1958 Lebanon crisis

The 1958 Lebanon crisis was a Lebanese political crisis caused by political and religious tensions in the country. It included a U.S. military intervention, leading to the easing of tensions.

Background

In July 1958, Lebanon was threatened by a civil war between Maronite Christians and Muslims. Tensions with Egypt had escalated earlier in 1956 when pro-western President Camille Chamoun, a Christian, did not break diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, angering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These tensions were further increased when Camille Chamoun showed closeness to the Baghdad Pact. Nasser felt that the pro-western Baghdad Pact posed a threat to Arab Nationalism. As a response, Egypt and Syria united into the United Arab Republic. Lebanese Sunni Muslim Prime Minister Rashid Karami supported Nasser in 1956 and 1958. Karami formed a national reconciliation government after the 1958 crisis ended.

Lebanese Muslims pushed the government to join the newly created United Arab Republic, while the Christians wanted to keep Lebanon aligned with Western Powers. A Muslim rebellion that was allegedly supplied with arms by the UAR through Syria caused President Chamoun to complain to the United Nations Security Council. The U.N. sent a group of inspectors that reported that it didn't find any evidence of significant intervention from the UAR.

The toppling of a pro-Western government in Iraq on July 14, along with the internal instability, caused President Chamoun to call for U.S. assistance.

Operation Blue Bat

U.S. Marine sits in a foxhole and points a machine gun towards Beirut, Lebanon, in the distance, 1958

US Marines on patrol in Beirut, summer of 1958.

The President of the United States, Eisenhower responded by authorizing Operation Blue Bat on July 15, 1958. This was the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine which gave the U.S. a self proclaimed right to intervene in countries threatened by international Communism. The goal of the operation was to bolster the pro-Western Lebanese government of President Camille Chamoun against internal opposition and threats from Syria and Egypt. The plan was to occupy and secure the Beirut International Airport, a few miles south of the city, then to secure the port of Beirut and approaches to the city. The operation involved approximately 14,000 men, including 8,509 Army personnel, including a contingent from the 24th Airborne Brigade of the 24th Infantry Division (based in Germany) and 5,670 officers and men of the Marine Corps. The presence of the troops successfully quelled the opposition and the U.S. withdrew its forces on October 25, 1958.

President Eisenhower also sent diplomat Robert D. Murphy to Lebanon as his personal representative. Murphy played a significant role in persuading President Chamoun to resign and also in the selection of moderate Christian general Fuad Chehab as Chamoun's replacement.

Aftermath

The operation, in conjunction with the resignation of Chamoun as President of Lebanon and his replacement by Fuad Chehab, was largely a success. Tensions faded and the government was secured under new leadership. The operation ended on October 25 of the same year. Casualties among the Americans were remarkably light, with only three soldiers dying in accidents and one killed by a sniper.

See also

• Multinational Force in Lebanon

Bibliography

Books and Studies

• Mohammed Shafi Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study, 1965.
• Erika G. Alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, American Intervention in the Middle East, 1994.
• Pierrick el Gammal, Politique intérieure et politique extérieure au Liban de 1958 à 1961 de Camille Chamoun à Fouad Chehab, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1991. (french)
• Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East 1945–1958, 1997
• Agnes G. Korbani, U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958–1982 : presidential decisionmaking, 1991.
• Nawaf Salam, L’insurrection de 1958 au Liban, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1979. (french)
• Jack Schulimson, Marines in Lebanon 1958, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, 1966, 60 p.
• Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, 2003.
• The Lebanon Operation, U.S. Army Center for Military History, Contingency Operations

Articles

• Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance", Beirut Review, 1993, pp. 83–113.
• David W. Lesch, "Prelude to the 1958 American Intervention in Lebanon", Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 7, n°3, 1996, pp. 87–108.
• Ritchie Ovendale, "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958", The International History Review, vol. XVI, n°2, 1994, pp. 284–304.
• Edouard de Tinguy, The Lebanese crisis of 1958 and the U.S military intervention, Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique, Paris : A. Pédone, n°4, décembre 2007. (french)

Links

• Shulimson, Jack (1966). Marines in Lebanon, 1958 (PDF). United States Marine Corps Historical Division.
• Global Security - Operation Blue Bat
• Article about the operation
• http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wade/wade.asp