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Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and China's religious community. In 1996, concerned with Falun Gong's popularity, several Buddhist journals had labelled Falun Gong a "heretical sect" that was turning Buddhists away from the "orthodox religion."<ref name="Penny2005">Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, ''Asian Studies Review'' March 2005, Vol 29, pp.35-46.</ref><ref name=palmer.fever262>Palmer (2007), p. 262</ref>
Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and China's religious community. In 1996, concerned with Falun Gong's popularity, several Buddhist journals had labelled Falun Gong a "heretical sect" that was turning Buddhists away from the "orthodox religion."<ref name="Penny2005">Penny, Benjamin, “The Falun Gong, Buddhism and ‘Buddhist qigong’”, ''Asian Studies Review'' March 2005, Vol 29, pp.35-46.</ref><ref name=palmer.fever262>Palmer (2007), p. 262</ref>


Major Chinese newspapers published articles critical of Falun Gong. On June 17, 1996, a week after Zhuan Falun, volume II, was listed as no.10 bestseller at a Beijing book market, the ''Guangming Daily,'' criticised Falun Gong.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref><ref name=Ownbyfuture>David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press</ref> The author wrote that the history of humanity is a "struggle between science and superstition," calling on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers."<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref> The article cited Zhuan Falun as an example of the rising number of publications ridden with "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin) and "pseudoscience" (wei kexue).<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}} After the Guangming Daily article had set off a wave of press criticism, with twenty major newspapers also issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, the Central Propaganda Department banned publication of Falun Gong books on July 24.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref>
The rapid rise and influence of Falun Gong had received little journalistic attention, but by mid-1996, articles critical of Falun Gong began to appear. This was a sign that China’s media and ideological establishment were considering Falun Gong’s influence on society, according to communications professor Zhao Yuezhi.<ref name="zhao"/> On June 17, 1996, a week after Zhuan Falun, volume II, was listed as no.10 bestseller at a Beijing book market, the ''Guangming Daily,'' criticised Falun Gong.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref><ref name=Ownbyfuture>David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (2008) Oxford University Press</ref> The author wrote that the history of humanity is a "struggle between science and superstition," calling on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers."<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref> The article cited Zhuan Falun as an example of the rising number of publications ridden with "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin) and "pseudoscience" (wei kexue).<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}} After the Guangming Daily article had set off a wave of press criticism, with twenty major newspapers also issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, the Central Propaganda Department banned publication of Falun Gong books on July 24.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p 249</ref>


Until this juncture, Falun Gong had successfully negotiated the space between science and native tradition in the public representation of its teachings, avoiding any suggestion of superstition.<ref name=jensen>Edward L. Davis, Encyclopedia of contemporary Chinese culture, Falun Gong (by Lionel M. Jensen), pp. 251-263</ref> Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to ''Guangming Daily'' and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated [[Hu Yaobang]]'s 1982 'Triple No' directive.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p. 249</ref> Li emphasised that activism to defend Falun Gong was an essential aspect of Dafa cultivation, and, according to David Palmer, adjunct professor of anthropology and religious studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, "would separate the false disciples from the true ones."<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), pg249f</ref> These attempts were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong. Falun Gong books remained officially proscribed, however.
Until this juncture, Falun Gong had successfully negotiated the space between science and native tradition in the public representation of its teachings, avoiding any suggestion of superstition.<ref name=jensen>Edward L. Davis, Encyclopedia of contemporary Chinese culture, Falun Gong (by Lionel M. Jensen), pp. 251-263</ref> Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to ''Guangming Daily'' and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated [[Hu Yaobang]]'s 1982 'Triple No' directive.<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), p. 249</ref> Li emphasised that activism to defend Falun Gong was an essential aspect of Dafa cultivation, and, according to David Palmer, adjunct professor of anthropology and religious studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, "would separate the false disciples from the true ones."<ref name=palmer.fever249>Palmer (2007), pg249f</ref>


Falun Gong practitioners were not the only victims of the state media's symbolic violence, nor the only group to protest, but theirs was the most mobilised and steadfast response.<ref name="zhao"/> Many of the attempts for positive, or non-negative portrayal, were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong. Falun Gong books remained officially proscribed, however.
⚫
In June 1998, Tianjin professor [[He Zuoxiu]] appeared on a [[Beijing Television]] talk show, and openly disparaged ''qigong'' groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.<ref name=smith2>{{cite web |first=Craig S. |last=Smith |title=Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Communist Leaders |page=1 |work=Wall Street Journal |date=26 April 1999 |url=http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 }}c/o third party link</ref> The lobbying from practitioners generated significant results - the reporter responsible for the show was fired, and a program broadcasting content favourable to Falun Gong was aired a few days later.<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}}<ref name="spie">{{cite book|last=Human Right Watch|coauthors=M Spiegel|title=Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong|location=New York|year=2001|page=9|accessdate=2009-12-15}}</ref> According to Ownby, the protest at the TV station was "an act of considerable audacity."<ref name=Ownby2008 /> The demonstrations happened 14 other media outlets.<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}} The Beijing Television incident resulted in directives from authorities to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of the [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989]].<ref name=smith2/>

⚫
In June 1998, Tianjin professor [[He Zuoxiu]] appeared on a [[Beijing Television]] talk show, and openly disparaged ''qigong'' groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.<ref name=smith2>{{cite web |first=Craig S. |last=Smith |title=Revered by Millions, a Potent Mystic Rattles China's Communist Leaders |page=1 |work=Wall Street Journal |date=26 April 1999 |url=http://www.tibet.ca/en/newsroom/wtn/archive/old?y=1999&m=5&p=5_3 }}c/o third party link</ref> The lobbying from practitioners led to the reporter responsible being fired, and a program broadcasting content favourable to Falun Gong aired a few days later.<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}}<ref name="spie">{{cite book|last=Human Right Watch|coauthors=M Spiegel|title=Dangerous meditation: China's campaign against Falungong|location=New York|year=2001|page=9|accessdate=2009-12-15}}</ref> According to Ownby, the protest at the TV station was "an act of considerable audacity."<ref name=Ownby2008 /> The demonstrations happened 14 other media outlets.<ref name="Jude Howell" />{{rp|215}} The Beijing Television incident resulted in directives from authorities to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of the [[Tiananmen Square protests of 1989]].<ref name=smith2/>


===Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests===
===Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests===

Revision as of 22:42, 29 March 2010

Falun Gong
The Falun Dafa emblem
Traditional Chinese法輪功
Simplified Chinese法轮功
Literal meaningPractice of the Wheel of Law
Falun Dafa
Traditional Chinese法輪大法
Simplified Chinese法轮大法
Literal meaningGreat Law of the Wheel of Law

Falun Gong (alternatively Falun Dafa) is a system of beliefs and practices founded in China by Li Hongzhi in 1992. The practice emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom" in the early 1990s as a form of qigong. Falun Gong differs from competing qigong schools through its absence of daily rituals of worship,[1] its greater emphasis on morality, and the theological nature of its teachings.[2][3] While the Chinese Communist Party has declared Falun Gong to be an "evil cult" since 1999, Western academics have described Falun Gong either as a new religious movement (NRM), a "spiritual movement" based on the teachings of its founder[4], or a "cultivation system", the latter having been a feature of Chinese life for at least 2500 years.[5] Falun Gong places a heavy emphasis on morality in its central tenets - Truthfulness, Compassion, and Forbearance (Chinese: 真、善、忍).[6] Its teachings are derived[7] from qigong, Buddhist and Taoist concepts, and draw upon modern science.[5][8][9]

The movement grew rapidly in China between 1992 and 1999. Government sources indicated that there may have been as many as 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in the country by 1998.[10] Its rapid growth generated attention from Chinese journalists, skeptics, scientists, and religious institutions,[1][11]. Falun Gong responded to its critics through protests and lobbying aimed at minimizing negative publicity for the practice.[1] In April 1999, after one such protest in Tianjin, some 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners gathered at Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest, while their representatives reportedly negotiated with government representatives.[12][13][14]

In July 1999, the Chinese government banned Falun Gong through a crackdown and began a large propaganda campaign against the practice.[7][15][16] Between 1999 and 2004, human rights groups reported that Falun Gong practitioners in China were subject to a wide range of human rights abuses.[17] Falun Gong practitioners continue to levy charges against the Chinese government by lobbying Western governments and spreading information about the persecution in public places, highlighting that its practitioners have been subject to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, organ harvesting, forced labour, and torture under the hands of the Communist Party of China.[18][19][20] Falun Gong practitioners have since founded media-outlets such as the Epoch Times, NTDTV and the Shen Yun Performing Arts as channels to publicize their cause and criticize the Chinese government, and the group has emerged as a notable force in opposing the Communist Party and its policies.[21] Falun Gong websites claim there are over 100 million practitioners of Falun Dafa in "114 countries and regions around the world".[22]

Beliefs and teachings

Main article: Teachings of Falun Gong
Practising the fifth exercise of Falun Dafa in Thailand.

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi (李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Its teachings cover spiritual, religious, mystical and metaphysical topics while promising health benefits to the practitioner and places heavy emphasis on morality.[attribution needed] The three central tenets of the Falun Gong system, as articulated by founder Li Hongzhi, are 'Truthfulness' (眞), 'Compassion' (善), and 'Forbearance' (忍). Together, these three ideas are regarded as the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos — an omnipresent nature that permeates and encompasses everything. In the process of cultivation, practitioners are supposed to assimilate themselves to these qualities by letting go of "attachments and notions," thus returning to the "original, true self." In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi said that "As a practitioner, if you assimilate yourself to this characteristic [sic], you are one that has attained the Tao."

Falun Gong is an introductory book that discusses qigong, which introduces the aforementioned principles and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises involved in Falun Gong practice. The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun (轉法輪),[23] published in late 1994. According to the texts, Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) is a "complete system of mind-body cultivation practice" (修煉).[24]

Falun Gong presents itself as a virtuous form of self-cultivation which draws on Oriental mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid knowledge system.[attribution needed] Yuezhi Zhao, professor in the University of California, describes it as a "quasi-religious fundamentalist movement with apparent conservative sensibilities"—where the religious facet is covered by the Taoist and Buddhist influences; the conservative facet is its resistance to the "prevailing pursuit of... the entire value system associated with the project of modernization". Spiritually, it claims supernatural powers, health and longevity, yet it borrows the language of modern science in representing its cosmic laws. Zhao says that Falun Gong is a "multi-faceted and totalizing movement that means different things to different people.. from physical exercise... to a moral philosophy...and a knowledge system". Practitioners, which include doctorate holders from prestigious American universities, see it as "a new form of science."[25]

According to Kai-Ti Chou, traditional Chinese cultural thought and modernity are clearly two main focuses in Li Hongzhi's teaching. From the angle of traditional Chinese cultural thought, Falun Gong's reinterpretation allows adherents to build a link with their life-experiences on the basis of their existing knowledge. Li criticises the "blindness and arrogance" of modern science, and offers his own vision of reality apart from the modern scientific epistemology.[26]

Craig Burgdoff notes that while Li may emphasise millenial themes, the organizational structure of Falun Gong works against totalistic control, with no hierarchy in place to enforce orthodoxy and little or no emphasis upon dogmatic discipline. There is no "official" membership, and practitioners are free to participate as much or as little as they like without censure, Burgdoff says. There is no attempt to isolate practitioners from society, and no manipulation of sexuality or finances other than emphasizing the need for strict moral behavior. "In my positive experience of Falun Gong, I have found practitioners to be engaged seriously in a highly disciplined spiritual and ethical practice."[27]

Theoretical background

Qigong refers to a wide variety of traditional "cultivation" practices that involve movement and/or regulated breathing designed to be therapeutic. Qigong is practiced for health maintenance purposes, as a therapeutic intervention, as a medical profession, a spiritual path, or a component of Chinese martial arts. In contrast to attitudes in the West, where many may believe that qigong is a socially neutral, subjective, New Age-style concept incapable of scientific proof, a segment of China's scientific establishment regards qi as a scientific concept. Controlled experiments by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, "actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration."[28]

Falun Gong also incorporates Buddhist and Taoist ideas[29], and its teaching tap into a wide array of Chinese qigong phenomena and cultural heritage.[30] It represents an indigenous spiritual, moral, and health movement opposite to "Marxism with Chinese characteristics," according to Sumner B. Twiss.[31]

History

Main article: History of Falun Gong
File:UNGenevaFalunDafaLecture.jpg
Li Hongzhi lectures on Falun Dafa at the UN General Assembly Hall, Geneva, 1998

Falun Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi. Chinese authorities assert that he was a former army trumpet player and grain clerk at the Changchun Cereals Company.[32] While in his spiritual biography, Li Hongzhi claims that he was taught ways of "cultivation practice" (xiulian) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist traditions, including Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, a Taoist master from age eight to twelve, and a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist from the Changbai Mountains. Li also claimed numerous supernatural feats, including invisibility, levitation, and weather modification.[33]

Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public in May 1992, in Changchun, Jilin.[34] Early versions of Zhuan Falun stated that the system was tested extensively in the years prior to its introduction;[33] later, as part of the anti-Falun Gong media campaign, the Chinese government asserted that Falun Gong was based on existing Qigong systems, namely Chanmi Gong and Jiugong Bagua Gong.[35] Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. During this time he was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations[36][37] According to David Ownby, Professor of History and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Université de Montréal, neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning.[38] Li became an "instant star of the qigong movement," and the movement enjoyed success and rapid growth.[38]

File:PrePersecutionFalunDafaPracticeinChina.jpg
Group practice in China in July 1999

Li made his lectures more widely accessible and affordable in later years, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books.[14] On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China.[14] In the face of Falun Gong's rise in popularity, a large part of which was attributed to its low cost, competing qigong masters accused Li of unfair business practices. According to Schechter, the qigong society under which Li and other qigong masters belonged asked Li to hike his tuition, but Li refused.[14] By 1995, Falun Gong had established, according to Lowe, a clear advantage over alternative qigong groups in its emphasis on morality and life philosophies, low cost, and its benefits to practitioners' health, and rapidly spread via word-of-mouth.[39] Its rapid growth within China was also related to family ties and community relationships.[39] Falun Gong attracted a wide range of adherents from all walks of life.[40]

Skeptics and critics emerge

Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and China's religious community. In 1996, concerned with Falun Gong's popularity, several Buddhist journals had labelled Falun Gong a "heretical sect" that was turning Buddhists away from the "orthodox religion."[35][41]

The rapid rise and influence of Falun Gong had received little journalistic attention, but by mid-1996, articles critical of Falun Gong began to appear. This was a sign that China’s media and ideological establishment were considering Falun Gong’s influence on society, according to communications professor Zhao Yuezhi.[25] On June 17, 1996, a week after Zhuan Falun, volume II, was listed as no.10 bestseller at a Beijing book market, the Guangming Daily, criticised Falun Gong.[42][43] The author wrote that the history of humanity is a "struggle between science and superstition," calling on Chinese publishers not to print "pseudo-scientific books of the swindlers."[42] The article cited Zhuan Falun as an example of the rising number of publications ridden with "feudal superstition" (fengjian mixin) and "pseudoscience" (wei kexue).[4]: 215  After the Guangming Daily article had set off a wave of press criticism, with twenty major newspapers also issuing criticisms of Falun Gong, the Central Propaganda Department banned publication of Falun Gong books on July 24.[42]

Until this juncture, Falun Gong had successfully negotiated the space between science and native tradition in the public representation of its teachings, avoiding any suggestion of superstition.[44] Thousands of Falun Gong followers wrote to Guangming Daily and to the CQRS to complain against the measures, claiming that they violated Hu Yaobang's 1982 'Triple No' directive.[42] Li emphasised that activism to defend Falun Gong was an essential aspect of Dafa cultivation, and, according to David Palmer, adjunct professor of anthropology and religious studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, "would separate the false disciples from the true ones."[42]

Falun Gong practitioners were not the only victims of the state media's symbolic violence, nor the only group to protest, but theirs was the most mobilised and steadfast response.[25] Many of the attempts for positive, or non-negative portrayal, were successful, resulting in the retraction of several newspaper stories critical of Falun Gong. Falun Gong books remained officially proscribed, however.

In June 1998, Tianjin professor He Zuoxiu appeared on a Beijing Television talk show, and openly disparaged qigong groups, making particular mention of Falun Gong.[45] The lobbying from practitioners led to the reporter responsible being fired, and a program broadcasting content favourable to Falun Gong aired a few days later.[4]: 215 [46] According to Ownby, the protest at the TV station was "an act of considerable audacity."[47] The demonstrations happened 14 other media outlets.[4]: 215  The Beijing Television incident resulted in directives from authorities to cease publishing any content critical of Falun Gong to "ensure stability" in the lead-up to the ten-year anniversary of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.[45]

Tianjin and Zhongnanhai protests

In April 1999, He Zuoxiu published a short editorial in Tianjin Normal University's Youth Reader magazine. Elaborating on what he had said months earlier on Beijing Television, he again launched into attacks on qigong groups that purport to give people supernatural powers and heal disease.[48] He said that he was particularly opposed to qigong practice amongst youth, saying that qigong-related trance and delusions could affect students for a lifetime, and made special mention of a case where a student of his practiced Falun Gong and refused to "talk, eat, sleep, or drink" as a result. He compared Falun Gong practitioners to the ignorant and superstitious Boxers.[48] Falun Gong practitioners claimed the cases that He cited as evidence of the dangers of Falun Gong erroneous[49] or otherwise "highly offensive."[50] He's article marked the beginning of a "dramatic public struggle" between Falun Gong practitioners and the Chinese government over the legitimacy of Falun Gong, but because the Falun Gong had no access to mass media, practitioners resorted to other symbolic forms to appeal to officials and the public.[51]

After the article was published practitioners gathered to protest in meditation posture outside the editorial office of the publication in Tianjin,[50] and sent petitions and appeals to the Tianjin party headquarters and municipal government for the retraction of He's piece. According to Falun Gong sources, the magazine editors initially agreed to publish a "correction," but then changed their attitude and refused to do so.[50] Within days those gathered had swelled to the thousands. Three hundred riot police were sent to disperse the crowd, some of the practitioners were beaten, and forty-five arrested.[14][50][52] Hundreds then marched to the munipical government to demand their liberation.[14][50] For Palmer, the Tianjin protest was another sign of Falun Gong's "militancy"; for Gutmann, it was because "refuting lies" is a central part of Falun Gong's moral system.[53] They were told that the police action had been carried out on orders from the Ministry of Public Security,[50] and that those arrested could only be released with the approval of Beijing authorities.[52][54]

On 25 April, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near Zhongnanhai, the residence compound of China's leaders, in silent protest. It was Falun Gong practitioners' attempt to seek redress from the leadership of the country by going to them and, "albeit very quietly and politely, making it clear that they would not be treated so shabbily."[5] Many Falun Gong practitioners were party members, who openly lobbied for the group. While Falun Gong's pre-1999 political involvement is difficult to verify, no other disenfranchised group has ever staged a mass protest near the Zhongnanhai compound in PRC history. The incident raised questions about the Party's control over the country.[55]

A World Journal report suggested that certain high-level Party officials wanted to crack down on the practice for years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai, which they claim was partly orchestrated by Luo Gan, a long-time opponent of Falun Gong.[56] There were also reportedly rifts in the Politburo at the time of the incident. Some reports indicate that Premier Zhu Rongji met with Falun Gong representatives and gave them satisfactory answers, but was criticized by General Secretary and President Jiang Zemin for being "too soft."[14] Jiang is held by Falun Gong to be personally responsible for the final decision:[57][58] Peerman cited reasons such as suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi;[57] Saich postulates at party leaders' anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle.[58]

The ban

On 20 July 1999, the Chinese government declared the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control to be outlawed for having been "engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability."[59] Xinhua further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political group "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, [that] preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition."[60] Xinhua also affirmed that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve."[61]

In response, Li Hongzhi declared that Falun Gong did not have any particular organization, nor any political objectives.[62]

Yuezhi Zhao argues that a number of factors contributed to the souring of relations between Falun Gong and the Chinese state and media.[25] These included infighting between China’s qigong establishment and Falun Gong, speculation over blackmailing and lobbying by Li’s qigong opponents and "scientists-cum-ideologues with political motives and affiliations with competing central Party leaders," which caused the shift in the state’s position, and the struggles from mid-1996 to mid-1999 between Falun Gong, the mainstream media, and the Chinese power elite over the status and treatment of the movement.[25] While Falun Gong had some elite support, it was fundamentally at odds with official ideology, and there were individuals within the scientific, ideological, and political establishments predisposed to attacking Falun Gong in the media.[25]

Statewide suppression

Main article: Persecution of Falun Gong

In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively.[63] Leung remarked that the effort was driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet.[63] According to Johnson, the campaign against Falun Gong extended to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces.[16] An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created to "oversee the terror campaign."[63][64][65]

Within the first month of the crackdown, 300-400 articles attacking Falun Gong appeared in each of the main state-run papers, while primetime television replayed alleged exposés on the group, with no divergent views aired in the media.[66] Human Rights Watch (2002) noted that families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government's position on Falun Gong, while practitioners themselves were subject to severe coercive measures to have them recant.[67] Falun Gong practitioners were among those most harshly persecuted by the Chinese government in 2008, according to Amnesty International.[68]

According to Human Rights Watch, China's leaders and ruling elite were far from unified in their support for the crackdown;[67] though James Tong suggests there was no real resistance from the Politburo. In February 2001, in an attempt to show unity, the Communist Party held a Central Work Conference and discussed Falun Gong.[67] President and party head Jiang Zemin insisted that all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee "testify" on the need to eradicate Falun Gong in front of some 2,000 party cadres. Under Jiang's leadership, the crackdown on Falun Gong became part of the Chinese political ethos of "upholding stability" - much the same rhetoric employed by the party during Tiananmen in 1989. Jiang's message was echoed at the 2001 National People's Congress, where Premier Zhu Rongji made special mention of Falun Gong in his outline of China's tenth five-year plan, saying "we must continue our campaign against the Falun Gong cult," effectively tying Falun Gong's eradication to China's economic progress.[67]

Media campaign

Since October 1999, three months after the Chinese government banned Falun Gong, it has repeatedly classified the movement as a xiejiao, (translated as 'evil religion' or 'evil cult')[69][70][71] and anti-Falun Gong propaganda activities dominated the Chinese media during that time as the government justifed its actions, arguing that Falun Gong practice was dangerous, and damages people's physical and mental health[72] like the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo.[72] This strategy was vital in the government’s logic, because such reference to cults was supposed to justify the government's actions.[73] According to China scholars Daniel Wright and Joseph Fewsmith, for several months after Falun Gong was outlawed, China Central Television's evening news contained little but anti-Falun Gong rhetoric in which academics, former followers, and ordinary citizens spoke about how "the cult" cheats its followers, separates families, damages health, and hurts social stability. The government operation was "a study in all-out demonization," they write.[74]

David Ownby and Ian Johnson have argued that the Chinese state gave the cultic appellation to Falun Gong by borrowing arguments from Margaret Singer and the West's anti-cult movement to blunt the appeal of Falun Gong.[16][43] According to John Powers and Meg Y. M. Lee, because the Falun Gong was categorized in the popular perception as an "apolitical, qigong exercise club," it was not seen as a threat to the government. The most critical strategy in the Falun Gong suppression campaign, therefore, was to convince people to reclassify the Falun Gong into a number of "negatively charged religious labels,"[73] like “evil cult,” “sect,” or “superstition.” The group’s non-violent and relatively silent protests were reclassified as creating “social disturbances.” In this process of reclassification and relabelling, the government was attempting to tap into a "deep reservoir of negative feelings related to the historical role of quasi-religious cults as a destabilising force in Chinese political history."[73]

Chinese media adopted three strands of rhetoric in attacking Falun Gong.[75] The first adopted the language of past "anti" campaigns to argue that Falun Gong was a threat to order; the second adopted a rhetoric of science and modernity to argue that Falun Gong threatened progress; and a third used anti-Western rhetoric to argue that Li was a "dupe of the West." It was a "multipronged attack designed to appeal to a broad cross-section of Chinese society," according to Frank.[75]

According to Lu Xing, associate professor of Communications at DePaul University, to simply label Falun Gong as "evil" was insufficient, because it only expressed opposition to Falun Gong without explaining why Falun Gong was "evil". State propaganda then used the appeal of scientific rationalism to argue that Falun Gong's worldview was in "complete opposition to science" and communism.[76][77] The People's Daily asserted on 27 July 1999, that it "was a struggle between theism and atheism, superstition and science, idealism and materialism." A polarized depiction was created where the scientific worldview was legitimized as "moral and truthful," while the Falun Gong discourse was "evil and deceptive."[77]

On the eve of Chinese New Year on 23 January 2001, seven people attempted to set themselves ablaze at Tiananmen Square. The official Chinese press agency, Xinhua News Agency, and other state media asserted that the self-immolators were practitioners while the Falun Dafa Information Center disputed this,[78] on the grounds that the movement's teachings explicitly forbid suicide and killing,[79] and further alleged that the event itself never happened, and was a cruel but clever piece of stunt-work.[80] The incident received international news coverage, and video footage of the burnings were broadcast later inside China by China Central Television (CCTV). Images of a 12 year old girl, Liu Siying, burning and interviews with the other participants in which they stated their belief that self-immolation would lead them to paradise were shown.[81][78] Falun Gong-related commentators pointed out that the main participants' account of the incident and other aspects of the participants' behaviour were inconsistent with the teachings of Falun Dafa.[82] Time reported that prior to the self-immolation incident, many Chinese had felt that Falun Gong posed no real threat, and that the state's crackdown had gone too far. After the event, however, China's media campaign against Falun Gong gained significant traction.[83]

Conversion program

According to James Tong, Professor of Political Science at the University of California and Chief Editor of the journal Chinese Law and Government, the regime aimed at both coercive dissolution of the Falun Gong denomination and reform and rehabilitation of the practitioners.[84] By 2000 the Party upped its campaign by sentencing "recidivist" practitioners to "re-education through labor", in an effort to have them renounce their beliefs and "transform" their thoughts.[67] Terms were also arbitrarily extended by police, while some practitioners had ambiguous charges levied against them, such as "disrupting social order," "endangering national security," or "subverting the socialist system."[20] According to Bejesky, the majority of long-term Falun Gong detainees were processed administratively through this system instead of the criminal justice system.[20] Upon completion of their re-education sentences, those practitioners who refused to recant were then incarcerated in "legal education centers" set up by provincial authorities to "transform minds".

This was accomplished through four program initiatives: a mass campaign of electronic and print propaganda; intensive individualized reeducation; special programmes for true believers that emphasised "internal transformation" rather than "external conformity"; and for the still defiant, punitive and rehabilitative labor reform.[84] Human rights organizations condemned this treatment of Falun Gong practitioners, with Amnesty International declaring it politically motivated, and Human Rights Watch reporting that access to the camps was heavily restricted, while the practitioners were subject to a wide range of human rights violations, including forced labour and a wide array of physical abuses.[67]

A battery of propaganda techniques were applied, according to Tong, known in official parlance as "mobile and fixed-point propaganda," seminars, "on-the-spot education," "theory guidance," and special topic discussion, through which Falun Gong practitioners were organised to study the speeches of Jiang Zemin, central government documents, and articles in major newspapers.[85] Special propaganda troupes to repudiate Falun Gong were formed and sent to residential committees and Falun Gong practice sites.[85]

Much of the conversion program relied on Mao-style techniques of indoctrination and thought reform, where Falun Gong practioners were organized to view anti-Falun Gong television programs and enroll in Marxism and materialism study sessions.[86] Traditional Marxism and materalism were the core content of the sessions.[87]

Sima Nan, a critic of perceived cults and supernaturalism, rose to prominence during the time of conversion program, being featured in newspapers and sent to state companies across the country to lecture and "smoke out [Falun Gong] members."[88] He lectured provincial officials on the evils of superstition, and worked on a TV documentary on Falun Dafa. He was awarded a national "hero of atheism" award.[88]

Coercive measures

The government-sponsored image of the conversion process emphasises psychological persuasion and a variety of "soft-sell" techniques; this is the "ideal norm" in regime reports, according to Tong. Falun Gong reports, on the other hand, depict "disturbing and sinister" forms of coercion against practitioners who fail to renounce their beliefs.[89] 14,474 cases are classified by different methods of torture in Falun Gong sources, according to Tong. Among them are cases of severe beatings; psychological torment, included forcing victims to curse Li Hongzhi, to destroy his portrait and the Falun Gong publications, or force the individual to drink alcohol and to smoke, which are contrary to Falun Gong injunctions;[89] corporal punishment and forced intense, heavy-burden hard labor and stress positions; solitary confinement in squalid conditions;[89] "heat treatment" including burning and freezing; electric shocks delivered to sensitive parts of the body that may result in nausea, convulsions, or fainting;[89] "devastative" forced feeding; sticking bamboo strips into fingernails; deprivation of food, sleep, and use of toilet;[89] rape and gang rape; asphyxiation; and threat, extortion, and termination of employment and student status.[89]

Such coercive practices are seen as pervasive across the country, and condoned or promoted by the central authorities, according to those sources, Tong says.[89] The cases "appear verifiable, as the great majority of them identify (1) the individual Falungong practitioner, often with age, occupation, and domicile; (2) the time and location that the alleged abuse took place, including not only urban districts and rural townships and villages but also specific penal institutions; and (3) the names and ranks of the alleged perpetrators. Many of these reports include lists of the names of human witnesses and descriptions of physical injuries."[89] While Tong notes that it is clear that such behaviour was officially prohibited, the publication of "persistent abusive, often brutal behavior by named individuals with their official title, place, and time of torture" for six years years suggests that there is no official will to cease and desist such activities.[89]

Falun Gong response

Amnesty International states that despite the crackdown many Falun Gong practitioners continued to hold exercise sessions in public, usually as a form of peaceful, silent protest against the crackdown and imprisonment; they were often attended by large numbers of people, including significant numbers of elderly and women.[15] The Party declared the sessions to be "illegal assemblies;" practitioners or others who "spoke up" for the movement would be detained by officials, at the beginning for several days.[90] This method was later seen as inadequate, because upon release, practitioners would resume protest activities.[67] The authorities treated these practitioners as "recidivists" and saw them as particularly problematic.

Despite Beijing's heavy hand against practitioners, protests continued well into 2000. According to Time magazine, a Falun Gong website editorial instructed followers to "step up" demonstrations, "especially in Tiananmen Square". Founder Li Hongzhi urged followers to immobilize the police and other "evil scoundrels" through use of supernatural powers.[83] Tiananmen Square thus became one of the prime locations where practitioners routinely demonstrated despite government deterrence. By 25 April 2000, within one year after the demonstration at Zhongnanhai, a total of more than 30,000 practitioners were arrested there,[91] and seven hundred Falun Gong followers were arrested during a demonstration in the Square on 1 January 2001.[92]

According to the Chinese government, Falun Gong activists have launched attacks against Sinosat's satellite-broadcast and jammed television signals, replacing regular state television broadcasts with their own material.[93] For example, in March 2002, Liu Chengjun, a Falun Gong practitioner, managed to intercept eight cable television networks in Changchun City and Songyuan City, Jilin Province, and televised a program titled “Self-Immolation or a Staged Act?”. Liu was arrested and reportedly subjected to 21 months of torture that led directly to his death.[94]

Response outside China

Main article: Falun Gong outside mainland China

Template:Image stack Due to its ban in mainland China, Falun Gong practitioners have taken to their cause internationally, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Since the ban in China, Falun Gong has alleged that its practitioners in China were subject to arbitrary arrest and torture, and violated their freedom of religion.[20] Falun Gong related cases comprise 66% of all reported torture cases in China, according to the Special Rapporteur on torture,[95] and at least half of the labour camp population.[96] Amnesty International urged the government to "take seriously its commitment to prevent torture and take action immediately."[97][98] Amnesty has since reported that nearly 100 Falun Gong practitioners has died due to mistreatment in detention in 2008[99] The United Nations asked the Chinese government to respond to the various allegations by Falun Gong and human rights groups.[17]

Falun Gong practitioners in the United States routinely file cases in U.S. federal courts, and have filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century with crimes charged among the most severe according to international criminal law.[47][100]

Practitioners engage in promotional activities by handing out flyers in busy intersections, in the subway or at the mall, leaving Falun Gong literature in stores, libraries, laundries etc. Although some of the literature deal with Falun Gong's situation in China, other publications also include the Nine Commentaries of the Communist Party, a critical editorial of the Communist Party of China, which are distributed by practitioners in both DVD and book form. Falun Gong practitioners also join marches, parades, and celebrations of Chinese culture.[43] Response to these appeals has been mixed.[101][102]

Since 2006, a central part of the Falun Gong campaign focused on alleged organ harvesting from living practitioners. The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong commissioned Canadian parliamentarian David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas to investigate the allegations.[103] The Christian Science Monitor considered the evidence circumstantial, but persuasive, and criticized the Chinese government for a lack of openness in investigating the claims.[104] Likewise, U.N. special rapporteur Manfred Nowak, said the report "shows a coherent picture that causes concern."[105] In November 2008, the United Nations Committee Against Torture noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincided with “the beginning of the persecution of [Falun Gong practitioners]” and demanded an explanation. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied these allegations, saying that the report was based on "rumors and false allegations".[106] The United States Congressional Research Service report by Dr. Thomas Lum stated that the Kilgour-Matas report relied largely on logical inference without bringing forth new or independently-obtained testimony, and that the conclusions also rely heavily upon questionable evidence.[40] Human rights activist Harry Wu also voiced doubts about conclusions of the Kilgour-Matas report.[107] David Ownby, a noted expert on Falun Gong, said that he saw "no evidence proving [organ harvesting] is aimed particularly at Falun Gong practitioners."[108]

On 16 March 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives called for "an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners." House Resolution 605 argued that Chinese authorities have devoted extensive time and resources over the past decade distributing "false propaganda" worldwide, and expressed sympathy to persecuted Falun Gong practitioners and their families.[109][110]

Organisation

The precise nature of Falun Gong's organization has been a subject of some controversy. Chinese authorities portray Falun Gong as a tight, well-structured and well-funded organization, able to mobilize millions of practitioners.[111] Falun Gong denies having an organizational structure, and maintains that it is merely a spiritual group that practices a brand of qigong.[112] It eschews the term 'membership' and doesn't keep figures. As a result, estimates vary over the number of people practicing Falun Gong. Before the ban, the government estimated 70 million, and later revised the figure to 2 million.[113]

Inside China

After its withdrawal from the Scientific Qigong Association in 1994, the Falun Dafa Research Society (FDRS) applied to a number of government agencies, and was rejected by all of them.[114] Unable to operate within a state-sponsored framework, Falun Gong pursued a more decentralized and loose organizational structure from 1997, according to Porter.

The Chinese government, in post-crackdown reports, claimed that Falun Gong was a highly organized group with 39 "main stations", 1,900 "guidance stations", and 28,263 practice sites nation-wide, overseeing a total of 2.1 million practitioners nationwide.[115] Time also described Falun Gong as "hierarchically structured, with neighborhood groups, like cells, acting autonomously but in contact with higher levels." Teachings were meant to be propagated through tapes and essays, which followers studied, and no one was permitted to interpret or question the master's words.[83] Anthropologist Noah Porter writes that Falun Gong's structure in China was not hierarchical, and that it was able to grow in a restrictive society like the PRC because of its relatively small size and flexible communication methods.[116]

Finances

Opinions differ on whether or not Li made money from the practice in China, and if so, how much. Dai Qing (2000) states that by 1997, Li was receiving annual income in excess of ¥10 million,[4] even arguing that "Li's income is more legitimate than those of corrupt government officials."[117] Others dispute the theory that Li made any serious money from Falun Gong. Ian Johnson links the claim with the government’s campaign to portray Falun Gong as a highly organised group, or a cult, and rejects both, since “during the most dynamic period of the group's existence in China the books and videos were bootleg, so he hadn't received royalties.” [16]

Outside China

Falun Gong practitioners have set up international media organizations to promote their cause and criticize the Communist Party of China. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, NTDTV, Sound of Hope radio station,[118] and Epoch Press Inc.[119] Maria H. Chang of the University of Nevada, says these organisations seem to be "[treated as] front organisations to influence public opinion via a concerted information-PR-propaganda campaign". She argues that, like the Chinese state, Falun Gong has to create organisations that are publicly unaffiliated with it for the organization to survive.[118]

While Chinese media have attacked Falun Gong since 1999, Falun Gong's response through its various media organizations has earned the group some degree of positive PR in the West. Explaining the genesis of Epoch Times, Ownby said that practitioners have become "somewhat paranoid" of being ill-treated by journalists during the last decade, "so they decided to publish a newspaper by themselves to publicize their beliefs..."[120] Heather Kavan, a communications professor in New Zealand, sees similarities between the media strategies of Falun Gong practitioners and those of the Chinese Communist Party: common traits are alleged to include intolerance of criticism, blanket denials when accused, exaggerating and sensationalizing claims, and deflecting blame by charging the other of the same offence.[121]

Patricia Thornton sees Falun Gong as an oppressed group whose bid to gain transnational support for its cause has sometimes backfired, leading to greater scrutiny of the affairs of participants and their public relations tactics. Generally, while new digital media have allowed repressed groups more access to international audiences, at the same time it has made their organization and beliefs more vulnerable to public exposure.[122]

Informal networks called "Falun Dafa Associations" exist around the world, of which the Canadian and American chapters are the most prominent. Practice points are also staffed at a number of universities. Falun Gong has also established university chapters in the United States.[123] Falun Gong practitioners also have considerable presence on the Internet,[61] with websites such as clearwisdom.net, faluninfo.net, mingui, pureinsight that publish Li's teachings and testimonials about the persecution in China.[64] Falun Gong practitioners have also set up groups like CIPFG, Falun Dafa Information Center, and "World Organisation to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong," which publish reports and attempt to deliver their message to Western media, governments, and NGOs.[15][90]

Public debate

Zhao (2003) sees Falun Gong as a profound challenge to China's dominant "meaning system" for Falun Gong's insistence on the public nature of the practice, the imperative to gain positive representation and to make known their dissent.[25]

Categorisation

There is some degree of scholarly debate about how Falun Gong should be categorised, whether as a qigong practice, a spiritual discipline, a New Religious Movement, or a "cult," as it was termed by the Chinese government.

Different contexts may lead to different forms of categorisation. Adam Frank identifies five generalizable frames of discourse surrounding Falun Gong: the Western media, the Chinese media, an emerging scholarly tradition, the discourse of human rights groups, and a sympathetic practice-based discourse.[124] Western journalists initially adopted what Frank regards as dubious historical referents, like the Taiping Rebellion and the Boxer Uprising to frame Falun Gong; the Chinese print media were "blanketed" with anti-Falun Gong propaganda; scholarly debate sought a place for the practice in a wider Chinese historical context without resorting to sensationalism; human rights groups took up a discourse of nonpractitioner opposition to Chinese government policy, focusing on legal mechanisms and specific cases; Falun Gong practitioners themselves attempted to emphasise the psycho-physiological foundation of their discipline, which is their basis for following Li Hongzhi's teachings and resisting state control.[125]

The Chinese Buddhist Association, concerned with Buddhist apostates taking up Falun Gong practice, were the first to term Falun Gong xiejiao in 1996. A direct translation of that term is "heretical teaching,"[15] but during the anti-Falun Gong propaganda campaign was rendered as "evil cult" in English. Western media initially adopted this language after the Chinese government's media reports,[124] but soon began using less loaded terms.[126]

Richard Madsen writes that like most qigong practices, Falun Gong may appear religious because it does not make a clear distinction between physical and spiritual healing.[127] Falun Dafa can be seen as part of a long tradition of Chinese folk Buddhism, he writes, which often had a millenarian element that "this world was hopelessly corrupt and would come to an end."[127]

Cheris Shun-ching Chan consider cults to be new religious movements that focus on the individual experience of the encounter with the sacred rather than collective worship, and writes that Falun Gong is neither a cult nor a sect, but a new religious movement with cult-like characteristics.[69] Some scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use"[128][129] These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement,"new religious syncretism" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions.[124][130]

Harvey Hill et al conclude in a study of media reporting on new religious groups that the most influential reporting on religion fails the standards of an "evenhanded, non-judgmental and fair approach," at least in the language used to describe such groups.[131] Since Falun Gong seems highly unlikely to commit acts of violence, and while the agent of violence has been the Chinese government, they write that "the characterization particularly of Falun Gong as "cult" would seem inaccurate and unjust." They attribute the reason for the adoption of such terms to uncritical acceptance of the views of the Chinese government by the media, an acceptance that is "rife with irony." Such negative portrayal of new religious movements is unfair and dangerous, they write, adding that "it would be preferable to use terms less likely to reinforce mutual mistrust and more conducive to real understanding."[132]

Controversies

Falun Gong's teachings are controversial,[133][134] and have been described as being homophobic,[133] pseudoscientific,[135] messianistic,[136] moralistic, and apocalyptic.[121][136][137] A Falun Gong practitioner said these views were held by "people who don’t understand Falun Gong and the propaganda from the Chinese government."[133]

David Ownby writes that interpreting Li Hongzhi's teachings presents numerous challenges because many of the things he says appear "somewhat puzzling." Startling assertions found in Li's writings, according to Ownby, include that there is a "small fluorescent screen like a television" positioned in the forehead that permits the initiated to possess the power of total recall; that animals can possess human beings in order to exploit humans' greater spiritual and supernormal capacities; and that the spiritual salvation of children of interracial marriages is problematic because, in the afterlife, the paradises are divided by race.[138]

Opinions among scholars differ as to whether Falun Gong contains an apocalyptic message, and if so what the consequences of that are. Li maintains that mankind has been destroyed 81 times, and, according to some interpretations, that another round of destruction may be imminent. At least one follower suggested there would be "some sudden change that will be good for good people, but bad for bad people."[139] In Heather Kavan's opinion, Falun Gong members don't leave the group because they believe that it's the only way to save themselves.[121] Richard Gunde, Assistant Director of the Center for Chinese Studies at UCLA, argues that Falun Gong is unlike western cults that fixate on death and Armageddon, but merely promises its followers a long and healthy life. "Falun Gong has a simple, innocuous ethical message," Gunde says, "and its leader, Li Hongzhi, despite his unusual, if not bizarre, statements, is in many ways simple and low key."[140] At the local level Li's fantastic claims seem to be of little theological importance, since Falun Gong practice does not require unquestioning acceptance of all of Li's teachings, and there is no overt emphasis on dogmatically enforcing orthodoxy, according to Craig Burgdoff.[27]

Adam Frank writes that in reporting on the Falun Gong, the Western tradition of casting the Chinese as "exotic" took dominance, and that "the facts were generally correct, but the normalcy that millions of Chinese practitioners associated with the practice had all but disappeared."[141] Sinologist Benjamin Penny sees Falun Gong's apparent last days message as largely innocuous, with Buddhist roots,[2] and suggests "the fact that [Falun Gong beliefs] are often difficult for Westerners to understand should not be any reason to relegate them to the anomalous or quirky or kooky."[36]

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Further reading

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