Jump to content

Battle of Loos: Difference between revisions

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Browse history interactively
← Previous editNext edit →
Content deleted Content added
VisualWikitext
m typo
→‎British plan of attack: comma splice fixed
Line 36: Line 36:
Sir John decided to keep a strong reserve consisting of the [[Cavalry Corps (United Kingdom)|Cavalry Corps]], the [[Indian Cavalry Corps]] and [[Richard Haking|Haking]]’s [[XI Corps (United Kingdom)|XI Corps]], which consisted of the [[Guards Division (United Kingdom)|Guards Division]] and two New Army Divisions ([[21st Division (United Kingdom)|21st]] and [[24th Division (United Kingdom)|24th]]) just arrived in France and a corps staff some of whom had never worked together or served on a staff before. [[Archibald Murray|Murray]] (Deputy [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff|CIGS]]) advised French that as troops fresh from training they were suited for the long marches of an exploitation rather than for trench warfare. French was privately doubtful that a breakthrough would be achieved. Haig (and [[Ferdinand Foch|Foch]], Commander of the French Northern Army Group) wanted the reserves close to hand to exploit a breakthrough on the first day; French agreed to deploy them closer to the front but still thought they should be committed on the second day.{{sfn|Holmes|1981|pp=300–302}}
Sir John decided to keep a strong reserve consisting of the [[Cavalry Corps (United Kingdom)|Cavalry Corps]], the [[Indian Cavalry Corps]] and [[Richard Haking|Haking]]’s [[XI Corps (United Kingdom)|XI Corps]], which consisted of the [[Guards Division (United Kingdom)|Guards Division]] and two New Army Divisions ([[21st Division (United Kingdom)|21st]] and [[24th Division (United Kingdom)|24th]]) just arrived in France and a corps staff some of whom had never worked together or served on a staff before. [[Archibald Murray|Murray]] (Deputy [[Chief of the Imperial General Staff|CIGS]]) advised French that as troops fresh from training they were suited for the long marches of an exploitation rather than for trench warfare. French was privately doubtful that a breakthrough would be achieved. Haig (and [[Ferdinand Foch|Foch]], Commander of the French Northern Army Group) wanted the reserves close to hand to exploit a breakthrough on the first day; French agreed to deploy them closer to the front but still thought they should be committed on the second day.{{sfn|Holmes|1981|pp=300–302}}


Haig's plans were limited by the shortage of [[artillery]] ammunition, which meant the preliminary bombardment, essential for success in the emerging [[trench warfare]], was weak. Prior to the British attack, about {{convert|140|LT|kg}} of [[chlorine]] gas was released, with mixed success, in places the gas was blown back onto British trenches. Due to the inefficiency of the contemporary gas masks, many soldiers removed them as they could not see through the fogged-up talc eyepieces or could barely breathe with them on. This led to some British soldiers being affected by their own gas, as it blew back across their lines. Wanting to be closer to the battle, French had moved to a forward command post at Lilliers, less than {{convert|20|mi|km}} behind First Army’s front. He left most of his staff behind at GHQ and had no direct telephone link to First Army. Haig’s infantry attacked at {{nowrap|6:30 a.m.}} on 25 September and he sent an officer by car requesting release of the reserves at {{nowrap|7:00 a.m.}}{{sfn|Holmes|1981|pp=302–305}}
Haig's plans were limited by the shortage of [[artillery]] ammunition, which meant the preliminary bombardment, essential for success in the emerging [[trench warfare]], was weak. Prior to the British attack, about {{convert|140|LT|kg}} of [[chlorine]] gas was released, with mixed success; in places the gas was blown back onto British trenches. Due to the inefficiency of the contemporary gas masks, many soldiers removed them as they could not see through the fogged-up talc eyepieces or could barely breathe with them on. This led to some British soldiers being affected by their own gas, as it blew back across their lines. Wanting to be closer to the battle, French had moved to a forward command post at Lilliers, less than {{convert|20|mi|km}} behind First Army’s front. He left most of his staff behind at GHQ and had no direct telephone link to First Army. Haig’s infantry attacked at {{nowrap|6:30 a.m.}} on 25 September and he sent an officer by car requesting release of the reserves at {{nowrap|7:00 a.m.}}{{sfn|Holmes|1981|pp=302–305}}


== Battle ==
== Battle ==

Revision as of 02:38, 7 September 2013

Battle of Loos
Part of the Western Front of World War I

Battle of Loos
Date25 September – 14 October 1915
Location
Loos, France
Result British success
Belligerents

 British Empire

 German Empire
Commanders and leaders
United Kingdom John French
United Kingdom Douglas Haig		 German Empire Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria
German Empire Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Armin
Strength
6 divisions 3 divisions
Casualties and losses
59,247 c. 26,000

The Battle of Loos was the largest British offensive mounted on the Western Front in 1915 during World War I. The first British use of poison gas occurred and the battle was the first mass engagement of New Army units. The British offensive was part of the attempt by the French to break through the German defences in Artois and Champagne and restore a war of movement. Despite improved methods, more ammunition and better equipment the Franco-British attacks were contained by the German armies, except for local losses of ground. Casualties in the [Herbstschlacht] Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (Autumn Battle) were high on both sides.

Background

Strategic developments

The battle was the British component of the combined Anglo-French offensive known as the Third Battle of Artois. Field Marshal Sir John French and Haig (GOC British First Army), both of whom initially regarded the ground, overlooked by German-held slagheaps and colliery towers, as unsuitable for an attack, persuaded themselves that the Loos attack could succeed, perhaps as the use of gas would allow a decisive victory.[1]

Prelude

British offensive preparations

The battle also marked the third use of specialist Royal Engineer tunnelling companies, who deployed mines underground to disrupt enemy defence lines through the use of tunnels and the detonation of large amounts of explosives at zero hour.[2]

British plan of attack

Sir John decided to keep a strong reserve consisting of the Cavalry Corps, the Indian Cavalry Corps and Haking’s XI Corps, which consisted of the Guards Division and two New Army Divisions (21st and 24th) just arrived in France and a corps staff some of whom had never worked together or served on a staff before. Murray (Deputy CIGS) advised French that as troops fresh from training they were suited for the long marches of an exploitation rather than for trench warfare. French was privately doubtful that a breakthrough would be achieved. Haig (and Foch, Commander of the French Northern Army Group) wanted the reserves close to hand to exploit a breakthrough on the first day; French agreed to deploy them closer to the front but still thought they should be committed on the second day.[1]

Haig's plans were limited by the shortage of artillery ammunition, which meant the preliminary bombardment, essential for success in the emerging trench warfare, was weak. Prior to the British attack, about 140 long tons (140,000 kg) of chlorine gas was released, with mixed success; in places the gas was blown back onto British trenches. Due to the inefficiency of the contemporary gas masks, many soldiers removed them as they could not see through the fogged-up talc eyepieces or could barely breathe with them on. This led to some British soldiers being affected by their own gas, as it blew back across their lines. Wanting to be closer to the battle, French had moved to a forward command post at Lilliers, less than 20 miles (32 km) behind First Army’s front. He left most of his staff behind at GHQ and had no direct telephone link to First Army. Haig’s infantry attacked at 6:30 a.m. on 25 September and he sent an officer by car requesting release of the reserves at 7:00 a.m.[3]

Battle

Map, Hohenzollern Redoubt, October 1915

The battle opened on 25 September. In many places British artillery had failed to cut the German wire in advance of the attack.[4] Advancing over open fields within range of German machine guns and artillery, British losses were devastating.[5] However, the British were able to break through the weaker German defences and capture the town of Loos, mainly due to numerical superiority. The inevitable supply and communications problems, combined with the late arrival of reserves, meant that the breakthrough could not be exploited. Haig did not hear until 10:02 a.m. that the divisions were moving up to the front. French visited Haig from 11:00–11:30 a.m. and agreed that Haig could have the reserve, but rather than using the telephone he drove to Haking’s Headquarters and gave the order personally at 12:10 p.m. Haig then heard from Haking at 1:20 p.m. that the reserves were moving forward.[3]

When the battle resumed the following day, the Germans were prepared and repulsed attempts to continue the advance. The reserves were committed against strengthened German positions.[6] Rawlinson wrote to the King's adviser Stamfordham (28 September) “From what I can ascertain, some of the divisions did actually reach the enemy’s trenches, for their bodies can now be seen on the barbed wire.” The twelve attacking battalions suffered 8,000 casualties out of 10,000 men in four hours.[3] Sir John French told Foch on 28 September that a gap could be “rushed” just north of Hill 70, although Foch felt that this would be difficult to coordinate and Haig told him that First Army was not in a position for further attacks at the moment.[7] The fighting subsided on 28 September, with the British having retreated to their starting positions. Their attacks had cost over 20,000 casualties, including three divisional commanders; George Thesiger, Thompson Capper and Frederick Wing. Following the initial attacks by the British, the Germans made several attempts to recapture the Hohenzollern Redoubt. This was accomplished on 3 October.[8] On 8 October, the Germans attempted to recapture much of the lost ground, by launching a major offensive along the entire line, but abandoned the effort by nightfall, due to heavy losses.[9] This marked the effective end of the battle, although in an attempt to strike before the winter rain set in, the British attempted a final offensive on 13 October, which failed, due to a lack of hand grenades.[10] General Haig thought it might be possible to launch another attack on 7 November, but the combination of heavy rain and accurate German shelling during the second half of October finally persuaded him to abandon the attempt.[11]

Major-General Richard Hilton, at that time a Forward Observation Officer, said of the battle:

A great deal of nonsense has been written about Loos. The real tragedy of that battle was its nearness to complete success. Most of us who reached the crest of Hill 70, and survived, were firmly convinced that we had broken through on that Sunday, 25th September 1915. There seemed to be nothing ahead of us, but an unoccupied and incomplete trench system. The only two things that prevented our advancing into the suburbs of Lens were, firstly, the exhaustion of the "Jocks" themselves (for they had undergone a bellyfull of marching and fighting that day) and, secondly, the flanking fire of numerous German machine-guns, which swept that bare hill from some factory buildings in Cite St. Auguste to the south of us. All that we needed was more artillery ammunition to blast those clearly-located machine-guns, plus some fresh infantry to take over from the weary and depleted "Jocks." But, alas, neither ammunition nor reinforcements were immediately available, and the great opportunity passed.[12]

Air operations

The Royal Flying Corps (RFC) came under the command of Brigadier-General Hugh Trenchard.[13] The 1st, 2nd and 3rd wings under colonels E. B. Ashmore, John Salmond and Sefton Brancker respectively, participated. As the British had a limited amount of artillery ammunition, the RFC flew target identification sorties prior to the battle to ensure that shells were not wasted.[14] During the first few days of the attack, target-marking squadrons with their recently improved air-to-ground wireless communications, helped ensure that German targets were heavily pounded by the British artillery.[15] Later in the battle pilots carried out the first successful tactical bombing operation in history. Aircraft of the 2nd and 3rd wings dropped many 100-pound (45 kg) bombs on German troops, trains, rail lines and marshalling yards.[16] As the land offensive stalled, British pilots and observers flew low over enemy positions, providing targeting information to the artillery.[17]

Aftermath

Analysis

British infantry advancing through gas at Loos, 25 September 1915.

French had already been criticised before the battle and lost his remaining support in both the Government and Army as a result of the British failure at Loos and his perceived poor handling of his reserve divisions in the battle.[18] He was replaced by Haig as Commander of the British Expeditionary Force in December 1915.[19]

Casualties

British casualties in the main attack were 48,367 and 10,880 in the subsidiary attack, a total of 59,247 losses of the 285,107 casualties on the Western Front in 1915.[20] German losses in the period 21 September – 10 October were c. 26,000 of c. 141,000 casualties on the Western Front, during the autumn offensives in Artois and Champagne.[21]

Commemoration

The Loos Memorial commemorates over 20,000 soldiers who fell in the battle and have no known grave.[22] The community of Loos, British Columbia's name was changed to commemorate the battle. Several survivors wrote of their experiences, the poet Robert Graves described the battle and succeeding days in his war memoir Goodbye to All That.[23] Author Patrick MacGill, who served as a stretcher-bearer in the London Irish and was wounded at Loos in October 1915, described the battle in his autobiographical novel The Great Push.[24] J. N. Hall related his experiences in the British Army at Loos in Kitchener's Mob.[25]

See also

Victoria Cross

Main article: Lists of Victoria Cross recipients

Notes

Footnotes

  1. ^ a b Holmes 1981, pp. 300–302.
  2. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 162, 252–263.
  3. ^ a b c Holmes 1981, pp. 302–305.
  4. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 163–167.
  5. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 191, 207, 223, 258, 261, 264.
  6. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 304–307.
  7. ^ Holmes 1981, pp. 305–306.
  8. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 369–370.
  9. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 372–375.
  10. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 380–387.
  11. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 389–391.
  12. ^ Warner 1976, pp. 1–2.
  13. ^ Jones 1928, p. 124.
  14. ^ Jones 1928, p. 125.
  15. ^ Jones 1928, pp. 129–130.
  16. ^ Jones 1928, pp. 127–128.
  17. ^ Boyle 1962, pp. 148–150.
  18. ^ Holmes 1981, pp. 306–310.
  19. ^ Edmonds 1928, p. 409.
  20. ^ Edmonds 1928, pp. 392–393.
  21. ^ Edmonds 1928, p. 392.
  22. ^ CWGC 2013, p. a.
  23. ^ Graves 1957, pp. 141–172.
  24. ^ MacGill 1916, pp. 118–168.
  25. ^ Hall 1916, pp. 146–168.
  26. ^ Edmonds 1928, p. 327.
  27. ^ Edmonds 1928, p. 333.
  28. ^ a b Edmonds 1928, p. 214.
  29. ^ Edmonds 1928, p. 194.

References

Books
  • Boyle, A. (1962). Trenchard Man of Vision. London: Collins. OCLC 752992766.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Edmonds, J. (1928). History of the Great War Based on Official Documents By Direction of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence: Military Operations France and Belgium, 1915: Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert, and Loos (1st ed.). London: Macmillan. OCLC 58962526.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Graves, R. (1957). Goodbye to All That (Penguin 1960 ed.). London: Cassell. ISBN 0-14-027420-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Hall, J. N. (1916). Kitchener's Mob, the Adventures of an American in the British Army (PDF) (1st ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. OCLC 1194374. Retrieved 15 July 2013.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Holmes, R. (1981). The Little Field Marshal. A Life of Sir John French (Cassell Military Paperbacks 2005 ed.). London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0-304-36702-3.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Jones, H. A. (1928). The War in the Air, Being the Story of the part played in the Great War by the Royal Air Force: Vol II (N & M Press 2002 ed.). London: Clarendon Press. ISBN 1-84342-413-4.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • MacGill, P. (1916). The Great Push: An Episode of the Great War (PDF). New York: G. H. Doran. OCLC 655576627. Retrieved 15 July 2013.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
  • Warner, P, (1976). The Battle of Loos. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions. ISBN 1-84022-229-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: ref duplicates default (link)
Websites
  • O'Dwyer, M. F. (1918). War Speeches (PDF). Lahore: Superintendent Government Printing. OCLC 697836601. Retrieved 15 July 2013.
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Battle of Loos.

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Battle_of_Loos&oldid=571864787"