Talk:Soviet offensive plans controversy

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We need to get over from relying on this review Teddy J. Uldricks every now and again (yes, I have read that review, too). This review is no definitive work on the subject at hand. As for Bobylev (Бобылев, Павел Николаевич), Uldrick seems to have forgotten some things. П.Н. Бобылев, ВИЖ, № 7-8, 1993) argues that a 'counteroffensive' was planned and played through indeed, though there's an important facet: the German assault was assumed, yet the games essentially only covered the counterattack [1]. Will give more references soon. --Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 17:11, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Great.

The current article is just a skeleton - let's put some meat on it. regards, DMorpheus (talk) 17:13, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Just a very recent piece by dr Magenheimer (popped up in google search Der Angriff der Wehrmacht auf die Sowjetunion am 22. Juni 1941 war weder Überfall noch Präventivkrieg Krieg zweier Angreifer Von Heinz Magenheimer (in Junge Freiheit).

Here's something by Bobylev (have never seen before; will check what he is arguing there) [2]. --Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 17:25, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Re: "We need to get over from relying on this review Teddy J. Uldricks" Why not? Uldricks' article meet all criteria applied to highly reliable sources by WP:V. In addition, if you read the sources cited in the article you will see that all scholars cited in the article (Derek Watson, Hugh Ragsdale, Roger Reese, Stephen Blank, Robin Edmonds, David Glantz, Gabriel Gorodetsky, Jonathan Haslam, and even purely anti-Soviet Nekrich) agree that the major Suvorov's writings rest on "virtually no evidentiary base"(Cythnia Roberts). Haslam is even more categorical, his opinion is quoted in the article. Your attempt to question these scholar's opinion resembles what is called "civil POV pushing".
To clarify everything, let me explain what I have done. I went to Jstor.org and looked though all article where the words "Suvorov" and "Icebreaker" or "Ledokol" were mentioned. I found no positive reviews, few negative reviews and other authors just briefly mentioned Suvorov as something insignificant. I believe, the conclusion is obvious.
To my opinion the best way to neutrality in not to find a source that supports your views, but to write based on what you have read.
And, last but not least, let's refrain from using Eastern European sources in this article: it is funny when the same people who reject one Russian sources under pretext of "propaganda" waves with other similarly questionable sources for only reason that they support their own views...--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:47, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

I think you forget that the article here is not Viktor Suvorov. For example, Hoffmann has likely many positive reviews. As for jstor. & Suvorov, I have conducted a similar search a few years ago and the results were the same. --Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 17:55, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

As to Gorodetsky, his works have been thoroughly criticized for factual errors by Hoffmann in his Stalins Vernichtungskrieg. --Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 17:55, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

I disagree with your claim, that I 'attempt to question these scholar's opinion resembles what is called "civil POV pushing"'. I am just trying to summarize Bobylev's writings. From what I just found on the Internet (article published in 2000):

Даже если Сталин действительно считал, что главный удар германские войск нанесут на юго-западном направлении, это ничего принципиально не меняло в представленном военными плане и только убеждало их в правильности сделанного ими выбора в отношении основного варианта развертывания советских войск. В записи нет упоминаний ни об угрозе Украине, ни о каких-либо оборонительных мероприятиях на юго-западном направлении. Создаваемая здесь мощная группировка советских войск предназначалась для решения наступательных задач.

Во-первых, до сих пор нет внятного объяснения совершенно неадекватного реагирования советского военно-политического руководства на полученные им из различных источников сведения о готовности Германии совершить нападение на СССР в июне 1941 г. Если бы оно думало исключительно об обороне, то отношение к подобным сообщениям было бы несколько иным.

I couldn't find any earlier articles by Bobylev available online, but I think we may rely on citations in Meltyukhov (2000):

Для отработки "северного" и "южного" вариантов соответственно 2—6 и 8—11 января 1941 г. в Генштабе проводились две оперативно-стратегические игры, подробности которых раскрыты в работах П.Н. Бобылева. (...) Хотя в заданиях к играм отмечалось, что "западные" напали, "никаких задач, связанных с действиями "восточных" по отражению агрессии не решалось". Стороны были поставлены в известность, что "западные" были отброшены к границе, а на [373] Юго-Западном направлении даже к линии рек Висла и Дунаец на оккупированной немцами территории Польши, и с этих рубежей уже шла игра. Исходя из этого, П.Н. Бобылев критикует мнение М.В. Захарова, что игры проводились для "отработки некоторых вопросов, связанных с действиями войск в начальный период войны". (...) Как мы увидим далее, никаких оборонительных операций советский Генштаб и не планировал, поэтому разыгрывавшиеся наступательные операции Красной Армии и должны были стать содержанием начального периода войны. В ходе игры наступление "восточных" на территории Восточной Пруссии захлебнулось, а на Юго-Западе они добились значительных успехов, что и привело к отказу от "северного" варианта действий Красной Армии. Тем самым главным направлением советского наступления была определена Южная Польша

(referring to Бобылев П.И. Репетиция катастрофы//Военно-исторический журнал. 1993. № 7. С. 14—21; № 8. С,28—35; Русский архив: Великая Отечественная. Т.12(1). М..1993. С,388—390; Бобылев П.Н. К какой войне готовился Генеральный штаб РККА в 1941 году//Отечественная история. 1995. № 5. С.3—20) In the light of this, the summary that

According to Bobylev, the January 1941 war games were based on the assumption of a German attack followed by the Soviet counterattack

seems inaccurate.

--Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 18:42, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Re: "I disagree with your claim... etc". I am glad that I was wrong because civil POV pushing is what I hate.

Re: "I think you forget that the article here is not Viktor Suvorov." The way the article is written creates an impression that it is focused mostly on the Suvorov's theories. However, I fully agree that his views deserve no detailed discussion on WP pages. I agree that many of his theses should be expluded and the works of other, more serious scholars, like Mel'tiukhov, should be added instead.
In connection to that, let me remind you that Mel'tiukhov doesn't support the major Suvorov's thesis that Barbarossa was a preventive war. According to him, Hitler and Stalin knew nothing about each other's plans, so no one expected the other's attack. In that situation, it is senseless to speak about any preventive war.
One more point. Since I am currently involved into the work on the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact article, it was interesting to me what did Mel'tiukhov write on this account in his major book. Interestingly, he almost literally reiterated the theses that are being vehemently rejected by WP editors from former Eastern Bloc countries. Namely, that the USSR didn't conduct secret negotiations with Germany before August, that the Baltic issue was a reason for not signing the anti-German alliance between the USSR, France and the UK, that Britain conducted a secret negotiations with Germany while talking with Soviet Russia about anti-German alliance etc. Does it mean that if we consider Mel'tiukhov a reliable source we have to consider equally seriously his other theses?
--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:58, 17 July 2009 (UTC)

Really surprised that Isayev was left out, so inserted him.--58.164.28.19 (talk) 10:25, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

I have no objections to inserting him. Here's a nice review on Isayev. In particular, it is argued that

В общем, Алексей Валерьевич предстает в виде типичного агитатора-пропагандиста советских времен, который долго и с жаром рассказывал о том, как плохо живется неграм в Америке и из этого выводил (!), что в СССР жить лучше, чем где-либо. С агитаторами-пропагандистами спорить нельзя, над ними можно только смеяться.

[3](remove asterisk from the link - the site seems to be blacklisted here). --Miacek and his crime-fighting dog (woof!) 12:33, 6 August 2009 (UTC)

This is exactly what is wrong with this controversy. If you disagree, you get labeled as "типичного агитатора-пропагандиста". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.120.18.38 (talk) 11:25, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

However, he has written several books, and if you read them they do not appear to be particularly written with a view to defend Soviet Union. There is a wealth of archival data in them that supports many arguments against "Suvorov" albeit I agree that he picks and chooses his issues. Peter Ton was banned from VIF for a year, but I don't think it was for his arguments, but rather his delivery, i.e. language.

More interesting is the lack of analytical works that evaluate the plethora of memoirs by veterans that appeared since 1993 which describes first few months of the war. I have been steadily reading these, and my impression is that at lower command levels and down to average enlisted personnel, regardless of the service, there were very few people who doubted there would be a war, but also almost no person who actually was ready for one or was issued orders to be ready for one in the immediate month before 22 June 1941. So, all the planning supposedly made by Stalin et.el. for attack on Germany was never transmitted to executive levels of the very organisation intended to perform the attack? My own uncle was an intelligence officer with the Red Navy in one of the border patrol squadrons on the Black Sea. Although he died during defence of Sevastopol, my grandmother told me she remembered that when he showed up at home three days after the war started, he was still in a shock that it had. And, keep in mind the Black Sea Fleet had received an early warning order! --58.164.28.19 (talk) 07:36, 8 August 2009 (UTC)

Controversy

Why is there "controvers" in the title? Surely we can write an article about "Soviet offensive plans" and whether or not they existed without having to call it a "controversy". It reads like Shock! Horror! journalism.

Secondly we should be more specific in the title about when and against whom these (possible) plans were to be targeted. DJ Clayworth (talk) 20:41, 20 August 2009 (UTC)

Maybe "Possible Soviet offensive plans against Nazi Germany"? There is also a controversy about possible Soviet plans to invade Western Europe after the war. That's what I expected this article to be about. Steve Dufour (talk) 04:05, 21 August 2009 (UTC)

Initially, this article was the Eastern Front article's section. It's name was "Soviet offensive plan theory". Since this theory is a fringe theory, I extensively modified the section, added a number of sources, shifted the accents accordingly, and changed the name to "Soviet offensive plan controversy". This caused long debates, and DMorpheus proposed to move a major part of material into a separate, newly created article. The current article's name, therefore, is a legacy of its past life (the article's section), and, obviously, it should be changed to something more informative.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:27, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

I dont see how "controversy" is much better than "theory". Theory indicates that this isn't mainstream line exactly the same way or even better, as if this thing would be mainstream we would be simply talking about "Soviet Offensive Plans" with no extra additions. Anyway for more accurate title "Theory of Soviet offensive plans against Axis powers" maybe?--Staberinde (talk) 21:44, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

That is what I mean: the name suitable for the section is not good for the article. The article's name should be quite different, any your proposal is an improvement. However, I would make it more specific: the article discusses a theory of a Soviet preemptive strike, so the name should be "Theory of Soviet preemptive strike against Nazi Germany" (or something like that). BTW, Germany is better, because in 1941 the USSR had no offensive plans against two other major Axis members, Italy and Japan.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:00, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I dont see point in "preemtive" as article also covers views that Soviets were planning to invade Germany on their own, not just as reply to German build-up. Problem with just "Germany" is that its a bit too narrow, I am pretty sure that Romania is usually considered also one of main targets in this scenario, and while I can't be sure, by looking map and considering political situation it feels logical that Hungary and Slovakia would had also got hit directly.--Staberinde (talk) 22:29, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

Up to you. However, if "Germany" is too narrow, "the Axis" is too wide. I would say, "Germany" is more accurate.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:37, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

Maybe "European Axis Powers" then? Excludes Japan and I dont think that anyone who has any basic knowledge about geography or history would think that Italy is primary target.--Staberinde (talk) 22:46, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

Maybe.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:49, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

The article name should contain the word "controversy" because that's what it is about - the fact that a controversy exists and the debate on several sides of the issue. The model for this was the Global warming controversy.

The term "theory" in no way communicates the notion that historians disagree about the existence of Soviet plans to invade Germany. 'Theory' has its own, very different meaning.

So, while I am not opposed to tweaking the title, I am opposed to removing the word 'controversy' and I do not think 'theory' is an adequate substitute. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:21, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Correct. With regards to the article's name, again, my point was that the section's name and the article's name have to fit different criteria. When this text was the part of the mother article, it was clear from the context what concrete offensive plans the section was talking about. By contrast, the article's name should me more specific.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:06, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Was there a single Hitler's war not preemptive? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.120.18.38 (talk) 11:13, 26 May 2011 (UTC)

Let's be consistent.

I've just removed the following words:

"But these arguments confuse the question of whether the Soviets were ready to attack with the question of whether Stalin intended an attack, a common confusion in discussions of this subject. Unless you presuppose infallible Soviet military judgment, showing that the USSR was not ready to attack Germany only shows that such an attack, if ordered, would have been a military blunder. Given the numerous failures of the Red Army in the 1941, the idea that this blunder was impossible for the Soviet High Command needs better support."

Let's be consistent: the major article's thesis is that the "Soviet ground forces were extremely well organized, and were mobilizing en masse all along the German-Soviet border for a Soviet invasion of Europe". If we use it as a starting point, the fragment I removed looks absolutely ridiculous: we conclude that the Soviets planned the attack because they were well organized, but if even they weren't well organized they planned their attack anyway...--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:34, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

I assumed that article's major thesis is: "Soviet union planned to invade Germany and its European allies". I know that Suvorov claimed that they were very well organized, but he has no monopoly over this theory and I am not sure that other supporters of theory have made similar claims.--Staberinde (talk) 22:43, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

Although I saw no positive reviews on Suvorov's books (but many negative ones), his theory is falsifiable, so it fits the basic scientific theory's criterion. By contrast, the statement I removed has nothing to do with science: it is impossible to determine how this "theory" can be falsified, in other words, how the reverse could be demonstrated. Again, we can seriously discuss the Suvorov's theory (although I would prefer not to do that), but I don't see how can we discuss this bullshit.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:55, 24 August 2009 (UTC)

The thesis of this article, and the Operation Barbarossa article that spawned it, is that historians disagree. There is no need to adopt any particular point of view on the merits of the argument and indeed it is wise to avoid one. Regards, DMorpheus (talk) 19:24, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Although you are, obviously, right, my point was quite different. I meant that we can discuss any point of view except those "theories" that are impossible neither confirm nor refute. --Paul Siebert (talk) 20:10, 28 August 2009 (UTC)

Hitler statements

Naturally anything coming out of Hitler's mouth warrants very careful consideration, however, it does seem that evidence for possible Soviet offensive preparations might be found on the German side.

Two which come to mind are the declarations made in Hitler's speech at the Reichtag on December 11 1941:

'"A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available which confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time and has given me the strength to do what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence. I may say this today: If this wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost."'

The propagandistic venue of a mass radio address is a factor that must be considered in evaluating Hitler's statement.

However, Hitler's conversation (as usual, a very one-sided one) with Marshal Mannerheim, as recorded in Finland on June 4, 1942, was not in a public venue, and he returned to the same theme and indeed quotes some of the same figures. Of course, it is possible that Hitler was trying to achieve some ulterior motive with his statements, or perhaps on a deeper psychological level, he was trying to exculpate himself from the guilt of initiating a wanton conflict.

The book "Hitler's Secret Conversations' also records statements in the same vein.

The repetition of these statements may indicate that Hitler did believe (or managed to persuade himself) that there was indeed a real threat of a major Soviet offensive.

Now, even if such a belief were, in fact, illusory, it might have been an actual factor in Hitler's decision to launch Barbarossa.

On another point, there is apparently some basis to the idea that pre-war Soviet military doctrine on deep penetration strategies were very offensive in outlook. If such were the case, then the geopolitical expediency of an attack for an opportunistic Stalin would match the military instrumentality of STAVKA.

P. Marder — Preceding unsigned comment added by 108.81.227.196 (talk) 06:26, 3 July 2011 (UTC)

Hitler's speech at the Reichtag on December 11 1941 - after the fact - says by itself. If it was June 11 1941 - it could be different matter. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 208.120.174.56 (talk) 16:32, 21 August 2011 (UTC)

While possible propagandistic intention in public speeches must be considered. Hitler was quite clear in a private conversation with Mannerheim where he didn't have reasons to make things up: https://archive.org/details/HitlerSprichtZuMannerheimsGeburtstag (in German) --197.228.42.166 (talk) 10:01, 3 October 2013 (UTC)

Obviously, "a truly impressive amount of authentic material" could only be obtained once Barbarossa had been launched. While not doubting the great unreliability of any Nazi sources, it is the reality that apart from the Soviets themselves (who obviously would want to hide any such plans had they existed), if anyone would know it would be the German troops that entered Soviet territory in summer 1941. 37.136.94.117 (talk) 00:54, 9 July 2016 (UTC)

sources

The article says (or quotes someone) : "Suvorov reluctantly reveals his sources"
I'm not exactly sure what they mean by that. I've read two of his books on the WW2 subject, and found them very hard to read because of the tons of quotes it contains, almost every page quotes from several memoirs, books etc given by name, and those are books that are not classified. I can't verify whether he quotes them right (though not doing so would be easily detected by researchers I suppose), and whether he interprets them right is another question. Hoemaco (talk) 19:47, 23 January 2012 (UTC)

Yes, it quotes some reliable source, and, therefore, this statement complies with our WP:V policy. Other sources tell about Suvorov's unsatisfactory evidential base. See, e.g. Cynthia A. Roberts (Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 47, No. 8 (Dec., 1995), pp. 1293-1326). Although Roberts also speaks about Soviet offensive stance (which she interpreted as "counter-offensive" defense), she also speaks about Icebreaker as absed on "virtually no documentary sources"). You have been probably mislead by the fact that Suvorov uses numerous circumstantial evidences. However, most serious historians do not treat such evidences seriously.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:28, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

I'm not exactly sure I understand you. I mean, I agree that the conclusions are not based on official soviet documents that state plainly "we are going to attack europe" but on sources that only slightly indicate it, but those sources are still "real" documents, not hearsay. And if there were real documents (as supposed), this idea would be a fact accepted by everyone, not a controversial idea, so it's somewhat strange to ask for official sources, esp. because the whole idea is about the soviet government denying the whole thing. On the other hand, scientific research is often about collecting lots of references that are indirect and using their overall weight to support the hypothesis. Also, I think that wikipedia's insisting of sources can sometimes go a bit far - eg. quoting one author about another author lacking sources... when all we need is to open the other author's book and see it for ourselves, sound ridiculous to me. I mean, say, what if person A writes a book, then person B writes another and says that person A uses no sources and is a complete moron by the way; would then both be included as reliable sources in the wiki article, even if, say, person B never even read the book of A ? (I don't mean to insult Roberts or anyone else, not being able to read their book, I just extrapolate wiki policy as I understand it).

As for me, when we learned history, I always wondered why soviets acted so stupidly and illogically, so I find this whole idea would fit the events much better (I won't say it's a fact though, only that it sounds more logical to me). Especially considering the old soviet rhetoric of world revolution (we in the central-east Europe remember it too well). It'd be also interesting to connect the idea with the bombing of Kassa (Kosice) in upper Hungary, which helped initiate the Hungarian participation in the war, and which is still debated to be of German or Soviet attack.

Hoemaco (talk) 08:38, 10 March 2012 (UTC)

I am going to remove the "reluctantly reveals his sources" bit as it does not seem to be correct. I'd read Icebreaker years ago and can confirm it's chock full of sources (many of them taken from Soviet-era memoirs of generals). Whatever one thinks of Suvorov's arguments and ideas, one thing he does not seem to be guilty of is hiding his sources - he brandishes them all the time. In fact, he prided himself on using only open-print and easily verifiable sources and not archival research (since he had no access to archives anyway). So either Ms. Roberts misrepresented his position or WP editor misread her book. Either way,

"reluctantly" has to go.

While I am at it, I'll try to generally trim the article. It's got too many repetitions and flab. Bazuz (talk) 15:36, 7 August 2013 (UTC)

Sentinel2074 (talk) 22:26, 20 November 2013 (UTC) Several observations:

1. As a a fellow historian and published author, I find it extremely regretable that this argument "most serious historians don't take circumstantial evidence seriously" keeps being brandished around as a stick to beat Suvorov with. Such a claim is completely absurd. Circumstantial evidence has always been treated seriously by historians. We don't need to look very far for evidence in this regard: take, for instance, David Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus", which was written as the main rebuttal of the Icebreaker and which is based on nothing else but circumstantial evidence, bccause you can't prove a negative otherwise. The main crux of "Stumbling colossus" is that the Red Army was unfit for offensive operations in 1941 and thus, Stalin not being an idiot, he could not have ordered the preparation of an invasion of Germany. If this is not "circumstantial evidence", then nothing is. It looks very much to me that this "circumstantial evidence" argument is a mere pretext, the most convenient which could have been found to reject an inconvenient theory - because there is no scientific basis or precedent for this rejection by default of circumstantial evidence.

2. I would also recommend Paul Siebert (and others) to show less deference towards the opinions of established historians. To put it simple, Suvorov's theory ran contrary to the establishment - it was utterly predictable that the first reviews would be negative no matter what. I recall that I have seen once a comment regarding the Icebreaker, which remarked that this theory was bound to encounter a hostile reception from the historical community because most of it was committed to the traditional version and to accept Suvorov meant that their own works would suddently become worthless. I can say with absolute certainty, from personal experience, that the majority of established historians would never admit to have been wrong, particularly against someone from the "outside", so to speak, as Suvorov. And, as such, the critics are not displaying good faith when reviewing Suvorov. For instance, this very wikipedia articles claims that "Some of Suvorov's claims have been shown to simply be inaccurate, such as his claim regarding Soviet conscription only starting in 1939, when in fact, conscription existed in the RKKA since 1925". That is utterly false. There is no such claim in Suvorov's books. What Suvorov says is that soviet universal conscription started in 1939, not conscription per se. Basically, Suvorov's main argument was that, starting in 1939, there was a massive build of Soviet military power and, as part of it, in september 1939, the "selective" conscription which was used until then (drafting between a quarter and half of all men reaching military age yearly) was replaced with an universal draft.

Personally, I'd be more wary of the negative reviews on Jstor and others places - that does not mean to dismiss them by default, as some would like to do with Suvorov, because "relies only on the circumstantial evidence", but a more critical approach to them would be advisable. Again, even this very wikipedia articles quotes opinions which are quite bizarre, and I'm putting this mildly, such as Michael Jabara Carley's claim, that the Stalin 5 May 1941 speech "could be equally interpreted as a deliberate attempt to discourage the Germans from launching an invasion". Teddy Uldricks, whose review Mr. Paul Siebert holds in such a high esteem, dismisses the 15 May offensive plan on the basis that "there is no documentary evidence that Zhukov's proposal was ever accepted by Stalin", apparently pretending not to know 2 elementary facts: 1) that the soviet archives were purged and altered constantly; 2)how likely would have been for the Soviet Chief of the General Staff to try to divert Soviet foreign policy on his own initiative (because that is Zhukov's proposal to Stalin amounted to, if it was the former's personal initiative: an attempt to dictate the course of the USSR's foreign policy). Can anyone imagine Zhukov's entering Stalin's office, pushing under his nose the war plans and saying: "Look, comrade Stalin, there's plan to attack Germany. Why don't you sign?". Apparently Teddy Uldricks can.

The same Teddy Uldricks, in his paper "Hitler, Stalin and the origins of war on the Eastern Front", makes the incredible claim that Stalin knew "how inadequately Soviet industry was responding to the need for a crash-paced arms buildup". Soviet industry inadequate??? The same soviet industry who produced around 6500 tanks in 1941 alone, compared to 3,600 tanks produced by the german industry? Inclduing 3900 T-34 and KVs with characteristics the german tank crews could not even dream of?

Or, from the same articles (referencing Roberts): "Soviet generals believed that their fairly light screening forces could hold off the enemy near the border while the RKKA’s main forces prepared to launch a devastating counter-attack. The fight would thus be carried quickly back onto the aggressor’s own territory. It is for this reason, rather than any aggressive intent, that so much of the Red Army was deployed in forward positions in the summer of 1941 rather than more sensibly arrayed farther in the rear for a defense in depth." The contradiction in the above statement is glaring. If so much of the Red Army was deployed in forward positions, then what is that insane assertion about "light screening forces" which were supposed to hold off the "enemy". On overall criticism of Uldricks article is not the point here, but, after reading it, I would say that Uldricks' piece is even more deserving than Icebreaker for one to ask about how seriously it should be treated.

Another example, this time from Glantz, in his book "Barbarossa: Hitler's invasion of Russia": "The cumbersome Soviet mobilization system did not meet the requirements of modern war". Yep, you read that right. The soviet mobilization system, which basically saved the USSR by replacing the Red Army from June 1941 with a new army by the end of 1941 (and which, btw, Glantz himself stresses at length in the book that it saved the Soviet Union) is declared in the conclusion that "it did not met the requirements of modern war". Frankly speaking, it looks very much that some of these leading experts Mr. Siebert is so in awe of are reiterating mechanically, from time to time, some cliches - otherwise is beyond my comprehension how someone like Glantz could write such nonsense. But then, when such mistakes show up in their books and reviews, should one refer to them as some kind of dictus papae?

3. The claim that Suvorov relies only on circumstantial evidence is totally outdated. It was true in regard to Icebreaker - but one must remember that the Icebreaker was written in the '80s and before 1991 any independent research in the soviet archives was virtually impossible. If one wanted to write about the Soviet side, there were only 2 choices: use circumstantial evidence or rely on the phony evidence the soviet regime was willing to provide. To each his own, but I would think the first option was far more preferable. And speaking of which, I fail to comprehend why Suvorov's book based on circumstantial evidence is so heavily attacked, but those books parroting the soviet versions are treated much more leniently. But I digress. The major point is that, after 1991, new evidence surfaced. Such as: - the 15 May war plans; - the content of the wargames from december 1940 - january 1941, which analyzed soviet offensive operations in Poland and Hungary; - a soviet plan of attack, with exact dispositions, against Finland from november 1940 (when Finland was aligned with Germany); - Stalin's speech from 5 May 1941, when he stated that the Soviet Union must give up on defense and go on offensive; - Stalin's assertions from 19 August 1939, where he speaks openly about the sovietization of Germany and France, which are corroborated by a later discussion between Stalin and Dimitrov, which the latter noted in his journal. It is up to each individual whether they give or not credit to the respective evidence, but circumstantial it is not. Sentinel2074 (talk) 22:26, 20 November 2013 (UTC)

All I can say is, thank you for this post. Many people seem to forget that any "digging" in Russian history is under heavy social and political pressure there. Anything that could stain the name of the country will be opposed by two groups - the 25-30 age range whose patriotism is measured by the career they made when Russia was "rising from its knees" at the turn of the century, and the 65-75 year olds who simply spent most of their lives under communist regime and its permeating propaganda. And it's no good looking for objective analysis and opinion in the west, either, because it's hard for someone who spent their whole life in a democratic, free country to understand the power structure, inner games, nuances, and even the language of a communist regime.

Of course that hardly matters on Wikipedia whose role is to simply aggregate opinions irrelevant of their validity or accuracy, but it's something to keep in mind when reading about Russian history. 194.29.180.210 (talk) 06:58, 30 November 2013 (UTC)

Agree with Sentinel: this should be fixed. One problem here is overall organization. The page should follow certain logic: description of the concept -> support -> criticism. Instead, it does not really explains the concept and includes and additional, "hidden" sub-summary for the "criticism and support" section. My very best wishes (talk) 21:54, 19 February 2015 (UTC)

Bibliography section organisation

The section is organised in a totally misleading manner. Firstly, this article is not about Suvorov, but about the concept (which, by the way, had been initially proposed not by him). Therefore, I see no need in complete Suvorov's bibliography on the top of the list. Secondly, Suvorov is not too famous in the West to cause some division between the scholars. In my opinion, Evan Mawdsley provided much better classification: "revisionist" and (much more numerous) "traditionalists" and "neo-traditionalists". I'll regroup the section accordingly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:09, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

Pro-Suvorov bias

The article (especially some recent edits) demonstrate strong bias towards the Suvorov's theory. In actuality, the "traditionalist" historians are much more numerous and more notable. I do not see why so much space is devoted to the discussion of the views of Mark Solonin (who is almost unknown in the West), and whose work are not even translated to English, whereas the opinia of such leading experts as Glantz, Gorodetsky, Roberts etc., are just briefly mentioned.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:36, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

Article churn happens. Editors drift by and add information that they consider to be important. In this case, I think it rather representative of the current historical view that the article is unbalanced the way it is: 1) the majority of people out there wouldn't know the offensive plans theory if it hit them upside the head; 2) those that do know about it are often impassioned about the theory being fact and will go out of their way to promote it; 3) very few people indeed concern themselves with "traditionalist" reactions to a theory which (I am sure you'll agree) is so far out of the mainstream as to be obscure in the general public eye.

But instead of sitting around whining about neglect of your side and "bias", why not write a nicely-sourced section on criticism and add it in? ~~ Lothar von Richthofen (talk) 20:24, 12 February 2012 (UTC)

In actuality, the criticism section is well sourced, and the sources used there are much better that those in "support" section: they are the book and the articles authored by leading English speaking experts in the field. What you propose is just to artificially inflate the criticism section using the sources that are already there.

However, in actuality, all sections need to be revised. Firstly, according to Mawdsley and Weeks, there are two camps (not three), so the division onto supporters, opponents and neutralists is OR. Secondly, they are not divided by their attitude towards Suvorov: as you correctly noted, his concept is generally ignored in the West. And, finally, Suvorov was not the first one, who proposed this concept, therefore, I do not understand why so much attention is devoted to this individual in the article. I'll try to rewrite it in close future (your participation is more than welcome), and, for the beginning, I remove the items that has a direct relation to Suvorov as a writer, but have no relation to the concept the article discusses.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:41, 13 February 2012 (UTC)

I would like to remove this line from the "Support" section as it is a logical fallacy: "As the latter has noted, the absence of documents with the precise date of the planned Soviet invasion can't be an argument in favor of the claim that this invasion was not planned at all" - the burden of proof should lie with he who makes a claim... the absense of evidence relating to the meatball spaghetti monster doesn't disprove its' existence. The way that the phrase is formulated makes it seem like the editor approves of the source which doesn't help the bias discussion. Vencaslac (talk) 15:38, 27 July 2015 (UTC)

Books that oppose existence of Soviet offensive plans

Please add new items. The last one was published in 2006.Xx236 (talk) 09:26, 29 April 2015 (UTC)

Flying tank - OK, but what about BT tank?

The SU lacked roads to run BT tanks. Such roads existed in Western Europe.Xx236 (talk) 09:54, 23 June 2015 (UTC)

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Controversial?

What's so controversial about this? First and foremost Communism's goal was "World Revolution" meaning world conquest by any means to establish a global government under the pretexts of Marxism-Leninism. Secondly the Soviet Union did indeed engage in an Offensive to the West during 1939-1941. Notably the invasion of Poland, Finnland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania. Or is that in dispute? --105.0.4.229 (talk) 18:32, 24 July 2018 (UTC)

"World Revolution" is Trotskyism. Stalin was in fact very much part of the Nazbol gang, that is to say, perfectly content with Communism remaining in Russia. Only later when the Cold War started did he show strategic interest in supporting socialist allies worldwide.

It's a very 'technical' historiographical argument about the theoretical timing intention and goals of a Soviet offensive, not a controversy over whether Stalin had expansionist ambitions in general.

Some of the Historians described as critics for instance argue that a Soviet offensive WAS intended but was scheduled for 1942. So it's an issue of the details and whether on the eve of Operation Barbarossa the Red Army was *actively* mobilized in an offensive stance rather than either a defensive or preparatory one.

There's an overlapping question of whether German officer's accounts are shaped by a self interest regarding both contemporary international sentiment and the later Nuremburg Trials but culpability and morality aren't really the focus of this dispute.

Does that answer your question adequately? FusionTorch (talk) 16:51, 2 August 2018 (UTC)

Not exactly. World revolution was a mainstream Communist concept, because they didn't believe a single proletarian state could survive when surrounded by capitalist states. It was an idea supported by Comintern. When Stalin came to power, he eliminated many Comintern leaders and finally disbanded it. Anyway, a world revolution was not supposed to take place via conquest, and Communists anticipated the political center would move from Moscow after the revolution would be victorious. Stalin's expansionism had nothing in common with the world revolution idea: it was just an expansion of his personal empire. --Paul Siebert (talk) 03:09, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

• • • • "World Revolution" is Trotskyism. Stalin was in fact very much part of the Nazbol gang, that is to say, perfectly content with Communism remaining in Russia. Only later when the Cold War started did he show strategic interest in supporting socialist allies worldwide.****

Hey Paul, this excerpt is absolutely not mine but appears that way on the talk page. My response begins with "it's a very historiographical", I've never actually heard Nazbol Gang before which I assume is Nazi-Bolshevik.

I'm not familiar enough with Wikipedia Talk, is this a result of someone not signing their input or should I perhaps worry about my account security? FusionTorch (talk) 13:26, 9 August 2019 (UTC)

 — Preceding unsigned comment added by FusionTorch (talk • contribs) 13:22, 9 August 2019 (UTC) 

Requested move 16 March 2019

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

The result of the move request was: Not moved (non-admin closure) EggRoll97 ^(talk) 07:57, 26 March 2019 (UTC)

---

Soviet offensive plans controversy → Soviet offensive plans conspiracy theory – Per WP:COMMONNAME & WP:NPOV. There's currently no controversy among historians on this topic. For example, Anthony Beevor says: "...conspiracy theories, mostly neo-Nazi ones, that claim that Stalin was preparing his own preemptive strike against Germany are, frankly, rubbish." [4]. -- K.e.coffman (talk) 03:40, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Add: Müller, Rolf-Dieter (2015). Enemy in the East: Hitler's Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union. London: I.B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1780768298. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help), page x, states: "In the explanation he gave the German populace and the Wehrmacht soldiers, Hitler claimed that he had been forced to counter Soviet expansionism with a preemptive strike. Proponents of this absurd justification can still be found today, a few even among historians and retired generals." --K.e.coffman (talk) 18:04, 17 March 2019 (UTC)

iVotes

I support the name change 99.99% of World War II historians say operation Barbarossa was not a preemptive strike but was because of the ideological goal of Lebensraum @K.e.coffman:Jack90s15 (talk) 03:53, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• Oppose mindless politically correct change (seriously, do you care that much about what you think or hope Stalin didn't want to do?) based solely on the views of a popular historian and a blatant "99.99%" inaccuracy. MPS1992 (talk) 05:43, 16 March 2019 (UTC)
• Oppose Although Beevor is a respected historian, one use of the term conspiracy theory in a Youtube talk does not indicate common use. Historiography is full of theories and speculation of plans and motives, and I think this particular one should be just described as neutrally as possible in the title (WP:NDESC). People like David Irving might also be supporters of the view, but none of the historians mentioned in this article have anything to do with neo-Nazism. Indeed, in Russia you are pretty much a liberal if you question the Stalin-era that's being trumped up for patriotic reasons. --Pudeo (talk) 07:47, 22 March 2019 (UTC)

Discussion

If it is true that such an accounting of historians has taken place, and this proportion of them agree that Operation Barbarossa was not a pre-emptive strike, then I would agree with and support this change. Please could User:Jack90s15 or User:K.e.coffman provide evidence of the proportion, i.e. 99.99%. Thank you. MPS1992 (talk) 04:24, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• what I mean by 99% is the the majority of historians say operation Barbarossa was not a preemptive strike but was because of the ideological goal of Lebensraum Jack90s15 (talk) 04:52, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Right, so you mean 51%, not 99.99% as you originally said? Is that right? MPS1992 (talk) 04:55, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• I was trying to put it like the majority of historians like Rolf-Dieter Müller who is a German military historian and political scientist, who has served as Scientific Director of the German Armed Forces Military History Research Office since 1999.Jack90s15 (talk) 05:00, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• • in is book Enemy in the East: Hitler’s Secret Plans to Invade the Soviet Union on page x he says it was not a preemptive strike but a act of aggression: [5]. Jack90s15 (talk) 05:03, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Page x? Please could you be more specific? MPS1992 (talk) 05:09, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• when you go on the google book the page below the Introduction has the x on it that's the page Jack90s15 (talk) 05:15, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Ah, but you see, I do not "go on the google book", and I do not see that "the page below the Introduction has the x on it". Have you actually read the book? MPS1992 (talk) 05:20, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• @MPS1992: I have the book; do you have a specific question? --K.e.coffman (talk) 05:21, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• Yes, I have a specific question. Which page does the quote or statement given above, appear? Also, why was someone told to come here with a pre-prepared statement "on page x he says it was not a preemptive strike but a act of aggression"? Surely if someone were writing their own comment, they would remember to replace "x" with the page number where they found the statement? MPS1992 (talk) 05:30, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

• @MPS1992: The introduction has Roman numerals; it's page x (10). K.e.coffman (talk) 05:35, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Also, who added all the images? Can they be removed? --K.e.coffman (talk) 05:22, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

They cannot be removed. They are required to demonstrate the regard in which the popular historian you mentioned, is held by certain parties. MPS1992 (talk) 05:30, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

I think the objection was to "tankie", so I removed it from my nomination statement. The images are too distracting and I removed them. --K.e.coffman (talk) 05:35, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

in the book he says it was not a preemptive strike but a act of aggressionJack90s15 (talk) 05:25, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Thank you for your input, Jack90s15. On which page of your copy of the book does he say that, please? MPS1992 (talk) 05:30, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

The introduction part of the bookJack90s15 (talk) 05:39, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

Which other parts of the book have you read? MPS1992 (talk) 05:48, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

the Full book that's why I suggested it Jack90s15 (talk) 18:09, 16 March 2019 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Article Issues

I see two major issues with the current article... first, in several places, it conflates the two theses that 1) The USSR planned to attack Germany in 1941, and 2) Germany believed such an attack was coming and launched Barbarossa as a preemptive strike as a result, into one. In reality, either could conceivably have been true or false independently of the other, and indeed, some of the historians cited in this very article argue that (1) was the case, but not (2).

Second, there is too much focus on Suvorov's work (from over 30 years ago!) and the response to it. In particular, almost the entire "Criticism" section concerns Suvorov's methodology and sources (and what else there is seems to chiefly concern the historians' own estimation of the readiness of the Red Army for an attack, rather than the estimation of Soviet political and military leadership at the time). More recent work supporting the central thesis that the USSR was planning to attack Germany (e.g. Meltyukhov's Stalin's Missed Chance) is mentioned, but without any mention of whether these (apparently better-cited) works have themselves been criticized, and if so, on what grounds. Meltyukhov's work is itself quite old by now (almost 20 years) - has there really been no critical analysis of the evidence it's based on? I would think such information would be of far greater importance to the article than criticism of a single flawed work written in a very different political climate, and at a time when many sources were not yet declassified. -- 208.124.9.11 (talk) 19:16, 28 May 2019 (UTC)

David M Glantz chief editor of the Journal of Slavic Military Studies says in his own words that the Suvorov's theory is a myth and the evidence he used as plans for a Soviet attack on Germany were in fact plans for a forgotten Soviet counterstroke early in the war 17m:58 mark https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5qkmO7tm8AU&t=301s Jack90s15 (talk) 19:32, 28 May 2019 (UTC)

Again, I'm not really concerned about Suvorov's evidence from 1987 (and believe this article gives far too much weight to analyses of that particular evidence - something that's been noted on this talk page as early as 2009). It is analysis of the later, more detailed, better sourced examinations (Meltyukhov's, Solonin's, perhaps others not currently mentioned in this article?) that I would like this article to address in more detail - if, of course, such analysis exists somewhere. And of course, I'm talking about actual critical examination of the evidence, not someone (no matter how reputable) simply saying so in a YouTube video. -- 208.124.9.11 (talk) 21:52, 28 May 2019 (UTC)

those two are mentioned here and Glantz does explain, what the plans were and how it is not what Suvorov's said it was the page does show that historians say that it was not a preemptive strike Jack90s15 (talk) 22:06, 28 May 2019 (UTC)

what do you think about what the Ip is bringing up about the article since you are more experienced? Jack90s15 (talk) 22:28, 28 May 2019 (UTC)@Paul Siebert:

I think that there is not much controversy around Soviet plans. The problem in not with the controversy, but with some amateur historians, mostly from some post-Soviet states. Suvorov is popular mostly in post-Soviet states and Germany. Solonin has almost no articles in peer-reviewed journals, however, he is very popular in post-Soviet states and among some fraction of Russian liberal intelligentsia. In contrast, western historians do not consider Suvorov as a reputable historian and essentially ignore Solonin. Just try to look at his works in google scholars: he was cited just few times.

I recall I presented a comprehensive collection of reviews on Suvorov by Western historians, all of them were negative. Just try to look through talk page archive of this and related articles.

Therefore, the very name of this article gives an undue weight to the views of non-mainstream historians, which is agains Wikipedia rules.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 29 May 2019 (UTC)

And Meltyukhov? You yourself called him a "more serious scholar" on this talk page (admittedly, 10 years ago).

Anyway, I'm not sure how my point keeps getting lost... the point is not regarding the notability of the scholars involved (and I'm not sure why Western attitudes should decide that in this case, anyway - the question is about preparations for war between Germany and the USSR; it's only natural that this question will be of most interest to historians from Germany and the former USSR). The point is that Suvorov put forward, however clumsily, a thesis that the Soviets were preparing for essentially a war of aggression against Germany in 1941. Meltyukhov and others subsequently researched this further, using evidence that wasn't available in 1987, refined that thesis, rejecting parts of it and supporting others. And this article is trying to tell me that Meltyukhov's theory (which surely still falls under the article's title of "Soviet offensive plans") is "generally discounted" because Suvorov relied on circumstantial evidence. I hope you realize how silly that sounds.

What I'm looking for from this article is an understanding of why the theory itself (and not just Suvorov's work on it) is discounted. Surely if the mainstream understanding is so uncontroversial even in the face of the evidence provided to the contrary by Meltyukhov and others, then some reputable historian somewhere in the last 20 years has analyzed the same evidence and explained how one can reasonably draw the opposite conclusion based on it? If so, that's the sort of information that would be nice to have in the "Criticism" section. Otherwise, "generally discounted" isn't really the right phrase to use; would be something like "not investigated" or just "ignored" instead. -- 208.124.9.11 (talk) 05:15, 29 May 2019 (UTC)

"War of aggression" against an aggressor? Actually, the same is equally applicable to Britain or the US. After Polish conquest, Hitler sincerely wanted piece with Britain (provided that the latter recognized his territorial acquisitions), therefore, formally, Britain also was preparing for a war of aggression in 1939-40. Of course, by saying that, I just demonstrate the logical flaw in your arguments.

That the USSR's strategy implied some large scale offensive operations was officially recognized even before 1941, and that was a part of official doctrine. The question is if it was a plan of a massive strategic offensive, massive preventive attack (a preemptive blow on German forces concentrated near a German-Soviet border and prepared to attack), or a massive counter-attack. The technical means needed for each of these three scenarios are essentially the same, and majority of authors are inclined to believe in the second or third version (the latter was, by the way, an officially recognised Soviet doctrine).

Moreover, the core Suvorov's idea is not that Soviets had some offensive plans, but that Soviets provoked Hitler to attack Poland and France, and that Hitler was aware of the prospective Soviet attack and organized Barbarossa as a preemptive strike. Other authors who concede that Soviet Union planned to attack Hitler in 1941 conclude both Hitler and Stalin were not aware of each other's aggressive plans, so Hitler's Barbarossa was not planned as a preemptive strike.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:05, 12 January 2020 (UTC)

Yes, YouTube should not be used for the referencing. Also the lead is obviously unbalanced and not a proper summary of the page. Why it mentioned Glantz so many times? My very best wishes (talk) 21:37, 20 September 2019 (UTC)

Actually, the main article's issue is that it puts too much emphasis on Suvorov's views, whereas he was not the first and not the major author who wrote on that topic. We already have the Icebreaker article, and most of Suvorov's related content should be moved there. In this article, he should be discussed along with Glantz, Gorodetsky, Mawdlsey, Hill, Weeks, Roberts, and many others.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:34, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

Revert

This edit. The problems.

1. "The Soviet offensive plans controversy is a theory ". No, this is not a theory. This is a controversy, a disagreement, debate, etc.
2. The division of historians to "defensists" and "offensists" - where this came from? Please directly cite supporting sources which make such classification. This looks like a typical WP:OR.
3. Reference on YouTube. No, we should not do it. How about using a book for referencing? My very best wishes (talk) 02:20, 29 September 2019 (UTC)

@IP, Let me also ask you: are you User:Jack90s15? My very best wishes (talk) 03:26, 29 September 2019 (UTC)

Rhetorical consideration

In the section "criticism", one cannot say that an argument is wrong because it was stated by Adolf Hitler. This is a political argument, and not a scientific one. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 91.182.248.223 (talk) 12:53, 20 December 2019 (UTC)

Recent edits

@KIENGIR: Could you elaborate on what you mean here: As I see the ending of the article there are still supportive opinions, not we should decide about ending [6]? --K.e.coffman (talk) 02:22, 22 August 2020 (UTC)

@K.e.coffman:, sure:

"In 2006, a collection of articles (entitled The Truth of Viktor Suvorov) by various historians who share some views with Suvorov was published.[76] This was followed by a number of sequels, six as of September 2010. In a 2009 essay entitled "Don’t Blame Hitler Alone For World War II", journalist Eric Margolis endorsed Suvorov's assertion that Operation Barbarossa was a "preventive war" forced on Nazi Germany by an alleged impending Soviet attack, and that it is wrong to give Hitler "total blame" for World War II.[77]

In another sequel to the collection, entitled the New Truth of Viktor Suvorov, Uri Milstein also defended Suvorov's positions."(KIENGIR (talk) 02:24, 22 August 2020 (UTC))

Neither appears to be a reliable source. For example, according to the article on Uri Milstein, he wrote a book The Blood Libel of Deir Yassin where he claims that the Deir Yassin massacre was a myth created by the Israeli left. --K.e.coffman (talk) 02:32, 22 August 2020 (UTC)

I removed these contents/sources: diff. --K.e.coffman (talk) 03:57, 22 August 2020 (UTC)

when you look at the Consensus from academic historians its not really the view Operation Barbarossa was a "preventive war" even the operation Barbarossa wiki page says its not. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Barbarossa#Soviet_preparations

Historians have debated whether Stalin was planning an invasion of German territory in the summer of 1941. The debate began in the late-1980s when Viktor Suvorov published a journal article and later the book Icebreaker in which he claimed that Stalin had seen the outbreak of war in Western Europe as an opportunity to spread communist revolutions throughout the continent, and that the Soviet military was being deployed for an imminent attack at the time of the German invasion.[163] This view had also been advanced by former German generals following the war.[164] Suvorov's thesis was fully or partially accepted by a limited number of historians, including Valeri Danilov, Joachim Hoffmann, Mikhail Meltyukhov, and Vladimir Nevezhin, and attracted public attention in Germany, Israel, and Russia.[165][166] It has been strongly rejected by most historians,[167][168] and Icebreaker is generally considered to be an "anti-Soviet tract" in Western countries.[169] David Glantz and Gabriel Gorodetsky wrote books to rebut Suvorov's arguments.[170] The majority of historians believe that Stalin was seeking to avoid war in 1941, as he believed that his military was not ready to fight the German forces.[171] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.57.156.122 (talk) 02:36, 22 August 2020 (UTC)

I think its not good source if they say, Deir Yassin massacre was a myth created by the Israeli left. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 174.57.156.122 (talk) 02:45, 22 August 2020 (UTC)

Just because you support one of the theories and you added materials supporting that, that does not mean the article should not be neutral, neither implies a debate to be ended in past tense.(KIENGIR (talk) 09:26, 23 August 2020 (UTC))

@KIENGIR: The IP has been CU-blocked. As it is New Jersey based, I'm assuming it was Jacob Peters who has more recently also used Legitimate Profit. --Pudeo (talk) 06:30, 1 September 2020 (UTC)

@Pudeo:,

Thanks for the info, I felt somehow that something is wrong, it's a pity K.e.coffman didn't...(KIENGIR (talk) 15:13, 1 September 2020 (UTC))

Last edits

I think this source is acceptable because Mark Solonin is a well known historian/expert on the subject, because we provide a direct attribution to him, and because this is essentially an explanation/elaboration of something already described in his published book ([link to online version) if I am not mistaken. My very best wishes (talk) 16:07, 14 May 2021 (UTC)

Re to this (edit summary). It does not matter that someone was already "listed". We must explain on the page what exactly their views and arguments are. My very best wishes (talk) 16:20, 14 May 2021 (UTC)

July 2021 edits

Preserving here by providing this link. My rationale was: these are not sources but WP:OR that includes classifying books as "supporting", "opposing" and "having neutral position". The sources for the article are included in Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#References, times two. (There are two sections thus named, so I plan to rename the other one as Soviet_offensive_plans_controversy#Bibliography. --K.e.coffman (talk) 05:38, 4 July 2021 (UTC)

Section: Criticism and support of books by Suvorov

I am curious as to the purpose of having such an extensive section dedicated to Suvorov in this article: [7], including sub-sections on "Criticism"; "Support" and "Middle position". This seems like undue focus on this author. --K.e.coffman (talk) 05:46, 4 July 2021 (UTC)

He was the one that started the debate so I think all of it is fine.Thelostone41 (talk) 14:56, 4 July 2021 (UTC)

• How come? Looking at the list of sources [8], I do not see them noticing Suvorov anywhere, except only several books by Suvorov himself. This is framed not as pro and contra Suvorov, but as pro and conta "Soviet offensive plans". But yes, I can see a problem. "Soviet offensive plans", what it means? Obviously, there were preparations by the Red Army for the future war with Nazi that was deemed inevitable and offensive, there is no really a dispute among historians about it. That was a hallmark of Soviet propaganda slogans at the time: "by a powerful strike to the enemy territory". The only question/controversy is about the timing. So the list needs to be retitled at least.My very best wishes (talk) 15:52, 23 July 2021 (UTC)

Most materials in "criticism and support" section are simply duplicated in the long "preface" and subsections themselves. This should be fixed. My very best wishes (talk) 20:16, 27 July 2021 (UTC)

Consensus

[9]. No, that is not how it works. You unilaterally made changes in the lead. I reverted them. Now you need WP:CONSENSUS to include and keep your changes. Here are a couple of problems with your text. (1) this is poorly written and difficult to understand. (2) Your write "The majority of historians believe..." and "It is currently believed that..." in the lead and places claims referenced to 1-2 cherry-picked sources instead of properly summarizing content of the page. This is difficult to summarize though. Please suggest something better and place here your version for discussion. My very best wishes (talk) 02:19, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

my edit was a improvement of the lead as the other version had a sentence that wasn't on the page anymore. I added Sourced information that is current about the controversy to the lead and its not cherry-picked as they are academic sources discussing the controversy and not taking a side.Thelostone41 (talk) 02:41, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

OK, I can explain this differently. You included the following text: "The majority of historians believe that Stalin was seeking ... [source]". Where this source say that "the majority of historians believe" in that? Can you cite this source directly here, please? Actually, I think it is you who believes that "The majority of historians believe that ...". My very best wishes (talk) 03:05, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

The source was originally put on wikipedia by Nick-D as he stated [[10]] I don't think someone who works so hard on WW2 pages. Would do OR on a Ga page that is why I put the source on this page as it was verified.Thelostone41 (talk) 03:23, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

• That source (currently #1 on the page) is an RS. This source is available online, but it paints this matter as something very complex, with no clarity, There is no agreement, however, as to why Stalin persisted with this strategy [of attempting to avoid a war in 1941 through a policy of appeasement vis-à-vis Nazi Germany] despite growing evidence of a German invasion. Sure it can be used on this page, but what you have included in the lead is not the proper summary of the source, or the content on this page. My very best wishes (talk) 04:36, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

• • It does say on page 479 (Most analysts of Barbarossa (the code name for the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941) argue that ample information was available to the Soviet Union in 1941 about the looming German threat. There are, however, excep-tions to the rule. One is Viktor Surovov, who argued that Stalin planned to attack Germany in the summer of 1941 and that the offensive deployment of the Red Army was the main cause for its defeats. Suvorov failed to provide compelling evidence, however, as Gabriel Gorodetsky and others have dem-

onstrated) [11].Thelostone41 (talk) 05:05, 30 July 2021 (UTC)

• The edit by Thelostone41 was an improvement, as shown in the diff: [12]. The previous version of the lead gave undue credence to the now debunked theory. --K.e.coffman (talk) 03:39, 30 July 2021 (UTC)