Talk:Syrian Kurdistan

Best sources for this article

I looked for book-length scholarship by academic publishers from the last five years or so, and this is what I came up with:

About Syrian Kurdistan in particular

1. Matthieu Cimino (2020), Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State, Springer. [1]
2. Harriet Allsopp & Wladimir van Wilgenburg (2019), The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts, Bloomsbury. [2]
3. Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms & Sareta Ashraph, eds. (2019), The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality, Cambridge. [3]
4. Brendan O'Leary (2018), The Kurds, the Four Wolves, and the Great Powers, The Journal of Politics. [4] PDF — not a book, but a book review of:
   1. Harriet Allsopp (2016), The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East, Bloomsbury. [5]
   2. Michael Gunter (2014), Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War, Hurst. [6]
   3. Michael Gunter (2017), The Kurds: A Modern History, Markus Wiener Publishers. [7] (O'Leary reviewed the 2016 ed.)

   (And four other books about Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran.)

5. Samer N. Abboud (2015), Syria, Wiley. [8]

   About Kurdistan in general (including Syrian Kurdistan)

6. Güneş Murat Tezcür, ed. (2020), A Century of Kurdish Politics: Citizenship, Statehood and Diplomacy, T&F. [9]
7. Zeynep N. Kaya (2020), Mapping Kurdistan: Territory, Self-Determination and Nationalism, Cambridge. [10]
8. David Romano, Mehmet Gurses, and Michael Gunter (2020), The Kurds in the Middle East: Enduring Problems and New Dynamics, Lexington Books. [11]
9. Sebastian Maisel (2018), The Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society, ABC-Clio. [12]
10. Michael Gunter (2018), Routledge Handbook on the Kurds, T&F. [13]
11. David L. Phillips (2015), The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East, Transaction Publishers. [14]
12. Mehrdad Izady (2015, orig. 1992), Kurds: A Concise Handbook, T&F. [15]
13. David McDowall (April 2021, 2004, orig 1996), A Modern History of the Kurds, Bloomsbury. [16]

Anything missing from this list? Anything that should be removed from the list? Some but not all of these are already in the article (or in related articles). Levivich ^harass/_hound 06:26, 7 December 2020 (UTC)

I agree with this sources. Merdad Izady has strong opponents, and even the climate info from him is seen as unreliable and is blamed to come from a nationalist. I don't share this view, but it will be difficult to source anything with him.

Others I would also recommend are:

1. Jordi Tejell: Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society

1. Jordi Tejel: Le mouvement kurde de Turquie en exil: continuités et discontinuités du nationalisme kurde sous le mandat français en Syrie et au Liban (1925-1946)

1. Roger Lescot is also good. His books you can read online hereParadise Chronicle (talk) 18:23, 7 December 2020 (UTC)

Also add Robert Lowe "The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria" in D. Romano et al. (eds.), Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East (2014). As for Izady (aside from the academic criticism), it is not as simple as climate. --Attar-Aram syria (talk) 08:24, 8 December 2020 (UTC)

extended discussion

[Izady] is treating the climate of Afrin as related to the climate of Zagros and not Aleppo. So, that deleted section is clearly used to push one POV and not the other: a greater Kurdistan taken by other countries. So nothing innocent in Izady's work. Now, can we agree on one thing: if these Kurdish inhabited regions are part of historical Kurdistan, then a historical source predating the establishment of Syria should be presented? If the criteria is: wherever Kurds live is a Kurdistan, then we will have Kurdistan in Damascus and Berlin. If Syria took parts of Kurdistan when it was established, then it is necessary to prove that these parts, all of them, were part of the historical region of Kurdistan before Syria took it (or France, whatever)- (even if they became parts of historical Kurdistan in 1900 is fine! just a historical source please, any!- ofcourse we are not talking if Kurds considered these regions parts of Kurdistan, because then we can also consider Cyprus part of Syria because Syrian nationalists claims it to be such).--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 08:24, 8 December 2020 (UTC) The former edit could be removed for WP:NOTFORUM. If you can source a Kurdistan in Damascus and Berlin, ask at the talk pages there and present your ideas there. We are here at the Syrian Kurdistan article and have numerous sources for a Syrian Kurdistan. This doesn't mean it is a recognized country. But Kurds in Syria did not just come out of nowhere and the Kurds in Syria are also not due to mere coincidence living adjacent to Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan. The historical Kurdistan argument has been discussed for weeks and the Kurd Dagh and Bohtan arguments against this were long ago presented. Fact is, there exists a Kurdish population in Syria adjacent to other parts of Kurdistan and in numerous sources it is known as Syrian Kurdistan.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 12:46, 8 December 2020 (UTC) So you have no source. What you wrote is your own logical conclusion not supported by sources. It is my right to ask you to present your sources when you claim this is part of historical Kurdistan, so this isnt a forum indeed and my arguments are legetimate. If Kurdistan exist in Syria today, for which you are bringing sources, then this doesnt mean it existed before Syria was established. Some Kurdish nomads expanding from their homeland doesnt make the new regions a Kurdistan. Please present historic evidence and spare us the conclusions. If this is part of historical Kurdistan, then how hard it is to find a traveler or historian from the 19th century writing that he visited Afrin in Kurdistan? Cant this be found? then dont argue that this is part of the historical homeland of the Kurds.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 12:53, 8 December 2020 (UTC) If you are not satisfied with the sources provided for a "historic" Syrian Kurdistan, what can we do? A Syrian KurdistaN is shown in numerous sources, and we ought to go by them. Wikipedia is not Aramattarpedia, it is an encyclopedia in which the info provided has to be sourced if contested. And there exist numerous sources for a Syrian Kurdistan. If you claim that if a source focuses on or about a Syrian Kurdistan, it means there exists no Syrian Kurdistan it is rather an WP:OR.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 20:40, 9 December 2020 (UTC) Are you heading in the direction of GP where you attack other editors? Its simple: historic means historical sources to support historicality. You have failed to provide this. All your sources do not confirm that before the establishment of Syria these regions were part of the historical cultural region of Kurdistan. Your inability to find historic sources is not on me to blame. So speak about Kurdistan as much as you want, but dont entertain ideas of historical native homelands without historical sources. NONE of the sources you provided contain a single cited historic document mentioning those regions as part of Kurdistan. Zero. Again, nomads migrate (in the case of Jazira), but it doesnt make the new regions part of a historic homeland. If you write that in 1918 Kurdistan was split by Syria and others, then provide a contemporary source to prove that in 1918 these regions were part of Kurdistan. Again, I know it is frustrating to you, but you cant defend your claims without adequate secondary sources based on actual primary sources (thats the first thing you learn when you start a research in academia).--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 23:20, 9 December 2020 (UTC) I am tired of recurring discussions whether a Syrian Kurdistan exists or not, while actually having a Wikipedia article Syrian Kurdistan with numerous academic sources actually showing and mentioning a Syrian Kurdistan. That there is an opposition to the existence of a Syrian Kurdistan belongs into a specific section but not into the lead as all what can be put there for a denial is OR. I call for an admin to craft an NPOV lead according to WP:Lead.Paradise Chronicle (talk) It exist today: I was not arguing about this, but about the notion that it is the historic land of Kurds annexed by Syria, for which you were not able to provide a single historic source. As for the opposition, this will be decided by consensus, but thanks for expressing your opinion.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 12:24, 10 December 2020 (UTC)

Somehow I forgot to put Cimino 2020 on my list, so I added it. Also, I added O'Leary even though it isn't a book, because it's a book review by a reputable scholar in a reputable journal. (Are there any other recent book reviews like it?) Re: the above, Tejel, Lescot, and Lowe I think are all reputable scholars as well and their works are usable. However, given the changes "on the ground", I think we should really lean on very recent scholarship: 2019-2020 preferably, post-2016 second choice, post-2011 third choice, and only use pre-war as necessary to fill in gaps. So I think, for example, for Tejel's views about Syrian Kurdistan, it's better to rely more on Tejel 2020 (in Cimino 2020) than Tejel 2009, although Tejel 2009 could be used to fill in gaps of material not covered by more recent sources. For this reason, even O'Leary's book review I think should be considered "second choice", because it was written in 2018 and reviews books written in 2016 or earlier. We want to tell our readers what Syrian Kurdistan is today, according to scholars. Levivich ^harass/_hound 07:27, 9 December 2020 (UTC)

I don't know how to vote here, but if the sources here presented are included in the article I agree.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 11:15, 10 December 2020 (UTC)

Dec 12 lead paragraph draft

Without cites, links, formatting, etc.:

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. It is the Syrian part of Kurdistan, a roughly-defined Kurdish-inhabited area spanning several sovereign states in Central Asia. Originally a collection of medieval principalities, Kurdistan was part of the Ottoman Empire until it was partitioned by the Allied Powers following World War I. The three enclaves were placed in the French Mandate for Syria, while the rest of Kurdistan was divided between what became the modern states of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, among others. Syrian Kurdistan is thus sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Rojava Kurdistanê‎, lit. "Kurdistan where the sun sets"), one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Bakurê Kurdistanê‎, 'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Başûrê Kurdistanê‎, 'Southern Kurdistan').

Thoughts? I don't think it's particularly well written, but I'm mostly curious if it has all the right parts in the right order with the right terminology. Is it complete (for a first paragraph)? Is it neutral? Levivich ^harass/_hound 08:54, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

No it is not the right terminology. The suggested text is presenting "Syrian Kurdistan" as being a real name for an area in Syria, which it isn't. The text is also claiming that before WW1 there was a "Kurdistan" that was divided and placed within Syria, which is also historically inaccurate. Current lead is better where "Syrian Kurdistan" is presented as a pov from some people which is the accurate situation and terminology.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 10:57, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Maybe-Can this be verified? I mean the historical part? The principalities constituting Kordistan and conquered by Selim I did not include these Syrian regions. This paragraph is inaccurate as it gives the impression that these regions are part of historical Kurdistan, but no historical source supports this. Also, no comtemporary source from 1918 mentions that these regions are part of the Kurdistan partitioned between allies. What are these information based on? I would be okay with it if this historical background that does not apply to Syrian Kurdistan is removed. This is not part of the historical Kurdistan, yet it is Kurdistan today as a result of several demographic and military and political changes. Its better not to mix history with modern developments. I would make it the following:

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), as one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Kurdish: Bakurê Kurdistanê, lit. 'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurdish: Başûrê Kurdistanê, lit. 'Southern Kurdistan').

I hope both parties can see the compromise in my wording: it present Syrian Kurdistan as existing, without qualification, but does not go into the wild historical accounts of Kurdish nationalists that have no support in actual HISTORICAL sources. If everyone can give up a little, we can bring peace to this article (and ourselves).--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 12:33, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Attar-Aram syria, your suggestion is not good because it presents "Syrian Kurdistan" as a real entity in Syria, instead as a pov. Also, kurdish nationalists have different vies of what is "Syrian kurdistan" and they include larger parts of Syria, not just 3 enclaves. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:29, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness: it is a real thing, and thats a reality. It was established by the Kurds, so it exist now. Presenting it as a Kurdish POV while Kurds are in control of the land isnt realistic. We cant keep fighting here forever!--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:07, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

What was "established by the kurds" ? The kurds who are currently controlling the area call it the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:14, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Thanks to both Levivich and Attar Aram syria for the drafts. @Levivich, I'd leave the historical part out of the lead and insert it in another specific historical section/paragraph. For now, I would just focus on "what it is" in the lead. I support Attar Aram syrias version. Let's find peace for the article and ourselves.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 15:57, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Why would we ad a historically inaccurate text in another specific historical section? Wouldn't it just be better if we don't include the inaccurate text in the article? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:29, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Agree, that makes sense. Attar-Aram's version looks good to me. Thanks! I still think the lead needs to explain what "Kurdistan" is (specifically, that it isn't a sovereign state), but that can be done later in the lead section (in a different paragraph), and we can defer the discussion of history until then. @Attar-Aram syria: I hope you don't mind, I added some markup to your draft so we can see what it will look like "live". The only thing I didn't link was Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira. I'm not sure what to link it to. I think it should be linked to the region articles (e.g. Afrin Region) but something tells me not everyone would agree with that :-) (If we don't reach consensus on a link target, then let's just leave it unlinked for now?) Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:04, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Thanks Levivich and Paradise Chronicle. Im fine with any historic background as long as sound secondary sources based on historical primary sources support it.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:07, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Yeah, we'll have to dig into sources to discuss the history formulation. One other thing: should we strike the word "as" in the sentence: "Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), as one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans""? Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:08, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Sounds good to me.--Attar-Aram syria (talk) 17:10, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Thanks Attar and Levivich for your attempts. However, with all due respect, I think the current lead, developed by Applodion after discussions on the Talk page, better describes the issue at hand. It is not a universally accepted terms. I can come up with hundreds of sources that refer to the area by "Kurdish-inhabited region in Syria". Simply presenting the area as "Syrian Kurdistan" means that the majority of the population, which are non-Kurdish, are living on the land of Kurds, not on their own land. This is simply "adopting" the narrative of the Kurdish nationalists. Thanks. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 17:11, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

The way I read both mine and Attar's revision, they say that Syrian Kurdistan is part of Syria (a sovereign state), and part of Kurdistan (a geographic area, but not a sovereign state). So I don't think anyone reading that would think that Syrian Kurdistan is land that legally belongs to the Kurds, as opposed to land that legally belongs to Syria where Kurds live. ("Land of the Kurds" could mean either Kurdish-owned or Kurdish-inhabited.) That said, would it change your mind if the paragraph was more explicit that Syria is a sovereign state and Kurdistan is not? (This is the reason I had included some sentences about history in my original draft: to explain that Kurdistan is not a sovereign state. I wonder if a second paragraph about history would make the first paragraph clearer, as it were.) Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:20, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

"Syrian Kurdistan" or "kurdistan" does not exist in Syria as a factual entity, it is only a disputed belief held by some people, and therefor it must be presented as such.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:18, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

I do not understand what you mean by "factual entity". "Syrian Kurdistan" isn't a belief, it's a place. It's not an imaginary or fictional place like Atlantis: Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira are real places on Earth. Levivich ^harass/_hound 19:06, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, can you see page 19 of this introduction to a recent work by Jordi Tejel? Unfortunately i don't have access to the full chapter. It is a fluid concept, as a place it is ill-defined and it is and has been a belief. Can you really not see how simplistic it is to assert 'Syrian Kurdistan' is a 'place', 'region', or 'area' while ignoring the implications? It's a term that has meant different things at different times, and has different meanings for different people. It is both a real place and it does not exist depending on the context. What it most certainly is not is Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira. fiveby(zero) 23:02, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Yes, on p. 19 Cimino summarizes the argument made by Tejel in Chapter 11 of that book. I think it's very important to see the context and not, as it were, "cherry pick" quotes. So here are some long-ish quotes:

From p. 19 (linked above), Cimino's introduction:

... In The complex and dynamic relationship of Syria's Kurds with Syrian borders: Continuities and changes (Chapter 11), Jordi Tejel questions the discourses and spatial representations of "Greater Kurdistan": How was this notion created? What is the spatial ideology carried by the PYD in Syria? Are the Syrian Kurds working to restore "historical" Kurdish territory and, more specifically, do they envisage secession from Syria? By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims".

Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented: from the Sharafnama map of 1596 (which displays "extreme expansionist tendencies, in particular to the south") to the Paris conference in 1919, where the Kurdish representative submitted Kurdish territorial claims, the representation of "Greater Kurdistan" is diverse and heterogeneous and is altered according to political contexts and the audiences for which it is intended. After the mandate period ... [it goes on to describe Tejel's chapter].

We should also look at what Tejel writes in Chapter 11.

On p. 243, Tejel introduces his chapter by writing: However, the tensions between the two de fact Kurdish autonomous territories controlled by two competing Kurdish movements since 2011 (Rojava or Western Kurdistan in Northern Syria and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Northern Iraq)...

On p. 244:

... I shall analyze the maps as well as school textbooks elaborated during the French Mandate and in the post-2011 context ... I shall argue that Kurdish populations and local political actors have developed a complex and dynamic relationship with the Syrian-Turkish and Syrian-Iraqi borders. Like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdish references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims. The map of Greater Kurdistan reproduced in different formats (including textbooks) definitely forges a sense of common Kurdish identity beyond international borders and Kurdish nationalism. It offers a 'historic territory' which, in turn, implies a narrative of conquest, defense, liberation and loss in which certain 'Others' play a role. In this respect, it is difficult to separate the feelings of national identity and geopolitical visions. Nevertheless, I shall demonstrate that Greater Kurdistan does not constitute an actual political goal for Syria's Kurds. It provides a cultural abstract that supports local political claims and strategies without questioning Syria's borders.

On p. 250 Tejel writes: ... while some visual representations remain relatively constant (Greater Kurdistan), others such as "Syrian Kurdistan," "Rojava" have varied over the time due to new developments and shifting power dynamics on the ground.

And on p. 261 he describes the depiction of Kurdistan and Rojava in PYD textbooks:

PYD-sponsored textbooks portray Kurdistan as an ancient country and nation ... Terms with pan-Kurdish connotations are used, such as Northern or Bakur (Eastern Turkey), Southern or Bashur (Northern Iraq), Eastern or Rojhilat (North-Eastern Iran) and Western Kurdistan or Rojava (Northern Syria) ... Unsurprisingly, Kurdistan's boundaries in Syria are more generous and suggest a territorial (and ethnic) continuity between the three traditional Kurdish enclaves in Northern Syria (Kurd Dagh, Kobane and the Upper Jazira), as opposed to the maps produced in the 1930s and 1940s ... in Rojava's textbooks towns such as Afrin and Qamishli deserve as much attention as larger cities (Erbil, Urfa, Diyarbakir) in Iraq and Turkey. Interestingly, while Western and Kurdish media outlets refer to Rojava as a precise de facto autonomous region, in Rojava's textbooks there is no map representing this region in detail ...

Tejel is making the argument that Syrian Kurdistan as Rojava or "Western Kurdistan", i.e. Syrian Kurdistan as part of a "Greater Kurdistan", is a construct, recently popularized, but not actually a political goal for (all of? most of?) Syria's Kurds. Tejel argues, basically, that Syrian Kurds want a Syrian Kurdistan that is part of Syria. I think this view should be included in the article. I don't think we should say it in wikivoice; it should be attributed to Tejel. Cimino expressly attributes these views to Tejel, after all.

(Note, BTW, the prominence of the French Mandate and 2011 as two important points in time for Syrian Kurdistan. Our lead should mention those as well.) Levivich ^harass/_hound 00:06, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, speaking as an administrator trying to keep an eye on this discussion, that is POV-pushing, which is disruptive. —valereee (talk) 20:16, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

Valereee, Really? So its not pov-pushing presenting a highly controversial and disputed nationalist claim with zero historical evidence as a real location in Syria and presenting this as an indisputable fact? Valereee, if I'm not mistaken you said before you didn't have any knowledge in the subject, so you can not possibly know what is pov and what is not pov. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 08:14, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, I don't need to have knowledge of the subject in order to recognize statements like "Syrian Kurdistan" or "kurdistan" does not exist in Syria as a factual entity, it is only a disputed belief held by some people, and therefor it must be presented as such and Can you really not see how simplistic it is to assert 'Syrian Kurdistan' is a 'place', 'region', or 'area' while ignoring the implications? are POV-pushing. —valereee (talk) 14:56, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

There has been plenty of sources brought up here that shows my comment to be correct, including by Öcalan himself. But to disregard all of this and only to present the kurdish nationalist narrativ without historical evidence and to present this as an undisputable truth, thats how things should be done? How is that neutral? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:49, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

SD, I'm not going to get into content, here. What I am telling you is that arguing Syrian Kurdistan simply does not exist because some people dispute the fact is POV-pushing. It's fine to argue that we must include the fact its very existence is disputed if we can find sources the consensus find reliable who are saying that. But arguing that because some dispute it, it must be presented as a "belief" rather than a place is pushing one POV over another. Wherever you are right now is a place, and if enough RS are calling that place by a name -- even if that name isn't an official government designation -- we will have an article on it and call it by that name, even if you don't like it. If you push hard enough to try to argue that's not its name, we will consider that POV-pushing, and we will find that disruptive. —valereee (talk) 19:44, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

Valereee, Then, that goes both ways, so lets say: "arguing Syrian Kurdistan simply does exist because some people claims it does is POV-pushing. It's fine to argue that we must include the fact its very existence is claimed if we can find sources"... I support having both views inside the article, the current lead is neutral and does that.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 08:27, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, I don't think I've seen anyone arguing that the article shouldn't include discussion of dispute. What I'm seeing is argument over how to present it, at what length, and where. I can tell you that if most recent independent scholarly works are referring to something as a place, it's a place. The person you want to be discussing this with is Levivich, who seems to be providing lots of evidence below. What I am telling you is that if you keep insisting none of recent scholarship proves anything, then you are simply here to POV push. —valereee (talk) 12:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness from my perspective you and Valereee are talking past each other with different concepts of place. We have articles for Iparralde and Hegoalde, North and South Basque Country. These have a great deal of history and you can draw boundaries around them that pretty much everyone would accept. We sort of have an article for Serbian lands, there's are great deal history here, used in context to describe various medieval states. In the '90s this term was used in a much different manner. As you can see from it's actual location and the talk page EN really does not like saying 'Serbian lands', SR more comfortable with it. There's quite a bit of disagreement over some boundaries, you couldn't draw a border that everyone would accept. Maritime Serbia (sr:Српско приморје) is a place, because enough people call it a place, even though most people would say Dalmatia or Upper Dalmatia (it should probably be a redirect because there is not much for content, but it's still a place). We don't need an accepted boundary or any official recognition, we would still talk about Cajun Country regardless of whether the Louisiana Legislature officially recognized 'Acadiana'. All of these are places, because enough people think of them as places. For Syrian Kurdistan, no one can really draw a good boundary, there is not so much history as some other ethnic regions, there are a number of issues with the name which require explanation and careful editing, not the ham-fisted approach above. I understand what you mean when you say it doesn't exist, and that a whole lot of people living in what some here want to say outright is Syrian Kurdistan would not agree, but it is still a place because enough people think of it and write about it as a place. fiveby(zero) 14:26, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Fiveby I understand what you are saying, but I think the current lead is really good and represents both povs, and the new suggested leads only represents one side. We can ad more info to the lead but I don't think anything in the lead should be removed. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 14:37, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Term vs. place? In wiki voice, Iranian Kurdistan is an 'unofficial name', Iraqi Kurdistan is a 'part of Kurdistan', Turkish Kurdistan is a 'term', Syrian Kurdistan is now a 'term' but proposed to be a 'Kurdish-inhabited area', French Basque Country is a 'region', Southern Basque Country a 'term'. fiveby(zero) 15:37, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Looks to be some degree of how well the boundary can be drawn and how closely it matches some formal place as to whether WP calls it a term/name vs. place/region. I don't know if that is intentional or if that is a good approach or not. fiveby(zero) 16:12, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich Thanks for taking the effort and time to get these quotes from Tejel. As you implied, Tejel represented the Kurdish POV in this "Syrian Kurdistan" concept, which is what we/I have been talking about all the time, i.e., the concept of "Syrian Kurdistan" is a Kurdish irredentist/nationalist imagination (regardless of their political ambition within vs. w/o Syria) pushed forward especially during the Syria civil war power vacuum and the rise of PYD and its military militia (YPG/SDF). As Tejel and many others (McDowall, Balanche, etc.) say rightly, there are Kurdish pockets in Syria, where in a cluster of villages Kurds represent the majority, but never at the level of a province, for example. This is a big difference b/w Kurdish areas in Syria (or "Kurdish enclaves in Northern Syria" as Tejel calls them) and Kurdistan. The main flagrant different is that Kurds are not the majority outside separate clusters of villages, as you said before: Afrin, Kobani, northeastern part of upper Jazira (al-Hasakah Governorate). The second big difference is that most of the Kurdish population here immigrated from Turkey (as discussed elsewhere on this Talk page), according to French mandate statistics and reports, not Syrian, not Baathist, not Arab nationalist, not ISIS, etc. as two users here have falsely claimed before. The third and most important difference, is that there is no historical account that says these enclaves used to be part of a Kurdistan. I echo the concerns of user:Fiveby, that although the term might sound normal, innocent, etc., however, it is charged with political meanings and ambitions that are widespread on Kurdish propaganda websites and repeating this here as if it is neutral would be misleading and wrong, to say the least. Besides some books that use the term and mostly present the Kurdish POV, it's hard to find other third party sources that use the term (e.g., news outlets, states, international organizations, international political figure, etc.). To summarize, it's fine to have the term but we should make it clear that it is mostly used from a Kurdish nationalist POV (which is somewhat implied in the current lead) , and retroactively in most cases. To be followed. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 01:58, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, Wikipedia doesn't actually care whether any term is politically charged. We don't care where or with whom the term originated, or whether the people originating it had a political agenda. What we care about is what term the preponderance of recent independent scholarship is using. —valereee (talk) 13:24, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

We should care a great deal when a term is politically charged, where and with whom the term originated, and about the political agenda, because all that needs to be explained for the reader. fiveby(zero) 15:27, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Fiveby, absolutely, such explanations are often appropriate for inclusion in an article, again with reliable sourcing, which in this case means recent scholarly works. My point was that we don't decide whether to even use a term because of any of those things. —valereee (talk) 16:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Couldn't agree more with Fiveby. Presenting something the is the pure imagination of nationalist claims as an undisputed facts has no place on an encyclopedia. Again, it's fine with me to use the term, and Levivich is showing enough notability for the term, but most of the quotes above, if not all, come from pro-Kurdish authors, so the context is even more important than the term itself, especially if we take into account that most Syrian Kurds originated in Turkey.

The majority of the Kurds in Syria are originally Turkish Kurds, who left Turkey in the 1920s in order to escape the harsh repression of the Kurds in that country. These Kurds were later joined in Syria by a new large group that drifted out of Turkey throughout the interwar period during which the Turkish campaign to assimilate its Kurdish population was at it highest. This is like the population of Algerian descent in Marseille claiming that southern France is Northern Algeria. People can claim anything, but we have to attribute claims to their original authors. I am seeing a consensus developing around this, am I wrong? Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 16:46, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

If there are any specific authors/editors/publishers/works that anyone thinks are not reliable and should be excluded, it should be taken up at WP:RSN. I disagree that there is really any such thing as "pro-Kurdish" or even "pro-Syrian Kurdish"... Kurds and even Syrian Kurds do not all have one viewpoint/opinion on anything... if there is one thing that everybody agrees on, it's that's Kurds do not agree on any one thing. I also disagree that any of the authors are "pro-Kurdish" or biased in a way that impugns their reliability, but I could be wrong about that. If we want to exclude authors/works from consideration, that probably needs consensus at RSN. Otherwise, we have to summarize the reliable sources even if we think they're pro-Kurdish. Levivich ^harass/_hound 19:19, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

The history paragraph

In the previous #Dec 12 lead paragraph draft section the question was asked if the history I wrote in the draft can be verified, and I think yes it can, but to reduce the text and scope of discussion, I want to list out the separate parts and ask which parts exactly are and which parts are uncontroversial:

The first 4 are taken from the article Kurdistan

1. The word 'Kurdistan', which translates as 'Land of the Kurds', is first attested in 11th century Seljuk chronicles
2. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, several Kurdish principalities emerged in Central Asia
3. Kurdistan in the Middle Ages was a collection of semi-independent and independent emirates
4. In the 16th century, after prolonged wars, Kurdish-inhabited areas were split between the Safavid and Ottoman empires

   The rest are "new" (Levivich's summary)

5. What is now the modern state of Syria used to be part of the Ottoman Empire (Ottoman Syria)
6. What is now the geographic area called "Kurdistan" used to be part of the Ottoman Empire
7. The three areas "Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira" (more accurately described as "areas near/around Afrin, Kobani, and northern Jazira") used to be part of the Ottoman Empire
8. After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was partitioned
9. The three areas (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira) became part of the French Mandate for Syria
10. Other parts of Kurdistan were divided between Turkey, the British Mandate for Iraq (now Iraq), Persia (now Iran), and the Soviet Union (now parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan)
11. After World War II, the French Mandate for Syria eventually became the modern state of Syria, including the three areas (Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira)
12. In 2011, the Syrian Civil War began
13. In 2012, Kurdish militia gained control of at least parts of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira
14. In 2014, Afrin Canton, Kobani Canton, and Jazira Canton were declared autonomous under the Constitution of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)
15. In 2016, a new constitution was formed for AANES, reorganizing the Cantons into Afrin Region, Euphrates Region, and Jazira Region, plus 4 other regions in northern Syria
16. Since 2016, Turkish occupation of northern Syria, including Afrin and parts of Euphrates Region

I'm of course not suggesting all of this should be in the lead. I am curious what people think is accurate/not accurate, neutral/not neutral, complete/incomplete, etc., and which parts are important enough to mention in the lead section (any paragraph). We can then "go to the sources" on the parts in dispute and start drafting maybe a second paragraph for the lead on history. Levivich ^harass/_hound 19:01, 12 December 2020 (UTC)

A quick response here. The Kurdistan page is a can of worms on its own, which will need some attention from the larger community, but that's besides the point for now. I agree with all the points mentioned above except for 7, 9, 15 and 16. For point #7, the Jazira area was grazing land used mostly for Arab tribes to herd their sheep (I have provided sources and maps earlier on this page and can do that again), so it was not even a Kurdish enclave at all. Consequently, the same observation is valid for no. 9. No. 10 is debatable, but outside my interest for now. No. 11 is the same as 7 and 9 above, this is projecting retroactively given the demographic changes that happened after WWI and the establishment of the Turkey-Syria border. No. 15, this is adopting the narrative of a Syrian civil war belligerent making claims of administrative divisions that in principle are not different from ISIL claiming their Al-Barakah province. These Kurdish administrative claims included large swaths of overwhelmingly Arab areas (Raqqa, Tel Abyad, Manbij, Tel Rifaat, etc.), so have no value from a Kurdish claims standpoint. No. 16, Turkey has not attacked Kobani. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 02:16, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

@عمرو بن كلثوم: Quick response to your quick response: if the word "enclave" was removed from #7, #9, and #11... so it just said Afrin/Kobani/Jazira was part of Ottoman Empire, then French Mandate, then Syria... would you agree? All I mean to say is that those three geographic locations were part of Ottoman Empire, then French Mandate, then Syria (regardless of who lived there or what they were at the various times... just talking about those geographic latitudes and longitudes). Levivich ^harass/_hound 02:21, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

Yes, you are definitely right. These areas were all part of the Ottoman empire, regardless of who lived there. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 03:08, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

OK I changed "enclaves" to "areas". Also I reworded #16 and added links. Levivich ^harass/_hound 03:34, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

There's a whole lot between #'s 11 and 12 that i think would be appropriate for the reader, pan-Arabism, Ba'ath Party, Iraqi Kurdistan, etc., but to me much of the history content is written as attempting to legitimize or de-legitimize the name, ending up with silly content such as the paragraph about 'west Kurdistan'. I think the article should be about how Kurds think and feel about the place, acknowledge the perspective and then describe it. fiveby(zero) 18:26, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Yeah there's like 65 years of relevant history between 11 and 12. I'm afraid it might take us 65 years to agree on a summary of it. :-) Levivich ^harass/_hound 18:46, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

"Syrian Kurdistan"

"Syrian Kurdistan" table

Use of "Syrian Kurdistan"

Author	Date	Title	Publisher	Quotes
Jordi Tejel	2020	"The Complex and Dynamic Relationship of Syria's Kurds with Syrian Borders: Continuities and Changes" in Matthieu Cimino, ed. Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State	Springer	while some visual representations remain relatively constant (Greater Kurdistan), others such as "Syrian Kurdistan," "Rojava" have varied over the time due to new developments and shifting power dynamics on the ground (p. 250) From Cimino's introduction (p. 19): By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims". Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented...
Güneş Murat Tezcür, ed.	2020	A Century of Kurdish Politics: Citizenship, Statehood and Diplomacy	T&F	...in 2012, a fracturing of the central state in Syria gave rise to a system of local self-government in this Kurdistan region. Thus, in both southern (Iraqi) Kurdistan (Basur) and western (Syrian) Kurdistan (Rojava) the weakness of the central power enabled new entities to emerge. The aims of the Kurdish actors and the nature of the entities that emerged, however, differed greatly. The Kurdistan region in Iraq today can be considered a proto-state or statelet, while the Kurdistan region in Syria is quite different, with a self-identity, political system and further aspirations toward a non-statist, confederated form of locally based self-administration. (Introduction)
Massoud Sharifi Dryaz [17]	2020	"Non-State Actors and Governance: Kurdish Autonomy in Syria" in David Romano, Mehmet Gurses, and Michael Gunter, eds., The Kurds in the Middle East: Enduring Problems and New Dynamics	Lexington Books	... [after 1921] Syrian Kurds remained in contact with their relatives on the other side of the border [with Turkey], and they used their trans-border networks for commercial trade and smuggling, an important source of income in underdeveloped regions like Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 100) Syrian Kurds were often involved in supplying their compatriots in Iraq and Turkey, though in practice the various and often fragmented Kurdish political parties in Syria have never managed to establish and build a generalized movement capable of expressing political demands by the people of Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 103) The PYD was founded on September 20, 2003 ... Shortly after its founding, the PYD opened its first head office in Qamishli ... In Syrian Kurdistan, where more than fourteen Kurdish organizations were active, the PYD progressively increased its activites. Its propaganda activities appeared to upset Syrian authorities, who started to arrest, detain, torture, kidnap, and kill pro-PYD activists beginning in 2004. (pp. 106-107) Also in the same book, Ozum Yeslitas, "Continuity and Change in Syrian Kurdistan: The Rojava Revolution and Beyond", p. 130: Thepurpose of this chapter is to shed light on the dynamics of continuity and change in Syrian Kurdistan in the context of the still-unfolding Syrian crisis. The chapter first provides a brief historical overview of the trajectory of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, then focuses on a number of themes to address continuity and change in Syrian Kurdistan...
Sirwan Kajjo [18] [19]	2019	"Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution" in Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen, Nir T. Boms & Sareta Ashraph, eds., The Syrian War: Between Justice and Political Reality	Cambridge	By the 1990s, former PKK members and other activists who had broken away from KDP-S started to form their own parties, believing there was a need for independent voices in Syrian Kurdish politics ... They promoted the concept of Syrian Kurdistan but with key constraints. (p. 275) Though vigorously supportive of the Syrian government, Iran hedges its bets on Syrian Kurdistan. (p. 284)
Various authors	2018	Sebastian Maisel, ed., The Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society	ABC-Clio	(authorship of chapters is not always available via free preview but the list of contributors to this book is available on Amazon's free preview, p. 365 [link is on the table of contents]; pages not linked to Google previews are viewable on Amazon's free preview, search for "Syrian Kurdistan" and use the results list) Selcuk Aydin, "Geography" The coldest area of Kurdistan is the northern part ... Central and southern Kurdistan are warmer ... And for the other parts of Kurdistan in southern Turkey, all parts of Syrian Kurdistan, and half of central Kurdistan in Iraq, they are the warmest part... (p. 23) Therefore, it is crucial to discuss the differentiation of political dimensions across Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian Kurdistan as the result of different experiences of Kurds across these countries. (p. 28) In "Life and Work", p. 125 Despite such environmental concerns, cotton remains an important crop for Kurdish communities even today in Rojava, Syrian Kurdistan and p. 126 Hostilities against Kurds also deepened as a consequence of the civil war in Syria, which had provided Syrian Kurdistan (Rojava) with an opportunity to declare its regional autonomy. Ozlem Belcium Galip, "Literature" p. 163 Kurdish literature developed late compared to that of other nations, has suffered from bans and obstacles, and is divided between several regions and alphabets (the Latin alphabet in Turkish Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdistan, an adapted version of the Persian-Arabic alphabet in Iraqi and Iranian Kurdistan, and the Cyrillic alphabet is also used in the former Soviet Union [FSU]). p. 176-177, section heading "Syrian Kurdistan" There was short-term cultural and linguistic freedom in Syrian Kurdistan during the period between the two World Wars ... With the de facto rule of PYD ... [p. 177] over three Kurdish areas, Afrin (Efrin in Kurdish), Kobani, and Jazira (Cezire)... p. 177 Then, after the 1980 military coup in Turkey, Sweden and Germany witnessed a striking increase in the publication of Kurmanji literature, especially among political refugees from Syrian Kurdistan (in particular after 2000). p. 178 The group of writers, particularly from Syrian Kurdistan, who migrated to Europe after 2000 includes... pp. 178-179 Along with those in Iraqi Kurdistan, a number of Kurdish poets emerged in other Kurdish regions as well [p. 179] such as Jila Huseni (1964-1996) from Iranian Kurdistan, Fatma Savci (b. 1974) from Turkish Kurdistan, and Diya Ciwan (b. 1953) from Syrian Kurdistan. In "France" p. 221 Furthermore, in recent years, there has also been an increase of Kurdish refugees from Rojava (Western/Syrian Kurdistan) and Bashur (Southern/Iraqi Kurdistan). Katharina Lange, "Syria" p. 285, In July 2012, the Syrian regime ceded control over most parts of Syrian Kurdistan (Efrin, Kobani, and the Kurdish quarters Sheikh Meqsud and Ashrafiyya in Aleppo, as well as the Kurdish areas in the Jazira with the exception of some strategic points in Qamishli) to the PYD... p. 286, In January 2014, the previously mentioned three regions were declared to be three separate "cantons" making up Syrian Kurdistan, which has been popularly referred to by the PYD and its sympathizers in Syria as well as outside of it as "Rojava"—Western (Kurdistan). This name was hardly used as a self-reference by Syrian Kurds before 2011 and was dropped again as official self-designation in favor of "Democratic Federal System of Northern Syria" in December 2016. The successive name changes did not indicate significant changes at the administrative level, however. Gulistan Gurbey and Vedat Dayan (a PhD candidate at Gurbey's university per contributor list at p. 366), "Turkey", p. 289 Kurmanji is the most widespread dialect that is spoken by Kurds in Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan or Northern Kurdistan). Kurmanji is furthermore spoken in Rojhilat (Iranian Kurdistan or Eastern Kurdistan), in the northern part of Bashur (Iraqi Kurdistan or Southern Kurdistan), and in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan). Vera Eccarius-Kelly, "United States" p. 309, Most recently, a solidarity group for Syrian-Kurdistan was formed in New York... p. 310 The dramatic siege of Shingal (Sinjar), a mountain top to which thousands of Yezidi Kurds fled after ISIS attacked them, and the ferocious battles for the town of Kobani in Syrian-Kurdistan created opportunities for Kurdish activists in the United States. p. 311 In Syrian-Kurdistan, Kurds are sometimes identified as trustworthy regional allies, but only as long as they pursue an agenda that is approved by the Pentagon.
Various authors	2018	Michael Gunter, ed., Routledge Handbook on the Kurds	T&F	(The free preview has no page numbers, this is from multiple chapters by multiple contributors) Modern Kurdish poetry in Syrian Kurdistan in the first place represents itself in Cigerxwin's (1903-1984) poetry. His revolutionary poems have inspired the masses, especially in western and northern Kurdistan. Some other Kurdish poets from Syrian Kurdistan, such as Jan Dost, Ahmad Hosseini and Axin Welat, have published their poems in exile ... Likewise the novels published by Kurdish novelists from Syrian Kurdistan, such as Halim Yusifand Jan Dost... By the same token, Syria relinquished part of its sovereignty, particularly in its relations with the PKK. Physically, PKK's militants took de facto control over a few small portions of Syrian territory, notably in Kurd Dagh...portraits of Ocalan and Barzani replaced those of Hafiz al-Assad...The most obvious political consequence of these dynamics was the adoption by some Kurdish parties of the expression "Syrian Kurdistan" or "Rojava", referring to Northern Syria, as opposed to the moderate, "Kurdish regions of Syria".
Brendan O'Leary	2018	The Kurds, the Four Wolves, and the Great Powers (PDF)	The Journal of Politics	The PYD, with the YPG as its armed fist, has sought to establish a political monopoly in Syrian Kurdistan ... The PYD has reversed Öcalan’s previous stance—whatever the daily changes in verbiage—and now stands for territorial autonomy for Syrian Kurdistan and equal citizenship rights for Kurds.
Harriet Allsopp	2016	The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East	Bloomsbury	The idea that the KDP was seeking influence amongst the Syrian Kurds and in a post-Assad 'Kurdistan Region of Syria' was raised in several reports. Analysists explained the part played by Barzani in terms of an attempt to make a bid for leadership of the pan-Kurdish nation. This prompted some to suggest that Syrian Kurdistan had become an arena for PKK-KDP cooperation. Any power struggle between the two parties could result in the split of the region between the two spheres of influence, increasing inter-Kurdish conflict and limiting the influence of the KDP to Syria's eastern Kurdish regions.
David L. Phillips	2015	The Kurdish Spring: A New Map of the Middle East	Transaction Publishers	France divided its mandate into six entities ... Syria's population was about three-quarters Arab. The balance included minorities such as Kurds ... Kurds were the largest ethnic minority in Syria. Kurds reside on a patchwork of territories, which they call Rojava. Syrian Kurdistan encompasses regions in northern Syria such as Kobani, near Jarablus, and Afrin, whose plains extend to the Turkish border. Kurds predominate in Jazira province, Hasakah Governorate, and the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah. There are also Kurds in Syria's northeast. (p. 38)
Michael Gunter	2014	Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War	Hurst	Among pan-Kurdish nationalists, Syrian Kurdistan is often referred to as Western Kurdistan or Rojava (the direction of the setting sun). (p. 7) Qamishli—with a population of 184,231 according to the 2004 census, but now much larger—is the largest Kurdish city in Syria and, as noted in the Introduction, is often considered the de facto capital of Western (Syrian) Kurdistan. (p. 8) Thus, it was not until 14 June 1957 that the first modern Kurdish political party was formed, the Kurdish Democracy Party in Syria (KDPS). Even so, the KDPS maintained a Syrian national agenda that did not call for the liberation of a Syrian Kurdistan. Rather, it was concerned with the improvement of Kurdish socio-economic conditions. Indeed, it is revealing that none of the numerous Kurdish parties currently use the sensitive term Kurdistan in their names, for fear that it might incite government fears of secession. (p. 25)
Robert Lowe	2014	"The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria" in David Romano, Mehmet Gurses (eds.), Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East	Palgrave Macmillan	(see also Amazon preview) page 225, The instability of the Syrian Civil War has enabled Kurdish political and military actors to take control of parts of northern Syria, marking the emergence of the nascent political entity of Kurdistana Rojava (West Kurdistan). This de facto autonomous Kurdish zone has developed politically, administratively, and militarily to the point that in November 2013 the largest Kurdish party there felt able to declare a transitional administration. Western Kurdistan was previously a vague concept rarely used by most Kurds, and this new political structure is fragile and underdeveloped. Nevertheless, it has become an important feature of the Syrian and Middle Eastern geopolitical landscape, and its future, and that of the wider Kurdish population in Syria, is a key factor in the future of the war-torn country. page 228, In theory, the SKC is a de facto interim administrative body for Syrian Kurdistan that represents all the Kurdish parties and communities, holds authority for political and civic organization, and has control of the Kurdish militias. page 236, Until 2012, the Kurdish national movement in Syria had barely flirted with the idea of devolved or autonomous government for Kurdish areas. The prospect was wholly unrealistic and any expression of interest in the idea attracted the harsh attention of the authorities. Despite the shining success of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and proposals explored for the government of Kurdish areas in Turkey, the concept of Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan received very little attention. Even the term was rarely used and then mostly only by the PYD and some more radical nationalist groups operating from abroad. The war has changed everything. The vacuum of authority in the north of the country, the vulnerability felt by the Kurdish territorial pockets, and the sharp opportunism of the PYD have created both a physical entity (or entities) controlled by Kurds and the more nebulous but increasingly tangible idea of Western Kurdistan... page 237, The course of the war may shift and if the Islamists or the regime gain power in the north, Western Kurdistan could be snuffed out. But while the YPG is successfully defending the "liberated" areas, something called "Rojava" exists and hence Kurdish ideas for its development need to be considered. A return to the pre-war status quo is now utterly unacceptable to Kurds, and while some may be content to gain improved rights in Syria, others, notably including those with guns, are now wedded to the idea of autonomy in Rojava ... Two other ideas may be ruled out. An independent Western Kurdistan is neither desired nor remotely viable. Rojava lacks sufficient population numbers, contiguity, and internal unity, and also has significant non-Kurdish populations and an economy that is completely dependent on the rest of Syria. A pan-Kurdish independent state is also not possible (and very probably not desired), given severe differences between the political elites of the different parts of Kurdistan as well as linguistic and cultural differences. The only option remaining the would satisfy the wishes of many of the Kurdish population is for some form of self-determination settlement within a new Syrian state structure ... ... For example, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term "Syrian Kurdistan" for the first time.. This model would establish a federal Syria with other communities...Qamishli would be the capital of a noncontiguous Kurdish region that [p. 238] would include the three northern pockets. Following a census, minorities within the region would receive a share of seats in the regional government... pp. 239-240, A settlement of the question of self-determination and decentralized government, the issue of what has become called "Rojava", will be far more copmlicated. Politicians involved in negotiations between the Kurds and [p. 240] the Arab opposition acknowledge that this is the key sticking opint. In general, Syrian Sunni Arabs are deeply opposed to Western Kurdistan and any form of devolution or federation in Syria. The Kurds are unclear and disunited on the issue. Western Kurdistan is riddled with internal weaknesses and sits in a deeply hostile environment. In the same book, Eva Savelsberg, "The Syrian-Kurdish Movements: Obstacles Rather Than Driving Forces for Democratization", p. 92 In several ways, the al-Qamishli revolt (serhildan) is different from earlier protests in the Kurdish areas of Syria ... For the first time in the history of contemporary Syria, the protest movement touched all Kurdish territories, thus reinforcing the symbolic unity of the Syrian-Kurdish arena—"Syrian Kurdistan."

Discussion of "Syrian Kurdistan"

• I bolded "Syrian Kurdistan" in the quotes. The above is not an exhaustive list, please feel free to add to it. I only included post-2011 sources from academic publishers (modern scholarship). I didn't list Izady, although he uses the term. Granted, not every source from an academic publisher in this time period uses the term, but I think enough do to support calling "Syrian Kurdistan" the Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria. Levivich ^harass/_hound 07:01, 13 December 2020 (UTC)
  • Are you proposing that be the entire scope of the article, "Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria"? No doubt that is how the term is sometimes used and understood in context. Let me ask this way, are you choosing a title and thereby defining the topic and scope, or choosing the scope and topic (Kurdish-inhabited areas of northern Syria) and then placing at the most appropriate title? fiveby(zero) 17:16, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

    I don't really understand what you're asking. I'm not proposing anything, and I'm neither choosing nor defining the title or the scope. The title is "Syrian Kurdistan" and I assume the scope is "Syrian Kurdistan" and I don't believe this is in dispute? The point of this table is to collect quotes from modern scholarship using the term "Syrian Kurdistan" (mostly to rebut arguments that either this term is not in widespread use, or it's only used by nationalists, or it's only used to refer to an idea and not a place). Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:24, 13 December 2020 (UTC)

Thanks Levivich for the huge effort of putting these together. Now, reading you last sentence, do you feel the quotes achieve the objectives you listed? To me, they clearly portray "Syrian Kurdistan" from the Kurdish nationalist perspective, hence support what we are talking/concerned about. As for the widespread use, I have listed below other names for the areas with their google hits:

• "Kurdish region" and "Syria": About 245,000 results
• "Kurdish area" and "Syria": About 44,400 results
• "Kurdish inhabited" and "Syria": About 10,700 results
• "Syrian Kurdistan": About 78,400 results

Also, below are some major news outlets and the term they use for the area with examples:

• CNN: Kurdish region. Syria grants citizenship to thousands in the Kurdish region
• BBC: Kurdish region. On our way to Qamishli, the largest Kurdish city in northern Syria, we see a US military convoy escorted by fighter jets heading east towards the Iraqi border. They are leaving the Kurdish region.
• Reuters: Border between Iraqi Kurdistan and Syrian Kurdish region closed...
• NYT: A recent trip by a reporter through the Kurdish area of Syria revealed ...
• WP: The Kurdish area of Syria is relatively secure ...
• WSJ: The Kurdish region of Syria ...
• Al-Jazeera: Kurdish areas of Syria ...

I realize there could be other names (e.g., "east of Euphrates" getting >115,000 hits). Given these results, I think we should have a discussion about the common name for the area per WP:COMMONNAME. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 01:55, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

The Google results or "hits" are unreliable for the reasons explained in WP:HITS (those numbers of results at the top of the search results page are not accurate). Popular press is OK to cite for breaking news, but it's not as reliable as scholarship (and really not very reliable at all); because scholarship is available for this topic, we should use scholarship and not news outlets. Specifically, modern scholarship, i.e. post-2011, the newer, the better. Ultimately, this article should be summarizing what scholars say about the topic in 2020. So I have no problem with a discussion about common name, this article title, or even a broader discussion about how all of these related articles are titled and arranged, but I think all content discussions around this topic should be based on modern scholarship first and older scholarship second. Top-level news (like you've listed: BBC, NYT, etc.) should only be used for any recent events not yet covered by scholarship. Levivich ^harass/_hound 06:28, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Would you please focus on topic. The constant change of direction and inability to come to an end of at least one the discussions begun since the lock of the page is confusing for us and probably also for the not so much involved admins who are the only ones who can edit the page now and of which we probably have lost Girth Summit. We (at least I) would all like to get to an end of the dispute and the page was created only a few months ago by an other Admin.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 07:53, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Paradise Chronicle, are you replying to Levivich? —valereee (talk) 13:10, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

The Edit summary says answer to Amr Ibn.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 23:40, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Paradise Chronicle, yes, but the indent says answer to Levivich. :) —valereee (talk) 12:14, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

References

Levivich: In the Savelsberg quote you added above, I read: "For example, the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term Syrian Kurdistan for the first time". This is what this discussion is all about. The PYD/Kurdish narrative is/has been the driving force of this "Syrian Kurdistan" term. As long as we include this fact in the article I am happy with anything you suggest. Cheers, Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 22:52, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich Eva Savelsberg is not a good source, but others are. Amr Ibn and I were involved in long discussions about KurdWatch, which Amr Ibn defended (an article Amr Ibn created) and for which she was the "content manager", at the Tell Abyad page. She attends Forums organized by the SETA and listen how she talks about freedom of press in the AANES. Press outlets can report from within the AANES and many reliable press outlets also have. Once again, the article is not about a recognized political entity Syrian Kurdistan, but a cultural region called Syrian Kurdistan in which of course are also active Kurdish political parties and movements.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 01:36, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

Eva Svalsberg's role has been to talk about human right violations by all parties, including Kurdish militias. I wonder whether that's enough reason for you to say "she is not a good source". Most (maybe all?) of the other sources mentioned in the list are pro-Kurdish anyway, so it's nice to have some diversity. The same issues Eva talks about were also raised by HRW, Amnesty, Roy Gutman, Fabrice Balanche, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and many others including countless respected media reports, so she is not an outlier. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 05:23, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

A few thoughts:

I saw Svalsberg is Chair of the European Center for Kurdish Studies at Free University of Berlin (FUB). Otherwise, I am not at all familiar with her so I have no opinion on her reliability as a source.

The quote "the Kurdish Democratic Party of Syria favors a full federal state and in the summer of 2012 began using the term Syrian Kurdistan for the first time" is from Robert Lowe's chapter in that 2014 book, not Svalsberg's chapter.

For what it's worth, Balanche 2018 (published by WINEP) uses "Syrian Kurdistan" multiple times (mostly talking about possible scenarios for political states or statelets in the region), including in a section called "Syrian Kurdistan under the PYD".

In my view, scholarship published by universities is more reliable than papers by think tanks/advocacy organizations (with a few exceptions, like Pew Research Center), but I'm not sure if that's just my view or if that view has consensus. Also, I think academics are more reliable than journalists (with some exceptions as well, of course). Levivich ^harass/_hound 05:51, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, pretty sure in general even the most reliable advocacy groups should be both directly quoted and attributed and only for supporting their own opinions. One high-profile example: Southern Poverty Law Center. RSNP says The Southern Poverty Law Center is considered generally reliable on topics related to hate groups and extremism in the United States. As an advocacy group, the SPLC is a biased and opinionated source. The organization's views, especially when labeling hate groups, should be attributed per WP:RSOPINION. —valereee (talk) 12:21, 15 December 2020 (UTC)

References

edit issue?

This edit did something to the page -- lost sections, not sure how. Can anyone figure it out? —valereee (talk) 17:01, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

weirdly, I can see it in vis ed, just not in source. —valereee (talk) 17:09, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

عمرو بن كلثوم, it was an edit of yours -- maybe try reverting yourself, then try again? —valereee (talk) 17:16, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Fixed. It was a missing / in a closing </ref>. Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:22, 14 December 2020 (UTC)

Dec 12 lead paragraph draft follow up discussion

Levivich and Attar-Aram syria have made a large effort for finding a lead and their co-production here seems to have found the best reasonable feedback so far. It's the version of Attar Aram syria with the "as" deleted before one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans".

Syrian Kurdistan is a Kurdish-inhabited area in northern Syria surrounding three noncontiguous enclaves along the Turkish and Iraqi borders: Afrin in the northwest, Kobani in the north, and Jazira in the northeast. Syrian Kurdistan is sometimes called Western Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojava Kurdistanê, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun sets'), one of the four "Lesser Kurdistans" that comprise "Greater Kurdistan", alongside Iranian Kurdistan (Kurdish: Rojhilatê Kurdistanê‎, lit. 'Kurdistan where the sun rises'), Turkish Kurdistan (Kurdish: Bakurê Kurdistanê, lit. 'Northern Kurdistan'), and Iraqi Kurdistan (Kurdish: Başûrê Kurdistanê, lit. 'Southern Kurdistan').

Does anyone have some improvements to add to this lead?The following discussion was mixed with confusing edits for a solution finding process, so I begin a new discussion.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 10:58, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

This suggested text is one sided and not neutral and does not take into consideration the sources that disputes the claim that a Kurdistan exists in Syria.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 13:28, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, can you suggest an addition, sourced to current scholarly work, that will improve it in your eyes? —valereee (talk) 14:33, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Valereee, as I have said before, the current lead is the most neutral version as it doesn't take a side to only one (disputed) perspective but presents both sides. The text Paradise Chronicle suggested takes only one side and presents it as an undisputed truth. And the other side is no where to be found. I can show sources but it will be a wall of text. The sources I can bring forward have also already been shown at this talkpage above and in the archives by me, Amr ibn Kulthoum and Levivich. Do you want me to do a compilation of them? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 16:22, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, the current lead is being objected to by editors here on talk as containing non-neutral statements. Per policy, the onus is on the editors who want to include the disputed information, so if there's information not included that you want included, can you suggest at least wording. I don't think anyone wants a compilation, no wall of text needed, just for a starter the name of the source where it's coming from probably, and then if other editors think that source needs discussion, that can happen. But first maybe suggest what wording you want added to the above? —valereee (talk) 16:35, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Valereee, the first line of the article should read: ""Syrian Kurdistan" is a modern and disputed name used by some Kurds and journalists for Kurdish-inhabited areas in northern Syria." Sources: "Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East" p 236, 225. "Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution" p 275, "Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State p 19.--Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 17:16, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

None of those three books (all quoted in the source table) say that Syrian Kurdistan is "used by some Kurds and journalists".

The first book (Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East) is Lowe 2014. That's the one where Lowe says "The war has changed everything". Lowe explains in very explicit language ("...something called 'Rojava' exists...") that before the war, few people used the term (because of fear of the Syrian government), and after the war, basically everyone uses the term, even the KDP-S (who had not used the term since its founding in the 1950s). Lowe is not saying "some Kurds and journalists", he is saying almost the opposite: everybody uses this term since the war. "The war has changed everything".

The second book (Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution) is Kajjo 2019, who mentions the use of the term Syrian Kurdistan by some Kurdish parties in the 1990s. Kajjo also uses the term, in his own voice, to refer to the area (p. 284) "...Iran hedges its bets on Syrian Kurdistan". That Kajjo is a journalist born in northern Jazira doesn't mean we can point to his book and say "used by some Kurds and journalists". That's WP:SYNTH. Kajjo needs to say "some Kurds and journalists" in order for us to cite him for the proposition. We can't use him as an example of a Kurdish journalist, and extrapolate from that example into "some Kurds and journalists".

The third book (Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State) is Tejel 2020 edited by Cimino. Tejel 2020 is quoted extensively above. He also explicitly says that he is concerned with "Greater Kurdistan", not the Syria-Turkish border, and that terms like "Syrian Kurdistan" and "Rojava" have changed over time. He doesn't say it's used by "some Kurds and journalists". Also, Tejel (in Gunter 2018) is the same person who says some Kurdish parties started using the term after the 1999 cease fire. Tejel supports the proposition that some Kurds used the term before the 2011 war, but he says nothing about its use after the war. And FWIW, Tejel is neither Kurdish nor a journalist. What he says is a "myth" is the notion of Syrian Kurdistan as part of a pan-Kurdish nation state (e.g., he's saying Syrian Kurdistan is not and was never Western Kurdistan), but even in this, he is the outlier, and he admits it. "I shall argue..." means he knows he is making a novel argument, not representing the scholarly consensus. And aside from all of that, Tejel isn't at all saying "Western Kurdistan"/"Rojava"'s use is limited to "some Kurds and journalists". He implicitly acknowledges that its use is widespread; he is arguing that the use is inaccurate; he is not arguing that it doesn't exist or isn't used. (FWIW Cimino equates "Rojava" and "Syrian Kurdistan" in his introduction summarizing Tejel, but Tejel actually never equates those two terms.) Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:53, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East p 236, 225: "Until 2012, the Kurdish national movement in Syria had barely flirted with the idea of devolved or autonomous government for Kurdish areas. The prospect was wholly unrealistic and any expression of interest in the idea attracted the harsh attention of the authorities. Despite the shining success of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and proposals explored for the government of Kurdish areas in Turkey, the concept of Syrian Kurdistan or Western Kurdistan received very little attention. Even the term was rarely used and then mostly only by the PYD and some more radical nationalist groups operating from abroad." "in November 2013 the largest Kurdish party there felt able to declare a transitional administration. Western Kurdistan was previously a vague concept rarely used by most Kurds"

Syrian Kurds: Rising from the Ashes of Persecution p 275 "They promoted the concept of Syrian Kurdistan but with key constraints."

Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State p 19 "By relying on unpublished maps and school books, dating from the sixteenth century to the present day, Tejel demonstrates that the Kurdish territorial imagination, comprising myths, mobilizing stories and political ambitions, is relatively plastic and fluctuating. Recently established, "Rojava" (Syrian Kurdistan) is part of a mythology of pan-Kurdish unity which does not constitute a political objective for the Syrian Kurds in itself, but is rather a "cultural abstract". For the author, "like Arab nationalists in Syria, the Kurdish movement has produced a political discourse that combines pan-Kurdist references intertwined with local patriotism and limited territorial claims". Yet the author shows that this imagined community is nevertheless very well documented..."

So we have reliable sources describing "Syrian Kurdistan" as a "concept", "Kurdish territorial imagination", "imagined community" and "comprising myths". Where are these facts in Paradise Chronicles suggested lead? --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 11:28, 18 December 2020 (UTC)

You misrepresent sources. The first source you quote, Lowe, the very next line after your quote ("Even the term was rarely used...") is "The war has changed everything.". This is what I pointed out in my last response and again you quote the passage before, and after, that part, while skipping the part where he says "war has changed everything" and "something called 'Rojava' exists". I've already quoted this section in full, twice (in this thread, and in the table), and you're totally ignoring it.

Lowe uses the terms Syrian Kurdistan, Rojava, and Western Kurdistan to refer to the place like a zillion times in that book (more Rojava and WK than SK). First of all, Lowe's Chapter 11 in the book is titled "The Emergence of Western Kurdistan and the Future of Syria." He write: "In theory, the SKC is a de facto interim administrative body for Syrian Kurdistan that represents all the Kurdish parties..." The section "The Establishment of Self-Rule in Rojava" is where he talks about the PYD's takeover of the three enclaves. Here are some examples where Lowe refers to the place, which he explicitly says exists, as Rojava or Western Kurdistan: "Rojava faces massive threats to its stability and existence...A fundamental weakness is geography as unlike Kurdistan-Iraq, Western Kurdistan lacks both the contiguity, which provides political coherence, and the mountains, which provide defense...following the 2012 takeover the regime continued to pay the salaries of civil servants in Rojava...The surrounding neighborhood does not give much encouragement for Western Kurdistan's future...A greater obstacle to the establishment of self-government in Western Kurdistan is what may be called 'non-Kurdish Syria', that is, the 85-90 percent of Syrians who are not Kurds...the KRG is unlikely to prove sufficiently strong or committed to Western Kurdistan should the Syrian civil war truly engulf Kurdish areas...[Then comes the section you've been incompletely quoting, entitled "Devolved Government for Kurdish Areas"]...The PYD took control of Kurdish towns in 2012; it is the leading party in designing and administrating Rojava, and is the only part to run a militia of any strength...The part is not interested in Western Kurdistan emulating models set by Kurdistan-Iraq or Scotland....Western Kurdistan also provides strategic depth to the wider PYD/PKK struggle...A settlement of the question of self-determination and decentralized government, the issue of what has become called "Rojava," will be far more complicated...In general, Syrian Sunni Arabs are deeply opposed to Western Kurdistan and any form of devolution or federation in Syria...Western Kurdistan is riddled with internal weaknesses and sits in a deeply hostile environment...the consolidation of some form of a representative-devolved administration in Western Kurdistan would help Syria to become more democratic...The inclusion of non-Kurdish minorities in Western Kurdistan is important...This commitment remains to be fully test in Rojava..."

It's just dishonest to claim that Lowe is saying Syrian Kurdistan is a concept and not a place when he says the very opposite, and it's dishonest to pick out one quote that supports that while omitting the quotes before and after that contradict it. It's dishonest to quote a part where Lowe is discussing pre-2011 and suggest it applies post-2011, even when Lowe specifically makes this point about the war changing everything. And I use the word "dishonest" because while someone could certainly make this mistake innocently, after it's been pointed out to you at least twice by me (and before me, others pointed this out, too), I don't see how you can continue to make this mistake innocently after all these quotes are on the page. You know Lowe is saying that SK is a place and not a concept, at least not since the war. I'm not going to spend time responding to #2 and #3, given your misrepresentation of #1, and because they've been addressed before (including in my previous post). You are massively wasting my time by making me have to "correct the record" like this.

BTW this is a little off topic for this post, but Lowe thinks Savelsberg, Tejel, and Allsopp are legit. While I'm typing all this other stuff from Lowe, let me type this part: "Eva Savelsberg and Jordi Tejel argue that there is no prospect of the Kurdish transition leading to democracy in the short term...Harriet Allsopp acknowledges the deep problems posed by the PYD but offers a more optimistic assessment..." If we're going to accept Lowe as an RS (which of course we must), then we should also accept Savelsberg, Tejel, and Allsopp as RSes. Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:50, 18 December 2020 (UTC)

Levivich, the quote I added said "Until 2012" so its self-explanatory that according to the author the situation changed after that point of time. But even if we look at the rest of the quote: "The war has changed everything. The vacuum of authority in the north of the country, the vulnerability felt by the Kurdish territorial pockets, and the sharp opportunism of the PYD have created both a physical entity (or entities) controlled by Kurds and the more nebulous but increasingly tangible idea of Western Kurdistan..."... have I said that kurds aren't controlling areas in Syria? Have I said that Western kurdistan isn't an idea? I only looked at the text in the template above as I don't have access to all the sources. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 18:48, 18 December 2020 (UTC)

Supreme Deliciousness, I'd like to have editors productively arguing from a variety of points of view at this talk page, as I think it's healthy. But honestly the arguments I'm seeing are all just POV-pushing. If you want to stay here and continue to argue, you are going to need to take a big step into listening to reliable scholarly sources and representing them not as you wish they were but as they are. We need diverse points of view, but not POV-pushers. Do you think you can make that step? —valereee (talk) 18:17, 18 December 2020 (UTC)

Neither enclave nor ethnic enclave would be correct. What would Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira link to? fiveby(zero) 16:18, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

What do you mean it would not be correct? What sources say it's not correct to call those enclaves? Levivich ^harass/_hound 16:26, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

What sources say it's not correct to call those enclaves? is not really the way to decide on wording. An enclave, as you can see by the article mostly implies some formal territory. This leads to confusion with Rojava and when areas were more enclaves in this sense. Ethnically or culturally part of Kurdistan would not be an enclave, it's contiguous with the rest. fiveby(zero) 17:10, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Looking at the sources is exactly how we decide on the wording. I'm pretty sure that each and every single source I've posted uses the word "enclave" to describe "Syrian Kurdistan", specifically the three enclaves in/around Afrin, Kobani and Jazira. Do you have any sources that use some other word, or that say the word "enclave" is not correct? It doesn't matter what the word implies; if the sources use it, we use it, implications and all. Levivich ^harass/_hound 17:24, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

WP:ONUS. WP:LEDE. The current summary in the article is the part of Kurdistan in Syria and i feel that is a better summary than emphasizing enclaves. For the first time in the history of contemporary Syria, the protest movement had touched all of the Kurdish territories, thus reinforcing the symbolic unity of the Syrian Kurdish arena - “Syrian Kurdistan.” (Tejel 2009, p. 108) Above you emphasized reading sources in context and not cherry-picking. fiveby(zero) 18:27, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Let me ask you this: Does Tejel use the word "enclaves" or not? Levivich ^harass/_hound 18:53, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

He does on that very same page of course. "northern Syrian Kurdish enclaves". How in the hell is it disruptive to try and avoid confusion with this, or this for example? fiveby(zero) 19:16, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Slate?? It's disruptive to bring Slate into this conversation. WTF? Academic sources. Get "on the level" here. What we're doing here is summarizing academic sources.

Also WTF, the book you're quoting from uses "enclaves" so it is disruptive to claim that this book supports not using enclaves, when that word is all over that book (and all over the other books too).

For everyone else, just one example, here is the same book fiveby was quoting from, page 8: The Kurdish populations placed under French Mandate occupy three narrow zones, isolated from one another, all along the Turkish fronteir: Jazira, Jarablus, and Kurd Dagh. These three Kurdish enclaves constitute the natural extension of Kurdish territory into Turkey and Iraq. (bold added). So to hell with the Tejel argument! :-) Levivich ^harass/_hound 19:25, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Slate, as an example of recent usage of enclave in an sense meaning Kurdish controlled territory is not disruptive. fiveby(zero) 19:44, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Fiveby, I'm afraid it really is, in an article that has plenty of scholarly sources to use. We don't use the media in such a case, a policy that has been explained. —valereee (talk) 19:49, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Fiveby, Levivich is correct. If reliable sources, in this case modern scholars, use a term, that's the term Wikipedia uses. I've explained this policy multiple times here. Refusing to understand this policy or accept it is disruptive. If you are not familiar with our policies, you should not be editing at this talk or the talk of any other contentious article. —valereee (talk) 17:44, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

WP:ONUS. WP:LEDE. I understand WP policy very well, and that using administrative tools and threats to shut down discussion or exclude editors you don't like is also against policy. fiveby(zero) 18:27, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

Fiveby, I am not trying to shut down discussion, I am trying to moderate it by preventing disruptive behavior at an article talk that has a history of being extremely contentious and plagued by disruptive behavior to the point other editors don't want to come in and help. I'm going to ignore the personal attack. —valereee (talk) 18:38, 17 December 2020 (UTC)

To PC's OP: I agree with this lead as an improvement over the current lead. Yes, I think it could be improved further, but really the best improvement would be expanding it from one paragraph to a full four-paragraph lead. So as far as the first paragraph goes, this is good with me for now, and maybe it's better to talk about the other lead paragraphs and then later re-visit the first paragraph? Levivich ^harass/_hound 22:07, 17 December 2020 (UTC)