Talk:Operation Overlord

Statistic table

Source	Page	British/Canadian armies	American armies	Airforce	Total	Notes
* Tamelander, Michael; Zetterling, Niklas (2003) [1995]. Avgörandets Ögonblick: Invasionen i Normandie (in Swedish). Stockholm: Norstedts. ISBN 978-91-1-301204-9. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |trans_title= ignored (|trans-title= suggested) (help)	341-342	83,825 (16,138 killed, 58,594 wounded, and 9,093 missing)	125,847 (20,838 killed, 94,881 wounded, and 10,128 missing)	16,714	226,386	No one appears to have access to this source to verify
* Beevor, Antony (2009). D-Day: The Battle for Normandy. Viking. ISBN 978-0-670-88703-3.	522	83,045	125,847	16,714	225,606	No source cited
* D'Este, Carlo (2004) [1983]. Decision in Normandy: The Real Story of Montgomery and the Allied Campaign. London: Penguin. ISBN 0-14-101761-9. OCLC 44772546.	517-518	83,045 (15,995 killed, 57,996 wounded, 9,054 missing)	125,847 (20,838 killed, 94,881 wounded, 10,128 missing)	16,714 (8,178 RAF, 8,536 USAAF)	225,606	British losses are cited to "War Diary, 21st Army Group, 'A' Section, SITEP, 29 August 1944, PRO (WO 171/140). American and air force losses are sourced from Ellis.
Notes on Operations of 21 Army Group	16	80,738^	/	/	80,738	Period document from staff of the 21st Army Group. Date period: 6 June - 24 August.
* Ellis, L.F.; Allen, G.R.G.; Warhurst, A.E. (2004) [1962]. Butler, J.R.M (ed.). Victory in the West, Volume I: The Battle of Normandy. History of the Second World War United Kingdom Military Series. London: Naval & Military Press. ISBN 1-84574-058-0. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)	488 (air losses), 493 (land casualties)	83,825 (16,138 killed, 58,594 wounded, and 9,093 missing)	125,847 (20,838 killed, 94,881 wounded, and 10,128 missing)	16,714 (8,178 British and 8,536 American)	226,386	British Official History
* Stacey, C.P. (1960). The Canadian Army 1939–45: A Historical Summary. Ottawa: Published by Authority of the Minister of National Defence. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)	271	82,309	124,394	/	206,703	Canadian Official History: American figures end 30 August, British/Canadian end 31 August. Sources the American Official History
* Pogue, Forrest (1989) [1954]. The Supreme Command. United States Army in World War II: The Europe Theater of Operations. Wasington D.C: Center of Military History. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)	248	82,309 (15,818 dead)	124,394 (20,668 dead)	/	206,703	US Official History, appears to source from SHAEF G-3 War Room Summary 91, 5 September 1944.
* Amidon Lusted, Marcia. D-Day: The Normandy Invasion.	90	83,045	125,847	16,714	225,606	No source
* Zuehlke, Mark. Terrible Victory: First Canadian Army and the Scheldt Estuary Campaign.	33	82,309	124,394	/	206,703	If i am not mistaken, is citing Roy 1944: The Canadians in Normandy
* Zuehlke, Mark. Breakout from Juno: First Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign.	413	82,309	/	/	206,703-124,394	Appears to be citing Stacey.
* Jarymowycz, Roman. Breakout from Juno: First Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaignank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine.	202	82,309	124,394	/	206,703	No source cited

^Allied units: 1,414: 290 killed, 1,023 wounded, and 101 missing. British: 12,328 killed, 44,297 wounded, and 6,640 missing. Canadian: 3,061 killed, 11,041 wounded, and 1,957 missing.

John English's The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign places total Canadian losses at 18,444, with 5,021 dead. (p. 300)

That appears to be the basic range. There are plenty of other sources, but they all seem to be quoting the same stats. No hits on Google Books for 29,370 American dead or 123,000 overall. I also think that it is very interesting that D'Este quotes from Ellis, who he pretty much has it in for. I leave it for others to suggest how to proceed.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 02:20, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

And once again, those are all preliminary figures including KIA only. The 1953 post-war assessment went back and determined that 29,370 were killed, died of wounds, or were never heard of again. Many of those are incidentally very close to 123,000.CJK (talk) 14:34, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

At the end of the day, we have to abide by the wiki guidelines for RS. So, again, where is the 1953 post-war assessment? I did quite a bit of searching last night (Google Books, JSTOR, fourms) and could not find anything (other than casualties very close to the ones you quoted, but they were for Italy). The figures quoted also include the number of American wounded, not just those killed.

I can understand why Pogue would not have used such a report, due to the publication date, but what is the excuse of more modern historians who are quoting the G-3 report (or apparently something similar due to the differing numbers) instead?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:23, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

The report is available here [1] see page 92. You have to add both Normandy (which they date from 6 June to 24 July) and Northern France (which they date from 25 July to 14 September). But don't include the air force losses which are also listed.

CJK (talk) 21:50, 5 March 2015 (UTC)

Adding the data like you suggested, I get (excluding Air Force losses) 123,109 American casualties, 29,370 of which were killed, for the period from 6 June to 14 September. The other report here says 124,394 American casualties, 20,668 of which were killed, for the period from 6 June to the end of August (not only different data, but a different time period). I think the best way to handle this is by adding an explanatory note to the info box data, so I've gone ahead and done that. Feedback welcome -- Diannaa (talk) 01:49, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

Not to be a broken record, but the 20,688 is purely the killed in action reported at the time, while 29,370 is total killed, died of wounds, and missing later declared dead as calculated after the war. In addition, if you have no problem inserting it in the infobox I don't see the problem mentioning it in the section about casualties.

CJK (talk) 02:06, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

I do understand your point totally. The data is from 1953 calculations; these are calculations that were done after the war, because the war ended in 1945. The numbers are different from the previous data, not only because they re-did the calculations, but also because they apply to a different time period. I think the explanatory note is totally adequate, and don't think we should add it to the body of the article, since the data is for only one country. -- Diannaa (talk) 03:12, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

The 1953 figures are different not only because of that but because they include the categories of died of wounds and missing declared dead. I am not understanding your point of withholding information if we only have data for one country.

CJK (talk) 03:39, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

I am most certainly not withholding the information, as I have already added it to the article. -- Diannaa (talk) 04:13, 6 March 2015 (UTC)

I know that most articles do not include air losses, but since we have the stats should we not include the overall losses not just the ground forces?

Additionally, the only source that appears to give a primary document is D'Este. I am not a fan of his or his work, but due to the fact other secondary sources do not appear to source their claims, should we not go for his re British losses? Nevermind the argument, that the British OH differs with the American OH.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 19:11, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

Following up on this, i would propose that the infobox to be changed to display Allies casualties as: 225,606 - 226,386, thus matching the way the German casualties are displayed (an overall figure). In addition i would propose the following change for the Allies section in the main article:

From D-Day to 21 August, the Allies landed 2,052,299 men in northern France. The cost of the Normandy campaign was high for both sides. Between 6 June and the end of August, the American armies suffered 124,394 casualties, of which 20,668 were killed. Casualties within the First Canadian and Second British Army are placed at 83,045: 15,995 killed, 57,996 wounded, and 9,054 missing. Of these, Canadian losses amounted to 18,444, with 5,021 killed in action. The Allied air forces, having flown 480,317 sorties in support of the invasion, lost 4,101 aircraft and 16,714 airmen (8,536 members of the USAAF, and 8,178 flying under the command of the RAF). Allied tank losses have been estimated at around 4,000, with losses split evenly between the American and British/Canadian armies. Historians slightly differ on overall casualties during the campaign, with the lowest losses totaling 225,606 and the highest at 226,386.

Comments?EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 23:30, 8 March 2015 (UTC)

This is good work EnigmaMcmxc, I have no objection to you going ahead with these amendments. -- Diannaa (talk) 00:13, 9 March 2015 (UTC)

Thanks for taking this on, EnigmaMcmxc. I made one tweek to the Harvard citation linking, otherwise a great addition to the article. -- Diannaa (talk) 01:45, 13 March 2015 (UTC)

I am Swedish speaking and I have access to the book written by Tamelander & Zetterling. I can verify the numbers later today. EriFr (talk) 09:09, 14 March 2015 (UTC)

That is very much appreciated!EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 12:53, 14 March 2015 (UTC)

I am sorry for the delay, but now I have the book in front of me. This is what Tamelander & Zetterling say about the Allied casualties:

"Under perioden från 6 juni fram till 21 augusti hade de allierade landsatt 2 025 299 man i norra Frankrike. Av dessa tjänstgjorde 1 222 659 under amerikansk flagg (inklusive fria franska förband) och 829 640 under brittisk (inklusive de kanandensiska, polska och de fåtaliga holländska-belgiska förbanden). I samband med striderna stupade 20 838 amerikanska soldader, 94 881 sårades och 10 128 rapporterades saknade. Motsvarande siffror för britterna blev 16 138 stupade, 58 594 sårade och 9 093 saknade. Totalt sett förlorade amerikanerna 125 847 man och britterna 83 825 - drygt 10 procent av insatt styrka.

Till ovanstående beräkning måste man lägga de allierade luftflottornas förluster. Det allierade flyget gjorde 480 317 uppstigningar med direkt aknytning till striderna i Normandie. Inte mindre än 4 101 plan gick förlorade och 16 714 piloter och andra besättningsmän dödades, sårades eller tillfångatogs (Tyskland förlorade 2 127 flygplan under perioden från juni till och med augusti; detta antal gäller endast 3:e Luftlottans operationer). Den allierade manskapsförlusten stiger därmed till 226 386 man.

För att gå over till de allierade stridsvagnsförlusterna måste vi tyvärr medge att ingen exakt siffra finns att tillgå. Vi blir därför tvungna att göra en uppskattning, och kommer att basera denna på de exakta uppgifter som finns för amerikanska medeltunga stridsvagnar. Totalt förstördes 899 sådana, men de utgjorde knappt en fjärdedel av alla allierade stridsvagnar (om bland dessa även inräknas amerikanska "tank destroyers"). Striderna på den brittiska sektorn var intensivare ifråga om stridsvagnsinsatster, och britterna mötte dessutom merparten av de tyska pansardivisionerna. En rimlig uppskattning hamnar på strax over 4 000 förstörda allierade stridsvagnar, varav knappt 2 000 gick förlorade hos de amerikanska förbanden."

I have quoted the book word for word in Swedish, and the above information can be found on page 341-342. In English, this summarizes as following:

- The Allies landed 2 025 299 men in northern France during the period between 6 June and 21 August. Of these men, 1 222 659 served under American flag (including Free French forces) and 829 640 served under British flag (including the Canadian, Polish and Dutch-Belgian forces).

- US casualties: 20 838 killed, 94 881 wounded and 10 128 missing, for a total of 125 847 men.

- British casualties: 16 137 killed, 58 594 wounded and 9 093 missing, for a total of 83 825 men.

- To this should be added the Allied air force casualties. The Allied Air forces made 480 317 sorties in direct connection to the battles in Normandy and no less than 4 101 air planes were lost and 16 714 pilots and other crew members killed, wounded or captured.

- Total Allied casualties: 226 386 men.

- Allied tank losses: an estimation of 4 000 tanks lost, of which nearly 2 000 belonged to American forces.

Please tell me if you are interested in knowing what Tamelander & Zetterling say about German losses or if you need more information about the book.

(Btw. Can anyone tell me how I do to "ping" certain users in order to notify them?)

Best regards. /EriFr (talk) 17:32, 6 April 2015 (UTC)

@EnigmaMcmxc: -- Diannaa (talk) 01:34, 7 April 2015 (UTC)

Infobox order

As there has been a bit of an edit-war going on, shall we discuss it? Per Template:Infobox military conflict, "combatant1/combatant2/combatant3 ... Combatants should be listed in order of importance to the conflict, be it in terms of military contribution, political clout, or a recognized chain of command. If differing metrics can support alternative lists, then ordering is left to the editors of the particular article."

The argument against the status quo has thus far been along the lines of the British engaged far more of the Germans than the Americans did, and the Germans were far more concerned with the British. We could debate strategy all day long, but working from the definition we have:

• military contribution: The US provided more manpower than the British, they even supplied most of the tanks in use by the British forces.
• political clout: The 1941-1944 period saw the British object to a cross-channel invasion due to a variety of reasons. The Americans were the ones who pressed for Overlord, over the British Balkan strategy.
• recognized chain of command: Monty and 21st Army Group may have had overall command of the ground forces, but they were under the command of SHAEF and Ike (who likewise was in overall command of the naval and air forces).

Opposing views? EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:24, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Do you have some data on how many participants there were from each country? I can't seem to find those stats in the books I have here at home. — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 03:44, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Per the article, on July 25, 812,000 American troops and 640,000 British and Canadians were part of the campaign. Americans suffered 125,000 causalities compared to 83,000 British and Canadian. FWIW, I also agree with Enigma's point about putting the US first. Calidum T|C 03:53, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for finding that, i must have been tired as I couldn't see it. I agree with "US first" for this article. -- — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 15:38, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

I would like to thank everyone for the discussion and I am going to restate my points

• military contribution: Yes the US provided most of the British tanks but the British supplied many of the landing craft used to get Americans on shore. Yes the Americans had more men but isn't it more important to engage and defeat the enemy, not simply have more men. I have already said that the Germans placed the bulk of their forces in front of the British and Canadians not the Americans, is this really outweighed because the Americans had more troops?
• political clout: Yes the British opposed Normandy form 1941-1944 because they knew how dangerous an amphibious assault was (Gallipoli, Salerno, Anzio), they wanted to wait until the German forces were extremely weak. Had they listened to the Americans and invaded in 1942 or 1943 it would have most likely have been a disaster, I agree that Overlord is much better than the British Balkan Strategy in 1944 but postponing the Invasion until 1944 and conducting the North African and Italian campaigns to draw away German forces was great alternative then invading in 1942 or 1943. Also although the Americans pushed for D-day to happen it was mainly the British who planned the operation (Frederick E. Morgan) and it was the British and Canadians who took on the bulk of German forces in France especially armor and SS troops.
• recognized chain of command: Yes the supreme commander was Ike but the Ground Forces Commander (Monty), Air Forces Commander (Trafford Leigh Mallory), and Naval Forces Commander (Bertram Ramsay) were all British. During the Normandy campaign Ike did not dictate the Campaign, it was only on September 1st when Operation Overlord officially ended that he became Ground Forces Commander. Ike was a good guy but the Supreme Commander position was not the position that dictated the course of battle.

The main reason that is stated for the US doing more is that they had more soldiers and took more casualties. For the casualties please read about the American replacement system and it’s putting of green young men in the front line of battle. As for having more soldiers I thought a campaign would be dictated by doing damage to the enemy whether it’s tactical or strategic. Having more Americans does not change the fact that the Germans placed far fewer of their soldiers in the American sector. The British and Canadians had a much tougher time against the best the Germans had to offer in France, I think that doing more to damage the enemy is more important than having more soldiers. For me the British where more important to the victory in Normandy because even though they had less troops they did far more damage to the Germans (which is how you win a campaign) while the Americans who had more troops did less to the overall defeat of the Germans in Normandy. So which is more important to winning a campaign having more soldiers then your ally or doing more damage to your enemy?-Colonialmarine9

The Allied strategy was one of teamwork; pinning down the Germans in the east to allow an encircling battle to fought. Not to mention, the western terrain (centered in bocage) was easier to defend than the largely open farmland to the east; German dispositions should take this into effect as well.

The British roles at the head of the various forces is another example of the political situation. A British commander was (during the war) never going to be at the top because the Americans took leadership of the alliance due to the men they could field bolstered by their political and industrial strength to the other powers.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:12, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

I agree 100% it was teamwork, the British Commonwealth couldn't have done it without the Americans and the Americans couldn't have done it without the British Commonwealth. Ike was the perfect man for the job of Supreme Commander as he got along with everyone and kept the allied team together. I understand it was a political situation but the facts are that although Ike was American his position was not to dictate the course of battle that was the job of his subordinates on the ground, air, and sea which were all British. My argument is that the British and Canadian role in tying up and wearing down the bulk of the German forces (thus allowing the American breakout) is more important than the Americans having more soldiers than their ally or having a supreme commander of their nationality.-Colonialmarine9

Alternately, it could be said that the British became bogged down around Caen due to a series of bungled battles and the poor performance of some units, and the Americans played the more significant role in winning the campaign - and there are any number of works which support such an interpretation of events. It seems more sensible to stick to an ordering based on the size of the forces and the casualties they incurred. Nick-D (talk) 07:32, 7 January 2016 (UTC)

That is true, and has been one of the major controversies surrounding the campaign for about as long as it has been studied (and one could probably argue, while it was underway).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:22, 7 January 2016 (UTC)

The British supplied almost all the ships involved. The US provided around 100. The rest were British or British-managed. The British also planned the entire operation, and if anyone seriously thinks the British were going to allow anyone else to take the decisions and responsibility for what would almost certainly be the most important operation of the war on the Western Front, one that if it failed could never be repeated, (and which would then affect them more than anyone else) they are very much mistaken.

The British for two years - first in 1942, then again in 1943 - had trouble conveying to the Americans what invading German-occupied Europe would involve, and the magnitude of the undertaking, and even went so far as to stage the ultimately disastrous 1942 Dieppe Raid to help get the message across.

Anyone who thinks the British were going to be dictated-to over their most important operation of the war, and what is more, one that was going to be executed from their own territory, using their ships, doesn't understand them at all.

BTW, the reason the British and Canadians were 'bogged down around Caen' was because they were facing seven and a half panzer divisions - most of them Waffen-SS ones - whereas the US troops were facing first half of a division, later one and a half. There were many, many more German tanks facing the British and Canadians, see. That's over 700 tanks facing the British and Canadians, and around 150 facing the Americans. Montgomery planned it that way, with Bradley's agreement. And the apparent lack of comprehension of this is one of the reasons the British weren't going to allow some bloody-amateur, such as some post-war historians who fail to understand such simple facts, to be running Overlord.

Oh, I nearly forgot. Montgomery attacked Caen because it was the main road and rail hub through-which all the German panzer reserves had to pass before they could get to Bradley's forces in the west. He knew therefore that the Germans could not afford to lose Caen and would do everything they could to hold it. The reserves were therefore likely to be used to defend Caen first - which they had to pass through to reach Bradley - rather than move to on to Bradley's area. Otherwise Caen was of no other importance to Montgomery.

The more it looked like Montgomery's attempted taking of Caen was failing the more the Germans thought they were doing the right thing in defending it. So they poured more and more of their reserves in and around Caen to prevent its loss. This was exactly what Montgomery and Bradley wanted. It was stopping those reserves ever getting to Bradley and his Americans in the west.— Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.240 (talk) 09:13, 20 September 2016 (UTC)

Operation Overlord Allied Order

Operation Overlord was an important campaign in the Second World War in which the Western Allies landing in Normandy and defeated the German Army in France in the summer of 1944. However the allied order is wrong, it should be the United Kingdom that is listed first. The reason for this is because the United Kingdom was the nation most responsible for the Allied victory in Normandy. Operation Overlord was planned mainly by the British, the British provided the vast majority of the warships and landing craft, also the British committed more aircraft. But the most important part of the campaign was the ground fighting it was the British who did more to break the German Army in Normandy. Here it was the job of the British 2nd Army to tie down the bulk of the German forces as well as the reinforcements and allow the Americans to breakout. Had it not been for the British and Canadians drawing in the vast majority of German forces especially armor the breakout would have failed. Throughout the campaign on average the Americans faced around 110 to 190 German tanks, while the British and Canadians faced around 640 to 700 tanks including all of the Tiger tanks. Also the vast majority of the SS divisions which are regarded as the best divisions of the war were fighting against the British and Canadians. The British Commonwealth soldiers faced more German troops, better trained, and better equipped soldiers then the Americans did, and not only did they tie them down but wore them down until they could hardly be called combat worthy. Therefore I feel that more credit should go the British Commonwealth forces that defeated the best the Germans had to offer in France. For the German forces the tank formations they assembled around Caen in the British Army's sector was the largest concentration of German tanks since the Battle of Kursk, also German casualty rates for the divisions in Normandy were double that of the average division on the Eastern front and most of these casualties were in the British and Canadian sector of the front. The Americans did surpass the British and Canadian troop strength sometime in July 1944 however they did not engage the majority of the German forces which I think are more important than having more troops. I do not wish to belittle the American contribution; I recognize that it is very important. But even if the Americans did have more troops and took more casualties it does not mean that they did more than the British and Canadians as the Americans went up against far fewer German soldiers, after all the Eastern front is the most important front because it tied down and destroyed the majority of the German forces in the Second World War. If those principles apply on the Eastern Front then why do they not apply in the Normandy Campaign where it was the British and Canadians who tied down and destroyed the majority of the German forces there? These are the reasons on why I think the British did more than the Americans to win in Normandy. I do not wish to offend anyone; I just wish to bring up the subject of who did more. Have a good day.-Colonialmarine9

Here are some Sources I used. http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/05/opinion/opinion-d-day-myth-reality/index.html http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Normandy+60+years+on%3a+myths+and+legends.-a0131499558 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1189604/The-untold-brutality-D-Day-Antony-Beevor-carnage-suffered-beaches-Normandy.html Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy by Max Hastings Battle of Caen (Wikipedia Article)

British Commonwealth forces made up the majority of Allied forces involved in D-Day, but the US force soon became much larger. The command arrangements reflected this. Nick-D (talk) 09:47, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

When studying the issue last night, I noticed that our D-Day article Normandy landings lists British first, while this one lists US first. On D-Day, the majority of the forces were indeed from Britain, Canada, and other Commonwealth countries. -- — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 15:41, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Tanks destroyed by aircraft

On 29 July, RAF 121 Wing launched 99 sorties with rocket firing Typhoons scoring only two tanks destroyed.(Copp, Montgomery's Scientists, pp. 167-171) On 7 August, and the following days in the Mortain area, over 700 sorties were flown by Anglo-American planes (a mixture of bombs and rockets split between the American and British aircraft) only seven tanks were confirmed to have been destroyed by rockets and a further two by bombs.(pp. 173-175) Of the 90 tanks found abandoned or destroyed within the Falaise Pocket, only four were confirmed to have been destroyed by rockets and a further two by bombs.(p. 183) Moving ahead to the Ardennes, the air force claimed 324 tanks destroyed. Out of 101 German armor vehicles examined, only four tanks were suspected of being destroyed by air attack.(p. 207)

I think the following diff needs a little more evidence considering it is claiming around 10 per cent of the tanks destroyed.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:05, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

The problem is that you seem to be just taking a small set of actions and assuming that the source must be wrong based on them. Unless those account for literally every single tank kill at Normandy, this is not really logical. You also seem to be ignoring how incredibly heavy the bombardment was at Normandy, when compared to the Ardennes. On the other hand, the source I cited (which is also cited on the rest of the page as an RS) gives an overall total for the number of tanks killed by aircraft. I would actually assert that stronger evidence than that would be needed (it seems you're relying on extrapolation and supposition) to just throw away information given in one of this page's main sources. Unless you have a more reliable source that explicitly contradicts it?--Nihlus1 (talk) 07:34, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

I would really like to know where they get there figure from, what is there source? The air force, granted made extreme numbers of sorties but they also made claims that were not supported in the ground. The examples given, from the operational research, were from several areas were the heaviest concentration of direct support had came from the air force in attacking German tanks. The operational research, at least what is printed, highlighted just how over the top the claims were and just how few tanks were being taken out.

Additional sources talk about the issue: here, here, here etc (there are lots more, that is just a quick sample).

The simple point being, we should use caution despite the claim being made in a RSEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:45, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

The sentence mentioning 100 tank kills is in the context of pointing out that AFV kills were over claimed. It is also below what aircraft claim to have destroyed in a single day. Therefore "AFV kills were over claimed" isn't really sufficient ground to throw away information given by one of this page's main RSs. I again ask if you have any evidence proving it wrong (that is, a statement from a reliable historian or the militaries themselves saying that substantially less than 100 were destroyed), because three picked handful of engagements in a three month operation involving some of the heaviest bombardment of the war really isn't it.--Nihlus1 (talk) 22:07, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Absolutely agree. It is well known that there was gross over-claiming of AFV kills by aircraft. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:44, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

I have been doing some additional reading on the subject, and it seems that the 100 figure is quite common and people do not really have qualrms with it. As noted, yes the Allied bombing was quite heavy and it would seem that most of the figure could be attributed to Operation Goodwood, then the various isolated incidents (such as the ones examined in the German counterattack and retreat) just pile up in the end.

With so much information out there on the over-estimates etc, I was just wanting to ensure this figure was accurate so to avoid possibly perputating a myth. I withdraw my (in good faith) objection.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:25, 26 February 2016 (UTC)

90 day battle

As can be seen from my recent edit, I have removed mention of it. First, I would like to apologize as on a second review I do see mention of it on that particular page.

However, the contentious part of my edit summary stands. While sources, such as Weinberg, do state so; I have read enough over the years that have stated otherwise. For example, after describing the general outline of what Overlord intended to achieve, the Canadian official history states "This great turning movement would bring the Allied line forward to the Seine on a 140-mile front. General Montgomery afterwards commented on the "academic" nature of forecasts in an operation of this magnitude. Nevertheless, the Allied planners had some hope, if not expectation, that their troops would reach the Seine and the Loire 90 days after the initial assault.43 This tentative forecast was closely connected with the administrative aspects of the planning." (Stacey, p. 84)

I was unable to locate any mention in the American official history Cross Channel Attack. The volume Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941-September 1944 echoes what Stacey states, all mention of D-Day+90 is in regards to logistical planning of who is going to have access to what port etc.

As i find additional sources, I will post. Regards, EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 16:30, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Here is a pre-D-day source: OUTLINE OF OPERATION OVERLORD [Note: This manuscript was prepared by the Historical Section of the G-4 of the Communications Zone, European Theater of Operations (COMZ, ETOUSA) as volume seven of its multi-volume manuscript organizational history. It was subsequently deposited at the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH; now US Army Center of Military History) for reference use by historians preparing the official history of the Army in World War II. It is typical of the kinds of detailed studies routinely acquired (as in this case) or carried out by the deployed historians during World War II. The original is on file in the Historical Manuscripts Collection (HMC) under file number 8-3.4 AA v.7

And here is the money quote: "Situation on D+90: By D+90, occupation of the lodgment area is complete. U.S. and British Forces are on the Seine River, First and Third Armies are abreast, and First Army Group has been established as has a Communications line. Our forces are prepared for further offensive operations."

I do not yet know the date of preparation but clearly it was prior to the invasion. Available on the US Army Center for Military History site: http://www.history.army.mil/index.html

DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:11, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for that. That link also includes an image I have been routing for: http://www.history.army.mil/documents/wwii/g4-ol/g4-OL-4.jpg I have seen this brought up on several occasions as the logistical and administration outline for Overlord, and the basis for the claim of the battle being envisioned for just 90 days.

Further digging has Ellis claim "...for it was never expected to reach the Seine in less than about three months" (Ellis, p. 78); this about the only comment I could so far find in regards to a timetable.

Further digging has the US logistic green book state, this "was to complete the mission announced in the OVERLORD plan-the establishment of the lodgment. This was expected to require three months (to D plus 90)." For possible further development of the article, it adds "The plan made an additional assumption which was to prove historically significant so far as logistic operations were concerned: a pause would probably be necessary upon the completion of the operation to permit the development of the administrative base in preparation for an advance beyond the Seine." (Ruppenthal, p. 189)

Likewise, further digging in cross-channel assault finds: "The Allied forces together would push to the Seine, securing the final lodgment area by about D plus 90 and completing the initial phase of Operation OVERLORD. The final stages of the operation were conceived and stated in these broad terms. The outlined scheme of maneuver and the timetables were not designed as tactical plans; they were frames of refrence for future planning, set forth primarily so that he men of the beginning should have some idea of the shape of the end, so that their thinking might be large and heir preparation adequate." Emphases added .(Harrison, p. 188).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 17:50, 14 March 2016 (UTC)

Not relevant to this discussion but - that map includes "FUSAG" - the First United States Army Group, (what in fact became the 12th Army Group) and while it includes US 3rd and 1st Armies, it also seems to include British XXX Corps. Interesting. DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:52, 14 March 2016 (UTC)