In low-speed rear-end crash testing, the fuel tank, positioned behind the rear axle and in front of the rear bumper, exhibited several flaws. Upon impact, the filler neck would tear away from the sheet-metal tank and spill fuel beneath the car. The tank was also easily punctured by bolts protruding from the differential and nearby brackets. One report later described the entire contents of a tank leaking out in less than a minute after an accident. These problems combined to create a serious risk of fire
• The Ford Pinto Case. State University of New York Press, Douglas Birsch and John Fielder, 1994, page 3. October 1, 1994. ISBN 978-0-7914-2234-2.
• Gioia, Dennis A. (May 1992). "Pinto fires and personal ethics: A script analysis of missed opportunities". Journal of Business Ethics. 11 (5–6): 379–389. doi:10.1007/BF00870550. ...routine crash testing revealed that the Pinto's fuel tank often ruptured when struck from the rear at a relatively low speed...

Note the summarization across multiple reliable sources. So much has been written about this case, we have vast reliable sources on Ford's testing: how many tests cars were prototypes, how many were pre-production or production Pintos, how many caught fire, etc. But we don't go into detail, because the point is one or more Pintos caught fire in rear end crash testing. Remove the paragraph on the NHTSA test detail. Hugh (talk) 16:07, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

• So far the most telling argument is HughD's attempt to belittle a peer reviewed source. [2] Springee (talk) 17:53, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

What in your mind is the significance for our readers, that there was gas in the tank, during the NHTSA testing? Hugh (talk) 18:14, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

What did the sociologist and graduate student Lee & Ermann say about the significance of NHTSA devising tests specifically designed to duplicate the reported fire hazard? Did the sociologist and graduate student Lee & Ermann say NHTSA exceeded their regulatory authority, cheated, deceived, or did anything illegal, unethical, or immoral? Hugh (talk) 23:36, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

Do you have any sources that say that the NHTSA did anything illegal, immoral, unethical, or wrong in their testing of the Ford Pinto? Can we add a reliable sourced topic sentence to this paragraph which conveys to our readers the significance of this paragraph? For example, "NHTSA exceeded their Congressionally mandated authority when they used real gas in the gas tank during their testing of the Ford Pinto in response to consumer complaints." Or "NHTSA illegally turned on the headlights of a test vehicle during their testing of the Ford Pinto in response to consumer complaints." Something like that? Thanks. Hugh (talk) 16:29, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Can you explain why we shouldn't include this information given that it comes from a RS? Why is this information not important but the claim that 6 people died in Pinto fires between the time the recall was initiated and parts were available is important (note that we don't know the details of those 6 deaths, if the impact speeds were in excess of 30 mph (ie the 1977 standard) etc). Springee (talk) 22:40, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Is it now your position that everything in RS goes in Wikipedia? Hugh (talk) 00:12, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

May I ask again, what would you propose as a topic sentence for this paragraph that might pull this detail together and give our readers some hint as to why we are asking them to read the details of the NHTSA test conditions? Hugh (talk) 00:12, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

You wrote in article space:

...in testing to determine in the Pinto tank design warranted a recall, the NHTSA for forewent the 1977 rear impact crash test standard and created a "worst-case" test.

What in the source is "NHTSA forewent" a paraphrase of? What justifies this in our article? Is this original research? Hugh (talk) 00:12, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Do you have any sources, which say that NHTSA, in investigating consumer reports of a fire safety issue known from reports to be the result of a rear-end collision by another car, was under any obligation to stop testing after simply repeating the standard moving barrier rear impact test, and grade pass/fail? Hugh (talk) 00:12, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Additional context and RS article. Lee, the first author of the Lee and Ermann paper was also the sole author on an earlier paper on the subject. Lee's CV [3] indicates that he is the chair of sociology at U of Akron. It also indicates that two of his works on the Pinto were republished as book chapters. The original publications and chapter publications are on page 10 of his CV. His 1998 article, "The Ford Pinto Case and the Development of Auto Safety Regulations, 1893-1978" makes it clear that he thinks the NHTSA handling of the case is significant as he discusses it in his article lead.

Lee, 1998

In an influentia1l 977 article in Mother Jones magazine, journalist Mark Dowie accused Ford Motor Company executives of callously deciding to produce and continuing to market the Pinto (which he labeled a "firetrap") even after company crash tests showed that its gas tank would rupture in rear end collisions at relatively low speeds [Dowie, 1977]. This reprehensible decision, according to Dowie's interpretation, derived from a cost/benefit analysis which purportedly demonstrated that settling the few inevitable lawsuits filed by burn victims or their families would cost less than the eleven dollars per car needed to fix the defective tanks [Green,1 997, p. 130]. Dowie, along with well-known consumer advocate Ralph Nader, held a press conference in Washington DC on August 10, 1977,t o drawn additional attention to the case. One day later, the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) began its own investigation of the Pinto gas tank [Cullen, Maakestad and Carender,1 987]. ] Lee Strickland was the NHTSA engineer assigned the task of determining if the Pinto gas tank met the criteria of a recallable safety defect [Stricldand, 1996]. The NHTSA investigation did not occur in a social vacuum. Strickland and his staff were charged with evaluating the Pinto in the midst of national publicity that had already labeled its gas tank "defective" and accused the federal government (and NHTSA) of buckling to pressure from lobbyists for the auto industry [Dowie, 1977]. Consumers also wrote letters to NHTSA demanding that it take action against Ford after Dowie's article was published [NHTSA, 1978]. However, according to Strickland, NHTSA's evaluation revealed that the Pinto had a "fire threshold" (i.e.t he speed at which a collision is likely to result in a fire) in rear-end collisions of between 30 and 35 miles per hour. Since the federal standard on fuel tank integrity (FMVSS 301, effective starting with 1977 model year cars) required that cars withstand only a 30 mile- per-hour rear impact, NHTSA would have to take extra-ordinary steps in order to force a recall of the Pinto [U.S. Department of Transportation 1988]. There was, and still is, disagreement within the federal government as to whether the law grants NHTSA the authority to hold cars with potential safety problems to a higher standard than the federal minimum. Based on all the evidence (and Dowie's article), Strickland's work group decided that Pinto was "unsafe" even though it met the minimum standard. The decision was then made to increase the speed of the crash tests to at least 35 miles per hour- beyond the Pinto's" fire threshold ("and beyond the federal minimum) - so that fuel-tank integrity would be compromised and sufficient leakage would occur to justify the application of the label "safety defect." To accomplish this goal, NHTSA selected a large and particularly rigid car as the" bullet car" (the moving vehicle in the collision) for the Pinto crash test, rather than the moving barrier that was normally used[ U.S. DOT, 1988]. Both the Pinto and the bullet car's gas tanks were filed with gas, rather than the non-flammable liquid normally used. The nose of the bullet car was weighted down so that it would slide under the Pinto upon impact and maximize the chance of contact with the gas tank. The bullet car's headlights were also turned on to provide a ready source of ignition. All of these steps, Strickland felt could be justified on grounds that they approximated "real-world" worst-case circumstances although most other cars were not subject to these test conditions. For NHTSA, the test was an unqualified success; the Pinto burst into flames upon impact. In the summer of 1978, NHTSA concluded that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, and Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall call the1 1971-1976 Pintos, even though they were built before the federal standard took effect [Strickland1, 996; Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender1,9 87, p. 165;N HTSA, 1978].

The bolded text makes it clear that testing the car to something beyond the standard of the time was questionable under the law (that answers one of HughD's earlier questions) and thus makes it very notable. Perhaps the best change to the article to address HughD's request for a reason why this should be included would be the statement that it wasn't clear if the "worst case" test was legal. Springee (talk) 19:45, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

Third Opinion

A third opinion has been requested. Will each of the two editors please state in one sentence (or at most two) what they think the question is? Robert McClenon (talk) 14:19, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

The above contended content attempts to convey to our readers that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, when investigating numerous consumer reports of a specific problem with a specific make and model, did something noteworthy, when they did not merely repeat a federal standard moving-barrier rear-end collision test applicable to all automobiles, but, acting entirely within the authority of their mandate, of course devised a test plan specific to the reported problem, make, and model. The above contended content offers our readers no indication of why the details the NHTSA test conditions might be noteworthy, as in, the NHTSA did anything illegal, unethical, or immoral (which they certainly did not); the relevance of the details the NHTSA test conditions is a minority opinion of one source written by a sociologist and a graduate student, and so is non-neutral and undue here WP:DUE, and serves only as a pointed attempt to cast doubt in our reader's mind WP:RGW on the clear, well-documented fact that the NHTSA tested and issued a finding of defect regarding the fuel system of the Ford Pinto. Hugh (talk) 15:22, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

• An acknowledged RS, quoted here [4], felt it was notable that the NHTSA, responding to political pressure, designed a test that was far in excess of the 1977 rear impact standards (no federal standards applied to the pre-1977 cars under investigation) and then used this extreme test to justify a Pinto recall. Springee (talk) 16:56, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

In my opinion, the description of the unusual standards of the 1977 test are appropriate precisely because it was an unusually designed test for an unusual purpose. If there is disagreement, try another Request for Comments. (WP:DRN is likely to be declined because two RFCs are already pending.) Robert McClenon (talk) 20:41, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your opinion. The testing performed by the NHTSA in investigating consumer complaints regarding the Ford Pinto was not unusual. Of course in investigating reports of exploding Pintos the NHTSA put gas in the tank. The NHTSA sets standards, AND investigates consumer complaints. The testing for conformance with standards is independent of the testing for investigation of consumer complaints. The contended content non-neutrally conflates these two roles to make a pointy point. Given consumer complaints regarding a specific problem with a specific make and model, were the NHTSA to merely re-test the Ford Pinto against the on-the-books 20 MPH moving barrier standard test that applies to all cars, and pronounce the Ford Pinto compliant, we would have all thought the NHTSA quite incompetent. No one says the Ford Pinto did not comply with standards; yet, the fact is NHTSA testing found it to exhibit a design defect in the fuel system. Our article may state, as supported by multiple reliable sources, that the Ford Pinto was in compliance with all federal regulations at the time; however, this in no way discredits the conscientious testing the NHTSA did in investigating the consumer complaints. You may be familiar with the distinction in software engineering between white-box and black-box testing; as you know, a software may pass all functional tests yet exhibit bugs. In the US there exists a minority point of view that regulation is bad, product testing is government over-reach, and the market knows best, but this point of view is not noteworthy in this article. The contended content non-neutrally impugns the motives of the NHTSA as "political" without basis in reliable sources WP:OR; no source suggests the NHTSA was motivated by anything other than concern for public safety or proceeded in any manor other than best practices. Respectfully request further discussion and reconsideration. Hugh (talk) 23:22, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

As you can see Robert, typical HughD behaviour. Ask for a third opinion, get one, don't like it, ask it to be reconsidered. Thanks Greglocock (talk) 00:46, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

• I would like to correct a few of the factual errors in HughD's descriptions of events. HughD's comments suggest that the NHTSA test was not unusual. I think such a statement would require some evidence. Note that in the section above[5] Lee said that even "today" (1998) it was not clear if the NHTSA could legally hold a car maker to a standard above and beyond the regulation. Second, HughD seems to be confused as to what standards the car complied with. There were NO applicable federal standards on the 1971-1976 cars. None because the first rear impact standard went into effect in 1977. HughD's statement, "were the NHTSA to merely re-test the Ford Pinto against the on-the-books 20 MPH moving barrier standard test that applies to all cars," illustrates a confusion. There never was a 20 mph federal standard. The NHTSA suggested a 20 mph standard. Ford internally decided all of their cars would meet a 20 mph standard as of 1973. The first federal standard was a 30 mph fixed barrier test. Where HughD got the idea that the NHTSA should test the car to a 20 mph standard that never existed is unclear to me. What is perhaps interesting to readers is that the pre-'77 Pintos likely would have (barely) passed the 1977 standard. What the car didn't pass was an invented standard that was not applied to other cars. Springee (talk) 03:20, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

In his master's thesis the sociology master's student Lee pointedly compared standards compliance testing with testing for investigating consumer complaints, as if it were a fair comparison. Perhaps if you are in a feverish small government state of mind, the NHTSA product testing of the Pinto in response to consumer complaints was a day of infamy in the history of outrageous government over-reach on a par only with the establishment of the income tax. The NHTSA testing of the Pinto in response to consumer complaints was widely publicized but it was not the origin of the idea of product safety testing in response to consumer complaints, even if some sociologists think it was. The Pinto recall was not an unprecedented recall of a product that had previously passed all written standards. Public safety issues may arise before they are addressed by standards; this is obvious, and a normal part of the product safety and standards development process, and the only reason one might attempt to portray otherwise is if one was determined to exonerate the Pinto, and advance a government conspiracy theory, at all costs, including the readability of our article. So much has been written about the Pinto, it has literally been written about from every conceivable point of view; however, the arch-anti-government point of view is undue weight in this article; the only relevant fact is that the NHTSA tested the Pinto and found a defect. Wikipedia prefers secondary sources to academic sources precisely because academics are expected to take a stand and adopt a point of view and defend it; while sometimes new editors are confused about this sourcing issue, mistakenly thinking peer-reviewed rules, or academic titles rule, this confusion is less common in experienced editors. Even if the details of the NHTSA testing were due weight, the context and background minimally sufficient for our readers to make an informed judgement about the significance of these details would require an absurdly long diatribe, off-topic in this article, into the role of government in a capitalist society, regulation, and consumer protection. The current article content on the NHTSA testing is grossly pointed and non-neutral. The evil governemnt did not "rig" tests so that the poor Ford Pinto had to fail. Balance on Wikipedia does not mean that an article must be written such that reprints would serve equally well as an encyclopedia article and as a handout at the Pinto table at a UFO conference. Hugh (talk) 14:46, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

If you think Lee is not a reliable source then perhaps you should bring it up at WP:RSN. As it stands the material was not once but twice peer reviewed and accepted twice. Journals don't care if the lead author is a grad student, that is actually quite common. Springee (talk) 01:33, 18 March 2016 (UTC)

RfC: section lede of Safety section

Should the following epigraph, a long direct quote from Lee and Erdmann (1999), and content sourced to Schwartz (1990) and Danley (2005), be included in the section lede of the "Safety issues, recalls, and lawsuits" section?

Scholarly work published in the decades after the Pinto’s release have offered summations of the general understanding of the Pinto and the controversy regarding the car's safety performance and risk of fire. Lee and Ermann summarized the popular yet largely erroneous understanding of the issues surrounding the Pinto and related fires.

Conventional wisdom holds that Ford Motor Company decided to rush the Pinto into production in 1970 to compete with compact foreign imports, despite internal pre-production tests that showed gas tank ruptures in low-speed rear-end collisions would produce deadly fires. This decision purportedly derived from an infamous seven-page cost-benefit analysis (the "Grush/Saunby Report" [1973]) that valued human lies at $200,000. Settling burn victims’ lawsuits would have cost $49.5 million, far less than the $137 million needed to make minor corrections. According to this account, the company made an informed, cynical, and impressively coordinated decision that "payouts" (Kelman and Hamilton 1989:311) to families of burn victims were more cost-effective than improving fuel tank integrity. This description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative.

Additional misunderstanding surrounds the actual number of fire related deaths related to the fuel system design, "wild and unsupported claims asserted in 'Pinto Madness' and elsewhere",[31] the facts of the two most significant Pinto related legal cases, Grimshaw vs Ford Motor Company and State of Indiana vs Ford Motor Company, the applicable safety standards at the time of design, and the nature of the NHTSA investigations and subsequent vehicle recalls.

References

Hugh (talk) 20:03, 18 March 2016 (UTC)

Discussion

Oppose inclusion The "Safety..." section is of course one of if not the most important sections of this article for us to get right.

1. The content is off-topic in this section lede of "Safety issues, recalls, and lawsuits" The topic of the section is a neutral, chronological telling of the facts and events of the history of the safety of the Ford Pinto, with an emphasis on fire safety. The content and references in the contended content are about the "popular understanding" and the "conventional wisdom" of the story. On Wikipedia, the popular understanding of events is a separate topic from events. Our first priority is a neutral telling of events. The purpose of Wikipedia is not to correct great wrongs in the conventional wisdom. WP:RGW
2. The content is non-neutral and undue, giving entirely too much weight in the section lede to three select academic journal articles with a shared, strong, revisionist, apologist point of view. These views may be due weight later in the article, but not as the epigraph of the "Safety..." section. WP:DUE
3. The content does not summarize content in the subsections of the section. MOS:LAYOUT
4. The content placement is contrary to a talk page consensus of a few weeks ago, 13-14 February. Please see Talk:Ford Pinto#Sectioning Compromise.3F above. The consensus was a very straight-forward re-commitment to the fundamental editorial principle that we endeavour to keep facts and events separate from opinions and interpretation, and present facts before analysis. Working on behalf of the consensus, a subsection "Subsequent analysis" was added to the "Safety..." section. WP:CONS

Thank you. Hugh (talk) 20:03, 11 March 2016 (UTC) Notice to WP:BRANDS, WP:VPM, WP:NPOVN, Talk:Ford Motor Company; update to WP:NPOVN. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 16:38, 23 March 2016 (UTC) update to Wikipedia talk:WikiProject Automobiles Hugh (talk) 21:31, 8 April 2016 (UTC) update to WP:VPM Hugh (talk) 15:30, 9 April 2016 (UTC) update to WP:BRANDS Hugh (talk) 19:25, 10 April 2016 (UTC)

Notice to editors. The content of the article section and even the title of the section are currently in not in stable form. Springee (talk) 21:11, 11 March 2016 (UTC)

Removed RfC tag pending agreement on appropriate RfC text. Please propose the RfC so that others can verify it is a reasonable and neutral question first. In the past you have asked imbalanced questions. Also, so long as the section body text is in flux it would be inappropriate to assume that the reply to a RfC would still be relevant after body changes. Your current reasons for opposition include assumptions such as the title of the section, the purpose and/or content that should be in the section, and an inherent assumption that the content of the section is largely static.

Instead of a binary RfC we should ask for input on the scope of the lead. The length of that material may make it too long for a lead. However, the scope of the lead clearly should include discussions of the misunderstandings surrounding the facts of the Pinto case. I would propose an RfC question something like:

How much weight should be given to the discussion of the public misunderstanding of the facts of the Ford Pinto case?

I'm open to other suggestions. Springee (talk) 20:20, 11 March 2016 (UTC)

• I have added a note regarding the stability of the related content to the RfC. I believe HughD is jumping the gun on this RfC since the content of the section is not stable.

Support with qualification I think this material could be cut down due to length. HughD's claims as to why it should not be included are based on what he wants to include in the body of the article, not an agreement between editors.

1. The content is clearly not off topic. The peer reviewed journal article which is the source of the material is perhaps the second most respected/influential academic study of the subject (the events surrounding the Ford Pinto fuel tank controversy). Author's such as Becker (a source HughD brought to the table as reliable, stated "Other scholars (Lee and Ermann 1999 and Schawrtz 1991) have examined teh accuracy of the public's perceptions regarding the facts of the case and those analyses do not need to be repeated here." Since the misconceptions and misinformation surrounding the case is encyclopedic in this case, some sort of material stating as much should be in the section lead. Note that HughD changed the section title to one that discounts the public controversy aspects of the case. That was not an agreed change.

2. Given the number of peer reviewed sources (Schwartz, Lee & Ermann, Danley, Becker) that support the view that there is a significant misunderstand of the facts of the case and that the misunderstanding had an impact in terms of public pressure on the NHTSA and the courts (Schwartz notes this) it would be totally wrong to claim the inclusion of public misunderstanding discussions is undue or lacking weight. HughD should prove this claim.

3. This is an unfair claim due to the fact that HughD radically changed the content of the section over the past few days. At the time he first removed the content from the lead it was true. As more content has been added it becomes less true. Perhaps it is valid to say it should be cut back until the content has made it to the body.

4. This is HughD's self serving opinion. He has claimed this based on consensus discussions which occurred before his arrival here on March 2nd. The editors who were participants in those discussions have not weighed in on HughD's claim of consensus against.

I think we should allow the article to become stable before answering this question. Springee (talk) 20:45, 11 March 2016 (UTC)

• It is highly questionable to not notify the Project Automobile page about this RfC. I have done so. Springee (talk) 05:27, 12 March 2016 (UTC)

• Include. The RFC FRS bot sent me. These are reliable sources about a prominent controversy. As such, the sources should be included and excerpted if need be, and the controversy summarized in the WP:LEAD. EllenCT (talk) 15:07, 13 March 2016 (UTC)

EllenCT Thank you for your comment. Of course include the sources, summarized in the body of the section, and further summarized succinctly in the section lede, but that is not the RfC question; the RfC question asks about the due weight of introducing the "Safety..." section with these three sources, the only three citations in the section lede, with extensive content drawn from these three sources, including a long, direct quote serving as an epigraph for the section. Would you please comment further? Thanks again for your participation in the feedback request service. Hugh (talk) 16:49, 13 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: Okay, but please first tell me why you believe that the sources have a "revisionist, apologist point of view." EllenCT (talk) 21:02, 13 March 2016 (UTC)

The three sources cited by the contended content in the lede of the "Safety.." section have in common that their topic is correcting popular misconceptions in the Ford Pinto story, taking down Mother Jones magazine, and rehabilitating Ford's reputation WP:RGW. These views may be due weight later in the body of the "Safety..." but are given undue weight by the contended content in the lede of the "Safety..." section. The main topic of the "Safety.." section is a neutral telling of the facts and events of the Pinto story, not correcting popular misconceptions in the Ford Pinto story. Introducing the "Safety..." section with a warning to readers that "much of what you are about to read is wrong" non-neutrally casts unwarranted doubt in our readers' minds on the many, many facts and events which are not controversial which are presented in our article. Let the facts speak; our first priority is a neutral telling of facts and events, controversies come later. Reliable sources are sufficiently in consensus on the vast majority of facts and events that a "he, said, she said" format is not warranted, even if one editor's preferred highly select sources adopt a "here's what most people think, now we will tell you what really happened" format. Hugh (talk) 21:39, 13 March 2016 (UTC)

EllenCT, please comment on the RfC question. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 23:31, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: You put "much of what you are about to read is wrong" in quotes, but that is not a quotation. Is there any statement in the excerpt being commented on which implies it? Does the statement that the excerpted, "description provides the unambiguous foundation on which the media and academics have built a Pinto gas tank decision-making narrative," imply that the description, its unambiguous foundation, or the narrative is flawed? EllenCT (talk) 15:36, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your question. The topic of the section is the facts and events of the history of the safety of the Ford Pinto. In contrast, the contended content excerpted above from the section lede, and the sources, are very clearly about the conventional wisdom and the popular misconceptions and righting great wrongs WP:RGW: "general understanding", "popular yet largely erroneous understanding", "Conventional wisdom holds", "Additional misunderstanding surrounds", "wild and unsupported claims", etc. On Wikipedia, the popular conception of historical facts and events is a distinct topic from historical facts and events; our first priority is to the latter. Our article on George Washington does not refute the cherry tree incident in the lede. The sources may be due weight in the body of the "Safety..." section but are afforded entirely too much weight as a long prelude to the "Safety..." section. The use of these sources and a long direct quote, in the section lede of one of the most important sections of this article, however intended, reads only as a pointed attempt to cast doubts in the minds of our readers on the overwhelming majority of the facts and events, which are well-documented in a wide consensus of vast reliable sources. Will you please comment on the RfC question? Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 16:07, 15 March 2016 (UTC) EllenCT, will you please comment on the RfC question? Thanks. Hugh (talk) 00:38, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

What a load of meandering waffle. Try editing your own posts before editing articles.Thanks very muchGreglocock (talk) 16:57, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

You are invited to comment on the RfC question. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:27, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Hugh, your implication that I have not commented on the RfC question is frankly quite offensive. I most certainly have, and I stand by my original opinion especially after having read your answers to my questions. EllenCT (talk) 05:02, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Hi Ellen, as you have discovered, Hugh is merely forum shopping. He did this on the third opinion subforum as well. If you do not post an acceptable affirmation of whatever bizarro POV he is pushing then he'll attack you. Unfortunately there seems little we can do to modify his behavior by discussion, but frankly, it's not our problem, we are not his therapist. Greglocock (talk) 07:59, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Note: I accidendently removed Gregs response; I may have had an old version up, or I may have fat-fingered something. I did not intend to nuke it. Anmccaff (talk) 17:33, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

No offense was intended; I sincerely thought you might have missed the point of the RfC question (the RfC question is not regarding inclusion/exclusion of sources). Thank you again for your participation. Hugh (talk) 17:16, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

I think it is slightly odd to include a long direct quote in the section lede, but since it summarises the situation in a neutral tone, and is well reffed in its own right, it is probably better to do that than paraphrase it, which would lead some pointless waffler to argue about cherry picking. Greglocock (talk) 17:37, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

• Oppose This is the lead. The lead is meant to summarize the article. There's to the question the neutrality in this. The article in itself drives home this point. The lead as it stands now drives home the point, This requested addition is beating a dead horse.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 08:13, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Where did the "facts first, then interpretation" "rule" come from?

HughD, there is no consensus to change the narrative presentation to "facts first, then interpretation". This was a justification used to move several large bodies of text. Previously you wanted a pure chronological presentation, now you are making changes based on some other claim. That is certainly disruptive. Also, it's bad enough when you tag a number of passages as "OR", especially when it turns out your tags are incorrect. If you think something is OR, or not properly cited then tag it and give editors more than 24 hours to actually fix the (supposed) problem. Sometimes the concerned editor is away from Wikipedia. Deleting large passages that YOU feel should be tagged without discussion or sufficient time for other editors to correct the problem is disruptive. You have now been notified to discuss such sweeping changes here before making them. Springee (talk) 02:57, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your post. It is genuine progress on this talk page that you explicitly state your confusion on the fundamental principle that Wikipedia editors are expected to be vigilant in distinguishing facts and events from opinions and interpretation. We are asked by policy to avoid asserting opinions as facts. Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 16:46, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Coming from someone who confuses the facts as presented in a trial with what actually happened that is pretty funny. Thanks very much again, that was bloody hilarious. Thanks Thanks again thanks. I think there's a phrase for that. Oh yes, Passive aggressive. Thanks Greglocock (talk) 17:17, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Protected edit request on 14 March 2016

Add top tags reflecting, without other POV comment, all the issues seen with the article in its current form. NPOV, at least, belongs at the top, not just buried below. Anmccaff (talk) 05:22, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Hello. Thank you for your proposal. I would support a POV article hat, although I feel much of the article outside of the "Safety..." section is non-controversial. What do you think? Your collaboration would be welcome here; perhaps your experience at General Motors streetcar conspiracy, trying to write an honest article on a subject rife with conspiracy theories, will find some parallels here. Can you please propose some specific article hats so we can reach consensus? Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 00:22, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Not done: It doesn't look like we have agreement about what tags to add, so I'm closing this without any action. — Mr. Stradivarius ^{♪ talk ♪} 02:47, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Proposed edit: remove citation to online course hand-out

In subsection "Cost-benefit analysis" remove citation:

• Rossow, Mark (2015). "Ethics: An Alternative Account of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Continuing Education and Development Inc. Retrieved February, 21 2016. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)

Replace with {{cn}}.

Discussion

The citation is to an unreliable source. The citation is to an online PDF of a hand-out in a for-fee online professional development course, see Ethics: An Alternative Account of the Ford Pinto Case. The source has no evidence of an editorial process. Vast reliable sources are available on the safety of the Ford Pinto, including books, major newspapers, and peer-reviewed academic journals; our project has no need to consider sourcing to online course hand-outs. If the supported article content is noteworthy, it can easily be sourced to multiple reliable sources.

Thank you. Hugh (talk) 16:03, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Since you are suggesting replacing the current citation with a CN tag, can you please tell us which particular claim/statement/fact in the article is, in your view, uniquely sourced to that particular citation? The RS guideline does not say we can only use sources that undergo editorial review. Instead the guideline says, "Each source must be carefully weighed to judge whether it is reliable for the statement being made in the Wikipedia article and is an appropriate source for that content. " The statements in question are from a PhD, PE in civil engineering. He was a Prof at Washington U in St Louis and Chair of Civil Engineering at Southern Illinois U. So which statements do you think are uniquely attributed to him and do you think he is unqualified to make such statements? Springee (talk) 22:35, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

The citation is to a self-published source. The source has no editorial process. The source is the sole work of the author. The source is not a peer-reviewed academic journal article. The source is a hand-out from a for-profit course. This proposed edit requests that the citation be replaced with an in-text request for citation, allowing interested editors to provide a reliable source for the content; this edit request takes no stand on the supported content pending resolution of the sourcing issue. Meanwhile, vast alternative reliable sources are available to the editors of this article. Hugh (talk) 23:44, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

I don't think you have answered Springee's comment at all, but have merely repeated your original assertion...which Springee -has- given an answer to; he's asserted, correctly so far as it goes, that the author has professional standing. (Whether that's enough by itself is another question.) So, what do you see in this source that requires something beyonf that? It's largely a collector of other sources which have undoubted "reliability" in wiki's peculiar use of the word. Anmccaff (talk) 16:39, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

It seems to have escaped HughD's attention that textbooks would often fit his description. Now, wouldn't it be nice if instead of boring us to tears he actually answered the following question, Since you are suggesting replacing the current citation with a CN tag, can you please tell us which particular claim/statement/fact in the article is, in your view, uniquely sourced to that particular citation?Greglocock (talk) 16:53, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your comment. The academic title of the author is not in dispute. The academic title of the author does not establish the reliability of the source. The content supported by this citation is not in dispute at this time. The proposed {{cn}} tag will invite concerned editors to improve the sourcing, or not, after which we can together evaluate the accuracy of the summarization across reliable sources. If it is the academic title of the author that lends this source due weight, then in-text attribution to the author and title might be a remedy, but I don't think so: the point is, the course hand-out was not vetted by any book publisher or editorial board or peer review, and so much high quality reliable sourcing is available to us on this topic, that if the supported content is truly noteworthy, it should be very straightforward to find better, reliable sources. Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 17:15, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

So your answer is None? That wasn't so hard was it Hugh? Thanks. thanks very much. Thanks you. Thanks again. Greglocock (talk) 17:21, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

May I please clarify, I have no comment on the content supported by this citation at this time, pending anticipated sourcing improvements. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:32, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Support removal of the source as proposer. The citation is to an unreliable source WP:RS. The citation is to an online PDF of a hand-out in a for-fee online professional development course. The source has no evidence of an editorial process. The source has no evidence of use by others WP:USEBYOTHERS. Meanwhile, vast alternative reliable sources are available on the safety of the Ford Pinto; if the supported article content is noteworthy, it can easily be sourced to multiple reliable sources. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:41, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

Use by others?

Has anyone cited the course hand-out by Rossow? Is there any evidence of use by others WP:USEBYOTHERS of the course hand-out by Rossow? Thanks. Hugh (talk) 17:18, 15 March 2016 (UTC)

Review of frozen article -Fuel system section

Since we have graciously been allowed a breathing space....

WP:NPOV - "Try to achieve a more neutral text by folding debates into the narrative, rather than isolating them into sections that ignore or fight against each other."

Lede OK as is.

Fuel system design

"The first federal standard for automotive fuel system safety, known as Section 301 in the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, was <INTRODUCED?> in 1968, and only applied to front-end collisions at over 30 miles per hour (48 km/h)." i

"In 1970 and 1973, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) issued notices regarding fuel system integrity, fuel spillage, and fire-related casualties.[" should make clear these proposals were made after the launch of the vehicle i n 1970, and wer enot law until whatever date..

"The Pinto's vulnerability to fuel leakage and fire in a rear-end collision was exacerbated by reduced rear "crush space," a lack of structural reinforcement in the rear, and an "essentially ornamental" rear bumper. " These features were also present in its competitors.

Cost-benefit analysis

This subsection should probably be called The Pinto Memo.

"In 2007 Time magazine said the memo was one of the automotive industry's "most notorious paper trails."" Which rather ignores the point that this notoriety is based on the MJ beatup.The following para corrects that but the two need to be combined, and quit wanking on about tort law, nobody cares. This is not a lawyer's primer.

OK I'll do the rest tomorrow, SWMBO needs a hand. Greglocock (talk) 11:04, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

• I'll second what you have said. The lack of paragraph integration is at least partially on me. I was afraid that if I edited the text of the other paragraphs my changes would be reverted. A pure addition of content avoids that issue but makes the article disjointed. I think the fuel tank placement paragraph should include some discussion of tank placement trade offs as Ford understood them at the time and perhaps discussion of the early crash tests. I'm not sure the accusatory one liner about delaying should stay as is. I think instead it should be expanded to provide a bit more context.

The cost benefit section now covers both the regulatory background and the memo. Perhaps we should change the section title to reflect both subjects. The section has an error in that it describes the memo as reviewing the cost of litigation to the car companies. Instead it discussed the societal costs as dictated by the NHTSA. Again, I think more expansion and context would be good.

Agree with respect to recall section.

The legal cases need to be expanded. Both sections lack significant detail. Of significance to the Grimshaw case would be the evidence that Ford was not allowed to include, some of the legal opinions on the verdict and punitive damages, reasons why the appellate court had such negative views of Ford's case (Schwartz specifically mentions this). Some of the material that is held up as "Ford knew" should be discussed. I have at least one new source that could be added here. The Indiana case seams to read like Ford only won because they had more money. That is inconsistent with our list of peer reviewed sources that seemed to think this case was, on it's merit and ignoring the perils of jury emotions, had basically no legal merit.

There is still plenty of material that can go in the historical analysis section. The long term impact of the case, general commentary on the misunderstandings and the way the case has become an example even though much of the public understanding, even that used as examples, is wrong. In that regard it's a bit like the idea that the Nova didn't sell in Spanish speaking countries. Springee (talk) 22:43, 16 March 2016 (UTC)

On further reading that is not a quote from Time magazine at all. It is a quote from an on line slideshow on their website called "The 50 Worst Cars of All Time", which given that the other refs we use are at least serious journalism, seems out of place. Since the basic premise is also false, that is, there is no paper trail, it seems to me this article would lose nothing by eliminating that sentence and the Time ref. Greglocock (talk) 06:58, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

Greglocock, you wrote "...this notoriety is based on the MJ beatup" This point of view is overly simplistic with respect to multiple reliable sources. Factors identified by multiple reliable sources as significantly contributing to the notoriety include crashes, fires, deaths, injuries, civil lawsuits, a criminal prosecution, a press conference with Ralph Nader, the Washington Post coverage, 60 Minutes, 20/20, other media, books, an NHTSA investigation, an NHTSA finding of defect, and a recall. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 17:48, 31 March 2016 (UTC)

On with the show

NHTSA investigation

First sentence needs a rewrite

"Lee and Ermann noted in testing to determine in the Pinto tank design warranted a recall, the NHTSA for forewent the 1977 rear impact crash test standard and created a "worst-case" test."

How about "Lee and Ermann that NHTSA used a worst case test to justify the recall of the Pinto, rather than the regular 1977 rear impact crash test." at least it is English.

"and in 1974 the NHTSA ruled that the Pinto had no "recallable" problem." should be "whereas back in 1974 the NHTSA ruled that the Pinto had no "recallable" problem."

Recall

same problem as paper trail, sensationalist quote from Time slide show mixed into an article that mostly uses serious refs. Voluntary recall needs no scare quotes.

Civil lawsuits

If you quote how many lawsuits were brought it would be at least interesting, and NPOV to list the outcomes in some summarised form. Once a deep pocketed target is established it is scarcely surprising that many suits would be filed, whatever the merits of the case, lawyers being well known for their love of a dollar.

Also Indiana v. Ford needs to be one sub section deeper. Greglocock (talk) 17:36, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

Interleaving as per explicit invitation of colleague, below. We agree our article's coverage of the magnitude and impact of the civil lawsuits needs improvement. Several reliable sources attempt to summarize the number of lawsuits and their outcomes. The issue of accurately summarizing the civil actions is complicated by the wide distribution of venues, the fact that the numbers were constantly changing, and that most of the suits were settled, and settled with terms including non-disclosure. All mentions of the number of lawsuits or outcomes should be dated in-text "as of..." Certainly, our article should include the number of lawsuits and that were settled prior to or in progress at the time of the recall, which the NHTSA compelled Ford to disclose, and which the NHTSA documented in the key report, the NHTSA finding of defect. The lawsuits prior to and in progress at the time of the recall are identified by multiple reliable sources as significantly contributing to motivating the recall. Thank you. Hugh (talk)

Subsequent analysis

I don't know what this sentence is trying to say but it fails. The refs do not support the sentence.

If this section is needed at all then it might be better titled "Overall safety record of the Pinto". I think the Gladwell article includes the relevant stats.Greglocock (talk) 17:33, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

Overall If any of the above are non controversial I at least would appreciate being allowed to make the edits above when the lock is lifted, without HughD's usual shotgun blasts and major surgery. I think in this case interleaved comments make sense.Greglocock (talk) 07:40, 17 March 2016 (UTC)

Best of luck with that last bit! As for the subsequent part, I agree the one liner was a quote from Schwartz taken totally out of context. The same dubious edits were tried over at Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co. I do think that section would be a good place to perhaps put scholar discussions that don't fit in other sections. For instance, both L&E and Schwartz note that the Pinto case is used as an example in business ethic's classes yet those classes often get the facts wrong. Danley looked at the case in terms of the issues of assigning moral blame to Ford based on the assignment of legal blame in the two notable legal cases. He basically concludes it's not reasonable in part because a criminal standard is a very high bar. In his view Ford might be morally wrong but not meet the statute of the criminal law. Conversely tort cases are often decided based on correcting harm even in cases where the company tried to do the right thing (ie a company can still be liable for harm caused by an honest mistake). It's an interesting related discussion that could fit in that last section. Anyway, I think the best way to fill up that section is let people add to it then let the editorial process decide weight. That said, I still share your shotgun concerns. Springee (talk) 01:45, 18 March 2016 (UTC)

Proposed edit: add 60 Minutes and 20/20

On June 11, 1978, two days after Ford announced the Pinto recall, CBS televised a segment of 60 Minutes on the Ford Pinto. Host Mike Wallace opened saying, "Is your car safe? Well, if you're driving a Ford Pinto, vintage 1971 to '76, the answer seems to be: Not as safe as it could be." The report included an interview with Ford Pinto fire crash victim Richard Grimshaw, and an interview with Ford's vice president of safety, who said that the value of a human life used in cost-benefit analyses was set by the US government, not by Ford, and that the cost-benefit analysis was taken out of context. The ABC News television program 20/20 ran a segment on the Ford Pinto in June, 1978 featuring the Grimshaw tragedy.

• Cullen, Francis T.; Cavender, Gray; Maakestad, William J.; Benson, Michael L. (2014). Corporate Crime Under Attack: The Fight to Criminalize Business Violence. Routledge. pp. 166–167. ISBN 9781317523666. Two days after Ford declared its recall, The Pinto received national exposure again...On Sunday evening, June 11, viewers of 60 Minutes were greeted by Mike Wallace's question, "Is your car safe?" He answered, "Well, if you're driving a Ford Pinto, vintage 1971 to '76, the answer seems to be: Not as safe as it could be." He then proceeded to tell the Pinto story. Richard Grimshaw a was the first to be interviewed. The audience learned that he had been in the hospital for four months following his Pinto Burn accident, and had returned for "about 65 major surgeries."...Herbert Misch, a twenty-three year veteran and vice president of environmental and safety engineering at Ford...countered by saying that the value placed on human lives was set by the government, not by Ford, and that the memo has "been taken totally out of context..."...Like Mike Wallace, other reporters found the Pinto matter a fascinating and eminently newsworthy upperworld scandal.
• Schwartz, Gary T. (1990). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068. By early June, the verdict in the Ford Pinto case was in, the NHTSA hearing was pending, and segment about the Pinto on the CBS television show, 60 Minutes, was imminent. At this point, Ford decided to undertake a "voluntary" recall.
• Graham, John D. (1991). "Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?"". In Huber, Peter W.; Litan, Robert E. (eds.). The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. p. 132. ISBN 9780815720188. The television shows "60 Minutes" and "20/20" ran segments in June 1978 that brought the Grimshaw tragedy into millions of American homes. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
• Wallace, Mike (June 11, 1978). "Is your car safe?". 60 Minutes. CBS News.
• Danley, John R (2005). "Polishing Up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. Beyond the legal problems, Ford was taking a public relations beating...On 60 Minutes, Mike Wallace claimed that he found it difficult to accept that top management would sit there and say "Oh, we'll buy 2,000 deaths, 10,000 injuries, because we want to make some money." 20/20 also came out with a critical episode.

While the Mother Jones magazine coverage was important, it was hardly the only media coverage. Schwartz credits CBS with a role in motivating the recall. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 20:01, 20 March 2016 (UTC) Additional reliable source added Hugh (talk) 18:14, 9 April 2016 (UTC)

No car is as safe as it could be. Obviously. So that segment, which should probably be included, needs quotes around it via any of the sources (say gladwell) that point out that the Pinto was at least as safe as its competitors. 22:43, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your support in including the 60 Minutes segment. "Not as safe as it could be" is in quotes, attributed in-text to Wallace, and the source verifies that Wallace said that. Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 22:56, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

I support including it IF it is accompanied by the information I suggested. Greglocock (talk) 23:10, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

What information do you suggest? Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 23:48, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

" needs quotes around it via any of the sources (say gladwell) that point out that the Pinto was at least as safe as its competitors." wasting my time again Hugh, even when I agree with you?Greglocock (talk) 05:43, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Greglocock, we have been asked to take advantage of this page lock to discuss proposed content changes. You have expressed conditional support for the above proposal, if supplemented by some additional content. May I respectfully ask, what do you propose we add to the above proposed content, such that you would support it? Thank you in advance for your reply. Hugh (talk) 15:43, 21 March 2016 (UTC) Greglocock, I would like to please hear from you on this question. Thank you again in advance for your reply. Hugh (talk) 16:52, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, that is a bit of a dishonest statement. "We were asked" ignores that the article was locked because you were edit warring. You were not willing to engage in talk page discussions before the article was locked. Since it was locked you have been pushing for all sorts of 3rd party feedback. When that feedback didn't go your way you weren't willing to accept "no" for an answer. Springee (talk) 15:57, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Greglocock, do I understand from your comments above, that you feel, in order for the above proposed edit to be acceptable to you, the paragraph must include the testimony of a former head of the NHTSA, testifying in defense of Ford, in a criminal trail in Indiana in 1980, two years later, regarding his general statement about the overall safety of the Ford Pinto compared to other cars, even though the testimony is already duly covered in our article in the subsection specific to the Indiana trial? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 16:06, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

• Include but not as proposed: The 60 Minutes news article was important in shaping public opinion and thus political pressure related to the Pinto case. However, the news article has been shown to be largely incorrect (see primarily Schwartz). We should not include quotes in a way that the reader may intemperate as a WP statement of fact. Springee (talk) 23:58, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

The quote is in quotes, and clearly attributed in-text, in conformance with policy WP:ATTRIBUTEPOV. What is your objection to this proposed edit? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:59, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

• Support as proposer. The clear consensus of noteworthy reliable sources is that public awareness of the fire safety of the Ford Pinto was a noteworthy significant factor in NHTSA investigation and the recall of the Ford Pinto. The clear consensus of noteworthy reliable sources is that Ford desire to limit further damage to its reputation was a noteworthy significant factor in Ford recalling the Pinto. Ford was aware that major network media coverage was imminent at the time they announced the recall. The current article content mentions only the media coverage by one article in one magazine, Mother Jones, and so is grossly non-neutral with respect to reliable sources and misleading to our readers. The clear consensus of noteworthy reliable sources is that the Mother Jones article was a noteworthy significant factor in raising public awareness, but it was far from the only media coverage of the fire safety of the Pinto and certainly not the most widely read or viewed. It is due weight that we accurately summarize the breadth of the media coverage that fomented public awareness and concerned Ford. Addressing this neutrality issue is an editorial priority with this article. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:32, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

Emergence of Controversy

Guys,

1) Sorry for not being involved in the recent debates. I'd wish I'd been here, but I've been a tad busy IRL. 2) User:HughD came in like a wrecking ball. Being somewhat familiar with Hugh's editing record, perhaps this isn't super surprising. 3) One thing that has been lost was the emphasis on MJ article and the "emergence of the controversy". In reading up on this subject, it became apparent to me that the revelations about the Pinto Memo and the public outrage it caused directly led to the 1977 recall. Not to play the "what if" game here, but I'm guessing if the Pinto Memo never came to light, the controversy and subsequent recall probably wouldn't have happened. As I've said before, I think the way the controversy started is probably as notable as the actual controversy itself. We ought to make sure it's mentioned.

Anyways, looks like the page got locked down. Hopefully when it reopens, we'll have enough eyes on this thing to prevent some of the sillier behavior we've seen recently. NickCT (talk) 01:22, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Hello Nick. Thank you for your contributions. Your collaboration is welcome. Reliable sources agree the 1977 Mother Jones article was an important event. Certainly letters from consumers contributed to the recall. However, "the Pinto Memo ... directly led to the 1977 recall" is synthetic and overs-simplified. After all, the Mother Jones subscriber base is tad niche-y, even in 1977. We know the Center for Auto Safety was on the case, petitioned the NHTSA twice, and, indulging with you in what-if against my best judgement, unlikely to go away; had Mother Jones declined the story, it may well have run elsewhere. The historic Grimshaw verdict was trial commenced shortly before the recall, making national and international headlines (the timing was critical but its relevance to the run-up of the recall is not apparent in our article). As seen in the previous talk page section, we know ABC and CBS were poking around preparing long-form television reports. Thank you for teasing out at article talk an editorial direction of some editors, that the whole Pinto thingy was an unfortunate result of rabble-rousing by Mother Jones. Attributing the motivations of actors in historical events is wrought with difficulty, the motivations of organizations even more so, and best avoided in Wikipedia voice absent compelling weight in reliable sources; let the facts speak. So much has been written on this episode that authors supporting every possible point of view may be found, including "the NHTSA was under political pressure and had to find a defect in the Pinto." Our article may not demonize Ford or Mother Jones, or impugn the motives or results of the NHTSA, in Wikipedia voice. Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 15:20, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

"Controversy" to me is a disagreement among persons. What to call Washington's football team is a controversy. What we are writing about here are historical events including crashes, fires, deaths, injuries, law suits, a criminal prosecution, federal investigations, and a product recall. May I respectfully comment that characterizing this content as a "controversy" is so dismissive of events as to be non-neutral. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 15:20, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

While HughD is correct in stating we don't know what would have happened if MJ didn't run the article, he is doing a lot of OR speculation in claiming that failing the run of the MJ article things would have been different. Schwartz even notes how the Pinto PR issues impacted the Grimshaw case. The Grimshaw plaintiff's lawyers and C4AS both provided information to Dowie for the article. It is not at all clear that ABC and CBS would have run their stories absent the controversy, and thus interest, created by the MJ story. Claiming one way or the other is clearly OR. "Our" article may report on the motives of MJ or NHTSA when acknowledged RS's say as much. What you think "controversy" is just your opinion. You are welcome to suggest other titles but your previous attempt didn't fly since it implies fault where fault has not been firmly established. What term would you suggest when it is clear there was a public outcry yet also a great deal of misunderstanding. Perhaps we should follow the example of RSs "Myth" (Schwartz, Lee & Ermann). Springee (talk) 16:12, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - Thanks for your comments HughD. Your collaboration may be welcome.

Well listen, we and sources seem to all agree that the MJ was important in revealing the Pinto Memo. We also all seem to agree, along with some sources, that the recall was at least in part a result of memo revelations. I'm not sure saying "MJ led to controversy which led to recall" would be synthetic. There are some sources which make that direct connection (e.g. this one and this one).

If we don't draw a direct line, I think we can all agree that it would be OK to say, 1) "There was an article exposing the Pinto Memo". 2)"There was a controversy over the memos", 3) "Following the controversy and subsequent NHTSA investigation, Ford recalled".

I don't think phrasing things this way would "demonize Mother Jones", so much that it would just indicate that Mother Jones may have had something to do with getting the ball rolling on a recall.

re "controversy ... is a disagreement" - Ah but controversy itself can be a historical event. Would you disagree that a controversy over the safety of the Pinto arose during the 1970's?

@Springee: - I sorta regret starting my "what if" conversation now. I think it may have taken us down the wrong track. I think it's sufficient to say that lots of sources point to the MJ article as being relevant to the controversy. So we probably should as well. NickCT (talk) 17:14, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Nick, we agree on your 1 and 2, and I think the current article does a decent job of conveying those two main points. However 3 "Following the controversy and subsequent NHTSA investigation, Ford recalled" is so over-simplified as to be non-neutral. A more accurate terse summarization of the narrative around which we organize the "Safety..." section might be:

Following deaths and injuries, following two Center for Auto Safety petitions, following an article in Mother Jones, following exposure of a controversial memo from Ford to the NHTSA, following a press conference by Ralph Nader, following numerous consumer complaints, following multiple lawsuits, following the largest punitive damages award in history, following the commencement of the Grimshaw trail, following national and international headlines, following an NHTSA investigation, following an NHTSA finding of defect, Ford recalled the Pinto.

But of course we would not say that in any one sentence but rather let the facts and events speak and trust our readers. Thanks again for your participation. Hugh (talk) 17:29, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: re "I think the current article does a decent job of conveying those two main points" - Can you point to the exact line in the current article that says the memo was exposed in an article, and that a controversy over the memo erupted?

Can you point to references which directly link Nader/Center for Auto Safety, or lawsuits to the recall in the same way I have provided you sources which directly link the MJ article to the investigation and subsequent recall? NickCT (talk) 17:46, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Your collaboration on improving the article's coverage of the roles of the "Ford Pinto memo", Ralph Nader, and the Center for Auto Safety is welcome. The interpretations of the "Ford Pinto" memo were diverse and we should cover that. The events leading to the recall were complex. Our article should not say that Mother Jones, the "Ford Pinto memo," Ralph Nader, or the Center for Auto Safety, or any other one thing, was the cause of the recall. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 17:58, 21 March 2016 (UTC) Wikipedia does not say that the American Civil War was the war to free the slaves or that the Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria triggered WWI and it should not say that the Pinto recall was because of Mother Jones. Hugh (talk) 19:51, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, if you are going to accuse others of OR related to this material (see the NOR section below) please make sure your own facts are correct. The MJ article and the NHTSA decision to investigate occurred in August of 1977. The Grimshaw case was first in court in February of 1978. Certainly you have placed the cart before the Pinto when stating, "following the largest punitive damages award in history". I'm pretty sure that the award came after the trial was completed in 1978. Do you have dates to support the claims that other lawsuits, prior to August of 1977 influenced the NHTSA? Basically, please don't accuse others of synthesis if your own understanding of the facts is VERY wrong. Springee (talk) 18:02, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - Apologies but you haven't answered my questions. Clearly the level of weight you're placing on the MJ article is lower than the other editors here. You can defend your viewpoint by answering the questions you've been asked, or your edits can simply be reverted. NickCT (talk) 18:06, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Nick, thank you for your question. In answer to your request for sources, here are some quick sources, most already in use in our article, that offer a telling of the lead-up to the recall more nuanced than "it was all Mother Jones", and citing crashes, deaths, injuries, consumer complaints, lawsuits, the Grimshaw trail, Ralph Nader, the Center for Auto Safety, the joint Mother Jones/Center for Auto Safety press conference, or other events:

• Dardis, Rachel; Zent, Claudia (December 1, 1982). "The Economics of the Pinto Recall". Journal of Consumer Affairs. 16 (2): 261–277. On August 10, 1977, Ralph Nader and Mark Dowie held a press conference to notify the public that unnecessary deaths and injuries were being suffered as a result of the faulty design of the pre-1977 model year Pinto.
• Cullen, Francis T.; Cavender, Gray; Maakestad, William J.; Benson, Michael L. (2014). Corporate Crime Under Attack: The Fight to Criminalize Business Violence. Routledge. p. 146. ISBN 9781317523666. To make certain that this message would not remain buried in the pages of Mother Jones, Dowie announced the publication of "Pinto Madness" at a Washington, D. C. press conference attended by Ralph Nader.
• Rossow, Mark (2015). "Ethics: An Alternative Account of the Ford Pinto Case". Continuing Education and Development Inc. About the time that the Grimshaw trial began, Mother Jones magazine held a press conference in which Ralph Nader and author Mark Dowie announced an article entitled "Pinto Madness" forthcoming in the September/October 1987 issue. {{cite news}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
• Clinard, Marshall; Yeager, Peter (2011). Corporate Crime; Volume 1 of Law, Culture, and Society. Transaction Publishers. p. 85. ISBN 9781412815253. The process in the more serious voluntary recalls generally starts with consumer complaints and news stories, then proceeds to government investigation and testing, consumer group pressuring, resistance from the auto manufacturer, and an official finding of safety defect. The story of the Ford Motor Company's decision to recall 1.5 million of its 1971-1976 subcompact Pinto cars is illustrative.
• The Wall Street Journal. August 16, 1978. Ford made the decision this June, but the seed of the decision was planted a year ago. it was in August 1977 that Mother Jones, a magazine published in California, printed an article titled "Pinto Madness"; it portrayed the car as particularly susceptible to fires in rear-end crashes. The article was ballyhooed at a Washington press conference by Ralph Nader and its author, Mark Dowie. A flood of calls and letters from outraged or terrified Pinto owners descended on the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, which opened an investigation that was to last eight months. The agency first ran an engineering analysis of the Pinto, finding that the fuel tank's location and the structural parts around it permitted easy crashing or puncturing of the tank in a crash. Officials also found that the short fuel-tank filler pipe could easily pull away from the tank. There was "real potential for trouble," says Howard Dugoff, the agency's deputy administrator. "The design looked fishy." Then came crash-testing; a letter-writing tug-of-war; the issuance of an initial defect finding that cited reports of 38 such accidents, 27 deaths and 29 lawsuits or liability claims against Ford; the setting of a public hearing for last June 14; and, finally, two meetings between agency and Ford officials. On the basis of the two meetings, the safety officials deduced that Ford was willing to recall the Pinto and that it wanted to do so before a public hearing could generate additional damaging publicity. {{cite news}}: Missing or empty |title= (help)
• Schwartz, Gary T. (1990). "The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case" (PDF). Rutgers Law Review. 43: 1013–1068. In order to draw attention to the publication of a story that it believed was a political blockbuster, Mother Jones, which is edited in San Francisco, held a press conference in Washington, D. C., at which Mark Dowie, the article's author, was accompanied by Ralph Nader.
• Lee, M.T.; Ermann, M.D. (February 1999). "Pinto "Madness," a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1). Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity.
• Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. Several months before the article, Jack Anderson had written a column claiming that thousands of people were either killed or disfigured as a result of this poorly designed vehicle.

Additional reliable source references documenting a more nuanced telling of the run-up to the recall, beyond blaming Mother Jones, including the roles of the Nader press conference and the Center for Auto Safety, are available upon request. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 19:13, 21 March 2016 (UTC) NickCT, does this answer your question? Hugh (talk) 22:53, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Many of these appear to be prone to the same problem as other cites already present; the presume a problem that isn't actually statistically supported, and they also largely trace back to the same, discredited, primary sources. 19:21, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD:

Take a look at my question again; "Can you point to references which directly link Nader/Center for Auto Safety" (bolding for emphasis) to the recall. Look at the sources I provided you. They say things like -

"responding in part to the allegations in the Mother Jones article, the NHTSA initiated a formal defect investigation"

Do you see how the source makes a direct and clear link between the MJ article and the subsequent investigation?

Now look at your sources. Do any of your sources provide a direct and clear link between Nader and the investigation, or do they just say "Nader was at a press conference on the topic"?

The sources say that the MJ article directly led to the NHTSA investigation in a way that they do not say that Nader directly led to the NHTSA investigation.

Your problem is that you see the MJ as an "equal player" to things like Nader and consumer complaints. This simply doesn't appear to what the sources are saying. Many of the sources clearly identify the MJ article as being somewhat central in getting the whole thing started.

Again, we're not trying to demonize MJ. Sometimes there are articles that kick off scandals/controversies, right? Think Woodward and Bernstein and Watergate. We're not demonizing Woodward and Bernstein when we say they started the Watergate controversy, we're simply reflecting the important part their article played in history. NickCT (talk) 18:05, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

NickCT, thank you for your reply. The source you quote, which very significantly qualifies its statement of causality with the clause "in part," explicitly agrees with the consensus of reliable sources, that the NHTSA investigation had multiple causes. The NHTSA did not act directly, solely, on the basis of an at the time little-read magazine published in San Francisco; the Mother Jones article and other media coverage contributed to public awareness which led to letters which, along with reports of crashes, fires, deaths, and injuries, and petitions, contributed to motivating the NHTSA investigation; the main effect of the Mother Jones article was indirect through public awareness. Clinard and Yeager excerpted above offer us guidance in avoiding the pitfall of attributing the Ford Pinto recall or any major recall to any one factor. We may state the role of the Mother Jones article but we may not over-state the role of any one factor. Cullen excerpted above tell us the author of the Mother Jones article himself was aware of the relatively obscure mind share of his magazine and sought wider main stream media coverage via the key news conference with Ralph Nader and the Center for Auto Safety; Bob & Carl had a tad better pulpit than Dowie - Dowie had to call a Washington press conference with Ralph to get into the WaPo! If anything, the consensus of reliable sources is that the NHTSA was responding to the public. Meanwhile, currently our article says that certain specific things that the Mother Jones article said "forced" the NHTSA to investigate, which exceeds all sources. Thanks again. Hugh (talk) 18:48, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

"Many of the sources clearly identify the MJ article as being somewhat central in getting the whole thing started." Yes, the Mother Jones article was important, and we can easily say so; however, we may not over-state its importance. Cullen and Danley, excerpted below, point out that the Mother Jones article was elaborating a point of view and re-using attitude and even language from Jack Anderson from nine months earlier; it may be said Jack Anderson got things started. Some, writing retrospectively, disproportionately feature the Mother Jones article in order to displace the role of reports of crashes, deaths, and injuries, and consumer input, in support of a point of view tending to exonerate Ford and impugn the NHTSA, but we are not free to lift their point of view to Wikipedia voice. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 19:35, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - re "but we may not over-state the role of any one factor" - Sure. We can't say "the MJ article caused the recall". We don't and can't know that. What we do know is that the MJ article was a notable and significant event leading to the recall. We know it was a notable factor in leading to the investigation and recall because the sources note it directly in relation to the recall. And no, it wasn't the sole event, but I don't think the wording that we've been putting into the article suggests that it was the sole event. Only that it was an important and notable event.

Your point about MJ not being the first to talk about the Pinto is understood and granted. But that doesn't mean that the MJ article wasn't the article that kicked the issue into the limelight. If the Jack Anderson had been as or more important in highlighting the Pinto thing, why don't more sources point to Jackson Anderson as starting the whole debate? NickCT (talk) 02:14, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

NickCT, thank you for your replies. We are in substantial agreement on the due weight of the Mother Jones article. Thank you for your patience.

The Mother Jones article did not kick the Ford Pinto into the limelight, because Mother Jones simply did not have that kind of readership or subscriber-ship. If it had, Dowie would not have had to arrange a Washington press conference with Ralph Nader. The press conference kicked the Mother Jones article and the Ford Pinto into wide main stream media coverage.

• "Ford Pinto Scored in Coast Magazine on Peril from Fire". The New York Times. Associated Press. August 11, 1977. p. 15. A magazine says that Ford Motor Company sold Pinto cars for six years even though company officials knew that the car's fuel tank could easily rupture in rear-end crashes and casue fires. The article by Mark Dowie in Mother Jones, a West Coast publication circulated to 150,000 subscribers, said that the company had been eager to get the subcompact into production in 1970 and, as a result, had ignored test showing the car was dangerous.
• "Ford accused of selling car with bad tank". The Washington Post. August 11, 1977. The Ford Motor Co. manufactured and sold subcompact Pinto automobiles for six years after...its own crash tests showed the fuel tank could easily rupture and burn in rear-end collisions, a California-based magazine charged today. Mother Jones, the magazine, published by the Foundation for National Progress, of San Francisco, claims that Ford could have prevented at least 500 burn deaths by installing a $1 plastic baffle now on '77 models. Instead Ford lobbied vigorously against tightening of federal highway safety standards until it was forced to put the device on its newest models, according to Mark Dowie, general manager of the magazine and author of the article. Dowie said he obtained a Ford Co. internal memorandum that shows the company conducted a cost-benefit study of proposed modifications to the fuel system, and concluded that the benefit in terms of lives and property saved would be under $50 Million and the cost of changing the design would be $137 million....Nader, speaking at a Mother Jones news conference here yesterday, demanded Ford recall all 3 million Pintos...
• "U.S. INVESTIGATING FIRES IN SMALL AUTOS' TANKS". The New York Times. Associated Press. September 22, 1977. The initial charges were made in an article in the September-October issue of Mother Jones, a magazine based on the West Coast...Ralph Nader, the consumer advocate, supported the charges, saying "This is corporate callousness at the highest level," and that Ford should recall all three million Pintos.
• Benedict, Howard (September 22, 1977). "Fuel tank fires investigation begun by transportation unit". The Washington Post. Associated Press. The Transportation Department announced yesterday it has launched a major investigation of fuel tank fires in all subcompact cars sold in this country. The action follows charges by Ralph Nader and others that in past models of the Ford Pinto, the gasoline tanks were located in a hazardous position...The charges were made in the September-October issue of Mother Jones, a West Coast-based magazine with 150,000 subscribers...Consumer advocate Nader backed the article's charges, claiming, "This is corporate callousness at the highest level of Ford Motor Co." He said Ford should recall all three million Pintos with vulnerable fuel tanks.
• "Award in injury suit is over $127 million". The Globe and Mail. Toronto, Ontario. February 7, 1978. p. 10. Last August, Ford characterized as "distortions and half-truths" claims by consumer advocate Ralph Nader that the company knowingly permitted sale of Pintos with fuel tanks that would rupture in rear-end accidents. Mr. Nader had demanded investigations by Congress and the National Traffic Safety Board.

We agree the Anderson column shows that Mother Jones was not the first or only media coverage of Ford fire safety issues; it was not the sole cause of the Ford Pinto investigation, any more than the Mother Jones was. Thanks.

You wrote "I don't think the wording that we've been putting into the article suggests that it was the sole event" With this established mutual understanding, may we focus on one sentence of current article content which states the compelling causes of the NHTSA investigation? May I ask you to comment at WP:ORN#Compelling cause of 1977 NHTSA investigation of the Ford Pinto? I believe the one sentence of article content discussed there is an example of current article content that over-states sources on the role of the the Mother Jones article. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 02:48, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

HughDYour question has already been answered. The way the statements appear in Lee and Ermann make it clear the authors associate the two events. It's odd that you would include Lee and Ermann in your list of more nuanced MJ's descriptions since the quote in the article is a paraphrase of Lee and Ermann. Perhaps, rather than flooding the talk page you could actually propose new language and explain why you think it fits better. Also, since you pointed out that I've added more text to the talk page, yes, I added several long passages from Lee and Ermann and collapsed the quotes so they don't create a wall of text. I would encourage you to do the same. I would also point out that your "quote from Lee and Ermann" was very selective. You left out the next sentence. For those who don't want to read the through the long Lee and Ermann passage I quoted above to find the where you got the text, "Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity. NHTSA beliefs and procedures were similar to Ford's: not enough evidence existed to warrant a full defect investigation (Graham I 991). The Pinto had no "recallable" problem, even though people were dying in Pinto fires.

By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration.

Flooding the talk page with selected and out of context quotes doesn't exactly make a strong case. Please consider an alternative. Write what you think the passage in the article SHOULD say then explain why with quotes and evidence. If people say no, please accept it and move on. Springee (talk) 04:29, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - re "We agree the Anderson column shows that Mother Jones was not the first or only media coverage of Ford fire safety issues; it was not the sole cause of the Ford Pinto investigation, any more than the Mother Jones was." - So we do now agree that the MJ article and related Dowie conference was probably more important/notable in starting the controversy/scandal than the other articles (e.g. Anderson) you've mentioned? We agree on that b/c most of the sources we've looked at (including the ones you've provided) directly note the MJ article and not the other articles. NickCT (talk) 13:33, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

@NickCT:, thank you for your reply. We agree, the Anderson column is not the sole cause of the Ford Pinto investigation. There was no sole cause. Neither was the Mother Jones article, nor the press conference with Nader, nor the Mother Jones article and the press conference with Nader. The causes were complex. At the time, Mother Jones was not the award-winning, widely recognized independent investigative journalism outlet we know today. People were not rushing out to snatch up Mother Jones. They were not reading it online. It was not in most decent-sized public libraries like it is today. The main stream media articles that kicked this issue into public awareness feature Nader standing alongside Dowie, and quote Nader demanding a recall, not Mother Jones. Nader, Dowie, Mother Jones, and the Center for Auto Safety recognized an article in Mother Jones was not enough, they needed more publicity, and Nader knew how to get it, and they got it. Two days after Ford agreed to the recall, Mike Wallace went on 60 Minutes; it is clear that CBS and ABC and other main stream media were taking up the story and asking Nader, Grimshaw, Grimshaw's lawyers, Ford, DOT and NHTSA for interviews. The point being our article should not make the Mother Jones article too central to motivating the recall. Mother Jones brought this to public attention is overly simplistic, but is definitely a point of view favored by some writers, particularly those who prefer to discount the role of other factors, including main stream media, and of course the reports of crashes, fires, deaths, and injuries, and consumer complaints; the "rabble-rousing" motif. The Mother Jones article took an over-the-top tone and made some claims that made it easy to set up as a target for defenders of the lowly Pinto. For some "NHTSA was forced to investigate after a hippy magazine made some outrageous claims" is an alternative narrative to "NHTSA investigated after numerous reports and consumer complaints." Meanwhile, we currently have one sentence in our article that incorrectly paraphrases one source that claims three very specific things "forced" the investigation; focusing on content, may I ask again that you please review the discussion at WP:ORN and comment, there or here? Can we maybe get an edit proposal out of our efforts? Progress is slow but real, thank you again for your engagement and patience. Hugh (talk) 14:54, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - You're dancing around the question. You just keep to seem pointing to the fact that the sources don't call the MJ article the sole cause of the investigation. That's not the question. Quit repeating the same point over and over when no one is arguing it. You're making straw men again.

The simple question is, do sources more often emphasize the role of the MJ article in leading to the investigation/recall than they do other events/articles in leading to the investigation/recall? If the answer is yes, then we too can emphasize the role of MJ. B/c we're reflecting the sources.

re "definitely a point of view favored by some writers, particularly those who prefer to discount the role of other factors" - Ok. So you seem to agree that this POV is reflected in some sources, but now you're calling those sources biased. Really? Look at the two sources I sent you. They seem to be from neutral academic sources.

I've reviewed a lot of sources (some of which, you yourself have pointed to) now which emphasize/note the MJ article in the early part of this story. Is it really your position that all these sources are biased? Not that it really matters what you think. If the majority of sources say it, that's what we're going to say.

I understand your conspiracy theory about people trying to propose an "alternative narrative", and I understand why it might look that. Is it not just possible the alternative narrative here is the right one? Maybe the MJ article did play a major role in kicking off the scandal.

I'm not going to look at WP:ORN b/c it looks like forum shopping. We're not deciding on an edit proposal. We're deciding on whether you're going to be worked with or whether you will be marginalized. If you want to "make progress" and continue to be here, why don't you propose what you think is acceptable wording on how the MJ article led to public attention, which led to the NHTSA investigation, which led to the recall? NickCT (talk) 00:38, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

Bro, no one asked you to sort out which editors will be permitted to collaborate, thank you. Please focus on content. I don't talk to you like that. I am not the issue; we are discussing due weight and editorial direction and what sources say, thanks. Now, all sources are biased; all sources have POV; we need to be able to discuss sources, including the POV of sources, and I am not advancing a conspiracy theory when I simply describe the diverse points of view of various authors in sources, thank you; my goal is a neutral telling of the vast majority of the facts and events which are not controversial, not to select from among the many available POV. You asked after my position on the bias of sources; my position is our article is biased: from discussion I know you to have a grasp on the causes of the NHTSA investigation; we currently have a sentence in our article that is a very strong statement of the causality of the NHTSA investigation, it says that three very specific things compelled the NHTSA administration, two of which are very specific things the Mother Jones article said; may I ask you to please comment on the copy of the OR issue below on this talk page or the edit proposal below on this talk page? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 03:01, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

• Graham, John D. (1991). Huber, Peter W.; Litan, Robert E. (eds.). "Does liability promote the safety of motor vehicles?"". The Liability Maze: The Impact of Liability Rules on Innovation and Safety. Washington DC: Brookings Institution. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |1= (help)

All sources that cover the causes of the NHTSA investigation cover the Mother Jones article; forgive me for repeating myself, but Graham says "in part"; Graham also covers Ralph Nader, the 1974 Center for Auto Safety petition, media coverage of the Grimshaw trial, 60 Minutes, and 20/20. The googles is blocking me from reading pages 44-45 in Baura, sigh. Hugh (talk) 03:01, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

You asked for a proposal Mother Jones article -> public attention -> NHTSA investigation. Thanks for the question. Writing explicitly about the causality of historical events is dangerous. Our approach should be to cover all the noteworthy precedents leading up to the investigation, then trust our readers: the Mother Jones article, of course, say what it said, but also Jack Anderson, other media attention including 60 Minutes, 20/20 and the Grimshaw trial, both Center for Auto Safety petitions, the press conference, the reports of crashes, fires, deaths, and injuries the NHTSA said prompted the investigation. We express our best editorial judgment about what events most significant contributed to the investigation through our due weight; it is the Wikipedia way, after all. My position is we do not need, and we have no right to sort out the theories, and offer an explicit statement in Wikipedia voice that "the NHTSA investigated because..." of any one cause or any small set of causes. What do you think? Again, more progress, thanks. Hugh (talk) 03:01, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

NickCT, what do you think? Should we sort through the various points of view in sources and pick the best one to for our article, or should we collaborate on a neutral compilation of the vast majority of the facts and events which are not controversial, and treat the controversies subsequently? Thank you again for your engagement. Hugh (talk) 15:10, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

@HughD: - Actually, I have been asked, bro. How many people are going to have to tell you you're the problem here before you get that? Yes of course you're right that it's dangerous to talk about causality. Yes of course there were multiple causes. You're still skirting the fact that a significant number of sources point to the MJ article as causal. Once again, please give the exact wording you would think is appropriate to reflect the sources which point to the MJ article as a cause of the NTHSA investigation and subsequent recall. NickCT (talk) 05:00, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

NickCT, thank you for your reply. You asked "please give the exact wording you would think is appropriate to reflect the sources which point to the MJ article as a cause of the NTHSA investigation and subsequent recall" Forgive me, I don't know how to reply to your request without repeating myself, but perhaps rephrasing will help: The events that precipitated the investigation and recall, and the motivations of the NHTSA and Ford, are so complex in reliable sources as to require treatment in Wikipedia voice in a section; attempting to summarize the vast noteworthy reliable sources in one sentence is ill-advised, unnecessary, and non-neutral. In a "Subsequent analysis" section or some such, we may paraphrase the significant points of view of representative noteworthy commentators on their interpretation of the causality, from later decades, with in-text attribution to distinguish from Wikipedia voice. Hope this helps. Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 16:53, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

"a controversy over the safety of the Pinto arose during the 1970's" Certain aspects of the story were controversial; most notably, the interpretation of the "Ford Pinto memo," but overall, the vast majority of the facts and events are not controversial, and our article should say so: There were crashes, fires, injuries, lawsuits, press coverage, jury awards, a criminal prosecution, an NHTSA investigation, an NHTSA finding of defect, and a recall. Stuff happened. It's in RS. I know you will agree that our first priority in our project is neutrally conveying the facts and events. Hugh (talk) 17:50, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

The investigation took place before the Grimshaw lawsuit was in court. We have RSs stating that the NHTSA acted due to public pressure. Springee (talk) 18:05, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, what exactly are you trying to illustrate with this wall of text and citations? Lot's of words but you haven't said what we are supposed to get out of them. Springee (talk) 20:56, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

• HughD has created an impressive wall of text. It seems his core argument is that the article should not state or imply that "Pinto Madness" was the only reason why the NHTSA initiated a second look at the Pinto. I'm sure HughD will be happy to know the article doesn't say that. He will also be happy to know the connection between MJ and the NHTSA's actions was outlined by Schwartz and Lee and Ermann, the two most referenced scholarly works on this subject. Can you think of any reason why we shouldn't quote or reference their views on the subject given their preeminent place in the related scholarship? I would suggest you cut down your argument to some core statement, say no more than 3 paragraphs then set up an open RfC and get group feedback. The wall of text isn't working because no one is going to read it. Springee (talk) 19:59, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

You are the master, I am not worthy, I would need half again more bytes to catch you on this talk page. Hugh (talk) 21:43, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

• HughD, you commented above:

Some, writing retrospectively, disproportionately feature the Mother Jones article in order to displace the role of reports of crashes, deaths, and injuries, and consumer input, in support of a point of view tending to exonerate Ford and impugn the NHTSA,...

That certainly reads like WP:OR to me. Do you have any source that backs your claims? Springee (talk) 20:36, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Disclosure of Ford Pinto fire safety issue, The Washington Post December 30, 1976

Some editors are advancing a point of view in Wikipedia voice pinning the whole Pinto dust-up on that darn anti-capitalist Mother Jones. Mother Jones was not first or only.

• Cullen, Francis T.; Cavender, Gray; Maakestad, William J.; Benson, Michael L. (2014). Corporate Crime Under Attack: The Fight to Criminalize Business Violence. Routledge. p. 146. ISBN 9781317523666. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten were perhaps the first to claim that Ford, despite having the technology to do so, had consciously refused to fix the potentially lethal hazard posed by the placement of the Pinto's gas tank. They began their December 30, 1976, column in The Washington Post by claiming, "Buried in the secret files of the Ford Motor Co. lies evidence that big auto makers have put profits ahead of lives." This "lack of concern," they lamented, "has caused thousands of people to die or be horribly disfigured in fiery crashes." All this, they said, was preventable: "Secret tests by Ford have shown that minor adjustments in the location of the fuel tank could greatly reduce the fiery danger." Moreover, "repositioning of the tank would cost only a few dollars more per car" - not much of a price when human lives are at stake. "In the long run," they warned, "the auto makers are saving little with this 'cost cutting'" Nine months later, these criticisms were elaborated in Mark Dowie's scathing condemnation of Ford, called "Pinto Madness."

• Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. Several months before the article, Jack Anderson had written a column claiming that thousands of people were either killed or disfigured as a result of this poorly designed vehicle.

• Anderson, Jack; Whitten, Les (December 30, 1976). "Auto maker shuns safer gas tank". The Washington Post.

Thank you. Hugh (talk) 19:40, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

A classic example of begging the question, right in the header. As other discussion here as indicated, there is a substantial body of expert opinion that the "Ford Pinto fire safety issue" was at best an grotesque exaggeration, and at worst simply nonexistent. Anmccaff (talk) 20:23, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Yes, some experts disagree on the hazard, and we should cover the disagreement, after a neutral telling of the vast majority of the facts and events that are in substantial agreement in reliable sources. Though some sources adapt a "dispelling the myths" organization, we are not free to. Thanks. Hugh (talk) 20:31, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

• It is questionable if not dishonest to claim that "Some editors are advancing a point of view in Wikipedia voice pinning the whole Pinto dust-up on that darn anti-capitalist Mother Jones." That is certainly your OR. If you feel that is occurring then perhaps you should get a 3rd opinion or RSN review of the subject. Making such claims is certainly tendentious on your part. Springee (talk) 20:56, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Umm, no, HughD. No. Experts don't disagree much on the hazards, they agree they are rather close to other vehicles of its type. The folk who disagree generally aren't very expert, and objective standards make that clear. If someone claims that thousands died in fiery crashes, and is able to produce a handful of names to "prove" this, then describing them as "expert" is reaching a bit. Anmccaff (talk) 20:59, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

The NHTSA found a hazardous defect. The NHTSA is an expert on auto safety. Some agreed, some disagreed. In February on this talk page, a consensus was reached to treat retrospective opinions in a "Subsequent analysis" subsection established for this very purpose, a subsection sadly under-utilized to date as some editors persist in their idiosyncratic editorial position that Wikipedia should come out of the gate on this as if we were MythBusters or The Straight Dope. Hugh (talk) 22:44, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Several of the sources make it clear that at the time the NHTSA was not the expert on crash testing and the like. The agency was still in it's infancy as was the science of crash testing. Since you haven't specifically said which passages you are unhappy with it is hard for others to decide what your editorial intent happens to be. Springee (talk) 01:17, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

• For all the accusations in HughD's posts, it's not at all clear what he things is wrong with the current article. Please provide some passages, specific issues and how you think they should be changed. Springee (talk) 00:15, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

You are welcome to participate, but please do not shout. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 01:29, 22 March 2016 (UTC) Some of us are attempting to evaluate the due weight of the Mother Jones article in the our article's coverage of the causality of the NHTSA investigation and the Pinto recall, sorry if that is not clear to you from the thread's original post, above. Hugh (talk) 01:35, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Reasking the question: What passage do you think is problematic. What text do you have an issue with. Please provide examples from the article as it stands. So far you have just provided a wall of text and a vague complaint. Your failure to get to the point required bold text. Springee (talk) 01:38, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

HughD, ducking direct questions related to the article edits is listed as a WP:TEND behavior, "One who ignores or refuses to answer good faith questions from other editors". Springee (talk) 20:07, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

NOR Noticeboard discussion related to this article

HughD has posted a NOR related to this article. This is a NOR question that is clearly related to this article. Due to HughD's failure to notify the group I am posting a link and copy of the question here:

Link [6]

Question:

Article content:

Lee and Ermann said that the Mother Jones labeling of the Pinto as a "firetrap" and accusations that the NHTSA was buckling to industry pressure as well as the public interest created by sensationalized new stories "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."

Source:

Dowie's (1977) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration.

Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems 46 (1): 30–47.

Not directly related to the sourcing of this content, but for interest "Dowie's (1977) article" is:

Dowie, Mark (September 1977). "Pinto Madness". Mother Jones. Retrieved January 17, 2014.

Discussion

The source clearly says that public interest "forced" the second (1977) NHTSA investigation of the Ford Pinto. The contended content is a claim about what a source said about the motivation of actors in historical events, specifically the causes that compelled the NHTSA to investigate. The paraphrase of the source strays into original research by exceeding the claim of the source when it collapses two separate sentences. Yes, the Mother Jones (magazine) article called the Ford Pinto a "firetrap" (and this is covered in earlier article content); and yes, the Mother Jones article claimed the NHTSA was too lenient on the auto industry, but Lee and Ermann did not say that Mother Jones saying those things was what "forced" the investigation.

Does the article content constitute original research? Comments? Thank you in advance. Hugh (talk) 23:45, 20 March 2016 (UTC)

Comment are welcome here or at the noticeboard. Springee (talk) 17:33, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

Please join your colleagues in discussion in progress at WP:ORN#Compelling cause of 1977 NHTSA investigation of the Ford Pinto. Thank you! Hugh (talk) 17:49, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Forum shopping again? No thanks Greglocock (talk) 18:06, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

Do we have enough editors to ask for a lift of the article edit lock?

It seems we now have five active editors on this page. Is this enough to ask for a lift of the page lock? I think at this point we can discuss things as a group. What are the thoughts of others? Springee (talk) 20:59, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

The lock is necessary; more discussion is required; the lock should stay as long as we have tendentious editors who are unclear on fundamentals of Wikipedia editing including the distinction on Wikipedia between facts and events and opinions and interpretations. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 22:49, 21 March 2016 (UTC)

I'm sorry that you are unclear on the fundamentals of Wikipedia. Springee (talk) 00:17, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

We can probably lift the lock. We're going to have tendentious editors until HughD chooses to go away.

HughD - Seriously dude. Springee and I don't see eye-to-eye on some of the points in this article. The difference between us and you is that User:Springee and I seem willing to calmly discuss our differences and seek compromise.

Tone it down. Maybe you can join us. NickCT (talk) 18:11, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

If two more editors agree that we have enough active editors to lift the lock I will put in the request. With just two editors it's hard for admins to identify the source of a disruption. It becomes he said, she said and it's the reason why the article was locked vs an editor sanctioned. However, if there are 4-5 active editors then I think the group can discuss and veto the actions of one and lodge a stronger ANI if need be. Springee (talk) 20:03, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

In the 10 days since the lock, not a single edit has been proposed at talk that achieved consensus and was incorporated into the article, strongly suggesting a lack of consensus, that additional dialog is required, and that lifting the lock would be premature. Admins will look for one or more proposed edits achieving talk page consensus through discussion. Why don't you express your support for one of the above proposed edits or propose an edit as per WP:EDITREQ? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 21:06, 22 March 2016 (UTC)

More distortions from HughD. Nobody has challenged my review of the frozen article, indeed an admin has started to work on them. So in fact there are several edits which have been proposed and one assumes consensed if only by silence. As I requested I would like a breathing space once the lock comes off to actually implement those suggestions. Greglocock (talk) 00:25, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Greglocock, thank you for your review. May I respectfully ask you to provide diffs of your proposed edits you refer to which have been implemented in the article during the page lock? Who is the administrator you refer to as implementing your proposed edits? Also, would you please propose specific edits, with sufficient detail that an administrator might implement them, for comment? Please see WP:Edit requests. Consensus on even one edit would show progress. Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 01:22, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Hugh, while I understand that Greglocock's 50+ edits per day were problematic, I think with a larger group of editors we can work together to handle any edits he tries to force on the article without consensus. Springee (talk) 01:39, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Silly Hugh can't even do a diff to find out the name of the admin who has implemented changes to the article without Hugh's permission. No Hugh, i am not going to waste my time doing your bidding. Greglocock (talk) 04:58, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

What changes? Posting deliberately misleading claims on an article talk page is a serious violation of talk page behavior guidelines. Hugh (talk) 15:11, 23 March 2016 (UTC) Since the edit lock, there has been one (1) edit to the article, a correction to a verb tense. What am I missing? I can't find the efforts of an administrator to implement your proposed edits you describe. Please help. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:17, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Despite your logorrhea your grasp of English is shoddy. Lies is not a tense of lives it is a different word entirely. You said " not a single edit has been proposed at talk that achieved consensus and was incorporated into the article" yet I demonstrated that one edit has in fact been made, thereby demonstrating your statement was false, if we accept silence as consensus which is what I proposed.Greglocock (talk) 20:59, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for proposing the typographic revision, but not sure kicking back and waiting for an admin to implement your proposals will help us demonstrate consensus so the edit lock can be lifted. Have you had a chance to look at WP:EDITREQ? We are asked to prepare our proposals in sufficient detail that our colleagues can express support and then an uninvolved administrator might be able to apply the edit. Will you please participate? Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 21:11, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

More timewasting from the king of time wasters. I shall edit this article as I see fit, thank you. That has worked well for many years.Greglocock (talk) 22:51, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

"...breathing space once the lock comes off..." The edit lock changes very little; with the edit lock, we need to achieve consensus for edits, and without the edit lock, we need to achieve consensus for edits. The only thing different is the relatively minor issue of the mechanics of applying the consensus edit in article space. Springee and Greglocock, do I understand from your comments here, that you do not intent to participate in the process described at WP:EDITREQ, preferring instead argue for an unlock, or to wait out the edit lock, and to demand the community confer on you exclusive rights to edit the article? Hugh (talk) 15:07, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Don't try and foretell my actions HughD. I have been editing wiki long enough to know how to edit an article. You on the other hand seem inclined to waste everybody's time and energy. I don't remember having to work with a worse editor than you. Thanks for nothing. Greglocock (talk) 21:06, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

We are all volunteers, my good colleague, do what you want, but I ask again that you join in collaborating at article talk. The edit lock is scheduled until 14 April or until disputes are resolved. If by April 14 we have not managed to achieve consensus on even a very few edits, the edit lock may be extended. Please advance one of your proposals as per WP:EDITREQ. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:00, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

(Personal attack removed) Hugh (talk) 16:29, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

The uninvolved editor will note that this section invoked begins "There is no official policy regarding when or whether most personal attacks should be removed, although it has been a topic of substantial debate." i.e., HughD is assuming a policy agrees with him, rather than actually read it. At least, that's the more charitable assumption. Anmccaff (talk) 16:46, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Proposed edit: move point-of-view, fix original research

Current article content

Subsection Ford Pinto#NHTSA_investigation

Lee and Ermann said that the Mother Jones labeling of the Pinto as a "firetrap" and accusations that the NHTSA was buckling to industry pressure as well as the public interest created by sensationalized new stories "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."

Source

• Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)

Dowie's (1977) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration.

Proposed edit

1. Move 1999 commentary and 1999 reference to subsection Ford_Pinto#Subsequent_analysis as per February talk page consensus at Talk:Ford_Pinto#Sectioning_Compromise.3F; and
2. Repair original research as per WP:OR.

In 1999 Lee and Ermann said that public interest generated by the 1977 Mother Jones article "forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that the NHTSA would be under the microscope for its duration."

Discussion

— Preceding unsigned comment added by HughD (talk • contribs) 12:00, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

• Oppose moving content: When the article is written does not dictated chronological placement in the article. A retrospective would be discussions regarding how this event shaped future events, lawsuits, corporate practices etc. It does not apply to a description of the events as they occurred.

• Oppose proposed change to content: Not an improvement and tries to downplay a view that is clear in many reliable sources. Springee (talk) 18:31, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your comment. The content has only one reference. The one reference does not support the content as stated. Do you have additional references that will rescue what appears to be a poor paraphrase bordering on original research? Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 21:15, 23 March 2016 (UTC)

You are most welcome. The specific paraphrase is attributed to Lee and Ermann hence your request for other sources would be inappropriate. I did include other sources in other sentences. As for the I felt that including a near 2 page quote was a bit much so I just included the most important sentence. It seems you are hung up on "sensationalized". OK. How would you try to incorporate L&E's comment that "Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not. For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored."? The numbers that were exaggerated resonated with the public but the numbers that turned out to be historically accurate did not. "Sensationalized" is one way of phrasing that. Do you have an alternative word which you feel is more neutral? I would be OK with a direct quote (not the neutered quote you proposed) and the inclusion of the italicized quote as well. Alternatively, if you can come up with a alternative word for "sensationalized", a word that makes it clear that the doom and gloom claims that later turned out to not be true, were widely reported and accepted. What about "articled with greatly exaggerated fatality claims"? That one we can surely support via the source. Springee (talk) 03:28, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

The collapsed section below contains an extended version of the quote for added context. The sentence above is indicated for reference.

Long quote from Lee and Ermann article

Technical Core Beliefs and Actions (1967-1973) To explain what employees in Ford's technical core subunits believed, when they believed it, and how corporate structures influenced them to communicate and act on their beliefs, we separate design from marketing stages. During the design stage ( 1967-1970), Ford technical core employees did not view their actions as taking calculated risks with consumers' lives. Even Harley Copp, the outspoken Ford safety whistle-blower, never asserted that informed Ford participants believed the car was unsafe. Furthermore, they were not thinking about potential lawsuits when making design decisions (Feaheny 1997; Gioia 1996). And they did not refuse to correct perceived problems because settling lawsuits would be cheaper (NHTSA C7-38; Strobel1980). Although technical core work groups were not informed by explicit cost-benefit analyses (we explain these analyses below), they did recognize that unavoidable cost and time constraints make safety trade-offs inevitable for all product designs (see Lowrance 1976). For the auto industry, with its long history of subordinating safety to styling (Eastman 1 984; Nader 1965), implicit safety compromises were particularly common. In the Pinto case, Lee Iacocca and others wanted to compete with foreign imports with a car that weighed less than 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000 (Camps 1997; Dowie 1977; Strobel1980). Other car manufacturers were building cars under similar or more stringent guidelines (Davidson 1983 ). Commentators on the Pinto case (writing in a later era with different beliefs) assume that fuel tank leakage in rear end-crash tests must have alarmed both engineers and managers. They didn't, because the tests were not sufficiently convincing at the time (or even today). Crash tests during that era were novel procedures. Both the auto industry and NHTSA were more concerned with the reliability and validity of the tests than with safety data generated by a particular car's tests. Harold MacDonald, the engineer in charge of the Pinto's design, and every other engineer charged with interpreting crash-test data at the time-all of whom whistleblower Harley Copp considered "safety-conscious individuals" (Strobel 1980:183)-doubted that the tests accurately represented real-world conditions (Feaheny 1997). After all, they reasoned, a car slamming backwards into a wall at twenty to thirty miles per hour in a crash test is only a rough approximation of a real-world car-to-car crash. Results that seemed "troubling" (Schwartz 1991:1028) to later writers seemed less problematical at the time and were neutralized by participants' background assumptions about small cars and crashworthiness. NHTSA validated the engineers' skepticism by asking the auto industry to help develop reliable and cost-effective ways to approximate real-world conditions (Strobel1980). Thus, engineers in the design stage were still trying "to find out how to conduct crash tests" (Feaheny 1997; see also Lacey 1986:613). For example, an internal Pinto test report dated November, 1970 listed as its objective "To develop a test procedure to be used to provide baseline data on vehicle fuel system integrity" (NHTSA C7-38-Al.5, Final Test Report #T- 0738). In this test, a Pinto sedan exhibited "excessive fuel tank leakage" when towed rearward into a fixed barrier at 21.5 miles per hour, considered roughly equivalent to a car-to-car impact at 35 miles per hour. Nothing in this, or any other, Ford test report indicates that participants felt cause for concern or organizational action. Although some Ford engineers were not especially pleased, they felt that the data were inconclusive or the risks acceptable (Feaheny 1997; Strobel 1980), or they kept their concerns to themselves (Camps 1997). Some felt that cars would rarely be subjected to the extreme forces generated in a fixed-barrier test in real-world collisions (Feaheny 1997; Devine 1996). NHTSA apparently agreed and ultimately replaced the proposed fixedbarrier test with a less-stringent moving-barrier test in its final standard (U.S. Department of Transportation 1988). Occupational caution encouraged engineers to view many design adjustments that improved test performance as "unproven" in real-world accidents (Devine 1996; Feaheny 1997; Schwartz 1991; Strickland 1996; Strobel 1980). Engineers, who typically value "uncertainty avoidance" (Allison 1971:72 ), chose to stick with an existing design rather than face uncertainties associated with novel ones (Devine 1996; Strobel 1980). One series of tests, for instance, showed that Pintos equipped with pliable foam-like gas tanks would not leak in 30 mile-per-hour crashes. But some engineers feared that such a tank might melt and disagreed with others who felt it was safer than the existing metal design (Devine 1996, see also Strobel 1980). Other engineers believed that rubber bladders improved performance in tests, but anticipated problems under real-world conditions (Strobel 1980). 3 Ford whistle-blower Harley Copp's argument-that the Pinto would have been safer had its gas tank been placed above the axle rather than behind it-is often cited in Pinto narratives as an example of safety being sacrificed to profits, or at least trunk space, in the design stage (Cullen, Maakestad and Cavender 1987; Dowie 1977; Strobel1994). Yet Copp did not reach this conclusion until1977 (Strobel1980). And other engineers were considerably less certain about it, even though the above-the-axle design did perform better in one set of crash tests. The engineer overseeing the Pinto's design, Harold MacDonald (whose father died in a fuel tank fire when his Model A Ford exploded after a frontal collision with a tree), felt that the above-theaxle placement was less safe under real-world conditions because the tank was closer to the passenger compartment and more likely to be punctured by items in the trunk (Strobel1980). Additionally, after making a judgment that the Pinto was acceptably safe, most participants readily devalued subsequent competing definitions (Feaheny 1997). Lou Tubben, an engineer Nwith a genuine concern for safety" (Dowie 1977:23), did not press his concerns until1971-after the car's release. Frank Camps (1981, 1997), another concerned engineer, did not formally object to the Pinto's windshield and frontal-impact fuel tank design problems until1973, and never objected to rear-end fuel tank integrity. Tom Feaheny (1997) was worried about the lack of safety glass on all Ford models, and viewed the Pinto gas tank as a "nonissue" by comparison. In sum, the design stage was not characterized by an engineering consensus that the Pinto was Nunsafe." The value of crash tests was unclear. The Pinto's specific "problem" (e.g., frontal fuel tank integrity, safety glass) varied among those few engineers troubled by the car's safety performance. A "safe" placement of the gas tank was not identified, and the safety value of potential design changes was subject to disagreement. Additionally, engineers believed that the crash test performance of other small cars, particularly imports, was "terrible" (Feaheny 1997). Given this background and the host of other safety issues confronting engineers as a result of the recently passed MVSA, it is not surprising that many Pinto engineers and their family members (e.g., the chief systems engineer's wife) drove Pintos (Strobel1980). In the design stage (1967-1970), no company or government standard on rear-end fuel tank integrity existed to guide the engineers, but their actions were consistent with the takenfor- granted, industry-wide tradition of building lower levels of crashworthiness into small cars. This situation changed in the marketing stage (post 1970). Shortly after the 1971 model year Pintos were released, Ford adopted an internal20 mile-per-hour moving barrier standard for the 1973 model year-the only manufacturer to do so (Gioia 1996; Strobel 1994). The extant legal/regulatory environment reinforced engineers' beliefs that this standard was Nquite reasonable" since it was the "same one recommended at that time by the federal General Services Administration; the Canadian equivalent of the GSA; the Society of Automotive Engineers; and a private consulting firm hired by NHTSA ... " and by NHTSA itself in 1969 (Strobel 1980:205). This standard would constrain future debates by certifying the Pinto as "safe" to Ford's subunit charged with evaluating potential recallable safety problems. Most Ford technical core personnel became less involved with Pinto safety during the marketing stage. One exception was Dennis Gioia, who began a new job in another part of Ford's technical core in the summer of 1972. A self-described Mchild of the '60s," Gioia ( 1992:379) hoped to change an industry he saw as insensitive to safety concerns. Within one year, this inexperienced recent MBA graduate was promoted to Field Recall Coordinator and charged with coordinating all active safety recall campaigns and identifying potential safety problems. Thus Ford had at least one individual in its technical core with the inclinations and authority, though little experience or organizational power, for taking a stand on the Pinto gas tank issue. When Gioia became Recall Coordinator, he inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related. As with most jobs, the enormous workload required him to use Mstandard operating procedures" (SOPs) to organize and manage information for decision making (d. Kriesberg 1976:1102). SOPs increase organizational efficiency by operating as cognitive scripts that transform decision-making opportunities into largely predetermined action patterns. Existing SOPs required that, to be "recallable," problems needed either high frequency or a directly traceable causal link to a design defect. When reports began to trickle in to Gioia that Pintos were "lighting up" in relatively low speed accidents, and after viewing the burned wreckage of a Pinto, he initiated a meeting to determine if this represented a recallable problem. His work group voted unanimously not to recall the Pinto because the weak data did not meet SOP criteria (Gioia 1996). The work group was unaware of any cost-benefit analyses or Pinto crash test results. Reports of Pinto fires continued to trickle in, and eventually Gioia did become aware of, and concerned about, the crash test results. Again he wondered if the Pinto had a recallable problem, so he initiated a second meeting to convince his co-workers that crash tests showed a possible design flaw. But others again saw no design flaws-after all, the Pinto met internal company standards, and no contradictory external standard existed. The work group conceived the tank leak "problem" not as a defect, but as a fundamental and unalterable design feature: the car's small size, the use of light metals, and unibody construction produced a tendency for Pintos (and others in its class) to "crush up like an accordion" in rear-end collisions (Gioia 1996). In light of what they believed, work group members felt they would become the "laughing stock" of the company if they recommended a recall (Gioia 1996). But fear of ridicule did not motivate their vote. They doubted a recall's legitimacy, or its chances of approval. NHTSA's Role In The Landmark Narrative We now consider NHTSA's often contradictory contribution to the Pinto landmark narrative. Two issues are of primary importance: the selection of the Pinto for recall and NHTSA's use of cost-benefit analysis. NHTSA ultimately recalled the Pinto, but this outcome was far from predictable given the agency's record on the issue of fuel tank integrity. NHTSA's top administrator even testified on behalf of Ford in the Pinto's criminal trial (Strobel 1980). While NHTSA's actions appear Mrational" from a distance, like Ford's they were the product of compromise, conflicting organizational interests and routines, and environmental pressures and constraints. Before we examine NHTSA's actions concerning the Pinto, some background is necessary. Most accidents involve multiple factors contributing to the crash itself or the resulting death and injury. In detailed studies of specific accidents (see NHTSA C7-38), NHTSA employees made numerous recommendations for tougher standards regarding driver behavior (e.g., drunk driving laws), road safety (e.g., guardrails), and vehicle design (e.g., airbag standards). Outside parties (e.g., consumer groups, insurance companies, state government agencies) lobbied NHTSA to take action on particular problems. Therefore, deciding which problems to address was far from clear, given the blizzard of information and cross-pressures (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). Following two fuel tank burn deaths when a large truck rear-ended a Pinto in 1976, for instance, Pennsylvania's Bureau of Traffic Engineering pleaded with NHTSA for tougher truck braking standards, not auto fuel tank integrity standards. As early as 1968, the year of its creation, NHTSA had attempted to adopt a fuel tank integrity standard. The specifics of the standard were subject to much disagreement. In addition to dealing with industry claims that NHTSA's fuel tank integrity proposals would prove ineffective, NHTSA had to son through a fog of ambiguous data on vehicle fires. An Insurance Institute for Highway Safety study (NHTSA C7-38), for instance, reported that only 72 (out of a sample of 1,923) fires in 1973 resulted from collisions. Of these 72 fires, only 24 originated in the fuel tank-most began in the engine compartment and were caused by electrical shorts. Additionally, a number of factors affected the likelihood of vehicle fires, including make and age of the vehicle. The Pinto landmark narrative describes unique design features that purportedly made the Pinto less crashwonhy than other cars: for example, bolts on the differential housing and a fuel filler pipe that easily pulled out in collisions. Yet these same issues had been identified much earlier with other cars. For example, a 1970 NHTSA report (C7-38), along with a 1968 Society of Automotive Engineers report, found that pre-1967 Ford sedans exhibited "gross fuel spillage [in crash tests] arising out of the detachment of the filler spout" and tank punctures caused by a "poorly located track-bar bolt." NHTSA did not recall these cars to fix this acceptable risk. Forcing a "Voluntary" Recall In September, 1974, NHTSA crash-tested a number of vehicles, including the Pinto, Mto verify the [Department of Transportation's] rear-end moving barrier procedure ... " (NHTSA C7-38). Several cars, including the Pinto, exhibited significant fuel loss in 30 mile-per-hour tests. A 1969 Plymouth station wagon exhibited a Msteady flow of fuel." Like the Ford crash- test reports discussed above, NHTSA's report expressed neither shock nor concern, concluding only that "The tests indicated that the procedure would produce repeatable test results." None of the cars were subjected to follow-up studies or recall proceedings. 5 Also in 1974, Ralph Nader's Center for Auto Safety asked NHTSA to investigate Pinto fuel tank integrity. NHTSA beliefs and procedures were similar to Ford's: not enough evidence existed to warrant a full defect investigation (Graham I 991). The Pinto had no "recallable" problem, even though people were dying in Pinto fires. By 1977, the social context had changed. Dowie's (1977:18) article had labeled the Pinto a "firetrap" and accused the agency of buckling to auto-industry pressure. Public interest generated by the article forced a second Pinto investigation and guaranteed that NHTSA would be under a microscope for its duration. NHTSA engineer Lee Strickland was assigned to determine if Pinto (and Chevrolet Vega) tank problems warranted a mandatory recall. Strickland's work group held the Pinto and Vega to a higher standard than other cars (Strickland 1996). It dispensed with the usual moving barrier. Instead, it intentionally selected a large and particularly rigid "bullet car" to hit the Pinto's rear end. It weighed down the bullet car's nose to slide under the Pinto and maximize gas tank contact. It also turned on the bullet car's headlights to provide a ready source of ignition. And it completely filled gas tanks in both cars with gasoline rather than the non-flammable Stoddard fluid normally used. Strickland justified these actions as approximating real-world worst-case circumstances (Davidson 1983; NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). For NHTSA, the tests seemed an unqualified success: two 1972 Pintos burst into flame upon impact. In the summer of 1978 NHTSA announced that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, leading to the largest recall campaign in automobile history at that time (NHTSA C7-38; Strickland 1996). Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall 1971-1976 Pintos. Other small cars sold during the 1 970s were not recalled, even though most were comparable, or in the case of the AMC Gremlin probably less safe (Schwartz 1991; NHTSA C7-38; Swigert and Farrell 1980- 81:180). Their manufacturers successfully defended them as acceptable risks (see Wallace 1978). When we asked why NHTSA forced a Pinto recall for failing the 35 mile-per-hour test, although most small cars could not withstand such a test, Strickland ( 1996) analogized that, "Just because your friends get away with shoplifting, doesn't mean you should get away with it too." Selection of the Pinto Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not (e.g., Davidson 1983; Epstein 1980). For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths (1977:18) was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths (NHTSA C7-38; Frank 1985) was ignored. A transmission problem that also caused 27 Pinto deaths (and 180 on other Ford products [Clarke 1988]) never became a social problem. Similarly, publics accepted claims of safety errors leveled by Harley Copp, a Ford engineer who was apparently overseas when early crucial decisions were made (Camps 1997; Strobel 1980), but ignored other safety-conscious Pinto engineers who believed windshield retention was a more important safety problem (Camps 1997), and lack of safety glass caused more deaths (Feaheny 1997). Ford's cost-benefit analysis, a normal product of an interorganizational network, also facilitated the selection of the Pinto for inordinate attention. The year Ford sent the Grush/Saunby document to NHTSA (thus making it available to outside audiences), General Motors conducted a similar cost-benefit analysis (Nader and Smith 1996). Like Grush/Saunby, this analysis used the government's $200,000 figure as the value of a human life. Unlike Grush/Saunby, which addressed static rollover for all cars and light trucks, the GM analysis looked specifically at rearend collisions on its own cars. These facts suggest that GM would have made a better target for Dowie's analysis, but the GM document did not enter the public record until 1988. Contingencies led to the identification of Ford as deviant, while other auto makers escaped scrutiny. By the time of its Pinto investigation, NHTSA had essentially abandoned its original mission of forcing industry-wide safety improvements, in favor of investigating and recalling specific cars (Mashaw and Harfst 1990). NHTSA had two primary incentives in reinforcing the extant Nfocal organization" imagery of the Pinto narrative. First, NHTSA was pressured by specific organizations in its network (e.g., the Center for Auto Safety) and members of the public (see NHTSA C7-38) to take action on the Pinto's gas tank. Second, other network actors (e.g., courts, the Nixon administration, the auto industry) had increasingly limited NHTSA's ability to address systemic auto safety issues.

Are we in agreement the current article content is not a good paraphrase? The current article content is a very strong statement explicitly specifying three factors as together the compelling cause of the NHTSA investigation of the Pinto. The current article content claims that three things "forced" the NHTSA to investigate the Pinto:

1. The Mother Jones article saying the Pinto was a firetrap;
2. The Mother Jones article saying the NHTSA was lenient on automakers; and
3. public interest created by sensationalized new stories

Meanwhile, the source says only that "public interest generated by the article forced..." I do not find support for the first two of these three factors as "forcing" the investigation anywhere in Lee & Ermann. I believe we should restrict ourselves to carefully summarizing noteworthy reliable sources. A reasonably accurate paraphrase of the source is proposed. The reasons why the NHTSA investigated are sufficiently complex that it is ill advised to attempt any summarization of the causes of the NHTSA investigation in one or even a few sentences, in our facts and events section, even if attributed in-text and not in Wikipedia voice. I would look forward to collaborating on summarizing Lee and Ermann's from 1999, and others', main views in the "Subsequent analysis" subsection. May I respectfully suggest our approach should be that our article quote the Mother Jones death claims in the context of the Mother Jones article, and quote the NHTSA number in the context of the finding of defect notice to Ford, and trust our readers to see the difference, and in case anyone doesn't get it, paraphrase Lee and Ermann 1999 analysis highlighting the discrepancy in the "Subsequent analysis" section; embracing the editorial principles of facts first, and when sources differ we include the difference. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 05:34, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

No, we are not in agreement that it's a poor paraphrase. Springee (talk) 10:15, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

If the current article content is a reasonable paraphrase of reliable sources, do you have reliable sources that say that the NHTSA investigation was the result of three things, two of which were the Mother Jones article calling the Pinto a "firetrap" and the Mother Jones article saying the NHTSA was lenient on automakers? Thanks. Hugh (talk) 14:35, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

• Support as proposer. This sentence is the single most significant problem sentence in the current article content, since it misleads our readers. The content is sourced to one academic journal article, with in-text attribution, but the paraphrase of the source in our article is not supported by the source or any other source. The sentence is an overly-strong claim explicitly identifying a unreasonably small set of three very specific factors which alone compelled the NHTSA to investigate the Pinto. No source says that Mother Jones calling the Pinto a "firetrap" forced the NHTSA to investigate and no source says that Mother Jones saying that the NHTSA was lenient on automakers forced the NHTSA to investigate. The vast majority of reliable sources are in substantial agreement that the precedent events and the reasons why the NHTSA investigated the Pinto are numerous and diverse. The paraphrase currently in the article so far exceeds the claims of the cited source, and all other sources, so as to constitute original research. Fixing it is an editorial priority with this article. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 14:41, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
• Oppose - Fairly clear WP:NPOV issues. NickCT (talk) 05:13, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your comment. The above proposed edit is intended to correct an inaccurate paraphrase currently in our article. May I respectfully ask, do you know of reliable sources that support the current article content? May I request that you clarify the neutrality issues you perceive with the proposed edit? Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 16:23, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

What goes in the subsequent analysis section

I wouldn't think that this is something that needs to be explained but one editor seems to disagree. Material that discusses how this case impacted future events, legislation, etc or information that looks back at the Pinto's performance now that the car is largely off the road would be subsequent. An article, written years later but discussing why choices were made or actions taken at the time is best included in the associated sections of the article. This material does not need to be dated in the article. So long as it is cited readers can find the date themselves. Thus a statement that the NHTSA was under considerable political pressure to act would be in the NHTSA investigation section. Similarly, statements by a NHTSA engineer explaining how and why he performed a crash test is not subsequent even if the interview was years after the fact. Subsequent material should be information that looks at the way this case impacted the future or information that is retrospective in view. For example, a statement by Schwartz looking at the car's overall safety record such as the one below would be "subsequent" (though the NHTSA's finding of 27 deaths from 1971-1978 would be at the time):

From what I have been able to learn, as for safety the Pinto was a car that was neither admirable nor despicable. Its overall fatality rate was roughly in the middle of the subcompact range; its record was better than the subcompact average with respect to fatalities-with-fire; yet for the quite small category of fatalities with rear-end-fire, its design features apparently gave it a worse than-average record.

Looking at how the Pinto legal cases framed the public's understanding or misunderstanding of cost benefit analysis with respect to injury/death risks or how the Pinto case, and the Memeo in particular, has become widely quoted but frequently even in academic articles is retrospective. Springee (talk) 10:56, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

Proposed edit: fatality numbers and subsequent commentary on public impact

Add to the Mother Jones article paragraph, after the sentence that begins "In September, 1977 Mother Jones magazine said...":

The Mother Jones article said "By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as high as 900."

Add to the NHTSA investigation paragraph, after "On May 8, 1978 the NHTSA informed Ford of their determination that the Pinto fuel system was defective.":

The NHTSA said the basis for the investigation was allegations, raised at the August 10, 1977 Washington press conference, that the Pinto fuel tank was vulnerable to damage in low and moderate speed rear end collisions. The NHTSA compiled reports from consumers, Ford, and the Canadian Ministry of Transport and found 38 Pinto rear-end collisions with fuel tank damage, fuel leakage, or fire, resulting in 27 fatalities and 24 non-fatal burn injuries.

Add to the "Subsequent analysis" section:

In 1999 Lee and Ermann said that the public accepted the fatality estimates from the 1977 Mother Jones article while ignoring the fatality statistics reported by the NHTSA in 1978.

Sources

• Dowie, Mark (September 1977). "Pinto Madness". Mother Jones. Retrieved January 17, 2014. By conservative estimates Pinto crashes have caused 500 burn deaths to people who would not have been seriously injured if the car had not burst into flames. The figure could be as high as 900.
• Investigative Report: Alleged Fuel Tank and Filler Neck Damage in Rear-end Collisions of Subcompact Cars Passenger Cars, 1971-1976 Ford Pinto, 1975-1976 Mercury Bobcat (PDF) (Report). Office of Defects Investigation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. May 1978. Retrieved March 5, 2016. In total the NHTSA is aware of 38 cases in which rear-end collisions of Pinto vehicles have resulted in fuel tank damage, fuel system leakage and/or ensuing fire. These cases have resulted in a total of 27 fatalities sustained by Pinto occupants, of which one is reported to have resulted from impact injuries. In addition, 24 occupants of these Pinto vehicles have sustained non-fatal burn infujuries
• Jones, William H. (June 10, 1978). "Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Small Cars. Ford Recalls 1.5 Million Pintos, Bobcats, Pintos, Bolcats Face Alteration To Cut Fire Risk". The Washington Post. Retrieved March 4, 2016. Last month, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration said it had received reports of 38 fires, with 27 fatalities and 24 non-fatal burns, resulting from rear-end collisions with Pintos.
• Lee, Matthew T; Ermann, M. David (Feb 1999). "Pinto "Madness" as a Flawed Landmark Narrative: An Organizational and Network Analysis". Social Problems. 46 (1): 30–47. Beginning in the late 1970s, claims consistent with "Pinto Madness" readily gained public acceptance, but credible contradictory claims did not. For instance, Dowie's "conservative" estimate of 500 deaths was accepted, while NHTSA's report that it could document only 27 Pinto fire-related deaths was ignored. {{cite journal}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)

(All 4 sources are already in use in the article.)

Discussion

Comments? Hugh (talk) 16:12, 24 March 2016 (UTC)

• Oppose Springee (talk) 02:48, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

Please elaborate. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 03:19, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

• Support as proposer. The proposed content is well-referenced WP:RS and all four sources are already in use in our article. The proposed content is three sentences, one a direct quote and the other two very straight-forward neutral paraphrases of the source. The clear consensus of reliable sources is that the Mother Jones article had a noteworthy role in the NHTSA investigation of the Pinto, so saying what the Mother Jones article said is due weight WP:DUE. The clear consensus of reliable sources is that the NHTSA finding of defect report delivered to Ford had a noteworthy role in the recall of the Pinto, so saying what the NHTSA said is due weight. In the decades that followed, the Ford Pinto recall was analyzed by investigative journalists, engineers, ethicists, lawyers, and sociologists. Some noteworthy subsequent analysis noted the discrepancy between the fatality estimates of the Mother Jones article and the NHTSA. Briefly summarizing what Lee and Ermann and others said about the discrepancy between the fatality estimates of the Mother Jones article and the NHTSA article is due weight. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:02, 25 March 2016 (UTC)
• Oppose - Proposer needs to be topic banned. NickCT (talk) 05:12, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Your comment is inappropriate on this article talk page; please focus on content WP:FOC, WP:TPG. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 16:12, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Proposed edit: add 30 December 1976 Jack Anderson Washington Post column

Add one sentence with four references before the sentences on the Mother Jones article in the Ford Pinto#NHTSA investigation subsection:

Among the first public attention to the fire safety of Ford automobiles was December 30, 1976 when columnist Jack Anderson and investigative journalist Les Whitten writing in The Washington Post said that Ford testing had revealed a fire hazard posed by the placement of the fuel tank behind the rear axle in some Ford models, and that "thousands" had died or been disfigured in fires after crashes.

References

• Cullen, Francis T.; Cavender, Gray; Maakestad, William J.; Benson, Michael L. (2014). Corporate Crime Under Attack: The Fight to Criminalize Business Violence. Routledge. p. 146. ISBN 9781317523666. Jack Anderson and Les Whitten were perhaps the first to claim that Ford, despite having the technology to do so, had consciously refused to fix the potentially lethal hazard posed by the placement of the Pinto's gas tank. They began their December 30, 1976, column in The Washington Post by claiming, "Buried in the secret files of the Ford Motor Co. lies evidence that big auto makers have put profits ahead of lives." This "lack of concern," they lamented, "has caused thousands of people to die or be horribly disfigured in fiery crashes." All this, they said, was preventable: "Secret tests by Ford have shown that minor adjustments in the location of the fuel tank could greatly reduce the fiery danger." Moreover, "repositioning of the tank would cost only a few dollars more per car" - not much of a price when human lives are at stake. "In the long run," they warned, "the auto makers are saving little with this 'cost cutting'" Nine months later, these criticisms were elaborated in Mark Dowie's scathing condemnation of Ford, called "Pinto Madness."

• Danley, John R. (April 2005). "Polishing up the Pinto: Legal Liability, Moral Blame, and Risk". Business Ethics Quarterly. 15 (2): 205–236. Beyond the legal problems, Ford was taking a public relations beating...Several months before the article, Jack Anderson had written a column claiming that thousands of people were either killed or disfigured as a result of this poorly designed vehicle.

• Anderson, Jack; Whitten, Les (December 30, 1976). "Auto maker shuns safer gas tank". The Washington Post. Buried in the secret files of the Ford Motor Co. lies evidence that big auto makers have put profits ahead of lives. Their lack of concern has caused thousands of people to die or be horribly disfigured in fiery car crashes. Undisclosed Ford tests have demonstrated that the big auto makers could have made safer automobiles by spending a few dollars more on each car.

• Swigert, Victoria Lynn; Farrell, Ronald A. (1980). "Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the Creation of Deviance". Law & Society Review. 15 (1): 161–182. It was not until December 30, 1976, however, that the automobile's fuel tank was brought to public attention in a syndicated editorial appearing in the Washington Post. Columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten alleged that: "Buried in the secret files of the Ford Motor Co. lies evidence that big auto makers have put profits ahead of lives. Their lack of concern has caused thousands of people to die or be horribly disfigured in fiery car crashes. Undisclosed Ford tests have demonstrated that the big auto makers could have made safer automobiles by spending a few dollars more on each car."

(Danley is already in use in our article; Swigert and Farrell are cited indirectly through Lee and Ermann, the other two references are new to our article).

Discussion

• Support as proposer. The 1976 Anderson column is noteworthy as a contributor to the public awareness of Ford fire safety, and as a predecessor to the 1977 Mother Jones article, and exhibits significant similarity in terms of tone, claims, and vaguely substantiated claims. The clear consensus of noteworthy reliable sources is that public awareness and the 1977 Mother Jones article had noteworthy roles in the events leading up to the NHTSA investigation and recall of the Pinto; however, the Mother Jones article was not the first, and far from the only, media coverage of Ford fire safety, and certainly not the most widely read. The current article content mentions only the media coverage by one article in one low-circulation niche magazine, Mother Jones, and so is grossly non-neutral with respect to reliable sources and misleading to our readers. Addressing this neutrality issue is an editorial priority with this article.

Comments? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 18:54, 25 March 2016 (UTC)

• Oppose - Pretty clearly HughD trying push his POV that the MJ wasn't central in getting the Pinto controversy started. What he's proposing here isn't inaccurate, but it's pretty clearly undue. Very few sources covering the Pinto safety issue note the Anderson article. Very many sources covering the Pinto safety issue point to the MJ article. Obvious example of WP:UNDUE weight. Pretty sad POV push. NickCT (talk) 05:05, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for your comment. The strong consensus of noteworthy reliable sources is that public awareness was significant in the lead-up to the NHTSA investigation and Pinto recall; currently our article mentions only one media report; it is non-neutral with respect to multiple reliable sources to present Mother Jones as the first or only media coverage of this issue. How can it be undue to add one sentence to our article to cover a second, earlier media report, that said many of the same things as the Mother Jones article, and was in a venue The Washington Post much more widely read than Mother Jones, by notable syndicated columnists Jack Anderson and Les Whitten much more widely recognized than the author of the Mother Jones article, and was covered by multiple noteworthy reliable sources in relating the build-up of public awareness? How would you summarize the above sources? Thank you again. Hugh (talk) 15:56, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

• Oppose: A 3rd opinion was requested regarding this addition. NickCT is correct, this is just an attempt to piecemeal material into the article in a way that isn't supported by reliable sources. RS's make it clear that the Mother Jones article and it's accusations kicked off the public controversy surrounding the Pinto. Any independent 3rd party review should take note of the [Topic Ban for HughD?] section below. Springee (talk) 21:39, 9 April 2016 (UTC)

Pursue Topic Ban for HughD?

Not sure how others feel, but I'm beginning to get the sense the User:HughD isn't going to be able to edit this article collaboratively. I motion that we move to topic ban HughD from this article. Anyone want to second that? NickCT (talk) 05:16, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Seconded. I'll probably get trouted for one of my comments above, hey ho. If you look at his previous record, eg, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_noticeboard/IncidentArchive894#Disruptive_Behavior_and_Editing.2C_HughD , you'll see that his behavior has not improved, and he's still up to his usual tricks. The result of the recent edit warring report https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Administrators%27_noticeboard/Edit_warring#.5B.5BUser:HughD.5D.5D_reported_by_.5B.5BUser:CZmarlin.5D.5D_.28Result:_.29 was rather more tightly focused than I'd hoped, probably because of the way the original report was written. I think Springee's suggestion of a permanent topic ban on all things automotive would be a start, but the patient will just find some other way to annoy the people he feels like annoying, since he apparently followed Springee here from some non automotive article. I'm not even sure there's any point in a wide ranging permaban since that is so easily evaded. If you do go ahead with this make sure that it includes diffs, is reasonably concise, and calmly written. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special%3ASearch&profile=advanced&search=HughD+arbitration&fulltext=Search&ns2=1&ns3=1&ns4=1&ns5=1&profile=advanced shows an astonishing record of similar behavior, yet somehow he continues to infest wiki with his nasty ways. Greglocock (talk) 08:38, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Agreed This article has been turned upside down and tilted in a single direction. It's difficult if not impossible to work with an intractable, biased editor. 842U (talk) 14:44, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

This thread is off-topic, please focus on content here on this article talk page WP:FOC, WP:TPG. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:46, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

No, a discussion concerning the prevention of the disruptive editing of this page is a valid subject for this page. Thank you very much. Thanks. ta. Greglocock (talk) 23:10, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Please see ANI topic here [7] Springee (talk) 20:55, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

I've started an ANI conversation to block HughD from this page here. NickCT (talk) 21:58, 26 March 2016 (UTC)

Note about related edits: HughD has been adding Pinto related material to several other articles. The addition of Pinto related material may be appropriate in those articles but the summary type material should ultimately be reflective of the material in the lead of the fuel tank controversy section here. Material has been added to

• Automobile safety[8]
• Ford Motor Company[9]
• History of Ford Motor Company[10]
• Product recall[11] Springee (talk) 14:58, 7 April 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - I've undone all those edits. HughD - Best wait till your topic ban discussion is wrapped up before trying to put more content on this topic on other pages. NickCT (talk) 15:53, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

Thanks. I think the recent edits are exactly what Safehaven86 was thinking of when he said "calculated aggravation". I don't agree with Hugh's edits but until we have a stable fuel system controversy section here it is premature to add the summary material to other articles. Springee (talk) 17:25, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

I left a talk page comment on [History of Ford Motor Company] briefly noting some of the the issues with the recent Pinto related edits to the article. I also noted that ultimately the material on those articles should reflect the content here. The tag noting issues with the lead[12] is perhaps ironically correct given the Pinto material added to the lead[13]. Springee (talk) 22:07, 9 April 2016 (UTC)

• This doesn't look like anything more than battleground behavior. It also doesn't look like the appropriate location. It also looks like your canvassing for support.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 08:01, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Judging from the behavior here, and from the previous need for multiple topic bans to be imposed on Hugh, another topic ban might be in his best interests. Better to be banned from one topic, than be indef blocked from editing all articles. Considering the prior block history and topic bans, I'm guessing that an indef block from editing, isn't too far away. Spacecowboy420 (talk) 08:55, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Judging from the behavior right here, he's not the only one that needs to be topic banned.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 10:06, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Who else would you suggest to be topic banned? Spacecowboy420 (talk) 10:22, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Experienced editors who inappropriately open an ANI discussion inappropriately on an articles talk page to drum up support and campaign for a future ANI they plan on opening would be a great target for a topic ban as this type of behavior is highly disruptive.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 10:30, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Seeing that it involves people on this talk page and this article, the comments were suitable.

It's much better than sending comments would be sent to individual editor's talk pages, therefore intentionally targeting certain editors. There is no realistic difference between a pre-ANI report comment, and someone making an ANI report, and linking to it, on the article that there has been a dispute on. Infact, it might be better to make the comments before an ANI report, and seeing if there are any better solutions proposed,before taking up more editors' time on ANI. Spacecowboy420 (talk) 10:51, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

There's not even a point to offer a rebuttal. This talk page is not forum. It's being used as a forum to see who dislikes HughD. It doesn't mean a damn thing if you do not like HughD. Whether you like HughD has nothing at all relevant to do with a ford Pinto. Not kind of. Not sort of. Not even in a round about way. WP:TALK Here's all about article talk pages. Oh and infact WP:TALK suggests you use WP:DISPUTE resolution if you have a disagreement or a problem with someone's behavior. WP:DISPUTE does not tell you to bring battleground behavior like this to the talk page of an article. It doesn't tell you to WP:VOTESTACK for support before an ANI. There wouldn't be any problem with someone coming here to find a solution to resolve any content dispute. That's even something that can be labeled.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 11:20, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

I'm so sorry that you didn't get the answer you were looking for. I don't think anyone here gives a flying fuck about liking or disliking Hugh. This is about his edits and his conduct. I'd suggest that if this was the first incident involving Hugh, you might have a valid point, but it isn't and you don't. I'd politely suggest that you defer to editors who have more experience actually editing articles, rather than spending all their time on wikipedia debating points in ANI. Editors with extensive experience actually making an encyclopedia, tend to understand how harmful a disruptive editor can be to an article's progress.Spacecowboy420 (talk) 11:36, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Oh, I'm sorry, You thought I was looking for an answer? I didn't realize as what typed has been an obvious statement against this behavior as opposed to questioning anything. And yes, you correct, many experienced editors know how detrimental disruptive behavior is to wikipedia, for example disruptive behavior like this. That's ok though, eventually when you get some experience you might learn more about the policies and guidelines of wikipedia as well. And if it's all the same to you, I'm going to go back to not inappropriately using this talk page as a Forum even though there are users so experienced that the rules apply to them in no way.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 11:47, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

I'm sorry, but I think I will trust the judgement of editors with a little more experience with actually editing articles, rather than just looking for drama in talk pages and wiki-lawyering than yourself. Spacecowboy420 (talk) 12:09, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

It's better to not use words like wiki-lawyering when you do not understand them.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 12:15, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

"It's to not use words" ? erm..... wanna rephrase that? Spacecowboy420 (talk) 12:18, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Oh my goodness you found a minor error from a disabled person. Thank you much. "It's better to not..."-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 12:28, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Don't get defensive, please. If I was attempting to criticize you based on your English, I would be far less subtle, I just didn't understand what you were saying. Spacecowboy420 (talk) 12:42, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

@Serialjoepsycho and Spacecowboy420: - Thanks for joining the fray guys. re "inappropriately open an ANI discussion" - Was this aimed at me? How exactly was this inappropriate? Several editors here suggested HughD's behavior was disruptive. I thought ANI was the correct forum to take this situation to. re "It's being used as a forum to see who dislikes HughD." - So if you don't want the discussion to take place here, and you apparently don't want it to take place at ANI, where should it take place? re "This is about his edits and his conduct." - Precisely. NickCT (talk) 14:23, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Is that directed at me, or serialjoe? I'm of the opinion that the discussion is suitable both here (it's related to this article) and ANI (they are equipped to deal with it) Spacecowboy420 (talk) 14:50, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

@Spacecowboy420: - Sorry for the ambiguity. I was replying to comments from both you and Serial. Your comment (i.e. This is about his edits....), I responded to with "Precisely". NickCT (talk) 15:03, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Page size and archiving

This page is, at the time of writing, 413,228 bytes long. This can make the page unreadable for some of our colleagues, and uneditable for others. I have therefore again tweaked the settings, to archive any section not edited in the last 30 days. Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 10:26, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

Pigsonthewing, I agree that the page is currently too long. However, I would suggest we just leave it at 60 days and deal with the problem for a bit longer. If need be some of the material could be collapsed. I don't think we should be trying to "defer archive" any of the topics if we set things back to 60 days. Springee (talk) 17:29, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

How are people for whom the page is too long to edit, or even read, supposed to " deal with the problem"? (Note that collapsing would do nothing to solve the issue; indeed would likely worsen it.) Why would sections not edited for over 30 days need to stay on this page? Andy Mabbett (Pigsonthewing); Talk to Andy; Andy's edits 18:43, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

I guess I don't find it too bad (not good just not too bad). However, perhaps that is because I was involved in the discussions vs because I'm reading them for the first time. I will differ to your judgment. Springee (talk) 19:11, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

I dunno. I think it might be better to keep the old stuff until it is resolved, otherwise it'll all just get reposted.

Again.

And Again. Anmccaff (talk) 19:18, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

I would suggest that HughD should discuss archiving rather than unilaterally deciding which topics should hang around for what ever reason. The "Do Not Archive" tags were removed once. Why add them back without discussion and without group support? Springee (talk) 20:38, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

Oh, I agree 100%. Actual discussion, as opposed to reiteration, seems kinda rare with him. Anmccaff (talk) 21:44, 8 April 2016 (UTC)

• There are many stale and no longer active topics on this page that can be manually archived. You can of course do this with permission. because the page is over 75KB. And if anyone needs any of the the discussions they can link them. It's archiving and not deleting.-Serialjoepsycho- (talk) 10:16, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Propose removal of Burgess v Ford section

I'm proposing the removal of Burgess vs Ford on grounds that it is WP:UNDUE. This section was added early in March when fewer editors were watching this talk page. This section is undue for several reasons. First, what makes the case significant was that it was an early, publicly disclosed settlement for a safety lawsuit that included a claim of "lack of (passenger side) airbags". This may make it a landmark case in terms of airbag litigation but that the case happened to involve a Pinto isn't notable. In the 1973, the year the car in question was built, virtually no cars had airbags and a passenger side mandate was 25 years away (1998). Thus the lack of airbags on the low cost Pinto wasn't notable. This is in contrast to the fuel tank controversy where the whole argument is that Ford used an unusually unsafe design. Second, in "Pinto" related historical terms the lawsuit doesn't stand out. A few articles covered the topic at the time but they focused on the airbag aspect, not that the car was a Pinto. The only recent reference to the case (Graham) mentions the Pinto only to indicate the type of car. His discussion doesn't make any claim that the Pinto was unusual. There are MANY articles that discuss the legacy of the Pinto. The fuel tank placement and the Mother Jones article discussing the "Pinto Memo" are always mentioned. This airbag case is not. At best this would merit an "other reading" type link. Springee (talk) 06:26, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

I agree, it does not seem notable so far as Pinto is concerned. Greglocock (talk) 07:51, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Thank you for discussing your section blanking at article talk before doing it this time 6 March 2016. Hugh (talk) 15:18, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Article size check: The article is currently Prose size (text only): 25 kB (4137 words) "readable prose size". The article is half the size at which the possibility of an article size issue is likely, as per our project's guideline WP:SIZERULE.

Removing noteworthy, well-referenced content seems an unusual editorial priority at this time. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:35, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Re :Article size check: The article is currently Prose size (text only): 25 kB (4137 words) "readable prose size". The article is half the size at which the possibility of an article size issue is likely, as per our project's guideline WP:SIZERULE.Hugh (talk) 15:35, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

That rule-of-thumb is irrelevant here, it covers whether a (legitimately) large article should be split. Anmccaff (talk) 16:14, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Removing noteworthy, well-referenced content seems an unusual editorial priority at this time. Thank you. Hugh (talk) 15:35, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

That's begging the question. You are taking as a given that a generic automotive safety issue should be highlighted in an article about a single model; that's extremely debatable, except, perhaps, in an article on Ambulance chasing, in the wider sense. I come down, firmly, on the "no" side Anmccaff (talk) 16:14, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Comment - After glancing at this briefly, I'm inclined to agree with Greg & Spring. It is not clear to me that the Burgess lawsuit was an obvious and direct result of the fuel tank issue. It's challenging to find sources which talk about the case and the fuel tank issue together. NickCT (talk) 15:57, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

NickCT, this isn't part of the fuel system controversy section. It was added as a stand alone section. Despite accusations that don't assume good faith, I see this as a case about airbags, not a case about the Pinto. No cars had standard passenger side airbags in 1973. According to the air bag history article only the Olds Torinado offered a passenger side airbag as even an option. Again, this might make sense in terms of history of airbag laws/litigation. It doesn't make sense here, especially as a full section of the article and given the only modern mention of the case was simply stating that the car was a Pinto. Springee (talk) 16:10, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

@Springee: - Ah OK. Well it might have made sense in the fuel system controversy section, if the suit had been clearly related to the fuel system. Which it doesn't seem to be.

As an WP:OTHERSTUFFEXISTS, I'd be interested to see if we can find a single example of another WP article where a single lawsuit against a car's design is noted like Burgess is being noted here. NickCT (talk) 16:16, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

That seams reasonable. I understand that we have seen the "otherstuff"[14] argument used to support adding content to a car company article even though it seemed absent from other car company articles. However, I think you are correct in this case. If a large range of automobile articles don't have such cases mentioned then it seems that editors in general haven't supported that sort of content. Project Automobile already noted that only the most significant recalls should ever make it to a car page. I would suggest we would treat lawsuits the same way. Springee (talk) 16:24, 11 April 2016 (UTC)

Contented content:

A passenger in a 1975 Pinto was seriously injured in a fiery collision. On August 30, 1979 Ford was served with a civil lawsuit Burgess v. Ford alleging defects including that the Pinto was structurally unsafe and that the Pinto fuel system was defective. In November, 1983, the suit was amended to include a claim of a lack of an airbag. Air bags were not legally required at the time. The suit was settled out of court in March, 1984 for $1.8 million, the largest known airbag litigation settlement. Ford said the injuries were due to driver negligence and that the settlement was unrelated to airbags. The court granted Ford a protective order on Ford documents obtained by the plaintiff via court order. The suit was widely publicized. The Today Show broadcast a consumer protection segment on the incident. The settlement was covered on the front page of The Wall Street Journal. According to the Center for Auto Safety, the settlement was a "landmark" in establishing that a lack of airbags may be considered negligent design.

References

Sources include a noteworthy mainstream newspaper The Wall Street Journal, the Associated Press, two noteworthy law review journals, and a chapter by a noteworthy author John Graham in a book from the Brookings Institute edited by a noteworthy editor Peter W. Huber. This section is much more strongly sourced than most of the article, cf. Ford Pinto#1974–1978, Ford Pinto#Mercury Bobcat (1974–1980) and Ford Pinto#1974–1978. This section seems an unlikely section in which to embrace a spirited defense of our project's due weight policy.

How would you summarize these sources? Thank you. Hugh (talk) 16:42, 11 April 2016 (UTC)