Talk:Falun Gong

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In relation to qigong and its roots in Chinese culture

In 1992, Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong and along with teachings that touched upon a wide range of topics, from detailed exposition on qigong related phenomenon and cultivation practice to science and morality. In the next few years, Falun Gong quickly grew in popularity across China to become the most popular qigong practice in Chinese History. Falun Gong was welcomed into the state-controlled Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped to organize many of his activities between 1992 and 1994, including 54 large-scale lectures. In 1992 and 1993 he won government awards at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos, including the "Qigong Master most acclaimed by the Masses" and "The Award for Advancing Boundary Science."

According to academics, Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, not religion. The debate between what can be called "naturalist" and "supernaturalist" schools of qigong theory has produced a considerable amount of literature. Xu Jian stated in The Journal of Asian Studies 58 (4 November 1999): "Situated both in scientific researches on qigong and in the prevailing nationalistic revival of traditional beliefs and values, this discursive struggle has articulated itself as an intellectual debate and enlisted on both sides a host of well-known writers and scientists — so much so that a veritable corpus of literature on qigong resulted. In it, two conflicting discourses became identifiable. Taking “discourse” in its contemporary sense as referring to forms of representation that generate specific cultural and historical fields of meaning, we can describe one such discourse as rational and scientific and the other as psychosomatic and metaphysical. Each strives to establish its own order of power and knowledge, its own “truth” about the “reality” of qigong, although they differ drastically in their explanation of many of its phenomena. The controversy centers on the question of whether and how qigong can induce “supranormal abilities” (teyi gongneng). The psychosomatic discourse emphasizes the inexplicable power of qigong and relishes its super-normal mechanisms or which causative factors which go beyond wht canbe explained by presentday scietific models, whereas the rational discourse strives to demystify many of its phenomena and to situate it strictly in the knowledge present day modern science." The Chinese government has generally tried to encourage qigong as a science and discourage religious or supernatural elements. However, the category of science in China tends to include things that are generally not considered scientific in the West, including qigong and traditional Chinese medicine.

David Aikman has written in American Spectator (March 2000): "Americans may believe that qigong belongs in a general category of socially neutral, New Age-style concepts that are merely subjective, not necessarily harmful, and incapable of scientific proof. But China's scientific community doesn't share this view. Experiments under controlled conditions established by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration. Qi, according to much of China's scientific establishment, for all intents existed."

Li Hongzhi states in Falun Buddha Fa Lectures in Europe:

"Since the time Dafa was made public, I have unveiled some inexplicable phenomena in qigong as well as things that hadn’t been explained in the qigong community. But this isn’t the reason why so many people are studying Dafa. It’s because our Fa can truly enable people to Consummate, truly save people, and allow you to truly ascend to high levels in the process of cultivation. Whether it’s your realm of mind or the physical quality of your body, the Fa truly enables you to reach the standards of different levels. It absolutely can assume this role."

Andrew P. Kipnis is quoted as stating: "...to the Western layperson, qigong of all sorts may seem to be religious because it deals with spiritual matters. Because Li Hongzhi makes use of many concepts from Buddhism and Taoism in his writings, this may make Falun Gong seem even more like a religion to the outsider; bur Falun Gong grew initially into a space termed scientific [in China], but was mostly insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries"

The term 'qigong' was coined in the early 1950s as an alternative label to past spiritual disciplines rooted Buddhism or Taoism, that promoted the belief in the supernatural, immortality and pursuit of spiritual transcendence. The new term was constructed to avoid danger of association with ancient spiritual practices which were labeled "superstitious" and persecuted during the Maoist era. In Communist China, where spirituality and religion are looked-down upon, the concept was "tolerated" because it carried with it no overt religious or spiritual elements; and millions flocked to it during China's spiritual vacuum of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars argue that the immense popularity of qigong in China could, in part, lie in the fact that the public saw in it a way to improve and maintain health. According to Ownby, this rapidly became a social phenomenon of considerable importance.

Membership and finances

Sociologist Susan Palmer writes that, "...Falun Gong does not behave like other new religions. For one thing, its organization - if one can even call it that - is quite nebulous. There are no church buildings, rented spaces, no priests or administrators. At first I assumed this was defensive [...] now, I'm beginning to think that what you see is exactly what you get - Master Li's teachings on the Net on the one hand and a global network of practitioners on the other. Traveling through North America, all I dug up was a handful of volunteer contact persons. The local membership (they vehemently reject that word) is whoever happens to show up at the park on a particular Saturday morning to do qigong."

Finances

In his thesis, Noah Porter takes up the issue of Falun Gong and finance in Mainland China. He quotes and responds to some of the allegations of the Chinese Communist Party that Li benefited financially from teaching the practice. Porter writes that when teaching seminars, there was an admission of 40 yuan per new practitioner and 20 yuan for repeat practitioners--with the repeat practitioners making up for 50-75% of the admissions. He goes on to say with respect to the CCP's claims: "...but the Chinese government figures for the profits of the seminars counted all attendees as paying the 40-yuan fee charged to newcomers. Also, the Chinese Qigong Research Society received 40% of admission receipts from July 1993 to September 1994. Falun Gong's first four training seminars took in a total of 20,000 yuan, which is only 10% of the 200,000 figure cited by the Chinese government. Finally, from that 20,000 yuan, they had several operating expenses..."

Ian Johnson points out that during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg.

James Tong writes about the competing claims by Falun Gong and the Chinese government in 'The China Quarterly' journal, 2003. He writes that the government has attempted to portray Falun Gong as being financially savvy with a centralized administration system and a variety of mechanisms for deriving profit from the practice. He also looks over Falun Gong's claims of having no hierarchy, administration, membership or financial accounts, and that seminar admission was charged at a minimal rate. Tong writes that it was in the government's interest, in the post-crackdown context, to portray Falun Gong as being highly organised: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was." He writes that the government's charges that Falun Gong made excessive profits, charged exorbitant fees, and that Li Hongzhi led a lavish lifestyle "...lack both internal and external substantiating evidence" and points out that that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities "had disclosed no financial accounts that established the official charge and credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals."

Li Hongzhi stipulates in his books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun that practitioners should only voluntarily help others learn the exercises and that this could never be done for fame and money, and also stipulates that practitioners must not accept any fee, donation or gift in return for their voluntarily teaching the practice. According to Falun Gong, Li's insistence that the practice be offered free of charge caused a rift with the China Qigong Research Society, the state administrative body under which Falun Dafa was initially introduced. Li subsequently withdrew from the organization.

Falun Gong website often state on their pages that "All Falun Gong Activities Are Free of Charge and Run by Volunteers"

In an interview in Sydney on May 2, 1999, mentioning his financial status, Li said : "In mainland China I published so many books, but added together, they haven't exceeded twenty thousand Renminbi (equivalent to US $ 2,469). This is what the publishing company gave me. When publishing books in other countries of the world, you know there is a rule, which pays 5 or 6% royalties to the author, so each time I can only get a little bit, a few hundred, or a few thousand dollars."

Sources

It seems to me that, maybe, we have not paid a great deal of attention to some of the more recent works on this subject. Revenge of the Forbidden City was a fairly well received book a few years ago about the Chinese reaction to FG, and the more recent Cultural Economy of Falun Gong, which has only been out a month or two and hasn't yet gotten a lot of reviews, is probably also very useful. Also, I note that Ownby and Palmer have both written and helped collect some articles for publication in Nova Religio, which seems to be the journal which has been selected for the publication of writings on the subject of FG as a movement in general. They would certainly be reasonable to be included. I can't e-mail books to anyone, but, if they were to want any articles, including the Nova Religio articles, and can't get them, I could e-mail those articles out. John Carter (talk) 21:11, 12 August 2011 (UTC)

I believe a few of these are already found in the article, including some Nova Religio pieces. Correct me if I'm wrong. Revenge of the Forbidden City is cited at length in the section on the conversion campaign. Tong not being an expert on Falun Gong as a religion (except, perhaps, its organization), I suspect his research will be more useful on the persecution page. But I would suggest being aware of the limitations of his research, which ended in 2005 and relied overwhelmingly on primary source, official literature (and zero field work, it would seem, or even interviews with former detainees and the like). I have not read Xiao Ming's book, but if you happen to have a pdf, send it my way. In my last round of edits to this page, I made a pretty feable attempt to incorporate some of the more recent scholarly and journalistic literature, including Vivienne Shue's excellent contribution to State and Society in 21st Century China. It's a worthwhile endeavor, but on the other hand, I worry already (as previously expressed) than the page already contains more scholarly exegesis than is useful to an average reader, so it needs to be balanced against the needs of brevity and clarity.Homunculus (duihua) 00:52, 27 August 2011 (UTC)

He and Luo, two years later.

I see that the issue with He and Luo is still basically unresolved. Did we just run out of steam like every other instance and let it be? See: Talk:Falun_Gong/Archive_37#RFC_on_connections_between_Luo_and_He, and my arguments prior to my departure from Falun Gong articles: Talk:Falun_Gong/Archive_34#Gutmann_deletions.3F. Colipon+(Talk) 03:22, 15 September 2011 (UTC)

Rationale for my edit on the Controversies section

1) PCCP's statement about non-scholarly anti-cult activists like Rick Ross is undue weight next to the opinions of numerous credible scholars. 2) The references were also messed up and misplaced in his earlier edit. 3) He included material that was taken out of context, like Palmer's quote about the "absolute centralization" of money, organization, and healing. The quote was explaining that local practice sites are not allowed to take money; it's not about Falun Gong being tightly organized. 4) He added in Craig Smith's quote saying that Falun Gong believes mixed-race people are the "spawn" of the dharma-ending period. The primary sources (i.e. Falun Gong's teachings, the sole corpus of teachings that determines what Falun Gong "believes") do not include such allegations. ✔ Olaf Stephanos ✍ 07:29, 17 October 2011 (UTC)

I don't understand your edit (or at least the one part that I was paying attention to). On the one hand we have a reliable secondary source, the New York Times, in an article about Falun Gong saying that Li Hongzhi "said interracial children are the spawn of the Dharma Ending Period, a Buddhist phrase that refers to an era of moral degeneration. In an interview last year, he said each race has its own paradise, and he later told followers in Australia that, "The yellow people, the white people, and the black people have corresponding races in heaven." As a result, he said, interracial children have no place in heaven without his intervention." and on the other we have a Wikipedia editor talking about what primary sources say as the basis for the removal of the WP:V compliant material. Please could you explain how the removal of the material is consistemt with policy ? Thanks. Sean.hoyland - talk 07:41, 17 October 2011 (UTC)

I'm not trying to reject the idea of including what Li Hongzhi has said about the the mixed-race issue; I'm talking about the opinionated, inflammatory wording in that article. There are no reliable academic sources contesting the idea that Li Hongzhi's lectures are the sole criterion for determining what Falun Gong "teaches". In fact, many sources explicitly state just the opposite. In this case, the primary sources are in no way ambiguous nor can they be dismissed when we evaluate what has definitively been said. Using another source is just like playing Chinese whispers—the further we get from the source, the less likely we are able to preserve the original meaning without distortion.

This is perfectly consistent with Wikipedia policies and guidelines, including the verifiability of sources. "The accuracy of quoted material is paramount and the accuracy of quotations from living persons is especially sensitive. To ensure accuracy, the text of quoted material is best taken from (and cited to) the original source being quoted. If this is not possible, then the text may be taken from a reliable secondary source (ideally one that includes a citation to the original). No matter where you take the quoted text from, it is important to make clear the actual source of the text, as it appears in the article. Partisan secondary sources should be viewed with suspicion as they may misquote or quote out of context. In such cases, look for neutral corroboration from another source." [5] Craig Smith is very partisan; all his articles by this era had become propaganda pieces for the CCP, a fact we can easily corroborate by comparing them with scholarly accounts of Falun Gong. Given that his account is contentious (i.e. the "spawn" thing, and the idea that people of mixed race are doomed without Li's intervention), we should seek an additional source on it. And since no other sources make these same claims, it shouldn't be included.

Moreover, the idea is already touched upon in the Ian Johnson quote. If you think that more needs to be said about it, you should attempt to accurately present these beliefs by first checking them against Li Hongzhi's teachings, and then refer to credible scholars of Falun Gong for insight into how to understand them. ✔ Olaf Stephanos ✍ 08:22, 17 October 2011 (UTC)

Hundreds of people have written thousands of pages on Falungong, but that does not mean that everything they have said should be included in this article simply because their writing it is verifiable. In determining whether this particular quote should be included, we need to ask, first, if the quote attributed to a living person is accurate; second, if it is given due weight; third, if it is relevant.

The answer to the first question is disputed, and the most inflammatory elements of the NYT article are not properly attributed. On those grounds alone, I would be reluctant to include it. To the question of due weight, we currently have two quotes in this section (one from Smith, one from Johnson) that touch on this topic, but no response from Falungong, and no evidence that this is actually notable. Which brings me to the third point of relevance. I checked Ian Johnson and David Ownby’s writings to see if they say more on this subject of mixed races, and they do not. Both only allude to the issue in passing as an example of novel Falungong beliefs, but do not return to it. Ownby devotes a lengthy chapter to exploring Falungong’s teachings, but does not think that this one is sufficiently notable to warrant any further discussion. Furthermore, this section of the page is about controversies. Craig Smith was not reporting on a controversy caused by this teaching (if anything, it seems he may have been trying to manufacture one). Aside from the fact that Falungong’s views on mixed races are antiquated and idiosyncratic, there’s nothing notable here. The single reference by Ian Johnson is certainly enough on this topic.

There is a legitimate controversy that is not currently explored in the article, which is the question of Falungong’s teachings and impacts on health. Namely, the charge that it discourages conventional medical treatment. On this topic, quite a bit has been said—not only by Falungong and PRC sources, but more importantly by academic observers. I will work on drafting this section when time allows.

Regarding the David Palmer quote, I agree with Olaf’s assessment that it was quoted in the article to convey quite a different meaning than was intended. Palmer recognizes that Falungong is loosely organised, just as do Ownby, Tong, (Susan) Palmer and others, so his statement should not be used to present the impression of dissent on that particular issue. Information from that section of Palmer could be included in a discussion of Falungong funds, but his statements should be used to explain the issue, not dramatise it.—Zujine|talk 13:49, 20 October 2011 (UTC)

I noticed that an editor attempted to restore his preferred version of the page, ignoring edits that have been made in the interim, and disregarding the discussion process. In so doing, he reintroduced edits that do not seem to comport with WP:UNDUE or WP:BLP, deleted source content, and mangled some references. I restored to the last version of the page, and suggest that any potentially controversial edits be discussed on the talk page.Homunculus (duihua) 05:15, 21 October 2011 (UTC)