Iran Air Flight 655

Iran Air Flight 655

CG image of Airbus 300 EP-IBU
Occurrence
Date	July 3, 1988
Summary	Airliner shoot-down
Site	Persian Gulf
Aircraft type	Airbus A300B2-203
Operator	Iran Air
Registration	EP-IBU
Flight origin	Mehrabad International Airport
Last stopover	Bandar Abbas International Airport
Destination	Dubai International Airport
Passengers	275
Crew	15
Fatalities	290
Survivors	0

Iran Air Flight 655 (IR655) was a commercial flight operated by Iran Air that flew from Bandar Abbas, Iran to Dubai, UAE. On Sunday July 3, 1988, towards the end of the Iran Iraq War, the aircraft flying IR655 was shot down by the U.S. Navy guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 passengers and crew aboard, including 38 non-Iranians, 66 children and one pregnant woman. The Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters at the time.

According to the US government, the Iranian airbus was mistakenly identified as an attacking F-14 Tomcat fighter aircraft. According to the Iranian government, the Vincennes knowingly shot down a civilian aircraft.

The flight number IR655 is still used by Iran Air on the Tehran-Bandar Abbas-Dubai route.

Background

Starting in May 1981 the war between Iraq and Iran had begun to witness attacks against oil tankers and merchant shipping of neighboring countries. Iran struck a Kuwaiti tanker in Bahrain's territorial waters on the 13th and a Saudi tanker in its own territory on the 16th. For the next five years, attacks continued until Kuwait petitioned the US for help in 1986. Besides the obvious damage to Kuwaiti/Saudi business interests, they also affected the flow of oil to America. In May 1987, USS Stark was struck by two missiles launched by an Iraqi Mirage F-1, killing 37 with no weapons fired in self-defense during the attack. In July 1987 the Navy instituted Operation Earnest Will on the orders of President Reagan to prevent further disruption and protect neutral tanker crews. They also undertook, again under Presidential directive, Operation Prime Chance. Following months of low intensity conflict, in April 1988 the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine, leading to a retaliation by the US called Operation Praying Mantis. The US Navy was operating under what Admiral Crowe called "the air of terrorism and peril that pervaded the Gulf at that time."

Shootdown

Locater map depicting Iran Air 655's origination point, destination and approximate location of the shootdown. (The air corridor is not necessarily a direct path)

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by Mohsen Rezaian, a veteran captain with 7,000 hours of flight time, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC+0330), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4,300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

At that same time, the Vincennes, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new AEGIS combat system, was nearby in the Strait of Hormuz.

Aegis screen displays on Ticonderoga class cruiser USS Vincennes

Vincennes had been rushed to the area after the April 14 mining of the USS Samuel B. Roberts by Iranian forces, to compensate for the lack of airborne AWACS coverage which hampered U.S. monitoring of the southern Persian Gulf. The Roberts had been operating in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Earnest Will, the effort to protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during the Iran-Iraq War.

On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes crossed into Iranian territorial waters during clashes with Iranian gunboats. Earlier in the day, the Vincennes — along with Iranian gunboats — had similarly violated Omani waters until challenged by an Omani warship. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.

The event triggered an intense controversy, with Iran condemning the shootdown as a "barbaric act." On the other hand, George H.W. Bush, at the time Vice President of the United States in the Reagan Administration, defended his country at the United Nations by declaring that the shootdown had been a wartime incident and that the crew of the Vincennes had acted appropriately to the situation at the time.

US government accounts

A missile departs the forward launcher of Vincennes during a 1987 exercise. The forward launcher was also used in the downing of Iran Air 655.

According to the US government, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the Airbus A300B2 as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run. The commercial flight had originated at Bandar Abbas, which served dual roles as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial, civilian flights. According to the same reports, the Vincennes tried unsuccessfully to contact the approaching aircraft, four times on the military emergency frequency and three time on the civilian emergency frequency, but never on air traffic control frequencies. Civil aircraft do not normally monitor emergency frequencies.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2MR Surface-to-air missiles. The first missile broke the aircraft in two and damaged the tailplane and right wing. After the engagement, the Vincennes’ crew realized that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalized in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988 and part II in 1993), which has drawn criticism from many observers.

The unclassified version of a Congressional report of a U.S. Navy investigation headed by Admiral William Fogarty reports that the USS Vincennes was in international waters, contrary to the claims of the Iranian government.

When questioned by BBC journalists in a 2002 documentary, the US government stated in a written answer that they believed the incident may have been caused by a simultaneous psychological condition amongst the 18 bridge crew of the Vincennes called 'scenario fulfilment’, which is said to occur when persons are under pressure. In such a situation, the men will carry out a training scenario, believing it to be reality while ignoring sensory information that contradicts the scenario. In the case of this incident, the scenario was an attack by a lone military aircraft.

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life but never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologized for the incident. Officially, it continues to blame Iranian hostile actions for the incident. This policy was coined by US Vice-President George H. W. Bush speaking to Republican leaders August 2, 1988 mentioning that "I will never apologize for the United States of America, ever. I don't care what it has done. I don't care what the facts are." An independent investigation by ICAO concluded that US was at fault by cultivating an unstable battle scenario with no regard for civilian air traffic.

Iranian government account

A block of 45 rials postage stamps released by Iran on 11 August 1988, in commemoration of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes.

According to the Iranian government, the shooting down of IR 655 by the Vincennes was an intentionally performed and unlawful act. Even if there was a mistaken identification, which Iran has not accepted, it argues that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, not an accident.

Independent sources

John Barry and Roger Charles of Newsweek wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care in their July 13, 1992 article. They also accused the U.S. government of a cover-up which Admiral Crowe refuted. An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire. The Vincennes had been nicknamed 'Robocruiser' by crew members and other US Navy ships, both in reference to its AEGIS system, and to the supposed aggressive tendencies of its captain.[1] The US fighter base in Bahrain had refused to provide supporting aircraft to cover the Vincennes — the commander of the base stated that his decision was based on a fear that the Vincennes would accidentally shoot down one of his aircraft.

On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice ruled that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America." However, the case relating to the Airbus downing, "the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)", was dropped 22 February, 1996 following settlement and reparations by the United States.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on American television show Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. This contradicted earlier Navy statements.

Captain David Carlson, commander of the USS Sides, the warship stationed near to the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers’ aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago." His comment referred to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn’t a smart thing to do." At the time of Rogers’ announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He’s climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

According to the BBC documentary of 2002, Carlson identified IR655 as a civilian craft based on its radar signature, its 'squawk' (IFF) code, and the fact that it was ascending at low speed — an attacking military aircraft would be descending towards the Vincennes at high speed. At first Carlson thought that the 'Iranian Tomcat' identified by the Vincennes must be some other aircraft, as it was difficult for him to believe that the Vincennes crew could mistake a civilian airliner for a Tomcat. The Vincennes’ warnings were on a military radio channel, addressed to 'Iranian Tomcat'. When Carlson concluded that the Vincennes was referring to IR655 in its warning to turn away or receive fire, he urgently warned IR655 on a civilian radio frequency that it was in danger, having been mistaken for a military aircraft, and should turn away. IR655 immediately complied and changed course onto a trajectory away from the Vincennes. The Vincennes fired regardless. Carlson expressed the view that the incident was a mistake brought about by an overly-aggressive approach by the captain of the Vincennes.

Craig, Morales & Oliver, in a slide presentation published in M.I.T.'s Spring 2004 Aeronautics & Astronautics, as the "USS Vincennes Incident," commented that Captain Rogers had "an undeniable and unequivocal tendency towards what I call 'picking a fight.'" On his own initiative, Rogers moved the Vincennes 50 miles northeast to join the USS Montgomery. An angry Captain McKenna ordered Rogers back to Abu Musa, but the Vincennes helicopter pilot, Lt Mark Collier, followed the Iranian speedboats as they retreated north, eventually taking some fire:

"…the Vincennes jumps back into the fray. Heading towards the majority of the speedboats, he is unable to get a clear target. Also, the speedboats are now just slowly milling about in their own territorial waters. Despite clear information to the contrary, Rogers informs command that the gunboats are gathering speed and showing hostile intent and gains approval to fire upon them at 0939. Finally, in another fateful decision, he crosses the 12-mile limit off the coast and enters illegally into Iranian waters."

The Fogarty report concluded, "The data from USS Vincennes tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that [Iran Air Flight 655] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from takeoff at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down." The fault in the USS Vincennes lying directly in the airplane’s pathway is Captain Rogers’.

Radio communication

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. According to the U.S. Navy investigation the Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air flight 655: seven on military frequencies and three on commercial frequencies, addressed to an "unidentified Iranian aircraft" and giving its speed as 350 knots.

However IR655 was arguably not "unidentified" as its commercial Mode III Transponder was active and squawking its assigned 6760 identifier code. It was traveling at an airspeed of 300 knots. The reference to "350 knots" was its speed over ground, as observed by radar.

International investigations concluded that the crew of IR655 assumed that the three calls that they received before the missiles struck must have been directed at an Iranian P3 (see below).

Potential factors

• Anti-Iranianism
• The ship’s crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules, due to confusion over which time zone the schedules referred to. The airliner’s departure was 27 minutes later than scheduled. "The CIC was also very dark, and the few lights that it did have flickered every time the Vincennes fired at the speedboats. This was of special concern to Petty Officer Andrew Anderson, who first picked up Flight 655 on radar and thought that it might be a commercial aircraft. As he was searching in the Navy’s listing of commercial flights, he apparently missed Flight 655 because it was so dark."
• An Iranian P-3 was in the area some time before the attack, providing a potential (albeit unlikely) explanation for the lack of target acquisition radar interrogation
• It was first claimed that Flight 655 deviated from the centre of its air corridor — an unusual occurrence with commercial flights — namely that it was 3.35 NM off the 20 NM-wide corridor at the time of being shot down. It is further claimed that this deviation had it bearing straight at the Vincennes. It is unclear how much of this deviation was true, and how much was claimed to obscure the Vincennes’ position within Iranian territorial waters.
• It is claimed that a Mode II IFF signal of 21100 was attributed to the Airbus track, identifying it as an Iranian military aircraft (commercial aircraft respond with Mode III signals). According to the official military report, the flight was in fact using the correct 'squawk' mode. The Vincennes either heard it incorrectly or believed it to be a military aircraft using Mode III 36760 to deceive them. It has since been assumed that the tracking device used to identify IFF squawks was left in the original position of Flight 655 when first sighted (at take-off), confusing the Flight 655 squawk with that of an Iranian F-14 fighter within the area. The Bandar Abbas airport was shared between commercial and military aircraft at that time.
• The crew of the Vincennes’ Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus’ original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides’ track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.
• The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboats. There are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogary in "Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992". Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help by a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around. This might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes’ engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.
• Software development expert Steve McConnell claimed:

• Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down by the USS Vincennes’ Aegis system in 1988, killing 290 people. The error was initially attributed to operator error, but later some experts attributed the incident to the poor design of the Aegis user interface.

• A lack of training contributed to the disaster.

  It was, however, a known fact that many of the senior officers on board the Vincennes knew very little about computerized warfare. The tactical officer for surface warfare, Lt Cmdr Guillory, knew so little that he routinely used his computer screens as a surface for sticky notes instead. Petty Officer Anderson, who missed Flight 655 on the schedule because it was so dark, also later claimed that he was confused by the gulf’s four different time zones, something proper training could have easily helped with. Lt Clay Zocher was the boss of Air Alley, which was responsible for air warfare, but he had only stood watch at that post twice before and had never fully learned and mastered the console routines. In fact, when he was finally given the green light to fire upon the incoming aircraft, he pressed the wrong keys 23 times, until a veteran petty officer leaned over and hit the right ones. Nerves were shattered, and the training seemed nonexistent."

• U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war

Medals awarded

The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, won the navy’s Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," noting his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" that enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure" The Legion of Merit was presented to Rogers and Lustig on 3 July 1988, according to a 23 April 1990 article in The Washington Post. The citations did not mention the Iran Air flight. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

The incident overshadowed U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655. The cause of the crash was later determined to be a bomb associated with the Libyan intelligence service.

The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to the downing of Korean Air Flight 007 by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Compensation

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life. The government never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologized for the incident.

On February 22, 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$61.8 million in compensation ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner) for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown. No payments were issued for the aircraft, which was estimated to be worth approximately US$30 million. This was an agreed settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for what happened.

References

Others

1. Nunn Wants to Reopen Inquiry into Vincennes’ Gulf Location. Washington Times, July 4, 1992. Abstract: Senator Sam Nunn called on the Pentagon to probe allegations that the Navy "deliberately misled Congress" about the location of the USS Vincennes when it shot down an Iranian civilian airliner four years ago.
2. Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation — The Conquest of the Middle East. London: Fourth Estate, 2005. 318–328. ISBN 1-84115-007-X
3. Marian Nash Leich, "Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis" American Journal of International Law Vol. 83 p. 319 (1989)
4. USS Vincennes Incident; Dan Craig, Dan Morales, Mike Oliver; M.I.T. Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004

See also

• Lists of accidents and incidents on commercial airliners
• List of airliner shootdown incidents

External links

• ABC Nightline interview with Admiral William Crowe aired 1 July 1992, in which Crowe admits that the Vincennes was inside Iranian waters at the time of the shooting, despite what the Navy had been claiming.
• US Senate, Armed Services Committee hearing, 8 September 1988
• A collection of US government statements on Iran Air Flight 655
• Tragedy over the Persian Gulf, from Chapter 9 of Trapped in the Net:The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization by Gene I. Rochlin
• Vincennes A Case Study, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
• Iran Air shot down, The History Channel
• Iran Air 655 Shootdown, Iran Chamber
• Mehr News, Mehr News Agency
• ICJ case — Written Pleadings, Iran and U.S. cases to the International Court of Justice
• U.S. Department of State Bulletin Sept. 1988 Transcripts: July 3, 1998, President’s Statement; July 4, 1988, Letter To Congress; July 6, 1988, U.S. Letter To The UN Security Council; July 11, 1988, Herbert S. Okun, White House Statement; July 13, 1988, Assistant Secretary Richard S. Williamson, ICAO Council, Montreal; July 14, 1988, Vice-President Bush, UN Security Council
• Sea of Lies, Newsweek, July 13, 1992

Further reading

• Rochlin, Gene I. (1997). Trapped in the Net: The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization. USA: Princeton University Press.
• Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-970-3. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)

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