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Battle of Arawe

Coordinates: 6°10′S 149°1′E / 6.167°S 149.017°E / -6.167; 149.017
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Battle of Arawe
Part of World War II, Pacific War

U.S. Army soldiers land at Arawe
Date15 December 1943 – 24 February 1944
Location
Arawe, New Britain, Territory of New Guinea
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
 United States
 Australia		  Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Julian W. Cunningham Masamitsu Komori
Strength
4,750[1] 1,000[2]
Casualties and losses
118 killed
352 wounded
4 missing		 304 killed
3 captured

The Battle of Arawe occurred during the New Britain Campaign of World War II and was fought between Allied and Imperial Japanese forces. The battle formed part of the Allied Operation Cartwheel, and had the objective of serving as a diversion before a larger landing at Cape Gloucester in late December 1943. The Japanese military was expecting an Allied offensive in western New Britain, and reinforcements were being dispatched to the the region at the time of the Allied landing in the Arawe area on 15 December 1943. The Allies were successful in securing Arawe after a month of intermittent fighting, and the Japanese force in the area was subsequently withdrawn.

During initial Allied planning, the landing at Arawe had the goals of securing a base for American PT boats and diverting Japanese forces away from Cape Gloucester. The PT boat base was later deemed unnecessary, and was never built. Only a small Japanese force was stationed at Arawe at the time, though reinforcements were en route. The main Allied landing on 15 December was successful, though it was marred by a failed subsidiary landing and problems coordinating the landing craft. American forces quickly secured a beachhead and dug in. Japanese air units made large-scale raids against the Arawe area in the days after the landing, and Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) units were directed to attack the American force. These counterattacks took place in late December, and were unsuccessful. In mid-January 1944 the American force, which had been reinforced with additional infantry and tanks, launched a brief offensive which pushed the Japanese back. The Japanese force at Arawe withdrew from the area towards the end of February as part of a general retreat from western New Britain.

Background

Military situation

See also: New Guinea Campaign and Solomon Islands Campaign

In July 1942 the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that the reduction of the major Japanese base at Rabaul on the eastern tip of New Britain would be the main objective of the Allied forces in the South Pacific and South West Pacific area commands. From August 1942, U.S. and Australian forces conducted a series of offensives in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands which had the goals of eliminating Japanese positions in the region and establishing air bases close to Rabaul. The Japanese forces in the area mounted a strong resistance, but were unable to stop the Allied advance.[3]

In June 1943, the Allies launched a major offensive—designated Operation Cartwheel—which sought to capture Rabaul. During the next five months, Australian and U.S. forces under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur advanced along the north coast of eastern New Guinea, capturing Lae and the Huon Peninsula in September. U.S. forces under the command of Admiral William Halsey, Jr. simultaneously advanced through the Solomon Islands from Guadalcanal and established an air base at Bougainville in November.[4] Plans for Operation Cartwheel were amended in August 1943 when the British and United States Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff's proposal that Rabaul be isolated rather than captured.[5]

A map of eastern New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago and Solomon Islands with towns and elevations marked
The area in which Operation Cartwheel took place

The Japanese Imperial General Headquarters assessed the strategic situation in the South-West Pacific in late September 1943 and concluded that the Allies would attempt to break through the northern Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago in the coming months en route to Japan's inner perimeter in the western and central Pacific. Accordingly, reinforcements were dispatched to strategic locations in the area in an attempt to slow the Allied advance. Strong forces were retained at Rabaul, however, as it was believed that the Allies would attack the town. At the time, Japanese positions in western New Britain were limited to airfields at Cape Gloucester on the island's western tip and several small way stations used by supply barges travelling between Rabaul and New Guinea.[6]

On 22 September 1943, MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ) directed Lieutenant General Walter Krueger's Alamo Force to secure western New Britain and the surrounding islands. This operation had two goals; the first of these was to establish air and PT boat bases to attack the Japanese forces at Rabaul. The second objective was to secure the Vitiaz and Dampier Straits between New Guinea and New Britain so that convoys could safely pass through them en route to conduct further landings along New Guinea's north coast and beyond. To this end, GHQ directed that Cape Gloucester at the western end of New Britain and Gasmata on the island's south coast be captured. This offensive was code-named Operation Dexterity.[7] The 1st Marine Division was selected for the Cape Gloucester operation, and the heavily reinforced 126th Regimental Combat Team from the 32nd Infantry Division was to attack Gasmata.[8]

Senior Allied commanders disagreed over whether it was necessary to land forces in western New Britain. Lieutenant General George Kenney—commander of the Allied Air Forces in the South-West Pacific—opposed the landings, arguing that it was not necessary to establish an air base at Cape Gloucester as the existing bases in New Guinea and surrounding islands were adequate to support the planned landings in the region. Vice Admiral Arthur S. Carpender—commander of the 7th Fleet—and Rear Admiral Daniel E. Barbey—commander of the Task Force 76 (TF 76)—were in favor of capturing Cape Gloucester to in order secure both sides of the straits, but opposed the landing at Gasmata as it was too close to the Japanese air bases at Rabaul. In response to Kenney and the Navy's concerns and intelligence reports that the Japanese had reinforced their garrison at Gasmata, the landing there was cancelled in early November.[9]

On 21 November, a conference between GHQ, Kenney, Carpender and Barbey was held in Brisbane at which it was decided to land a small force in the Arawe area to establish a PT boat base and create a diversion prior to the main landing at Cape Gloucester.[10] The landing at Arawe had three goals; firstly to divert Japanese attention away from Cape Gloucester, secondly to establish a defensive perimeter and make contact with the Marines once they landed and thirdly to establish a base for PT boats.[11] It was intended that PT boats operating from Arawe would disrupt Japanese barge traffic along the southern shore of New Britain and protect the Allied naval forces at Cape Gloucester from attack.[12]

Geography

A terrain map of the Arawe area as described in the article's text
The Arawe area

The Arawe area lies on the south coast of New Britain about 100 mi (87 nmi; 160 km) from the island's western tip. Its main geographical feature is Cape Merkus, which ends in the "L"-shaped Arawe Peninsula. Several small islands called the Arawe islands lie to the south-west of the Cape.[13]

In late 1943, the Arawe Peninsula was covered by the Amalut Plantation and the terrain inland from the peninsula and on its offshore islands was swampy. Most of the shoreline in the area comprises limestone cliffs.[13] There was a small unused airfield 4 mi (6.4 km) east of the neck of the Arawe Peninsula, and a coastal trail leading east from Cape Merkus to the Pulie River where it split into tracks running inland and along the coast. The terrain to the west of the peninsula was a trackless region of swamp and jungle which was very difficult for troops to move through.[14] Several of the beaches in the area were suitable for landing craft; the best were House Fireman on the peninsula's west coast and the village of Umtingaulu to the east of the peninsula's base.[15]

Prelude

Planning

Alamo Force was responsible for coordinating plans for the invasion of western New Britain. The Arawe landing was scheduled for 15 December as this was the earliest date by which the air bases around Nadzab in New Guinea, which were needed to support the landing, could be made operational. This date also gave the landing force time to conduct essential training and rehearsals.[16] As Arawe was believed to be only weakly defended, Krueger decided to use a smaller force than that which had been selected for the landing at Gasmata.[8] This force—which was designated the Director Task Force—was concentrated at Goodenough Island where it was stripped of all equipment not needed for combat operations. Logistical plans called for the assault echelon to carry 30 days worth of general supplies and enough ammunition for three days of intensive combat. After the landing holdings would be expanded to 60 days of general supplies and six days worth of all categories of ammunition other than anti-aircraft ammunition, for which a 10-day supply was thought necessary.[17] The assault force and its supplies were to be carried in fast ships which could rapidly unload their cargo.[18]

The commander of the PT boat force in the South-West Pacific, Commander Morton C. Mumma, opposed building a PT boat base at Arawe as he had sufficient bases and Japanese barges normally sailed along the north coast of New Britain. Mumma took his concerns to Carpender and Barbey, who eventually agreed that he would not be required to establish a base there if he thought it unnecessary.[12] Instead, he assigned six boats stationed at Dreger Harbor in New Guinea and Kiriwina Island to operate along the south coast of New Britain east of Arawe each night, and asked for only emergency refuelling facilities to be established at Arawe.[19]

The Director Task Force's commander—Brigadier General Julian W. Cunningham—issued orders for the landing on 4 December. Under these plans, the Task Force was to initially capture the Arawe Peninsula and surrounding islands and establish an outpost on the trail leading to the Pulie River. Once the beachhead was secure, amphibious patrols would be conducted to the west of the peninsula to attempt to make contact with the Marines at Cape Gloucester. Two subsidiary landings were planned to take place one hour before dawn; this was also before the main body of the Director Task Force landed at House Fireman Beach on the Arawe Peninsula. One landing was to capture Pitoe Island to the peninsula's south, as it was believed that the Japanese had established a radio station and a defensive position there which commanded the entrance to Arawe Harbor. The other landing was to be made at Umtingalu to establish a blocking position on the coastal trail east of the peninsula.[20] U.S. Navy personnel on the planning staff were concerned about the subsidiary landings, as a night-time landing conducted at Lae in September had proven difficult.[21]

Opposing forces

Main article: Battle of Arawe order of battle

The Director Task Force was centered around the U.S. Army's 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team (112th RCT). This regiment had arrived in the Pacific in August 1942 but had not seen combat. It was dismounted and converted to an infantry unit in May 1943, and undertook an unopposed landing at Woodlark Island (Operation Chronicle) on 23 June.[22] The 112th Cavalry Regiment was smaller and more lightly armed than U.S. infantry regiments as it had only two battalion-sized squadrons compared to the three battalions in infantry regiments. Moreover, the squadrons were smaller and more lightly equipped than their infantry equivalents.[23][Note 1] The 112th RCT's combat support units were the M2A1 howitzer-equipped 148th Field Artillery Battalion and the 59th Engineer Company. The other combat units of the Director Task Force were two batteries of the 470th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Automatic Weapons), most of the 236th Anti-aircraft Artillery Battalion (Searchlight), "A" Company of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) 1st Amphibious Tractor Battalion and a detachment from the 26th Quartermaster War Dog Platoon.[24] The 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment was held in reserve to reinforce the Director Task Force if required. Several engineer, medical, ordnance and other support units were scheduled to arrive at Arawe after the landing was completed.[8] Cunningham requested that a 90 mm (3.54 in) anti-aircraft gun-equipped battery be added to the force, but none were available.[19] The U.S. Navy's Beach Party Number 1 would also be landed with the Director Task Force, but was withdrawn once the beachhead was secured.[25]

A map of western New Britain showing the movements of Japanese forces and landings of Allied forces as described in the article
Movements of Japanese forces in western New Britain during late 1943 and early 1944 and locations of Allied landings

The Director Task Force was supported by Allied naval and air units. The naval force was drawn from TF 76 and comprised U.S. Navy destroyers USS Conyngham (Barbey's flagship), Shaw, Drayton, Bagley, Reid, Smith, Lamson, Flusser and Mahan and a transport group with destroyer transports USS Humphreys and Sands, landing ship infantry HMAS Westralia, landing ship dock USS Carter Hall, two patrol craft and two submarine chasers. The naval force also included a service group with three LSTs, three tugboats and the destroyer tender USS Rigel.[26][27] United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) units operating under the Fifth Air Force would support the landing, but only limited air support was to be available after 15 December.[28]

Australian coastwatchers on New Britain were reinforced during September and October 1943 to provide warning of air attacks from Rabaul bound for the Allied landing sites and to report on Japanese barge and troop movements. In addition to a coastwatching team already in place at Cape Orford near Wide Bay, five other parties were sent to Cape Hoskins, Gasmata, Open Bay (on the north coast at the base of the Gazelle Peninsula), the area south of Wide Bay, and the neck between Wide Bay and Open Bay. The Gasmata party was discovered by the Japanese while en route to its destination and eliminated, but the other teams were in place by the end of October.[29][30]

At the time of the Allied landing, Arawe was defended by only a small force, though reinforcements were en route. The Japanese force at Arawe comprised 120 soldiers and sailors organized in two temporary companies drawn from the 51st Division.[31] The reinforcing units were elements of the 17th Division, which had been shipped from China to Rabaul during October 1943 to reinforce western New Britain ahead of the expected Allied invasion. The convoys carrying the division were attacked by U.S. Navy submarines and USAAF bombers, resulting in 1,173 of its men being killed or wounded. The 1st Battalion, 81st Infantry Regiment was assigned to defend Cape Merkus. However, it did not depart Rabaul until December as it needed to be reorganized after suffering casualties when the ship transporting it from China was sunk. In addition, two of its rifle companies, most of its heavy machine guns and all its 70 mm (2.76 in) howitzers were retained by the 8th Area Army at Rabaul, leaving the battalion with a strength of just its headquarters, two rifle companies and a machine gun platoon. This battalion—which came under the command of Major Masamitsu Komori—was a four-day march from Arawe when the Allies landed.[32][Note 2] A company of soldiers from the 54th Infantry Regiment, some engineers and detachments from other units were also assigned to the Arawe area. The ground forces at Arawe came under the overall command of General Matsuda, whose headquarters were located near Cape Gloucester.[34] The Japanese air units at Rabaul had been greatly weakened in the months prior to the landing at Arawe by prolonged Allied attacks and the transfer of the 7th Air Division to western New Guinea.[35] Nevertheless, the Japanese 11th Air Fleet had 100 fighters and 50 bombers based at Rabaul at the time of the landing at Arawe.[36]

Preliminary operations

The Allies possessed little intelligence on western New Britain's terrain and the exact location of Japanese forces. To rectify this, Allied aircraft conducted extensive air photography and small ground patrols were landed by PT boats.[37] A small team from Special Service Unit No. 1 reconnoitered Arawe on the night of 9/10 December and concluded that there were few Japanese troops in the area.[8][38] This party was detected near the village of Umtingalu, leading the Japanese to strengthen their defenses there.[39]

Operation Dexterity was preceded by a major Allied air offensive which sought to neutralize the Japanese air units stationed at Rabaul. From 12 October until early November the Fifth Air Force frequently attacked the airfields around the town as well as ships in its harbor. Aircraft flying from U.S. Navy aircraft carriers also attacked Rabaul on 5 and 11 November in support of the USMC's landing at Bougainville.[40]

The Allied air forces began pre-invasion raids on western New Britain on 13 November. Few attacks were made on the Arawe area, however, in an attempt to achieve tactical surprise. Instead, heavy attacks were made against Gasmata, Ring Ring Plantation, and Lindenhafen Plantation. The Arawe area was struck for the first time on 6 December and again on 8 December; little opposition was encountered on either occasion. It was not until 14 December—the day before the landing—that heavy air attacks on Arawe were conducted. On this day, Allied aircraft flew 273 sorties against targets on New Britain's south coast.[41]

The Director Task Force was concentrated at Goodenough Island in early December 1943. The 112th Cavalry was notified that it had been selected for the Arawe operation on 24 November, and departed Woodlark for the short voyage to Goodenough Island in two convoys which sailed on 30 and 31 November. The regiment completed disembarking at Goodenough on 2 December.[42] A full-scale rehearsal of the landing was held at the island on 8 December which revealed problems with coordinating the waves of boats and demonstrated that some of the force's officers lacked confidence in conducting amphibious operations. There was not sufficient time to conduct further training to rectify these problems, however.[19][43] During its period at Goodenough the troopers of the 112th Cavalry were issued with several types of infantry weapons with which they had not been previously equipped. Each of the regiment's rifle squads received a Browning Automatic rifle and a Thompson submachine gun, and a number of 2.36-inch (6.0 cm) bazookas, rifle grenades and flame throwers were also issued. The cavalrymen received little training on these weapons, however, and did not know how to make the best use of them in combat.[44]

The Director Task Force embarked onto transport ships during the afternoon of 13 December, and the convoy sailed at midnight. It proceeded to Buna to rendezvous with most of the escorting destroyers and made a feint towards Finschhafen before turning towards Arawe after dusk on 14 December. The convoy was detected by a Japanese aircraft shortly before it anchored off Arawe at 3:30 am on 15 December, and the Japanese 11th Air Fleet at Rabaul began to prepare aircraft to attack it.[27][45]

Battle

A black and white map of the Arawe area depicting the 112th Cavalry Regiment's landing on 15 December 1943 as described in the article
Arawe landings, 15 December 1943

Landings

Shortly after the assault convoy arrived off Arawe, Carter Hall launched LVT amphibious tractors and Westralia lowered landing craft; the LVTs were operated by the these small craft operated by Marine and U.S. Army units. The two large transports departed for New Guinea at 5:00 am. The high speed transports carrying "A" and "B" Troops of the 112th Cavalry Regiment's 1st Squadron closed to within 1,000 yd (910 m) of Umtingalu and Pilelo Island respectively, and unloaded the soldiers into rubber boats.[45]

"A" Troop's attempt to land at Umtingalu ended in failure. At about 5:25 am, the troop came under fire from machine guns, rifles and a 25 mm (0.98 in) cannon as it was nearing the shore, and all but three of its 15 rubber boats were sunk.[46] Shaw—the destroyer assigned to support the landing—was unable to provide supporting fire until 5:42 am as her crew initially could not determine if the soldiers in the water were in the ship's line of fire; once she had a clear shot, Shaw silenced the Japanese positions with two salvos from her 5 in (130 mm) guns.[47] The surviving cavalrymen were rescued by small boats and later landed at House Fireman beach; casualties in this operation were 12 killed, four missing and 17 wounded.[48]

The landing conducted by "B" Troop at Pilelo Island was successful. The goal of this operation was to destroy a Japanese radio station believed to be at the village of Paligmete on the island's east coast. While the troop originally intended to make a surprise landing at Paligmete, it switched to the island's west coast after "A" Troop came under attack.[48] Once ashore, the cavalrymen advanced across the island and came under fire from a small Japanese force in two caves near the village of Winguru. Ten cavalrymen were detached to contain the Japanese while the remainder of the force continued to Paligmete. This village proved to be unoccupied, and did not contain the suspected radio station. The majority of "B" Troop then attacked Winguru, and used bazookas and flamethrowers to destroy the Japanese positions there.[48][49] One American and seven Japanese soldiers were killed in this fighting.[48] Personnel from the RAAF's No. 335 Radar Station also landed on Pilelo Island on 15 December, and established a radar station there in 48 hours.[50]

The 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry Regiment made the main landing at House Fireman Beach. The landing was delayed by difficulties forming the LVTs into an assault formation and a strong current, and the first wave landed at 7:28 am rather than 6:30 am as planned. Destroyers bombarded the beach with 1,800 rounds of 5 in ammunition between 6:10 and 6:25 am, and B-25 Mitchells strafed the area once the bombardment concluded. The delays meant that the landing area was not under fire as the troops approached the beach, and Japanese machine gunners fired on the LVTs; rockets fired from SC-742 and two DUKWs rapidly silenced these guns. The first wave of cavalrymen were fortunate to meet little opposition as there were further delays in landing the follow-up waves due to differences in the speeds of the two types of LVTs used. While the four follow-up waves were scheduled to land at five-minute intervals after the first wave, the second wave landed 25 minutes after the initial force and the succeeding three waves landed simultaneously 15 minutes later.[51][52] Within two hours of the landing, all the large Allied ships other than Barbey's flagship had departed from Arawe. Conyngham remained in the area to rescue the survivors of the landing at Umtingalu, and withdrew later that day.[53]

Once ashore, the cavalrymen rapidly secured the Arawe Peninsula. An American patrol sent to the peninsula's toe met only scattered resistance from Japanese rear guards. Over 20 Japanese were located in a cave on the east side of the peninsula, and these were killed by members of "E" Troop and personnel from the squadron headquarters. The remaining Japanese units in the area retreated to the east.[54] The 2nd Squadron reached the peninsula's base at 2:30 pm, and began to prepare its main line of resistance (MLR) there.[55] By the end of 15 December over 1,600 Allied troops were ashore.[36] The two Japanese Army companies which had been stationed at Arawe withdrew to the north east, and took up positions at Didmop on the Pulie River about 8 mi (13 km) from the MLR. The naval unit which had been stationed at Umtingalu retreated inland in a state of disarray.[31]

The naval force off Arawe was subjected to a heavy air raid shortly after the landing. At 9:00 am, eight Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers escorted by 56 A6M5 "Zero" fighters evaded the USAAF combat air patrol (CAP) of 16 P-38 Lightnings. The Japanese force attacked the recently-arrived first supply echelon, which comprised five Landing Craft Tank (LCT) and 14 Landing Craft Medium (LCM), but these ships managed to evade the bombs dropped on them.[56] While the first wave of attackers suffered no losses, at 11:15 am four P-38s shot down a Zero, and at 6:00 pm a force of 30 Zeros and 12 Mitsubishi G4M3 "Betty" and Mitsubishi Ki-21-II "Sally" bombers was driven off by four P-38s.[57] The Japanese lost a total of two Zeros in the day's air actions, but both pilots survived.[58]

Air attacks and base development

Although the U.S. ground troops faced no opposition in the days immediately after the landing, naval convoys carrying reinforcements to the Arawe area were repeatedly attacked.[36] The second supply echelon came under continuous air attack on 16 December, resulting in the loss of APc-21, damage to SC-743, YMS-50 as well as four LCTs and about 42 men killed or seriously wounded. Another reinforcement convoy was attacked three times by dive bombers on 21 December as it unloaded.[59][60] Overall, at least 150 Japanese aircraft attacked Arawe on this day.[50] Further air attacks took place on 26, 27 and 31 December.[59] The Allied air forces were able to mount a successful defense of the Arawe area as the coastwatcher parties in New Britain provided 30 to 60 minutes warning of most incoming raids.[61] Between 15 and 31 December, at least 24 Japanese bombers and 32 fighters were shot down near Arawe.[57][Note 3] During the same time period, Allied air units also conducted several attacks on Japanese airfields at Madang in New Guinea and Rabaul which were believed to be the bases of the aircraft which had attacked Arawe. In aerial combat over Rabaul on 17, 19, and 23 December, 14 Zeros were shot down by Allied aircraft.[63][64] The process of unloading ships at Arawe was hampered by air attacks and congestion on House Fireman Beach, however. The beach party contributed to these delays as it was too small and lacked experience. The resultant problems with unloading LCTs caused some to leave the area before they had discharged all their cargo.[65]

Two World War II-era trucks driving along a muddy road. Tents and palm trees are visible in the background.
Two U.S. Army trucks moving through a camp area at Arawe

Air attacks on Arawe dropped off after 1 January. As a result of the heavy losses they suffered during attacks on Arawe and Cape Gloucester, and the damage caused by Allied raids on Rabaul, the Japanese air units conducted only small scale raids at night after this date. The IJN fighter units based at Rabaul and nearby Kavieng were kept busy throughout January and February 1944 defending their bases from continuous Allied air attacks.[66][67] Few raids were made against the Arawe area after 90 mm anti-aircraft guns were established there on 1 February.[57] These weak attacks did not disrupt the Allied convoys.[59] In the three weeks after the landing, 6,287 short tons (5,703 t) of supplies and 541 guns and vehicles were transported to Arawe.[59] On 20 February, the Japanese air units at Rabaul and Kavieng were permanently withdrawn to Truk, ending any significant aerial threat to Allied forces in New Britain from the IJN.[68]

Following the landing, the 59th Engineer Company constructed logistics facilities in the Arawe area. Due to the Japanese air raids, priority was given to the construction of a partially underground evacuation hospital, and it was completed in January 1944. The underground hospital was replaced with a 120-bed above-ground facility in April 1944. Pilelo Island was selected for the site of the PT boat facilities, and a pier for refueling the boats and dispersed fuel storage bays were built there. A 172 ft (52 m) pier was built at House Fireman Beach between 26 February and 22 April 1944 to accommodate small ships; three LCT jetties were also constructed north of the beach. A 920 ft (280 m) by 100 ft (30 m) airstrip was hurriedly built for artillery observation aircraft on 13 January, and this was later upgraded and surfaced with coral. The engineer company also constructed 5 mi (8.0 km) of all-weather roads in the Arawe region and provided the Director Task Force with water via salt water distillation units on Pilelo Island and wells dug on the mainland. These projects were continuously hampered by shortages of construction materials, but the engineers were able to complete them by improvising and making use of salvaged material.[69]

The 112th Cavalry Regiment strengthened its defensive positions during the week after the invasion. As "A" Troop had lost all of its weapons and other equipment during the landing attempt at Umtingalu, supplies were air dropped into the beachhead during the afternoon of 16 December to re-equip the unit.[70] The troop was also assigned 50 replacement personnel. Most of "B" Troop was also transferred from Pilelo Island to the mainland in the days after the invasion.[71] The regiment improved its MLR through removing vegetation in order to create clear fields of fire, establishing minefields and wire entanglements and laying down a field telephone network. A reserve defensive line was also established closer to Cape Merkus, and patrols were conducted each day along the shores of the peninsula in search of Japanese personnel attempting to infiltrate the Task Force's rear area. These patrols located and killed between ten and twenty Japanese near Cape Merkus.[71] In addition, the regiment established a network of observation posts throughout the Arawe area; these included positions in villages, key positions on the peninsula and on several offshore islands. "G" Troop was assigned to secure Umtingalu, and after doing so the troop established a patrol base at the village as well as two observation posts along the track which connecting it with the MLR.[71]

Japanese response

The commander of the Japanese 17th Division—General Sakai—ordered that Arawe be urgently reinforced when he was informed of the landing. He did not believe that this was the main Allied effort in western New Britain, however.[72] The force under Komori was ordered to make haste, and the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment (less one company) was directed to move to Arawe by sea from Cape Bushing. Komori was appointed the commander of all Japanese forces in the Arawe area, with his command being designated the Komori Force. The 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment landed at the village of Omoi on the night of 18 December, and started overland the next day to link up with Komori at Didmop. The battalion took eight days to cover the 7 mi (11 km) between Omoi and Didmop, however, as it became lost on several occasions while travelling through trackless jungle and paused whenever contact with American forces seemed likely. Komori reached Didmop on 19 December, and gathered the unit which had retreated from Umtingalu into his command.[73] On the basis of discussions with Japanese personnel who had witnessed the landing at Arawe, Komori mistakenly concluded that they had greatly over-estimated the size of the American force. As a result, on 20 December he ordered a counter-offensive on Arawe.[74]

Black and white photo of mean wearing military uniforms and carrying rifles standing in front of a dense forest of palm trees
American soldiers returning to positions at Arawe after completing a patrol in December 1943

After establishing its beachhead, the Director Task Force began patrols of the area. Cunningham had been ordered to gather intelligence on Japanese forces in western New Britain, and on 17 December he dispatched a patrol of cavalrymen in two LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel) to the west of Arawe to investigate the Itni River area. These landing craft encountered seven Japanese barges carrying part of the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment near Cape Peiho, 20 mi (32 km) west of Arawe, on 18 December. After an exchange of gunfire the U.S. soldiers abandoned their landing craft and returned to Arawe along the coast.[73][75] Another patrol travelling in LCVPs was fired on by Japanese barges near Umtingalu on 18 December, but was able to return to Cape Merkus.[74]

After organizing his force while waiting for the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment for several days, Komori began his advance on Arawe on 24 December. He arrived at the airstrip to the north of Arawe during the early hours of Christmas Day.[2] During that morning, the force under Komori's command ambushed two platoon-sized American patrols which were traveling in trucks north-east of Umtingalu. The American units withdrew to the village and reinforced "G" Troop in defensive positions there. The American force defeated several Japanese attempts to move around the Umtingalu during the day, and killed at least three enemy soldiers. Cunningham believed that the force encountered around Umtingalu was the advance guard of a much larger body of Japanese soldiers advancing from Gasmata, and withdrew the troopers stationed around the village to positions behind the MLR.[76] At 10:30 pm that night, 50 Japanese soldiers made a poorly coordinated attack on the MLR. While they succeeded in over-running some American positions, the Japanese force was repulsed by fire from the 112th Cavalry's 60 millimetres (2.4 in) mortars. The Americans lost one man killed and eight wounded in this attack, and estimated that the Japanese had suffered twelve casualties.[76] As a result of his mistaken belief that a large Japanese force was heading for Arawe, Cunningham had contacted Krueger on 24 December to request that the Director Task Force be reinforced by the 2nd Battalion of the 158th Infantry Regiment. Krueger agreed to this, and ordered that three of the battalion's four companies be sent to Arawe. "G" Company of the 2nd Battalion, 158th Infantry arrived on 27 December and the other two companies reached Arawe in early January.[1]

The Japanese offensive continued after the Christmas Day attack. Two small attacks, each made by 15 soldiers, were made against the eastern edge of the MLR on the nights of 26 and 27 December. These were also repulsed by the 112th Cavalry's light mortars, and inflicted only a small number of casualties on the American force.[77] On 28 December part of the 112th Cavalry Regiment's "B" Troop set out from the MLR in an attempt to reach Umtingalu, but withdrew after encountering snipers and some light mortar fire. A platoon from "C" Troop also made an unsuccessful patrol from the western end of the MLR during which it suffered six casualties from Japanese machine gun and rifle fire.[78] The same day, Komori dispatched a force of between 20 to 30 soldiers to destroy the American mortar positions. The Japanese soldiers infiltrated the American positions by wading through swamps at the western end of the MLR, but were detected before they could reach dry land. The Director Task Force mounted a strong response which included a counterattack made by elements of three cavalry troops and a platoon from the 158th Infantry Regiment supported by mortars. The Japanese force suffered 17 casualties.[78]

The 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment arrived in the Arawe area on the afternoon of 29 December, and conducted several small and unsuccessful attacks in early January 1944 before taking up positions about 400–500 yd (370–460 m) north of the American MLR. These positions comprised shallow trenches and foxholes which were difficult to see. While only about 100 Japanese soldiers were in the area, they moved their six machine guns frequently, making them difficult targets for American mortars and artillery.[75]

American counterattack

An American patrol located the Japanese defensive position on 1 January 1944. B Troop of the 112th Cavalry Regiment launched an attack later that morning, but was beaten off by heavy fire; the Americans suffered three killed and 15 wounded in this action. On 4 January G Troop incurred three killed and 21 wounded in an unsuccessful attack on well-built Japanese positions. This attack had been made without artillery support in an attempt to surprise the Japanese, and also included a feint against Umtingalu which was conducted by several LCMs. Further attacks on 6, 7 and 11 January failed to make any headway, but gave the cavalrymen experience in maneuvering through the Japanese defensive positions.[79] These American operations were conducted on a limited scale as Cunningham and the 112th Cavalry Regiment's other senior officers believed that the unit had already achieved the goals of the landing at Arawe and did want to incur unnecessary casualties.[80]

Rear view of three World War II-era tanks moving in a line between tall palm trees. A man wearing military uniform is crouching in the foreground
USMC tanks supporting the Army advance on 16 January

On 6 January Cunningham requested further reinforcements, including tanks, to tackle the Japanese defenses. Krueger approved this request and ordered "F" Company, 158th Infantry Regiment and "B" Company of the USMC 1st Tank Battalion to Arawe; the two units arrived on 10 and 12 January respectively. The Marine tanks and two companies of the 158th Infantry Regiment subsequently practiced tank-infantry cooperation from 13–15 January, while the 112th Cavalry continued to conduct patrols into Japanese-held areas.[81][82] By this time, the Komori Force had incurred casualties of at least 65 killed, 75 wounded and 14 missing in action as a result of its offensive actions as well as the attacks on it conducted by the Director Task Force. The Japanese were also suffering from severe shortages of supplies.[83]

The Director Task Force launched its attack on 16 January. That morning, a squadron of B-24 Liberator heavy bombers dropped one hundred and thirty-six 1,000 lb (450 kg) bombs on the Japanese defenses, and 20 B-25s strafed the area. Following an intensive artillery and mortar barrage the Marine tank company, two companies of the 158th Infantry and C Troop, 112th Cavalry Regiment attacked. The tanks led the advance, with each being followed by a group of infantry or cavalrymen. The attack was successful, and reached its objectives by 4:00 pm. Cunningham then directed the force to withdraw back to the MLR; during this part of the operation two Marine tanks—which had become immobile—were destroyed to prevent the Japanese from using them as pillboxes.[82][84] American engineers destroyed the Japanese defensive position the next day. The Director Task Force believed that 139 Japanese had been killed in this attack, while it had suffered 22 killed and 64 wounded.[85]

Following the American attack, Komori pulled his remaining troops back to defend the airstrip. As this was not an Allied objective, the Japanese were not subjected to further attacks by ground troops other than occasional patrol clashes and ambushes. As a result of the supply shortages many of the Japanese soldiers fell sick. Attempts to bring supplies in by sea from Gasmata were disrupted by U.S. Navy PT boats and the force lacked enough porters to supply itself through overland trails. Komori concluded that his force was serving no purpose, and on 8 February informed his superiors that it faced destruction due to supply shortages.[86] They responded by ordering the force to hold its position, however, though it was awarded two Imperial citations in recognition of its supposed success in defending the airstrip.[87]

Aftermath

The 1st Marine Division's landing at Cape Gloucester on 26 December 1943 was successful. The Marines secured the airfields which were the main objective of the operation on 29 December against only light Japanese opposition. Heavy fighting took place during the first two weeks of 1944, however, when the Marines advanced south east of their initial beachhead to secure Borgen Bay. Little fighting took place once this area had been captured and the Marines patrolled extensively in an attempt to locate the Japanese.[88] On 16 February, a marine patrol from Cape Gloucester made contact with an army patrol from Arawe at the village of Gilnit.[89] On 23 February, the remnants of the Japanese force at Cape Gloucester were ordered to withdraw to Rabaul.[90]

Map of western New Britain with tracks and settlements involved in the Japanese withdrawal marked on it
Japanese evacuation routes in western New Britain

The Komori Force was also ordered to withdraw on 24 February as part of the general Japanese retreat from western New Britain. The Japanese immediately began to leave their positions, and headed north along inland trails to join other units. The Americans did not detect this withdrawal until 27 February, when an attack conducted by the 2nd Squadron, 112th Cavalry and the Marine tank company to clear the Arawe area of Japanese encountered no opposition.[87] The Director Task Force subsequently established a number of observation patrols along the southern coast of New Britain and increased the distances its patrols covered.[91] Komori fell behind his unit, and was killed on 9 April near San Remo on New Britain's north coast when he, his executive officer and two enlisted men they were travelling with were ambushed by a patrol from the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines.[92]

The Japanese force at Arawe suffered much heavier casualties than the Allies. The Director Task Force's total casualties between 15 December 1944 and the end of major fighting in the area were 118 dead, 352 wounded, and four missing.[82] Most of these casualties were members of the 112th Cavalry Regiment, which suffered 72 killed, 142 wounded and four missing. Japanese casualties over this period were 304 men killed and three captured.[93]

In the period immediately after the Japanese withdrawal, the Director Task Force remained at Arawe. In line with standard practice, the 112th Cavalry continued to improve the defensive positions in the area. The regiment also undertook training, and some men were granted leave in Australia and the United States.[93] Combat patrols continued to be conducted in the Arawe region in search of Japanese stragglers.[94] Elements of the 40th Infantry Division began to arrive at Arawe in April 1944 to assume responsibility for garrisoning the area.[95] The 112th Cavalry Regiment was informed that it was to be deployed in New Guinea in early June, and the Director Task Force was dissolved at this time.[93] The regiment sailed for the Aitape area of New Guinea on 8 June, and subsequently saw combat there during the Battle of Driniumor River.[96] The 40th Infantry Division maintained a garrison at Arawe until the Australian Army's 5th Division assumed responsibility for New Britain in late November 1944.[97]

Historians disagree over whether the Arawe operation was worthwhile for the Allies. The official history of the USMC in World War II stated that the presence of two experienced Japanese battalions at Arawe made the 1st Marine Division's task at Cape Gloucester easier.[2] However, Samuel Eliot Morison wrote in his History of United States Naval Operations in World War II that "Arawe was of small value" as the Allies never used it as a naval base and the garrison stationed in the area would have been better employed elsewhere.[59] The U.S. Army's official history concluded that in retrospect the landings at Arawe and Cape Gloucester "were probably not essential to the reduction of Rabaul or the approach to the Philippines", though the offensive in western New Britain had some benefits and was not "excessively high in casualties".[98]

References

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Notes
  1. ^ The U.S. Army's dismounted cavalry regiments comprised a regimental headquarters and headquarters troop, a service troop, a weapons troop, a medical detachment, a band (whose members also served as stretcher bearers) and two cavalry squadrons. Each of the dismounted squadrons comprised a small headquarters and three rifle troops.[23]
  2. ^ Full-strength Japanese infantry battalions comprised a headquarters, a battalion train, a machine gun company, a battalion gun platoon or company and four infantry companies.[33]
  3. ^ According to Hata, Imperial Japanese Navy air units based at Rabaul lost three Zeros on the 16th, four Zeros on the 21st, five Zeros on the 26th, four Zeros on the 27th, and four Zeros on the 31st in raids on both Arawe and Cape Gloucester.[62]
Citations
  1. ^ a b Powell (2006), p. 83
  2. ^ a b c Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 343
  3. ^ Coakley (1989), pp. 504–507
  4. ^ Coakley (1989), pp. 510–511
  5. ^ Miller (1959), p. 225
  6. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 324–325
  7. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 272–273
  8. ^ a b c d Miller (1959), p. 277
  9. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 273–274
  10. ^ Miller (1959), p. 274
  11. ^ Holzimmer (2007), p. 117
  12. ^ a b Morison (1958), p. 372
  13. ^ a b Rottman (2002), p. 186
  14. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 334
  15. ^ Miller (1959), p. 283
  16. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 274–275
  17. ^ Miller (1959), p. 279
  18. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 335
  19. ^ a b c Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 336
  20. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 334–335
  21. ^ Barbey (1969), p. 101
  22. ^ Rottman (2009), pp. 21–22
  23. ^ a b Rottman (2009), p. 13
  24. ^ Rottman (2009), p. 24
  25. ^ Barbey (1969), pp. 103–104
  26. ^ Gill (1968), p. 338
  27. ^ a b Morison (1958), p. 374
  28. ^ Morison (1958), p. 373
  29. ^ Gill (1968), pp. 335–336
  30. ^ Feldt (1991), pp. 341–349
  31. ^ a b Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 339–340
  32. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 327–328
  33. ^ Rottman (2005b), pp. 29–31
  34. ^ Miller (1959), p. 280
  35. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 281–282
  36. ^ a b c Miller (1959), p. 287
  37. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 276–277
  38. ^ Rottman (2005a), p. 37
  39. ^ Morison (1958), pp. 374–375
  40. ^ Mortensen (1950), pp. 318–328
  41. ^ Mortensen (1950), pp. 332–335
  42. ^ Powell (2006), p. 66
  43. ^ Powell (2006), p. 67
  44. ^ Powell (2006), pp. 66–67
  45. ^ a b Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 338
  46. ^ Miller (1959), p. 284
  47. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 338–339
  48. ^ a b c d Miller (1959), p. 285
  49. ^ Powell (2006), p. 71
  50. ^ a b Odgers (1957), p. 127
  51. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 285–286
  52. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 339
  53. ^ Barbey (1969), pp. 106–107
  54. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 286–287
  55. ^ Powell (2006), p. 73
  56. ^ Morison (1958), p. 376
  57. ^ a b c Mortensen (1950), p. 336
  58. ^ Hata (2011), p. 65
  59. ^ a b c d e Morison (1958), p. 377
  60. ^ Hata (2011), p. 66
  61. ^ Drea (1992), p. 91
  62. ^ Hata (2011), p. 66
  63. ^ Mortensen (1950), pp. 337–338
  64. ^ Hata (2011), p. 66
  65. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 340–342
  66. ^ Mortensen (1950), p. 341
  67. ^ Hata (2011), pp. 66–69
  68. ^ Hata (2011), p. 69
  69. ^ Office of the Chief Engineer, General Headquarters Army Forces, Pacific (1951), p. 192
  70. ^ Mortensen (1950), p. 335
  71. ^ a b c Powell (2006), p. 75
  72. ^ Willoughby (1966), pp. 237–238
  73. ^ a b Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 342
  74. ^ a b Powell (2006), p. 77
  75. ^ a b Miller (1959), p. 288
  76. ^ a b Powell (2006), p. 78
  77. ^ Powell (2006), pp. 78–79
  78. ^ a b Powell (2006), p. 79
  79. ^ Powell (2006), pp. 79–81
  80. ^ Powell (2006), pp. 81–82
  81. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 392
  82. ^ a b c Miller (1959), p. 289
  83. ^ Powell (2006), p. 82
  84. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), pp. 392–393
  85. ^ Powell (2006), p. 84
  86. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 393
  87. ^ a b Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 394
  88. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 289–294
  89. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 403
  90. ^ Miller (1959), p. 294
  91. ^ Powell (2006), pp. 84–85
  92. ^ Shaw and Kane (1963), p. 427
  93. ^ a b c Powell (2006), p. 85
  94. ^ Powell (2006), p. 106
  95. ^ "Combat Chronicle of the 40th Infantry Division". United States Army Center of Military History. Retrieved 12 December 2011.
  96. ^ Powell (2006), p. 107
  97. ^ Long (1963), p. 241
  98. ^ Miller (1959), pp. 294–295
Bibliography

6°10′S 149°1′E / 6.167°S 149.017°E / -6.167; 149.017

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