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Indo-Pakistani war of 1965

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The 1965 war, also known as the Second Kashmir War, between India and Pakistan was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 1965 and September 1965. Details of this war, like those of most India-Pakistan wars, are sketchy and riddled with media biases.

The Rann of Kutch

Fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in an area known as the Rann of Kutch, a barren land between the Indian state of Gujarat and Pakistan, in April 1965. Later the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict saw Pakistan gaining 350 sq. miles of the Rann of Kutch.

Pre-war

A declassified US State Department telegram that confirms the existance of hundreds of "infiltrators" in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Dated during the events running upto the 1965 war.

After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan is said to have believed that the Indian army was unwilling or unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss to China in 1962. Pakistan believed that the populace of Kashmir was generally discontent with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. This was codenamed Operation Gibraltar.

For its part, Pakistan claimed to have been concerned by the attempts of India to absorb Kashmir - a state that Pakistan claims as "disputed", into the Indian union by way Articles 356 and 357 of the Indian Constitution allowing the President of India to declare President's Rule in the disputed state.

The War

On August 15 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and launched an attack on Kashmir, marking an official beginning to the war. Pakistani reports cite this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to a tip the Indian forces received from Kashmiri civilians about Pakistani soldiers crossing the Line of Control (LoC) dressed as local Kashmiris.

Most of the war was fought on land by each country's infantry and armor units, with substantial backing from their air forces. Initially the Indian army met with considerable success in the northern sector (Kashmir). After launching a prolonged artillery barrage against Pakistan, India was able to capture three important mountain positions. However, by the end of the month both sides were on even footing as Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Punch and India had gains in Pakistan Administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir), having captured the Haji Pir Pass eight kilometers inside Pakistani territory.

These territorial gains and rapid Indian advances were met with a counterattack by Pakistan in the southern sector (Punjab) where Indian forces, having been caught unprepared, faced technically superior Pakistani tanks and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its airforces to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, Pakistan retailiated, calling in its airforces to retaliate against Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab.

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on September 6 (some officially claim this to be the beginning of the war).

On September 6, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under WWII veteran Major General Prasad battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a de facto border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross over the Ichhogil Canal was made though the bridge in the village of Barki, just east of Lahore. This brought the Indian army within the range of Lahore International Airport, although temporarily. The United States requested for a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.

The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by PAF Sabres rained down on the Indian 15th Division forcing it to withdraw to its starting point.

File:1965 Kashmir.jpg
A map of Kashmir shows the 1949 ceasefire line, Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Indian Jammu and Kashmir. Sectors of active conflict during the 1965 war such as Chumb are also shown.

On the days following September 9, both nations' premire formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armored Division, labelled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs and came under heavy Pakistani tank fire at Taroah and was forced to withdraw.

Similarly, Pakistan's pride, I Armored Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan with the intent to capture Amritsar (the capital of Punjab) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandar. The Pakistani 1 Armored Division never made it past Khem Karan and by the end of September 10 lay disintegrated under the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the battle of Asal Uttar (True North).

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 sq. miles of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 sq. miles of Indian territory, mostly in Chumb in the northern sector.

The navies of both India and Pakistan played no prominent role in the war of 1965. On September 7, a flotilla of the Pakistani Navy carried out a bombardment of the coastal Indian temple town of Dwarka, which was 200 miles south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. The Indian fleet from Mumbai sailed to Dwarka to patrol off that area to deter further bombardment.

There was no retaliatory response from India. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, but to restrict the war to a land based conflict.

There are reports of underwater attacks by the Indian Navy against what they suspected were American supplied Pakistani submarines, but this was never confirmed.

Indian and Pakistani Claims

India and Pakistan hold widely divergent claims on the damage they have inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. There has been no neutral assessment of the damages of the war. The following summarizes each nation's claims

Indian claims Pakistani claims
Aircraft Destroyed 35 IAF, 73 PAF 104 IAF, 19 PAF
Areal Victories 13 30
Land area won 1,500 miles of Pakistani territory* 2,000 miles of Indian territory*

* American sources claim India held 710 sq. miles of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held 210 sq. miles of Indian territory.

Ceasefire

On September 22, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution that called for an unconditional ceasefire from both nations. The war ended the following day. The Soviet Union, lead by Premier Alexey Kosygin, brokered a ceasefire in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed an agreement to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than February 25 1966.

The battle remained largely inconclusive and saw a five year period of relative peace between the two neighboring rivals before war broke out once again in 1971

Intelligence Failures

Indian miscalculations

Strategic miscalculations by both nations ensured that the result of this war remained stalemate. The Indian army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armorments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official History of the 1965 War", drafted by the Ministy of Defence of India in 1992 was a long suppressed document that outlined intelligence and strategic blunders by India during the war. According to the document, on September 22 when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked the commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, where he to hold off accepting the ceasefire for a while longer. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank loss.

It was found later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India still held twice the number of tanks than Pakistan did. By this time, the Pakistani Army itself had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshall (retd) Lal points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other.The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes attributed to the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani army's flailures started from the drawing board itself, with the supposition that a generally discontent Kashmiri people would rise to the occasion, and revolt against their Indian rulers, briging about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. For whatever reason, the Kashmiri people did not revolt, and on the contrary provided the Indian army with enough information for them to learn of "Operation Gibraltar" and the fact that the army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani army regulars.

The Pakistani army failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would attack the southern sector and open up the theater of conflict. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Ankhur, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India was also a failure. Many Pakistani critics have criticized the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. They claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Ankhur to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all out war. Despite progress made in Ankhur, General Ayub Khan for some inexplicable reason relieved the commanding Gen. Ahktar Malik of charge and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24 hour lul ensued, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Ankhur and oppose a lacluster attack headed by General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue", asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command.

See also

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947

Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Kargil War

Sino-Indian War

United States Library of Congress Country Studies - India

Story of Pakistan

GlobalSecurity.org Indo-Pakistan War 1965

Grand Slam - A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin, very detailed roll of events and analysis

A Critical Look at the 1965 Operations, Air Chief Marshall (retd) PC Lal dispassionate analysis

Official History of the 1965 War