Operation Rolling Thunder

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Operation "Rolling Thunder"
Part of the Vietnam War
Bombing in Vietnam.jpg
F-105 Thunderchiefs radar-bombing at the instruction of a B-66 leader.
Date 2 March 1965 – 2 November 1968
Location Over North Vietnam
Result Strategic US failure
 United States
 South Vietnam
 North Vietnam
 North Korea[1]
Soviet Union Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
United States Joseph H. Moore
United States William W. Momyer
United States George S. Brown
South Vietnam Nguyen Cao Ky
North Vietnam Phung The Tai (Air Defense)
North Vietnam Nguyen Van Tien (Air Force)
Casualties and losses

United States 1,054 killed, wounded or captured[2]

922 aircraft lost[2][3]

North Vietnam $370 million worth of direct damages
18,000 soldiers killed
52,000[4][5]–182,000 civilians killed
120 aircraft destroyed in air combat or accidents[6]

North Korea14 pilots killed[7]

Operation Rolling Thunder was the title of a gradual and sustained aerial bombardment campaign conducted by the US 2nd Air Division (later Seventh Air Force), US Navy, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 2 March 1965 until 2 November 1968, during the Vietnam War.

The four objectives of the operation (which evolved over time) were to boost the sagging morale of the Saigon regime in the Republic of Vietnam, to persuade North Vietnam to cease its support for the communist insurgency in South Vietnam without actually taking any ground forces into communist North Vietnam, to destroy North Vietnam's transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses, and to halt the flow of men and material into South Vietnam. Attainment of these objectives was made difficult by both the restraints imposed upon the U.S and its allies by Cold War exigencies and by the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from its communist allies, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The operation became the most intense air/ground battle waged during the Cold War period; indeed, it was the most difficult such campaign fought by the U.S. Air Force since the aerial bombardment of Germany during World War II. Supported by communist allies, North Vietnam fielded a potent mixture of sophisticated air-to-air and ground-to-air weapons that created one of the most effective air defenses ever faced by American military aviators.

Gradually escalating action[edit]

For more details on the origins of American involvement in Vietnam, see Gulf of Tonkin Incident.


In response to President Ngo Dinh Diem's abrogation of the 1956 reunification election and suppression of communists during the late 1950s, Hanoi had begun sending arms and material to the guerrillas of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF), who were fighting an insurgency to topple the American-supported Saigon government.[8] To combat the NLF and to shore up the government in the south, the U.S. initially delivered monetary aid, military advisors, and supplies.[9] Between 1957 and 1963, the U.S. found itself committed, through its acceptance of the policy of containment and belief in the domino theory, to defending South Vietnam from what it saw as expansive communist aggression.[a]

U.S. policy was for a time dictated by its perception of improvement in the Saigon government.[b] No further commitment by the Americans would occur without tangible proof of the regime's survivability.[10] Events in Vietnam, however, outraced this policy. By the beginning of 1965, it was stood upon its head—it was believed that without further American action the Saigon government could not survive.[11] However, as late as February 8, in a cable to US Ambassador to South Vietnam Maxwell Taylor, Johnson stressed that the paramount goal of a bombing campaign would be to boost Saigon's morale, not to influence Hanoi, expressing hope "that the building of a minimum government will benefit by ... assurances from us to the highest levels [of the South Vietnamese government] that we ... intend to take continuing action."[12][c]

Questions then arose among the U.S. administration and military leadership as to the best method by which Hanoi (the perceived locus of the insurgency) could be dissuaded from its course of action. The answer seemed to lie in the application of air power. By 1964 most of the civilians surrounding President Lyndon B. Johnson shared the Joint Chiefs of Staff's collective faith in the efficacy of strategic bombing to one degree or another.[13] They reasoned that a small nation like North Vietnam, with a tiny industrial base that was just emerging after the First Indochina War, would be reluctant to risk its new-found economic viability to support the insurgency in the south.[14] Constantly affecting this decision-making process were fears of possible counter moves or outright intervention by the Soviet Union, the PRC, or both.[15] The civilians and the military were divided, however, on the manner of affecting Hanoi's will to support the southern insurgency. The civilians thought in terms of changing the regime's behavior while the military men were more concerned with breaking its will.[16]

In August 1964, as a result of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, in which U.S. naval vessels claimed to have been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats, President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes (Operation Pierce Arrow) launched against the north.[d] This did not, however, satisfy the military chiefs, who demanded a wider and more aggressive campaign.[17]


In March 1964 the CinC Pacific began developing plans for a sustained eight-week air campaign designed to escalate in three stages. This was published at the end of August as CINCPAC OPLAN 37-64, which included the "94 target list". Bridges, rail yards, docks, barracks and supply dumps were all targeted, and selected based on a criterion system considering:

(a) reducing North Vietnamese support of communist operations in Laos and South Vietnam, (b) limiting North Vietnamese capabilities to take direct action against Laos and South Vietnam, and finally (c) impairing North Vietnam’s capacity to continue as an industrially viable state.[18]

There was widespread concern that an air campaign could lead to a wider conflict involving the Chinese or Soviets. Westmoreland referred to "an almost paranoid fear of nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union" and a "phobia" that the Chinese would invade.[19] Johnson later noted:

By keeping a lid on all the designated targets, I knew I could keep the control of the war in my own hands. If China reacted to our slow escalation by threatening to retaliate, we’d have plenty of time to ease off the bombing. But this control—so essential for preventing World War III—would be lost the moment we unleashed a total assault on the North—for that would be rape rather than seduction—and then there would be no turning back. The Chinese reaction would be instant and total.[19]

For a time, no overt action was taken, and the plans continued to evolve. A further refinement of the plan was developed by William and McGeorge Bundy on 29 November 1964, with a more moderate target list, which the Joint Chiefs opposed. No action was taken while these, and other, plans were considered. But matters came to a head with the attack on Camp Holloway on 7 February 1965, which demanded immediate action, and resulted in a reprisal raid known as Operation Flaming Dart. A sapper raid against an American enlisted men's billet at Qui Nhon on the 10th[20] led to Flaming Dart II. These small-scale operations were launched against the southern region of the country, where the bulk of North Vietnam's ground forces and supply dumps were located.[21]

F-105Ds refueling en route to North Vietnam in 1965.

These actions led to the plans for a sustained air campaign being reconsidered. On 13 February a new plan, merging targets and priorities from the lists produced by the Bundys and the JSC, was approved and given the name Rolling Thunder. This campaign was not aimed at specific actions on the part of the North Vietnamese, but was intended as a larger response to the growing hostilities as a whole. Although some within the administration believed that the campaign would be costly, and that it might not work, they reasoned that it was "an acceptable risk, especially when considered against the alternative of introducing American combat troops."[22][e] Rolling Thunder called for an eight-week air campaign consistent with the restrictions that Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara had imposed upon it. If the insurgency continued "with DRV support, strikes against the DRV would be extended with intensified efforts against targets north of the 19th parallel."[23]

It was believed that selective pressure, controlled by Washington, combined with diplomatic overtures, would prevail and compel Hanoi to end its aggression.[24] The military was still not satisfied, since, for the time being, the bombing campaign was to be limited to targets below the 19th parallel, each of which would have to be cleared individually by the President and McNamara.[25][f]

The first mission of the new operation was launched on 2 March against an ammunition storage area near Xom Bang. On the same day, 19 VNAF A-1 Skyraiders struck the Quang Khe Naval Base. The Americans were shocked when six of their aircraft were shot down during the mission.[26] Five of the downed crewmen were rescued, but it was a portent of things to come.[27]

Over the north[edit]

Strategic persuasion[edit]

In keeping with the doctrine of "gradualism", in which threatening destruction would serve as a more influential signal of American determination than destruction itself, it was better to hold important targets "hostage" by bombing trivial ones. From the beginning of Rolling Thunder, Washington dictated which targets would be struck, the day and hour of the attack, the number and types of aircraft and the tonnages and types of ordnance utilized, and sometimes even the direction of the attack.[28] Airstrikes were strictly forbidden within 30 nautical miles (60 km) of Hanoi and within ten nautical miles (19 km) of the port of Haiphong. A thirty-mile buffer zone also extended along the length of the Chinese frontier. According to air force historian Earl Tilford:

Targeting bore little resemblance to reality in that the sequence of attacks was uncoordinated and the targets were approved randomly – even illogically. The North's airfields, which, according to any rational targeting policy, should have been hit first in the campaign, were also off-limits.[29]

Although some of these restrictions were later loosened or rescinded, Johnson (with McNamara's support) kept a tight rein on the campaign, which continuously infuriated the American military commanders, right-wing members of Congress, and even some within the administration itself.[30] One of the primary objectives of the operation, at least to the military, should have been the closure of Haiphong and other ports by aerial mining, thereby slowing or halting the flow of seaborne supplies entering the north. President Johnson refused to take such a provocative action, however, and such an operation was not implemented until 1972. There was also little consultation between Johnson and the military chiefs during the target selection process. Even the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Earl G. Wheeler, was not present for most of the critical discussions of 1965 and participated only occasionally thereafter.[31]

The majority of strikes during Rolling Thunder were launched from four air bases, in Thailand: Korat, Takhli, Udon Thani, and Ubon.[g] The aircraft refueled from aerial tankers over Laos before flying on to their targets in the DRV. After attacking their targets (usually by dive-bombing) the strike forces would either fly directly back to Thailand or exit over the relatively safe waters of the Gulf of Tonkin. It was quickly decided that, in order to limit airspace conflicts between air force and naval strike forces, North Vietnam was divided into six target regions called "route packages", each of which was assigned to either the air force or navy and into which the other was forbidden to intrude.[32]

Navy strikes were launched from the aircraft carriers of Task Force 77, cruising off the North Vietnamese coast at Yankee Station. Naval aircraft, which had shorter ranges (and carried lighter bomb loads) than their air force counterparts, approached their targets from seaward with the majority of their strikes flown against coastal targets.[h]

On 3 April the Joint Chiefs persuaded McNamara and Johnson to launch a four-week attack on North Vietnam's lines of communications, which would isolate that nation from its overland sources of supply in the PRC and the Soviet Union. About one-third of the North's imports came down the northeast railroad from the PRC, while the remaining two-thirds came by sea through Haiphong and other ports.[33] For the first time in the campaign, targets were to be chosen for their military, rather than their psychological, significance.[34] During the four weeks, 26 bridges and seven ferries were destroyed.[35] Other targets included the extensive North Vietnamese radar system, barracks, and ammunition depots.[19]

The panhandle of southern North Vietnam, however, remained the primary focus of operations and total sorties flown there rose from 3,600 in April to 4,000 in May.[36] Slowly moving away from the destruction of fixed targets, "armed reconnaissance" missions, in which small formations of aircraft patrolled highways, railroads, and rivers, searching for targets of opportunity, were authorized. These missions increased from two to 200 sorties per week by the end of 1965.[36] Eventually, armed reconnaissance missions constituted 75 percent of the total bombing effort, in part because the system through which fixed targets were requested, selected, and authorized was so complicated and unwieldy.[37]

Changing priorities and POL strikes[edit]

If Rolling Thunder was supposed to "send signals" to Hanoi to desist in its actions, it did not seem to be working. On 8 April, responding to requests for peace negotiations, North Vietnamese premier, Pham Van Dong, stated that they could only begin when: the bombing was halted; the U.S. had removed all of its troops from the south; the Saigon government recognized the demands of the NLF; and it was agreed that the reunification of Vietnam would be settled by the Vietnamese themselves.[38]

As part of a large attack on the Thanh Hóa Bridge on 3 April, the VPAF first appeared with two flights of four MiG-17s launched from Noi Bai airbase and shot down an F-8 Crusader[i] for the cost of one of their own aircraft written off when it landed on a river bed after running short of fuel. A repeat the next day resulted in a classic dogfight with F-100 Super Sabres and F-105s fighting with more MiG-17s. In total, the USAF lost eleven aircraft to air and ground forces, while the VPAF lost three of their fighters.[39]

The entire complexion of the American effort was altered on 8 March 1965, when 3,500 U.S. Marines came ashore at Da Nang, ostensibly to defend the southern airfields committed to prosecuting Rolling Thunder.[40] The mission of the ground forces was expanded to combat operations and, from that point onward, the aerial campaign became a secondary operation, overwhelmed by troop deployments and the escalation of ground operations in South Vietnam.[41] Until the third week of April, Rolling Thunder had enjoyed at least equal status with air missions conducted in the south. After that time, strikes that interfered with requirements for the southern battlefield were either cut back or cancelled.[42]

By 24 December 1965, 170 U.S. aircraft had been lost during the campaign (85 Air Force, 94 Navy, and one Marine Corps). Eight VNAF aircraft had also been lost.[43][j] Air force aircrews had flown 25,971 sorties and dropped 32,063 tons of bombs. Naval aviators had flown 28,168 sorties and dropped 11,144 tons. The VNAF had contributed 682 missions with unknown ordnance tonnages.[44]

An F-105D hit by an SA-2 missile

U.S. reconnaissance discovered on 5 April 1966, that the North Vietnamese were constructing positions for what could only be surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. The air force and navy then filed a joint appeal to Washington for permission to strike the sites, but they were refused since most of the sites were near the restricted urban areas.[45] Then, on 24 July, an F-105 was shot down by a SA-2 Guideline missile. Three days later, a one-time strike was authorized against the two offending missile sites. The Americans, however, fell for an elaborate trap when the sites turned out to be dummies surrounded by anti-aircraft artillery defenses. One American pilot described the action which followed as "looking like the end of the world."[46] Six of the strike craft were destroyed (two of the pilots were killed, one missing, two captured, and one rescued) during the ambush.[46]

On 29 June 1966, airstrikes against the North's petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) storage areas were authorized by Johnson. The American military had advocated such strikes since the inception of the operation, believing that to deny North Vietnam its POL would cause its military effort to grind to a halt. At first, the strikes appeared highly successful, destroying tank farms near Hanoi and Haiphong and leading the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to estimate that 70 percent of North Vietnam's oil facilities had been destroyed for the loss of 43 aircraft.[47] The loss of the oil storage tank farms and refineries proved to be only a short-term inconvenience for North Vietnam, however, since Hanoi had anticipated just such a campaign and had during that time dispersed the majority of its POL stocks in 50-gallon drums across the length of the country. The POL attacks were halted on 4 September, after U.S. intelligence admitted that there was "no evidence yet of any shortages of POL in North Vietnam."[48]



Rolling Thunder exposed many problems within the American military services committed to it and tended to exacerbate others. A key interservice issue (and one which was not solved until 1968) was the command and control arrangement in Southeast Asia. The Air Force's 2nd Air Division (replaced by the Seventh Air Force on 1 April 1966) was ostensibly responsible for aerial operations over North and South Vietnam. It was subordinate, however, to MACV and its commander, U.S. Army General William C. Westmoreland, who tended to see his problems centered in the south.[49] The U.S. Seventh/Thirteenth Air Force, based in Thailand (which carried out the majority of the Air Force's strikes in North Vietnam), had a dual command structure. It reported to the Seventh on operational matters and to the Thirteenth Air Force (whose headquarters was in the Philippines) for logistical and administrative concerns. These command and control complexities grew even more tangled with the division of the aerial effort into four competing operational areas (those in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and Laos (both north and south).[50]

The Navy's Task Force 77 took its orders via 7th Fleet from CINCPAC, a Navy admiral based in Honolulu, through his subordinate, the Air Force commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF).[51] Due to their influence, the Navy could not be persuaded to integrate its air operations over North Vietnam with those of the Air Force. General William Momyer, commander of the Seventh, had the impression that CINCPAC and PACAF wanted to keep the Thai-based aircraft out of his hands. "By denying Momyer, they were really denying Westmoreland and keeping air operations against the DRV under their control."[52][k] To complicate matters, the U.S. ambassadors to Thailand (Graham Martin) and Laos (William H. Sullivan) exerted undue influence over operational and command arrangements.[52]

This bizarre command structure went against the grain of the Air Force's single air manager concept, which dictated that one commander was to control and coordinate all aircraft within a combat theater.[l] The chain through which operational strike requests had to flow gave some indication of the growing overcomplexity of the campaign. Requests for airstrikes originated with the 2nd Air Division and Task Force 77 in Vietnam and then proceeded to CINCPAC, who in turn reported to his superiors, the Joint Chiefs, at the Pentagon. After input from the State Department and the CIA, the requests then proceeded to the White House, where the president and his "Tuesday Cabinet" made decisions on the strike requests on a weekly basis.[53][m]

U.S. Navy A-6A Intruder all-weather bombers, in 1968.

Another problem exposed by Rolling Thunder was the unpreparedness of the Air Force for the operations it was undertaking. Its aircraft had been designed and its pilots trained for strategic operations against the Soviet Union – for nuclear, not conventional war.[54] The new campaign exposed years of neglect in conventional tactics, while aircraft capabilities and armament were ill-suited to the task at hand. The Air Force was also embarrassed by the fact that the Navy was better prepared. It possessed the only all-weather fighter-bomber in the U.S. inventory in the new A-6 Intruder and was also responsible for the development of the F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber, which became ubiquitous during the Vietnam War.[n]

Once air-to-air combat began over North Vietnam, the Air Force was again found lacking. The mainstay missiles of the air war turned out to be the Navy-developed AIM-9 Sidewinder and AIM-7 Sparrow, not its own AIM-4 Falcon.[55] The Air Force continuously opposed adapting to the war in Southeast Asia, since its leadership believed that it was an aberration that would be quickly resolved. It could then turn its attention (and its more modern weapons) against the greater threat posed by the Soviet Union. None in the Air Force high command foresaw that the war would drag on for nearly a decade.[54]

The Air Force did possess an aircraft which had an all-weather capability, radar-guided bombing equipment, and awesome destructive potential – the B-52 Stratofortress. The civilian administration, however, never considered utilizing the big bombers (whose operations remained under the control of the Strategic Air Command) very far north of the DMZ, believing that it was too overt an escalation.[56] Air Force Chief of Staff John P. McConnell also opposed sending the bombers into the air defense environment in the north and limited B-52 strikes to Route Package One.[57][o]

Compounding these issues was the one-year rotation policy adopted by the Pentagon in Southeast Asia. Although the first aircrews arriving in-theater were highly experienced, the rapidly growing tempo and ever-expanding length of the operation demanded more personnel. This exacerbated a growing lack of experienced aircrews. This dilemma was further compounded by an Air Force policy which dictated universal pilot training while proscribing involuntary second combat tours, which combined, had the effect of rotating personnel to different aircraft.[58][p] Conversely, the Navy tended to maintain its aircrews within the same community for the duration of their careers, thereby retaining their expertise, but also incurring greater losses among experienced crews undergoing multiple combat tours.[59]

Another factor was the weather within the operational theater. The cyclical monsoon patterns meant that the weather was deplorable for flight operations eight months of the year (from late September to early May) when rain and fog tended to conceal targets.[60] Lack of adequate all-weather and night-bombing capability made it necessary for the majority of U.S. missions to be conducted during daylight hours, thereby easing the burden on the air defense forces of North Vietnam.[61]

People's War in the air[edit]

Before Rolling Thunder even began the North Vietnamese leadership knew what was coming. It issued a February 1965 directive to the military and the population to "maintain communication and transportation and to expect the complete destruction of the entire country, including Hanoi and Haiphong."[62] The communist leadership declared "a people's war against the air war of destruction...each citizen is a soldier, each village, street, and plant a fortress on the anti-American battlefront."[63] All except those deemed "truly indispensable to the life of the capital" were evacuated to the countryside. By 1967, Hanoi's population had been reduced by half.[64]

Since gaining air superiority over U.S. forces was out of the question, the northern leadership decided to implement a policy of air deniability. At the beginning of the campaign, North Vietnam possessed approximately 1,500 anti-aircraft weapons, most of which were of the light 37 and 57mm variety. Within one year, however, the U.S. estimated that the number had grown to over 5,000 guns, including 85 and 100mm radar-directed weapons.[65] That estimate was later revised downward from a high of 7,000 in early 1967 to less than a thousand by 1972.[66][q] Regardless, during Rolling Thunder, 80 percent of U.S. aircraft losses were attributed to anti-aircraft fire.[67]

Backing up the guns were the fighter aircraft of the North Vietnamese Air Force, which originally consisted of only 53 MiG-17 Fresco fighter aircraft.[65] Though considered antiquated by the Americans when compared to their supersonic jets, the North Vietnamese turned their aircraft's weaknesses into strengths. They were fast enough for hit and run ambush operations and they were also maneuverable enough to shock the American fighter community by shooting down more advanced F-8 Crusaders and F-105 Thunderchiefs, which had to quickly develop new tactics. The newer missile-armed F-4 Phantom would become the Americans' primary dogfighting platform.[68]

The simple appearance of MiGs could often accomplish their mission by causing American pilots to jettison their bomb loads as a defensive measure.[69][r] In 1966, the MiG-17 were joined by more modern Soviet-built MiG-21 Fishbeds, which could fight on a more equal footing with the U.S. aircraft. By 1967, the North Vietnamese Air Force was maintaining an interceptor force of 100 aircraft, many of which were based on PRC airfields and out of reach of American air attack.[70]

The northern economy was decentralized for its protection and large factories, located in the heavily populated Red River Delta region, were broken up and scattered into caves and small villages throughout the countryside. In the more heavily bombed southern panhandle, entire villages moved into underground tunnel complexes for the duration. Food shortages in North Vietnam became widespread, especially in the urban areas, as rice farmers went into the military or volunteered for service repairing bomb damage.[71] When the nation's transportation system came under attack, destroyed bridges were repaired or replaced by dirt fords, ferries, and underwater or pontoon bridges. The system proved to be durable, well built, easily repaired, and practically impossible to shut down.[72]

Perhaps North Vietnam's ultimate resource was its population. During 1965, 97,000 North Vietnamese civilians volunteered to work full-time in repairing the damage inflicted by U.S. bombs. Another 370,000–500,000 civilians worked part-time.[73] When the nation's lines of communication came under attack, railroad supply trains and truck convoys were split into smaller elements which traveled only at night. The logistical effort was supported by citizens on sampans, driving carts, pushing wheelbarrows, or man-portering supplies on their backs to keep the war effort going. They were motivated by slogans like "Each kilogram of goods...is a bullet shot into the head of the American pirates."[74]

Biggest shooting gallery on Earth[edit]

SAMs and Wild Weasels[edit]

North Vietnam's deployment of SAMs forced American pilots to make hard choices: either approach targets at higher altitudes (to avoid anti-aircraft fire) and become prey to SAMs, or fly lower to avoid the missiles and become the target of anti-aircraft batteries. Due to altered tactics and the increased use of electronic radar jamming, the record of SAM kills decreased over time. The already dismal missile success rate fell from one kill for 30 launches to less than one kill for 50.[75]

U.S. Navy A-7B Corsairs armed with Shrike anti-radiation missiles, 1969.

The nature of the gradual escalation had given Hanoi time to adapt to the situation. By 1967, North Vietnam had formed an estimated 25 SAM battalions (with six missile launchers each) which rotated among approximately 150 sites.[76][s] With the assistance of the Soviet Union, the North Vietnamese had also quickly integrated an early warning radar system of more than 200 facilities which covered the entire country, tracking incoming U.S. raids, and then coordinating SAMs, anti-aircraft batteries, and MiGs to attack them.[77] During 1967 U.S. losses totaled 248 aircraft (145 Air Force, 102 Navy, and one Marine Corps).[43]

To survive in this ever more lethal air defense zone, the U.S. had to adopt newer, more specialized tactics. Large-scale strikes, known as force packages in the Air Force and multi-carrier "Alpha strikes" by the Navy, were assigned numerous support aircraft to protect the fighter-bombers. First into the target areas were specialized Iron Hand flak suppression missions. These consisted of F-105 Wild Weasel hunter/killer teams configured with sophisticated electronic equipment to detect and locate the emissions associated with SAM guidance and control radars.[78]

The Wild Weasels also carried electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment to protect themselves. They directed flak suppression strikes and carried AGM-45 Shrike anti-radiation missiles (another Navy development), which homed in on the radar systems of the SAMs. The SA-2 had greater range than the Shrike, but if the Shrike was launched and the radar operator stayed on the air, the American missile would home in on the signal and destroy the radar source. A sophisticated cat and mouse game then ensued between North Vietnamese radar operators and the Wild Weasel pilots.[79]

An USAF "Iron Hand" SAM-suppression team late in the war.

Next came the bomb-laden strike aircraft protected by escort fighters (Combat Air Patrol or MIGCAP) and electronic jamming aircraft to degrade enemy radar. New ECM devices had hurriedly been deployed to protect aircraft from missile attacks, but they remained subject to frequent breakdowns because of climate conditions in Southeast Asia. Also included in the missions were KC-135 aerial tankers and Search and Rescue (SAR) helicopters, which were, in turn, protected by propeller-driven A-1 escorts.[80]

From mid-1966 until the end of 1967, President Johnson continued to dole out sensitive targets one by one to the generals while simultaneously trying to placate the doves in Congress and within his own administration with periodic cutbacks and half-hearted peace initiatives.[t] In the end, this erratic course satisfied no one and did little to alter the course of the war.[81]

The nature of the targets and the risks involved in striking (and re-striking) them began to take a toll. Chief of Naval Operations David McDonald reported to his co-chiefs after a trip to South Vietnam in September 1966, that Rolling Thunder aircrews were angered with the targeting process and that they faulted the campaign due to "guidelines requiring repetitive air programs that seemed more than anything else to benefit enemy gunners."[82] During 1967, the second full year of Rolling Thunder operations, 362 U.S. aircraft had been lost over North Vietnam (208 Air Force, 142 Navy, and 12 Marine Corps).[43]

MiGs and interdiction[edit]

Rolling Thunder reached the last stage of its operational evolution during 1967 and 1968. The chief purpose of the American air effort in the higher Route Packages of North Vietnam was slowly transformed into that of interdicting the flow of supplies and material and the destruction of those segments of the north's infrastructure that supported its military effort. Although most U.S. aircraft losses continued to be inflicted by anti-aircraft fire, U.S. Air Force F-105s and Navy A-4 Skyhawks increasingly encountered SAMs and MiGs. North Vietnamese fighters also became a particular problem because of the lack of radar coverage in the Red River Delta region, which allowed the MiGs to surprise the strike forces. Airborne early warning aircraft had difficulty detecting the fighters at low altitudes and the aircraft themselves were difficult to see visually.[83]

A missile-armed VPAF MiG-21PF landing, using its drogue parachute.

While F-105s did score 27 air-to-air victories, the overall exchange ratio was near parity. On January 2, 1967, the Americans sprang a surprise on the MiGs when they launched Operation Bolo. F-4 Phantoms, using the same radio call signs, direction of approach, altitude, and speed as a typical flight of bomb-laden F-105s, lured a group of MiG-21s toward what the MiG pilots thought would be easy prey. The result was seven MiG-21s shot down within 12 minutes for no U.S. losses.[84]

Later in the year, the U.S. launched its most intense and sustained attempt to force North Vietnam into peace negotiations. Almost all of the targets on the Joint Chiefs' list had been authorized for attack, including airfields that had been previously off limits.[85] Only central Hanoi, Haiphong, and the PRC border area remained prohibited from attack. A major effort was made to isolate the urban areas by downing bridges and attacking LOCs. Also struck were the Thai Nguyen steel complex (origin of the Pardo's Push), thermal and electrical power plants, ship and rail repair facilities, and warehouses. North Vietnamese MiGs entered the battle en masse, as their capital was threatened and kill ratios fell to one U.S. aircraft lost for every two MiGs.[85] During 1968, MiGs accounted for 22 percent of the 184 American aircraft (75 Air Force, 59 Navy, and five Marine Corps) lost over the north.[86] As a result, operations against the last of North Vietnam's airfields, previously off-limits to attack, were authorized.[87]

Despite the best interdiction efforts of Rolling Thunder, however, the NLF and PAVN launched their largest offensive thus far in the war on 30 January 1968, striking throughout South Vietnam during the lunar new year holiday. The Tet Offensive concluded as a military disaster for North Vietnam and its NLF allies, but it also adversely affected U.S. public opinion, which in turn affected the will of Washington.[u] Fortunately for North Vietnam, many U.S. bombing advocates (including Air Force Chief of Staff McConnell) did not want to risk the one aircraft capable of delivering a lot of bombs in bad weather – the B-52. Without them, there was little that could be done over the north in response to Tet, since bad weather minimized fighter operations until the beginning of April.[88]

End of the line[edit]


For more details on the positions of the secretary of defense, see Robert S. McNamara.
For more details on the negotiations, see Paris Peace Talks.

Writing after the war, Robert McNamara stated that by spring 1967 he and other civilians in the administration had become convinced that both Rolling Thunder and the ground war in South Vietnam were not working.[89] McNamara claimed that he and others within the administration continuously opposed the Joint Chief's recommendations for an increased tempo of bombing and the loosening of target restrictions.[90] The generals found themselves on the horns of a dilemma of their own making. They continuously claimed that the campaign was working, yet they also had to continuously demand greater latitude in order to make the campaign succeed.[91][v] The limited goals entailed in American foreign policy and the military's goal of total victory were simply not reconcilable. The great conundrum had then become how to defeat North Vietnam without defeating North Vietnam.[92]

On 9 August 1967 the Senate Armed Services Committee opened hearings on the bombing campaign. Complaints from the armed services had sparked the interest of some of the most vocal hawks on Capitol Hill.[93] The military chiefs testified before the committee, complaining about the gradual nature of the air war and its civilian-imposed restrictions. It was obvious that McNamara, the only civilian subpoenaed and the last to testify before the committee, was to be the scapegoat.[94] The Secretary of Defense marshaled his objections to an indiscriminate air war and adeptly rebutted the charges of the military chiefs.[95] He bluntly admitted that there was "no basis to believe that any bombing campaign...would by itself force Ho Chi Minh's regime into submission, short, that is, of the virtual annihilation of North Vietnam and its people."[96]

It had now become clear to President Johnson that McNamara had become a liability to the administration.[97] In February 1968, McNamara resigned his position and was replaced by Clark Clifford, who was chosen because of his personal friendship with Johnson and his previous opposition to McNamara's suggestions that the number of troops in the South Vietnam be stabilized and that Rolling Thunder be ended.[98] McNamara's position, however was almost immediately taken up by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, (until then an ardent advocate of the bombing campaign). Rusk proposed limiting the campaign to the panhandle of North Vietnam without preconditions and awaiting Hanoi's reaction.[99] Within months Clifford too began to adopt the views of the man he had replaced, gradually becoming convinced that the U.S. had to withdraw from an open-ended commitment to the war.[100] Disappointed by perceived political defeats at home and hoping that Hanoi would enter into negotiations, President Johnson announced on 31 March 1968, that all bombing north of the 19th parallel would cease.[101] As a result of that decision, into the area between the 17th and 19th parallels, the Air Force and Navy began to pour all the firepower that they had formerly spread throughout North Vietnam. The Air Force doubled the number of sorties sent into Route Package One to more than 6,000 per month with the campaign concentrated on interdiction "choke points", road closing, and truck hunting.[102] Once again, the military commanders were faced a familiar dilemma: having opposed the bombing cutback, they then decided that the new policy had a lot of merit, especially when considering the alternative of no bombing at all.[103] The North Vietnamese responded by doubling the number of anti-aircraft batteries in the panhandle, but most of their SAM batteries remained deployed around Hanoi and Haiphong.[104]

Hanoi, which had continuously stipulated that it would not conduct negotiations while the bombing continued, finally agreed to meet with the Americans for preliminary talks in Paris. As a result, President Johnson declared that a complete bombing halt over North Vietnam would go into effect on 1 November 1968, just prior to the U.S. presidential election. Although the bombing halt was to be linked to progress in the peace talks, the Joint Chiefs were skeptical that the administration would reopen the bombing campaign under any circumstances.[105] They were correct. North Vietnam was not the target of intense bombing again for another three and half years.[106]


Between March 1965 and November 1968, aircraft of the U.S. Air Force had flown 153,784 attack sorties against North Vietnam, while the Navy and Marine Corps had added another 152,399.[107] On 31 December 1967, the Department of Defense announced that 864,000 tons of American bombs had been dropped on North Vietnam during Rolling Thunder, compared with 653,000 tons dropped during the entire Korean War and 503,000 tons in the Pacific theater during the Second World War.[108]

The CIA estimated on 1 January 1968 that damage inflicted in the north totaled $370 million in physical destruction, including $164 million worth of damage to capital assets (such as factories, bridges, and power plants). The agency also estimated that approximately 1,000 casualties had been inflicted on the North Vietnamese population per week, or approximately 90,000 for the 44-month period, 72,000 of whom were civilians.[109] Due to combat and operational circumstances, 506 U.S. Air Force, 397 Navy, and 19 Marine Corps aircraft were lost over or near North Vietnam.[3][2] During the operation, of the 745 crewmen shot down, the U.S. Air Force recorded 145 rescued, 255 killed, 222 captured (23 of whom died in captivity), and 123 missing.[2] Figures on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps casualties were harder to come by. During the 44-month time frame, 454 naval aviators were killed, captured, or missing during combined operations over North Vietnam and Laos.[110]

Rolling Thunder had begun as a campaign of psychological and strategic persuasion, but it changed very quickly to interdiction, a tactical mission.[111] Its ultimate failure had two sources, both of which lay with the civilian and military policy-makers in Washington: first, neither group could ever conceive that the North Vietnamese would endure under the punishment that they would unleash upon it. The civilians, moreover, did not understand air power well enough to know that their policies might be crippling it; second, the American military leadership failed to initially propose and develop, or later to adapt, an appropriate strategy for the war.[112]

Along the way, Rolling Thunder also fell prey to the same dysfunctional managerial attitude as did the rest of the American military effort in Southeast Asia. The process of the campaign became an end unto itself, with sortie generation as the standard by which progress was measured.[113] Sortie rates and the number of bombs dropped, however, equaled efficiency, not effectiveness.[114]


Studying the outcome of the events in Rolling Thunder, the Air Force and Navy came to very different conclusions on how to adapt. The Air Force noted that most of their air-to-air losses were due to unseen attacks from the rear, and thus the problem could be addressed through additional technology that would provide early warning of such attacks. They began modifying their aircraft with built-in M61 Vulcans for close-in use, adopted the Sidewinder and began upgrading them to improve their performance, and introduced new ground and air-based radars to provide an overall watch over the battlefield.[115] The Navy concluded that the primary problem was that their pilots had not been given proper air combat maneuvering training, and were forced to rely on missiles that were not performing as expected. In 1968 they introduced the TOPGUN program, a move that was welcomed by the F-8 pilots who had been campaigning for this all along.[116]

Which of these two policies was more effective was immediately clear: during Rolling Thunder the US maintained a 3.7:1 kill ratio over the VPAF as a whole, but the Air Force's portion of that was closer to 2:1., By 1970 the Navy's ratio had climbed to 13:1. The Air Force, however, saw its ratio stagnate and actually decrease, for a short time being less than one.[117] More critically, in 1970 the VPAF inflicted a kill on the USAF every three times they tried, while it took six missions to do the same against the Navy, and inversely, the VPAF lost a MiG every two engagements with the Air Force, but every time they engaged the Navy.[118]

It was not until Operation Linebacker in 1972 that the problem became acute enough for the Air Force to finally take note. In the three months following the start of Linebacker in May 1972, the US lost 48 aircraft, 21 to VNAF MiGs and 27 to improved ground defenses. In the same period, only 31 MiGs were shot down by US aircraft and things worsened in the summer with 13 US aircraft lost to MiGs and only 11 MiGs shot down. General John Vogt, commander of the Seventh Air Force, reported to the AF Chief of Staff that they were losing the air war.[119] One immediate outcome was Operation Teaball, which reorganized the entire operational side of the Air Force's early warning systems, and tying them with the Navy's, so that every aircraft had a channel providing immediate warning of incoming aircraft.[120] It was not until 1975, however, that the Air Force introduced Exercise Red Flag to match the performance of the Navy's TOPGUN.[121]

See also[edit]


  1. ^ In its public defense of its policies, the State Department argued that South Vietnam was "fighting for its life against a brutal campaign of terror and armed attack inspired, directed, supplied, and controlled by the communist regime in Hanoi. U.S. Department of State, p. 60.
  2. ^ The coup against President Ngo Dinh Diem had unleashed a maelstrom of political unrest and communist victories. Coup followed coup in Saigon as ARVN generals vied for power. There were seven governments in Saigon in 1964, three between 16 August and 3 September alone. Gillespie, p. 63.
  3. ^ According to VanDeMark, Rolling Thunder failed to achieve any such objective. VanDeMark, p. 69.
  4. ^ See Edwin E. Moise, Tonkin Gulf.
  5. ^ For the Secretary of Defense's thoughts on the planning and implementation of the air campaign see McNamara, pps. 171–177.
  6. ^ The daily target selection meetings were soon replaced by weekly sessions and finally by the creation of bi-weekly "force packages."
  7. ^ Only one South Vietnam-based squadron (based at Da Nang) participated in the DRV missions.
  8. ^ This also helped account for the lower number of aircraft and pilot losses suffered by the navy. Fighters had only to defend a 90 degree arc in front of the strike force, SAM exposure was more limited, and coastal targets made the shorter distances of search and rescue operations more conducive to success.
  9. ^ Some sources, including Toperczer, claim two F-8s were shot down on 3 April.
  10. ^ These losses include not only combat shootdowns, but those due to accidents, mechanical failure, and unknown causes.
  11. ^ This policy was ultimately unsuccessful. In November 1965, bombing in the area abutting the DMZ (Route Package One) was handed over to Westmoreland as part of the "extended battlefield." Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 48.
  12. ^ See Operation Niagara.
  13. ^ The meetings were usually attended by the president, McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and the president's special assistant for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy.
  14. ^ The Air Force's unpreparedness was further revealed by its lack of adequate aerial reconnaissance aircraft (e.g. O–1 observation aircraft used for crucial Forward Air Control missions over South Vietnam, which it originally had to borrow from the Army) and tactical fighter-bombers (e.g. Korean War-era A-1 Skyraiders, which it had to obtain from the Navy). The F-4 Phantom that the Air Force fielded was not equipped with a gun since it was expected to conduct air-to-air combat operations solely with missiles. General Momyer had long opposed putting a gun on the F-4 and was convinced to do so only after air-to-air engagements in 1966. The first Air Force version equipped with an internal gunsystem only appeared in 1968. Thompson, p. 64.
  15. ^ This policy compounded already existing tensions between airmen and their Army and Navy counterparts. The airmen were already upset that Westmoreland was ordering the greatest strategic bomber ever built into a ground support role, but then to have a naval officer (CINCPAC) pick their targets was simply unbearable. Head, p. 23.
  16. ^ An experienced F-4 pilot could end up flying FAC missions in an O-2 Skymaster during a subsequent tour whereas an SAC or Military Airlift Command pilot could end up flying the F-4 Phantom.
  17. ^ The 1972 figure might also reflect the redeployment of anti-aircraft battalions after the end of Rolling Thunder to the defense of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. See Operation Commando Hunt.
  18. ^ During the last four months of 1966, 192 American aircraft were intercepted by MiGs. Of these, 107 (56 percent) were forced to jettison their bombs. Morocco, p. 142.
  19. ^ Average time for the deployment of a SAM battery was four hours. Two more hours produced an operational site.
  20. ^ The most complete treatment of the search for peace is Allen E. Goodman, The Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War.
  21. ^ Contrary to opinion, the U.S. public still supported the American effort in South Vietnam. It was disturbed by the magnitude of the offensive only in that its military and civilian leadership had constantly reassured them that American goals were being achieved and that there was "a light at the end of the tunnel." Tet merely served notice to the administration that the public wanted either victory or an end to the open-ended commitment of American resources and manpower. Dougan, pps. 68–70.
  22. ^ The military men could not back down. Unless given the opportunity to demonstrate the full potential of their services, they feared the loss of future roles and diminished budgets. Morocco, p. 153.



  1. ^ Bennett, Richard M. (18 August 2006). "Korea: Missiles and madness". Asia Times Online. Retrieved 26 September 2015. 
  2. ^ a b c d Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 53.
  3. ^ a b Hobson, pps. 15–116.
  4. ^ Tucker 1998, p. 617
  5. ^ Rummel, R.J. "Statistics of Cambodian Genocide and Mass Murder: Estimates, Calculations, and Sources". hawaii.edu. Retrieved 26 September 2015. 
  6. ^ "Timeline". Battlefield Vietnam. PBS Online. Retrieved 26 September 2015. 
  7. ^ "North Korea fought in Vietnam War". BBC News. 31 March 2000. Retrieved 18 October 2015. 
  8. ^ Karnow, pps. 237–239.
  9. ^ Spector, pps. 275–373.
  10. ^ Gravel, pps. 17–20.
  11. ^ Kahin, p. 272.
  12. ^ "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam". 8 February 1965. 
  13. ^ Tilford, p. 92; Gillespie, pps. 64–69.
  14. ^ Tilford, p. 92.
  15. ^ Johnson, pps. 66–67.
  16. ^ Gillespie, p. 70.
  17. ^ Clodfelter, p. 47.
  18. ^ Drew 1986; Van Staaveren, p. 46; Tilford, p. 93.
  19. ^ a b c Drew 1986.
  20. ^ Fournier, Richard (February 2015). "Qui Nhon, 1965: Terrorism Takes A Toll". VFW Magazine. 
  21. ^ McMaster, pps. 218–222.
  22. ^ Morocco, p. 40.
  23. ^ McMaster, p. 226.
  24. ^ Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 46.
  25. ^ Morocco, p 56.
  26. ^ Van Staaveren, p. 86.
  27. ^ Morocco, p. 54.
  28. ^ Morocco, p. 55.
  29. ^ Tilford, p. 109.
  30. ^ Morocco, p. 57.
  31. ^ Thompson, p. 80.
  32. ^ Boyne, Walter (November 1999). "Route Pack 6". Air Force Magazine. 
  33. ^ Thompson, p. 26.
  34. ^ Morocco, p. 58.
  35. ^ Morocco, p. 61.
  36. ^ a b Morocco, p. 63.
  37. ^ Tilford, p. 108.
  38. ^ Morocco, p. 62.
  39. ^ Toperczer, p. 88.
  40. ^ Karnow, p. 415.
  41. ^ Sheehan, pps. 442–443; Tilford, p. 115.
  42. ^ Schilght, Air War in South Vietnam. p. 33.
  43. ^ a b c Hobson, pps. 15–166.
  44. ^ Van Staaveren, p. 316.
  45. ^ Morocco, p. 107.
  46. ^ a b Morocco, p. 109.
  47. ^ Morocco, p. 130
  48. ^ Morocco, p. 131.
  49. ^ Thompson, p. 14.
  50. ^ Schlight, Air War in South Vietnam, p. 24.
  51. ^ Thompson, p. 18.
  52. ^ a b Thompson, p. 15
  53. ^ Van Staaveren, pps. 72–76.
  54. ^ a b Tilford, p. 113.
  55. ^ Thompson, p. 91.
  56. ^ Morocco, p. 85.
  57. ^ Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 48.
  58. ^ Michel, p. 163.
  59. ^ Michel, p. 168
  60. ^ Tilford, p. 113.
  61. ^ Thompson, p. 41.
  62. ^ Van Staaveren, p. 83.
  63. ^ Morocco, p. 96.
  64. ^ Morocco, p. 137.
  65. ^ a b Morocco, p. 102.
  66. ^ Thompson, p. 40.
  67. ^ Thompson, p. 311.
  68. ^ Thompson 2013.
  69. ^ Thompson, p. 35.
  70. ^ Morocco, p. 148.
  71. ^ Morocco, pps. 135–139.
  72. ^ Tilford, p. 112.
  73. ^ Morocco, p. 98.
  74. ^ Morocco, p. 100.
  75. ^ Thompson, p. 50.
  76. ^ Thompson, p. 40.
  77. ^ Thompson, p. 41.
  78. ^ Krone, Robert. "Iron Hand". National Museum of the USAF. Archived from the original on 20 May 2007. 
  79. ^ Tilford, p. 126.
  80. ^ Tilford, p. 131.
  81. ^ Van Staaveren, p. 147.
  82. ^ Van Staaveren, p. 187.
  83. ^ Thompson, p. 17.
  84. ^ Schlight, A War Too Long, p. 52.
  85. ^ a b Morocco, p. 159.
  86. ^ Hobson, pps. 15–166; Morocco, p. 159.
  87. ^ Rendall, p. 154.
  88. ^ Thompson, pps. 124–125.
  89. ^ McNamara, pps. 265–271.
  90. ^ McNamara, pps. 275–277; Morocco, pps. 153–154.
  91. ^ Tilford, p. 120.
  92. ^ Tilford, p. 138.
  93. ^ Morocco, p. 154.
  94. ^ McNamara, pps. 284–291.
  95. ^ Thompson, pps. 81–82.
  96. ^ Morocco, p. 156.
  97. ^ Karnow, p. 454.
  98. ^ Tilford, pps. 149–150.
  99. ^ Thompson, pps. 135–136.
  100. ^ Morocco, p. 183; Thompson, pps. 136–139.
  101. ^ Morocco, pps. 183–184.
  102. ^ Thompson, p. 145.
  103. ^ Thompson, p. 141.
  104. ^ Thompson, p. 143.
  105. ^ Thompson, p. 151.
  106. ^ Frankum, p. 220.
  107. ^ Thompson, p. 303.
  108. ^ Berger, p. 366.
  109. ^ "Appraisal of the Bombing of North Vietnam (through 1 January 1968)". Vietnam Virtual Archive. Texas Tech University. p. 32. 
  110. ^ Marolda, p. 82.
  111. ^ Tilford, p. 106.
  112. ^ Tilford, p. 155.
  113. ^ Tilford, p. 132.
  114. ^ Head, p. 38.
  115. ^ Michel 2007, p. 181.
  116. ^ Michel 2007, pps. 186, 278.
  117. ^ Morgan, Forrest (13 September 2014). The Transformation of American Airpower (PDF) (Technical report). RAND. 
  118. ^ Michel 2007, p. 277.
  119. ^ Smith 2000.
  120. ^ Michel 2007, p. 251.
  121. ^ "414Th Combat Training Squadron "Red Flag"". Nelllis Air Force Base. 7 June 2012. 


Published government documents[edit]

Document collections[edit]

  • Gravel, Senator Mike, ed. (1971). The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam. 5 Volumes. Boston: Beacon Press. ISBN 9780807005231. 
  • Sheehan, Neil; Smith, Hedrick; Kenworthy, E.W.; Butterfield, Fox (1971). The Pentagon Papers as Published by the New York Times. New York: Ballentine. OCLC 600998961. 

Biographies & memoirs[edit]

  • McNamara, Robert S.; VanDeMark, Brian (1995). In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam. New York: Times Books. ISBN 9780712676823. 
  • Johnson, Lyndon B. (1971). The Vantage Point: Perspective on the Presidency, 1963–1969. New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston. ISBN 9780030844928. 

Secondary sources[edit]

  • Clodfelter, Mark (1989). The Limits of Airpower: The American Bombing of Vietnam. New York: Free Press. ISBN 9780029059906. 
  • Dougan, Clark; Weiss, Stephen (1983). Nineteen Sixty-Eight. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 9780939526062. 
  • Gillespie, Robert M. (1994). The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Escalation of the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1965 (Master's (Unpublished) thesis). Clemson University. 
  • Goodman, Allen E. (1986). The Search for A Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. ISBN 9780912966908. 
  • Frankum, Jr., Ronald B. (2006). "Swatting Flies with a Sledgehammer". In Wiest, Andrew. Rolling Thunder in a Gentle Land: The Vietnam War Revisited. New York: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 9781846930201. 
  • Kahin, George M. (1986). Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam. New York: Knopf. ISBN 9780385240994. 
  • Karnow, Stanley (1983). Vietnam. New York: Viking Press. ISBN 9780670746040. 
  • Hobson, Chris (2001). Vietnam Air Losses: U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps Fixed-Wing Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, 1961–1973. Hinkley UK: Midlands Press. ISBN 9781857801156. 
  • McMaster, H.R. (1997). Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. New York: Harper Collins. ISBN 9780060929084. 
  • Michel III, Marshall (2007). Clashes; Air Combat Over North Vietnam 1965–1972. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-519-8. 
  • Moise, Edwin E. (1996). Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 9780807823002. 
  • Morocco, John (1984). Thunder from Above: Air War, 1941–1968. Boston: Boston Publishing Company. ISBN 9780939526093. 
  • Nichols, John B. (2001). On Yankee Station: The Naval Air War over Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 9780870215599. 
  • Rendall, Ivan (1999). Rolling Thunder: Jet Combat from World War II to the Gulf War. Simon and Schuster. ISBN 9780684857800. 
  • Smith, John T. (1987). Rolling Thunder: The Strategic Bombing Campaign, North Vietnam, 1965–1968. Kensington Publishing Group. ISBN 9781871187205. 
  • Smith, John (2000). The Linebacker Raids: The Bombing of North Vietnam, 1972. Cassel Military. 
  • Thompson, Roger (2013). Lessons Not Learned: The U.S. Navy's Status Quo Culture. Naval Institute Press. 
  • Toperczer, István (2001). MiG-17 and MiG-19 Units of the Vietnam War. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1841761626. 
  • Tucker, Spencer, ed. (1998). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War: A Political, Social, and Military History. Volume Two. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 0-87436-983-5. 
  • VanDeMark, Brian (1991). Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195096507. 

External links[edit]