Praxeology

Praxeology is the study of human action. Defined as "the science of human action," the most common use of the term is in connection with the work of Ludwig von Mises and the Austrian School of economics.

Etymology

The neologism, praxeology (Gr. praxis, action, and logos, talk, speech), is said to have been coined by Louis Bourdeau (1824-1900), the French author of a classification of the sciences, where he published in his Theorie des sciences: Plan de Science integrale in 1882:

A raison de leur double ceractère de spécialité et de généralité, les fonctions doivent constituer l’objet d’une science distincte. Quelques—unes de ses perties ont été étudiées de bonńe heure, car ce genre de recherches, dont l’homme pouvait se faire le sujet principal, a présenté de tout temps le plus vif intérèt. La physiologie, l’hygiene, la medicine, la psychologie, l’histoire des animaux, l’histoire humaine, l’economie politique, la morale, etc., répresentent des fragments de la science que nous voudrions établir; mais fragments, épars et sans coordination, sont restés a l’état de sciences particulieres. Il faudrait les rapprocher et en faire un tout afin de mettre en lumière l’ordre de l’ensemble et son unite. On aurait alors une… science, innommee jusqu’ici et que nous proposons d’appler Praxéologie (de πραζιζ, action), ou, en se référant a l’influence des milieu, Mésologie (de μεơοζ, milieu).

English translation:

On account of their dual character specialty and general, functions should be the subject of a separate science. Some of his losses were studied early, because this kind of research, which man could be the main subject, has always presented the greatest interest. Physiology, hygiene, medicine, psychology, history, animals, human history, political economy, morality, etc.. represent fragments of science that we would make, but fragments scattered and uncoordinated, has remained the status of special sciences. They should be together and make a label to highlight the order of the whole and its unity. We would then ... a science, so far unnamed, and we propose to call a Praxeology (from πραζιζ, action), or by referring to the influence of the environment, environmental data (from μεơοζ, middle).

The term, however, was being used as far back as 1612 by Clemens Timpler in his Philosophiae practicae systema methodicum. In this work, Timpler, when examining ethics, goes on to say (original Latin italicized):

The general ethics falls into two parts: 1) Aretologie and 2) Praxiologie, i.e., of virtue and of their action.

This distinction between the moral actions of the virtues seems a novelty; but it's necessary, however, because the habit of virtue and the move to action do not coincide.

It was mentioned later by Robert Flint. The proper meaning of this word was given by Alfred V. Espinas (1844-1922), the French philosopher and sociologist and the forerunner of the modern Polish school of the science of efficient action. The Austro-American school of economics was also based on a philosophical science of the same kind.

In the slightly different spelling, praxiology, the word was used by the English psychologist Charles A. Mercier (in 1911), and then proposed by Knight Dunlap to John B. Watson as a better name for his behaviorism. It was rejected by Watson, but was accepted by the Chinese physiologist of behavior, Zing-Yang Kuo (b. 1898) in 1935, and mentioned by William McDougall (in 1928, and later).

Previously the word praxiology, with the meaning Espinas gave to it, was used by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (in 1923) and some time later by several economists, such as the Ukrainian, Eugene Slutsky (1926) in his attempt to base economics on a theory of action, the Austrian Ludwig von Mises (1933), the Russian, Nicholas Ivanovitch Bukharin (1888-1938) during the Second International Congress of History of Science and Technology in London (in 1931), and the Pole, Oscar Lange (1904-1965) in 1959, and later.

The Sicilian philosopher, Carmelo Ottaviano, was using the Italianised version, prassiologia, in his treatises starting from 1935, but in his own way, as a theory of politics. After the Second World War the use of the term praxeology spread widely. After the emigration of von Mises to America his pupil Murray Newton Rothbard defended the praxeological approach. A revival of Espinas's approach in France was revealed in the works of P. Masse (1946), the eminent cybernetician, Georges Theodule Guilbaud (1953), the Belgian logician, Leo Apostel (1957), the cybernetician, Anatol Rapoport (1962), Henry Pierron, psychologist and lexicographer (1957), François Perroux, economist (1957), the social psychologist, Robert Daval (1963), the well-known sociologist, Raymond Aron (1963) and the methodologists, Abraham Antoine Moles and Roland Caude (1965).

But, under the influence of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, it was in Poland that the praxeological studies properly flourished. A special 'Centre of Praxeology' (Zaklad Prakseologiczny) was created under the organizational guidance of the Polish Academy of Sciences, with its own periodical (from 1962), called at first Materialy Prakseologiczne (Praxeological Papers), and then abbreviated to Prakseologia. It published hundreds of papers by different authors, and the materials for a special vocabulary edited by Professor Tadeusz Pszczolowski, the leading praxeologist of the younger generation. A sweeping survey of the praxeological approach is to be found in the paper by the French statistician, Micheline Petruszewycz, A propos de la praxeologie.

Praxeology in Economics

Ludwig von Mises expounded on praxeology in his economic treatise Human Action

The Austrian School economist Ludwig von Mises wrote that economics, the study of human choice under conditions of scarcity, can be treated as a specialization of praxeology, the study of all human action. Like other members of the Austrian School, von Mises rejected the use of empirical observation in the study of economics, and instead, favored the use of logical analysis. He wrote that the empirical methods used in the natural sciences cannot be applied to the social sciences because the principle of induction does not apply. We cannot build a theory to predict how humans will act (what ends they will seek) in a "complex" situation from how they will act in "simple" situations. Furthermore, there may be limits to how much we can learn from even a "simple situation". Only the human actor knows the ends toward which he acts. Observers may try to "understand" why an actor behaved in a particular way, but this reason must be inferred from a complex set of data which can only be gathered once. Reproducible experiments are not possible because both the actor and the observer have been altered by the experiment.

To counter the subjective nature of the results of historical and statistical analysis (see Methodenstreit), Mises looked at the logical structure of human action (he entitled his magnum opus Human Action). In other words, he built on the methodological aspect of Economics, the a priori.

From praxeology, Mises derived the idea that every conscious action is intended to improve a person's satisfaction. He noted that praxeology is not concerned with the individual's definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction and that individual's increase of their satisfaction by removing sources of dissatisfaction or "uneasiness".

An acting man is defined as one capable of logical thought — to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly, an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes can be changed, otherwise he cannot act.

Another conclusion that Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being capable of only one decision at a time — even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction. Additionally, Mises dismissed the notion that subjective values could be calculated mathematically; man can not treat his values with cardinal numbers, e.g., "I prefer owning a television 2.5 times as much as owning a DVD player."

As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal, then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, the satisfaction, or utility, that he derives from every further goal attained is less than that from the preceding goal. This assumes, of course, that the goals are independent, which is not always the case--for example, acquiring the television may enable one to pursue the goal of watching a documentary on biology, which may make one decide to study biology, which opens the goal of writing a research paper, and so on.

In human society, many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague's possession than he does for his own. This assertion modifies the classical economic view about exchange, which posits that individuals exchange goods and services that they both appraise as being equal in value. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics.

Categories

The categories of praxeology, the general, formal theory of human action, as outlined by Murray Rothbard are as follows:

• A. The Theory of the Isolated Individual (Crusoe Economics)

• B. The Theory of Voluntary Interpersonal Exchange (Catallactics, or the Economics of the Market)
  • 1. Barter
  • 2. With Medium of Exchange
    • a. On the Unhampered Market
    • b. Effects of Violent Intervention with the Market
    • c. Effects of Violent Abolition of the Market (Socialism)

• C. The Theory of War -- Hostile Action

• D. The Theory of Games (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern)

• E. Unknown

See also

• Social actions
• Human Action
• Methodological individualism
• Cognitive science
• Semiotics
• Self-efficacy
• Behavioral economics
• Bounded rationality
• Ludwig von Mises
• Murray N. Rothbard
• Methodological Dualism

Further reading

• Selgin, G. A. (1988). Praxeology and Understanding: An Analysis of the Controversy in Austrian Economics. The Review of Austrian Economics, 2, 19-58.

External links

• Preface to von Mises' book Epistemological Problems of Economics

• The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science by Ludwig von Mises

• Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics by Murray Rothbard

• Praxeology as the Method of the Social Sciences by Murray Rothbard

• In Defense of Extreme Apriorism by Murray Rothbard

• Economics and Praxeology by Ludwig von Mises

• Time and Praxeology by Ludwig von Mises

• Praxeology as Law & Economics by Josef Šíma

• Mises's Non-Trivial Insight by Robert P. Murphy

• Psychology versus Praxeology by Robert P. Murphy

• The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism on Praxeology by Ronald Hamowy