Battle of the Admin Box
| Battle of the Admin Box | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Burma Campaign | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
 United Kingdom India |
 Imperial Japan | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
 Philip Christison |
 Tohutaro Sakurai | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 2 Infantry Divisions | 1 Infantry Division | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
| 7,951 total |
3,106 killed 2,229 wounded | ||||||
The Battle of the Admin Box (sometimes referred to as the Battle of Ngayedauk or the Battle of Sinzweya) took place on the Southern Front of the Burma Campaign from February 5 to February 23 1944, in the South-East Asian Theatre of World War II. The Japanese attempted a local counter-attack against an Allied offensive, with the aim of drawing Allied reserves from the Central Front in Assam, where the Japanese were preparing their own offensive.
After initial setbacks, the Allies recovered to thwart the Japanese attack, pioneering the methods which would lead to further Allied victories over the following year.
Situation in early 1944
During 1941 and early 1942, the Japanese army had driven Allied troops (British, Indian and Chinese) from Burma. During 1943, the Allies had tried a limited offensive into Arakan, the coastal province of Burma. The aim had been to secure Akyab Island at the end of the Mayu Peninsula. The island possessed an important airfield, from which the Japanese Army Air Force had launched raids on Calcutta and other Indian cities, and which also featured prominently in Allied plans to recapture Burma.
This first Allied offensive had failed disastrously, for several reasons. Because the British Indian Army was being massively expanded, most of the Indian units committed to the attack lacked training and experience. Allied tactics and equipment were not suited to the jungle-covered hills, and Japanese units repeatedly achieved surprise by crossing rivers and hills which the Allies had dismissed as impassable. Finally, the Allied command structure was inefficient, with a single overworked division headquarters trying to control a large number of sub-units and also a large line-of-communications area.
During the following months, the Allies reorganised, engaged in extensive jungle training, and prepared for a renewed effort in 1944. Under British Fourteenth Army, the offensive was to be launched by Indian XV Corps under Lieutenant General Philip Christison.
Second Allied offensive
The Mayu peninsula consisted of a flat coastal plain, indented by several chaungs (tidal creeks), and separated from the fertile valley of the Kalapanzin River by the jungle-covered Mayu Range of hills. The Indian 5th Infantry Division, which had already seen heavy fighting in East Africa and the Western Desert, attacked down the coastal plain. The comparatively inexperienced but well-trained Indian 7th Infantry Division attacked down the Kalapanzin Valley. Another division, the British 81st (West Africa) Division was advancing further east, down the Kaladan River valley, but would not directly affect the battle. Two other divisions, the British 36th Infantry Division and Indian 26th Infantry Division were in reserve.
The advance began cautiously at first, but steadily gained momentum. On January 9, 1944, Indian 5th Division captured the small port of Maungdaw. While they reduced a Japanese position south of the port (a hill known from its shape as the Tortoise), the Corps prepared to take the next major objective. This was part of the Mayu Range where two disused railway tunnels provided a route through the hills linking the towns of Buthidaung and Letwedet in the Kalapanzin Valley with Maungdaw. To reposition troops and resources for this attack, XV Corps improved a narrow track known as the Ngakyedauk Pass, across the hills, while Indian 7th Division established its main administration area at Sinzweya, near the eastern end of the pass.
Japanese moves
The Japanese 28th Army under Lieutenant General Shozo Sakurai commanded the troops in Arakan and in southern Burma. The Japanese 55th Division under Lieutenant General Tadashi Hanaya occupied Arakan. The Japanese troops in the Mayu area were the bulk of the 55th Division under its Infantry Group headquarters commanded by Major-General Tohutaro Sakurai, no relation to the Army commander. (A Japanese division had a separate headquarters to administer its infantry units which, as in this case, could command any substantial detachment from the division).
The Japanese were confident that they could repeat their success of the previous year in a local counter-attack. Also, it was intended that by launching their attack (given the name HA-GO or Operation Z) in the first week of February, they would force the Allies to send reinforcements from the Central Front, thus clearing the way for the main Japanese offensive there, planned to begin in the first week of March.
Beginning on February 5, Sakurai Force' infiltrated the front lines of the Indian 7th Division, which was widely dispersed, and moved north undetected on the small town of Taung Bazaar. Here they swung west and south, and on February 6 they attacked the HQ of 7th Division. There was heavy fighting, but 7th Division's signallers and clerks eventually had to destroy their documents and equipment and retreat. (Other radio operators listening on the division's frequency heard a voice say, "Put a pick through that radio", then silence.)
Sakurai's force then followed up towards Sinzweya and the rear of 7th Division. A Japanese battalion (I/213 Regiment, known as Kubo Force from its commander), crossed the Mayu Range at a seemingly impossible place, to set ambushes on the coastal road by which Indian 5th Division was supplied. The Japanese still holding the railway tunnels area (Doi Force) launched raids and diversions, while unexpectedly large numbers of Japanese fighter aircraft flew from Akyab to contest the skies over the battlefield.
Battle of the Admin Box
It was evident to all of XV Corps that the situation was serious. However, Fourteenth Army had spent much time considering counters to the standard Japanese tactics of infiltration and encirclement. The forward divisions of XV Corps were ordered to dig in and hold their positions rather than retreat, while the reserve divisions advanced to their relief.
The administrative area at Sinzweya was converted into a defended area, known as the Admin. Box. Commmand was assumed by Brigadier Geoffrey Evans, commander of Indian 9th Brigade, part of the 5th Division. He reinforced the defenders, who were mainly headquarters and line of communication troops, with one of his battalions (2nd Battalion, the West Yorkshire Regiment) and some of the 4/8th Gurkha Rifles). Even more important were two troops of M3 Lee tanks of the 25th Dragoons. The commander of 7th Division (Major General Frank Messervy) reached the Admin. Box, followed by several of his HQ personnel, and re-established control over the division.
Meanwhile, Allied Dakota transport aircraft dropped rations and ammunition to the cut-off troops, including the defenders of the Admin. Box. The Japanese had not foreseen this development. While they themselves ran short of supplies, the Indian formations could fight on. The Japanese tried to supply Sakurai Force with a convoy of pack mules and Arakanese porters, following the route of Sakurai's original infiltration, but this was ambushed and the supplies were captured.
The first air-drop missions met opposition from Japanese fighter planes, but three squadrons of Spitfires, operating from new airfields around Chittagong contested the air over the battlefield. Sixty-five Japanese aircraft were claimed shot down for the loss of three Spitfires. Whatever the true figures, the Japanese fighters were quickly driven from the area.
On the ground, the fighting for the Admin. Box was severe. On the night of February 7, some Japanese troops captured the divisional hospital. In what was undoubtedly a war crime, thirty-five medical staff and patients were murdered. Japanese fire caused heavy casualties in the crowded defences and twice set ammunition dumps on fire. However, all attempts to overrun the defenders were thwarted by the tanks, to which the Japanese had no counter once their few Mountain Guns were out of ammunition. The Japanese tried an all-out attack on the night of February 14 and succeeded in capturing one hill on the perimeter; with support from the tanks, the West Yorkshires recaptured it the next day, suffering heavy casualties.
By February 22, the Japanese had been starving for several days. Colonel Tanahashi, commanding the main body of Sakurai's force (Japanese 112 Infantry Regiment) stated that his regiment was reduced to 400 men out of a nominal 2150, and refused to make further attacks. Sakurai was forced to break off the operation. Meanwhile, XV Corps's reserve divisions had relieved 5th Division, which in turn sent a brigade to break through the Ngakyedauk Pass to relieve 7th Division. Kubo force was itself cut off and suffered heavy casualties trying to regain the Japanese lines.
Aftermath
Although total Allied casualties were higher than the Japanese, the Japanese had been forced to abandon many of their wounded to die. For the first time in the Burma Campaign, the Japanese tactics had been countered and indeed turned against them. This was to be repeated on a far larger scale in the impending Battle of Imphal.
The Indian 26th and British 36th Divisions resumed the offensive in late March and early April. They captured the railway tunnels but at this point, operations had to be curtailed to free transport aircraft and troops for the Imphal battle. As the monsoon began, it was found that the low-lying area around Buthidaung was malarial and unhealthy and the Allies actually withdrew from the area to spare themselves losses to disease. Akyab would remain in Japanese hands until January 1945.
It was for conspicuous valour shown during the fighting at the Ngakyedauk Pass that Major Charles Ferguson Hoey of the 1st Battalion, The Lincolnshire Regiment was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross.
References
- William Slim, Defeat Into Victory, London: Cassell, 1956.
- Louis Allen, Burma: The longest War, Dent Publishing, 1984, ISBN 0-460-02474-4
- Jon Latimer, Burma: The Forgotten War, John Murray, (2004). ISBN 0719565766.