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Change "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more then a month." to "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more than a month." [[User:AlternateHistoryGuy|AlternateHistoryGuy]] ([[User talk:AlternateHistoryGuy|talk]]) 06:35, 30 September 2020 (UTC)
Change "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more then a month." to "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more than a month." [[User:AlternateHistoryGuy|AlternateHistoryGuy]] ([[User talk:AlternateHistoryGuy|talk]]) 06:35, 30 September 2020 (UTC)
:{{to|AlternateHistoryGuy}} {{done|done}}, and good catch, thank you''!'' '''''[[User:Paine Ellsworth|<span style="font-size:92%;color:darkblue;font-family:Segoe Script">P.I.&nbsp;Ellsworth</span>]]'''''&nbsp;&nbsp;[[Editor|<span style="color:black">ed.</span>]]&nbsp;[[User talk:Paine Ellsworth|<sup>put'r&nbsp;there</sup>]]&nbsp;<small>07:26, 30 September 2020 (UTC)</small>
:{{to|AlternateHistoryGuy}} {{done|done}}, and good catch, thank you''!'' '''''[[User:Paine Ellsworth|<span style="font-size:92%;color:darkblue;font-family:Segoe Script">P.I.&nbsp;Ellsworth</span>]]'''''&nbsp;&nbsp;[[Editor|<span style="color:black">ed.</span>]]&nbsp;[[User talk:Paine Ellsworth|<sup>put'r&nbsp;there</sup>]]&nbsp;<small>07:26, 30 September 2020 (UTC)</small>

== Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 15 November 2020 ==

{{edit extended-protected|War in Donbass|answered=no}}
tl;dr: Reference 43's link is broken, working link below.

Reference 43 is a Yahoo News link ( Yahoo republishes news articles on their site ) and the link no longer works. Working link from the actual Associated Press site below.

https://apnews.com/article/e2dcda041fa84a7192093bfe98dea55a [[Special:Contributions/2601:204:C080:9520:C0A0:923E:DC46:8CA9|2601:204:C080:9520:C0A0:923E:DC46:8CA9]] ([[User talk:2601:204:C080:9520:C0A0:923E:DC46:8CA9|talk]]) 03:58, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

Revision as of 03:58, 15 November 2020

Template:Vital article

RfC about the question of military intervention or invasion

Should Russia's role in the War in Donbass be described as a Russian hybrid aggression against Ukraine, Russian intervention in an existing civil conflict, or are there reputable academic sources arguing for both perspectives? The discussion in the section above did not result in an agreement, but hopefully shed some light on the existing arguments and the available research. Heptor (talk) 08:31, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

(Summoned by bot)Question Could it be both? --Shrike (talk) 09:54, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I think yes. Heptor (talk) 10:04, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
To sum it up quickly, following publications understand the Russian involvement as an intervention:
  • Bruno De Cordier, Ghent (2017-02-14). "Ukraine's Vendée War? A Look at the "Resistance Identity" of the Donbass Insurgency". Russian analytical digest. 198: 2–5. Retrieved 2020-07-08.
  • Moniz Bandeira, Luiz Alberto (2019), Moniz Bandeira, Luiz Alberto (ed.), "Ukrainian Separatists and the War in Donbass", The World Disorder: US Hegemony, Proxy Wars, Terrorism and Humanitarian Catastrophes, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 235–247, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03204-3_20, ISBN 978-3-030-03204-3, retrieved 2020-07-08
  • Katchanovski, Ivan (2016-10-01). "The Separatist War in Donbas: A Violent Break-up of Ukraine?". European Politics and Society. 17 (4): 473–489. doi:10.1080/23745118.2016.1154131. ISSN 2374-5118.
  • Matveeva, Anna (2016). "No Moscow stooges: identity polarization and guerrilla movements in Donbass". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (1): 25–50. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1148415. ISSN 1468-3857.
  • Loshkariov, Ivan D.; Sushentsov, Andrey A. (2016). "Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from 'accidental' diaspora to rebel movement". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (1): 71–90. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1149349. ISSN 1468-3857.
while the following support the view of a Russian invasion:
My understanding of WP:NPOV is that both views should be presented in the article. Heptor (talk) 15:43, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • This RfC is malformed. The sources above are, first of all, cherrypicked, and second of all, are placed into two categories as if they are in opposition to each other. They are not. Heptor has, for whatever reason, ignored the fact that all RS agree that the Russian role in Donbass evolved over time. It progressed from intervention to invasion, and was also both of those things at once at different times during the conflict. These are not mutually-exclusive categories, hence the the term 'hybrid war'. In any case, the consensus of current RS is that the specific events of late August 2014 were an 'invasion', and the sources for this statement were cited in the article until Heptor removed them. This RfC is a farce, and should be closed. If an RfC is to be held, it needs to present a neutral question, not one that is framed in such a way that implies that Russian intervention in a civil conflict and Russian invasion are mutually exclusive, and in opposition to each other. RGloucester 16:36, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Examples of specific uses of disputed sources in this revert. No idea why RGloucester sees their sources as better than those he/she removed. Heptor (talk) 16:57, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Bandeira, I disputed in the above section. He writes from a known far-left perspective that is contradicted by the vast majority of RS. Clarke, I don't object to the claim he made, but rather to its inclusion out chronology with the events in the actual section, seemingly to try to downplay the Russian role overall. More importantly, he is also a far-left activist, writing in that capacity, rather than in any academic one. The last bit about '3 months' is not actually supported by the article linked, and contradicted by all the other sources linked in the article. Another case of WP:UNDUE weight, and more importantly, another attempt to introduce contradictions into the article not actually supported by RS. RGloucester 17:34, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
@RGloucester: this aggressive rhetoric you are deploying is unwikipedian, but unfortunately characteristic of the public discourse in Ukraine. Consider for example Matveeva 2016, writing that

Puralism in these matters becomes extinct. Left has been discredited and barely has a voice in legitimate public discourse. Emotive and aggressive public rhetoric means that voices of dissent are silenced not by the state, but by the 'civil society'.[1]: 6 

I don't normally defend 'left', but I guess there is a first time for everything. Heptor (talk) 17:53, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I myself would be placed relatively 'far' on the political left, if we were engaging in such an exercise. However, people writing from an activist angle (of any colour) are not reliable for statements of fact when contradicted by the vast majority of mainstream sources. See WP:SCHOLARSHIP. RGloucester 17:58, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • No, those are not two equal perspectives. WP:GEVAL. The first one, the aggression against Ukraine, is the main/significant majority view. That second one is essentially the classic Russian propaganda version. It means the intervention by Russia to the alleged civil war on Ukraine, war that did not exist. Simply looking at the edit by Heptor [1] who started this RfC, that is exactly what he trying to push here during the standing RfC ("The Russian leadership met the Donbass uprising without enthusiasm, but under pressure from domestic opinion, provided sufficient aid to allow the revolt to survive"). Yes, but the "uprising" was actually started by Russian agents and undercover military forces (the so called "separatist forces"). So, I would definitely agree with the last edit by RGloucester [2]. As about the bigger change, this is more complex. My very best wishes (talk) 00:40, 20 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • I am not sure what the question here is. Yes, there was a civil conflict back in the 2014 Ukrainian revolution. Yes, Russia intervened during or after that. But what Russia did after that launching point is seen more and more as Russian aggression. Vici Vidi (talk) 08:28, 22 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • I’m also not clear on what this RfC is asking. Volunteer Marek 08:36, 22 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Apparent WP:IDONTLIKEIT removal

RGloucester reverted the following addition by Heptor:

Russian involvement in the Donbass War has taken a variety of forms since the beginning of the conflict in 2014. The Russian leadership met the Donbass uprising without enthusiasm, but under pressure from domestic opinion, provided sufficient aid to allow the revolt to survive;[2] Putin tried to deflate the conflict and dissuade the separatists from proclaiming independence.[3] Three months of hostilities passed before Moscow decided to provide limited support to the rebels.[4]: 15 

References

  1. ^ Matveeva, Anna (2016). "No Moscow stooges: identity polarization and guerrilla movements in Donbass". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (1): 25–50. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1148415. ISSN 1468-3857.
  2. ^ Clarke, Renfrey (2016). "The Donbass in 2014: Ultra-Right Threats, Working-Class Revolt, and Russian Policy Responses". International Critical Thought. 6 (4). Informa UK Limited: 534–555. doi:10.1080/21598282.2016.1242340. ISSN 2159-8282.
  3. ^ Moniz Bandeira, Luiz Alberto (2019), Moniz Bandeira, Luiz Alberto (ed.), "Ukrainian Separatists and the War in Donbass", The World Disorder: US Hegemony, Proxy Wars, Terrorism and Humanitarian Catastrophes, Cham: Springer International Publishing, pp. 235–247, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-03204-3_20, ISBN 978-3-030-03204-3, retrieved 2020-07-08
  4. ^ Loshkariov, Ivan D.; Sushentsov, Andrey A. (2016-01-02). "Radicalization of Russians in Ukraine: from 'accidental' diaspora to rebel movement". Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16 (1). Informa UK Limited: 71–90. doi:10.1080/14683857.2016.1149349. ISSN 1468-3857.

This seems to me to be well-sourced. The sources also seem solid. Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, Emeritus professor for History, University of Brasília, St. Leon-Rot, Germany and two Russian academics, all three sources are by decent academic imprints.

Apart from not liking what it says, what's the objection? It does conflict somewhat with the dominant view of Russian subversion, is the problem something to do with Russian domestic pressure having been ginned up by Putin? (POlausible). Guy (help!) 17:42, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I agree with what Clarke says, and indeed, that viewpoint is supported further down in the section. My main concern with that piece is that it is being put in the article out of context with the purpose of skewing the overall narrative. Clarke is documenting what happened in the early stages of the conflict. However, the Russian role evolved over time, as is documented further down in the section. Heptor's addition makes it seem as if Clarke was making an overall statement about Russian involvement, but in fact, it is simply a statement about Russian intervention at one stage in the broader conflict.
I also agree that Putin tried to deflate the conflict and dissuade the separatists from independence. This is also supported by other sources further down in the section. What I again contest is its insertion at the top of the section, as if it is a broader claim about Russia's involvement, without context. It is not, again. The reason Russia tried to deflate the conflict was because Russia wanted to establish a frozen conflict-type scenario, as documented further down in the section ("Putin insists that this region be given "statehood"--that is, extensive autonomy that would create a frozen conflict inside Ukraine controlled by Moscow, giving Putin a veto over Ukraine's domestic and pro-European foreign policy" Kuzio 481).
The final claim about 'three months of hostilities' is directly contradicted by all other sources in the article. I believe that this is an attempt to give WP:UNDUE weight to a fringe claim. As the article states now, real Russian military assistance didn't come until May...but they had been assisting the separatists in other ways. Perhaps the issue is not the claim, but again, its provision without context. RGloucester 17:50, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
To further clarify, I am not opposed to incorporating these sources into the article, only opposed to their usage in the above manner. RGloucester 18:15, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
This is just confusing the issue. There is no disagreement that the Russian involvement was decisive. The sourced additions I made don't agree very well with the other statements that RG recently edit warred into the article, such as Russia would go on to take advantage of this, however, to launch a co-ordinated political and military campaign against Ukraine, When the Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early March, these were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services, In response to the deteriorating situation in the Donbass, Russia abandoned its hybrid approach, and began a conventional invasion of the region. Heptor (talk) 18:33, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Actually, they agree just fine with all those statements, except for Bandeira, who as above, I dispute as an RS. The idea that the likes of the Rand Corporation report should be put in the same league with Bandiera is absurd. Talk about WP:UNDUE weight. RGloucester 18:40, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Well, call me Ishmael. I've reinstated these two statements, along with some copy-editing. Heptor (talk) 19:02, 17 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • Renfrey Clarke is not a scholar or an expert on the subject, but a "political activist" (click at his name in the title of the page here) - that one? This is not an RS on the War in Donbass. "When the Ukrainian authorities cracked down on the pro-Russian protests and arrested local separatist leaders in early March, these were replaced by people with ties to the Russian security services" Well, but the "local separatist leaders in early March" were already the "people with ties to the Russian security services". My very best wishes (talk) 01:26, 20 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • I have to agree with RGloucester. That was bad revert and a poor source (an article by a "political activist" from Australia). It is important to know the subject. In essence, saying that "The Russian leadership met the Donbass uprising without enthusiasm, but under pressure from domestic opinion, provided sufficient aid to allow the revolt to survive" is an outright and blatant disinformation. Also, "Putin tried to deflate the conflict and dissuade the separatists from proclaiming independence". What? Yes, sure, Putin said that he wants to deflate the conflict (aka "civil war in Ukraine") after planting the "separatists" and starting the conflict himself. But it is important what he actually did, i.e. continued supporting very same people he initially planted and replacing them by other, even more professional military/GRU people, as this page tells. My very best wishes (talk) 00:54, 20 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Speaking about the anti-American book by Moniz Bandeira, well, I am looking at this [3]: "in February 2015, the militias of the Donbass dealt a hard blow to the Kiev troops in the Battle of Debaltseve, killing anything between 3000 and 3500 government troops". Does not author know that the "blow" was dealt by Russian regular Army, not by militias? "Poroshenko could only govern with the support of the extreme right—the neo-Nazis—...". Does not author know that the extreme right—the/neo-Nazis parties received only a few % during the elections? What kind of expert on the Ukrainian subjects is he? My very best wishes (talk) 03:15, 20 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, as I said above, this hardly qualifies as an 'RS' of any kind....the writing style itself exposes that it is not a true academic work, just some form of activist screed. RGloucester 13:37, 20 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

I’m only peripherally following this conversation, and in the course I had a look at the first source that I noticed cited, above: Clarke 2016. I only scanned it, but that was plenty. Clarke seems to try to stick to facts, but he is very selective, he demonizes Ukrainian Maidan protestors, their government, and their armed forces, citing a “massacre,” while glossing over crimes and human-rights violations by Russian-led militants and Russian forces, minimizing the role of the Russian state in Ukraine, and playing down the occupation of Crimea. By him, Ukrainian centrist party Fatherland is “right-wing,” but while Gubarev’s background in a Russian Federation neo-Nazi organization merely makes him “colourful.”

In his bio, he calls himself a political activist, omits the source of his PhD, and appears to conduct no teaching or research.

In his own authored articles on the website he edits, he promotes his pro-Kremlin political aims much more clearly. Read “Fourth International needs to oppose the war and austerity drive against Ukrainian people” to see all of these biased positions skewed way over, and how he casts the Russian occupation of Crimea as “the re-joining of Crimea to Russia,” when he deems to acknowledge the international crime of aggression at all. Another beaut is “Ukrainian Air Force jet shot down Malaysian airliner,” to see how Clarke swallowed a bunch of transparent Russian propaganda hook, line, and sinker. This “Su-25” conspiracy theory was started by the Russian defence ministry, but was soon discredited and is now abandoned by even semi-journalistic Russian outlets. He even cites some awful fake-news websites in his footnotes. These articles carry no retraction or correction.

Clarke should not be cited for anything to do with Ukraine. Editors, please evaluate what you are bringing here before you generate so much discussion and unnecessary work in dealing with it. —Michael Z.

Perhaps you can just fix current version. I agree, looking at the edits by Heptor, such as [4], that was definitely not an improvement. But the recent addition by Cloud (one that you copy-edited) was good I think. My very best wishes (talk) 23:45, 21 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
I've done that. The final 'unresolved' matter is whether this conflict should be defined as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War in the lead. Any opinions? RGloucester 20:28, 22 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I think there is a problem. The page Russian military intervention in Ukraine was incorrectly renamed to Russo-Ukrainian War because of your vote. For example, the annexation of Crimea was an act of military aggression or intervention, hence a part of Russian military intervention in Ukraine. But a part of Russo-Ukrainian War? No, because the Ukrainians did not fire a single shot. My very best wishes (talk) 02:37, 23 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Whether someone "fired a shot" or not does not determine whether there is a war...reliable sources do! And, those sources are cited, in both this article and the other article, as referring to Crimea and Donbass as theatres in a "Russo-Ukrainian War". I have no particular desire to fight over this matter, and no more particular bone in the fight. I don't think, however, that we can turn our backs to the consensus that emerged in RS over these past few years. In any case, such discussion should be had at Russo-Ukrainian War, not here. RGloucester 03:31, 23 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
My very best wishes, the invasion and occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, as well as its intervention in eastern Ukraine, meet the UN’s 1974 definition of an act of aggression (by several of the possible criteria). The Crimea occupation, even without armed military combat, does trigger the protection of the fourth Geneva Convention “Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.” The International Criminal Court made a finding in 2016 that the events in Crimea are definitely an international armed conflict from at least February 26, 2014, to the present, and that information on events in Eastern Ukraine suggest the existence of an international armed conflict there. In simple terms, that is a war.
“Your vote”—our community’s vote. Try to move on. —Michael Z. 19:09, 23 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
Well, I agree with everything you just said above. Of course annexation of Crimea belongs to that page, I did not argue otherwise. I only said it was not good renaming of the page. "Try to move on" - what do you mean? My very best wishes (talk) 02:28, 24 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Should we refer to the war in Donbass as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War in the lead?

Might as well take a survey, to see what people think. RGloucester 19:33, 23 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

  • Support inclusion – The consensus of the community at the rename discussion applies here as well, and it's clear that RS define this conflict as part of the broader war...so why should we not include that information in the lead? RGloucester 19:33, 23 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
  • Support, but let’s not try to pigeonhole everything too much. There are aspects of the conflict that cross the boundary between Donbas War and Crimea occupation, and there are broader aspects that encompass both, and others outside of them, like in the political, economic, information, and cyber realms. —Michael Z.
  • Support. Of course it should, as I said above. What was the reason for starting this section? No one objected in the discussion just above. It is another matter that page Russo-Ukrainian War should be moved back to Russian military intervention in Ukraine, in my opinion. My very best wishes (talk) 02:24, 24 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]
The point of this section is to gauge consensus, as the 'consensus required' restriction in effect on this page means that content removed cannot be replaced unless consensus is attained. RGloucester 02:41, 24 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Given there has been no objection, I will restore the wording that includes Russo-Ukrainian War. RGloucester 14:45, 27 July 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 30 September 2020

Change "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more then a month." to "The latest (29th[51]) ceasefire came into force on 27 July 2020 which led to no Ukrainian combat losses for more than a month." AlternateHistoryGuy (talk) 06:35, 30 September 2020 (UTC)[reply]

To editor AlternateHistoryGuy:  done, and good catch, thank you! P.I. Ellsworth  ed. put'r there 07:26, 30 September 2020 (UTC)[reply]

Extended-confirmed-protected edit request on 15 November 2020

tl;dr: Reference 43's link is broken, working link below.

Reference 43 is a Yahoo News link ( Yahoo republishes news articles on their site ) and the link no longer works. Working link from the actual Associated Press site below.

https://apnews.com/article/e2dcda041fa84a7192093bfe98dea55a 2601:204:C080:9520:C0A0:923E:DC46:8CA9 (talk) 03:58, 15 November 2020 (UTC)[reply]