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File:Holodomor2.jpg
Child victim of the Holodomor

The Ukrainian famine (1932-1933) or Holodomor was one of the largest national catastrophes of the Ukrainian nation in modern history with direct loss of human life in the range of millions (estimates vary). While the famine in Ukraine was a part of a wider famine that also affected other regions of the USSR, the term Holodomor is specifically applied to the events that took place in territories populated by the ethnic Ukrainians.

Most modern scholars agree that the famine was caused by the policies of the Communist government of the Soviet Union under Stalin, rather than by natural reasons, and the Holodomor is sometimes referred to as the Ukrainian Genocide,[18] [19] [20] [21] implying that the Holodomor was engineered by the Soviets to specifically target the Ukrainian people in order to destroy the Ukrainian nation as a political factor and social entity.[1] While historians continue to disagree whether the policies that led to Holodomor fall under the legal definition of Genocide, numerous governments have officially recognized the Holodomor as such.

Etymology

The term Holodomor is derived from the Ukrainian expression 'Морити голодом' (moryty holodom), which means "to inflict death by hunger".

Causes and outcomes

A policy of collectivization of agriculture was introduced. Agriculture in Ukraine was substantially affected, but contrary to some myths, it did not proportionally impact Ukraine the most. In Ukraine, in the beginning of 1932, 69% of households were collectivized compared to 83% in Lower Volga [2]

At the same time, the "Twenty-Five Thousanders", industrial workers, mostly devoted Bolsheviks, were sent to help run the farms. In addition, they were to fight the increasing passive and active resistance to collectivisation by engaging in what was euphemistically referred to as "dekulakization": the arresting of 'kulaks' — allegedly well to do farmers who opposed the regime and withheld grain — and transferring kulak families to the Urals and Central Asia where they were to be placed in others sectors of the economy such as timber. [3] It is documented that around 300,000 Ukrainians out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930-31. [4] However, Ukrainians composed only 15% of the total 1.8 million relocated kulaks.

Collectivization proved to negatively affect agricultural output everywhere, but since Ukraine was the most productive area (over 50% of Imperial Russian wheat originated from Ukraine in the beginning of 20th century), the effects here were particularly dramatic.

File:Holodomor1.jpg
Passers-by no longer pay attention to the corpses of starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933.

As projections for agricultural production declined, so did collections by the state. For the 1932 harvest, it was planned that there would be 29.5 million tons in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain.[5] In fact, collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests [6]

USSR Grain production and collections, 1930-33 (million tons)
Year Production Collections Remainder Collections as % of production
1930 73-77 22.1 51-55 30.2-28.7
1931 57-65 22.8 34-43 40-35.1
1932 55-60 18.5 36.5-41.5 33.6-30.8
1933 70-77 22.7 47.3-54.3 32.4-29.5

On August 7, 1932, the Soviet government passed a decree that would impose the death penalty in the USSR for any theft of public property [22] [23] [24]. The scope of this law seemed wide, and included even the smallest appropriation of grain by peasants for personal use. However, it was not very firmly enforced and was substantially revised.

Politburo protocols reveal that secret decisions had later modified the original decree. On September 16, 1932, the Politburo approved a measure that specificially exempted small-scale theft of socialist property from the death penalty. It declared that "organizations and groupings destroying state, social, and cooperate property in an organized way by fires, explosions and mass destruction of property shall be sentenced to execution without weakening", and listed a number of cases in which "kulaks, former traders and other socially-alien persons" should suffer the death penalty. So-called "kulaks", whether members of a kolkhoz or not, who "organize or take part in the theft of kolkhos property and grain", should also be sentenced "to the death penalty without weakening." But "working individual peasants and collective farmers" who stole kolkhoz property and grain should be sentenced to ten years; the death penalty should be imposed only for "systematic theft of grain, sugar beet, animals, etc" [7]

When it became clear that the 1932 grain deliveries were not going to meet the expectations of the government, the decreased agricultural output was blamed on the "kulaks", "nationalists", and "Petluravites". According to a report of the head of the Supreme Court, by January, 15, 1933 as many as 103,000 people had been sentenced under the provisions of the August 7 decree. Of the 79,000 whose sentences were known to the Supreme Court, 4,880 had been sentenced to death, 26,086 to ten years' imprisonment and 48,094 to other sentences. Those sentenced to death were categorised primarily as kulaks; many of those sentenced to ten years were individual peasants who were not kulaks. [8]

A special commission headed by Vyacheslav Molotov was sent to Ukraine in order to execute the grain contingent.[25] On November 9, a secret decree urged Bolshevik police and repression forces to increase their "effectiveness". Molotov also ordered that if no grain remained in Ukrainian villages, all beets, potatoes, vegetables and any other food were to be confiscated.

On December 6, a new regulation was issued that imposed the following sanctions on Ukrainian villages: ban on supply of any goods or food to the villages, requisition of any food or grain found on site, ban of any trade, and, lastly, the confiscation of all financial resources.[26] Measures were undertaken to persecute upon the withholding or bargaining of grain. This was done frequently with the aid of 'shock brigades', which raided farms to collect grain. This was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.

The famine mostly affected the rural population. In comparison to the previous famine in the USSR during 1921–22, which was caused by drought, and the next one in 1947, the famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine was caused not by infrastructure breakdown, or war, but by deliberate political and administrative decisions (e.g., see [27]).

File:Holodomor3.jpg
Victim of the Holodomor

The result was disastrous. Within a few months, the Ukrainian countryside, one of the most fertile agricultural regions in the world, was the scene of a general famine. The Soviet government denied initial reports of the famine, and prevented foreign journalists from traveling in the region. Scholars who have conducted research in declassified archives have reported[28] "the Politburo and regional Party committees insisted that immediate and decisive action be taken in response to the famine such that 'conscientious farmers' not suffer, while district Party committees were instructed to supply every child with milk and decreed that those who failed to mobilize resources to feed the hungry or denied hospitalization to famine victims be prosecuted."

At the same time, however, the Soviet regime provided some aid to famine-stricken regions, poorly limiting the impact of the famine. Between February and July 1933 at least thirty-five Politburo decisions and Sovnarkom decrees selectively authorised issue of a total of only 320,000 tons of grain for food for 30 million people. [9]

Further evidence shows measures taken by the Soviet government to reduce famine. On April 6, 1933, Sholokhov, who lived in Vesenskii district, wrote at length to Stalin describing the famine conditions and urging him to provide grain. Stalin received the letter on April 15, and on April 16 the Politburo granted 700 tons of grain to the district. Stalin sent a telegram to Sholokhov "We will do everything required. Inform sieze of necessary help. State a figure." Sholkhov replied on the same day, and on April 22, the day on which Stalin received the second letter, Stalin scolded him, "You should have sent answer not by letter but by telegram. Time was wasted" [10]

Grain exports during 1932-1933 continued, however, even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930/31 there had been 5,832 thousand tons of grains exported. In 1931/32, grain exports declined to 4,786 thousand tons. In 1932/1933, grain exports were just 1,607 thousand tons and in 1933/34, this further declined to 1,441 thousand tons. [11]

Poor weather played a substantial role in the famine according to revisionist scholars. [12] Russia and parts of Ukraine suffered from fairly regular droughts, which significantly reduced crop yields. The fluctuations in the annual level of temperature and rainfall on the territory of the USSR are greater than in major grain-producing areas elsewhere in the world. The weather pattern is highly continental, and is complicated by the frequent and irregular dry winds which blow from Central Asia across the Volga region, North Caucuses, and Ukraine in the growing months of late spring and early sumer. Morever, the critical unsufficiency of humidity makes a large territory particularly susceptible to drought, resulting in high temperatures and low rainfall. The weather was largely responsible for the above-average yield over the whole five years 1909-13. In 1925-29 the weather was only slightly worse than average. But in 1930-34 the weather was poorer than usual over the five years, with particularly bad conditions in 1931 and 1932. This was a factor over which the Soviet government had no immediate control. [13]

In 1925-29, the weather was favourable; the only break in the years of fine weather came in 1927. Then weather in 1930 was excellent. In 1931, however, this good luck came to an end. The spring weather was much colder than usual; and June was warmer, and July much hotter than usual. The cold spring and hot July were a deadly combination. The cold spring delayed the sowing and hence the whole development of grain. The grain reached its vulnerable flowering stage later than normal, coinciding with the hot July weather. And from June the southeast suffered what what is known as as a sukhovei (literally, dry wind). In May-July, the normal weather pattern in the Volga and Ukraine was that the warm, dry, southeasterly winds from Kazakhstan gave way to colder and wetter winds from the northwest. But about once in every ten or twelve years the southeasterlies predominated throughout these months, the winds became scorching, no rain fell, and the earth became parched. At these times, grain yields fell significantly and there was a risk of famine if reserve stocks of grain were not available. These dry winds brought famine in 1891 and 1921. In 1906, massive government assistance largely alleviated the problem. The drought, which had begun in West Siberia in May, spread to the Volga regions in June and July. A huge defecit in rainfall was accompanied by temperatures much higher than average in these regions as well as Ukraine. [14]

For 1931, the spring sowing was considerably delayed. Virtually no sowing took place in March and in April it was delayed by nearly three weeks. The delay in Ukraine and Lower Volga was caused primarily by the unusually cold weather. In other areas, excessive rain also added to the problems and made it difficult to catch up. A report from the Lower Volga noted: "After a short improvement another rainy spell has begun. Mass sowing in the southern districts of the region is taking place in a struggle with the weather. Literally every hour and every day have to be grabbed for sowing." The people's commissar for agriculture stated that the delay of two-three weeks had been caused by the "very difficult meteorological and climatic conditions of the spring". [15]

Natural calamities had descended on regions particularly the Central and Lower Volga in 1931. In August, the agricultural newspaper published numerous references to the exceptionally rainy weather which had delayed harvesting and damaged harvested grain which had not been stacked. It was later reported that in the Central Volga the burning of the ripening grain by the hot drought had been followed during the weeks of harvesting by enough rain for three harvests. On the right bank of the Volga, large quantities of wet grain had been spoiled. There were reports of warm, dry weather had set in from Mid-May 1931 and that exceptionally high temperatures were recorded in many parts of Ukraine, North Caucuses, Lower Volga, and Kazakhstan. For the USSR as a whole they were higher than average. [16]

In Ukraine, the temperature was considerably lower during the whole of March 1932 than in the previous year. At the end of May and in early June temperatures were even higher than in 1931. Then there was a sudden change: high rainfall was experienced in most of the USSR, especially in the Kiev region. Temperatures were less severe than in 1931, but the combination of high temperatures in the initial flowering stage and great humidity during early flowering greatly increased the vulnerability of the crop. [17]

Another major factor in the decline of the harvests were the shortage of draught power for ploughing and reaping was even more acute in 1932 than in the previous year. The number of working horses declined from 19.5 million on July 1, 1931 to 16.2 million on July 1, 1932. The desperate efforts to replace horses by tractors failed to compensate for this loss. In 1931, the total supply of tractors to agriculture amounted to 964,000 h.p., 393,000 produced at home, and 578,000 imported. But in 1932, because of the foreign trade crisis, no tractors at all were imported.[18] In the whole of 1932, only 679,000 tractor horse-power were supplied to agriculture, considerably less than in 1931. Only about half became available in time for the harvest, and even less in time for the spring sowing. Animal draught power deteriorated in quality. Horses were fed and maintaned even more inadequately than in the previous year. [19] The acute shortage of horses led to the nortorious decision to employ cows as working animals. On February 23, the Lower Volga party bureau decided to use 200,000 cows for special field work. The following shows the amount of horses in the USSR [20]:

Horses in USSR
Year All Horses(thousands)
1930 30237
1931 26247
1932 19368
1933 16579
1934 15664

To further prevent the spread of information about the famine, travel from Ukraine and some Don regions - was especifically forbidden by directives of January 22 1933 (signed by Molotov and Stalin) and of January 23 1933 (joint directive VKP(b) Central Committee and Sovnarkom). The directives stated that the travels "for bread" from these areas were organized by enemies of the Soviet power with the purpose of agitation in northern areas of the USSR against kolkhozes. Therefore railway tickets were to be sold only by ispolkom permits, and those who managed to travel northwards should be arrested. [21]

Estimation of the loss of life

While the course of the events as well as their underlying reasons are still a matter of debate, the fact that by the end of 1933, millions of people had died from factors relating to malnutrition in the USSR is undisputed. The Soviet Union long objected to the reports of famine.

The Russian archives have shown that excess deaths in Ukraine numbered 1.54 million [22] In 1932-1933, there were a combined 1.2 million cases of typhus and 500 thousand cases of typhoid fever. Others, contrary to the declassified demographic reports, have put forth 2.5 million (Volodymyr Kubiyovych) and 4.8 million (Vasyl Hryshko). Deaths resulted primarily from manifold diseases due to lowered resistance and disease in general rather than actual starvation [23] All major types of disease, apart from cancer, tend to increase during famine as a result of undernourishment resulting in lower resistance to disease, and of insanitary conditions. In the years 1932-34, the largest rate of increase was recorded for typhus. Typhus is spread by lice. In conditions of harvest failure and increased poverty, the number of lice is likely to increase, and the herding of refugees at railway stations, on trains and elsewhere facilitates their spread. In 1933, the number of recorded cases was twenty times the 1929 level, which was the lowest number of cases ever recorded in the Russian Empire and the USSR until that year. The number of cases per head of population recorded in Ukraine in 1933 was naturally considerably higher than in the USSR as a whole. But by June of 1933, incidence in Ukraine had increased to nearly ten times the January level and was higher than in the rest of hte USSR taken as a whole. [24]

Incidence of Disease in Russian Empire and USSR
Year Typhus Typhoid Fever Relapsing Fever Smallpox Malaria
1913 120 424 30 67 3600
1918-22 1300 293 639 106 2940

(average)

1929 40 170 6 8 3000
1930 60 190 5 10 2700
1931 80 260 4 30 3200
1932 220 300 12 80 4500
1933 800 210 12 38 6500
1934 410 200 10 16 9477
1935 120 140 6 4 9924
1936 100 120 3 .5 6500

Modern calculation that use demographic data including those available from formerly closed Soviet archives narrow demographic losses from rising deaths from falling births to about 3.2 million or, allowing for the lack of the data precision, 3 to 3.5 million.[25][26][27][28] Of these 3 to 3.5 million "losses", 1.54 million were due to excess deaths. [29] The following calculation is presented by Stanislav Kulchytsky.[25] The declassified Soviet statistics show a decrease of 538 thousand people in the population of Soviet Ukraine between 1926 census (28,925,976) and 1937 census (28,388,000). The number of births and deaths (in thousands) according to the declassified records is:

Year Births Deaths Natural change
1927 1184 523 662
1928 1139 496 643
1929 1081 539 542
1930 1023 536 485
1931 975 515 460
1932 982 668 114
1933 471 1850 -1379
1934 571 483 88
1935 759 342 417
1936 895 361 534

According to the correction for officially non-accounted child mortality in 1933[30] by 150 thousand calculated by Serhiy Maksudov, the number of births for 1933 should be increased from 471 thousand to 621 thousand. Assuming the natural mortality rates in 1933 to be equal to the average annual mortality rate in 1927-1930 (524 thousand per year) a natural population growth for 1933 would have been 97 thousand, which is five times less than this number in the past years (1927-1930). A major hurdle in estimating the human losses due to famine is the needed to take into account the numbers involved in migration (including forced resettlement). According to the Soviet statistics, the migration balance for the population in Ukraine for 1927 - 1936 period was a loss of 1,343 thousand people.

According to estimates[31] about 81.3% of the victims were ethnic Ukrainians, 4.5% Russians, 1.4% Jews and 1.1% were Poles. Also many Belarusians, Hungarians, Volga Germans and Crimea Tatars became victims of Holodomor.

Elimination of Ukrainian cultural elite

The famine of 1932-33 fit well into the politics of assault on the elitist intelligentsia of Ukraine. At the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moscow's plenipotentiary Postyshev declared that "1933 was the year of the defeat of Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution."[32] This defeat referred to the repression of Ukrainian intelligenti and clergy.

By the end of the 1930s, approximately four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural elite had been "eliminated".[33] Some, like Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy, committed suicide. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Mykola Skrypnyk, witnessing the results of his cooperation with Moscow, shot himself in the summer of 1933. The Communist Party of Ukraine, under the guidance of state officials like Kaganovich, Kosior, and Postyshev, boasted in early 1934 of the elimination of "counter-revolutionaries, nationalists, spies and class enemies". Whole academic organizations, such as the Bahaliy Institute of History and Culture, were shut down following the arrests.

In the 1920s, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church had gained a significant following amongst the Ukrainian peasants. Mass arrests of the hierarchy and clergy of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church culminated in the liquidation of the church in 1930. Thousands of priests were tortured, executed and sent to labor camps in Siberia and the Far North.

However, this repression of elitist sectors occurred in virtually all parts of the USSR. Furthermore, there is not any credible evidence that the repression of Ukrainian elitists was accompanied by restrictions of cultural expression. In 1935-36, 83% of all school children in the Ukrainian SSR were taught in Ukrainian even though Ukrainians were about 80% of the population. [29].

Was the Holodomor genocide?

Cover of the Soviet magazine Kolhospnytsia Ukrayiny ("Collective Farm Woman of Ukraine") dating December 1932

The inventor of the term "genocide", Raphael Lemkin was a featured speaker at the manifestation of Ukrainian-Americans in September 1953 to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the famine.[1] Today, the heads of state, governments or parliaments of 26 countries, consider the 1932-1933 famine as an act of genocide. Among them Ukraine, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, United States, and Vatican City. Most revisionist scholars today see the famine as a policy blunder that affected millions belonging to other nationalities. [30]

Robert Conquest, the author of one of the most important Western studies published prior to the declassifying of the the Soviet archives, concluded that the famine of 1932–33 was artificial—that is a deliberate mass murder, if not genocide committed as part of Joseph Stalin's collectivization program under the Soviet Union. In fact in 2006, the SBU declassified more than 5 thousand pages of Holodomor archives. These documents show that Moscow singled out Ukraine, while regions outside it were allowed to receive humanitarian aid.[31] The term Ukrainian Genocide is often used in application to the event, technically, the use of the term "genocide" is inapplicable.[1] Western scholars such as Wheatcroft argue that since the famine did not affect cities, and was limited to rural areas of Ukraine, it is not plausible to argue that the government tried to destroy the Ukrainian people as such. It has been suggested that the Holodomor be classified not as genocide, but as democide.[citation needed]

In controversy, the term democide, introduced by the academic R.J. Rummel is "the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder".[34] That the rural population (in 1932 75% to 85% of Ukrainians resided in villages) does not represent the whole nation, what terminology to use for the designation of an event that led to the extermination of roughly one quarter of the population of the former Soviet republic of the Ukraine in 1932-1933, as well as the dispute to what extent the Soviet government deliberately aggravated the famine are the arguments that are often used for confrontation and politicization of the tragedy.[32]

According to the US Government Commission on the Ukrainian Famine ([35]) the seizure of the 1932 crop by the Soviet authorities was the main reason of the famine. The US commission stated that "while famine took place during the 1932-1933 agricultural year in the Volga Basin and the North Caucasus Territory as a whole, the invasiveness of Stalin's interventions of both the Fall of 1932 and January 1933 in Ukraine are paralleled only in the ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region of the North Caucasus". However, it is also notable that 20% of Ukraine's population at the time consisted of nationalities other than Ukrainian.

At the international conference of the Ukrainian Holodomor, which was held in October 2003 at the Institute of Social and Religious History of Vicenza, 28 conference participants that included the well-respected historians like James Mace, Hubert Laszkiewicz, Andrea Graziosi, Yuriy Shapoval, Gerhard Simon, Orest Subtelny, Mauro Martini; etc. - endorsed a resolution addressed to the Italian government and the European Parliament with a request to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.[33][36].

Politicization of the famine

The famine remains a politically charged topic and hence heated debates are likely to continue for a long time. Until around 1990, the debates were largely among the so called "denial camp" who refused to recognize the very existence of the famine or stated that it was caused by natural reasons (such as poor harvest), scholars who accepted reports of famine but saw it as a policy blunder[34] followed by the botched relief effort, and scholars who alleged that it was intentional and specifically anti-Ukrainian or even an act of genocide against the Ukrainians as a nation.

Nowadays, most scholars tend to agree that the famine affected millions. While it is also accepted that the famine affected other nationalities, as well as Ukrainians, the debate is still ongoing whether the Holodomor qualifies as the act of Genocide since either Famine itself or that it was unnatural is not disputed. As far as the possible effect of the natural reasons, the debate is restricted to whether the poor harvest[37] or post-traumatic stress, played any role at all and in what degree the Soviet actions were caused by the country's economic and military needs as viewed by the Soviet leadership.[38]

Nowadays, the Holodomor issue is politicized within the framework of uneasy relations between Russia and Ukraine (and also between various regional and social groups within Ukraine). The anti-Russian factions in Ukraine have vested interest in advancing the interpretation that the Holodomor was a genocide, perpertrated by Russia-centric interests within the Soviet government. Russian political interests and their supporters in Ukraine have reasons to deny the deliberate character of the disaster and play down its scale.

The Ukrainian communities are sometimes criticized for using the term Holodomor, Ukrainian Genocide, or even Ukrainian Holocaust, to appropriate the larger-scale tragedy of collectivization as their own national terror-famine, thus exploiting it for political purposes.[32]

One of the biggest arguments is that the famine was preceded by the onslaught on the Ukrainian national culture, a common historical detail preceding many centralized actions directed against the nations as a whole. Nationwide, the political repressions of 1937 under the guidance of Nikolay Yezhov were known for their ferocity and ruthlessness, but Lev Kopelev wrote, "In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933", referring to the comparatively early beginning of the Soviet crackdown in Ukraine. [39].

While the famine was well documented at the time, its reality has been disputed due to the ideological reasons, such as by the Soviet government and its spokespeople (as well as apologists of the Soviet regime), by others due to being deliberately misled by the Soviet government (such as George Bernard Shaw), and in at least one case, Walter Duranty, for personal gain.

An example of a late-era Holodomor objector is Canadian journalist Douglas Tottle, author of Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (1987). Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst, to justify a German invasion. Tottle is not a professional historian and his revisionist work did not receive any serious attention in the historiography of the subject.

On May 15, 2003, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine passed a resolution declaring the famine of 1932–1933 an act of genocide, deliberately organized by the Soviet government against the Ukrainian nation. Governments and parliaments of several other countrieshave also officially recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide.[40] [41] [42] [43] [35]

Remembrance

To honor those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide. The fourth Saturday in November is the official day of remembrace for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repressions.[36]

In 2006, the day of remembrace is November 25th. President Viktor Yushchenko directed, in decree No. 868/2006, to observe a minute of silence at 4 o'clock in the afternoon on that Saturday. Flags in Ukraine should fly at half-mast as a sign of mourning. In addition, entertainment events are to be restricted and television-radio programming adjusted accordingly.[37]

2006

29 October, 2006 - In Paris, about 2000 people honored the 72 anniversary of the artificial famine. Kateryna Yushchenko, politicians and diplomatic representatives attended the remembrance event of millions who died in the Holodomor.[38]

18 November, 2006 - The annual commemorative observance of Ukraine's man-made famine took place at St. Patrick’s Cathedral in New York City.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ Potocki, p. 320.
  2. ^ ibid, p. 321.
  3. ^ Serczyk, p. 311.
  4. ^ E.g. Encyclopedia Britannica, "History of Ukraine" article.
  5. ^ Rajca, p. 77.
  6. ^ Davies, Wheatcroft, pp. 424-5
  7. ^ Tauger 1991 [44] and the acrimonious exchange between Tauger and Conquest [45] [46].

References

  1. ^ a b c Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). "Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932-1933 Genocide?". Journal of Genocide Research. 1 (2): 147–156.
  2. ^ Stephen Wheatcroft Wheatcroft and RW Davies, Soviet Agriculture: 1931-33, Years of Hunger, Palgrave MacMillan, 2004 p.487
  3. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies
  4. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies p.490
  5. ^ Wheatroft and Davies, p. 448
  6. ^ ibid
  7. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, pp.167-168, 198-203
  8. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.198.
  9. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, pg.214
  10. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p. 217
  11. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.471
  12. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p 51, 53, 61-63, 66, 68, 70, 73-76, 109, 119-23, 131, 231, 239, 260, 269, 271n, 400, 439, 458-9
  13. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.439
  14. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.69
  15. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, pp.119-23
  16. ^ ibid,
  17. ^ ibid
  18. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.111
  19. ^ ibid
  20. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, pg.449
  21. ^ Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939., Ithaca. N.I., 2001, p. 306
  22. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.415
  23. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.429
  24. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies, p.512
  25. ^ a b Stanislav Kulchytsky, "How many of us perished in Holodomor in 1933", Zerkalo Nedeli, November 23-29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
  26. ^ Stalislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book" Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  27. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, "Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 4-10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
  28. ^ Stalislav Kuchytsky, "Demographic lossed in Ukrainian in the twentieth century", Zerkalo Nedeli, October 2-8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  29. ^ Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment
  30. ^ J.Arch Getty, "The Future Did Not Work", The Atlantic Monthly, Boston: March 2000, Vol. 285, Iss.3, pg.113
  31. ^ SBU documents show that Moscow singled out Ukraine in famine 5tv - Ukraine Channel Five. 22 November 2006. Retrieved 23 November 2006.
  32. ^ a b "I am not saying that the famine or the other components of the victimization narratives do not deserve historical research and reflection, nor that evil should be ignored, nor that the memory of the dead should not be held sacred. But I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim of generating political and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when “our own” evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others’ dead is not held sacred."[1] Himka, John-Paul. "War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of the Ukrainian Diaspora". Spaces of Identity. 5 (1): 5–24. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help); line feed character in |title= at position 62 (help)
  33. ^ [http://www.aisu.it/convegni/vicenza.pdf Convegno internazionale di studi La grande carestia, la fame e la morte della terra nell'Ucraina del 1932-33
  34. ^ J.Arch Getty, "The Future Did Not Work", The Atlantic Monthly, Boston: March 2000, Vol. 285, Iss.3, pg.113
  35. ^ Countries whose government recognize Holodomor as Genocide are Argentina [2], Australia [3] [4], Azerbaijan [5], Belgium [6], Canada [7], Estonia [8], Georgia [9], Hungary [10], Italy [11], Latvia [12], Lithuania [13], Moldova [14], Poland [15], United States [16] and the Vatican [17]
  36. ^ Bradley, Lara. "Ukraine's 'Forced Famine' Officially Recognized. The Sundbury Star. 3 January 1999. URL Accessed 12 October 2006
  37. ^ Yushchenko, Viktor. Decree No. 868/2006 by President of Ukraine. Regarding the Remembrance Day in 2006 for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repressions Template:Uk icon
  38. ^ World News Briefs. The Day. 1 November 2006. URL Accessed: 1 November 2006
  1. ^ US House of Representatives Authorizes Construction of Ukrainian Genocide Monument
  2. ^ Statement by Pope John Paul II on the 70th anniversary of the Famine
  3. ^ HR356 "Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932-1933", U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003
  4. ^ U.S. Congress Library Exhibit on Ukrainian Famine, "Resolution Of The Council Of People's Commissars Of The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic And Of The Central Committee Of The Communist Party (Bolshevik) Of Ukraine On Blacklisting Villages That Maliciously Sabotage The Collection Of Grain", December 6, 1932.
  5. ^ Dana G. Dalrymple, "The Soviet famine of 1932-1934" [47] in Soviet Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Jan., 1964). Pages 250-284.
  6. ^ Robert Conquest, "The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine" (Chapter 16: "The Death Roll" [48]), University of Alberta Press, 1986.
  7. ^ Template:En icon Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933" in Slavic Review 50 No 1, Spring 1991, pp. 70-89
  8. ^ Template:En icon Letters of Mark Tauger and Robert Conquest in Slavic Review 51 No 1, pp. 192-4
  9. ^ Template:En icon Letters of Mark Tauger and Robert Conquest in Slavic Review 53 No 1, pp. 318-9
  10. ^ Template:En icon David Marples, "Debating the undebatable? Ukraine Famine of 1932-1933" in Edmonton Journal, June 28, 2002.
  11. ^ Robert Potocki, "Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930-1939" (in Polish, English summary), Lublin 2003, ISBN 83-917615-4-1
  12. ^ Template:Pl icon Władysław A. Serczyk, "Historia Ukrainy", 3rd ed., Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, Wrocław 2001, ISBN 83-04-04530-3
  13. ^ Andrew Gregorovich, "Genocide in Ukraine 1933", part 4: "How Did Stalin Organize the Genocide?" [49], Ukrainian Canadian Research & Documentation Centre, Toronto 1998.
  14. ^ U.S. Commission on the Ukraine Famine, "Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine" [50], Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., April 19 1988
  15. ^ Dr. Otto Schiller, "Famine's Return to Russia, Death and Depopulation in Wide Areas of the Grain Country" [51], The Daily Telegraph, 25 August, 1933, as well as British Diplomatic Reports on the Ukrainian Famine.
  16. ^ "12th Congress of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, Stenograph Record", Kharkiv 1934.
  17. ^ Miron Dolot, "Execution by Hunger. A Hidden Holocaust", New York 1985, ISBN 0-393-01886-5
  18. ^ Sergei Maksudov, "Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR 1918–1958", in The Samizdat Register II, ed R. Medvedev (London–New York 1981)
  19. ^ R.W. Davies & Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture 1931-33", Palgrave 2004.
  20. ^ Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,. ISBN 0-8020-5809-6.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
  21. ^ Czesław Rajca, "Głód na Ukrainie", Werset, Lublin/Toronto 2005, ISBN 83-60133-04-2
  22. ^ James Mace, "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine" in "Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933", p. 1-14, Edmonton 1986
  23. ^ Ярослав Грицак (Jarosław Hrycak), "Historia Ukrainy 1772-1999. Narodziny nowoczesnego narodu", Lublin 2000, ISBN 83-85854-50-9, available online in Ukrainian language
  24. ^ Yuri Shapoval, "The famine-genocide of 1932-1933 in Ukraine", Kashtan Press, Ontario 2005, ISBN 1-896354-38-6 (a collection of source documents)
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