Operation Linebacker II

Operation Linebacker II
Part of the Vietnam Conflict
B-52 on bomb run
Date 18 December to 29 December 1972 Location Democratic Republic of Vietnam Result Debatable
Belligerents
United States (U.S.)	Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV)
Commanders and leaders
John W. Vogt, Jr.	Dang Tinh
Casualties and losses
43 killed in action, 49 taken prisoner	1,624 civilian, Military casualties are unknown

Operation Linebacker II was a U.S. Seventh Air Force, and U.S. Navy aerial bombardment campaign conducted against targets in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) during the final period of the American commitment to the Vietnam Conflict. The operation, conducted from 18 December to 29 December 1972 (hence its unofficial nickname - the "Christmas Bombings") saw the largest heavy bomber strikes launched by the U.S. Air Force since the end of the Second World War. Linebacker II was a resumption of the Operation Linebacker bombings conducted from May to October, with the emphasis of the new campaign shifted to attacks by B-52 Stratofortresses rather than tactical fighter aircraft.

"Peace is at hand"

Main articles: Vietnam War, Easter Offensive, and Operation Linebacker

On 8 October 1972, U.S. National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho met in Paris. They were there to discuss new proposals by both nations, hoping to reach mutually agreeable terms for a peace settlement for the eleven year old Vietnam Conflict. Tho presented a new North Vietnamese plan which included proposals for a cease-fire in place, the withdrawal of American forces, and an exchange of POWs. Both combatant Vietnamese governments would remain intact, as would their separate armies. The U.S. did not have to cease its aid to the South Vietnamese government and both sides would be able to resupply their allies or forces on a parity basis. No new PAVN forces would be infiltrated from the north and the U.S. agreed to extend post-war reconstruction assistance to the DRV.

The new terms on the table also included the establishment of an Administration of National Concord, a loosely defined organization which was to work toward general and local elections within South Vietnam. Political power would be shared by three groups, the Saigon government, the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG), and a "third force" group to be mutually agreed upon by the other two parties. Nothing could be accomplished by the new administration without the approval of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu.

The only real bone of contention between the two parties was Le Duc Tho's refusal to guarantee a simultaneous cease-fire in Laos and Cambodia, but he did promise to use his influence to promote one. The North Vietnamese had made significant modifications to their past negotiating position and were hurrying to get the agreement signed before November, believing that President Richard M. Nixon would be more willing to make concessions before, rather than after, the upcoming presidential election. Kissinger was satisfied with the new terms and so notified Nixon, who gave his approval to the settlement. The finalized agreement was to be signed in Hanoi on 31 October.

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President Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Dr. Henry Kissinger

Kissinger then flew on to Saigon on the 18th to discuss the terms with Thieu. The South Vietnamese president was not happy with either the new agreement or with Kissinger, who he felt had betrayed him. Although Kissinger knew Thieu's negotiating position, he had not informed him of the changes made in Paris nor had his approval been sought. Kissinger "had negotiated on behalf of the South Vietnamese government provisions that he, Thieu, had already rejected." Thieu completely castigated the agreement and proposed 129 textual changes to the document. He went further, demanding that the Demilitarized Zone separating the two Vietnams be recognized as a true international border and that South Vietnam be recognized as a soverign state. The supreme irony, in the words of Stanley Karnow, had now arrived - "having fought a war to defend South Vietnam's independence, the United States was now denying its legitimacy ."

Thieu then went one step further on 26 October and released an altered version of the text that made the South Vietnamese provisions look even worse than they actually were. The DRV leadership, believing that they had been hoodwinked by Kissinger, responded by broadcasting the actual text of the agreement on Radio Hanoi. Kissinger, hoping to both reassure the communists of America's sincerity and convince Thieu of the administration's dedication to a compromise, held a televised press conference at the White House during which he announced "We believe that peace is at hand."

On 20 November, the South Vietnamese revisions and 44 additional changes demanded by Nixon were presented to the DRV delegation by Kissinger (who personally considered them "preposterous"). These new demands included: That the DMZ be accepted as a true international boundary; that a token withdrawal of PAVN troops take place; that the DRV guarantee an Indochina-wide cease fire and; that a strong international peace-keeping force (the ICCS) be created for supervising and enforcing the cease-fire.

Once the North Vietnamese read the new demands, they began to retract their own concessions and wanted to bargain anew, leading Kissinger (who fully understood their position) to proclaim that they were "stalling." The talks, scheduled to last ten days, ended on 13 December with both parties agreeing to resume negotiations.

Decisions

Nixon was now working against his own January deadline. Kissinger's "peace is at hand" statement had raised expectations of a settlement among the American population. Even weightier on the president's mind was the fact that the new Ninety-third Congress would go into session on 3 January, and the president feared that the heavily Democratic legislative branch would preempt his pledge of "peace with honor" by legislating an end to the conflict.

Also prompting the president toward some form of rapid offensive action was the cost of the force mobilization that had accompanied Operation Linebacker. The additional aircraft and personnel assigned to Southeast Asia for the operation was straining the Pentagon's budget. The cost of maintaining this "augmentation force" totaled over $4 billion by mid-autumn and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird insisted that the president request a supplementary defense appropriation from Congress to pay for it. Nixon and Kissinger were convinced that Congress "would seize the opportunity to simply write the United States out of the war."

B-52 on bomb run

After returning from Paris on 14 December, and after consultations with Nixon, Kissinger fired off an ultimatum to Hanoi, threatening "grave consequences" if the DRV did not return to the negotiating table within 72 hours. On that day, Nixon ordered the reseeding of North Vietnamese ports with air-dropped naval mines and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the Air Force to begin planning for a bombing campaign (a three-day "maximum effort") which was to begin within 72 hours. Two days after the 16 December deadline had passed, the U.S. bombed Hanoi.

Many historians of the Southeast Asian conflict follow the lead of President Nixon, who claimed that Hanoi's representatives had walked out of the talks, refusing to continue the negotiations. These claims, however, bear little resemblance to the truth, since both sides had proclaimed their willingness to continue. The goal of President Nixon was not to convince Hanoi, but to convince Saigon. President Thieu had to be convinced that "whatever the formal wording of the cease-fire agreement, he could count on Nixon to come to the defense of South Vietnam if the DRV broke the cease-fire."

Planning

In the wake of Operation Linebacker, the U.S. had a force of 207 B-52 bombers available for use in Southeast Asia. 54 bombers (all B-52Ds) were based at U-Tapao RTAFB, Thailand, while 153 were based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam (55 B-52Ds and 98 B-52Gs). This deployment, however, utilized nearly half of the Air Force's manned bomber fleet and Strategic Air Command (SAC) commanders were initially reluctant to risk the highly expensive aircraft and their highly trained crews in such an operation.

The use of large numbers of B-52s was unprecedented in the conflict and the proposed large-scale attacks on targets within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi "represented a dynamic change in the employment of air resources." Many within SAC, however, welcomed the opportunity to fly into the heavily defended airspace of the DRV, hoping to finally prove the viability of manned bombers in a high-intensity sophisticated Soviet style air defense network of SAMs, AAA and MiG interceptors.

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A-7s and F-4s refuel from a KC-135 during December 1972

One purely local reason for utilizing the B-52s instead of tactical aircraft for the planned campaign was the September through May monsoon weather within the DRV, which made visual bombing operations by tactical fighter-bombers difficult. The B-52s were equipped with their own radar bomb navigation systems and supporting fighter-bombers would be able to strike targets with either newly-deployed laser-guided bombs in clear weather or by utilizing LORAN radar-guided bombing systems.

The new operation, given the title Linebacker II, was marked by top-down planning by the SAC headquarters at Omaha, Nebraska. Due to the restrictive time frame imposed by President Nixon (only three days) and the past experience of Linebacker (in which North Vietnamese fighter aircraft had posed the highest threat to the bombers), SAC's plan called for all of the bombers to approach Hanoi at night in three distinct waves, each using identical approach paths and flying at the same altitude. The aircraft themselves were to fly in three-plane formations known as "cells" for more effective electronic warfare (EW) jamming coverage

Once the aircraft had dropped their bombs, they were to execute what SAC termed "post-target turns" (PTT) to the west. These turns had two unfortunate consequences for the bombers - the B-52s would be turning into a strong headwind, slowing their ground speed by 100 knots (185 km/h) and prolonging their stay in the target area and the PTT would point the emitter antennas of their EW systems away from the radars they were attempting to jam, degrading the effectiveness of the cells, as well as showing the largest radar cross-section to the missile guidance radars. The aircraft employed, however, had significantly different EW capabilities; the B-52G carried fewer jammers and put out appreciably less power than the B-52Ds. Because of these factors, the campaign would be ultimately be conducted in three distinct phases as tactics and plans were altered in response to losses to SAMs.

Initial phase

DRV anti-aircraft defense weapons

The first three missions of the operation were flown as planned by SAC on three consecutive nights beginning on 18 December. On the first night 129 bombers were launched, 87 of them from Guam. 39 support aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, the Navy's Task Force 77, and the Marine Corps supported the bombers by providing F-4 fighter escorts, F-105 Wild Weasel SAM-suppression missions, Air Force EB-66 and Navy EA-6 radar-jamming aircraft, chaff drops, KC-135 refueling capability, and search and rescue aircraft.

The targets of the first wave of bombers were DRV airfields at Kep, Phuc Yen, and Hoa Lac and a warehouse complex at Yen Vien while the second and third waves struck targets around Hanoi itself. Three aircraft were shot down by the estimated 220 surface-to-air missiles (SAMS) launched by North Vietnamese batteries - two B-52G's from Andersen and a B-52D from U-Tapao. Two D models from Andersen with heavy battle damage managed to limp into U-Tapao for repairs. Only one of the three downed crews could be rescued. That same evening, an Air Force F-111 Aardvark was shot down while on a mission to bomb the broadcasting facilities of Radio Hanoi.

Unlike the initiation of Linebacker, which had been launched in response to a PAVN offensive in South Vietnam, President Nixon did not address the nation on television to explain the escalation. Instead, Kissinger held a press conference at which he accused (at Nixon's behest) Le Duc Tho of having "backed off" on some of the October understandings.

On the second night, 93 sorties were flown by the bombers. Their targets included the Kinh No Railroad and storage area, the Thai Nguyen thermal power plant, and the Yen Vien complex. Although an estimated 185 SAMs were launched and a number of the bombers were damaged, none were lost on the mission. SAC expected that the third (and supposedly last) night of the operation would proceed just as well as the previous one.

The targets of the 99 bombers sent in on 20 December included the Yen Vien Railroad yards, the Ai Mo warehouse complex, the Thai Nguyen power plant, a transhipment point at Bac Giang, the Kinh No Railroad complex, and the Hanoi petroleum products storage area - all in or near Hanoi. The combination of repetitive tactics, degraded EW systems, and limited jamming capability, however, led to dire consequences when, as the official Air Force history of the campaign has stated, "all hell broke loose."

The repetitious nature of the previous evening's strike profiles had allowed the DRV air defense forces to anticipate strike patterns and to salvo over 300 missiles into the target area. Four B-52Gs and three B-52Ds were lost in the first and third waves of the mission. A fourth D model, returning to Thailand, crashed in Laos. Only two of the eight downed crews was recovered by search and rescue aircraft.

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Linebacker II Strike Sorties

The repercussions from the mission were fast and furious. SAC headquarters was under pressure from "many external sources" to "stop the carnage...it has become a blood bath." Of more concern was the position taken by many senior Air Force officers "that we would lose too many bombers and that airpower doctrine would be proven fallacious...or, if the bombing were stopped, the same thing would occur."

The main problem seemed to lay within the headquarters of SAC, which had based its tactics on a MiG threat that had not materialized during the three missions. The tactics utilized (flight paths, altitudes, formations, timing, etc.) had not varied. The Air Force explanation for this course of events was that the similarity would be helpful to the B-52 crews, who were inexperienced in flying in such high-threat environments. Air Force historian Earl Tilford offered a differing opinion: "Years of dropping bombs on undefended jungle and the routines of planning for nuclear war had fostered a mind-set within the SAC command that nearly led to disaster...Poor tactics and a good dose of overconfidence combined to make the first few nights of Linebacker nightmarish for the B-52 crews."

Re-evaluation

It was at this point that President Nixon ordered that the effort be extended past its original three-day deadline. The first change that could be made by local Air Force commanders was divulged by a comparison of the differences between the radar jamming equipment of the B-52 models. The equipment aboard the G models was designed for utilization in the more sophisticated AAA environment of the USSR, not against the the more antiquated SAM-2 and FAN-SONG radar systems utilized by the North Vietnamese. SAC headquarters in Omaha stipulated that only the aircraft stationed at U-Tapao (equipped with more powerful and sophisticated ECM gear) be allowed over the DRV. As a result the attack waves were reduced in size, but the tactics employed, however, did not change.

On the fourth night (21 December) of the operation, 30 of the U-Tapao bombers struck the Hanoi storage area, the Van Dien storage depot, and Quang Te Airfield. Two of the Ds were lost to SAMs. On the following night, the target area shifted away from Hanoi to the port city of Haiphong and it's petroleum storage areas. Once again, 30 aircraft participated in the strikes, but this time there were no losses among the bombers. An F-111, however, was shot down over the Kinh No Railroad complex.

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US Navy A-7s and F-4s on a LORAN bombing mission

Two days before Christmas, SAC added SAM sites and airfields to the target list. Air Force F-111s were sent in before the arrival of the bombers in order strike the airfields and reduce the threat of enemy fighters. The Aardvarks proved so successful in these operations that their mission for the rest of the campaign was shifted to SAM site suppression.

The bomber missions of the sixth night (23 December) again avoided Hanoi and hit SAM sites northeast of the city and the Lang Dang Railroad yards. There were no losses. On the following night, the run of luck (and avoidance of Hanoi) continued. 30 bombers, supported by 69 tactical aircraft, struck the railyards at Thai Nguyen and Kep and no American aircraft were lost during the mission.

Although the Stratofortresses garnered the lion's share of the publicity during the campaign, their "little brothers", the tactical aircraft, were also hard at work. While the B-52s and F-111s attacked by night, an average of 69 tactical aircraft of the Air Force, Navy and Marines attacked by day (averaging nearly 100 sorties per day). Losses for these aircraft were extremely light, with fewer than a dozen lost during the entire campaign. It was not difficult for their crews to deduce why. The North Vietnamese air defense forces "simply waited for nightfall and the arrival of more lucrative targets."

Final phase

The strikes of the 24th were followed by a 36-hour Christmas stand-down, during which Air Force planners went to work to revise their plans for the next phase of operations. Due to aircraft losses during the initial phase, they intended to launch an all-out attack on the DRV's air defenses when the operation resumed. This course was also necessary since, by Christmas, most of the strategic targets within North Vietnam were in a shambles.

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Linebacker II Sorties by Type

SAC also belatedly turned over tactical mission planning to its subordinate Eighth Air Force headquarters on Guam, which promptly revised the previously costly tactics. Instead of utilizing multiple waves, all of the bombers would be in and out of the target area within 20 minutes and they would approach from multiple directions and at different altitudes. They would exit by varying routes and the steep PTTs were eliminated. Ten targets, in both the Hanoi and Haiphong areas, were to be struck by bombers approaching in seven separate streams, four of which were to come in off the Gulf of Tonkin. Additional jammers were also installed in the B-52Gs, allowing them to return to the operation.

On 26 December, 120 bombers lifted off to strike Thai Nguyen, the Kinh No complex, the Duc Noi, Hanoi, and Haiphong Railroads, and a vehicle storage area at Van Dien. 78 of the bombers took off from Andersen in one time block, the largest single combat launch in SAC history, while 42 others came in from Thailand. The bombers were supported by 113 tactical aircraft which provided chaff corridors, escort fighters, Wild Weasel SAM suppression, and electronic countermeasures support.

The DRV air defense system, though still capable, was overwhelmed by the number of aircraft it had to track in such a short time period and by a dense blanket of chaff laid down by the fighter-bombers. Almost 950 SAMs had been fired previously, and the strain on the remaining DRV inventory showed, since only 68 were fired during the mission. One B-52 was shot down near Hanoi and another damaged aircraft made it back to U-Tapao, where it crashed just short of the runway. Only two members of the crew survived.

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Damage assessment photos of DRV targets

On the following night, 60 bombers flew the mission, with some attacking SAM sites while others struck Lang Dang, Duc Noi, the Trung Quang Railroad, and Van Dien. One B-52 was so heavily damaged that its crew ejected over Laos, where it was rescued. A second aircraft was not so lucky. It took a direct hit and went down while attacking the Trung Quang Railroad yards. During the evening's operations two F-4s and an HH-53 search and rescue helicopter were also shot down.

Day ten (28 December) called for strikes by 60 B-52s - 15 Gs and 15 Ds from Andersen and 30 Ds from U-Tapao, The aircraft formed six waves attacking five targets. Four of the waves struck targets in the Hanoi area (including SAM Support Facility #58), while the fifth hit the Lang Dang Railroad yards southwest of Lang Son, a major chokepoint on the supply route from China. No aircraft were lost on the mission.

By the eleventh and final mission (29 December), there were few strategic targets worthy of mention left within the DRV. There were, however, two SAM storage areas at Phuc Yen and the Lang Dang yards that could be profitably attacked. A total of 60 aircraft again made the trip north, but the mix was altered. U-Tapao again provided 30 D models, but the Andersen force was varied, putting 12 G models and 18 Ds over the DRV. Total bombing was rounded out by sending 30 G models on Arclight missions in the southern DRV and in South Vietnam. Once again, there were no aircraft losses to AAA fire, MiGs, or missiles.

Back to the negotiating table

On 26 December, Hanoi proposed that negotiations would continue once the bombing had stopped (this had been it's position during the entire operation). Nixon replied that he wanted the talks to resume on 2 January and that he would halt the bombing if Hanoi agreed. They did so and Nixon suspended aerial operations north of the 20th parallel on 29 December. He then informed Kissinger to accept the terms offered in October, if that was what it took to get the agreement signed. Senator Henry Jackson (D, Wash.), tried to persuade Nixon to make a televised address in order to explain to the American people that "we bombed them in order to get them back to the table." It would, however, have been extremely difficult to get informed observers in the U.S. to believe that he "had bombed Hanoi in order to force North Vietnamese acceptance of terms they had already agreed to."

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Le Duc Tho and Dr. Henry Kissinger (fourth and fifth from the left respectively)

Now the only stumbling block on the road to an agreement was President Thieu. Nixon tried to placate him by writing on 5 January that "you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam." By this time, however, (due to congressional opposition) Nixon was in no position to make such a promise, since the possibility of obtaining the requisite congressional appropriations was nil. The South Vietnamese president, however, still refused to agree. On the 14th Nixon made his most serious threat: "I have therefore irrevocably decided to proceed to initial the Agreement on January 23, 1973...I will do so, if necessary, alone. One day before the deadline, Thieu bowed to the inevitable and consented to the agreement.

On 9 January Kissinger and Le Duc Tho returned to Paris. The agreement struck between the U.S. and the DRV was basically the same one that had been reached in October. The additional demands that had been made made by the U.S. in December were generally discarded or went against the U.S. John Negroponte, one of Kissinger's aides during the negotiations, was more caustic: "We bombed the North Vietnamese into accepting our concessions." The DMZ was defined as provided for in the Geneva Accords of 1954, and would in no way be recognized as an international boundary. The demanded withdrawal of PAVN troops from South Vietnam was not mentioned at all in the text of the agreement. Kissinger did, however, obtain a "verbal agreement" from Tho for a token withdrawal of 30,000 North Vietnamese troops.

The demand for an inclusive, Indochina-wide cease-fire was simply discarded in the written agreement. Once again, Kissinger had to be satisfied with a "verbal understanding" that a cease-fire would be instituted in Laos simultaneous with, or shortly following, that in South Vietnam. An agreement on Cambodia (where the North Vietnamese had no influence whatsoever over the Khmer Rouge) was out of the question. The size of the ICCS was finally decided by splitting the difference in the number demanded by both parties at 1,160 personnel. The Paris Peace Accords were signed at the Majestic Hotel in Paris on 27 January 1973.

Conclusion

During operation Linebacker II a total of 741 B-52s had been dispatched to bomb the DRV and 729 had actually completed their missions. 15,237 tons of ordnance were dropped on 18 industrial and 14 military targets (including eight SAM sites) while fighter-bombers added another 5,000 tons of bombs to the tally. 212 additional B-52 missions were flown within South Vietnam in support of ground operations during the same time period. Ten B-52s had been shot down over the DRV and five others had been damaged and crashed in Laos or Thailand. 33 B-52 crew members were killed or missing in action, another 33 became prisoners of war, and 26 more were rescued. North Vietnamese air defense forces claimed that 34 B-52s and four F-111s had been shot down during the campaign.

769 additional sorties were flown by the Air Force and 505 by the Navy and Marine Corps in support of the bombers. 12 of these aircraft were lost on the missions (two F-111s, three F-4s, two A-7s, two A-6s, an EB-66, an HH-53 rescue helicopter, and an RA-5C). During these operations, ten Americans were killed, eight captured, and 11 aircrew members were rescued.

Damage to the DRV's infrastructure was severe. The Air Force estimated 500 rail interdictions had taken place, 372 pieces of rollng stock and three million gallons of petroleum products were destroyed, and 80 percent of the DRV's electrical power production capability had been eliminated. Logistical inputs into North Vietnam were assessed by U.S. intelligence at 160,000 tons per month when the operation began. By January 1973, those imports had dropped to 30,000 tons per month. Although the Hanoi government claimed that U.S. aircraft had "carpet-bombed hospitals, schools, and crowded residential areas, committing barbarous crimes against our people," civilian casualties were comparatively low. The DRV government itself only claimed that 1,624 civilians had been killed by the bombing.

U.S. air order of battle

• Task Force 77

USS America (CVA-66), Carrier Air Wing 8 (F-4), (A-6), (A-7)

USS Enterprise (CVAN-65), Carrier Air Wing 14 (F-4, (A-6), (A-7)

USS Midway (CVA-41), Carrier Air Wing 5 (F-4, (A-7)

USS Oriskany (CVA-34), Carrier Air Wing 19 (F-8), (A-7)

USS Ranger (CVA-61), Carrier Air Wing 2 (F-4, (A-6), A-7)

USS Saratoga (CVA-60), Carrier Air Wing 3 (F-4, (A-6), A-7)

• Seventh Air Force

8th Tactical Fighter Wing, Ubon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4)

+two squadrons from 4th TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, North Carolina

+one squadron from 33rd TFW, Eglin AFB, Florida

354th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (A-7)

388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Korat RTAFB, Thailand (F-4), (F-105G)

432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udon RTAFB, Thailand (F-4), (RF-4)

+two squadrons from 366th TFW after its departure from Da Nang AB, RVN

474th Tactical Fighter Wing, Takhli RTAFB, Thailand (F-111)

43d Strategic Wing, Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52D)

72d Strategic Wing (Provisional), Andersen AFB, Guam (B-52G)

307th Strategic Wing, U Tapao RTAFB, Thailand (B-52D)

References

Published Government Documents

• LINEBACKER II, Boyne, Walter J. Linebacker II, Air Force Magazine, Vol. 80, Number 11, May, 1997.
• Gilster, Herman L. The Air War in Southeast Asia: Case Studies of Selected Campaigns. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1993.
• Head, William P. War from Above the Clouds: B-52 Operations During the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine. Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 2002.
• McCarthy, Brig. Gen. James R. and LtCol. George B. Allison, Linebacker II: A View from the Rock. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1979.
• Nalty, Bernard C. Air War Over South Vietnam: 1969–1975. Washington DC: Center of Air Force History, 1995.
• Schlight, John, A War Too Long. Washington DC: Center of Air Force History, 1993.
• Tilford, Earl H. Setup: What the Air Force Did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991.
• Thompson, Wayne, To Hanoi and Back: The U.S. Air Force and North Vietnam, 1966-1973. Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute Press, 2002.

Secondary Sources

• Ambrose, Stephen E., The Christmas Bombing in Robert Cowley, ed. The Cold War: A Military History, New York: Random House, 2005.
• Casey, Michael, Clark Dougan, Samuel Lipsman, Jack Sweetman, Stephen Weiss, et al, Flags Into Battle. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1987.
• Drendel, Lou, Air War over Southeast Asia: Vol. 3, 1971–1975. Carrollton TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1984.
• Karnow, Stanley, Vietnam: A History. New York: Viking Books, 1983.
• Lippsman, Samuel, Stephen Weiss, et al, The False Peace: 1972-74. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
• Littauer, Raphael and Norman Uphoff, The Air War in Indochina. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
• Morocco, John, Rain of Fire: Air War, 1969–1973. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985.
• Linebacker II Day by Day