Talk:Stepan Bandera

"Terrorist"

Of course one can find sources calling him terrorist, fascist, whatever. However, he is generally described in 3rd party sources as a "Ukrainian nationalist". Let's check the source that was currently used to label him a "terrorist" [1]. It tells in Summary (1st phrase): "This article discusses the reinterpretations of the career of Ukrainian nationalist leader Stepan Bandera...". Yes, that is how he is generally described. According to another citation used for sourcing in the lead (an opinion of a MI6 operative) he was actually a "bandit". OK, should we call him a "bandit" in the lead? Of course he collaborated with Nazi, and that is already correctly noted in the lead. My very best wishes (talk) 02:53, 6 October 2018 (UTC)

I tend to agree. When I checked the article about the most famous terrorist Osama bin Laden I found the lead does not call him a "terrorist". He is described as "a founder of the pan-Islamic militant organization". I think we should stick with this style here too. I doubt anybody may claim the sources used in this lead are non-reliable or non-mainstream, so I replaced the text with what these sources say: Bandera became a leader of a more militant wing of Ukrainian nationalist movement because he was a head of the terrorist activity in the past. He was also a convicted terrorist (the article says about that too).

With regard to his political activity, I am not sure what the lead is talking about. This statement is unsourced, and I have no idea during which period of his life Bandera got a chance to participate in any political activity. Maybe, you can explain me?--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:14, 6 October 2018 (UTC)

Is Bandera really controversial?

The lede says:

"Bandera remains a highly controversial figure today, both in Ukraine and internationally, with some hailing him as a liberator who fought both the Soviets and the Nazis while trying to establish an independent Ukraine, while others consider him to be a Nazi collaborationist and a war criminal."

I am wondering if Bandera is really considered as a liberator by someone besides some Ukrainians (both in the Ukraine and abroad). As far as I know, there is an international scholarly consensus about Bandera. Can anybody provided sources to support the statement that he is a controversial figure both in Ukraine and internationally?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:52, 19 October 2018 (UTC)

I see the statement about Bandera as a internationally controversial figure was restored [2]. The problem is that the sources that have been used to support this statement are misused. The statement: "Bandera remains a highly controversial figure today, both in Ukraine and internationally" implies that Bandera is a subject of controversy both in Ukraine and internationally. However, the sources that used areforeign sources that describe some domestic controversy around Bandera. Thus, one of these sources say that Bandera "is regarded in western Ukraine as a hero of the independence struggle, but regarded by many in Poland, Israel and Russia as a terrorist and Nazi collaborator who died with the blood of thousands on his conscience". It does not mean Bandera is a controversial figure internationally, it means there is a contradiction between the view of Bandera in western Ukraine and in Poland, Russia and Israel (Bandera is generally unknown in other countries). The fact that Bandera is seen in Ukraine as a controversial figure is recognised internationally, but that does not mean he is a highly controversial figure (internationally).

If no sources will be provided that Bandera is a subject of debates outside of Ukraine, I am going to revert this edit within one week. As far as I know, there are no debates about Bandera outside Ukraine, and the majority views of him is that he was a leader of a paramilitary organisation responsible for multiple war crimes and a Nazi collaborator.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:50, 27 November 2018 (UTC)

Absolutely.--Ymblanter (talk) 17:17, 27 November 2018 (UTC)

Bandera is no bigger Nazi collaborator than the USSR that provided the Nazi regime with resources during the WWII before Hitler turned to them. Shmyg (talk) 11:06, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

Great to hear this from a user with two edits.--Ymblanter (talk) 11:16, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

The US provided Japan with vital resources during its war with China. Were the US Japan's collaborator?--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:50, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

I see the statement about an international controversy has been restored [3]. I would like to see the sources that say that. An edit summary is not enough. If no sources will be provided that allow us to speak about an international controversy, at least, it Poland, Israel and Russia (because Bandera is essentially unknown outside of these country), I'll remove this statement. --Paul Siebert (talk) 14:39, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

I agree with this removal.Faustian (talk) 15:20, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

I am a little bit puzzled by these two reverts, and especially by the edit summary: this revert restores the edit tagged with the "citation needed" template, but the edit summary says the text is "well referenced". Is it logical? This revert restores "Sic!" notion, which is a purely editorial remark that is hardly allowed by our neutrality policy rules. Interestingly, this edit summary speaks about some "consensus", whereas the two users who added this text seem to have abstained from the talk page discussion. I am also not aware of any 1RR restriction imposed on this page. I revert these two edits; before reinserting this text, please, discuss it in the talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:00, 2 December 2018 (UTC)

I am afraid we are slowly heading in the disrection of arbitration enforcement. I already gave Openlydialectic a notice in September 2018, if they continue editing disruptively in the articles on East Europe they should be just topic-banned.--Ymblanter (talk) 09:47, 2 December 2018 (UTC)

• Okay, maybe it's just me and my lack of fluency in English, but doesn't work word CONTROVERSIAL imply that he is looked down upon, at least by some, outside of the Ukraine? Because that was the expression I was trying to convey by trying to protect that word from the removal. Which is funny because having read this discussion, apparently I was wrong. Lost in translation, I guess. Perhaps, if the consensus here is that he's universally looked down upon outside of the Ukraine, we should try to convey that one way or another in the lede? Openlydialectic (talk) 15:08, 2 December 2018 (UTC)

" if the consensus here is that he's universally looked down upon outside of the Ukraine,". This seems to be an incorrect assertion - outside Russia, Poland, and perhaps Israel few people outside Ukraine have heard about him, so such negative feelings cannot be described as "universal."Faustian (talk) 23:48, 6 December 2018 (UTC)

Correct. However, the point is not if the negative feeling are universal. As you correctly noted, he is not known outside of Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia, Poland and Israel, so we cannot speak neither about some universal feeling, nor about some international controversy.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:49, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

"The article has to be expanded with translation from Russian"

Why is that? Russian view on Bandera is highly skewed. To suggest expanding the article using Russian sources is the same as to suggest expanding article on Yasser Arafat from Jewish sources. Shmyg (talk) 11:06, 28 November 2018 (UTC)

No it's not. Not unless you prove otherwise. Openlydialectic (talk) 21:36, 5 December 2018 (UTC)

There is a big difference between the official Russian view and a view of a Russian speaking world. The latter includes Ukrainians, Jews and Russian diaspora. Actually, more educated Russian speaking Internet users live outside of Russia than inside. By the way, Russian speaking sources tell about Bandera essentially the same as English, Polish or Jewish sources.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:49, 5 December 2018 (UTC)

Recent reverts

I tend to agree with the removal of this text. The fact that Ukrainian antisemitism has deep roots in nationalism is well known, and an opinion of a single scholar cannot be presented as a universally accepted fact. In reality, during the civil war in Ukraine (1918-20), 'all parties except Red Army engaged in massive pogroms and other forms of anti-Jew violence. I think this statement is controversial, and if someone wants it to stay, it should be balanced with opinia of other scholars who thinks otherwise. However, I am not sure this article is a proper place for detailed discussion of the roots of Ukrainian antisemitism.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:56, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

The same source and author are also used to describe Bandera's role in anti-Jewish maassacres such as here: [4] and may very well be the foremost expert on Ukrainian nationalism and anti-semitism. It's a reliable source and the statement is accurate. The reality is that Ukrainian nationalism's relationship with anti-semitism has been rather complex. In Western Ukraine, nationalists and Jews cooperated against Poles prior to and after World War I (such as here: [5]). The infamous Kiev pogrom was btw committed by anti-Ukrainian Russian nationalists. So there is nothing inaccurate or strange about the statement "Unlike competing Polish, Russian, Hungarian or Romanian nationalisms in late imperial Austria, imperial Russia, interwar Poland and Romania, Ukrainian nationalism did not include antisemitism as a core aspect of its program and saw Russians as well as Poles as the chief enemy with Jews playing a secondary role. Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism was not immune to the influence of the antisemitic climate in the Eastern and Central Europethat had already become highly racialized in the late 19th century, and had developed an elaborate anti-Jewish discourse" unless one takes for granted the anti-Ukrainian ideas that Ukrainian nationalist = antisemite. Please review what is written before deleting. Faustian (talk) 03:45, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

This was the original text [6] "Ukrainian nationalism incorporated little modern anti- Semitic ideology. (32) The main thrust of the Ukrainian struggle was directed against Russians and Poles; the Jews were merely adjunct. Ukrainian nationalism never developed the fully articulated anti-Semitism that existed in Polish, Russian, Hungarian or Romanian nationalisms. (33) Ukrainians and Ukrainian nationalists may have disliked Jews, but they did so on traditional or on real-political grounds; rarely would they demonize Jews or place them at the center of some conspiracy. None the less, in the era of nationalism anti-Semitic ideology was widespread in Eastern Europe, and certainly the Ukrainians were frequently exposed to it, even if they did not incorporate it into their own nationalist discourse. In some cases, anti- Semitism was a major component of the ideology of nationalist movements with which the Ukrainian national movement engaged in intense conflict, such as Polish National Democracy in Austrian Galicia and interwar Poland and the Russian Black Hundreds in tsarist Ukraine. In certain states within which the Ukrainians found themselves, anti-Semitism suffused the political culture (late imperial Austria, imperial Russia, interwar Poland, interwar Romania). This constant exposure to anti-Semitic ideology probably facilitated its acceptance when it was also espoused, in a more lethal form, by the German occupation authorities.".Faustian (talk) 04:07, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

I know Himka, and I saw this source. Nevertheless, I find this statement very questionable, at least because Russian nationalism have much less reasons to see Jews as primary enemies than Ukrainian one. At least, as far as I know, the most enthusiastically the Black Hundreds was supported in a Ukrainian part of Russian empire.

A possible explanation of this controversy is that Himka, probably, means some specific nationalistic movement, because Ukraine was (and still is) highly inhomogeneous in this aspect.

Anyway, if you think this statement should stay, it should be attributed to Himka, and I'll add other sources that say otherwise, because this statement looks very odd: it looks like Ukraine, which was a center of anti-Jewish pogroms during the Civil war, and which was one of the main centers of the Holocaust (where locals enthusiastically participated), was not antisemitic initially, and that Ukrainians became antisemits due to malicious neighbours.

However, I don't think it is correct, because this article is about Bandera (whose antisemitism is well known), and we don't need to discuss these details here.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:26, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

Russian nationalism proposed that Jews were the center of a global conspiracy to destroy Russia It produced the The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. Polish nationalism at that time felt that because Poland had the most Jews in Europe, Jews were conspiring to take over Poland and turn it into their homeland with Poles as servants. Ukrainian nationalists at that time saw Poles and Russians as their main enemies, and Jews at worst merely as henchmen of one of those two groups. As such, they were willing to cooperate withj Jews against Poles. See here: [7]. While there were many pogroms in Ukraine, the Black Hundreds were Russian, not Ukrainian, nationalists who also assaulted Ukrainian nationalists. Ascribing Black Hundreds crimes to Ukrainian nationalists is just very inaccurate. Even Petliura's was a complex case. His forces massacred many Jews, but he was close to some Zionists, and his money was printed in Hebrew as well as Ukrainian.

This is all irrelevant for this article, but the stuff taken from Himka is accurate and shouldn't be removed. The reason to keep it is to avoid presenting the simplistic view that Ukrainian nationalism was simply antisemitic when the issue was more complex.Faustian (talk) 04:43, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

First of all, we need to specify what we are talking about. The meaning of the terms "Russian", "Ukrainian", "nationalism" etc change, and they meant something different in late XIX - early XX century. Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality, the slogan proposed during Nicolas I times, used the term "nationality" in the same sense as that term was used in Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicae, where Nationis meant "native to Germany", or "population of Germany". That means "Nationality" (narodnost) referred to population (narod as whole), not to some ethnic group. Accordingly, "Russian" was a synonym of "An orthodox Christian who is Russian Emperor's subject" (close but not identical to the modern Western term "nationality"). That means, "Russian" and "Ukrainian" were not mutually exclusive terms, because the first one referred to citizenship, and the second one to the ethnicity: in Russian Empire passports, Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians were denoted as "orthodox", and nonone cared which language, Russian, Ukrainian or Belorussioan they speak. In a rare case when one needed to specify ethnicity of some Russian person, the word "Velikoross" was used for a Russian, and the word "Maloross" or "Ukrainian" for a Ukrainian. (If you believe "Maloross", literally, "Little Russian" is a derogatory term, let me remind you that Małopolska ("Lesser Poland") is a core of historical Polish land, whereas the southern part of Italian peninsular was called Great Greece during ancient times, in contrast to old historical Greece).

Since the term "Russian" was not associated with Russian ethnicity (in a modern sense), XIX century Ukrainians who lived in the Russian Empire identified themselves as Russians, although they did not consider themselves Velikorosses. In connection to that, you should keep in mind that "Black hundreds" (Union of the Russian People, etc) were open to all Russians (not only velikoross) population, and it was especially popular among ethnic Ukrainians in Southern Ukraine.

In connection to the Protocols, you should keep in mind that they were written by an Swiss emigrant and published by a Moldavian. The Jewish conspiracy Protocols are telling about was a conspiracy against Russians in the old meaning of this word: the conspiracy against Orthodox subjects of Russian Emperor, and against Russian empire as whole, not against Velikorosses specifically. Ethnic Russian nationalism, as well as ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, are very recent phenomena, and we should not be mislead by the terms whose meaning dramatically changed since late XIX century.

I am almost sure Ukrainian nationalism Himka is talking about is an early ethnic nationalism as it appears in early works of Ukrainian intellectual nationalists, it has nothing in common with an attitude of regular Ukrainians towards Jews. In a current form, this statement looks odd and apologetic, and it should be removed (preferably) or significantly modified.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:59, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

About Black Hundreds - correct, but the Black Hundreds ideology was really opposed to those Ukrainians who considered themselves to be Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainian nationalism was fundamentally opposed to Russian nationalism. Ukrainian nationalism was condemned by the Black Hundreds for splitting up the Orthodox all-Russian people. So while Black hundreds were not opposed to people whom we would not call Ukrainians, it was bitterly and brutally opposed to Ukrainian nationalists, who were beaten by Black Hundreds members. About Black Hundreds and Ukrainian nationalists: [8] "To fight the revolution the Russian government and reactionaries stirred up an extreme Russian nationalism that was antisocialist, anti-Semitic, and anti-Ukrainian. The nationalists, known as Black Hundreds, organized pogroms against Jews and against supporters of the revolution. Moderate Ukrainian politicians condemned the anti-Jewish pogroms in their organ Ukrainskii vestnik (Saint Petersburg); revolutionary Ukrainian activists, especially members of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers' party, organized self-defense units to combat the pogromists.".

About Himka - he was referring to traditional Ukrainian nationalism which indeed did not place Jews at the center of some conspiracy and which hated Russians and Poles more. This is even true of Bandera and his movement. See here: [9]. Bandera henchman Stetsko's statement: "Although I consider Moscow, which in fact held Ukraine in captivity, and not Jewry, to be the main and decisive enemy, I nonetheless fully appreciate the undeniably harmful and hostile role of the Jews, who are helping Moscow to enslave Ukraine. I therefore support the destruction of the Jews and the expedience of bringing German methods of exterminating Jewry to Ukraine, barring their assimilation and the like". Another Banderist manifesto: "The OUN combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and simultaneously it renders the masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow." This distinction is notable enough that a sentence stating it belongs in this article. I think it is very unfortunate that some guy just removes referenced information to a reliable source, that provides some piece of information that is otherwise lacking, because it sounds wrong to him. Faustian (talk) 22:24, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

Glad to see that you understand that Black Hundreds had nothing in common with Russian nationalism. In reality, any nationalism (as it was seen in late XIX - early XX century) was in opposition to any estate society: in Russian Empire, people were divided not by ethnic, but by estate and confessional criteria, there were no Russians, Ukrainians or Jews ("yevrey"), but just Cristian orthodox peasants (or nobility), or Jewish ("iudey") borgeous. In that sense, Black Hundreds were not nationalists, but monarchist movement, and that meant all nationalist movements, including Russian (Velikorussian) were in opposition to them.

In connection to that, my argument is mostly not about a description of Ukrainian nationalism, but about a comparison with other nationalisms. This is a comparison between apples and oranges. If you speak about Petliura, you should compare him not with some odious monarchists like Purishkevich, but with Kerensky or Miliukov in Russia or Pilsudsky in Poland. Was anti-semitism so important to them? Definitely, not. They were pretty westernised leaders, and they were not antisemits at all.

Of course, if you compare Ukrainian socialists, who got majority in the Ukrainian republic in 1919, and who were real Ukrainian nationalists, with "Russian nationalists" like Krushevan or de Katsman, you can came to a conclusion that anti-semitism played a key role in Russian nationalism, however, these were really marginal figures, and this comparison is totally illegitimate.

In other words, I trust Himka when he speaks about the subject where he is an expert, but I do not trust him when he speaks about other nations. By the way, Himka found that UPA extensively edited its documents after the war to conceal their crimes, and many statements found in their post-war archives were made purely pro forma, so I am not sure the primary source you cited is a good evidence. It would be better to find a good secondary source on that subject.

Finally, I see you keep restoring the fragment that has been contested. I am not sure it is correct. Let's wait until tour discussion come to some logical end.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:58, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

I think you misunderstood. Russian nationalism holds that Ukrainians are Russians - but that if they deny being Russians than they are Russian traitors (or, at best, confused). So Black Hundreds were Russian nationalists even though many of them could be considered to be of Ukrainian ethnicity. There is no contradiction being Russian nationalism and being of what we would call Ukrainian ethnicity, if one refuses to call it Ukrainian. As a Ukrainian, if you renounce being Ukrainian and claim to be a Russian you get accepted as one by Russian nationalists. In Russian nationalist discourse a Ukrainian identity is sometimes called a Polish or even Jewish plot to break up the one Russian people. You are correct that conservatism opposed nationalisms but the Black Hundreds were not conservative by those standards. A conservative would prefer the right of the Polish nobleman over the Russian Orthodox peasant but the Russian nationalist would not. The wiki article is correct when it states the Black Hundreds "was an ultra-nationalist movement in Russia in the early 20th century." About Poland - Pilsudski, like his ally Petliura, was a socialist nationalist and was not antisemitic. But Poland was largely dominated by his rival Dmowski, a "pure" Polish nationalist who was intensely antisemitic. The Polish nationalism of Dmowski and the Russian nationalism of the Black Hundreds and their heirs in the White movement were indeed more antisemitic than Ukrainian nationalists.

The OUN quote was taken from Himka himself so it was not a doctored one; Himka knows what he is doing. OUN did indeed view Jews as a secondary rather than primary enemy (to be sure, to be destroyed as well), with the main enemies being Poland and Russia. This detail is notable. It should not be removed. As a reflection of this, Himka notes - "According to the Germans, to finance their activities, the Banderites raised some of their contributions from Jews, whom they often blackmailed. (42) On the other hand, the Bandera movement provided some Jews with false papers. (43) The impression created by the German documentation is that the extreme Ukrainian nationalists were so indifferent to the fate of the Jews (44) that they would either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate to their political goals. Morality (Sheptytsky's "obligation of Divine law") did not enter into the calculation. ".

That having been said, as a compromise and in light of the fact that Himka's expertise is focused d on OUN and Jews, I don't object to taking out the comparative parts while leaving in the fact that Ukrainian nationalists considered Russians and Poles to be greater enemies than Jews.Faustian (talk) 23:37, 7 December 2018 (UTC)

No, it is you who misunderstands that. The claim "Russian nationalism holds that Ukrainians are Russians" is totally ahistorical in the context of our discussion, because it uses the words in its present meaning and applies it to the past. Yes, some modern Russian nationalists claim Ukrainians are Russians (although only part of them think so; as far as I know, most modern Russian nationalists do not consider West Ukrainians as Russians), thereby denying that some separate Ukrainian ethnicity exists. However, the same statement had a totally different meaning one hundred years ago. "Russian" meant not Velikoross, but any Orthodox subject of the Russian emperor, which means every Ukrainian who lived in Russian Empire would agree with the statement: "You are Russian". At the same time, he considered himself a maloross, or Ukrainian, and there was no contradiction with that, because "Russian" did not refer to ethnicity, but "Ukrainian" did. Therefore, in late XIX early XX century, the statement "Ukrainians are Russians" sounded either as a universally accepted truth (if it was applied to Ukrainians who lived in Russian Empire) or as a universally accepted nonsense (when it was applied to the Ukrainians who lived in Galicia, because they were not subjects of Russian emperor, and, therefore, were not Russians byu definition).

One hundred years ago, the slogan "Ukrainians are Russians" would sound like "Malorosses are Velikorosses". However, that is the claim that was an obvious nonsense, and I don't know if any Russian nationalist really believed in that. We have no opportunity to see how would modern Russian nationalists deal with Ukrainian question (a Provisional government was too shorl living to develop any specific policy on that subject), but the attitude of White movement leaders towards Ukrainians was close to that of the Poles, and, had Whites been victorious, the situation of Ukrainians in Russia under the rule of Whites would be similar to that in the Second Polish Republic.

Re "The Polish nationalism of Dmowski and the Russian nationalism of the Black Hundreds and their heirs in the White movement were indeed more antisemitic than Ukrainian nationalists." Again, you compare total marginals ("black hundreds") with moderate and reasonable, although weak, politicians (Petliura). A Russian analog of Petliura was Kerensky or Milyukov, and they were absolutely not antisemitic. If you want more close analogy with "black hundreds", their Ukrainian twins were hrygorievtsy, who killed more than 50% of all Jews during the Civil war.

To summarise, Himka compares the worst and extreme representatives of Russian nationalism with Ukrainian nationalism as whole and concludes that Ukrainian neighbours were more antisemitic. This claim is outstanding, and it needs in an oudstanding proof. Therefore, it would be correct if you self-reverted, and we discussed the correct wording on the talk page.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:40, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

"One hundred years ago, the slogan "Ukrainians are Russians" would sound like "Malorosses are Velikorosses." This was probably correct 200 years ago. 100 years ago there was already a Ukrainian national movement. In opposition was not a Great Russian national movement but simply a Russian national movement that considered Ukrainian to be Little Russians and as such a subset of Russians. "Ukrainians" were seen as treasonous Little Russians. So the Russian census of 1897 [10] had a category "Russians", and within this category were three types of Russians: Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarussians. The Great Russians played a primary role, and Russian nationalists of the time of the Black Hundreds promoted the Great Russian language in Ukraine (Russification) and subservience to the Russian Tsar and Russian Church by the Little Russian people. They actively opposed Ukrainian nationalism: [11]. It was a Russian nationalist movement. And it was linked to the Russian state and was hardly marginal. Vladimir Purishkevich was a major Black Hundreds leader. How was he not a Russian nationalist? And he certainly was not marginal. "Therefore, in late XIX early XX century, the statement "Ukrainians are Russians" sounded either as a universally accepted truth (if it was applied to Ukrainians who lived in Russian Empire) or as a universally accepted nonsense (when it was applied to the Ukrainians who lived in Galicia, because they were not subjects of Russian emperor, and, therefore, were not Russians byu definition)". his is simply not true. Russian nationalists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries certainly considered Galicians to be Russians. My grandmother's older brothers, Galician Russophiles, studied in St. Petersburg on a scholarship for Galician Russians. When Brusilov captured Galicia during World War I, he proclaimed "We are entering Galicia, which despite its being a constituent part of Austria-Hungary, is a Russian land from time immemorial, populated, after all, by Russian people (russkim zhe narodom)." (source: Mark Von Hagen. (2007). War in a European borderland: occupations and occupation plans in Galicia. Seattle: University of Washington Press ISBN 0-295-98753-7. pg. 19)

That being said, this issue of comparing antisemitisms is not the most important one from Himka's source. I don't mind removing for the sake of compromise. It is rather this, taken right from Himka who as we both agree is an expert on OUN and antisemitism: "Ukrainian nationalism did not include antisemitism as a core aspect of its program and saw Russians as well as Poles as the chief enemy with Jews playing a secondary role.[66] Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism was not immune to the influence of the antisemitic climate in the Eastern and Central Europe,[66] that had already become highly racialized in the late 19th century, and had developed an elaborate anti-Jewish discourse." I will add "historically" to the sentence. Do you think it is okay?Faustian (talk) 02:34, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

Re "within this category were three types of Russians: Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belarussians" You continue to misunderstand that. This old "Russian" was equivalent to modern "Rossiyanin" (a citizen of Russia). According to modern views Tatars or Ossetins are "Rossiyanin", but not "Russian". In other words, the old equivalent of modern "Rossiyanin" was "Russian", and old equivalent of modern "Russian" was "Velikoross". Applying modern terminology to old phenomenae is misleading and causes various mistakes.

Re ""Ukrainians" were seen as treasonous Little Russians." Seen by whom? Russian monarchists saw all democratic movements (including Russian and Ukrainian nationalists) as treasonous, Russian (and Ukrainian) Bolsheviks saw Ukrainian and Russian nationalists as counter-revolutionary elements (and Russian nationalism was much more suppressed in 1920-30s than other nationalist movements).

Re "Russian nationalists of the time of the Black Hundreds promoted the Great Russian language in Ukraine (Russification)" I think that was because of the attempt of bureaucratic unification of the Empire: the central government was trying to suppress any democratic movement, and suppression of Russian (Velikorussian) democratic movement had different forms, because they used the official language of the Empire. However, the central authorities were equally hostile to any liberals or democrats, no matter which language they were speaking. Again, if you will call Black Hundreds "Russian nationalists", I will use the term "Ukrainian nationalists" only for some marginals like hrigorievtsy or banderovsy. "Black hundreds" were not Russian nationalists, they were Monarchists, and Russian monarchy (like many other European monarchies) was not a national phenomenon.

Re Galicia. Yes, there was still a terminological confusion between "Russian" and "Velikoross", and that is because Russian ethnic nationalism (as well as Ukrainian one) are very recent phenomenae. Indeed, if at some period of history the word "Russian" meant "East Slav" and the word "Velikoross" meant "Russian", and the meaning started to change, that means during this transition period these terms were being used interchangeably. Yes, when the Russian army came to Galicia, it was the army of Russians, not Velikorosses, and it would be natural to expect it representatives would speak on behalf of all "Russians" (a.k.a. East Slavs). And yes, they didn't claim Galicia was populated by Velikorosses, it was populated by "Russians" (which was an umbrella term for what we currently know as Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians).

I perfectly understand that the modern Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes this subject a very sensitive, however, you should have understood that those participants of that conflict who are acting in a good faith make a big mistake when they apply modern terminology to old events and facts, because that just increases mutual misunderstanding. Modern Ukraine and modern Russia are significantly different from old Velikorossiya and Malorossiya+Galicia, and modern Russians and Ukrainians are significantly different from the ethnic groups that lived there 100 years ago, and it is a big mistake to project the current events to the past, and to try to find superficial analogies between the old and recent events.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:10, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

What you are saying is absolutely correct, however you seem to be off by about 50 years. By the end of the 19th century, partially in response to the Polish uprising, the Russian monarchy had appropriated and adopted what we would now consider to be modern Russian nationalism; Ukrainian nationalists of those times had adopted what is basically modern Ukrainian nationalist ideas. The conflict between Russian monarchism and Russian nationalism was an early to mid 19th century phenomenon. While there were Russian nationalist extremists opposed to the monarchy, most supported the Russian monarchy. This is why various sources correctly describe the Black Hundreds as Russian nationalists. Here is Britannica [12]: "black Hundreds, Russian Chernosotentsy, reactionary, antirevolutionary, and anti-Semitic groups formed in Russia during and after the Russian Revolution of 1905. The most important of these groups were the League of the Russian People (Soyuz Russkogo Naroda), League of the Archangel Michael (Soyuz Mikhaila Arkhangela), and Council of United Nobility (Soviet Obedinennogo Dvoryanstva). The Black Hundreds were composed primarily of landowners, rich peasants, bureaucrats, merchants, police officials, and clergymen, who supported the principles of Orthodoxy, autocracy, and Russian nationalism." Modern Russian nationalists, like those of the late 19th century, continue to view the Great Russians and Little Russians as one Russian people who ought to be I one state and who ought to all speak the proper Great Russian language. They are more likely to accept that Galicians are not redeemable but the premise is identical.

What do you think of the latest edit I made?Faustian (talk) 15:02, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

I think your latest edits are the steps in a right direction.

Regarding "Black Hundreds". Your view of ethnic anti-semirtism is irrational: according to you, Russian nationalists were intrinsically antisemitic, whereas Ukrainians were not. This claim is supposed to have some rational ground, and I don't see it here. Indeed, for Russians to see a major threat in Jews, these two ethnic groups were supposed at least to interact extensively. In reality, due to Pale of Settlement, Russians had no opportunity to interact with Jews. In reality, The Union of the Russian People was not popular in the parts of the Empire with ethnically homogeneous population, but it was extremely popular in Moldavia, Belorussia, Ukraine. Just read the statistics (unfortunately, these data are not easy to find, I saw them some time ago, I can find them again, but it may require some special efforts). As you correctly noted, "Black Hundreds" formed as a responce to the First Russian revolution, which means it was not a reaction on some ethnic tensions, but the attempt to preserve the regime. It was primarily a counter-revolutionary and monarchist organisation, not nationalistic one. In addition, although it proclaimed it was an organisation of a Russian nation, and it strictly prohibited membership of all non-Russians, it defined the term "Russian" exactly as I did (the Orthodox nation that combines Velikorosses, Malorosses, and Bielorosses). Since this organisation saw its primary goal in preservation of the monarchy, the major enemies were revolutionaries, and in particular those national minorities who were the most active opponents of the regime. In other words, Black Hindreds saw Jews, Poles, and intellectuals (lyahi, zhudy i skubenty, derogatory and mangled "Poles, Jews, and students") as primary enemies, because they were the enemies of the monarchy. By no means that was a real nationalism, with, in XIX century, was a progressive and democtratic movement that was an antithesis to any monarchy (I am speaking about old nationalism; modern ethnic nationalism is always a regressive phenomenon).

In connection to that, you should read this article DAVID G. ROWLEY. Imperial versus national discourse: the case of Russia. Nations and Nationalism, 6 (I), 2000, 23-42.

One of the observations the author makes is that the Imperial officials treated Russian nationalist movements with the same (if not greater) suspect than other ethnic national movements.

With regard to Ukrainian nationalism, we actually should speak about two different nationalisms, because Ukrainians were a divided ethnic group. Western Ukrainian nationalism formed in Austro-Hungary, and it was seen (correctly) as a threat by the Russian government. Regarding the domestic Ukrainian nationalism, the suppression of Ukrainian printed language was seen as persecution of Ukrainians, but suppression of narodniki movement by the Imperial government was not seen as a suppression of Russians. Meanwhile, I find it incorrect when the actions of the central government against progressive political or cultural movement in provinces populated by non-Russians (in a modern sense) were considered as suppression of national movement, but the samem actions against Russians were not. When Russian authorities banned Kolokol it was not considered a suppression of the Russian liberation movement, but had Kolokol been being printed in Ukrainian, we would speak about persecution of Ukrainians. I find that deeply illogical. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:02, 8 December 2018 (UTC)

"Regarding "Black Hundreds". Your view of ethnic anti-semitism is irrational: according to you, Russian nationalists were intrinsically antisemitic, whereas Ukrainians were not." - Not exactly, and it was from Himka not me. Himka claimed antisemitism played a central role in Russian nationalism but not a central role in Ukrainian nationalism, which was focused instead on Poles and Russians as enemies. Since Himka is an expert on Ukrainian but not Russian nationalism, I removed this from the article. The Russian government was a Russian state with ethnic Russians as the dominant nationality and the Russian language as the dominant language - so I see no reason why Russian nationalists would not also support the Russian state that promoted Russification and Russian power. " Indeed, for Russians to see a major threat in Jews, these two ethnic groups were supposed at least to interact extensively. In reality, due to Pale of Settlement, Russians had no opportunity to interact with Jews. In reality, The Union of the Russian People was not popular in the parts of the Empire with ethnically homogeneous population, but it was extremely popular in Moldavia, Belorussia, Ukraine. " Again, Russian nationalists considered Ukrainians to be Russians (they still do). Russian nationalism like all nationalism seems to be strongest when the nation perceives itself to be under threat. And so it is no surprise that Russian nationalism, by people who considered themselves to be Russians, was stronger in Ukraine than in Russia itself. The Russian government did not merely ban Ukrainian newspapers, it banned thew use of the Ukrainian language itself (Ems Ukaz). "With regard to Ukrainian nationalism, we actually should speak about two different nationalisms, because Ukrainians were a divided ethnic group. Western Ukrainian nationalism formed in Austro-Hungary, and it was seen (correctly) as a threat by the Russian government.". This is mistaken. The nationalism developed in Galicia was developed largely by exiles from Russian-ruled Ukraine, Galician natives tended to initially be Russian nationalists (there was a funny observation by one of the exiles from Russian-ruled Ukraine - that the Ukrainian nationalists in Galicia, being from Russia, knew more about Russian culture than the local Galician Russian nationalists). The most famous of these was of course Mykhailo Hrushevsky. This is why Ukrainian nationalism eventually adopted in Galicia focused so strongly on Cossack culture in its mythology. Even the ideologue who inspired Banderist-style fascist- nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov, was from the Russian Empire and had studied in St. Petersburg before eventually moving to Lviv. Note that all of these people were from the turn of the 19th-20th centuries, a time when modern nationalism supposedly did not exist.

I was unable to access the article you posted, only the abstract. I also have a recommendation on this topic, it is a book rather than article [13]- Children of Rus, Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation, Cornell University Press. It clearly describes these people as Russian nationalists and traces how modern Russian nationalism began in what is now Ukraine, in the late 19th century. A description - "Right-bank Ukraine would seem unlikely terrain to nourish a Russian nationalist imagination. It was among the empire’s most diverse corners, with few of its residents speaking Russian as their native language or identifying with the culture of the Great Russian interior. Nevertheless, as Hillis shows, by the late nineteenth century, Russian nationalists had established a strong foothold in the southwest’s culture and educated society; in the first decade of the twentieth, they secured a leading role in local mass politics. By 1910, with help from sympathetic officials in St. Petersburg, right-bank activists expanded their sights beyond the borderlands, hoping to spread their nationalizing agenda across the empire. Exploring why and how the empire’s southwestern borderlands produced its most organized and politically successful Russian nationalist movement, Hillis puts forth a bold new interpretation of state-society relations under tsarism as she reconstructs the role that a peripheral region played in attempting to define the essential characteristics of the Russian people and their state." A lot of it can be read online through googlebooks.Faustian (talk) 00:24, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Just an example from Children of Rus (pg. - a Russian nationalist from Ukraine condemned Ukrainian nationalists such as Hrushevsky and wrote that the Orthodox people of Little Russia were "creators of the Russian national idea and the heralds of Russian ethnic unity. (my emphasis). I found the entire book on pdf here: [14].Faustian (talk) 00:51, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Re "The Russian government was a Russian state with ethnic Russians as the dominant nationality and the Russian language as the dominant language". Which version of "Russian" do you use? Modern "Russian" (former Velikorosses) or old "Russian" (a.k.a. East Slav)? Assuming that you mean "modern Russian", your statement should be "The government of the Russian Empire was a state where Velikorosses were a dominant ethnic group, the Russian language was the dominant language." The last statement is correct (it was strictly enforced that Russian was the only official language of the Empire). The second is wrong. There were more velokorosses in the Russian government, but they were represented proportionally: it was quite logical to expect that the most numerous ethnic group would be more represented. In reality, ethnicity had absolutely no influence, one has to be an Orthodox, and that was sufficient in majority cases (except for Jews: there were some additional limitations, although not significant). I would say, the only group that was really overrepresented in the Russian government was ethnic Germans. Anyway, all what you say is correct if we agree that the term "Russian" has its old meaning (Galician Ukrainians, obviously, are not included in the "Russian" category).

Regarding the article, try this link, I can open it from my home IP, so it should work fine. An interesting conclusion of the author is that no Russian nationalism existed until after WWII, and that is because Russian mentality was more imperial than national. The author define the term "Empire" quite neutrally ("an empire is a state that administers a number of different nations"), so the word "Imperial" has neither negative nor positive connotation in that case.

The author argues that the Imperial government was equally hostile to any nationalist movements

"the Russian state kept at arm's length all individuals and groups that expressed Russian national sentimental or patriotic themes. Slavophiles, Pan-Slavs, Pochvenniks and others were all viewed by the tsar with great suspicion precisely because they implied that the purpose of the autocracy might serve the interests of Russia ± rather than the other way around. The Russian autocracy could not accept any ideology that did not ®rst and foremost serve the interests of the state."

He also argues that it was Lenin who gave a start to nationalism:

"Since the rise of nationalism within the Soviet Union has been widely considered to be the product of Lenin's nationalities policy, perhaps Lenin should really be considered Russia's ®rst `nationalist' ± in function if not intention. (For discussions of how this occurred see Motyl 1990, Suny 1993, and Kaiser 1994.)"

I strongly recommend you to read this article, the new link should work.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:21, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Thank you! Will do so, and comment when finished!Faustian (talk) 01:41, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

Okay, read the article. The author makes the interesting and very bold claim that there was no Russian nationalism prior to the end of the 20th century. This, of course, goes against general consensus. His reasoning seems to be based on the flawed premise that nationalism and imperialism are mutually exclusive and that movements that support imperialism or include imperialism cannot also be nationalistic. But why wouldn't a nationalist be an imperialist also, if his nation is the one in charge of the empire and if the empire is used as a vehicle to increase his nation's power? Most Russian nationalists were, of course, very happy with the Russian Empire which Russified the Little Russians and made Russia a world power. German nationalists loved the German Empire; they did not want it to lose its colonies or to give up Polish-inhabited lands, on the contrary they wanted it to expand. According to the author, the Nazis would not be considered German (or Aryan) nationalists because they wanted to rule all of Europe. He also makes some mistakes, such as stating that there was no effort to Russify the Baltic Germans. This was true 200 years ago but not by the late 19th or early 20th centuries. The not uncommon habit of Russifying German names (a prominent example: the linguist George Shevelov) reflects this. The article does make one good and correct point: that nationalism wasn't widespread among the general Russian population. Nationalism does depend on literacy. It is why those parts of Russia outside urban areas that had higher literacy rates (typically southern Russia and Cossack lands) were more likely to support the Whites during the civil war. Two excellent papers about literacy and nationalism by Keith Darden. In Western Ukraine and Banderism: [15] and in formerly Russian-ruled Ukraine: [16]. Faustian (talk) 18:07, 9 December 2018 (UTC)

First of all, majority of statements in this article belong not to the author, Rawley cites to other authors (most of whom are renown scholars), and majority of facts and statements in this article seem to reflect scholarly consensus. Second, this article has been cited by many other scholars, which means the opinion expressed by Rawley is not marginal, and there is not in a direct contradiction to a scholarly consensus.

However, I agree that some of author's own ideas are not completely correct. First, the definition of the term "Empire" is somewhat primordialist. Indeed, the very phenomenon of nation is pretty new, and majority of empires existed before nations had formed. It would be more correct to see empires as predecessors of nation-states, not as rivals. Second, the idea that an empire is above nations is not fully correct. I would say, all empires can be subdivided on Roman and British types. In a Roman empire (after 212), almost all urban population had equal civil rights, and there was no ethnic group that politically dominated over others, and there were no colonies of metropole. Even earlier, Plutarch considered himself a Greek, but he was a Roman citizen. In contrast, in Britain empire population of the metropole and colonies had very different rights and a legal status. Obviously, when Rawley speaks about an empire, he means a Roman type empire (and Russian empire was closer to the late Roman type, an empire without a metropole and colonies, if we forget about Central Asia, which was more a protectorate than a colony).

In general, old feudal empires were the empires of an old estate society, and there were no nations during that time. The word "nation" had a totally different meaning (thus, in Prague, "Czech nation" and "German nation" were the names of Czech and German student communities in the Prague university). During Husite wars, Czech saw absolutely no problem with their formal leader, who was a German, and after his death, they selected a Polish prince as their king, instead of selecting some ethnic Czech as a leader. The Second Empire (German) united a population of different states, who considered themselves as different peoples, although belonging to the same ethnic group (Germans), which didn't prevent them from constantly fighting against each other. During late XIX century, they combined into a single entity that is now known as a German nation, and the empire became de facto a nation-state. However, as the examples of Austria and Switzerland demonstrate, a different scenario could be possible, when several German speaking nation-states would form, and now we would be discussing differences between Prussian and Bavarian nations. The opposite scenario, when all German-speaking Europeans would be united in one big German state, and we would see that absolutely logical. Indeed, nations are a very recent phenomenon, and their formation is a rather arbitrary process, which is not necessarily governed by ethnicity. The same ethnic group may produce two or more different nations (Serbia and Croatia is a good example), and different ethnic groups may form a single nation. Britain or Germany are good examples, and if you think that the difference between Bavarian and Frisian dialects is smaller that the difference between Russian and Ukrainian languages, you should probably explain me why do Germans have to use Hochdeutcsh as lingua franka.

In connection to that, Rawley's generalisations about empires can be considered a redundant oversimplification. However, that doesn't mean his conclusions about the absence of Russians nationalism are incorrect or fringe: the article provided an explanation for the phenomenon that is universally recognised. Thus, Martin's The Affirmative Action Empire, which was cited 1,471 times is a demonstration that this view is by no means fringe.

Regarding literacy and nationalism, there is also a positive correlation between literacy and internationalism. For example, if you look at statistics of Russian Constituent Assembly elections, you will see that Bolsheviks were supported by most literate regions of the empire (although this dependence was not strict). In general, nationalism can emerge only in the society where (i) the interactions of people with their compatriots are intense and diverse (so they recognize them as "us"), and (ii) the influence of some foreign nations on their life is significant (so people recognise other nations as "them"). In other words, no matter how literate some society is, if the population is living in some isolated communes that do not interact with other communes economically and culturally, and there is no direct contacts with representatives of other nations, no nationalism can form, because the very concept of "us" and "them" is purely abstract to these people. That means, a nation can emerge only in an industrial society with well developed trade, mass-media and transportation. Before that, people cannot (and have no reasons to) feel themselves as a part of any entity which is not an estate or a local community. It is not a surprise that more advanced society with well developed trade, transportation and mass media is more literate, however, correlation does not mean causation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:55, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

The characterisation of the British Empire as "metropole and colonies" with unequal rights doesn't stand up if you consider that prior to 1946, people of the former colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc, had equal status as British subjects. Also, around 40% of the population of Ancient Rome were slaves with no civil rights what so ever. --Nug (talk) 21:29, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

"...the former colonies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, etc" And India too? And Burma? And Nigeria? And South Africa? Was the famous episode with Gandhi in South Africa (I believe you saw that film) a total fake?

"...around 40% of the population of Ancient Rome were slaves" Slavery was a normal practice even in some modern nation-states, such as North American United States. In addition, you will be surprised to learn that in XVII century, a lion share of wheat was imported to Europe from Poland (a.k.a. The Respublica), were so called demesne-robot farming system existed, and "robot" meant not a cybernetic machine, but a serf who was working 5 days in a week at his souveren's land. It was de facto slavery, the same slavery as in America or Caribean plantations.

Please, no ahistorisms and anachronisms.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:54, 10 December 2018 (UTC)

demonizingwith fake reference

For example -

"178.92.184.117 (talk) 16:51, 29 December 2018 (UTC)