Argument from morality
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The argument from morality is an argument for the existence of God. Arguments from morality tend to be based on moral normativity or moral order. Arguments from moral normativity observe some aspect of morality and argue that God is the best or only explanation for this, concluding that God must exist. Argument from moral order are based on the asserted need for moral order to exist in the universe. They claim that, for this moral order to exist, God must exist to support it.
German philosopher Immanuel Kant devised an argument from morality based on practical reason. Kant argued that the goal of humanity it to achieve perfect happiness and virtue (the summum bonum) and believed that an afterlife must exist in order for this to be possible, and that God must exist to provide this. Both theist and nontheist philosophers have accepted that, if objective moral truths exist, then God must too exist; the argument from moral objectivity asserts that objective moral truths do exist, and that God must exist too. C. S. Lewis supported this argument and challenged the evolutionary naturalistic view of morality – that morality evolved and is a human construct – by arguing that without objective moral truths, moral scepticism would set in, leading to moral anarchy. He concluded that, because people act as if is morality is an objective truth, then it must be, and that God must exist. A related argument is from conscience; John Henry Newman argued that the conscience supports the claim that objective moral truths exist because it drives people to act morally even when it is not in their own interest. Newman argued that, because the conscience suggests the existence of objective moral truths, God must exist to give authority to these truths.
General form
All variations of the argument from morality begin with an observation about moral thought or experiences and conclude with the existence of God. Some of these arguments propose moral facts which they claim evident through human experience, arguing that God is the best explanation for these. Other versions describe some end which humans should strive to attain, only possible if God exists.[1]
Many arguments from morality are based on morality normativity, which suggest that objective moral truths exist and require God's existence to give them authority. Often, they consider that morality seems to be binding – obligations are seen to convey more than just a preference, but imply that the obligation will stand, regardless of other factors or interests. For morality to be binding, God must exist.[2] In its most general form, the argument from moral normativity is:
- A human experience of morality is observed.
- God is seen to be the best or only explanation for this moral experience.
- Therefore, God exists.[2]
Some arguments from moral order suggest that morality is based on rationality and that this can only be the case if there is a moral order in the universe. The arguments propose that only the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived could support the existence of moral order in the universe, so God must exist. Alternative arguments from moral order have proposed that we have an obligation to attain the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue. They attest that whatever we are obliged to do must be possible, and achieving the perfect good of both happiness and moral virtue is only possible if a natural moral order exists. A natural moral order requires the existence of God as orthodoxly conceived, so god must exist.[3]
Variations
Practical reason
In his Critique of Pure Reason, German philosopher Immanuel Kant stated that no successful argument for God's existence arises from reason alone. In his Critique of Practical Reason he went on to argue that, despite the failure of these arguments, morality requires that God's existence is assumed, owing to practical reason.[4] Rather than proving the existence of God, Kant was attempting to demonstrate that all moral thought requires the assumption that God exists.[5] Kant argued that humans are obliged to bring about the summum bonum: the two central aims of moral virtue and happiness, where happiness arises out of virtue. As ought implies can, Kant argued, it must be possible for the summum bonum to be achieved.[3] He accepted that it is not within the power of humans to bring the summum bonum about, because we cannot ensure that virtue always leads to happiness, so there must be a higher power who has the power to create an afterlife where virtue can be rewarded by happiness.[4]
Philosopher G. H. R. Parkinson notes a common objection to Kant's argument: that what ought to be done does not necessarily entail that it is possible. He also argues that alternative conceptions of morality exist which do not rely on the assumptions that Kant makes – he cites utilitarianism as an example which does not require the summum bonum.[6] Nichola Everitt argues that much moral guidance is unattainable, such as the Biblical command to be Christ-like. She proposes that Kant's first two premises only entail that we must try to achieve the perfect good, not that it is actually attainable.[7]
Argument from objective moral truths
Both theists and non-theists have accepted that the existence of objective moral truths might entail the existence God. Atheist philosopher J. L. Mackie accepted that, if objective moral truths existed, it would warrant a supernatural explanation. Scottish philosopher W. R. Sorley presented the following argument:
- If morality is objective and absolute, God must exist.
- Morality is objective and absolute.
- Therefore, God must exist.[8]
The argument from moral normativity (or against evolutionary naturalism) challenges the biological and sociological account of the development of human morality. This account, known as evolutionary naturalism, proposes that the human experience of morality is a by-product of natural selection. This produces an experience of morality which was useful for the development of humans, but is not based in any objective moral truths and thus entails that objective moral values do not exist. Scottish empiricist David Hume argued that belief in objective moral truths is unwarranted and to discuss them is meaningless.[9]
Evolutionary naturalism can lead to moral scepticism, which has been seen as implausible by some philosophers.[10] C. S. Lewis argued that, if evolutionary naturalism is accepted, human morality becomes worthless and are incapable of being true of false. Despite this, Lewis argued, those who accept evolutionary naturalism still act as if objective moral truths exist, which makes evolutionary naturalism impractical and leads Lewis to reject it.[11] As an alternative ethical theory, Lewis offered a form of divine command theory which equated God with goodness and treated goodness as an essential part of reality, thus asserting God's existence.[12]
As a challenge to this variation of the argument from morality, Parkinson argues that it must be shown that morality is objective and commanded by God, rather than just human inventions. He continues his challenge, arguing that there is no reason to believe it is God who gives authority to moral laws – it could be given by the consent of humanity, for example.[6] American philosopher Michael Martin argues that the first premise of this argument is unsupported, claiming that it is not necessarily true that objective moral truths must entail the existence of God, suggesting that alternative explanations could exist. He argues that naturalism is an acceptable explanation for the existence of morality and, even if a supernatural explanation is necessary, it does not necessarily have to be God (polytheism is a viable alternative). Martin also challenges the second premise, arguing that a non-objective account of ethics might be acceptable and that a subjective account of morality does not necessarily entail moral anarchy.[8]
Conscience
Related to the argument from morality is the argument from conscience, associated with eighteenth-century bishop Joseph Butler and nineteenth-century cardinal John Henry Newman.[13] Newman proposed that the conscience, as well as giving moral guidance, provides evidence of objective moral truths which must be supported by the divine. He argued that emotivism is an inadequate explanation of the human experience of morality because people avoid acting immorally, even when it might be in their interests. Newman proposed that, to explain the conscience, God must exist.[14]
British philosopher John Locke argued that moral rules cannot be established from conscience because the differences in people's consciences would lead to contradictions. Locke also noted that the conscience is influenced by "education, company, and customs of the country", a criticism mounted by J. L. Mackie, who argued that the conscience should be seen as an "introjection" of other people into an agent's mind.[15] Michael Martin challenges the argument from conscience with a naturalistic account of conscience, arguing that naturalism provides as adequate explanation for the conscience with the need for God's existence. He uses the example of the internalisation by humans of social pressures, which leads to the fear of going against these norms. Even if a supernatural cause is required, he argues, it could be something other than God; this would mean that the phenomena of the conscience is no more supportive of monotheism than polytheism.[14]
Notes and references
- ^ Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
- ^ a b Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
- ^ a b Byrne, Peter (May 25, 2004). "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God". Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved March 24, 2012.
- ^ a b Oppy 2006, pp. 372–373
- ^ Guyer 2006, p. 234
- ^ a b Parkinson 1988, p. 344
- ^ Everitt 2003, p. 137
- ^ a b Martin 1992, pp. 213–214
- ^ Craig & Moreland 2011, p. 393
- ^ Craig & Moreland 2011, pp. 393–394
- ^ McSwain & Ward 2010, pp. 110–111
- ^ McSwain & Ward 2010, p. 112
- ^ Parkinson 1988, p. 344
- ^ a b Martin 1992, p. 214
- ^ Parkinson 1988, pp. 344–345
Bibliography
- Adams, Robert (1987). The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in Philosophical Theology. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780195041460.
- Boyd, Richard (1988). Sayre-McCord, Geoffery (ed.). Essays on Moral Realism. Cornell University Press. Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief. ISBN 9780801495410.
- Craig, William Lane; Moreland, J.P. (2011). The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 9781444350852.
- Everitt, Nichola (2003). Non-Existence of God. Routledge. ISBN 9780415301060.
- Guyer, Paul (2006). Kant. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415283359.
- Hare, John (1996). The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God's Assistance. Oxford University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Part I, Bk. II, Chap. V.
- Mackie, J.L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism. Oxford University Press. Chap. VI.
- Martin, Michael (1992). Atheism: A Philosophical Justification. Temple University Press. ISBN 9780877229438.
- McSwain, Robert; Ward, Michael (2010). The Cambridge Companion to C.S. Lewis. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521884136.
- Oppy, Graham (2006). Arguing About Gods. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521863865.
- Parkinson, G. H. R. (1988). An Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780415003230.
- Swinburne, Richard (1979). The Existence of God. Oxford University Press.
External links
- Moral Arguments at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- "Kant's 'Appropriation' of Lampe's God", Harvard Theological Review 85:1 (January 1992), pp. 85–108; revised and reprinted as Chapter IV in Stephen Palmquist, Kant's Critical Religion (Ashgate, 2000).